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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132428. October 24, 2000]

GEORGE YAO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, George Yao (hereafter YAO) assails the 25 April 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16893 which dismissed

his appeal and ordered the remand of the records of the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Caloocan* City (hereafter MeTC) for execution. YAO was convicted by said MeTC for unfair competition.

YAO’s legal dilemma commenced in June 1990 when the Philippine Electrical Manufacturing Company (hereafter PEMCO) noticed the proliferation locally of General Electric (GE) lamp starters. As the only local subsidiary of GE-USA, PEMCO knew that

it was a highly unlikely market situation considering that no GE starter was locally manufactured or imported since 1983.PEMCO commissioned Gardsmarks, Inc. to

conduct a market survey. Gardsmarks, Inc., thru its trademark specialist, Martin Remandaman, discovered that thirty (30) commercial establishments sold GE starters. All these establishments pointed to Tradeway Commercial Corporation

(hereafter TCC) as their source. Remandaman was able to purchase from TCC fifty (50) pieces of fluorescent lamp starters with the GE logo and design. Assessing that these

products were counterfeit, PEMCO applied for the issuance of a search warrant. This was issued by the MeTC, Branch 49, Caloocan City. Eight boxes, each containing 15,630 starters, were thereafter seized from the TCC warehouse in Caloocan City.

Indicted before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City for unfair competition under

Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code were YAO, who was TCC’s President and General Manager, and Alfredo Roxas, a member of TCC’s Board of Directors. The

indictment[1] charged YAO and Roxas of having mutually and in conspiracy sold fluorescent lamp starters which have the General Electric (GE) logo, design and containers, making them appear as genuine GE fluorescent lamp starters; and inducing

the public to believe them as such, when they were in fact counterfeit. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-155713.

Both accused pleaded not guilty. At the trial, the prosecution presented evidence

tending to establish the foregoing narration of facts. Further, the State presented witnesses Atty. Hofilena of the Castillo Laman Tan and Pantaleon Law Offices who underwent a familiarization seminar from PEMCO in 1990 on how to distinguish a

genuine GE starter from a counterfeit, and Allan de la Cruz, PEMCO’s marketing manager. Both described a genuine GE starter as having “a stenciled silk-screen

printing which includes the GE logo... back to back around the starter, a drumlike glowbulb and a condenser/capacitor shaped like an M&M candy with the numbers .006." They then compared and examined random samples of the seized starters with

the genuine GE products.They concluded that the seized starters did not possess the full design complement of a GE original. They also observed that some of the seized

starters did not have capacitors or if they possessed capacitors, these were not shaped like M&M. Still others merely had sticker jackets with prints of the GE logo. Mr. de la Cruz added that only Hankuk Stars of Korea manufactured GE starters and if these

were imported by PEMCO, they would cost P7.00 each locally. As TCC’s starters cost P1.60 each, the witnesses agreed that the glaring differences in the packaging, design and costs indisputably proved that TCC’s GE starters were counterfeit.

The defense presented YAO as its lone witness. YAO admitted that as general manager, he has overall supervision of the daily operation of the company. As such, he

has the final word on the particular brands of products that TCC would purchase and in turn sold. He also admitted that TCC is not an accredited distributor of GE

starters. However, he disclaimed liability for the crime charged since (1) he had no knowledge or information that the GE starters supplied to TCC were fake; (2) he had not attended any seminar that helped him determine which TCC products were counterfeit;

(3) he had no participation in the manufacture, branding, stenciling of the GE names or logo in the starters; (4) TCC’s suppliers of the starters delivered the same already

branded and boxed; and (5) he only discussed with the suppliers matters regarding pricing and peak-volume items.

In its 13-page 20 October 1993 decision,[2] the MeTC acquitted Roxas but convicted YAO. In acquitting Roxas, the trial court declared that the prosecution failed to prove

that he was still one of the Board of Directors at the time the goods were seized. It anchored its conviction of YAO on the following: (1) YAO’s admission that he knew that

the starters were not part of GE’s line products when he applied with PEMCO for TCC’s accreditation as distributor; (2) the prosecution’s evidence (Exhibit G-7), a delivery receipt dated 25 May 1989 issued by Country Supplier Center, on which a TCC

personnel noted that the 2000 starters delivered were GE starters despite the statement therein that they were China starters; this fact gave rise to a presumption that the TCC

personnel knew of the anomaly and that YAO as general manager and overall supervisor knew and perpetrated the deception of the public; (3) the fact that no genuine GE starter could be sold from 1986 whether locally manufactured or imported

or at the very least in such large commercial quantity as those seized from TCC; and (4) presence of the elements of unfair competition.

The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

For the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, Alfredo Roxas, of

Unfair Competition under Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code ... i.e., to prove

that he was Chairman of the Board of the Tradeway Commercial Corporation on October 10, 1990, as well as to have him identified in open court during the trial, he

is acquitted of the same.

But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other accused, George Yao,

beyond reasonable doubt as principal under the said Article 189 (1) for Unfair

Competition, he is convicted of the same. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged/proven, and considering the provisions of the

Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and

twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and five (5)

months of prision correccional.

