2010 september-basel-iii

Proposed Basel III Guidelines: A Credit Positive for Indian Banks

Contacts:

Vibha Batra [email protected]

+91-124-4545302

Karthik Srinivasan, [email protected]

+91-22-30470028 Puneet Maheshwari [email protected]

+91-124-4545348

Sumeet Gambhir [email protected]

+91-124-4545329

Manushree Saggar [email protected]

+91-124-4545316

The proposed Basel III guidelines seek to improve the ability of banks to withstand periods of economic and financial stress by prescribing more stringent capital and liquidity requirements for them. ICRA views the suggested capital requirement as a positive for banks as it raises the minimum core capital stipulation, introduces counter-cyclical measures, and enhances banks‟ ability to conserve core capital in the event of stress through a conservation capital buffer. The prescribed liquidity requirements, on the other hand, are aimed at bringing in uniformity in the liquidity standards followed by banks globally. This requirement, in ICRA‟s opinion, would help banks better manage pressures on liquidity in a stress scenario. The capital requirement as suggested by the proposed Basel III guidelines would necessitate Indian banks1 raising Rs. 600000 crore in external capital over next nine years, besides lowering their leveraging capacity. It is the public sector banks that would require most of this capital, given that they dominate the Indian banking sector. Further, a higher level of core capital could dilute the return on equity for banks. Nevertheless, Indian banks may still find it easier to make the transition to a stricter capital requirement regime than some of their international counterparts since the regulatory norms on capital adequacy in India are already more stringent, and also because most Indian banks have historically maintained their core and overall capital well in excess of the regulatory minimum. As for the liquidity requirement, the liquidity coverage ratio as suggested under the proposed Basel III guidelines does not allow for any mismatches while also introducing a uniform liquidity definition. Comparable current regulatory norms prescribed by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), on the other hand, permit some mismatches, within the outer limit of 28 days.

1 Except foreign banks

ICRA Comment

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ICRA Comment Proposed Basel III Guidelines: A Credit Positive for Indian Banks

ICRA Rating Services Page 2

Introduction The key elements of the proposed Basel III guidelines include the following:

1. Definition of capital made more stringent, capital buffers introduced and Loss absorptive capacity of Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital instrument of Internationally active banks proposed to be enhanced

2. Forward looking provisioning prescribed 3. Modifications made in counterparty credit risk weights 4. New parameter of leverage ratio introduced 5. Global liquidity standard prescribed

The Basel committee is expected to finalise the Basel III guidelines by December 2010, following which a six-year phase-in period beginning 2013 is likely to be prescribed. This note seeks to assess the impact of the proposed Basel III guidelines on Indian banks‟ capitalisation profile and their liquidity position till 2018. The impact of the suggested norms relating to forward looking provisioning and counterparty risk weights are not captured in this note, since for that more granular data would be required and these are not available currently in the public domain. The norms on “leverage ratio” and “net stable funding ratio” are also not discussed in this note as they are likely to be implemented not before 2019. Capital requirement: The new elements and their impact on Indian banks The proposed Basel III guidelines seek to enhance the minimum core capital (after stringent deductions), introduce a capital conservation buffer (with defined triggers), and prescribe a countercyclical buffer (to be built up in times of excessive credit growth at the national level). Changes in standard deductions The proposed Basel III guidelines suggest changes in the deductions made for the computation of the capital adequacy percentages. The key changes for Indian banks include the following: Table 1: Deductions from Capital—Proposed vs. Existing RBI Norms

Proposed Basel III Guideline

Existing RBI Norm Impact

Limit on deductions Deductions to be made only if deductibles exceed 15% of core capital at an aggregate level, or 10% at the individual item level

All deductibles to be deducted Positive

Deductions2 from Tier I

or Tier II All deductions from core capital

50% of the deductions from Tier I and 50% from Tier II (except DTA and intangible assets wherein 100% deduction is done from Tier I capital )

Negative

Treatment of significant investments in common shares of unconsolidated financial institutions

Any investment exceeding 10% of issued share capital to be counted as significant and therefore deducted

For investments up to: (i) 30%: 125% risk weight or risk weight as warranted by external rating

(ii)30-50%: 50% deduction from Tier I and 50% from Tier II

Negative

2 These typically include intangible assets and losses, Deferred Tax assets (DTA), Any gain on sale recognized

upfront on securitization of assets, Securitization exposure, Investment in financial subsidiaries and associates

etc.



