Caesars Gallic Wars - Essential Histories (58-50 BC)

Essential Histories

Caesar’s Gallic Wars 58–50 BC

Essential Histories

Caesar’s Gallic Wars 58–50 BC

Kate Gilliver

NEW YORK AND LONDON

This hardback edition is published by Routledge, an imprint ofthe Taylor & Francis Group, by arrangement with Osprey

Publishing Ltd., Oxford, England.

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go towww.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

For information, please address the publisher:Routledge (USA)

29 West 35th Street, New York. NY 10001www.routledge-ny.com

Routledge (UK)11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

www.routledge.co.uk

First published 2002 under the title Essential Histories 43:Caesar’s Gallic Wars 58–50 BC by Osprey Publishing Ltd.,

Elms Court, Chapel Way, Botley, Oxford OX2 9LP

© 2003 Osprey Publishing Ltd.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted orreproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic means,now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and

recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system,without permission in writing from the publishers.

ISBN 0-203-49484-9 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-57978-X (Adobe eReader Format)ISBN 0-415-96858-5 (Print Edition)

03 04 05 06 07 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Gilliver, Catherine.Caesar’s Gallic wars, 58–50 B.C. / Kate Gilliver

p. cm. — (Essential histories)Originally published: Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2002.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-415-96858-5 (hardback : alk paper)

1. Caesar, Julius—Military leadership. 2. Gaul-History-GallicWars, 58–51 B.C. 3. Rome—History, Military—65–30 B.C.

I.Title. II. Series.DG264.G55 2003

936.4′02–dc212003009611

Contents

Introduction 1

Chronology 4

Background to war Building an empire 6

Warring sides Discipline vs. spectacle 13

Outbreak The migration of the Helvetii 26

The fighting Invasion, siege and conquest 30

Portrait of a soldier Caesar’s centurions 63

The world around war The impact of the conflict 66

Portrait of a civilian Roman merchants 76

How the war ended Roman triumphs 78

Conclusion and consequences Pax Romana 85

Further reading 89

Index 90

Introduction

Julius Caesar is probably the most famous Roman of all. As dictator, he paved the way for theestablishment of the Roman Empire under his great-nephew Augustus, more infamously, had a love affair withCleopatra of Egypt, and even invented the leap year, before being assassinated by friends and colleagueswho had previously supported him. But before his dictatorship he had conquered a vast area of Europe in anincredibly short time. The provinces of Gaul invaded by Caesar (Aquitania, Gallia Belgica and GalliaLugdunensis) relate to modern-day France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany to the west of the Rhine,an area of over 300,000 square miles. The political map of much of modern Europe can be traced back to JuliusCaesar’s nine years of campaigning. During his battles in Gaul, Caesar also became the first Roman to crossthe Rhine at the head of an army, and to cross the Channel to Britain, an island that contemporariesconsidered a mysterious, frightful and possibly even mythical place.

There is only one detailed account surviving of this extraordinary war, and that is by Caesar himself. Aswell as being a great (and exceptionally fortunate) general and an inspirational leader of men, Caesar was anastute politician fully aware of the importance of self-presentation; in today’s terms, he was his own, extremelyable spin-doctor. Caesar’s De Bello Gallico (Gallic War) is the most detailed eye-witness account of warthat survives from the Greek or Roman world. He wrote up his Commentaries annually and had thempublished in Rome every year. Everyone in the capital was hungry for news of events in Gaul and there wasgreat excitement at the progress of the war. Caesar made sure they got a one-sided version of events thatstressed the magnitude of the Roman victories (and his part in them), and underplayed the size andsignificance of the reverses. The historical reconstruction of the conquest of Gaul must be accomplishedusing this one extremely biased source, a few brief descriptions in other works of literature written byRomans, and limited archaeological evidence. There is nothing that presents the motives, aims or feelingsof the Gauls, except Caesar’s interpretation of them, for they had no tradition of recording their history.

The conquest of Gaul took place amid cultural and political change in both Gaul and Rome. By the mid-1stcentury BC, parts of Gaul were starting to become urbanised and ‘Romanised’ as they adopted some of thecustoms of the inhabitants of the neighbouring Roman province of Transalpine Gaul in southern France.Roman traders were very active in Gaul, particularly in the southern and central areas, and they too helpedto spread their own culture, exchanging ‘luxury’ goods such as wine in return for grain, iron, hides andslaves. Some of the Gallic tribes were developing more centralised forms of organisation, and towns werebeginning to grow. Ironically, this helped to make the Roman conquest, when it came, more straightforward:while some of the more ‘Romanised’ tribes such as the Aedui allied themselves to the invaders, some ofthose who resisted were easier to conquer because they were centralised and had clear centres of occupationand wealth. The tribes with few key occupation centres often had more mobile wealth and resources, andcould more easily avoid conquest simply by evading the Romans. Rome itself was sliding towards civil waras a political system designed for a small city-state could no longer cope with controlling a huge empire.

Leading politicians vied with each other for power and gathered support from their peers, the commonpeople, and the armies that they had commanded when governing Rome’s provinces. Military success andloyal soldiers were prerequisites for becoming a leading figure in the power games, and huge areas of theMediterranean were swiftly conquered by ambitious Romans. Most recently, Pompey, lately returned fromthe East after a magnificent tour of conquest had set new standards for others to emulate. When JuliusCaesar engineered for himself the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul (northern Italy) and Dalmatia in 59 BC,there was no doubt that he would conduct campaigns to enhance his military reputation and political future.When the governorship of Transalpine Gaul (southern France) was added to his command and the Helvetiiin Switzerland began a huge migration, Caesar decided to campaign in Gaul.

Over the next few years the Romans made rapid conquests throughout Gaul. The task was made easier bythe inability of the Gallic tribes to unite to form a combined resistance to the invaders. Indeed, some tribessupported the Romans, and the Romans themselves played one tribe off against another, exploiting theterritorial ambitions of different Gallic tribes and even political divisions within tribes. Few Gallic armies werecapable of resisting the disciplined and well-equipped Roman legions, and Caesar was able to draw on anincreasingly large and experienced army, as well as allies from Gaul and occasionally Germany to supplyhim with cavalry in particular. Within three years of leading his army into Gaul, Caesar was able topronounce that the whole province was conquered and lead his army into Germany and across the Channelto Britain, expeditions that provoked shocked admiration back in Rome.

Gaul may have been conquered, but the Gauls were not. The last years of Caesar’s command were spentdealing with sporadic revolts across the province, which were followed, in 52 BC, by a major uprising.Finally the Gauls had found a leader who could unite them: Vercingetorix. The year 52 BC was make orbreak for both sides: the Gauls pursued a guerrilla campaign of hit-and-run tactics and a scorched-earthpolicy, while the Romans utilised more sophisticated engineering skills; it also saw two huge-scale sieges ofhill forts at Avaricum (Bourges) and Alesia (Alise-Ste-Reine, near Dijon). It was at Alesia that the wholewar in Gaul came to a climax, and when the army raised to relieve the besieged Gauls was repulsed, therevolt was effectively over. The relieving army dissolved and Vercingetorix surrendered. Although it wasnot until the reign of the first emperor, Augustus, that Gaul was properly pacified (and even after that thereare indications of the occasional rumble into the mid-1st century AD), the Gauls were never able to uniteeffectively again. Gaul became several Roman provinces, evolving after five centuries into the Frankishkingdoms and eventually becoming France. Julius Caesar went on to fight and win a civil war, and makehimself dictator of Rome, only to be assassinated in 44 BC.

2 ESSENTIAL HISTORIES • CAESAR’S GALLIC WARS

Portrait bust of Julius Caesar, (c. 102–44 BC) the Roman politician and general who conquered Gaul in the mid-1 st centuryBC. (Ancient Art and Architecture)

INTRODUCTION 3

Chronology

390 BC Gallic sack of Rome.

154 Marseilles, a Greek city, requests help from Rome following threats from Gallic tribes.

122 Alliance formed between Rome and the Aedui tribe.Roman campaigns against Allobroges tribe.

121 A Roman army 30,000 strong defeats a combined force of Arverni and Allobroges reportedly 200,000strong. The Allobroges are incorporated within Roman territory.The Via Domitia road is built across southern France, linking Italy and Spain.

118 Roman colony of Narbo (Narbonne) is founded.

113–101 Invasions of Gaul and Italy by Cimbri and Teutones (Germanic tribes).

71 Rivalry between Aedui and Arverni; Arvernian allies, the Sequani, hire German mercenaries and togetherthey defeat the Aedui.

66 & 62 Allobroges revolt, mainly because of poor Roman administration.

61 Aedui request help from Rome; Rome declines to assist but the Senate formally confirms Roman supportfor them. The Helvetii prepare to migrate to western France.

59 Caesar is consul (chief magistrate) in Rome; he is appointed governor of northern Italy (Cisalpine Gaul)and Dalmatia for five years.Southern France (Transalpine Gaul) is added to Caesar’s jurisdiction after the sudden death of thegovernor.

58 Caesar takes up his governorship.March: the Helvetii begin their migration.Late June: Helvetii defeated and ordered home.Mid-September: Ariovistus defeated.

57 Campaigns against the Belgae.Winter: Roman reverse in the Alps.

56 Roman naval defeat of Veneti.Roman legate Sabinus defeats tribes of Normandy.Roman legate Crassus reduces Aquitania (south-west France). The Menapii and Morini (Belgian coast andRhine delta) successfully resist Roman incursions.Caesar’s command is extended for a further five years.

55 German tribes cross the Rhine; they are massacred by Caesar.The Romans bridge the Rhine. First Roman invasion of Britain.

54 Morini submit to Rome, possibly intimidated by the presence of the Roman fleet in the English Channel.Summer: second Roman invasion of Britain.Winter: attacks on Roman winter camps.

53 Punitive campaigns against Belgic tribes.

52 Gallic revolt.Winter: massacre of Roman civilians at Cenabum (Orleans).Spring/summer: capture of Avaricum. Gallic success at Gergovia and partial defection of Aedui.Roman successes against Parisii. Siege of Alesia; surrender of Vercingetorix.

51 Winter: raids on Bituriges. Roman raids against Bellovaci.Final defeat of Treveri. Blockade and surrender of Uxellodunum (in Lot, south-west France).

50 Minor Roman campaigns in central Gaul.

49 Caesar crosses the Rubicon in north Italy and civil war ensues.

5

Background to warBuilding an empire

Romans and Gauls had been clashing for centuries before the conquest of Gaul in the 1st century BC, but forlong periods they had also experienced comparative peace as neighbours or near neighbours. Celtic orGallic tribes (as the Greek writers called them) migrated into northern Italy during the late 5th and early 4thcenturies BC, with some tribes settling, particularly around the fertile Po valley. The first major encounterbetween Rome and these Celtic tribes of what is known as the La Tène culture came in the early 4th centuryBC. They penetrated south into Etruria and Latium (Toscana and Lazio) where the invaders captured andsacked some of the largest cities, including the important Etruscan centre of Veii only a few miles north ofRome. In 390 BC Rome’s field forces were defeated, and the poorly defended city captured by the Gauls.Only the citadel held out: according to tradition, when the Gauls tried to scale it in a surprise night attack,the guard dogs failed to bark and it was only the honking of geese (kept on the Capitol because they weresacred to Jupiter) that awoke the guards. The guards then repelled the attack. The story may not be true, butafter sacking Rome, or being paid off by the Romans, the Gauls withdrew. They were defeated shortlyafterwards by Camillus, the great Roman general who is traditionally credited with making fundamentalchanges to the Roman army in order to deal with this new Gallic threat. The sacking of Rome was neverforgotten, and Romans remained haunted by a kind of collective inbred fear of hordes of barbariansreturning to destroy the city. The sack, along with the long subsequent history of violent encounters betweenthe two cultures, formed part of the background to Caesar’s conquest of Gaul.

During the 150 years after the sack, Rome was gradually able to establish superiority over much of theItalian peninsula, ejecting several of the Gallic tribes from lands to the north of Rome. Between the Firstand Second Punic Wars (during the 3rd century BC) this conquest of Italy extended to the north as acoalition of Gallic tribes from northern Italy and across the Alps moved south, only to suffer a devastatingdefeat at Telamon in 225 BC which broke Gallic resistance in Italy. In the following five years much of theterritory beyond the Po was incorporated as the province of Cisalpine Gaul, and Roman colonies werefounded at Piacenza and Cremona. The final reduction of this new province had to wait until after theSecond Punic War and the repulse of the

Carthaginian raiding forces under Hannibal. After the first big Roman defeat at the hands of Hannibal atthe Trebia in 218 BC, Gallic mercenaries flocked to join Hannibal and served with him through much of theItalian campaign. But after defeating Carthage, Rome turned back to north Italy and punished the tribes whohad fought against them. The whole of Italy as far north as the Alps was incorporated as Roman territoryand further colonies were created at Bologna and Parma. By the mid-2nd century BC Rome was ready tomove into France, having secured her occupation of the whole of Cisalpine Gaul.

The excuse came in 154 BC when the Greek city of Marseilles requested help from Rome against raidsfrom Liguria. The Roman response included the establishment of a small veteran settlement at Aix enProvence, which irritated the powerful Alloboges tribe nearby, on whose territory it was founded. They and

their allies, including the Arverni, were defeated in a series of campaigns fought by Domitius Ahenobarbusand Fabius Maximus. Fabius inflicted an appalling defeat on the Gauls in 121 BC, claiming the quiteextraordinary (and highly unlikely) casualty figures of 120,000 Gallic dead to only 15 Roman. The newprovince of Transalpine Gaul was created, which the Romans frequently referred to as simply TheProvince’, from which modern Provence gets its name. As in Cisalpine Gaul, colonies were founded, atNîmes and Toulouse, and a road was built, the Via Domitia, linking Italy with Spain. As well as leading tothe creation of another province, the campaign to assist Marseilles also brought Rome into alliance with theAedui, a Gallic tribe of modern Burgundy who were also allied to Marseilles. The existence of the newprovince and a formal alliance with the Aedui provided Rome with opportunities for further intervention inGaul and the affairs of the Gallic tribes, but any further expansion was brought to a sudden stop by thearrival in southern Gaul of the Cimbri and Teutones. These migrating Germanic tribes offered seriousresistance to Rome, defeating successive consular armies in the late 2nd century BC. They were eventuallybeaten by Marius (a great Roman general and consul), but as with the Gallic sack of 390 BC, the experienceleft scars on the Roman psyche. Future Roman attacks and campaigns against Germanic tribes could bepassed off as retribution for the defeats and casualties of the 2nd-century incursions.

By the 1st century BC many of the tribes in Gaul were becoming urbanised, particularly those in thesouth where they came under the cultural influence of Marseilles and then, with the establishment of theprovince of Transalpine Gaul, Rome. Although Caesar uses the word oppidum to describe hill forts, he alsouses it for defended settlements that were not on hills. Some of these could have been described as towns evenby Romans who might have regarded Gaul and nearly everything about it and its inhabitants as barbaric.Avaricum (Bourges) had an open space which Caesar called a forum and may have had civic buildings; ithad a huge defensive wall and its inhabitants regarded it as the most beautiful city in Gaul. Cenabum(Orleans) had a series of narrow streets which may well have had some kind of plan to them: Gallic townswere starting to adopt the grid plans of Mediterranean cities. Evidence of coin manufacture at important oppidasuggests that they may have been tribal capitals, indicating some degree of political centralisation; Bibracte,for example, seems to have been the ‘capital’ of the Aedui, who were a fairly centralised tribe althoughplagued by factions. Other tribes that lacked this degree of centralisation might have been consideredculturally backward by the Romans, but this added to their military reputation: Caesar considered theBelgae to be the bravest warriors of the Gauls because they were furthest removed from Roman influence.Their lack of centralisation also meant that they could be harder to conquer, as Caesar was to find whenfighting tribes like the Veneti and Menapii who had no single centre of occupation and wealth.

One of the main reasons for the Greek and Roman influence on the Gallic tribes was trade. Marseilleswas a significant centre of trade, and though Gallic tribes and Rome regularly fought each other, that didnot prevent a huge amount of trade taking place between them well before the conquest under Caesar.Romans imported raw materials from Gaul, including iron, grain, hides and, particularly, slaves, the sourceof the latter being regular inter-tribal warfare that took place between both Gallic and Germanic tribes. Inexchange, the Gauls (or at least the Gallic elite) received luxury goods and foods, and enormous amounts ofwine. Wine had become a key symbol of wealth, status and ‘civilisation’, though the historian DiodorusSiculus says that the Gauls drank it neat, rather than diluted with water in the Roman style. Hence, althoughthey were adopting the ‘civilised’ customs of the Mediterranean, Diodorus makes it clear that they were stillbarbarians because they did not know how to drink it properly. He goes on to say that wine had becomesuch a valuable commodity that the exchange rate for an amphora of wine was one slave, although therewere certainly plenty of slaves around. There must have been many Roman merchants already in Gaulbefore Caesar’s campaigns, including a community of citizens at Cenabum. Some of them were of highstatus and belonged to the Roman ‘equestrian’ order, the influential class immediately below senatorial rank,

BACKGROUND TO WAR 7

LEFT Hellenistic and Roman art regularly illustrated Celts and Gauls being defeated in battle on as in this case, committingsuicide after a defeat. The heroically nude Gaul holds his dead wife whom he may have just killed himself, to prevent herfalling into enemy hands. (AKG London/A. Lorenzini)

itself a prime source of new senators. They might expect to benefit from the opportunities conquest wouldbring, especially if they provided assistance in the form of intelligence and supplies for the Roman army.

Many of the tribes that had come under greater influence from the Greek and Roman cultures to the southwere ruled by oligarchies with annually appointed magistrates. The spreading centralisation and tendencytowards urbanisation made such tribes easier targets for Rome, and internal factions within them helped theRomans too. In the mid-1st century BC the Aedui were divided between a pro-Roman faction underDiviciacus, and those who opposed the Romans led by his brother Dumnorix. Dumnorix held a monopolyover the wine trade on the Saône, a tributary of the Rhône, and probably resisted the growing Romaninfluence for economic as well as political reasons. His influence came from his wealth and his position as adruid: druids held high social status in Celtic society which could bring them political influence. Accordingto the account by Caesar, Dumnorix was attempting to increase his power-base within the Aedui not justbecause he was opposed to the tribe’s pro-Roman stance, but because he was keen to seize power and makehimself king. It was important for Rome that the Aedui remained a united and powerful ally of Romeamong the Celtic tribes of Gaul, and the squabbling between the two brothers must have given Rome causefor concern.

But the Aedui were coming under pressure from other tribes in Gaul in the 1st century BC. They were apowerful tribe with other lesser tribes under their protection and they had a long-standing rivalry with theirneighbours, the Arverni. This rivalry came to a head in 71 BC when the Arverni attacked, along with theirallies the Sequani, and German mercenaries from the Suebi whom the Sequani had rather foolishly invitedin. Once the Aedui were defeated the German mercenaries under their king Ariovistus turned on theirerstwhile allies and seized much of the Sequanian territory. These events had several consequences. Romefailed to assist her ally, the Aedui, which must have damaged her reputation among the Gallic tribes, andGermans were now settling in Gaul near the territory of the Helvetii. This must have seriously worried theHelvetii who had already been forced into Switzerland by earlier migrations of Germanic tribes and theyprepared to evacuate their homelands and migrate themselves, to western France.