This case was prosecuted by the law offices of Castillo Laman Tan and Pantaleon for

... PEMCO ... Considering that no document was submitted by the private

complainant to show how the claim of P300,000 for consequential damages was

reached and/or computed, the court is not in a position to make a pronouncement on the whole amount. However, the offender, George Yao, is directed to pay PEMCO the

amount of P20,000 by way of consequential damages under Article 2202 of the New

Civil Code, and to pay the law offices of Castillo, Laman Tan and Pantaleon the amount of another P20,000.00 as PEMCO’s attorney’s fees under Article 2208 (11) of

the same.

This decision should have been promulgated in open court on July 28, 1993 but the promulgation was reset for August 31, 1993 in view of the absence of parties; it was

again re-set for today.

Promulgated this 20th day of October, 1993 in Kalookan City, Philippines. [3]

YAO filed a motion for reconsideration, which the MeTC denied in its order [4] of 7 March 1994.

YAO appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTC). The appeal was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-47255(94) and was assigned to Branch 121 of the court.

On 24 May 1994, Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of Branch 121 issued an order[5] directing the parties to file their respective memoranda.

On 4 July 1994 YAO filed his Appeal Memorandum.[6]

Without waiting for the Memorandum on Appeal of the prosecution, which was filed

only on 20 August 1994,[7] Judge Adoracion Angeles rendered on 27 July 1994 a one-page Decision[8]which affirmed in toto the MeTC decision. In so doing, she merely quoted the dispositive portion of the MeTC and stated that “[a]after going over the

evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court.”

YAO filed a motion for reconsideration[9] and assailed the decision as violative of

Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court.[10] In its order[11] of 28 September 1994, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration as devoid of merit and reiterated that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed on appeal unless for strong and cogent reasons.

On 4 October 1994, YAO appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal.[12]

The appealed case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 16893. In its Resolution[13] of

28 February 1995, the Court of Appeals granted YAO an extension of twenty (20) days from 10 February or until 12 March 1995 within which to file the Appellant’s Brief. However, on 25 April 1995 the Court of Appeals promulgated a

Resolution[14] declaring that “[t]he decision rendered on July 27, 1994 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, has long become final and executory” and ordering the records

of the case remanded to said court for the proper execution of judgment. The pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:

In Our resolution, dated February 28, 1995, accused-appellant was granted an

extension of twenty (20) days from February 10, 1995, or until March 12, 1995 within

which to file appellant’s brief.

To date, no appellant’s brief has been filed.

From the Manifestation, filed on March 24, 1995, by City Prosecutor Gabriel N. dela Cruz, Kalookan City, it would appear that:

x x x

2. George Yao received a copy of the RTC’s decision on August 16, 1994, and filed a motion for reconsideration on August 30, 1994. On October 3, 1994, George Yao

received a copy of the RTC’s order, dated September 28, 1994, denying his motion

for reconsideration.

3. On October 4, 1994, George Yao filed a notice of appeal by registered mail.

We will assume from the said Manifestation that the decision of the RTC and the order denying YAO’s motion for reconsideration were sent to and received by YAO’s

counsel.

Proceeding from said assumption, Yao had fifteen (15) days from August 16, 1994 to

elevate his case to this Court. On August 30, 1994, or fourteen (14) days thereafter,

Yao filed a motion for reconsideration. When he received the Order denying his aforesaid motion on October 3, 1994, he had one more day left to elevate his case to

this Court by the proper mode of appeal, which is by petition for review. Yao,

however, on October 4, 1994, filed a notice of appeal by registered mail informing the RTC that he is appealing his conviction to the Court of Appeals. By then, the fifteen

(15) day period had already elapsed.

That notwithstanding, the Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 121, transmitted to this Court the entire records of the case, thru a transmittal letter, dated October 13,

1994, and received by the Criminal Section of this Court on October 28, 1994. YAO’s

counsel, on February 20, 1995, filed with this Court, a motion for extension of period to file brief for accused-appellant which was granted in Our resolution mentioned in

the opening paragraph of this resolution.

Petitions for review shall be filed within the period to appeal. This period has already

elapsed even when Yao filed a notice of appeal by registered mail, with the RTC of Kalookan City. Worse, the notice of appeal is procedurally infirm.

YAO filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment contending that the 25 April 1995 resolution did not specifically dismiss the appeal, for which reason, there was

no judgment on which an entry of judgment could be issued. He also argued that the attendant procedural infirmities in the appeal, if any, were cured with the issuance of the 28 February 1995 resolution granting him twenty (20) days from 10 February 1995 or

until 12 March 1995 within which to file an appellant’s brief and in compliance thereto, consequently filed his appellant’s brief on 2 March 1995.[15]

In its Resolution[16] of 26 January 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the Urgent

Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment for lack of merit. It considered the 25 April 1995 resolution as having “in effect dismissed the appeal, [hence] the Entry of Judgment issued on May 26, 1995... was proper.”