While the proposal to make deductions “only if such deductibles exceed 15% of core capital” would provide some relief to Indian banks (since all such deductibles are currently reduced from the core capital), the stricter definition of “significant interest” and the suggested 100% deduction from the core capital (instead of 50% from Tier I and 50% from Tier II) could have a negative impact on the core capital of some banks. Capital conservation buffer The Basel committee suggests that a new buffer of 2.5% of risk weighted assets (over the minimum core capital requirement of 4.5%) be created by banks. Although the committee does not view the capital conservation buffer as a new minimum standard, considering the restrictions imposed on banks and also because of reputation issues, 7% is likely to become the new minimum capital requirement. The main purpose of the proposed capital buffer is two-fold:

1. It can be dipped into in times of stress to meet the minimum regulatory requirement on core capital. 2. Once accessed, certain triggers would get activated, conserving the internally generated capital. This

would happen as in this scenario, the bank would be restrained in using its earnings to make discretionary payouts (dividends, share buyback, and discretionary bonus, for instance).

The final contours of the norm on conservation of capital would be known by December 2010. However, the Basel committee may allow some distribution of earnings by the banks, which are in breach of the proposed capital conservation buffer. If a bank wants to make payments in excess of the amount that the norm on capital conservation allows, it would have the option of raising capital for such excess amount. This issue would be discussed with the bank‟s supervisor as part of the capital planning process. Table 2: Illustration on distributable Earnings in Various Scenarios

Actual conservation capital as percentage of required conservation capital

Maximum Permissible earnings that can be distributed in the subsequent financial year

< 25% 0%

25% - 50% 20%

50% - 75% 40%

75% - 100% 60%

>100% 100%

Countercyclical buffer The Basel committee has suggested that the countercyclical buffer, constituting of equity or fully loss absorbing capital, could be fixed by the national authorities concerned once a year and that the buffer could range from 0% to 2.5% of risk weighted assets, depending on changes in the credit-to-GDP ratio. The primary objective of having a countercyclical buffer is to protect the banking sector from system-wide risks arising out of excessive aggregate credit growth. This could be achieved through a pro-cyclical build up of the buffer in good times. Typically, excessive credit growth would lead to the requirement for building up higher countercyclical buffer; however, the requirement could reduce during periods of stress, thereby releasing capital for the absorption of losses or for protection of banks against the impact of potential problems. The key features of the buffer include the following:

Credit-GDP gap could be used as a reference point

Buffer to be set at the national level every year

Buffer to be calculated at the same frequency as the normal capital requirement

Banks could be given one year to comply with the additional capital requirement

Reduction in buffer could take effect immediately

Banks not meeting the norm could be restrained from distributing the earnings (in the same manner as in the case of the capital conservation buffer)



Enhancement in Loss Absorption capacity of capital of internationally active banks The Basel committee issued a consultative document in August 2010 to introduce a “write off clause” in all non-common Tier I and Tier II instruments issued by internationally active banks. The main features include the following:

Capital instruments to be written off on the occurrence of trigger event

In the event of write off, instrument holders could be compensated immediately in the form of common stock

The trigger event is the earlier of: o The decision to make a public injection of fund or support, without which the bank would

become non-viable ( as determined by National authority) o A decision that write-off is necessary to prevent the bank from becoming non-viable (as

determined by the National Authority)

The main purpose of the proposed contingent capital clause is to:

Ensure that holders of capital bear the loss in a stress scenario before public money is infused and are not its (public funds‟) beneficiaries; and

Reduce the possibility of public support for a bank under stress, as the bank‟s core capital base would get strengthened at the expense of non-core capital (Tier I and Tier II) holders.