In 61 BC the Roman senate had confirmed its support for the Aedui, but still failed to act. Romans wereexpecting some kind of involvement with Gaul in 60 BC though, perhaps military support for the Aedui.

BELOW Detail from the Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus, a 1st-century BC relief illustrating the taking of a censuswhich included details of the military liability of every citizen. The two soldiers represent the link between citizen statusand military service. (Ancient Art and Architecture)

BACKGROUND TO WAR 9

Probably because of concern about the huge migration which was obviously about to take place,

A modern archaeological dig on the site of Bibracte, the chief oppidum of the Aeduan people who were supporters ofRome. Bibracte was a useful supply point for Roman armies throughout the Gallic War (Ancient Art and Architecture)


preparations were made in Rome, including the holding of a levy. During his consulship in 59 BC JuliusCaesar had bought off the Suebic king Ariovistus by diplomatic gifts and the title of Friend of the RomanPeople. It was not an unusual move for a leading politician to make alliances with kings outside the Romanempire, especially kings of neighbouring territories who might supply additional troops for a campaign.During his year as Consul, Caesar also engineered for himself the appointment as governor of CisalpineGaul and Illyricum (the Adriatic coast of Dalmatia); when at the end of the year the governor of TransalpineGaul suddenly died, Caesar was given that command as well. The forces under his command consisted ofone legion based in Transalpine Gaul and three more legions that were in garrison at Aquileia in north-eastItaly, based there because of the potential threats from Ariovistus and the Helvetii to the north and the

A silver coin of the Aeduan leader; Dumnorix. The coin shows an Aeduan warrior with a boar standard. Whilst theAedui were allied to Rome, there were anti-Roman elements within the tribe led by the aristocratic druid Dumnorix,who Caesar referred to as ‘a man of boundless daring’. (AKG Berlin)

BACKGROUND TO WAR 11

Dacians to the north-east. Caesar may have been planning a campaign against Illyricum initially, but the lateaddition of Transalpine Gaul to his command opened up a better option.

Caesar was an ambitious politician and in order to dominate politics as a senator in Rome in the 1stcentury BC, it helped to be extremely wealthy (to bribe the electorate), and to have a great militaryreputation. Of his two allies and rivals, Marcus Crassus was fabulously rich, and Pompey was both wealthyand Rome’s leading general after conquering much of Spain and Turkey. On his appointment as governor ofCisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, Caesar was pretty much broke and had had little opportunity to establishhimself as an able general. Conquest of a new province would allow him both to enrich himself and impressthe public in Rome with his military ability. There was no doubt at all that Caesar would campaignsomewhere and conquer a new province, either on the eastern Adriatic coast or in Gaul. It just happenedthat there were two convenient pretexts for launching operations in Gaul: the Helvetii began their migrationjust as Caesar was taking over command, and there was still the matter of Rome’s previous failure tosupport their allies the Aedui. If they requested assistance, particularly against the German King Ariovistus,Caesar could justifiably intervene. At the start of 58 BC the new governor of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaulwas still in Rome when news arrived of the movement of the Helvetian tribes.

A barge being pulled upriver by manpower. Many of Gaul’s rivers were navigable and provided excellent trade routes,and supply and communication conduits for the invading Roman army. Gaulish leaders were keen to import luxurygoods, such as wine, in return for raw materials such as iron, grain and slaves. (AISA)


Warring sidesDiscipline vs. spectacle

The Roman army that campaigned in Gaul in the 1st century BC was to all intents and purposes aprofessional one, with many soldiers in the legions regarding their military service as a career. The soldierswere equipped, trained and paid by the state, often serving for many years at a stretch. The Gallic armieswere completely different. Gallic warfare was based on the values of a warrior society; while the elitewarriors may have been able to spend time raiding neighbouring tribes and may have possessed high qualityarms and armour, tribes were unable to maintain armies for long because of the lack of any organisedsupply system and the need for many of those fighting to return to their fields. The Roman conquest of Gaulwas a clash between two cultures employing very different methods of waging war.

The Romans

The Roman army was made up of two types of troops: the legions, comprising Roman citizens andauxiliaries, and non-Romans who fought alongside Roman generals because of treaty obligations or out ofchoice. When Caesar started his governorship he had four legions assigned to his command, but heimmediately began recruiting more, mainly from northern Italy, and possibly not being too strict about thecitizen status of his recruits, since much of the population of Cisalpine Gaul did not have full Romancitizenship.

In the Imperial period a legion was usually commanded by a legate who was a senator or equestrian, butin the late Republic the legion had no permanent commander. Instead, the provincial governor appointedsenators from his staff to command one or more legions. These might be legates of quite senior status(Caesar’s most experienced legate, Labienus, had held the important magistracy of Praetor), or they might bemuch younger men like Publius Crassus who was just beginning his senatorial career. Each legion had six military tribunes who were usually equestrians or the sons of senators gaining military experience beforestarting their own political careers. The most important officers within the legion were the centurions, andthere were 60 in each legion. Appointed for their bravery and experience, these men were responsible forthe training of their centuries and the day-to-day running of the legion whether on campaign or in winterquarters. The senior centurions of each legion (the primi ordines) regularly attended Caesar’s councils ofwar and would have contributed to strategic discussions; they were the backbone of the legion.

Legionaries were uniformed at state expense, and were well equipped for their military roles. Eachlegionary, with his mail coat and bronze or iron helmet, was armed as well as the most wealthy andsuccessful Celtic warriors and this must have given them a huge psychological advantage when facing theGauls. The large shield or scutum provided additional protection. The legionary’s principal weapons werethe pilum (javelin) and short sword, the gladius.

Recruitment to the legions was based on a mixture of conscription and volunteering, the onlyqualification for service being citizenship, at least in theory. Recruits were supposed to be at least 17,although the majority were in their early 20s when they joined up. Roman ideology preferred recruits fromrural backgrounds rather than from towns and cities with their softening and corrupting influences, butCaesar probably experienced little difficulty in raising troops for his campaigns in Gaul because there hadpreviously been little wide-scale recruitment in Cisalpine Gaul. The legionaries signed up for militaryservice of no fixed length, although they could expect to be discharged with a grant of land on which tosettle after five years or so continuous service. Military pay was not especially good, but there were plentyof opportunities for enrichment, particularly on a lucrative campaign like Caesar’s conquest of Gaul withthe likelihood of generous amounts of booty.

While the legions were armed and equipped uniformly, and were principally heavy infantry, the variationin type of forces a successful army needed was provided by ‘auxiliary’ units raised from other provinces ofthe Roman empire or from neighbouring states and tribes friendly to Rome. It was up to the provincialgovernor to maintain friendly relationships established by his predecessors with local tribes, such as the treatyof friendship between Rome and the Aedui. Caesar was so successful in his early campaigns in Gaul and hismilitary prestige so great that he was able to attract auxiliary units from the Germans as well as support fromGallic tribes, who provided him with another source of cavalry that was particularly valuable when theloyalty of the Aedui wavered in 52 BC. Auxiliaries used their own fighting techniques, they were nottrained in the Roman style of fighting, and were commanded by their own officers, usually members of theruling elite of the tribe or state from which they were recruited.

Auxiliaries provided the Roman army’s main cavalry force. The cavalry Caesar employed in Gaul,consisting mainly of Gallic or Germanic elites, was not always reliable or effective, and sometimes theylacked discipline, particularly early on in the campaigns. Its drubbing by the Nervian cavalry in 57 BC wasprobably the most serious setback it suffered, and by the end of the campaigns the cavalry was a powerfulforce that contributed to Caesar’s victory in the Civil War. The German cavalry sometimes worked in concertwith light infantry which allowed the holding of terrain in addition to the useful mobility of cavalry.

The Roman legion was arranged into 10 cohorts of six centuries. The cohort of c. 480 men was a key tactical unit in theRoman army and provided great flexibility as one or more cohorts could be detached from a legion for tacticalpurposes.


The Celtic-style saddle allowed Caesar’s cavalry to be as effective as later stirruped cavalry, despite theabsence of stirrups. Cavalry troops might vary considerably in their equipment, since they equippedthemselves, but a wealthy cavalryman might have a mail shirt and helmet, an oval or hexagonal shieldwhich was more manoeuvrable on horseback than a rectangular one, a spear and a long sword, which wasideal for running down those fleeing from battle, one of the principal roles of the cavalry.

A Montefortino-style helmet Although this example dates from the 2nd century BC, with its cheek guards and ampledome, it is fairly typical of the kind of helmets issued to soldiers in the late Republic. (Ancient Art and Architecture)

WARRING SIDES 15

The Roman army in Gaul included slingers from the Balearics and archers from Crete and Numidia whoprovided lightly armed mobile troops to increase the firepower of the army, particularly at a distance or in asiege. Their role is rarely commented upon, but they added an important degree of flexibility to the Romanarmy. Additional infantry was provided by Gallic tribes in the same way as cavalry, and would haveconsisted of groups of warriors from tribes who were allied to Rome like the Aedui or Remi whosurrendered to Caesar following his invasion. The wealthiest of these warriors were probably armed andequipped in a way very similar to the Roman legionaries, but the Gauls placed greater emphasis onindividual prowess and prominent displays of courage in battle, rather than the discipline and training of thelegions.

Logistical support was generally well organised, with a supply system usually reliant on shuttlingprovisions from a supply base to the campaigning army. The army made use of Gaul’s navigable rivers tomove supplies around, but the poor road system and the speed of Caesar’s movements led to difficulties.Although Caesar could call on his Gallic allies and later the subjected tribes for supplies, his movementsand the direction of the campaign were often heavily influenced by logistical demands. An understanding ofthis lay behind the Gallic scorched-earth policy in the revolt of 52 BC. When the legions were in winterquarters, Caesar ensured they were garrisoned in the territories of recently conquered tribes to serve thedual purpose of ensuring a strong military presence in newly reduced territory, and punishing those whoresisted Rome by forcing them to feed the occupying army, a penalty that could have affected a tribe’sability to support its own population. The winter allowed troops time to recover from the often exhaustivecampaigning that Caesar demanded of his armies, in particular those who were sick or had been wounded infighting. Roman imperial armies had medics attached to them, and this may have been the case in the lateRepublic, too. In the aftermath of pitched battle Roman armies usually paused, sometimes for several days,so the dead could be buried and the wounded treated. The wounded would later be escorted to a base,probably a supply base, to recuperate before rejoining their units.

Gauls, Britons and Germans

In the 1st century BC Celtic tribes employed different methods of warfare. Although prowess in combatremained important for the tribal elite, in some tribes, particularly in southern and central Gaul, other meanswere becoming available to gain and maintain status. The Aeduan aristocrat Dumnorix fought as a cavalrymanto display his elite warrior status, but he also held a monopoly over the wine trade, which enhanced hiswealth and therefore his position within Celtic society. Encouraged by the impact of Mediterranean cultureon Gallic society, the Romans interpreted this shift in emphasis as a demoralising factor. Caesar perceivedthe Belgae as the bravest of the Gauls ‘because they are furthest away from the culture and civilisation ofProvence, and are least often visited by merchants importing degenerate luxury goods, and also becausethey are nearest to the Germans who live across the Rhine and with whom they are continuously at war’.

In most Gallic tribes, raiding neighbours was the warrior’s principal means of acquiring wealth andposition, and tribes sought to extend their influence over smaller neighbours. The bravest tribes, andtherefore the most secure, were those with wide influence and many dependent tribes. Tribes might formalliances with neighbours or even, in the case of the Sequani, the Germans, in order to increase their ownmilitary prowess. Gallic war bands consisted of groups of warriors belonging to an elite class, followingtheir chieftain and concentrating on raiding; larger-scale armies of the kind faced by the Romans in Gaulwere probably less common, and may have included peasants, the dependent farmers who would notnormally have been involved in regular warfare. If Caesar really did face an army of 50,000 Helvetii andtheir allies, it probably included tribesmen of all status, but we hear no details of them or how they were


Detail of the Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus depicting two differently dressed and equipped legionaries. The legionaryon the left is wearing mail armour and carries a large scutum. His sword is suspended from a belt and hangs on the rightside to prevent the scabbard becoming snagged on the shield, (Ancient Art and Architecture)

WARRING SIDES 17

armed and equipped. The warriors equipped themselves according to their wealth and status: the braver andmore successful, the more likely they were to be able to adorn themselves with beautifully decorated andhigh quality equipment.

Only the wealthiest warriors would have possessed mail coats, but such aristocrats could have beenequipped in a way very similar to a Roman legionary, with the mail armour providing reasonably goodprotection from the slashing blows of the long Celtic swords, a bronze or iron helmet, sword and shield.Helmets, like mail coats, were probably very rare and worn only by the wealthiest warriors, but stylisticallythey were very similar to some Roman helmets; indeed the coolus helmet which evolved into one of themain helmets of the Roman imperial army was originally a Gallic design. Gallic warriors carried spears andswords, the latter considerably longer than the Roman gladius. They were designed primarily for slashingrather than stabbing, and pointed to a fighting technique that required plenty of room for the individual towield his long weapon. Though the Greek historian Polybius claims these long swords had a tendency tobend on impact, many were made of high quality iron and they were extremely effective weapons. TheGallic elongated rectangular shield was probably made of hide or wood like the Roman scutum. Someshields may not have been particularly thick or strong, which may explain why Caesar reports that theRoman pila were able to pierce several of them simultaneously; the bronze shields that survive fromantiquity may have been for decorative or ceremonial purposes and not actually for use in battle. Given thatthe majority of warriors probably lacked body armour, and indeed some may have chosen to fight withoutarmour to stress their courage and military prowess, the shield was a vital piece of protective equipment.When their shields were put out of action by the Roman pila, the Helvetii became dangerously exposed tothe Roman attack.

Celtic cavalry, manned by the wealthiest warriors, was particularly effective and scored significantvictories against Caesar’s more numerous auxiliary cavalry in the first couple of campaigning seasons. Thelack of stirrups was no bar to powerful cavalry: the design of the Celtic saddle provided its rider with asecure mount from which to throw spears, thrust with a spear or slash with a sword and implement shocktactics. Some German cavalry may have used these saddles as well, but the horsemanship of the cavalrymenand their co-operation with the light infantry who regularly worked alongside the German cavalry wasclearly impressive and indicative of at least some training, which we hear little about in any sources. The

TOP Detail of the Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus showing two legionaries and a cavalryman. Each legion included asmall cavalry force, but the majority of the Roman army’s cavalry was provided by allied tribes under treaty obligations.(Ancient Art and Architecture)


Celtic tribes in Britain were still using chariots, something that had gone out of fashion on the Continent, buttheir speed and agility caused the Roman infantry serious difficulties. The chariots served as battlefield‘taxis’ for the wealthiest nobles, dropping them off at the fighting and then collecting them up again if theywere injured or needed to withdraw from the battle.

Firepower was available in the form of slingers and archers, although these men were probably notmembers of the warrior class, as this form of warfare was not really regarded as ‘heroic’. Slingers weresometimes involved in open warfare (such as the Gallic ambush of a Roman column in 54 BC), but moreoften in the defence of hill forts, along with archers. In preparation for the general revolt of 52 BC,Vercingetorix called up all the archers of Gaul; they were probably Gauls of the lower classes, but were vitalto the success of the strategy of the revolt.

Very little is known about the organisation of Gallic armies and their workings in pitched battle, althoughthey seem to have relied heavily on the effectiveness of infantry and cavalry charges at the start of battle tobreak the enemy lines. Pitched battle, even at a small scale, provided one of the best opportunities to displaymilitary prowess and so was an important way of making war, but not all Gallic tribes were so keen onmeeting the enemy in the open, especially when that enemy was as powerful as Rome, so the strategies ofthe tribes varied. While some Images of fighting were common in ancient Rome including, as in this case,on sarcophagi. This late 2nd-century AD sarcophagus from Rome has a stylised depiction of battle betweenRomans and barbarians that portrays the confusion and urgency of pitched battle. (Museo NazionaleRomano) stronger tribes and coalitions like the Nervii were eager to meet the Romans in pitched battle,others like the tribes of Aquitania in south-western Gaul relied more on hit-and-run tactics and attacking theinvaders’ supply lines as Vercingetorix planned to do during the revolt of 52 BC. Some of the coastal tribes

ABOVE Detail from Trajan’s Column. Roman casualties are treated by their comrades on the battlefield. Considerableeffort was taken to assist the convalescence of sick and wounded soldiers so that they could be returned to active servicein their units quickly. (Ancient Art and Architecture)

WARRING SIDES 19

who possessed mobile wealth (usually in the form of cattle) were able to withdraw into marshlands andavoid direct conflict with the Romans, like the Menapii and Morini of the Channel coast. The Veneti, whosewealth was founded on trade and whose military strength was maritime, based their strategy around defenceof hill forts situated on coastal promontories, simply moving by sea to another when one was about to becaptured by the Romans. Different tribes, then, had the military capacity to adapt their strategies to dealwith the new threat of Rome, and some of these variations were quite successful in impeding Roman

Sculpture of an aristocratic warrior from Vachères in France, Ist century BC.Wearing a torque round his neck, he mayrepresent a Gaul who fought against the Romans, or perhaps a Gallic officer in a Roman auxiliary unit. He is equippedin the Roman style, with mail shirt, large shield and sword. (Ancient Art and Architecture)


progress. Hit-and-run tactics and the avoidance of pitched battle may also have been preferred by Gallictribes, or necessitated by the absence of the kind of logistical support that Roman armies could depend upon.Large Gallic armies could not remain in existence for very long and unless a decisive engagement quicklyoccurred, such an army would usually have to disband because of lack of supplies. The Belgic army in 57BC, which combined many different tribes, was forced to dissipate for this reason when a decisive engagementwith Caesar was not forthcoming.

The professional Roman army had many advantages over the armies of the Gallic warrior societies and itwas not surprising that several tribes quickly went over to Rome, or that under the leadership of such aneffective general as Caesar, the conquest of Gaul was completed remarkably quickly.

The Battersea shield, found in the Thames at London. This bronze shield may just have been for ceremonial purposes,but is the same design as the wooden versions used in battle. The Celtic shield, like the Roman scutum, provided goodprotection to the infantryman. (Ancient Art and Architecture)

WARRING SIDES 21

Gallic flair and Roman discipline

Gallic and Roman fighting styles were the complete antithesis of each other. For both cultures, victory inpitched battle was the ultimate accolade for a warrior or soldier, and also for tribal chieftains and Romangenerals. To show courage on the battlefield was expected; to die in battle was glorious. By the mid-1stcentury BC, when Caesar began his conquest of Gaul, Romans and Gauls had been fighting each other onand off for centuries. In their literature the Romans betrayed both a fear of their barbarian neighbours, and asneaking admiration for the way they fought. Gauls were perceived as much larger than Romans (they areportrayed as being of almost giant stature in some accounts); certainly they probably were generally a littletaller than the average Italian legionary, and the Romans seem to have been rather defensive about beingshorter than their adversaries. Nonetheless, the style of fighting they employed was perfect for fightingGauls. Indeed, the organisation of legions into maniples (120-man units), and the introduction of the largescutum and short gladius as the principal weapons of legionary hand-to-hand combat may have beeninspired by conflicts with the Gauls in the 4th century BC.