In this petition for review on certiorari, YAO reiterates the arguments he raised in his

Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Judgment of the Court of Appeals, thus: (1) that the entry of judgment was improvidently issued in the absence of a final resolution

specifically dismissing the appeal; (2) the procedural infirmity in the appeal, if any, has been cured; and (3) the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying him (YAO) due process of law.

In support of his first argument, YAO cites Section 1, Rule 11 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, thus:

SEC. 1. Entry of Judgment. -- Unless a motion for reconsideration is filed or an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court, judgments and final resolutions of the Court of

Appeals shall be entered upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days after notice to

parties.

YAO claims that the 25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of Appeals was not a

judgment on his appeal nor was it “a final resolution” contemplated in the Internal Rules since it did not specifically dismiss his appeal. A fortiori, the entry of judgment was improvidently issued for lack of legal basis.

YAO also repeats his argument that any procedural infirmity in the appeal was

cured when the RTC gave due course to the appeal, elevated the records to the Court of Appeals which in turn issued on 13 December 1994 a notice to file his Appellant’s Brief and granted him until 12 March 1995 within which to file the appellant’s brief.

Finally, YAO asserts that he was denied due process considering that (1) none of the elements of unfair competition are present in this case; (2) he filed his appeal to the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period; and (3) notwithstanding his filing of a

notice of appeal (instead of a petition for review), it was a mere procedural lapse, a technicality which should not bar the determination of the case based on intrinsic

merits. YAO then invokes the plethora of jurisprudence wherein the Supreme Court “in

the exercise of equity jurisdiction decided to disregard technicalities”; “decided [the case] on merits and not on technicalities”; “found manifest in the petition strong

considerations of substantial justice necessitating the relaxing of the stringent application of technical rules,” or “heeded petitioner’s cry for justice because the basic

merits of the case warrant so, as where the petition embodies justifying circumstances”; discerned “not to sacrifice justice to technicality”; discovered that the application of “res judicata and estoppel by judgment amount to a denial of justice and or a bar to a vindication of a legitimate grievance.”[17]

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit. It maintains that although the 25 April 1995 resolution did

not specifically state that the appeal was being dismissed, the intent and import are clear and unequivocable. It asserts that the appeal was obviously dismissed because the RTC decision has long become final and executory. YAO failed to challenge the

RTC decision, within the reglementary period, by filing a petition for review of the same with the Court of appeals pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42 of the Rules of

Court. Instead, he filed an ordinary appeal by way of a notice of appeal. Hence, the period to file the correct procedural remedy had lapsed.

There is no dispute that YAO availed of the wrong procedural remedy in assailing the RTC decision. It is clear from the records that YAO received a copy of the adverse

RTC judgment on 16 August 1994. He has fifteen (15) days or until 31 August 1994 within which to file either a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review with the

Court of Appeals. Fourteen (14) days thereafter or on 30 August 1994, YAO opted to file a motion for reconsideration the pendency of which tolled the running of the period. He received a copy of the RTC’s order denying the motion for reconsideration on 3 October

1994. He had therefore, only one day left, 4 October 1994 as the last day, within which to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for review.[18] However, on said date, YAO filed

a notice of appeal. He palpably availed of the wrong mode of appeal. And since he never instituted the correct one, he lost it.

The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by

statute.[19] Since the right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process, it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.[20] Corollarily, its requirements must be strictly complied with.

That an appeal must be perfected in the manner and within the period fixed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional.[21] Non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal,[22] for it renders the decision sought to be appealed final and executory,[23] with the end result that no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision. [24]

In the light of these procedural precepts, YAO’s petition appears to be patently without merit and does not deserve a second look. Hence, the reasons he enumerated

to persuade this Court to grant his petition and reinstate his appeal are obviously frivolous if not downright trivial. They need not even be discussed here.

In the normal and natural course of events, we should dismiss the petition outright, if not for an important detail which augurs well for YAO and would grant him a reprieve

in his legal battle. The decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO palpably transgressed Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly

and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

x x x

Let us quote in full the RTC judgment:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 52, Kalookan City, in Crim. Case No. C-155713, the dispositive portion of which reads as

follows:

x x x

But because the prosecution proved the guilt of the other accused, George Yao;

beyond reasonable doubt as principal under the said Article 189 (1) for Unfair

Competition, he is convicted of the same. In the absence of any aggravating or

mitigating circumstances alleged/proven, and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to a minimum of four (4) months and

twenty-one (21) days of arresto mayor to a maximum of one (1) year and five (5)

months of prision correccional.

x x x

After going over the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb

the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court.

WHEREFORE, this Court affirms in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court

dated October 20, 1993.

SO ORDERED.

That is all there is to it.