Capital instruments with this clause are likely to increase the downside risk for potential investors; therefore the risk premium could go up. However, price discovery may not be easy as it could be difficult to assess the probability of conversion to equity or a principal write-down and the extent of loss after the event. Further considering the riskier nature of these instruments, there may be a wider notching in the credit rating of such instruments as compared to existing capital instruments. Additionally in case this „loss absorption clause‟ is adopted, a large number of instruments would get disqualified for inclusion under Tier I and Tier II capital. Therefore, Indian banks would need to mobilize capital for replacing this as well; the quantum of capital to be replaced could be large as total non common Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital of Indian bank is close to Rs. 200000 crore as on March 31, 2010 and large part of it is issued by internationally active banks. However, transition may be not be abrupt as these instruments would be phased out over 10 years starting 2013; their recognition would be capped at 90% in the first year and the percentage would drop by 10% each subsequent year. Comparison on Capital Requirement Overall, with the Basel III being implemented, the regulatory capital requirement for Indian banks could go up substantially in the long run (refer Table 3). Additionally within in capital, the proportion of the more expensive core capital could also increase. Moreover, capital requirements could undergo a change in various scenarios, thereby putting restriction on bank‟s ability to distribute earnings. Please refer to Annexure 2 for an Illustration on the same. Table 3: Regulatory Capital Adequacy Levels—Proposed vs. Existing RBI Norm

Proposed Basel III Norm

Existing RBI Norm

Common equity (after deductions) 4.5% 3.6% (9.2%)

Conservation buffer 2.5% Nil

Countercyclical buffer 0-2.5% Nil

Common equity + Conservation buffer + Countercyclical buffer 7-9.5% 3.6% (9.2%)

Tier I(including the buffer) 8.5-11% 6% (10%)

Total capital (including the buffers) 10.5-13% 9% (14.5%)

Source: Basel committee documents, RBI, Basel II disclosure of various banks; Figures in parenthesis pertain to aggregated capital adequacy of banks covering over 95% of the total banking assets as on March 31, 2010. Please refer Annexure 1 for details. Indian banks are subjected to more stringent capital adequacy requirements than their international

counterparts. For instance, the common equity requirement for Indian banks is 3.6% , as against the 2%

Innovative perpetual debt and perpetual non-cumulative preference share cannot exceed 40% of the 6% Tier I, thereby minimum core capital works out to be 60% of 6%, which is 3.6%



mentioned in the Basel document. At the same time, the total capital adequacy requirement for Indian banks is 9%, as against the 8% recommended under Basel II. Moreover, on an aggregate basis, the capital adequacy position of Indian banks is comfortable, and being so, they may not need substantial capital to meet the new norms. However, differences do exist among various banks. While most of the private sector banks and foreign banks have core capital in excess of 9%, that is not the case with some of the public sector banks, as Chart 1

3

brings out.

Once Basel III comes into force, some public sector banks are likely to fall short of the revised core capital adequacy requirement and would therefore depend on Government support to augment their core capital. In recent times, Government of India (GOI) support has come via non-core Tier I, but this form of support may change in favour of equity capital, especially for banks falling short on core capital. The expected growth in the risk weighted assets along with the requirement of more stringent capital adequacy norms would also require banks to mobilise additional capital. In a scenario of 20% annualised growth in risk-weighted assets and in internal capital generation, the volume of additional capital that would be required by the banking sector (excluding foreign banks) as a whole over the next nine years ending March 31, 2019 works out to be Rs. 600000 crore (over internal capital generation). Of this, the public sector banks would require 75-80% and private banks 20-25%. However, any variation in the assumed growth rate may lead to a change in the volume of capital required. Further, in case some non-common Tier I and Tier II capital instruments get disqualified for inclusion under regulatory capital, the requirement would go up. It could be a challenge to find the investors, with higher risk appetite, to subscribe to the capital requirement of Indian banks.

* IDBI‟s Common equity% increased to 6.1% from 4.4% as on March 31, 2010 after factoring in the RS 3119 crore

equity infusion by the GOI in August-2010



Impact on return on equity

0.00%2.00%4.00%6.00%8.00%

10.00%12.00%14.00%16.00%18.00%20.00%

6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 9.0% 9.5%

Re

turn

on

Co

re T

ier

1

Core Tier 1 Capital

Chart 3: Return on Core Tier 1 at various levels of Core Tier 1

As discussed, the minimum core Tier I capital requirement may increase to 7-9.5% (9.5% including countercyclical buffer at the maximum level) and the overall Tier I capital to 8.5-11% (depending on the countercyclical capital buffer level). This would impact the leveraging capital of banks and therefore their return on equity (ROE). For instance, a bank generating 18% ROE on a core capital of 6% would generate around 15% ROE (3 percentage points lower) in case it were to raise its core capital to 8%. As most private sector banks and foreign banks in India are very well capitalised, transition to Basel III may not impact their earnings much, but the upside potential associated with higher leveraging would decline. As for public sector banks, those with Core Tier I less than 7% would be negatively impacted. Further, as the countercyclical buffer has to be set annually by the RBI, this could introduce an element of variation in lending rates and/or the ROE of banks. Liquidity Table 4: Liquidity Ratio—Proposed vs. Existing RBI Norm