The Gallic fighting style allowed the warrior to display himself on the battlefield, either through fightingnaked or by wearing elaborately decorated armour, and he showed off his valour by fighting as an individual.The warrior’s long sword required him to have a fair amount of space around him on the battlefield in orderto operate properly. The Celtic sword was essentially a slashing weapon and in the hands of a tall Gallicwarrior with a long reach, could be a deadly blade, particularly against shorter opposition with shortswords. But the Gallic warriors fought as individuals; though training and especially experience must have

Celtic infantry and cavalry on the Gundestrup Cauldron. The warriors have distinctive animal motifs on their helmetswhich would have made them stand out on the battlefield, and they are accompanied into battle by the carnyx, a longtrumpet-like instrument made of bronze. (Ancient Art and Architecture)


provided them with some understanding of tactics, and commands could have been communicated on thebattlefield through musical instruments, they did not possess the same degree of training to fight as a unitthat Roman soldiers did. When forced to retreat, they could not always maintain ranks and withdraw in

Images of fighting were common in ancient Rome including, as in this case, on sarcophagi. This late 2nd-century ADsarcophagus from Rome has a stylised depiction of battle between Romans and barbarians that portrays the confusionand urgency of pitched battle. (Museo Nazionale Romano)

WARRING SIDES 23

good order, something that required considerable training and absolute trust in one’s fellow soldiers. Thismade them vulnerable to outflanking manoeuvres and to cavalry attacks on retreating warriors. Lack ofspace to swing their swords could also cause havoc in the Gallic ranks. When forced together, Gallicwarriors could not use their swords properly, and this made them vulnerable to an enemy who could operateat very close quarters with deadly efficiency.

The Roman legionary’s equipment did not make him reliant on his neighbour’s shield for protection incombat as in a Greek phalanx formation, as he fought as an individual, but he was dependent on the strengthof his unit. If his comrades in his century, cohort or legion gave way, he would eventually become exposedto attack on the flank or rear. The might of the Roman army lay in the strength of its formations, and thatwas based on unit morale, discipline and training. These can clearly be seen when Caesar’s legions cameunder sudden attack by the Nervii in the second season of campaigning. The legionaries did not even needtheir officers to give them orders: they automatically dropped their entrenching tools, picked up theirweapons, and formed a battle line. Their training ensured that even though they were not with their ownunits and the men they normally fought with, they were resourceful enough to create an effective line ofbattle. Roman soldiers were not automatons in a ‘military machine’: they were trained to think and use theirinitiative as well as follow orders. The training and discipline instilled in the soldiers meant that Romanunits could move over battlefields in formation and even retreat while maintaining a defensive formation, aninvaluable technique in warfare for minimising casualties.

TOP Mid-1st century AD column base from Mainz, Germany. Two legionaries fight in pitched battle, the figuresclearly showing the thrusting motion of the short but deadly Roman sword, the gladius. (Landesmuseum, Mainz)


In combat with their taller Gallic opponents with their slashing swords, they threw their pila and thenmoved in very close for hand-to-hand combat. The large scutum protected most of the legionary’s front andleft side, his short gladius was ideal for stabbing in close-quarter fighting, and he could even punch at theenemy with the metal boss of his shield. If the legionaries moved in close enough, they could literally crampthe style of their Gallic opponents while still giving themselves the small amount of room they needed tooperate effectively. The short gladius was a brutally efficient tool for killing: a short stab at the torso orespecially the belly of his opponent, who may well have been fighting without armour, and he would havebeen killed or badly injured with damage to internal organs and serious bleeding. Though Roman soldiers weretrained to stab with their swords, that did not stop them from slashing with them, and the fine quality and perfectweighting of the gladius meant that they could easily hack off limbs. The average Roman legionary mayhave been shorter in stature than his Gallic opponent, but his equipment meant he was not at a disadvantage.Moreover, the tactics and fighting style employed in pitched battle against Celtic opponents turned it into anadvantage. Usually, in pitched battle Roman discipline triumphed over Gallic flair.

LEFT Column base from Mainz, Germany. An auxiliary soldier in action. Unlike the legionaries, he is armed with anoval shield and spears instead of a pilum (javelin) and short sword. Auxiliary troops on the Rhine would have beenraised from nearby provinces, including Gaul. (Landesmuseum, Mainz)

WARRING SIDES 25

OutbreakThe migration of the Helvetii

On 28 March 58 BC the Celtic tribe of the Helvetii left their homes in Switzerland and, along with theirneighbours, the Raurici, Tulingi, Latobrigi and Boii, began a migration west. The purpose of this massmovement of tribes, including women, children and livestock, was to move to western Gaul, to the lands ofother Gallic tribes on which they intended to settle after defeating the inhabitants and forcing them to moveon. These mass migrations of whole tribes were not unheard of, and a similar movement of German tribes inthe late 2nd century BC had led to the clashes between them and Rome, leading to the catastrophic defeatsof several Roman armies. The migration of the Helvetii did not come as a surprise to anyone, however, asextensive planning had been necessary. Preparations had begun three years previously. By the late 60s BCthe Helvetii were feeling the pressure of space. Hemmed in by the mountains of Switzerland, they had littleopportunity to expand their territory to cater for a growing population and to display their military prowessby occupying enemy land. The Helvetii were also concerned at the presence to the north of their land ofGerman tribes which had been migrating westwards, particularly the aggressive Suebic king Ariovistus,who had settled in the territory of the Sequani after they and the Arverni had sought his support in localwars with the Aedui.

The Helvetii had begun their preparations in 61 BC, building up three years’ supply of grain for thejourney and for sowing the new lands they planned to take over in western Gaul. Other supplies weregathered, draught animals and wagons. Much of this was done under the leadership of a Helvetian noble,Orgetorix, who also secretly formed an alliance with two Gallic aristocrats, Casticus of the Sequani andDumnorix the Aeduan, the brother of Diviciacus who had close ties with Rome. The three seem to haveplanned to seize power in their tribes and lead a coalition, perhaps to conquer and partition Gaul betweenthe three tribes or, more likely, either to drive the Germans under Ariovistus back east of the Rhine, or tooppose the increasing threat of Roman intervention or invasion, or perhaps both. Whatever the purpose ofthe plot, it was discovered and Orgetorix committed suicide before he could be put on trial for conspiring tomake himself king. This did not deter the Helvetii from their migration plans, however; in the spring of 58BC they burned their towns, villages and surplus grain to rule out the possibility of abandoning themigration, and with thousands of wagons started west, towards the Gallic lands west of the Rhône, andtowards the Roman province.

Gauls and Romans were concerned by the prospect of the migration. The movement of several thousandpeople would cause huge damage to the lands they passed through, and could destabilise the whole ofsouthern Gaul as tribes chose whether to join the Helvetii in a bid for land or to oppose them. At the end oftheir migration the Helvetii planned to seize land from other tribes, causing further disruption to thepolitical balance of the area. Some tribes would have looked towards Rome for assistance, and in 60 BC theSenate had sent ambassadors to Gallic tribes in an attempt to discourage them from joining the Helvetii. Theproposed migration threatened the security of Rome’s allies including the Aedui and the Allobroges, as well

as Provence with its desirable fertile lands. While it was unlikely that the Helvetii would have turned southto threaten Italy, memories of the disasters inflicted by the Germans may have made Romesomewhat concerned about migratory tribes, and there was a real worry over Germanic tribes moving intothe vacated Helvetian lands. In Roman thought, Germans were less desirable neighbours than Gauls. Romedid not want upheavals on her northern borders and the preparations for the migrations led to thoughts ofwar in Rome. Ostensibly launched to protect Rome’s interests, a war against the Helvetii would probablyhave led to the greater Roman intervention in Gaul that concerned Orgetorix and his allies.

A Roman war in Gaul was becoming inevitable by the late 60s. The consul of 60 BC, Metellus, seems tohave been extremely keen to campaign against the Gauls and obtain a triumph. The leading Romanpolitician Marcus Cicero describes him as ‘not over-happy at the reports of peace in Gaul’, after Orgetorix’sfailed coup, and the consul of 59 BC, Julius Caesar, was equally eager to make his mark militarily. Thethreat posed by the Helvetii to Provence and Gallic allies provided the casus belli, and the opportunity forCaesar to involve himself in Gaul, but had this not arisen, he may well have found some other excuse tocampaign there. As it was, once the Helvetian threat had been neutralised, he swiftly found justifications tomove deeper into Gaul and Gallic affairs to ensure sensational victories and conquests. These were easilyfound in the request by Rome’s Aeduan allies for assistance against Ariovistus, and from there the Roman

OUTBREAK 27

conquest of Gaul was Caesar’s most likely aim. When Caesar, the new governor of Cisalpine andTransalpine Gaul, heard that the Helvetii were finally on the move, it was his duty to protect his province ofTransalpine Gaul, which was directly in the path of the migrants. The Helvetii asked Caesar for permissionto cross Roman territory and when he refused they turned north to continue their migration withouttrespassing on the Roman land. Although they were now no longer a direct threat to Rome, Caesar followedthem and made an unprovoked attack on the Helvetii while they were crossing a river. The actions of the

Trajan’s Column in Rome illustrates campaigns of the early 2nd century AD, but many of the features shown, especiallyengineering skills and camp building, were just as important in the conquest of Gaul. In the top scroll, soldiers build acamp from turves to ensure the army is not attacked at night. (Ancient Art and Architecture)


Helvetii were sufficient to warrant such a reaction, especially since the Romans considered them to be‘barbarians’. The conquest of Gaul was an aggressive war of expansion led by a general who was seeking toadvance his career and standing amongst his peers, but who was acting within the expectations of Romansociety and its value systems.

OUTBREAK 29

The fightingInvasion, siege and conquest

58 BC The first campaign

In the first year of his governorship, Caesar fought and won two major pitched battles and set himself up toconquer Gaul. The speed and decisiveness with which he operated must have impressed his political rivalsin Rome, and terrified the Gauls. Caesar had freed them from the menace of the migrating Helvetii and theGerman king Ariovistus, but now he threatened their independence himself.

Caesar was still in Rome when news arrived in mid-March that the Helvetii were on the move, heading westtowards Geneva and southern Gaul, dangerously close to the Roman province. He immediately headed forProvence, ordering the only legion stationed there to make for Geneva and to destroy the bridge over theRhône. He levied auxiliary troops in Provence and raised two new legions in northern Italy. Playing fortime, he agreed to consider a request that the Helvetii be allowed to pass, but then refused once his troopshad built defences that forced the Helvetii away from Roman territory and into central France. He thendashed back to Italy to collect the two new legions and three veteran legions in garrison at Aquileia,marched them through the Alps in early summer and caught up with the Helvetii as they were crossing theSaône. Three-quarters had crossed, but Caesar attacked those remaining. Some escaped into the woods, buthis legions slaughtered the rest. The casualty figures are not recorded.

Crossing the Saône in a single day on pontoons, Caesar caught up with the main body of Helvetii andtrailed them at a discreet distance, refusing to be drawn into combat except on his terms. The Helvetii werekeen to avoid battle and tried to negotiate, but Caesar’s demands were too severe, perhaps intentionallysince he was probably eager to fight when the tactical situation became favourable. It did a few days laterand a force under Labienus took the high ground above the Helvetian camp in preparation for an attack, buta veteran scout panicked and wrongly reported to Caesar that the flashes of arms he had seen on the hillwere definitely Gallic, not Roman, so the attack had to be aborted.

Caesar continued to tail the Helvetii, but was finally forced towards Bibracte to collect supplies from hisAeduan allies, his own supply train being stuck on the Saône. Perhaps hoping to cut the Romans off fromtheir supplies, the Helvetii decided to give battle and attacked the Roman rearguard. Caesar deployed on aslope under cover of a cavalry screen.

Battle against the Helvetii

The Roman forces consisted of six legions numbering c. 24,000–30,000 men, as well as unknown numbersof auxiliary infantry and cavalry. Two of the legions were newly recruited and many of the auxiliaries wereGauls. Their fighting capabilities must have been suspect.

There are no figures for the size of the Helvetian army; their allies, the Boii and Tulingi, numbered c. 15,000, and it is unlikely that the total Gallic army was more than c. 50,000 men.

Caesar deployed his two new legions and the auxiliary infantry on the high ground as a reserve and toguard the Roman encampment; the four veteran legions deployed as a triplex acies on ground sloping downtowards the Helvetii. (Four cohorts were in the front line, with two further lines of three cohorts each as areserve force.) The Helvetii formed up in very close order. They gathered their baggage, wagons andfamilies beyond the left wing of their battle line, along with their allies, the Boii and Tulingi.

The first attack of the Helvetii was easily repulsed by the Romans, who had the advantage of the slopeand superior weaponry in the form of their pila, which stuck into the enemy’s shields, weighing them downand pinning them together. The Helvetii were forced back, but this attack may have been a feint. As theRoman cohorts followed the retreating Helvetii, the Boii and Tulingi outflanked the Roman right. At this pointthe Helvetii renewed the fight and the Romans were surrounded. Close-quarter infantry combat ensued. Thebrilliant tactical flexibility of the legion enabled Caesar to order the rear line of cohorts to turn round andthe legions fought the battle on two fronts. The Roman reserves on the hill were not even engaged.

The Helvetii fled; the Boii and Tulingi were forced back against the wagons and slaughtered, along withthe women and children.

In the aftermath of the battle, Caesar rested for three days to see to his wounded before continuing hispursuit of the Helvetii, who promptly surrendered. Concerned that Germanic tribes might move into thelands vacated by the Helvetii, Caesar ordered the survivors home. Caesar claims that of the 368,000 who setout on the migration, only 110,000 returned.

After dealing with the Helvetii, Caesar turned on the German tribes who occupied land on the left bank ofthe Rhine under their king Ariovistus. Caesar needed a good reason for attacking a king who was a ‘Friendand Ally of the Roman People’, and claimed that the Germans were raiding allied Aeduan territory and otherGallic tribes had asked for help. Both sides aimed to occupy the strategically important town of Besançonbut Caesar got there first. Here panic spread through Caesar’s inexperienced troops and even among someof his officers that Ariovistus and his army was going to be a much tougher prospect than the migratorytribes the Romans had so easily slaughtered. Caesar had to restore discipline by threatening to march offwith only one of his legions. When he did march, with all his army, the two leaders met to parley butneither was prepared to damage his reputation by backing down and agreeing to the other’s demands tovacate Gaul. Pitched battle was inevitable, although Caesar was more eager to force an engagement,perhaps because of his usual difficulties with his supplies. He was dependent for supplies on Gallic tribeswhose reliability was sometimes suspect, and the speed with which he liked to operate on campaign onlyadded to the uncertainties of his supply lines. Eventually, the Romans forced Ariovistus to deploy bymarching in battle formation right at the German encampment.

The Germans parked their wagons behind their battle line, Caesar says to prevent the warriors escaping,but it may equally have been to prevent an outflanking manoeuvre by the Romans. The engagement beganwith the Germans charging so quickly that the Romans had no time to throw their pila, and an intenseperiod of hand-to-hand combat ensued. The German left was routed by the Roman right under the personalcommand of Caesar, but the Roman left was coming under pressure. The officer in command of the cavalry,Publius Crassus, saw this and had the initiative to redeploy the third line of each legion to attack the Germanright. Again it was the flexibility of legionary tactics that turned the battle and the Germans fled, pursuedthe full 15 miles to the Rhine. The German losses are reported at 80,000 and the battle was clearly anoutright victory for the Romans. In just one year Caesar was able to report to his rivals in Rome that he haddefeated two of Rome’s traditional and most feared enemies, Gauls and Germans. He wintered his legions nearVesontio and returned to northern Italy to attend to the civil aspects of his governorship.

THE FIGHTING 31

The engineering skills of the Roman army are best illustrated by the bridge Caesar’s soldiers built in 10 days across theRhine. The bridge was built entirely of wood and required hundreds of timbers to be driven into the river bed frombarges built specially for the purpose. Once they were in place, a timber roadway was constructed on top, allowing theRoman army to march across the river into Germany. (Glasgow University Library)


57 BC Conquest of the east

By early 57 BC, if he had not already resolved to do so the previous year, Caesar had decided to conquer the

THE FIGHTING 33

whole of Gaul.

German cavalry tacticsAlthough the horses the German cavalrymen used were small and sometimes of poor quality, the cavalry

itself was made particularly effective through the addition of a force of light infantry that worked in tandemwith the cavalry. This provided the manoeuvrability of cavalry along with the staying power of infantry.

‘With the six thousand cavalry was the same number of infantry, the swiftest and bravest men, each chosenfrom the whole army by a cavalryman for his own protection; they went into battle together. The cavalry wouldfall back on them; if the cavalry were in difficulties the infantry ran to help; if a cavalryman had been woundedand fallen from his horse, they surrounded him. They had become so swift through training that on a longadvance or a quick retreat they could keep up by running, holding on to the horses’ manes.’

Caesar, Gallic War

Some Gallic tribes were persuaded to form alliances with Rome because of the protection and influencesuch a relationship would bring within Gaul, and they may have felt, probably correctly, that as conquestwas inevitable, it was better to be on the winning side. The Aedui in central Gaul were encouraged toremain Caesar’s staunchest ally by his willingness to let them expand their influence over defeated Gallictribes. The Remi in northern Gaul preferred to fight with Rome rather than against her, providing Caesarwith intelligence during the campaign. However, the majority of Belgic tribes, feared Rome’s growingpower in the region and prepared to resist, soliciting help

Caesar’s subordinatesCaesar had under his command a number of officers who were also senators in Rome and whom he could

appoint to senior positions. A quaestor was attached to the province of Gaul who had some financialresponsibilities, and as a junior senator could also command troops, sometimes independently. Publius Crassusseems to have been a particularly able young man who, in 54 BC, went to join his father on the doomedcampaign against the Parthians; he was killed at Carrhae the following year.

Caesar was also allowed to appoint a number of legates, usually more senior senators like Labienus who hadheld the Praetorship, a senior magistracy in Rome. These men could be placed in command of quite largeforces of several legions plus cavalry, and trusted with independent commands. Labienus was left in charge ofthe entire province of Gaul during the expeditions to Britain. Appointing legates provided an opportunity topay back political debts or to place others in your debt through patronage, although his debt to Caesar did notprevent Labienus from siding with Pompey in the Civil War.

from the Germans. Caesar claims they could muster an army of 200,000 warriors.Caesar raised two more legions, bringing the total to eight (32,000–40,000 men, plus auxiliaries), and at

the start of the campaigning season, headed for northern Gaul. His intention was to defeat the powerfulBelgic tribes and cut them off from German support to the east. The Belgae caught up with him near Bibraxand tried to capture the oppidum from the occupying Remi who were being assisted by lightly armed missiletroops Caesar had sent to help. Unable to capture the town, the Belgae instead ravaged the land and thenturned towards Caesar’s camp by the river Aisne. Neither side wished for battle at this point, althoughCaesar had prepared by linking artillery redoubts to the camp by means of trenches to prevent a Belgicoutflanking manoeuvre should battle ensue. Skirmishes followed, but still no battle. Eventually each side’ssupply requirements effected a result of sorts: Caesar attempted to precipitate a general engagement by sendinghis cavalry and light infantry against the Belgae because he was concerned about being cut off from hissupplies. But the Belgae, too, were running short of supplies and because they had no logistical support, simply


A coin depicting the Celtic thunder god, Taranis, who is shown clutching a lightning bolt and standing next to a solarwheel, the symbols of his power His rectangular shield closely resembles those of the Gallic warriors who foughtagainst Caesar’s legions (see also illustration on page 24). (Ancient Art and Architecture)

THE FIGHTING 35

disbanded their army, to re-form if, or when, Caesar threatened them directly. They may also haverecognised that Caesar’s prepared battlefield made the terrain too unfavourable for a successfulengagement.