We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which they were written and even if “there (was left) much to be desired in terms of

(their) clarity, coherence and comprehensibility” provided that they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were based,[25] as when they stated the legal

qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability;[26] or discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense that was

charged in the information, and accordingly rendered a verdict and imposed the

corresponding penalty;[27]or quoted the facts narrated in the prosecution’s memorandum but made their own findings and assessment of evidence, before finally agreeing with the prosecution’s evaluation of the case.[28]

We have also sanctioned the use of memorandum decisions,[29] a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of

Section 40, B.P. Blg. 129[30]on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. We have also declared that memorandum decisions comply with the constitutional mandate.[31]

In Francisco v. Permskul,[32] however, we laid down the conditions for the of validity of memorandum decisions, thus:

The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the

conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading

the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must

provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statementattached to the said decision. In other words, the

memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually

embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of

the decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on which it is based. The proximity at

least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has been

undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or

adoption will rectify its violation.

The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be

sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional

condition for the validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and easily determinable by

the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an

extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be

employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss

it.

x x x

Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set

forth both as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section

14 of the Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.

Tested against these standards, we find that the RTC decision at bar miserably

failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short of the constitutional injunction. The RTC decision is brief indeed, but it is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content

and trite in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done.Its inadequacy speaks for itself.

We cannot even consider or affirm said RTC decision as a memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the measures of validity laid down in Francisco v.

Permskul. It merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision without saying more. A decision or resolution, especially one resolving an appeal, should directly meet the issues for resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless.[33]

We therefore reiterate our admonition in Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[34] in that while we conceded that brevity in the writing of decisions is an admirable trait, it should not and cannot be substituted for substance; and again

in Francisco v. Permskul,[35] where we cautioned that expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the constitutional requirements.

This is not to discourage the lower courts to write abbreviated and concise

decisions, but never at the expense of scholarly analysis, and more significantly, of justice and fair play, lest the fears expressed by Justice Feria as the ponente in Romero v. Court of Appeals[36] come true, i.e., if an appellate court failed to provide the appeal

the attention it rightfully deserved, said court deprived the appellant of due process since he was not accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible

magistrate. This situation becomes more ominous in criminal cases, as in this case, where not only property rights are at stake but also the liberty if not the life of a human being.

Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution

is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play.[37] It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution.[38] The parties to a litigation

should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any

justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision

should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors

of the court for review by a higher tribunal.[39] More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the

processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the

purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must

ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision.[40]

Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the

Court of Appeals whose careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the Constitution.

Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with Section 14, Article VIII of

the Constitution, a decision, resolution or order which: contained no analysis of the evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions;

contained nothing more than a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties;[41] convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any legal authority or principle to support conclusions that the letter in question was libelous;[42] consisted merely of one

(1) paragraph with mostly sweeping generalizations and failed to support its conclusion of parricide;[43] consisted of five (5) pages, three (3) pages of which were quotations from

the labor arbiter’s decision including the dispositive portion and barely a page (two [2] short paragraphs of two [2] sentences each) of its own discussion or reasonings [44]; was merely based on the findings of another court sans transcript of stenographic

notes;[45] or failed to explain the factual and legal bases for the award of moral damages.[46]

In the same vein do we strike down as a nullity the RTC decision in question.

In sum, we agree with YAO that he was denied due process but not on the grounds

he ardently invoked but on the reasons already extensively discussed above. While he indeed resorted to the wrong mode of appeal and his right to appeal is statutory, it is still an essential part of the judicial system that courts should proceed with caution so as not

to deprive a party of the prerogative, but instead afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.[47]

In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, may be relaxed.[48] In other words, if strict adherence to the letter of the law would result in absurdity and manifest injustice [49] or where the

merit of a party’s cause is apparent and outweighs consideration of non-compliance with certain formal requirements,[50] procedural rules should definitely be liberally

construed. A party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities.[51] We therefore withhold legal approbation on the RTC decision at

bar for its palpable failure to comply with the constitutional and legal mandates thereby denying YAO of his day in court. We also remind all magistrates to heed the demand of

Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. It is their solemn and paramount duty to uphold the Constitution and the principles enshrined therein, lest they be lost in the nitty-gritty of their everyday judicial work.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition in this case is

GRANTED. The questioned 25 April 1995 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

No. 16893 is hereby SET ASIDE and the 27 July 1994 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Kalookan City rendered in its appellate jurisdiction is

NULLIFIED. The records are hereby remanded to said Regional Trial Court for further proceedings and for the rendition of judgment in accordance with the mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., on leave.

* Spelled Kalookan in the record of Crim. Case No. C-155713 of MeTC, Branch 52 and in Crim. Case No.

C-47255 (94) in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City.*

[1] Original Record (OR), 26.

[2] OR, 257-269; Rollo, 25-37. Per Judge Delfina Hernandez Santiago.

[3] OR, 268-269; Rollo, 36-37.

[4] OR, 317-318.

[5] OR, 307.

[6] Id., 308 et seq.

[7] Id., 323-366.

[8] Id., 322; Rollo, 38.

[9] OR, 368-370.

[10] Section 2 Rule 20 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Form and contents of judgment. - The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.

If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense,

whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon t he accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived.

In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did

not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party.

[11] OR, 379.

[12] Id., 380.

[13] Rollo, 47.

[14] Id. 40-42. Per Solano, A., J., with Benipayo, A., and Galvez, R., JJ., concurring.