Proposed Basel III Existing RBI Norm

Liquidity Ratios Liquidity Coverage Ratio = Stock of high quality liquid assets/Net cash outflows over a 30-day time period >= 100%

Number of days

1 2-7 8-14 15-28

Maximum Permissible gap (as % of outflows)

5% 10% 15% 20%

Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) = Available amount of stable funding/Required amount of stable funding > =100%

No such norm



The net stable funding ratio (NSFR) is likely to be implemented from 2019. But implementation of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) from 2015 may necessitate banks to maintain additional liquidity since the LCR requirement is more stringent; also some assumptions on the rollover rates and the required liquidity for committed lines may be more stringent. However, considering the period of one month and the fact that most Indian banks have upgraded their technology platforms, the transition to LCR may not be a very difficult one.



Annexure 1: Capitalization Profile of Top Indian Banks as on March 31, 2010

Public Sector Banks (Amount in Rs. crore)

Core Tier-1 (net of

deductions)

Core Tier-1 (net of

deductions) %

Tier-1 (net of

deductions) %

Tier-2 (net of

deductions) %

CRAR %

GOI shareholding

%

Allahabad Bank 5,876 7.72% 8.12% 5.51% 13.62% 55.23%

Andhra Bank 4,221 7.81% 8.18% 5.75% 13.93% 51.55%

Bank of Baroda 13,157 8.43% 9.20% 5.16% 14.36% 53.81%

Bank of India (Consolidated) 12,230 7.51% 8.57% 4.43% 13.0% 64.47%

Bank of Maharashtra 2,069 5.61% 6.41% 6.37% 12.78% 76.77%

Canara Bank 12,030 7.99% 8.54% 4.89% 13.43% 73.17%

Central Bank of India 4,341 4.71% 6.83% 5.40% 12.23% 80.20%

Corporation Bank 5,724 8.19% 9.25% 6.12% 15.37% 57.17%

Dena Bank 2,202 7.33% 8.16% 4.61% 12.77% 51.19%

IDBI Bank 7,952 4.37% 6.35% 5.13% 11.48% 52.67%

Indian Bank 6,603 10.50% 11.13% 1.58% 12.71% 80.00%

Indian Overseas Bank 6,095 7.68% 8.67% 6.11% 14.78% 61.23%

Oriental Bank of Commerce 7,297 8.63% 9.28% 3.25% 12.54% 51.09%

Punjab National bank 15,207 8.04% 9.11% 5.04% 14.16% 57.80%

Punjab & Sind Bank 2,127 7.14% 7.68% 5.41% 13.10% 100.0%

State Bank of India - Group 75,295 8.60% 9.28% 4.21% 13.49% 59.41%

State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur 2,343 7.70% 8.35% 4.95% 13.30%

State Bank of Hyderabad 3,748 7.07% 8.64% 6.26% 14.90%

State Bank of Mysore 1,965 6.70% 7.59% 4.84% 12.42%

State Bank of Patiala 3,505 7.52% 8.16% 5.10% 13.26%

State Bank of Travancore 2,658 8.31% 9.24% 4.50% 13.74%

Syndicate Bank 5,206 7.17% 8.24% 4.46% 12.70% 66.47%

UCO Bank 3,482 4.90% 7.06% 6.16% 13.21% 63.59%

Union Bank 8,657 7.06% 7.91% 4.60% 12.51% 55.43%

United Bank 2,871 6.85% 8.16% 4.64% 12.80% 84.20%

Vijaya Bank 2,478 6.40% 7.69% 4.81% 12.50% 53.87%

Total - Public Sector Banks 205,119 7.66% 8.60% 4.75% 13.36%



Private Sector Banks (Amount in Rs. crore) Core Tier-1 (net of

deductions)