The speed at which Roman armies could move proved an important factor in the success of this year’scampaigns. Caesar pounced on the oppidum of the Suessiones at Noviodunum (on the river Aisne), hopingto capture it before the warriors returned after the Belgic army had disbanded. Though the warriors wereable to sneak in at night, they quickly surrendered when they saw the siege preparations: clearly they hadnever experienced anything like Roman siege warfare before. The psychological effects of this surrenderwere widespread, with the Bellovaci and Ambiones surrendering to the Romans without resistance. The nexttribe though, the Nervii, decided to resist, formed an alliance with the neighbouring Atrebates andViromandui and planned to ambush Caesar’s army as it was marching or at its most vulnerable whenencamping. Making use of the terrain, the land patched with dense woodland and divided by high hedgerows,the Nervii set an ambush in woods on the far side of the river Sambre. The Romans began fortifying campon the near side of the river, and their cavalry and light infantry crossed the water to scout and keep theNervii away while the legionaries completed the encampment. They were easily repulsed by the Nervii,who then charged very fast at the entrenching Roman soldiers. Caesar had failed to deploy a screen ofinfantry to protect those entrenching, standard procedure when encamping in the presence of the enemy, andhis legions were caught dispersed and unprepared. The two rookie legions forming the rearguard had noteven arrived at the campsite.

Battle against the Nervii

Caesar employed eight legions, two of which were still marching, and an unknown number of auxiliaryinfantry and cavalry. The Nervii had at least 60,000 warriors of the Nervii, Atrebates and Viromandui.

Faced with a sudden attack, the Roman legionaries did exactly the right thing. Both they and theirofficers had a year’s more experience than when they had panicked in the face of Ariovistus the previousyear, and their training and discipline kicked in. They grabbed arms and automatically created a line ofbattle. The IX and X legions held the left wing, the VIII and XI the centre, and the VII and XII the rightwing.

The Nervii created a very strong left wing; the Viromandui held the centre and the Atrebates the rightwing.

The two cavalry forces were already engaged, with the Gallic cavalry mauling the Romans.Despite the battle line being cut up by the hedgerows, the Romans held the line fast and withheld the

Belgic onslaught. The Roman centre was successful and the left wing repulsed the Atrebates, pursuing themacross the Sambre. This success left the half-built Roman camp and the right wing of the battle line exposedand the Gauls captured the camp.

Meanwhile, the Roman right wing was outflanked by the Nervii, several of the officers had been killedand the ranks had become too packed together to operate effectively: the situation was critical. Taking upposition on foot with the front rank soldiers, Caesar ordered the ranks opened up and the two legions to forma square so they could defend themselves from attack on all sides. His own presence helped to stiffenresistance until help arrived in the form of the X Legion, which had been sent back to assist after capturingthe enemy encampment, and the two rookie legions of the rearguard which had finally arrived. Thecombined force of five legions turned the tide of battle and obliterated the Nervii who refused to surrenderor withdraw.


Caesar’s over-confidence had led to a dangerous situation, but his personal bravery and the experience of

THE FIGHTING 37

his army turned it into a significant victory. This successful engagement broke the power of the Belgae tosuch an extent that even German tribes beyond the Rhine sent envoys to Caesar offering submission. Inoperations towards the end of the year, one legion was sent to pacify the tribes on the Atlantic seaboard andwith the remainder of his army, Caesar reduced the Aduatuci, who as allies of the Nervii were legitimatetargets. Because they broke the terms of their surrender, all the Aduatuci were sold into slavery. The profitfrom selling 53,000 Aduatuci into slavery was, by rights, Caesar’s alone.

Towards winter, Caesar sent one of his senior officers, Galba to open up the road over the Great StBernard pass into Italy, allegedly for trade purposes. But he had been given an inadequate force of one under-strength legion and when Galba billeted his troops in the village of Octodurus he came under heavy attackfrom the local tribes who were concerned, probably rightly, that the Romans were more interested inconquest than trade routes. Galba’s legion, the XII, was depleted after its mauling in battle with the Nerviiand the poorly defended position they held was untenable. Galba was forced to abandon the campaign andbreak out, though according to reports they managed to kill some 10,000 Gauls on the way. Despite thissetback, at the end of this second year, Caesar reported that Gaul was at peace and the Senate in Rome votedhim an unprecedented 15-day public thanksgiving, which greatly increased his political and militaryreputation. He returned again to northern Italy to spend the winter; his legions were quartered in northernGaul, the tribes there being forced to provide for the soldiers.

56 BC Naval warfare and the conquest of the west

Gallic resentment at the compulsion to feed the Roman legions over the winter showed itself when theVenetic tribes in north-western Gaul detained Roman officers sent out to procure grain and other supplies.Roman prestige demanded a heavy response.

The AeduiFriendly relations between Rome and the Aedui had existed since 122 BC, and Aeduan warriors had served

as auxiliaries in Roman armies, particularly as cavalry. Their support was vital for Caesar’s campaigns inGaul: they provided additional forces, food supplies, and a friendly place to fall back on should the Romanssuffer a reverse. They were able to pressurise some tribes into allying themselves to Rome, such as theBellovaci in 57 BC, but there was not unanimous support for Rome amongst the tribe. While Diviciacus, aninfluential aristocrat who had been chief magistrate of the Aedui, was a staunch supporter of Rome, his brotherDumnorix was just as passionately opposed to the alliance and though he was killed by Roman troops in 54 BC,some anti-Roman sentiment continued. Some Aeduan forces joined the revolt of 52 BC, but the tribe’sinvolvement was by no means total. In return for Aeduan support, Caesar had allowed the tribe to extend itsinfluence, letting them settle the Boii on their territory after their defeat with the Helvetii, for example, andpicking them out as one of only two tribes spared punishment after the surrender of Alesia. Their favouredstatus and the willingness with which they embraced Roman culture resulted in the Aedui producing the firstGallic senator after the emperor Claudius admitted Gauls to that institution.

Since the Veneti were essentially a maritime force, ships were requisitioned from Gallic allies, warshipswere ordered constructed on the Loire, and oarsmen recruited in Provence with a view to beginning thenaval campaign as early as the weather permitted. The Veneti knew that the capture of Roman officerswould bring the invading army down on them and also prepared. They had the advantage of knowledge ofboth the land and the sea: warfare on the Atlantic with its storms and strong tides would be rather differentfrom the kind of naval warfare Rome was used to in the Mediterranean. The Veneti fortified their hill forts,


many of which were situated on isolated spits of land more accessible by sea than land, and gathered alliesfrom Aremorica (modern Brittany), the Channel coast, and even the British tribes with whom they traded.

Caesar divided his forces and sent them to campaign in different parts of northern and western Gaul, proofthat his claims that Gaul was at peace or had been conquered were something of an exaggeration.Throughout his governorship, Caesar was worried about incursions by German tribes and always kept astrong force in the Ardennes with cavalry to provide mobility against the Germans. This force also helped tohold down the Belgic tribes. Other forces were sent to Aquitania under Crassus, and Normandy underSabinus. Caesar himself led a force of nearly four legions to meet with his newly gathered fleet, probablynear the mouth of the Loire.

The Veneti

The Venetic campaign was a tough one. Sieges and assaults took care of the hill forts, but the wealth andresources of the Veneti were mobile and when one hill fort was about to be taken they loaded up their shipswith people and possessions and simply sailed off to another. The newly built Roman fleet, designed forMediterranean conditions and warfare, lacked the sturdiness needed to face Atlantic conditions and wasstuck in harbour. The Romans, despite their professional army, sophisticated siege equipment and brandnew fleet, were facing an impasse and Caesar was forced to pause until his fleet could join him. Eventuallythe sea was calm enough to allow the Roman fleet to sail, and it encountered the Venetic navy off the coastof Brittany.

The size of the Roman fleet is not reported, but it consisted of Roman galleys, and ships provided byRome’s allies south of the Loire. The combined fleet of the Veneti and her allies numbered 220, althoughsome may have been little more than fishing boats. The Venetic ships, designed for rough seas, were builtof strong oak beams, too sturdy to be rammed by the galleys and too high in the water for the effective useof missiles.

Under the command of Decimus Brutus (who was later one of Caesar’s assassins), the Roman fleetprepared grappling hooks to take on the Gallic sailing ships and then attacked. As with the famous corvus,the boarding bridge used against the mighty Carthaginian navy in the First Punic War, the Romans used thegrappling hooks to overcome their disadvantage in naval warfare, cutting the rigging of the Gallic ships andrendering them helpless since they relied entirely on sail power. Unable to counter this new tactic, theVeneti decided to withdraw, at which point the wind dropped. Fortune favoured the Romans, who relied onoar power, and the galleys were able to go in and pick off the becalmed Venetic ships at their leisure. In anengagement lasting from late morning till sunset, most of the Venetic ships were destroyed.

Having lost their naval power, the Veneti could no longer retreat; they had nothing to protect them againstthe Romans or against other Gallic and British tribes and were forced to surrender. To serve as an example,Caesar executed the elders and sold the remainder of the population into slavery.

Normandy and Aquitania

Sabinus easily defeated a coalition of Venelli, Curiosolites and Lexovii when they charged the encampmenthe had located at the top of a long rise. They were so exhausted by the time they reached the camp thatwhen the Romans sortied they routed them easily. All the tribes involved surrendered, placing the regionsof modern Normandy under Roman control.

With just over one legion and a cavalry attachment, Publius Crassus had a tougher task against the tribesof Aquitania, so he raised additional infantry and cavalry from Provence and marched south of the Garonne

THE FIGHTING 39

and towards the Pyrenees, repulsing an attack by the Sontiates on the marching column. There was tougheropposition from the Vocates and Tarusates who had Spanish allies who had fought alongside the rebelRoman general Sertorius in the 70s BC. They aimed to cut Crassus off from his supply lines, a strategy thatforced the Romans to seek pitched battle. But, having learned from the successful guerrilla tactics Sertoriushad employed against Roman armies in Spain, the Gallic and Spanish tribes refused battle, instead blockingroads and supplies, and attacking Crassus’ marching column. If he wanted a result from the campaign,Crassus had to force an encounter, so his army attacked the enemy encampment. The camp was onlyproperly fortified at the front, and once he learned of this, Crassus ordered reinforcements to circle roundand attack the rear of the camp. The army of about 50,000 Gauls was taken by surprise and, completelysurrounded, attempted to break out and flee, pursued by Crassus’ cavalry force. Crassus reported to Caesarthat only about 12,000 escaped the slaughter, and most of the tribes in the surrounding area surrendered.This was a significant victory and Crassus had succeeded in forcing the surrender of a huge area of south-western Gaul.

Towards the end of summer, Caesar turned on the Morini and Menapii on the Channel coast. They hadsupported the Veneti and that was reason enough for an attack, but Caesar was probably already consideringhis campaigns for the following year, which would require a settled situation in northern Gaul. However,the poor weather and enemy tactics of withdrawing into forested and marshy land, meant that Caesar was


only able to ravage farmland, rather than engage the enemy and he withdrew for the winter. The legionswent into winter quarters in the land between the Loire and Saône that belonged to recently conqueredtribes, their punishment for having resisted.

Before Caesar’s campaigns, Roman naval actions had been confined to the Mediterranean. The trireme illustrated onthis civil war denarius was ill-suited to working in the tidal waters of the Atlantic seaboard and campaigns had to behalted until suitable conditions or vessels were available. (AISA)

THE FIGHTING 41

55 BC Publicity stunts

Caesar’s two campaigns of 55 BC were dictated more by events in Rome than by military requirements inGaul. His two closest political allies, the same men who were his greatest rivals, Pompey and Crassus, wereconsuls in Rome. The chief magistrates of the Roman state, their positions enabled them to seize all thepublicity and buy the people’s affections and votes with gifts, grain, and public banquets. Aware of the needto remain in the public eye, Caesar decided to enhance his reputation by being the first Roman to lead anarmy across the Rhine into Germany and over the ‘ocean’ to the mysterious island of Britain.

Two German tribes, the Usipi and Tencteri, had crossed the Rhine in search of Roman soldiers buildingcamp, their arms neatly stacked within reach. Caesar defied military theory by building camps near woodsand consequently, his troops were attacked whilst entrenching. When the Nervii attacked his army in 57BC, he was lucky that they were able to form a battle line and retaliate. (Trajan’s Column, AKG) land afterbeing ousted from their own by stronger Suebi, but following the policy he had established in his first yearof office, Caesar refused to allow them to settle in Gaul. With a small force of 800 cavalry these Germantribes then routed a Roman cavalry force (actually made up of Gauls) some 5,000 strong, killing 74. Inretaliation, Caesar attacked their camp, caught them by surprise and massacred them, men, women andchildren, driving them into the nearby Rhine. Though there were probably nothing like the 430,000casualties Caesar claims, it is likely that tens of thousands were killed, with no Roman losses. Romanwarfare was often brutal, but this was excessively so, and Caesar’s enemies in Rome threatened to prosecutehim for war crimes once his governorship and its accompanying immunity from prosecution came to an end.

Caesar then decided to cross the Rhine to intimidate the Germans further, if they were not terrifiedenough by his massacre of the Usipi and Tencteri. Because this was a publicity stunt to gain prestige amongboth the Germans and his fellow Romans, Caesar decided to build a bridge and march across the Rhinerather than row across. In ten days, his troops had built a timber bridge on wooden piles driven into theriverbed and Caesar marched into Germany, burned some empty villages, marched back before thepowerful Suebic army could muster, and destroyed the bridge. The first Roman invasion of Germany lasted18 days.

The expedition to Britain was as brief as that to Germany. Caesar crossed the Channel late in thecampaigning season, his justification for the campaign being the military assistance the British tribes keptgiving the Gauls, but that was a mere excuse. The expedition to Britain was hardly an invasion; Caesar tookonly two legions with him, the VII and X, and the cavalry force never got across the Channel, seriouslylimiting Roman operations. It is not known where in Kent Caesar landed, but the land-fall was protected bycliffs and the A Celtic promentary fort in Spain, similar to those utilised by the Veneti in Brittany.Positioned on isolated spits of land, these forts were often accessible only by sea, which made attacks adifficult proposition for the invading Romans. (AISA)Britons were waiting, so he moved seven miles up thecoast to a flat, more open beach. The British had sent on their cavalry and chariots to oppose the landingsand the deep-hulled Roman transports had to disembark the legionaries in deep water. Up to their waists inwater and fully loaded with kit, the legionaries struggled ashore to be met by the terrifying barbarians,cavalry and chariots. Despite artillery support, thelegionaries were reluctant to leave the safetyof their ships.They were inspired to do soby the example set by the famouseagle-bearer of the X Legion. Jumping intothesea, this unnamed soldier forced hisfellow legionaries to follow him by takingthe standard into battle. Tolose a standardwas the ultimate disgrace and the soldiers ofthe X Legion began disembarking. Once thescoutships began ferrying more legionariesto shore, the infantry was able to form upand force a landing. TheBritons fled, butthe failure of the cavalry to make thecrossing meant the Romans were unable tofinish thebattle decisively.


Roman soldiers building camp, their arms neatly stacked within reach. Caesar defied military theory by building campsnear woods and consequently, his troops were attacked whilst entrenching. When the Nervii attacked his army in 57BC, he was lucky that they were able to form a battle line and retaliate. (Trajan’s Column, AKG)

THE FIGHTING 43

In the following days the Roman expeditionary force suffered nothing but setbacks. Again, the cavalryfailed to make the crossing, high tides caused serious damage to a number of the ships and transports, and

A Celtic promentary fort in Spain, similar to those utilised by the Veneti in Brittany. Positioned on isolated spits ofland, these forts were often accessible only by sea, which made attacks a difficult proposition for the invading Romans.(AISA)


the small Roman force was in no position to winter in Britain, as it was inadequately supplied. To cap allthis, a detachment of the VII Legion was ambushed while harvesting grain and although a rescue party haddriven the British off, this only inspired them to gather a large force to attack the seemingly vulnerableRomans. A short pitched battle ensued in front of the Roman encampment, but Caesar gives no detailsexcept that the Britons were easily repulsed and once again the lack of cavalry prevented any pursuit.Caesar demanded hostages from the defeated British tribes but could not wait for them to be handed over. Withthe rapidly approaching equinox and the likelihood of storms, Caesar withdrew, having never got beyondthe coast of Kent. The expedition to Britain could have been a disaster. Caesar had risked everything byleading an under-strength and poorly supplied force to Britain. But the crossing of the Channel caught theimagination of the Roman public more sharply even than the bridging of the Rhine. Caesar became a hero

An iron helmet of Agen Port style. Heavy and robust,the Agen helm is deep and full, rather like a bowler hat, providingexcellent protection to the skull. (Schweisz Landesmuseum, Zurich)

THE FIGHTING 45

and a public thanksgiving of 20 days was decreed in Rome, very satisfactorily trumping any popularityPompey and Crassus had been able to achieve in the capital.

54 BC Back to Britain

Transports suitable for operations in the Channel were designed and built over the winter and a force of fivelegions and 2,000 cavalry made an unopposed landing in Kent in 54 BC. Caesar left three legions and afurther 2,000 cavalry to hold down northern Gaul, and the fact that he took various untrustworthy Gallicchieftains to Britain with him indicates that Gaul was by no means pacified. Nonetheless, the Roman armydisembarked and Caesar immediately took four of the legions and most of the cavalry to find the Britishwho had gathered some 12 miles off. The Britons utilised hit-and-run tactics for most of the campaign andgained some success in hampering Caesar’s advance. But the weather caused problems and again the shipswere damaged by a storm. Caesar was compelled to return to the beachhead, fortify it securely and arrangefor repairs to the ships before heading back out to find the British. The Britons used the delay to gather alarger army under the leadership of Cassivellaunus, king of the powerful Catuvellauni tribe.

The mobility of the British infantry, cavalry and especially the chariots, caused the Romans problems andforced them to remain in close formation on the march, lest they become isolated and picked off by theBritons. But when Cassivellaunus attacked a foraging party and was comprehensively repulsed, seriousBritish resistance was crushed. The Romans crossed the Thames, aiming for the Catuvellaunian capital, ahill fort surrounded by trees, perhaps Wheathampstead in Hertfordshire. At this point, various tribes begansurrendering to Caesar, offering hostages and grain. Caesar’s willingness to accept these overturesencouraged others to capitulate, and once the hill fort was easily taken by storm, Cassivellaunus alsorequested terms. Eager to withdraw from Britain before the equinoctial storms, Caesar agreed, demandinghostages and an annual tribute paid to Rome. The second expedition to Britain was far more successful thanthe first, and could truly be described as an invasion. Tribute had been exacted from the tribes and theycould be considered subject to Rome. Caesar had no need to return to the island, and events in Gaulprohibited that anyway.

The winter of 54/53 BC was one of considerable disturbance in Gaul, showing how superficial much ofthe Roman conquest had been. Poor harvests throughout the province forced Caesar to divide his legions upwhen they went into winter quarters in north-eastern Gaul and probably increased discontent among thetribes, who were forced to supply scarce grain to the occupying legions. The scattering of the legionsprovided an opportunity, and within two weeks the winter camps were coming under co-ordinated attack.