[15] Rollo, 49-51.

[16] Per Galvez, R., J. , ponente, with Brawner, R., and Buzon, M., JJ., concurring.

[17] Rollo, 117-122.

[18] See Soco v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 449 [1996]; Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Corp. Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 602, 615 [1998].

[19] Aris, Phil. Inc. v. NLRC, 200 SCRA 246, 253 [1991].

[20] See Pedrosa v. Hill, 257 SCRA 373, 378 [1996], citing Bello v. Fernandez, 4 SCRA 138; Ortiz v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 708 [1998].

[21] See Almeda v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 587 [1998]. See also Asuncion v. NLRC 273 SCRA 498 [1997]; Mabuhay Development Industries v. NLRC, 288 SCRA 1 [1998]; Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. NLRC, 290 SCRA 408[1998].

[22] Laza v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 654 [1997]; Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. NLRC, id.

[23] Uy v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 343 [1998]; Mabuhay Development Industries v. NLRC, supra note 16; Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. NLRC, id.; Pascual v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 214 [1998].

[24] Id., id.

[25] See People v. Bongahoy, G.R. No. 124097, 17 June 1999.

[26] People v. Landicho, 258 SCRA 1, 26 [1996].

[27] People v. Sandiosa, 290 SCRA 92, 107 [1998].

[28] People v. Gastador, 305 SCRA 659, 670 [1999].

[29] In Francisco v. Permskul, 173 SCRA 324, 333 [1989], the Court described “[t]he distinctive features of

a memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, second, it incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision, order, or ruling under review. Most likely, the purpose is to affirm the decision, although it is not impossible that the approval of

the findings of facts by the lower court may lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher court. At any rate, the reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. The

idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body of the latter decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court since they are being approved or adopted anyway.

[30] Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. - Every decision or final resolution of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on which it is based

which may be contained in the decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by reference from those set forth in the decision, order or resolution appealed from.

[31] See Romero v. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 183; Francisco v. Permskul, supra note 29; Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114323, 28 September 1999.

[32] Francisco v. Permskul , supra note 29, at 335-337.

[33] See ABD Overseas Manpower Corporation v. NLRC, 286 SCRA 454, 464 [1998].

[34] 206 SCRA 127, 134 [1992].

[35] Supra note 29, at 331.

[36] Supra note 30.

[37] See Anino v. NLRC 290 SCRA 489, 500 [1998]. See also Saballa v. NLRC, 260 SCRA 697, 706 [1960].

[38] See Spouses Yu Eng Cho & Francisco Tao Yu v. Pan American Airways, et al., G.R. No. 123560, 27 March 2000.

[39] Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29, 132; Saballa v. NLRC, supra note

32; ABD Overseas Manpower Corp. v. NLRC, supra note 28, 462; See also People v. Viernes, 262 SCRA 641, 659 [1996]; Caltex Refinery Employees Association v. Brilliantes, 279 SCRA 218, 243 [1997] citing Saballa v. NLRC; People v. Cayago, G.R. No. 128827, 18 August 1999; Madrid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130683, 31 May 2000.

[40] People v. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384, 393 [1997].

[41] See People v. Landicho, supra note 26.

[42] De Vera v. Sancho, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1455, 13 July 1999.

[43] People v. Cayago, supra note 39.

[44] People v. Sandiosa, supra note 27.

[45] People v. Ortiz-Miyake, 279 SCRA 180 [1997].

[46] Spouses Yu Eng Cho & Francisco Tao Yu v. Pan American Airways supra note 33.

[47] See Moslares v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 440, 448 [1998], citing Santos v. Court of Appeals, 253

SCRA 632 [1996]; See also Santos v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 632 [1996]; Magsaysay Lines Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 513 [1996].

[48] See Ginete v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 418 [1998].

[49] See Republic v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 344 [1996]; Camacho v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 611 [1998].

[50] See Banez v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 19 [1997].

[51] Ginete v. Court of Appeals, supra note 48.

FIRST DIVISION

MANUEL P. SAMSON, G.R. No. 139983

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO, - versus - CORONA,

AZCUNA, and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS and Promulgated: WILFRO LUMINLUN,

Respondents. March 26, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] dated 6 September 1999 of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 31904 reversing the Decision[2] dated 15

May 1990and the Order dated 7 December 1990 of the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 160, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 58052.

The Antecedent Facts

On 26 February 1982, petitioner Manuel P. Samson (Samson) applied for the

registration of the “OTTO” trademark with the Philippine Patent Office on belts,

bags, t-shirts, blouses, briefs, pants, jackets, jeans, and bra. On 21 January 1983,

respondent Wilfro Luminlun (Luminlun) likewise filed for the registration of the

“OTTO” trademark on jeans, sportswear, skirts, and socks.