Core Tier-1 (net of

deductions) %

Tier-1 (net of

deductions) %

Tier-2 (net of

deductions) %

CRAR %

Axis Bank 15,369 10.89% 11.18% 4.62% 15.80%

Federal Bank 4,680 16.92% 16.92% 1.44% 18.36%

HDFC Bank 20,484 13.13% 13.26% 4.20% 17.44%

ICICI Group 43,106 12.12% 12.92% 6.23% 19.15%

Indusind 2,140 9.65% 9.65% 5.68% 15.33%

ING Vysya Bank 1,972 9.62% 10.11% 4.79% 14.91%

Jammu & Kashmir Bank 2,986 12.79% 12.79% 3.10% 15.89%

Kotak Group 7,490 17.31% 17.31% 1.97% 19.28%

South Indian Bank 1,412 12.42% 12.42% 2.97% 15.39%

Yes Bank 3,020 11.84% 12.85% 7.76% 20.61%

Total - Private Sector Banks 102,659 12.42% 12.88% 5.05% 17.93%

Foreign Banks (Amount in Rs. crore) Core Tier-1 (net of

deductions)

Core Tier-1 (net of

deductions) %

Tier-1 (net of

deductions) %

Tier-2 (net of

deductions) %

CRAR %

Barclays Bank4 4,665 16.62% 16.62% 0.46% 17.07%

Citibank - Group 15,607 17.29% 17.29% 0.57% 17.86%

Deutsche Bank5 4,171 16.50% 16.50% 0.71% 17.21%

HSBC Bank 9,144 16.63% 16.63% 1.40% 18.03%

RBS 1,722 6.72% 7.94% 4.56% 12.50%

Standard Chartered Bank 8,037 8.94% 8.94% 3.47% 12.41%

Total - Foreign Banks 43,346 13.80% 13.90% 1.87% 15.77%

All SCBs (Amount in Rs. crore) Core Tier-1 (net of

deductions)

Core Tier-1 (net of

deductions) %

Tier-1 (net of

deductions) %

Tier-2 (net of

deductions) %

CRAR %

351,124 9.19% 9.97% 4.58% 14.55%

4 Figures as on March 31, 2009

5 Figures as on December 31, 2009. Also, Core Tier-I and Tier-I are assumed to be same due to non-availability of data



Actual Regulatory Core Capital 8%

Capital Conservation Buffer 2.5%

Core Capital 4.5%

Normal Scenario

Countercylical Buffer 1%


Core Capital 4.5%

High credit growth scenario

Countercyclical Buffer 2.5%


Core Capital 4.5%

Higher credit growth scenario


Core Capital 4.5%

Stress situation, normal credit growth

Actual Regulatory

Core Capital 8%

Countercyclical Buffer 1.5%


Core Capital 4.5%

Stress situation , high credit growth continues

Actual Regulatory

Core Capital 6.5%

Actual Regulatory

Core Capital 8.5%

Actual

Regulatory Core Capital

5.5%

Annexure 2: An illustration on movement of capital requirement and triggers under various scenarios Regulatory Capital = Core Capital + Capital Conservation Buffer + Countercyclical buffer (if any)

Note: Figures in circles represent the minimum regulatory requirement

Complete release of

countercyclical buffer

Restriction on earning

distribution

continue (although

restrictions

are lower)

Introduction of


No restriction on earning

distribution

Part release of


Restriction on earning

distribution become

higher

Higher level of countercyclical buffer

Restriction on earning distribution

kicks in



Annexure3: Time lines (shading indicates transition periods) (All dates are as of 1 January)

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 As of 1 January2019

Leverage Ratio Supervisory monitoring

Parallel run 1 Jan 2013-I Jan 2015

Disclosure Starts 1 Jan 2015

Migration to Pillar 1

Minimum Common Equity Capital Ratio

3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5%


1.25% 1.875% 2.50%

Minimum common equity plus capital conservation buffer

3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.125%

5.75% 6.375% 7.0%

Phase-in of deductions from CET1 (including amounts exceeding the limit for DTAs, MSRs and financials)

20.0% 40.0% 60.0%

80.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Minimum Tier 1 Capital 4.5% 5.5% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0%

Minimum Total Capital 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0%

Minimum Total Capital plus conservation buffer

8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.625%

9.25% 9.875% 10.5%

Capital instruments that no longer qualify as non-core Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 capital

Phased out over 10 year horizon beginning 2013

Liquidity coverage ratio Observation period begins

Introduce minimum standard

Net stable funding ratio Observation period begins

Introduce minimum standard



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Economy & Finance

2010 september-basel-iii