Cotta and Sabinus

The furthest east of the winter camps, Cotta’s was the most exposed Roman base and therefore the one mostvulnerable to attack. One inexperienced legion and five cohorts were attacked by the Eburones under theirdynamic leader Ambiorix, who claimed that all northern Gaul was in revolt and German mercenaries hadcrossed the Rhine to join in. He promised safe conduct to the Romans if they left their camp. Foolishly,Sabinus took him at his word and, despite the protestations of his fellow officers he led his force out of thesafety of camp in a formation inappropriate to the tactical situation, straight into an ambush the Gauls hadlaid in a steep-sided valley. The inexperienced troops panicked, unable to maintain proper formation interrain that denied them any opportunity to manoeuvre. The Romans were wiped out, Sabinusignominiously being killed when trying to parley with Ambiorix, whom he still felt he could trust. A few


escaped with their lives, others made it back to the encampment where they committed suicide during thenight to avoid capture.

News of the second campaign in Britain ‘We are waiting for the outcome of the war in Britain. It’s known thatthe approaches to the island are surrounded by wall-like cliffs. It’s also been established that there isn’t a scrapof silver In the island and no hope of booty except for slaves—and I don’t suppose you’re expecting them toknow much about literature or music!’ Marcus Cicero, letter to Atticus, c. 1 July 54 BC.

‘On 24 October I received letters from my brother Quintus and from Caesar, sent from the nearest point onthe coast of Britain on 25 September. The campaign in Britain is over, hostages have been taken, there’s nobooty, but tribute has been paid and they are bringing back the army from Britain.’ Marcus Cicero, letter toAtticus, late October 54 BC.

Quintus Cicero

Quintus Cicero, the brother of Rome’s most famous orator, had one legion encamped in the territory of theNervii. Encouraged by the massacre of Sabinus’ force, the Aduatuci, Nervii and their dependent tribesattacked Cicero’s camp, trying to sell him the same story about general revolt and a German invasion.Unlike Sabinus, Cicero refused point blank to discuss terms, strengthened the camp’s defences and triedfrantically to contact Caesar. Under guidance from Roman prisoners, the Nervii built a circumvallation oframpart and ditch and moved siege towers up to the Roman fortifications. There followed a desperatecouple of weeks in which the legion successfully held off attacks that continued both day and night.Cicero’s troops refused to leave the ramparts even when the barracks were fired and their possessions wereburning, but injuries were taking their toll. By the time Caesar relieved the siege, the legion had suffered 90per cent casualties.

When Cicero did finally get a message to Caesar, he acted immediately, redeploying his legions andhurrying by forced marches to Nervian territory, covering up to 20 miles a day. Though he had only twolegions and a small cavalry force, Caesar destroyed a Nervian army 60,000 strong, which abandoned itssiege of Cicero’s camp to head off the relieving army. Cicero’s dogged resistance and the outstandingbravery of his officers won high praise from Caesar.

53 BC

Following the disastrous winter of 54 BC, the season’s campaigns concentrated on re-establishing Romanmilitary superiority in north-eastern Gaul. Caesar recruited two more legions and borrowed one fromPompey, bringing the total to ten (40,000–50,000 legionaries). The size of the army allowed operations tobe conducted, often simultaneously, against numerous tribes who had either been involved in the winter’suprisings or whom Caesar did not trust. At the end of the campaign most of the legions were quarteredtogether on the Senones; the remaining four were quartered in pairs on the Treveri and Lingones, to preventa repeat of the previous winter’s attacks.

Before the campaigning season had properly begun, Caesar launched a surprise attack, concentrating ondestroying property and capturing prisoners and cattle. The Nervii were swiftly forced to surrender and thelegions returned to winter quarters.

In early spring Caesar marched suddenly on the Senones, taking them before they were able to withdrawinto their fortified town or oppidum. With their people and supplies vulnerable, they had no alternative butto surrender.

THE FIGHTING 47

Caesar marched into the Rhine delta with seven legions. Menapian tactics were to withdraw into themarshes, but the Romans built causeways to allow them access to the area, then destroyed all their property,capturing cattle and taking prisoners as they advanced. With their wealth destroyed, the Menapii wereforced to surrender.

The Treveri were still unsettled after the winter and were awaiting promised German reinforcements beforeattacking Labienus, who was encamped with 25 cohorts of legionaries and a large cavalry force. Keen todefeat the Treveri before help arrived, Labienus tricked them into attacking on terrain that was veryunfavourable to them. Labienus pretended to be withdrawing and the Treveri charged up a very steepriverbank to fall on the Romans. The Romans formed up their battle line and the Treveri, disordered and outof breath from their uphill charge, were routed within minutes of the battle commencing; Labienus’powerful cavalry force mopped up those fleeing. Help would never be forthcoming from the Germans now,so the whole tribe of Treveri surrendered.

For a second time Caesar bridged the Rhine and marched into Germany to punish the tribes for sendinghelp to the Gauls and discourage them from doing so again. But supply problems limited the scope ofoperations and Caesar seems to have been unwilling to risk battle against the powerful Suebi so hewithdrew.

In the Ardennes two columns of three legions each raided much of modern Belgium, destroying propertyand taking prisoners. The burning of crops threatened the Gauls with starvation and many tribes, includingthe Eburones, surrendered.

In the space of a year, northern Gaul was totally reduced through vicious punitive raids aimed atdestroying the property and wealth of the tribes.

52 BC The great revolt

In the winter of 53/52 BC the general revolt which had been threatening erupted, perhaps because the tribesrealised that co-ordinated resistance could prove effective against the Romans, and possibly because a tribalcouncil Caesar held the previous year indicated that Gaul was now being treated as a province of Rome.Taking advantage of Caesar’s return to northern Gaul and the political turmoil and uncertainties in Romecaused by the death of the popular politician Publius Clodius, the Gauls began to plan their campaign.Amongst the tribes leading the call for revolt was the Carnutes, whose territory included consecrated landsupposed to be the centre of Gaul, and where the druids met annually to settle disputes between Gauls. Thissacred space was now being threatened by Roman advances and was of interest to all Gauls, encouragingthem to put aside their previous differences. The massacre of Romans settled in the town of Cenabum(Orleans) signalled the beginning of the revolt and enabled a charismatic young Arvernian, Vercingetorix,to build a coalition of Gallic tribes around his own leadership. Caesar, who had been in Italy, reacted swiftlyto try to prevent the whole of Gaul going up in revolt and rushed to Provence with a small force. Havingarranged the defence of Roman territory, Caesar marched through the Massif Central and used Agedincumas his base to threaten Arvernian territory and force Vercingetorix to abandon an attack on Gorgobina,capital of the Boii who were still allied to Caesar.

The Roman route detoured in order to capture several oppida (the towns of Vellaunodunum, Cenabum,and Noviodunum), partly to spread terror, but perhaps more importantly, to capture supplies of grain andfodder. As it was still winter there was no forage available and the Roman army was finding it difficult tosupply itself. The Gauls realised this and Vercingetorix’s strategy was to avoid general engagements withthe Romans, instead attacking foraging parties and supply trains. The Gauls cut off the Romans from allsources of food by withdrawing the population and supplies to the strongest oppida and adopting a scorched-


earth policy, abandoning all other oppida. Vercingetorix did not want to defend the oppidum of Avaricum(Bourges) despite its strong defences, but was persuaded to do so by the Bituriges. Caesar immediatelyinvested it.

Avaricum

The oppidum was virtually surrounded by a river and marshes, but Caesar entrenched where there was a gapin the natural defences and constructed a siege terrace of earth and timber 330 feet wide and 80 feet high.Despite the cold, rain, sorties and attempts by the Gauls to undermine and fire the terrace, it was completedin only 25 days. Camped with a large force outside the oppidum, Vercingetorix had unsuccessfully tried toattack Roman foraging parties and wanted to abandon the defence of Avaricum before it was captured. A coinof Vercingetorix who made himself king of the Arverni tribe and was able to unite the Gallic tribes underhis sole leadership to create serious opposition to the Romans. Caesar called him a man ‘of boundlessenergy’, who ‘terrorised waverers with the rigours of an iron discipline’. (Ancient Art and Architecture) Hewas unable to persuade those whose home it was to do so, however: they were confident in the strength oftheir defences. Under cover of a heavy rainstorm when the Gallic sentries were less vigilant, Caesar ordered

THE FIGHTING 49

siege towers into position and his troops to assault the walls. The Gauls valiantly but vainly defended thebreach and the Roman artillery took its toll, clearing an entrance for the legionaries who then tookpossession of the circuit of walls without risking street fighting by descending into the town proper. Oncepossession was secured the soldiers turned from disciplined attack to rape and pillage. No prisoners weretaken and Caesar claims 40,000 died.

VercingetorixAn ambitious young noble of the Arvernian tribe whose father had been executed for attempting to make

himself king, Vercingetorix was ejected from the tribe by his uncle and other tribal leaders. They opposed hisattempt to raise rebellion, but he was nonetheless able to raise a force and take control of the Arverni, thensucceed where no other Gallic leader had, by forging an army under single leadership to resist Rome. Hisauthority was so great that he was able to maintain Gallic morale even after a couple of reverses.

A coin of Vercingetorix who made himself king of the Arverni tribe and was able to unite the Gallic tribes under hissole leadership to create serious opposition to the Romans. Caesar called him a man ‘of boundless energy’, who‘terrorised waverers with the rigours of an iron discipline’. (Ancient Art and Architecture)


Artillery

Catapults were an important weapon in the armoury of the Roman army and were the ancient equivalent ofcanons and machine guns. Torsion artillery had been invented by the Greeks in the 4th century BC anddeveloped during the subsequent Hellenistic period. By the late 1st century BC the machines available wereboth sophisticated and highly effective in warfare. There were two basic types of catapults, the ballista,which hurled stones, and the scorpion, which fired quarrels similar to the later crossbow. The catapults werepowered by coils of rope or sinew, which could be tightened up using a ratchet, and when the stored energywas released, the missile could be projected with terrific speed and noise. Specialist architects and engineerswere attached to Roman armies who would build and maintain these machines, but in the field they wouldhave been operated by the soldiers. In addition to the greater firepower such catapults provided to Romanarmies, the presence of these engines of war on the battlefield or before a besieged town must have putconsiderable psychological pressure on the enemy. Gallic armies and communities were unused to suchcomplex machinery; having to face a scorpion on the battlefield with its vicious sting cannot have been

THE FIGHTING 51

something they would have relished, and the very prospect of these machines may have put the Gauls at adisadvantage. Artillery mounted in boats was used, along with slingers and archers, to provide covering firefor the landings in Britain in 54 BC; Caesar says that the Britons were unnerved by the machines as theyhad never seen anything like them before, and this helped to drive them off the beaches.

Despite their technological superiority though, not all catapults were appropriate to Gallic warfare. Bothtypes of catapults used by Roman armies were essentially anti-personnel devices. Although the largeststone-throwing ballistae might have been able to cause some damage to stone fortifications, they were not usedprimarily to knock down walls from afar: that was the job of battering rams and mines. They would havehad little impact, in any case, against the earth ramparts of oppida, or the murus Gallicus, a combination ofearth, timber and stone ramparts that fortified some oppida. But they were large and slow to move, andgiven the speed with which Caesar frequently operated, and the straightforward nature of most of the siegewarfare he encountered, these larger catapults were probably not used. The scorpions, however, were muchmore mobile and could be used in both open warfare and sieges, adding to the missile barrage fired upon anenemy army in the opening phases of a pitched battle, for example. In preparation for a possible pitchedbattle against the Belgae, Caesar ordered the construction of trenches to protect his battle line and preventoutflanking manoeuvres by the enemy. At the end of each trench a redoubt was dug and artillery positionedin them. Had battle ensued, the scorpions in the redoubts would have provided considerable protection tothe Roman army’s flanks. Years later in the ‘mopping-up’ operations of 51 BC, Caesar positioned his battleline so that if pitched battle occurred against the Bellovaci, their battle line would be well within reach ofthe Roman artillery. While a volley of pila might be visible and Gallic warriors knew what to expect,scorpion bolts were swift, silent, and deadly. To be killed by one would not have been as glorious as beingkilled by an enemy warrior or soldier in open battle. In neither case, however, did the Gauls accept pitchedbattle: Caesar had so weighted the odds in his favour through use of topography and siting of artillery thatthe Gauls refused to engage. They were undoubtedly brave warriors, but they were not so stupid as to throwtheir lives away.

Most Roman camps would have been defended by artillery and it is surprising that Caesar does notmention it having any role in defending Quintus Cicero’s winter camp, which came under a sustained Gallicassault in the winter of 54 BC. It is unlikely that Cicero’s winter quarters would not have been equippedwith scorpions positioned in the gates and towers of the fortifications, something that was required by 2nd-century AD Roman textbooks on fortifying camps. Such artillery would have been especially useful, as thelegionary strength defending the camp was depleted by the deaths and injuries that Caesar reports. It seemsto have been the artillery that made the difference a few years later when an under-manned Roman camp atGergovia came under attack by the Gauls: the machines could fire several bolts a minute and required farless physical effort to operate than hurling pila or lunging at the enemy with spears. When used by skilledoperators, moreover, the scorpions could be deadly accurate.

The accuracy of scorpions is best illustrated through their role in Roman siege warfare. Carefully sitedartillery could keep the defenders off the walls, while other soldiers operated battering rams, scaled withladders or conducted undermining operations at the bottom of ramparts. At Avaricum they provided someprotection for the legionaries constructing the huge siege terrace, at least until the besieged Gauls sortied enmasse. But they were ineffective in preventing the Gauls from trying to set fire to the terrace. The Gaul whowas throwing incendiary material onto the terrace was killed by a scorpion, but then another took his place.Caesar says they continued sacrificing themselves in attempting to fire the terrace and the scorpion kept onkilling them until the fire went out and they gave up the effort. A scorpion must have been trained on onepoint and was able to fire accurate missiles one after the other. Accurate artillery also helped to end the lastsiege of the conquest, at Uxellodunum in 51 BC. Scorpions positioned in towers prevented the Gauls from


OPPOSITE Finds of weapons from the Roman siege at Alesia. The site was explored by Napoleon III in the 19thcentury and many of these iron spearheads, pilum shafts and catapult bolts were found at Monte Rea where the fiercestfighting took place.

THE FIGHTING 53

getting access to their only remaining water supply, though they did not actually surrender until the springfeeding the supply was diverted.

ABOVE These iron catapult bolts were excavated at Licenza, near Rome. Historians continue to debate the extent ofCaesar’s personal contribution to weapons development. (Ancient Art and Architecture)


The Gallic coalition

Despite the setback at Avaricum, Vercingetorix had the authority to maintain the Gallic coalition and it wasstrengthened by the revolt of the Aedui. Some Aedui remained loyal and Caesar continued to command anduse Aeduan cavalry, but it caused another blow to his already precarious supply lines, although the captureof supplies at Avaricum must have helped. Now the campaigning season had begun and fodder wasbecoming available in the open, Caesar ordered Labienus with four legions and cavalry to crush the Parisiiand Senones, while he marched the remaining six legions down the Allier to Gergovia. Unlike Avaricum,which Vercingetorix had not wished to defend, this was one of the oppida he did intend to hold, probablybecause it was very strongly fortified, but perhaps also because it was the hill fort of his own tribe, theArverni.

Gergovia

The hilly terrain dominated the Gergovia campaign. On arrival the Romans as usual entrenched camp, thencaptured a high hill opposite the oppidum, which dominated the principal water supply. Caesar had asmaller camp constructed there and linked his two camps with a wide ditch. This allowed him to move hisforces around without interference from enemy sorties or cavalry. The next step was to capture another hillmuch closer to the hill fort and which actually adjoined the oppidum. The Gauls were not patrolling itproperly and the legionaries were able to take it without much difficulty, crossing a six foot wall built toprevent such an action. In his Commentaries Julius Caesar claims he was only intending to take this hill andthen halt the action. Either the soldiers failed to hear the recall he claimed to have sounded, and disobeyedorders, or he had actually intended to launch an attack against the oppidum itself if this first phase provedsuccessful. Whatever the truth, the Romans did proceed to make a direct attack on Gergovia’s defences, theenthusiasm of the centurions for being the first onto the walls driving them on against the defenders whohugely outnumbered them. The Romans were driven back; 700 men were killed including 46 centurions.Caesar blamed his men for the defeat and may have been less than clear in reporting his intentions in hisCommentaries to distance himself from blame for a serious setback.

Caesar’s forced withdrawal from Gergovia must have greatly increased Vercingetorix’s reputation andencouraged more tribes to join the revolt. He continued to attack the Roman supply lines while calling inreinforcements. The Romans, too; obtained reinforcements, from the Germans who proved effective inrouting the Gallic cavalry attacks on the Roman marching columns. The next oppidum Vercingetorixdecided to defend was Alesia in the territory of the Mandubii and after the victory at Gergovia he must havebeen confident of success.

Alesia

About 30 miles north-west of modern Dijon, Alesia was a large hill fort on a lozenge-shaped plateauprotected by steep slopes and rivers on two sides. There was a plain at one end and at the other, the easternend, the Gallic army was encamped. It was clear that an assault was out of the question, particularly afterGergovia, so the Romans would have to blockade. This was Vercingetorix’s intention, for he allowed himselfto be hemmed in at Alesia and ordered a relieving army to be gathered with all possible speed. The intentionwas to catch the Roman army in a pincer movement with simultaneous attacks by the besieged underVercingetorix and a relieving army, which Caesar claims (perhaps dubiously) was nearly a quarter of amillion strong.

THE FIGHTING 55

The Roman siege works at Alesia were extraordinary in their size and complexity. After digging a deepditch on the plain to prevent cavalry attacks on the working parties, the Romans built a rampart withpalisade and towers at regular intervals, and a double ditch, one filled with water diverted from the riverswhere possible; seven camps and 23 redoubts were added at strategic points. This line covered a circuit of11 miles. Caesar was not happy even with this formidable system of defences, and lines of booby traps wereextended for several yards in front of the trenches. These comprised rows of sharpened stakes, then coveredpits with sharpened stakes planted in them, and finally rows of wooden stakes with barbed iron spikes stuckinto them. Once this circuit was completed Caesar had another identical line built outside, 14 miles incircumference, to protect the besiegers from the relieving army. The whole system took about a month toconstruct. Archaeological investigations have indicated that the fortifications were not as complete as Caesarsuggests. There may have been gaps in the lines, particularly where the terrain provided natural protection,but the systems held up to concerted attacks by both Gallic armies even when they were prepared withbridging materials to cross the outer defences and ditches.


Ultimately, however, the Romans did not have to starve out the defenders at Alesia, and no attempts weremade to take the oppidum by assault. Violent co-ordinated attacks by both Gallic forces on the Roman siegeworks had no effect and although the lines came under enormous pressure in one attack, reinforcementsarrived in time and the Gauls were repulsed. It became clear that the extraordinary defences the Romanarmy had constructed were not going to break and the failure of the revolt and starvation for those shut inAlesia were inevitable. The relieving army disbanded and Vercingetorix surrendered. Caesar distributedmost of the prisoners amongst his men in lieu of booty. Vercingetorix was kept, to be displayed six yearslater in Caesar’s triumphal procession in Rome, after which he was ritually strangled.