On 29 December 1983, Samson executed the following

document[3] granting Luminlun the authority to use the “OTTO” trademark for

jeans only:

AUTHORITY TO USE TRADEMARK

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

I, MANUEL P. SAMSON, Filipino, of legal age and a resident of Doña Betang Subdivision, Santolan, Metro Manila, am the registered owner of

the trademark OTTO for bags, shoes, sandals and slippers under Registration Certificate No. 29840 issued on September 29, 1981, and the applicant in Application hearing Serial No. 47626 for the same trademark OTTO filed on

February 26, 1982 for belts, bags, t-shirts, blouses, briefs, pants, jackets, jeans and bras, which application was duly approved for publication in the Official

Gazette last November 18, 1982;

That for valuable consideration, I hereby grant unto WILFRO P.

LUMINLUN, Filipino, of legal age and with business address at No. 959 Soler Street, Binondo, Manila, a non-transferable, non-assignable, non-

exclusive right and license to use said trademark OTTO for jeans only. This authority shall remain valid and existing for as long as I remain the owner of the trademark OTTO unless said WILFRO P. LUMINLUN should do or cause to be

done any act which in any way prejudice or discredit the trademark OTTO not only in connection with its use for jeans but as well as for other products

enumerated in my registration certificates/application documents.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this

29th day of December, 1983.

SGD. MANUEL P. SAMSON

On 19 March 1984, the Philippine Patent Office issued to Samson a

Certificate of Registration for the mark “OTTO” in the principal register for use on

belts, bags, t-shirts, blouses, briefs, pants, jackets, jeans, and bra.

In a letter[4] dated 29 March 1989, Samson, through counsel,

informed Luminlun that he was revoking the latter’s authority to use the trademark

“OTTO.” Samson advisedLuminlun to “cease and desist from further

manufacturing and distributing OTTO jeans” otherwise he would confiscate jeans

using the unauthorized “OTTO” trademark. Samson likewise demanded the

payment of royalties, thus:

Dear Mr. Luminlun:

On behalf of my client, Mr. Manuel P. Samson, this is to demand that you CEASE and DESIST from further manufacturing and distributing OTTO jeans effective as of receipt of this notice considering that my aforesaid client had

already revoked the authority granted to you for the use of the trademark ‘OTTO’

in jeans. A copy of the Revocation of Authority To Use Trademark filed in the Patent Office on March 21, 1989 is attached.

Further, you have to account for the sale of OTTO jeans beginning January

1984 up to March 1989 as we will get a percentage thereof for the royalty due to my client of not less than P5,000,000.00 for your use of said trademark for more than five (5) years.

Kindly give us the name and address of your sales outlet in order that they

maybe properly appraised (sic) of this development.

Should you fail to heed this advice, we will be constrained to file an action

for damages and we will pray for issuance of injunction against you and for the confiscation and removal of jeans with the use of an unauthorized trademark

‘OTTO’.

I trust for your compliance within five (5) days from receipt hereof to

obviate being embroiled in a costly and cumbersome litigation.

Very truly yours, SGD. NELSON Y. NG

Samson also filed with the Philippine Patent Office a Revocation of

Authority to Use Trademark.[5]

As a result, Luminlun filed a complaint before the Regional Trial

Court, Pasig City questioning the validity of Samson’s revocation of his authority

to use the “OTTO” trademark. Luminlun likewise prayed that he be compensated

for the loss of sales he suffered since the sales outlets refused to accept his

deliveries for fear that the goods would be confiscated and removed from their

stores.

On 10 April 1989, the trial court issued an Order restraining Samson from

“proceeding and carrying out the confiscation and the removal of jeans with

trademark ‘OTTO’ pending hearing on the petition for preliminary

injunction.” On 19 April 1989, Samson filed an “Opposition to Motion for

Issuance of preliminary injunction and/or Motion to Lift Restraining Order.”

After presentation of evidence and submission of memoranda by both parties,

on 28 April 1989, the trial court issued an Order granting Luminlun’s prayer for

preliminary injunction.

On 9 May 1989, Samson filed his Answer. Samson raised, among others, the

defenses that: (1) Luminlun failed to pay royalties for the use of the trademark; and

(2)Luminlun violated the terms and conditions of the Authority to Use Trademark

when he used the “OTTO” trademark for other products.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Decision dated 15 May 1990, the trial court

dismissed Luminlun’s complaint. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the complaint is ordered DISMISSED. With costs against plaintiff.

The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued by the Court is set aside

and recalled. On the counterclaim, plaintiff is ordered to pay defendant attorney’s fees

of P25,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[6]

The trial court ruled that Samson was justified in revoking the authority

of Luminlun to use the trademark. The trial court found that Luminlun’s acts of

manufacturing and selling products bearing the trademark “OTTO LTD.” like

skirts, shorts, pants, jeans, as as well as products with the trademark “OTTO” like

belts, buttons, and bags, clearly violated the authority granted by Samson to

use the “OTTO” trademark for jeans only. The trial court, however, ruled that

Samson failed to prove that he was entitled to royalties.