The surrender of VercingetorixThe leader Vercingetorix put on his finest armour and equipped his horse magnificently, then sallied out of

the gate. After riding several times around Caesar who was sitting on a dais, he then dismounted, took off hisarmour and set himself at Caesar’s feet where he remained in silence until Caesar ordered the guard to take himaway and keep him for his triumph.’

Plutarch, Life of Julius Caesar

51–50 BC Mopping up

The legions were distributed throughout Gaul over the winter to keep down the defeated tribes, and toprotect the Remi who alone had been unswerving in their support for Rome. Caesar’s last full year ofcampaigning in Gaul involved mid-winter terror raids against the Bituriges and Carnutes and, once springhad begun, Roman forces were sent which crushed all remaining thought of rebellion amongst the Belgictribes, the Bellovaci, Eburones, Treveri and Carnutes. The only remaining serious resistance was in south-western Gaul. Here two men, Drappes, a Senonian who was nonetheless able to exert influence among othertribes, and Lucterius, a local Cadurcan, took over the oppidum of Uxellodunum which was extremely wellfortified.

Uxellodunum

With only two legions, the general Caninius invested the oppidum, building three camps at strategic pointsand starting a circumvallation. The reconstructed Roman siege-works of Alesia. Archaeologicalinvestigations at Alesia have shown that these defences were nowhere near as extensive or complete asCaesar claimed. Nonetheless, they were highly effective in repelling a joint attack by those besieged in Alesiaand the Gallic relieving army. (Ancient Art and Architecture) Drappes and Lucterius clearly knew what toexpect because they sortied to collect supplies, but were intercepted by Caninius, and Drappes wascaptured. Roman reinforcements arrived during the siege, and Caesar personally attended to the finalcrushing of the revolt.

Despite the disaster that befell Drappes’ foraging party, Uxellodunum was very well supplied and theforces bottled up there were nothing like as numerous as those at Alesia the previous year. Potentially, theycould have held out for some time, but Caesar was keen to take the town swiftly to serve as an exampleand so attacked the water supply. Like many Gallic oppida, Uxellodunum was dependent on an externalwater supply and artillery was set up to cut the defenders off from the rivers, leaving only a spring fromwhich water could be obtained. The Romans then built a huge ramp and tower to dominate the spring andfire on those collecting water, and secretly dug tunnels towards it. Parts of the tunnels were discovered byarchaeologists in the 19th century. The Gauls sortied in an attempt to destroy the siege ramp, rolling flaming

THE FIGHTING 57

The reconstructed Roman siege-works of Alesia. Archaeological investigations at Alesia have shown that thesedefences were nowhere near as extensive or complete as Caesar claimed. Nonetheless, they were highly effective inrepelling a joint attack by those besieged in Alesia and the Gallic relieving army. (Ancient Art and Architecture)


LEFT A 16th-century woodcut of the Roman siegeworks at Alesia showing the booby traps beyond the rampart andditches, the sharpened stakes (cippi), half-buried wooden stakes (lilia or lilies), and iron spikes (stimuli), creating aformidable series of obstacles. (AKG Berlin)

THE FIGHTING 59

casks down onto the woodwork, but their diversionary attack was repulsed and the Roman soldiers wereable to extinguish the incendiary devices before serious damage was

CommiusOne of the Gallic rebellion’s leaders was Commius, chieftain of the Gallic Atrebates and an early ally of

Caesar. He travelled to Britain in advance of the 55 BC expedition to gather intelligence for the Romans, andhis reward was control over the neighbouring Morini and exemption from taxation for the Atrebates; but theystill joined Vercingetorix. Commius was one of the commanders of the relieving army at Alesia and in 51 BCstirred up further rebellion amongst the Bellovaci. Labienus tried to have him assassinated at a parley butCommius escaped and later fled to Britain where he was able to establish himself as king of the BritishAtrebates.

done. Finally, the Roman tunnels reached the spring and the Gauls, ignorant of what had caused their ever-reliable spring to run dry, interpreted it as a divine signal and surrendered. Instead of massacring thedefenders, Caesar cut off their hands and set them free, to serve as an example of the punishment meted outto those who resisted Rome.

So Gaul was conquered, or at least the tribes had all surrendered to Roman power. The legions werebrigaded throughout Gaul over the winter and virtually no campaigning took place the following year

BELOW Bronze of a dead Gaul, found at Alesia. Caesar does not provide the casualty figures from the Alesiacampaign, but they were undoubtedly high. (Ancient Art and Architecture)


A scene from Trajan’s Column showing an enemy leader being taken before the Roman commander Traditionally, anenemy leader who was captured would be displayed in a triumphal procession in Rome and then executed— exactly thefate which befell Vercingetorix. (AISA)

THE FIGHTING 61

because the province was largely at peace, and Caesar had already turned his attention back to Rome. Civilwar was becoming inevitable and Caesar would be one of the key players.

The ‘rules of war’When the Gallic oppidum of the Aduatuci was being besieged by the Romans, the tribal leaders sent envoys

requesting peace. Caesar replied that he would be merciful and spare the tribe, ‘provided that they surrenderedbefore the battering ram touched the wall of the oppidum’.

There were no rules laid down in antiquity about the treatment of the defeated in war. Ancient custom gavethe victor total and absolute power over the defeated, whether they had surrendered voluntarily or been forcedinto submission. Defeated peoples, both combatants and non-combatants, could be executed, sold into slaveryor even released, and their treatment was totally dependent on the decision of the victorious commander.Important captives, those of high social or political status, might be treated better than ordinary people, or theymight be executed to set an example to others. Setting an example was one of the main factors in deciding thefate of the defeated, and linked with this were the overall aims of the conqueror. The difficulty of the campaignor battle might also have affected how the victor treated the conquered, along with whether the losing side hadcommitted any atrocities during the course of the war. The slaughter of civilians at Avaricum was so brutal,Caesar tells us, because the siege had been a hard one and the Roman soldiers were avenging the massacre ofRoman civilians at Cenabum.

We hear little of the Gallic treatment of of the immolation of captured warriors by Gauls as a sacrifice to the— ‘Gallic war god Esus, but does not report this happening to any Roman captives.


Portrait of a soldierCaesar’s centurions

Centurions are often considered to be the backbone of the Roman legions, and rightly so. It may seem odd,but at the time of Caesar’s campaigns the legion had no official commander; Caesar sometimes appointed alegate or quaestor to command one or more legions. It was not until the establishment of the Principateunder Augustus that each legion had its own permanent commander, usually a senator, appointed by theemperor. The centurions (and the six military tribunes attached to the legion) had a vital role in providingthe leadership, experience and stability that the legion needed to operate effectively. Centurions were thehighest echelon of professional soldiers in the legion and their senior officers and commanders werepoliticians whose military experience and skill could vary considerably. The 60 or so centurions in eachlegion were appointed by the army commander—the provincial governor. While some may have beenappointed because of their social status, the majority gained promotion through experience, leadership andconspicuous courage. This must have encouraged ambitious private soldiers to prove their worth on thebattlefield to gain promotion to the rank of centurion. It also drove centurions to continue to provethemselves to their peers and to the soldiers under their command, so they led from the front, and oftensuffered disproportionately high casualty rates because of this. In the reverse at Gergovia, for example, 46of the 700 killed were centurions.

These high casualty rates may have been exacerbated not just by centurions seeking to engage the enemy,but by the enemy deliberately targeting them. Centurions could have made themselves highly visible inbattle, and probably did, through their armour, equipment, and particularly their helmets, which haddistinctive transverse crests, as well as by wearing their decorations as a clear marker of their courage. AGallic warrior who killed a Roman centurion would have greatly increased his reputation and therefore hisinfluence within his tribe.

Sensible commanders recognised the value of their centurions not only in leading men into battle, butalso in providing valuable advice based on their experience of war. Caesar regularly invited the seniorcenturions of his legions to the briefings and councils of war he held with his senior officers; he would havelistened to their advice and used them to pass on information and orders to the rank and file. Theirunderstanding of an intended battle plan was vital for success simply because they were the ones leading themen on the ground. The value Caesar placed on his centurions is also reflected in the good press hegenerally gives them in his account of the campaign in Gaul. When Caesar is prepared to give others creditfor a Roman victory, the centurions are often praised; but they can also be blamed for a reverse likeGergovia. They were too eager, Caesar claims, to capture Gergovia, and led their men into difficultiesthrough their desire to gain the plaudits and military decorations for a successful action. But they did die tosave their men in the retreat.

P.Sextius Baculus

The XII Legion had been raised by Caesar in 58 BC in preparation for the campaign against the Helvetii,and although it consisted largely of new recruits, it had a core of experienced centurions who would havehad to train their new soldiers on the job. The Chief Centurion (Primus Pilus) of the XII was PubliusSextius Baculus, a man renowned for his bravery, but he would also have been an experienced andtrustworthy leader for such an appointment. He was probably transferred from another legion, and wouldhave been appointed by Caesar himself. During its second year in existence this legion suffered in the battleagainst the Nervii in 57 BC; most of the centurions were killed or injured, including all those from thelegion’s IV cohort. Baculus was seriously injured in the battle, but was able to remain with his legion orrejoin it later, after treatment in a camp hospital. Towards winter in the same year, Caesar sent the legioninto the Alps with Galba. The legion was already under-strength and was probably still short of experiencedofficers following the battle with the Nervii, when it came under attack in the village of Octodurus and waspinned down by Alpine tribesmen. Baculus and a fellow officer, a military tribune, together advised Galbathat the situation was too desperate to hold and they should break out. Galba listened to the advice of his juniorsand in the ensuing break-out the XII Legion managed to turn the tables on the enemy and put them to flightwith heavy casualties.

We hear nothing more of Baculus for the next three years, but he probably remained with his legion forthe campaigns in northern and western Gaul. He reappears briefly in 53 BC during a German raid on aRoman camp garrisoned by the inexperienced XIV Legion, 200 cavalry and 300 legionaries from otherlegions who were on the sick list and recovering in camp. Baculus was presumably one of the sick, but wedo not know if this was because he had been injured in battle again. A group of soldiers and camp servantsout foraging was attacked by the German cavalry and some of them tried to make it back to camp. Baculusrose from his sick-bed and helped to hold the gates of the camp, allowing the rest of the garrison time toman the fortifications. Already weakened through illness, Baculus was seriously injured and fainted, butwas dragged back to safety by his companions. He probably recovered from this injury (Caesar wouldalmost certainly have reported it had he died), but nothing further is known of him.

Centurions were promoted for their courage, but they were expected to continue to show bravery tojustify their position, and to push for further advancement to the ranks of the senior centurions in the legion.Titus Pullo and Lucius Vorenus were two centurions in Cicero’s legion who were in competition with eachother for promotion to senior centurion. The attacks on Quintus Cicero’s camp during the winter of 54 BCgave the two an opportunity to compete with each other to see who was the bravest. Both took part in asortie, Pullo charging first with a spear but getting into trouble when his sword got stuck in its scabbard by ajavelin which had pierced his shield and hit his sword belt. Vorenus came to his aid and forced the Gauls toretreat, but then tripped and became surrounded. Pullo rescued his rival and the two of them made it backwithin the fortifications after killing a few Gauls. Despite their rivalry they had saved each other’s lives andhad shown themselves to be equal in bravery. Caesar says nothing more about them so unfortunately we donot know if they were promoted.

At the end of their service, Caesar’s centurions who had survived the wars in Gaul and the Civil Warwere probably wealthy men from the booty they had acquired and the bonuses they had been paid. Many ofthe soldiers of these wars were settled with land in military colonies in Provence or in northern Italy. Thecenturions were given larger allotments than the ordinary soldiers and often held public office in their localtowns.


The tombstone of M.Caelius, a centurion of Legion XVIII who was killed in the Varian disaster in AD 9. Promoted fortheir courage and leadership, centurions frequently suffered very high casualty rates in battle as they led their men fromthe front and strove to preserve their reputations for courage and valour. (Bonn Museum)

PORTRAIT OF A SOLDIER 65

The world around warThe impact of the conflict

War was central to the lives of both Romans and Gauls. In both societies one of the most effective ways forthe aristocracy to maintain status was to be successful in war, and warfare touched upon the lives ofeveryone, rich and poor. For the Gauls, though, the Gallic War was different from the kinds of conflict theyusually experienced in its range, intensity and destructiveness. Wars in Gaul tended to be on a fairly smallscale, often little more than raiding parties against neighbours to grab easily portable property, livestock andslaves. These allowed the elite warriors to maintain their positions of authority in their tribes bydemonstrating prowess in battle and the acquisition of wealth, which benefited the whole tribe. In particularthe aristocratic leaders were able to display their position through the purchase of other ‘status’ goods fromabroad, mostly from the Greek and Roman cities of southern Gaul. Younger warriors, too, could make theirnames through these raids and begin to acquire wealth. On a wider level, successful raiding increased atribe’s military reputation and could lead to the subjection of neighbouring tribes to dependent status,thereby lessening the likelihood of attack by other tribes. After the defeat of the Helvetii, for example, theAedui allowed the beaten Boii to settle on their land because of their reputation for valour: the Boii wouldhave become dependent on the Aedui, thus increasing the latter’s military strength and influence in inter-tribal relations. So pressing was the need for increasing prestige in this way, that the Arverni and Sequanienlisted the help of German warriors in their campaign against the Aedui. Such raids caused somedestruction and loss of property, including cattle, and Gallic peasants were often captured to be sold intoslavery, but permanent conquests were rare.

The Roman approach to warfare was different. Whilst the Celtic style of warfare involved mainly thoseof warrior status, Roman society not only expected regular wars of conquest, but was prepared for it. Agovernor in Caesar’s position would have been expected to campaign and possibly conquer new territory,and he had access to forces drawn from a mixture of conscripts and volunteers. The extra legions that wereraised for the war in Gaul (six further legions during the governorship) were unlikely to have put considerablestrain on the manpower of Italy. The majority of recruits came from northern Italy and would havewelcomed the opportunity to serve in the legions (especially as many of them may well not have possessedfull Roman citizenship and legionary service would have allowed them to assert their claims to it). Militaryservice meant full integration into the Roman state, and the opportunity for enrichment from booty. So interms of manpower and resources, the conquest of Gaul had little impact on the Roman state: it was, quitesimply, what Rome expected. For the Gauls though, the intensity of Roman campaigning and particularly thespeed with which their lands were reduced to provincial status must have been a terrible shock.

One of the main reasons for the extraordinary speed of the Roman conquest was the failure, or inability,of the Gauls to co-operate in their own defence. Caesar took advantage of the rivalry between Gallic tribesand when they were eventually combined under the leadership of Vercingetorix in 52 BC, it was too late toprevent the permanent establishment of Rome in Gaul and the creation of Roman provinces. We hear little

from Caesar about the effects of the war on Gaul and its population (his audience would not have beenparticularly interested in these kinds of detail), but the effects must have been widespread, affecting thelives of wealthy and poor, influential and unimportant alike. Despite the turmoil caused by the campaigns ofconquest though, the establishment of the Roman provinces ensured the continuation of the Gallicaristocracy in their dominance over the lower orders.

Loss of life

Ordinary Gauls were not always involved in the actual fighting, but they were all, men, women and children,legitimate targets in ancient warfare. Those tilling the soil or tending animals might be captured and carriedoff as slaves, or slaughtered by Romans in search of supplies or casual plunder. Such actions might besanctioned by Roman officers and might even be organised on a large scale, particularly in the search forsupplies, or carried out on the initiative of soldiers without their superiors’ knowledge since there wasunlikely to be serious punishment for such minor misdemeanours. The civilian population was particularlyat risk because of the speed with which the Roman army moved: they could easily be caught out in the open,too far from the supposed shelter provided by oppida. During the campaigns of early 52 BC, Caesar’s menregularly caught civilians in their fields and villages, as did the Gauls, who posed just as serious a risk tocivilians from tribes who still supported Rome. Very high civilian casualties must have been caused duringthe destruction of the Helvetian army at the very beginning of the conquest, since the Helvetian warriors’families were at the battle site, watching from their wagons. They were almost certainly caught up in theslaughter following the capture by Roman soldiers of the Helvetian encampment. Worse was the massacreof the Usipi and Tencteri. The Roman troops fell on a poorly fortified encampment and met only minorresistance.

Caesar noted, ‘Because they had brought all their possessions with them when they had abandoned theirhomes and crossed the Rhine, there were also many women and children, and they then began to flee in alldirections. Caesar ordered the cavalry to hunt them down.’ No mercy was shown, even to those who couldoffer no resistance. It was not surprising that Caesar’s enemies in Rome pounced on the news of thisslaughter and threatened to prosecute him for war crimes. But while some in Rome may have beengenuinely appalled at this action, their concern was aimed more at destroying Caesar’s reputation thanexacting justice for the massacre.

Throughout the wars the majority of civilian casualties occurred during sieges. More often than not atribe’s civilians were caught up in the assault and capture of their hill forts or oppida, or in the blockadesthat occurred more rarely. Some of these oppida were well defended by Celtic standards (though not byRoman), and were basically fortified towns, some of which were flourishing with substantial buildings andpopulations by the mid-1st century BC. Civilians naturally sought refuge within their walls when an enemyarmy appeared on the scene, and when their armies were defeated in the field or chose not to face theRomans in pitched battle, they too retreated to the ‘safety’ of their oppida. These fortifications rarely posedmuch of a challenge to the Romans, however, and the lives of those inside, whether warrior or civilian, werein the hands of the Roman general. Under the accepted modes of behaviour in ancient warfare, if the placesurrendered, then usually the defenders and civilians caught inside were treated with leniency, but if itresisted and was taken by force or starved into surrender after a blockade, then the treatment of all might beextremely brutal. Indiscriminate slaughter followed the capture of Avaricum by assault in 52 BC with nearly40,000 Gallic casualties, according to Caesar. Many of them were women and children. The Aduatuciescaped this fate when they surrendered their oppidum to Caesar in 55 BC but because they then attackedthe Roman guards, Caesar had the whole lot sold into slavery. Siege warfare brought a worse fate though

THE WORLD AROUND WAR 67

for the civilian inhabitants of Alesia. The non-combatants of the Mandubii tribe whose town it was werethrown out of their oppidum by Vercingetorix, who was trying to conserve his food supplies. Caesar,following standard military procedure, refused to allow them through the Roman lines and sent them backin an attempt to hasten the Gauls’ starvation and hence the end of the siege. Vercingetorix refused to allowthem entry back into the town and they remained, gradually starving to death, in no-man’s land within thesiege works.

The Romans did not escape without losses, the most serious being the one and a half legions wiped out inthe winter of 54 BC, anything from 5,000 to 7,000 men depending on how under-strength the legions were.Caesar is unusually frank about the seriousness of this defeat, mainly because he could place the blame firmlyon his legate Sabinus, who had been commanding the detachment. He reports the losses at Gergovia asnearly 700, including 46 centurions, but elsewhere the general is fairly circumspect about the reverses andlosses suffered by his own forces, not even providing the casualty figures from successful pitched battleswhich he must have known. Injuries, sickness and deaths must have reduced the strength of the legions, andby the end of the civil war with Pompey in 48 BC some of his legions were less than two-thirds of theirproper strength. But because his Commentaries had a propaganda purpose, Caesar deliberately downplayedmost of the reverses he suffered and the casualties his forces took. Few Roman civilians were caught up inthe war: merchants and their families were massacred during the general uprising of 52 BC, and althoughthere were enough of them to form an identifiable group within several towns, we can only guess at thenumbers involved— probably not that many.

It is impossible to make any kind of accurate calculation of the total loss of life during the Gallic War.Gallic casualty figures are inflated for literary and political effect, whilst Roman ones are downplayed. Anestimate of tens of thousands of Roman losses would probably be reasonable, while the casualty figures forthe Gauls, Germans and Britons combined ran into the hundreds of thousands. Gallic warriors and men ofmilitary age are likely to have been particularly heavily hit with a resultant imbalance in the population, butthe population of Gaul especially would also have been depleted by the numbers carried off into slavery.

Slavery

Slavery was a common feature of many societies in the ancient world. Rome was increasingly dependent onslavery in the late Republic with large numbers being employed in agriculture and the production of rawmaterials, especially in mines and quarries. Gauls also kept slaves, procuring them during raids on othertribes, and there was a thriving trade in slaves from Gaul to Rome, with luxuries and particularly wine beingexchanged for them. Slaves were one of the most common acquisitions from Rome’s extensive wars ofconquest since prisoners of war were generally sold into slavery. An influx of Gallic slaves was probablyexpected when Caesar began his campaigns in 58 BC. Traditionally, the slaves taken in a campaign werethe property of the commanding general, and they represented one of the most lucrative immediate sourcesof income for him. This must have been particularly important for Caesar, who had bankrupted himselfduring his election campaigns for various magistracies in Rome, and especially in buying the position ofPontifex Maximus (Chief Priest) in 63 BC. Despite his right to possession of the slaves, Caesar wasgenerous to his soldiers and gave them the slaves captured in some of the campaigns. This made him extremelypopular with his men and increased their loyalty, an important factor in the succeeding civil war.

Caesar reports that his army captured huge numbers of prisoners during his wars of conquest and many ofthese were sold into slavery. He claims that 53,000 men, women and children of the Aduatuci tribe werecaptured when he took their oppidum in 57 BC, and this may have been the majority of the entire tribe.Because of their perfidy (they had surrendered but then during the night had rallied and attacked the


Romans), Caesar had all of them sold into slavery. This was done by auction, one of the reasons merchantswould have been keen to accompany an army on campaign, and Caesar pocketed all the proceeds whichmust have been a vast sum. The following year he treated the Veneti in a similar manner. Many tribes thatresisted Caesar escaped fairly lightly and did not have their populations taken as slaves, but the Veneti weretreated differently because, like the Aduatuci, they had shown themselves to be untrustworthy in Romaneyes, detaining Caesar’s envoys (admittedly to requisition grain supplies during the winter, which they mayhave felt legitimately aggrieved about given that they were not at the time subject to Rome). The Veneticelders were executed and the entire population, men, women and children (or at least those who wererounded up), were sold into slavery.

While the slaves captured during the campaigns were a useful source of much-needed wealth for Caesar,their worth lay principally in their numbers. As individual slaves they were less valuable, relatively, thanslaves from other parts of the Mediterranean world, for they were unskilled. In a letter to his friend Atticus,Marcus Tullius Cicero makes a snide remark about the perceived barbarous culture of the Celts, indicatingthat the slaves were illiterate and ‘uncivilised’. Rome had not yet reached the point when thousands ofprisoners of war were sacrificed in the arena by emperors for the amusement of their subjects; many of theslaves from the Gallic wars would have been sold for their muscle, to work in the fields, in quarries andmines, often in appalling conditions with a very short life expectancy. Some, including women andchildren, may have ended up in Rome, but the majority were probably put to work in northern Italy,Provence and Spain.

It is just as impossible a task to estimate the numbers of Gauls enslaved as it is the casualty figures;whatever the actual numbers though, Caesar’s Gallic War must have dealt a major blow to the size andbalance of Gaul’s population. Those not killed or captured and auctioned off as slaves by the Romans didnot avoid the suffering themselves: the war brought widespread destruction and hunger.

Destruction

Ancient warfare, by its very nature, was nothing like as destructive as more modern forms of war; thedemolition of property and possessions would usually have been quite well targeted, at least whensanctioned or specifically ordered by Roman officers. What we do not hear about, but must assumehappened, was casual raiding, destruction and looting by Roman soldiers. They are not reported in theancient accounts of the campaigns because of the political nature of the narrative that Caesar wasproducing: ill-disciplined soldiers did not reflect well on him and he wanted to tell his audience aboutsuccessful operations, battles and conquest, not the minor details of soldiers looting. But we hear about suchactivities from narratives of other wars and campaigns from the Roman period, and there is no reason toassume that the behaviour of the Roman soldiers in Gaul was any different. As with casualties, it isimpossible to quantify the amount of destruction; that carried out on orders was probably precisely directedand tribes friendly to Rome such as the Aedui and the Remi probably escaped more or less unscathed. Siegewarfare obviously resulted in the destruction of a great deal of property as towns were captured and sacked,but the countryside was also devastated. The enormous siege terrace at Avaricum and extensivefortifications at Alesia must have required huge quantities of timber for their construction, and thecountryside surrounding these oppida must have remained scarred for a generation after the conquest.

The campaigns against the Menapii and Morini were primarily destructive. Because the populationwithdrew into inaccessible marshes, the Romans simply destroyed all the livestock, farms and villages theycould find in the hope or expectation that this would force the Gauls into surrender. It did, for with theirwealth and livelihoods gone they had no option. Despite being able to cause widespread destruction and


Column base from Mainz, Germany, mid-1st century AD. Two captured barbarians are chained together to be sold intoslavery. Slaves formed one of the main sources of income from foreign conquests, and although Caesar could haveclaimed all the profits from the sale of Gauls, he shared them with his men. (Landesmuseum, Mainz)


casualties, however, Rome rarely resorted to uncontrolled ravaging of the countryside or mass slaughter as ameans of defeating her enemies. In a highly emotive passage, the Roman historian Tacitus, writing in theearly 2nd century AD about Roman provincial policy, claims that the Romans ‘made a desert and called itpeace’. But in creating her empire this was not Rome’s approach, as there was no point in making aprovince if the land was unworkable and unable to sustain a population who could pay taxes to Rome.

The Gauls, too, resorted to destruction of property: in 52 BC, the entire strategy of the revolt was basedon a scorched-earth policy and the expectation that the Roman army would face such severe supply problemsespecially early on in the campaigning season that it would be forced to retreat. Given the annual problemsthat Caesar did face in supplying his army, this was a perfectly sound strategy, and so excess supplies offood, fields, livestock and towns with all their contents were destroyed. After the complete failure of therevolt, the following winter must have been a desperate one for the Gauls and it is likely that there waswidespread famine and starvation throughout central Gaul. Many of the Gallic tribes probably suffered foodshortages during the winter because of the very presence of the invading army, when military requisitioningaffected both subjected and allied tribes.

Food supply

The Gallic economy was based mainly on agriculture and we have already seen how the war disrupted thelives of the population in some areas of the country through the deliberate destruction of crops and livestock.Shortages were also caused by requisitions imposed by Caesar on many of the tribes in Gaul. Although itused one of the most advanced logistical systems of any ancient army, the relatively slow speed ofcontemporary transport meant that Roman armies had to arrange the provision of additional supplies fromthe theatre of war or from other nearby areas. In Gaul this burden was placed partly on newly conqueredtribes, but also on allies such as the Aedui, part of the price they paid for Roman support. The obligation toprovide for a large standing army, unlike the Gallic armies that dispersed to their homes over the winter, puta considerable strain on the tribes. Caesar relied on the Aedui for supplies, particularly during the earlycampaigns before he had established clear supply routes. When trailing the migrating Helvetii in 58 BC, hewas intending to divert to the Aeduan capital of Bibracte to obtain supplies from his allies, and he regularlydemanded grain from defeated tribes and even allies, particularly at the start of the campaigning seasonwhen little fodder would have been available in the fields.

The heaviest demands for grain and other supplies from the Gauls came over the winter months duringthe closed campaigning season. The legions were put into winter quarters, usually a well-fortifiedencampment rather than being billeted in Gallic towns, but their stationing was carefully chosen. For themost part, legions spent the winter on the lands of newly conquered tribes to keep an eye on them, perhapsto impress on them the idea that Rome was there for good with a military presence that did not disband overthe winter, and to punish the tribes for opposing Rome by forcing them to feed the occupying force over thewinter. These demands could place considerable strain on a tribe’s grain supply and threaten their survival.But there were no ‘neutrals’ in this campaign and even tribes in areas far away from the campaigning whohad not even opposed the Romans might have demands made upon them. The Veneti were still anindependent tribe in western Gaul who had not fought against Caesar when, during the winter of 57/56 BChe sent officers to requisition grain. Not surprisingly they were unhappy at the demands made of them anddetained the officers.


Religious and social change

Gallic tribes were already undergoing social and political change before the Roman conquest. It was causedby the interaction between the Greek and Roman culture in the south of France and the Gallic tribes ofcentral France. The incorporation of Gaul within the Roman empire led to the emergence of a Gallo-Romanculture, a fusion of the two civilisations, but this was a gradual process of assimilation that had barely begunby the end of Caesar’s campaigns. The conquest of Gaul did not lead to a fundamental shift in the balanceof power in the provinces, at least at the level of the Gauls. The hierarchical structure of Gallic societysuited the way Rome liked to administer her provinces, relying on existing oligarchies to rule the subjectpopulation. This allowed provinces to be run by a Roman governor with a very small administrative staff.Pro-Roman chieftains may well have been able to maintain their positions of power and status within theirtribes.

Rome did not seek to impose a particular set of religious beliefs on the peoples she conquered, and localgods were often incorporated into the Roman pantheon, usually in association with a Roman god. It wasextremely rare for Rome to persecute or attempt to crush a religion it encountered in the provinces, butdruidism proved to be the exception and Julius Caesar began the attempt to eradicate it. Druids hadconsiderable influence in Gallic society that was not just confined to religion: they also had a political roleand could be highly influential within their tribes. The fiercely anti-Roman Aeduan aristocrat and druidDumnorix was able to wield considerable power, and Caesar was clearly concerned that he might attempt toseize control. The principal reason for Rome’s condemnation and persecution of druidism, though, was itsassociations with human sacrifice.

All the Gauls are very superstitious; so people with serious illnesses and those about to enter the dangersof battle make or promise to burn human beings as sacrifices, and the druids officiate at these sacrifices…When they have decided to fight a battle, they promise to dedicate the spoils that they capture in battle toMars. If they are victorious they burn the captured animals and pile up all the other spoils at one point.(Caesar, Gallic War)

A shrine at Ribemont-sur-Ancre in Picardy appears to illustrate this sacrifice of warriors defeated inbattle quite clearly. The dismembered remains of over 200 people, mostly young men, were arrangedaround a central area, along with captured weapons just as Caesar describes. The site was in use from the3rd century BC but may have continued in use until the Roman conquest. The site seems to have beendestroyed at that point, probably by the Romans. The poet Lucan describes how Caesar ordered thedestruction of a shrine at Marseilles which displayed the skulls of sacrificial victims. Such shrines havebeen excavated at Roquepertuse, Glanum and Entrement in southern France. To Roman sensibilities, humansacrifice was ‘barbarous’ and it was inappropriate to bury the dead within the precincts of shrines, sodruidism was outlawed, human sacrifice was banned and the shrines destroyed.

Rome

As already indicated, the conquest of Gaul would have had minimal impact on the lives of most Romanswhatever their status. We know that Caesar’s peers, particularly his political rivals, followed his exploits,and they tried to make life difficult for him, threatening him with prosecution for war crimes and at onepoint attempting to have his governorship terminated. But there was also considerable excitement amongstthe Roman public to hear the latest news of the campaigns, particularly the crossing to Britain: ‘I lookforward to receiving Britannic RIGHT Roman soldiers foraging, Trajan’s Column, 2nd century AD. Caesarrelied heavily on his Gallic allies for grain and fodder, but during the campaigning season foraging partiessupplemented the normal supply routes. With their attention elsewhere, soldiers foraging could, and did, get


RIGHT Roman soldiers foraging, Trajan’s Column, 2nd century AD. Caesar relied heavily on his Gallic allies for grainand fodder, but during the campaigning season foraging parties supplemented the normal supply routes. With theirattention elsewhere, soldiers foraging could, and did, get into difficulties. (Ancient Art and Architecture)


into difficulties. (Ancient Art and Architecture) letters from you’, Marcus Cicero wrote to a young friend,Trebatius, who was expecting to go with the expedition of 54 BC.

Caesar’s rivals were right to be worried about him, though. During the campaigns he receivedunprecedented plaudits for his successes, granted to him by the senate and people in Rome; his popularity withthe ordinary people, already solid, increased. He acquired a massive fortune, having been almost bankruptonly a few years previously, and most importantly he acquired a fanatically loyal army of veteranlegionaries and auxiliaries drawn from the Gauls and Germans he had been fighting. With this militarystrength he felt confident to risk gambling his political future and his very life, and was ready to resort tocivil war to obtain the domination he felt was due to him.


Porch from a Gallic shrine at Roquepertuse, Provence. The niches allowed the display of human skulls, the kind ofpractice that fuelled Roman prejudice of the ‘barbarian’ Gauls and the alleged brutality of Gallic cults. (Ancient Art andArchitecture)


Portrait of a civilianRoman merchants

The first Romans to settle in Gaul were almost certainly merchants and traders. Merchants from Rome andItaly could be found in towns and cities all over the Mediterranean, from Egypt to Spain, well before theseareas were taken over into direct Roman control. They settled especially in centres of production orcommunication which acted as trade centres, and could become extremely wealthy from the commercebetween Rome and her neighbours. By the time Caesar began his campaigns in the mid-1st century BC,Romans had moved well beyond the boundaries of the Roman possession of Provence and there wereidentifiable communities of Romans living in several Gallic towns, including Cenabum (Orleans), Gergovia,Cabillonum (Châlons-sur-Saône) and Novoidunum (Nevers). The Roman presence in these towns helped inthe spread of Roman culture and language, and the Roman and Italian merchants must have picked upsomething of Gallic culture and language themselves. There is no evidence to suggest that Romans andGauls did not co-exist peacefully in these towns, at least until the arrival of Caesar with his armies. Thecreation of a new province might have offered the prospect of greater opportunities for the Romanmerchants already based there, but the campaigns caused disruption and danger to the lives of civilians, bothRoman and Gallic. The Roman merchants were probably a group easily identified with the invaders, andduring the widespread uprising of 52 BC, they became a clear target for the Gauls.

Traders and other ‘hangers-on’ also accompanied Roman armies on their campaigns. They do not seem tohave been considered a part of the army as they camped outside the fortifications, and did not have anofficial role in supplying the army. They followed the army at their own expense, even hiring their ownships to accompany Caesar across the Channel on his invasions of Britain, in the hope of obtaining bootyand perhaps opening up new trading opportunities. However, they provided a number of useful services forarmies on campaign and so were tolerated by most generals. These traders were particularly useful duringthe winter and soldiers could supplement their probably fairly monotonous rations with more interestingfare, including pastries and other culinary luxuries from home. They might also have purchased booty fromthe soldiers, enabling them to exchange their spoils of war for more portable wealth in the form of coinage.Other ‘hangers-on’ included soothsayers and prostitutes; some of the more disciplinarian generalsconsidered the presence of these non-combatants to be a drain on the army’s morale and ejected them fromthe encampment. Caesar appears to have been more tolerant, and their presence probably had a positiveeffect on the soldiers’ morale. By following the army, however, these traders, both Gauls and Romans,exposed themselves to the same dangers as the army. When the German cavalry attacked Quintus Cicero’scamp in 53 BC the merchants who were encamped just outside the Roman ramparts had no chance toescape and were cut down, the Germans not bothering to discriminate between soldiers and non-combatants.

Traders were a useful source of information and military intelligence both for the tribes living in Gauland for the invading Romans. It seems to have been normal for Gallic tribes to interrogate passing traders toacquire the latest news, and Caesar obtained information particularly from

77

How the war endedRoman triumphs

There is no single incident or date at which the Gallic War can be said to have ended. Caesar was wagingwar against numerous tribes who came together in 52 BC in a concerted but failed attempt to eject theRomans from their lands. Throughout the years of campaigning, the tribes had to be defeated individuallyor in small coalitions. Even the surrender of Vercingetorix at Alesia did not signify the end of the war,though it was the end of serious resistance to Rome, at least for the time being. Caesar portrayedVercingetorix’s surrender as the climax of his whole governorship. He had not only conquered all of Gaul,he claimed, but had completely crushed the revolt led by the charismatic Gallic chieftain, a hero worthy ofhis prominent position in Caesar’s narrative. Caesar stopped compiling his commentaries on the war afterthe crushing of the revolt of 52 BC, because he had been granted a further 20 days’ public thanksgiving andno longer needed to boast to those in Rome of his military successes. But the campaigns continued; AulusHirtius, one of Caesar’s officers, continued the commentaries, taking the story down to 50 BC and the eveof civil war. Small-scale campaigns rumbled on into 50 BC and only stopped because of the needs of thecivil war: Caesar took most of the garrison out of Gaul to fight against Pompey. Gaul was not fully reducedto provincial status until the reign of the first emperor , Augustus, and even after that there are indications ofthe need for further campaigns. But there was no doubt who was the victor; the campaigns had been largelyone-sided, and the capitulation of the tribes by the late 50s was all but total. Surrender had beenunconditional.

Seven legions marched against the Bellovaci in 51 BC, which may have been an over-reaction, butCaesar wished to make an example of those who continued to resist. He forced the surrender ofUxellodunum, an oppidum in south-western Gaul that was being held by the remnants of the revolt of theprevious year, and punitive campaigns took place against several tribes in the north. The last military actionin Gaul reported by Aulus Hirtius occurred at the end of 51 BC, after the legions had been sent to winterquarters. Commius, a chief of the Atrebates tribe who had once been an ally of Caesar but had then joinedVercingetorix, began causing problems. In the account, Aulus Hirtius claims that the Atrebates as a tribe werepeaceful and submissive to Rome, and that Commius was little more than a bandit, riding around with agroup of warriors disturbing the peace. The fact that Commius was actually attacking military targets,successfully ambushing supply convoys, suggests that in reality he was attempting to continue resistance,albeit on a fairly small scale. The Roman legate Volusenus was detailed to wipe out Commius and a seriesof encounters took place, coming to a head in a small skirmish in which Volusenus received a lance throughthe thigh courtesy of Commius. Commius and his followers were promptly put to flight and agreed toRoman demands that he live where told and surrender hostages to guarantee his compliance. But AulusHirtius does not give us the full story. A brief account by the 1st-century AD writer Frontinus claims thatCommius tried to escape from the Romans in a boat but it was stranded by the low tide. The cunningAtrebatan hoisted the sails despite being grounded and the pursuing Romans, believing him to be getting away,

abandoned the pursuit. Commius made it to Britain where he managed to establish himself as king of theBritish Atrebates. Roman traders based in Gaul. At Besançon before setting out against Ariovistus, the Romansquestioned both Gauls and traders about the Germans. The informants seem to have exaggerated thephysique and military prowess of the Germans, causing widespread fear among the Roman army;intelligence gained from merchants might not have been very accurate, especially on military capabilities.Before crossing to Britain for the first time, Caesar had tried to extract information about the geography ofthe island, the size and customs of the inhabitants, including their fighting habits, and especially aboutharbours. He does not seem to have got much information of particular value for his expedition and wasforced to dispatch one of his officers, Volusenus, to scout for harbours. He, too, was unable to enlightenCaesar on this subject. The merchants must have been Gauls in this instance, because they immediatelyreported the Roman plans to the Britons. Clearly merchants were able to move with comparative easethroughout the tribes of northern Europe, and it is not surprising that some Roman traders spoke Gallic, andcould thus act as interpreters for Caesar.