Upon motion for reconsideration of both parties, the trial court in an Order

dated 7 December 1990[7] affirmed its decision with the modification of an award

of moral damages of P20,000 in favor of Samson.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court. The

appellate court found that Samson revoked the authority on the sole ground

that Luminlun failed to pay royalties. According to the appellate court, Samson

could not validly revoke the authority based on this ground since he failed to prove

that royalties were due him. The appellate court further ruled

that Luminlun suffered losses as a result of the revocation and thus awarded

damages. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the decision

appealed from and a new one issue making the injunction permanent and ordering appellee to pay appellant the following sums of money:

a) actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P2,257,872.20.

b) attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00.

Costs against appellee. SO ORDERED.[8]

The Issues

Thus, in this petition, Samson raises the following assignment of errors:[9]

(a) The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the revocation of

the Authority to Use Trademark made by Samson was unjustified;

(b) The Court of Appeals erred in awarding actual or compensatory

damages of P2,257,872.20 in spite of the total absence of evidence to

show that Luminlunsustained such damages as a consequence of the

revocation of the Authority to Use Trademark;

(c) The Court of Appeals erred in awarding attorney’s fees

of P50,000 in spite of the absence of any legal ground for such award;

and

d) The Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the trial court’s

award of moral damages and attorney’s fees in favor of Samson.

The Court’s Ruling

The resolution of this case hinges on whether Samson was justified in

revoking Luminlun’s authority to use the “OTTO” trademark.

We rule in the affirmative.

In finding for respondent Luminlun, the appellate court rationalized:

x x x In appellee’s Opposition to Motion for Issuance of Preliminary

Injunction and/or Motion to Lift Restraining Order dated April 18, 1989 (p.

37, Records), it is clearly stated that he revoked the Authority to Use

Trademark on the sole ground that appellant failed to pay royalty tax, thus:

“x x x. When plaintiff unjustly and illegally failed, refused

and neglected and still fails, refuse, and neglects to pay royalty tax, defendant revoked the grant of authority and the same was

filed with the Patent Office on March 21, 1989, a copy of which was served on plaintiff and received by him contained in a letter dated March 29, 1989. (at page 3 of Opposition)

x x x x x x x x x

“It is defendant who is entitled to the issuance of injunction to restrain plantiff from further manufacturing and distributing

OTTO jeans after plaintiff’s authority had been revoked for

failure to comply with his obligation to pay royalty tax due to

defendant.” As correctly pointed out by appellant, the issue that appellee had been

allegedly affected and his products allegedly discredited by appellant’s use of the trademark OTTO and OTTO Ltd. was but a belated attempt on the part of the appellee to justify his illegal act of revoking the Authority to Use Trademark

issued to the appellant. It was only after realizing the weakness of his sole ground for revoking the authority that he raised said issue.

It is evident that when appellee executed the Revocation of Authority

to Use Trademark on March 28, 1989 he was not concerned with appellant’s

use of the trademark OTTO Ltd. on appellant’s product and the trademark

OTTO on belts and buttons because there was no prejudice on his

part. Otherwise, he could have mentioned the same in the Revocation and in the demand letter dated March 29, 1989 of his counsel, Atty Nelson Y.

Ng.[10] (Emphasis supplied)

We disagree with the appellate court’s ruling.

The authority granted to Luminlun to use the “OTTO” trademark was

limited for use on jeans only. Under the agreement, Samson could revoke the

authority if Luminlun“should do or cause to be done any act which would in any

way prejudice or discredit the trademark OTTO not only in connection with its

use for jeans but as well as for other products” enumerated in Samson’s

registration certificates.

As correctly found by the trial court, Luminlun manufactured “OTTO” belts,

buttons, and bags as well as “OTTO LTD.” clothing in violation of the terms and

conditions of the authority which affected Samson and discredited his products,

thus:

On the second issue, the Court finds that defendant has been affected

and his products discredited by plaintiff’s use of trademark “OTTO” and

OTTO LTD.” on other products, aside from jeans. Plaintiff admitted

manufacturing and selling products bearing the trademark “OTTO LTD.”

like skirts, shorts, pants, jeans; also plaintiff manufactures and sells

products with the trademark “OTTO”, like belts, buttons and bags. (Exh. “3”; also pp. 67, 68, 69, 91, rec.) The authority given to plaintiff was a non-transferable, non-assignable, non-exclusive right and license to use said

trademark “OTTO” for jeans only x x x”. (Underlining supplied) Clearly, plaintiff failed to comply with the terms and conditions enumerated in the

agreement. Plaintiff had the option to use the trademark “OTTO” but he had done acts constituting bad faith, necessarily discrediting the interest of defendant on his products which were duly registered with the Philippine Patent Office,

such as: Exh. “6,” photograph of over all with trademark “OTTO”; Exh. “7”, issue of Panorama Magazine; Exh. “7-A”, trousers with “OTTO

LTD.”, Exh. “8”, t-shirt with brand “OTTO [LTD.]”; Exh. “14”, pants bearing “OTTO [LTD.]”, Exh. “14-A” & Exh. “14-B”; belt and pant with “OTTO LTD.” & “OTTO”; Exh. “15” Cash invoice, pants “OTTO”; Exh. “17”- .”, jeans classic

with trademark “OTTO”.

Defendant therefore was justified when he served notice of revocation of

the authority of plaintiff to use the trademark.[11] (Emphasis supplied)

Under the circumstances and in accordance with the terms and conditions of

the Authority to Use Trademark, we find that Samson was justified in

revoking Luminlun’s authority to use the “OTTO” trademark.

However, the appellate court chose to ignore Luminlun’s glaring violation of

the terms and conditions of the Authority. The appellate court instead resorted to

hair-splitting and ruled that Samson could not justify the revocation since he did

not raise this ground in his “Opposition to Motion for Issuance of Preliminary

Injunction and/or Motion to Lift Restraining Order.”

We find such reasoning flawed.

The records reveal that Samson, in his Answer, raised, among others, the

affirmative defense that he had the right to revoke the Authority to

Use Trademark because Luminlun manufactured other “OTTO” products aside

from jeans:

Defendant had every right and prerogative to revoke the authority granted to plaintiff on the use of the trademark for “OTTO” for jeans only when plaintiff failed to pay a single centavo of royalty and had likewise violated the grant of

authority by illegally manufacturing and distributing aside from jeans, other

products like jackets, skirts, shirts, blouses and shorts which are not covered

by the grant of authority granted to him.[12] (Emphasis supplied)

We find that Samson seasonably raised this defense and we do not see any

basis for the apellate court’s ruling that Samson could not invoke this ground.

The appellate court further makes issue of the fact that Samson did not

mention in both the Revocation of Authority to Use Trademark and his demand

letter dated 29 March 1989 that Luminlun’s manufacture of other “OTTO”

products such as belts and buttons was prejudicial to him and was the cause for the

revocation.

We note that the Revocation of Authority simply mentioned that “it

was Luminlun’s failure to comply with his undertaking when the authority was

executed as the reason for the revocation.” The fact that Samson did not indicate

the specific reason for the revocation is of no moment and should not be taken

against him. Thus, we find no basis for the appellate court’s conclusion that when

Samson executed the Revocation of Authority he was not concerned

with Luminlun’s use of the “OTTO” trademark on other products because there

was no prejudice on his part. Samson was affected and his products discredited

by Luminlun’s unauthorized manufacture of other “OTTO” products. Thus, in its

Order resolving the Motions for Reconsideration filed by the parties, the trial court

stated:

x x x it is not denied defendant was given the authority by the Patent Office and has been the registered owner of the trademark “OTTO” under principal register

no. 33064 and 29840 and supplemental register 7390 and 4166. The license was issued to the defendant for the protection of his rights as a registered owner of the

trademark in order to identify the lawful user. It was intended to protect the public to be deceived of the use of the products.

On the issue of the violation of the conditions involving the claim of royalty, the Court said that defendant has been affected and his products

discredited by the plaintiff’s use of trademark “OTTO” and “OTTO LTD,” on other products. Plaintiff had admitted manufacturing and selling products

with the same trademark on skirts, shorts, pants and jeans. Bad faith was

evident from the acts of plaintiff. The authority of plaintiff to use the

trademark “OTTO” for jeans was revoked for violation of the terms of the

agreement.[13] (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that Samson was justified in revoking the authority

of Luminlun to use the “OTTO” trademark, it necessarily follows that the damages

awarded by the appellate court in favor of Luminlun have no basis.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the Petition. We SET ASIDE the assailed

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals and REINSTATE the 15 May

1990 Decision and the 7 December 1990 Order of the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 160, Pasig City.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S.

AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate

Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the

conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case

was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon

A. Barcelona and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole. [2] Penned by Justice Mariano M. Umali.

[3] Records, p. 60. [4] Id. at 62. [5] Id. at 63. [6] Rollo, p. 62. [7] Amending its Order dated 15 October 1990.

06 Jul 2006. The Supreme Court on 5 July 2006 rejected a claim of trademark infringement by US-

based Philip Morris and its two sister companies against Philippine tycoon Lucio Tan's cigarette company Fortune Tobacco.

Philip Morris together with Benson & Hedges (Canada) and the former Fabriques de Tabac Reunies had

asked the Supreme Court in 2003 to reverse rulings by an appeals court and a lower tribunal that found

Fortune Tobacco didn't violate trademark rules in its manufacture and sale of cigarettes under the "Mark" brand. </o:p>

Philip Morris is the registered owner of "Mark VII" trademark, Benson & Hedges has registered the "Mark

Ten" brand, and Fabriques is assignee of the "Lark" trademark. </o:p>

The Philip Morris group filed a case for damages against Fortune Tobacco with the lower court in 1982. The

Supreme Court said it rejected the Philip Morris group's plea because the group failed to show it actually

used the trademarks in the Philippines prior to Fortune Tobacco's usage of the "Mark" brand, or that Fortune

Tobacco's action resulted in consumer confusion. "Evidence of non-usage of the mark rebuts the presumption of trademark ownership, as what happened here when petitioners no less admitted not doing

business in this country," the court ruled. The high court also rejected Philip Morris' c laim that Fortune

Tobacco's action was a violation of the Intellectual Property Code since the code only took effect in 1998,

while the trademark infringement case started in 1982. </o:p>