Merchants could be influential men of equestrian status, the rank below men of the senatorial class likeCaesar, and they could be very wealthy. Gaius Fufius Cita was a merchant of equestrian rank who was amember of the Roman community of Cenabum massacred in the uprising of 52 BC. Caesar had placed himin charge of the grain supply for his army, probably because of his business, and possibly language skills,and in return Cita would probably have expected the governor to favour him in the granting of businesscontracts such as mining, quarrying, and supplying the army once Gaul was reduced to provincial status. Itis debated how much influence the wealthy merchants could have had on Roman foreign policy. Caesarclaims that the opening up of a route through the Alps in the winter of 57 BC was to provide merchants witha safer route free of duties levied by the Gallic tribes, but it was just as likely to have been for militaryreasons. Military success and personal advancement were the principal reasons for campaigning andconquest by Roman generals, but opening up commercial opportunities (from which the general couldexpect to benefit considerably financially), and thus profiting merchants of equestrian status are very likelyto have added further encouragement. The equestrian vote could be hugely influential in elections for publicoffice in Rome. It is very likely that the hostility of the Venetic tribes to Rome was caused by worry aboutRoman encroachment on her lucrative trading routes with Britain and along the whole Atlantic coast of Gaul.The Roman advance into Gaul, then, provided plenty of opportunities for merchants to benefit financiallyand they were the first to spread Roman culture among many of the Gallic tribes.

By the late 50s it had become apparent to many Gallic tribes that there was little point in furtherresistance to the Roman conquest, even if they had had the manpower and resources to do so. Much of theland in central Gaul had been devastated, particularly in the revolt of 52 BC when the Gauls devastated theirlivestock and grain supplies in order to deny the Romans; many of the tribes that had been heavily involvedin the fighting must have been short of warriors. With Roman armies wintering in Gaul and neverdisbanding, it was clear that, unlike most of the enemies they had faced previously, the Romans were notsimply going to go away. At the time, submission must have seemed to many to be the only option short ofannihilation. Viewed from two millennia away, this outcome was virtually inevitable. Caesar may haveridden his luck many times and taken some appalling risks, but the Roman army was too well trained andequipped to be defeated in such a war, too organised, with a strong command structure, logistical system(which worked well at least some of the time), and the ability to maintain an army in the field year in yearout. If Caesar had not conquered Gaul, some other Roman general would have done.

The remainder of Caesar’s tenure as governor was spent in conciliating the Gauls he had so recentlyconquered, the next stage in creating a Roman province. Civil war blocked the normal procedure: thesending out of a senatorial commission to establish the provinces, and it was not until much later that these

PORTRAIT OF A CIVILIAN 79

were established by Augustus. Caesar aimed at establishing a working relationship with the tribes he hadrecently been fighting against, especially with the tribal elites. He bolstered the positions of those he trustedthrough concessions and gifts, thus ensuring their loyalty to Rome, and also to himself, something that hewould benefit from in the ensuing civil war. The tribal system was allowed to remain, based initially roundthe oppida, and these or later more Roman-style settlements nearby formed the foundations of the civitates,the towns of Roman Gaul on which the government and administration of the provinces were centred. Atribute was set for the subject tribes throughout Gaul that was not light, but nor was it oppressively heavy.

Public thanksgivings were offered by the Senate and People of Rome for the last time in 52 BC. Caesarhad been awarded an unprecedented number of tributes for his various exploits, so his successes were beingcelebrated in Rome in his absence. The formal celebrations for victory in the war had to wait for years, until46 BC; when the civil wars had run their course and Caesar had made himself dictator of Rome. Then heheld a triumph; this was the procession through Rome of the successful general in a chariot, followed bytableaux illustrating the campaigns, and his troops who traditionally sang dirty songs about theircommander:

‘Home we bring our bald whoremonger; Romans, lock your wives away!All the bags of gold you lent him, went his Gallic tarts to pay.’(Suetonius, Life of Caesar, translated by Robert. Graves)

A Roman sculpture from Germany of a merchant ship transporting casks of beer or wine indicates the importance oftrade between Rome and northern Europe both before and after the conquest of Gaul. Gallic chieftains had beenimporting Roman wine for decades before Caesar’s invasion. (Trier Museum)


The Gallic triumph was one of four; the others celebrated campaigns in Turkey, Africa and Egypt. Moneywas given to the people of Rome who watched the procession and to the soldiers, a particularly generousdonation in this instance because of their loyal support throughout the civil wars. While Caesar was the starof all four triumphs, ‘second billing’ in the Gallic triumph was given to Vercingetorix. The Gallic chieftainhad been imprisoned in an Italian town for six years, waiting the day of the triumph when he would beprocessed round the streets of Rome in chains, and then taken to the Tullianum prison in the Roman Forumto be strangled. Caesar undertook huge building projects in Rome financed partly through his spoils fromthe war. He built the Temple of Venus Genetrix not only to honour the legendary divine founder of hisfamily (and his lover Cleopatra), but also to display the spoils from his campaigns, probably weapons andparticularly wealthy booty, including from Britain, to remind his fellow Romans that he had been the first tocross the Ocean and invade the mystical island.

Caesar’s lightning campaigns and conquest of a huge area meant that some parts were not thoroughlyconquered and further campaigns would be necessary. But he got out of his governorship what he hadintended and what he needed to secure his political future. He had set out to make himself a fortune and amilitary reputation and to do that he had precipitated an encounter with the Helvetii and engineered acampaign against the Germans, giving him the excuse to conquer the whole of Gaul. He had the means by50 BC to wage successful civil war and make himself dictator.

The Romanisation of Gaul was a slow and gradual process. Celtic style buildings, such as these reconstructed examples,would have continued to exist and be built for some decades after the Roman conquest; eventually a ‘Gallo-Roman’culture evolved. (Ancient Art and Architecture)


Vercingetorix, the Arvernian who united the Gallic tribes against Gaul, became a symbol of French unity during the19th-century resistance to Prussian aggression. This huge sculpture by the French artist J.F. Millet of an idealisedVercingetorix was erected on the site of Alesia by Emperor Napoleon III. (Ancient Art and Architecture)


Caesar, shown here on a coin minted during his dictatorship, was as aware of the importance of ‘image’ as any modernpolitician, and ensured that his exploits in Gaul were regularly reported to the Senate and people in Rome by writing upthe campaigns on an annual basis. (Ancient Art and Architecture)


Silver denarius of 44 BC illustrating julius Caesar wearing the laurel wreath of victory and commemorating hisappointment as Perpetual Dictator (Ancient Art and Architecture)


Conclusion and consequencesPax Romana

Facts and figures were an important part of any narrative of an ancient war and Caesar’s account is noexception. He regularly enumerates the size and type of enemy forces he was facing and often gives a figurefor their casualties. The accuracy of these figures is rather suspect and as already indicated there were goodpolitical reasons for exaggerating both the size of the enemy force and the number of casualties inflicted.Casualty figures were a kind of currency of military success, not least because a general needed to haveinflicted at least 5,000 enemy casualties in battle in order to claim a triumph back in Rome. So figures arelikely to have been inflated to stress the military skill and prowess of the commander and his troops. Andthe rule on minimum figures for triumphs may have encouraged the slaughter in the aftermath of battle to goon longer than strictly necessary, just to make sure enough were killed. The figures given in the Gallic Warfor sizes of enemy forces and casualties must be regarded as very rough estimates that are severelyexaggerated. Sometimes they become almost unbelievable. It is highly unlikely that the Gallic relieving armyat Alesia was anything like the 240,000 Caesar claims, even though to give his figures a suggestion ofauthenticity he lists each individual tribe and the number of warriors they contributed. Along with thealleged 80,000 Gauls trapped in the oppidum with Vercingetorix this represents an unlikely concentration oftroops. Caesar was probably never as seriously outnumbered as he likes to suggest. Despite the problemswith numbers, however, the total casualties in the nine years of fighting must have been appalling. Sometribes were all but wiped out, or else their influence declined so much because of crushing defeats with highcasualties that little is heard of them again. The Helvetii thought of themselves as one of the bravest andmost influential of the Gauls, but after they were forced back to their homelands little is heard of them again.

Caesar was unlikely to be criticised for killing Gauls and Germans though, especially since he managedto do it without suffering any really serious defeats himself. The one major defeat with the loss of one and ahalf legions in the winter of 54 BC was blamed squarely on his subordinate officer Sabinus, who isportrayed as an inept coward. As far as Caesar’s fellow Romans were concerned, killing Gauls andGermans in large numbers was perfectly acceptable and usually to be praised. Both peoples had inflictedserious defeats on the Romans in the past (in the very distant past in the former case), and so the destructionof Gallic and Germanic armies by Caesar was seen simply as revenge for previous losses and a defenceagainst anything like it ever happening again. Caesar goes to a great deal of trouble in his accounts to linkthe enemies of his first campaigns to tribes who had actually been involved in earlier defeats of Romanarmies. So the Tigurini, the Helvetians massacred at the Saône in 58 BC, had defeated a Roman army in 107BC; Ariovistus was a German king; the Aduatuci descended from the Cimbri and Teutones who haddestroyed several Roman armies in the late 2nd century BC. To the Romans, these people were alsobarbarians, and it would not be going too far to suggest that in the Roman mentality the only good barbarianwas a dead one.

Despite this outlook, there were moves by some politicians in Rome to have Caesar removed from hisgovernorship and charged with what would today be termed ‘war crimes’. Charges would probably haveincluded waging war outside his own province (which was, of course, limited to Cisalpine and TransalpineGaul), and attacking peoples without justification, a necessary factor for a just war in antiquity. The outcryat the massacre of the Usipi in 55 BC may represent genuine repugnance at the slaughter of so many womenand children on so flimsy a pretext. But it is important to remember that the men working to bring thesecharges against Caesar were bitter political rivals who saw him as a threat to the stability of Rome. Most oftheir actions to try to get Caesar removed and put on trial were motivated more by a desire to destroy himthan genuine concern for the treatment of the enemy. In his Life of Caesar, Suetonius noted, ‘He did notignore any opportunity to wage war regardless of how unjustified it was or how dangerous. He attackedenemies and barbarians without provocation, and even allies, so eventually the Senate sent legates to reporton the condition of Gaul. Several suggested that Caesar should be handed over to the enemy (for punishmentfor his actions)’.

No major advances were made by either side in military terms. The Roman style of fighting, and indeedtheir equipment, was entirely suitable for facing taller Celts and Germans with their long slashing blades,and the flexibility offered by the cohortal organisation of the legions was ideal for dealing with an enemythat did not maintain disciplined rank formations. Many modern historians have suggested that Caesar madealterations to the pilum (javelin). He is credited with fitting the pilum with an iron shank that was partlyuntempered. This ensured that it was likely to be a far less effective weapon for the enemy to throw back ifthe shaft had bent, and if it pierced an enemy shield and subsequently bent, it would be very difficult toextract in a hurry and might force the enemy to throw away his shield and fight unprotected. This is theeffect that Caesar notes during the battle with the Helvetii and it is this observation that led modernhistorians to claim that he made the alterations himself. Examples of such pila with bent shanks have beenexcavated at Alesia, so clearly his reporting of the effect of the pilum is not only plausible but also reliable.However, there is no evidence at all to associate Caesar with any experimentation with the pilum or changein its design. Marius had done so previously, replacing two of the iron rivets fastening the shank to thewooden shaft with wooden pegs in order to create the same effect in a pilum with a fully tempered shank,but it would be wrong to credit Caesar with this further development.

The Gauls learned during the conquest of their lands that pitched battle was not the way to defeat theRomans: they were too well trained and disciplined to be beaten in open warfare. Hit-and-run tactics werefar more effective, as were ambushes, and as the Gauls gained more experience of Roman techniques, theymade more use of these methods. Crassus had encountered them first in Aquitania where the Gallic tribeswere assisted by Spaniards from across the Pyrenees who had learned the effectiveness of guerrilla warfareagainst Roman armies when fighting for the Roman renegade Sertorius against Pompey in the 70s BC. TheGallic strategy of 52 BC was based on a scorched-earth policy, hit-and-run tactics to cut the Romans offfrom their supplies, and an avoidance of pitched battle. It failed because of the Romans’ skill in siegewarfare. Guerrilla warfare remained the most effective form of military opposition to Roman armies inwestern Europe, as illustrated by the spectacular success of Arminius’ ambush of three Roman legions inAD 9, ending Roman hopes of the conquest of Germany.

The transition from conquered lands to provinces was a slow one. Any major advances in this direction wereput on hold by the impending civil war between Caesar and Pompey, but even during his last year asgovernor Caesar had turned his attention back towards Rome. His actions in setting tribute were a stop-gapand although only a skeleton garrison remained in Gaul during the civil wars there is little sign of anyserious attempt at an uprising: the tribes were probably still licking their wounds and recovering from thecrushing defeats inflicted by the Romans. Others, like the Aedui and Remi, must have been counting their


luck that they had chosen to side with Rome. As far as possible, the existing hierarchies within tribes weremaintained. Caesar did not attempt to impose a different method of rule on the Gauls but, in keeping withusual Roman policy towards provinces, preferred to work with the systems of rule that the people were usedto. The Gallic tribes and their internal structures fitted in well with Rome’s preference for rule by wealthyoligarchies, whether that was tribal chieftains in Gaul or elite magistrates in cities in the easternMediterranean. The existing tribal territories were for the most part maintained, becoming the landsadministered by the towns that grew up or were established, often close to Gallic oppida, but generallywithout fortifications. ‘Civilisation’ had arrived.

This ‘civilisation’, literally meaning ‘living in a town’, was not imposed on the Gauls by the Romans, butduring his dictatorship Caesar established a number of citizen colonies in Gaul, mostly in Provence. Theyserved a dual purpose: providing land and retirement rewards for the soldiers who had served Caesar duringthe civil war, and forming a core of experienced veterans who could be called on in times of emergency, butwho could also illustrate to the locals the advantages of being Roman. It was some time, however, before allthe tribes in Gaul accepted this. Though Gaul seems to have remained remarkably quiet during the civilwars, it was not entirely trouble free. In 39 BC the Roman governor Agrippa (who later won the battle ofActium for Julius Caesar’s great-nephew Octavian, effectively making him emperor of Rome), campaignedin the same areas of north-eastern and south-western Gaul that had never been fully settled by Caesar. Healso established a road network that provided Gaul with a strong infrastructure that helped in both thecontinuing pacification of the area and with economic development and the spread of Roman culture.Octavian, who became the emperor Augustus, visited Gaul several times, probably increasing his prestigeamong the Gauls by stressing his relationship to the man who had conquered their lands. Roman camps innorth-eastern Gaul may date to these campaigns, but very little is known about them. In 27 BC Augustusestablished three provinces probably based on the three parts of Gaul that Caesar had defined at the verybeginning of his Gallic War. The provinces were Aquitania, Gallia Belgica and Gallia Lugdunensis, thelatter having as its provincial capital the city of Lugdunum or Lyons, founded as a Roman veteran colony in44 BC. Many of the towns that were founded as the ‘capitals’ of the individual Gallic tribes flourished andremain important towns in modern France, including Soissons, Bayeux, Tours and Autun (with its Romanname Augustodunum, ‘town of Augustus’), which was the new capital of the Aedui.

Further campaigns took place in the Alps between the 20s and 15 BC before Roman attention turnedtowards Germany. Military disaster there in AD 9 brought the frontier between Gaul in the Roman empireand Germany to more or less the line of the Rhine, and a very strong legionary force was stationed along theriver. Like the new towns in Gaul, these legionary bases also left their mark on the later history of the regionas most of the fortresses spawned civilian settlements that outlived the Roman empire: Strasbourg, Bonnand Mainz all began in this way. Despite the strong military presence, however, there are indications thatGaul was still not completely settled and the occasional outburst of resistance materialised. A revolt brokeout in AD 21 led by two noblemen, Julius Florus, a Treveran, and an Aeduan, Julius Sacrovir, who had bothcommanded Roman auxiliaries and been granted Roman citizenship. The cause was very probably related tothe collection of taxes, but it failed to gather widespread support and was put down with the help of otherGauls. The recent discovery of a legionary fortress near Dijon dating to about the AD 70s suggests thatthings were still not completely quiet even a century after Augustus’ formal establishment of the provinces,but there is no evidence of widespread destruction. Gaul was on its way to becoming a ‘Romanised’province, clearly indicated by the decision of the emperor Claudius to allow Gallic noblemen to enter thesenate.

Julius Caesar claimed to have conquered Gaul. He did defeat the tribes and force them to surrender, buthe left Gaul still unsettled in order to pursue his personal ambitions. His fame as the conqueror of Gaul

CONCLUSION AND CONSEQUENCES 87

comes from his own hand, as the author of his Commentaries; he did not on his own turn Gaul into Romanprovinces—that was for his political successors to do. The conquests brought Gaul into the Roman empireand began a process that had a profound political and cultural impact on western Europe; and it providedCaesar with the springboard to establish himself as dictator of the Roman world.


Further reading

Caesar, Gallic WarSuetonius, Life of the Divine Julius CaesarPlutarch, Life of CaesarDrinkwater, J., Roman Gaul, London, 1983Feugere, M., Les armes des Romains, Paris, 1993Goudineau, C., César et la Gaule, Paris, 1990Holmes, T.Rice, Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul, Oxford, 1911Keppie, L., The Making of the Roman Army, London, 1984King, A.C., Roman Gaul and Germany, London, 1990Reddé, M., L’armée Romaine en Gaule, Paris, 1996

Index

Aduatuci 40, 50, 65, 70, 72, 89Aedui 16

and Arverni 15–16and Boii 40, 69Gallic revolt (52 BC) 58Roman alliance 13, 16, 17, 36, 40, 74

Agedincum 52Agrippa 91Aix en Provence 11Alesia, siege of (52 BC) 9, 57, 58–60, 59, 60–61, 62, 63,

71, 89Alloboges 11Altar of Domitius Ahenobarbus 13, 21, 22Ambiones 38Ambiorix 49Aquitania, engagements in 42archers 20, 25architecture, Celtic 84Ardennes, campaigns in 41, 51Ariovistus 16, 30, 35–36, 89Arminius 90armour 19, 21, 23, 24artillery 54–57Arverni 11, 15–16, 52–53, 58, 69Atrebates 38, 39, 63, 83Augustodunum (Autun) 91Augustus, Roman emperor 83, 84, 91Aulus Hirtius 83Autun see AugustodunumAvaricum (Bourges) 13, 52–53, 55–57, 65, 70Baculus, P.Sextius 66–68Balearic Islands 20ballistae 54–55barges 17Battersea shield 24Belgae 15, 23, 36–38, 40De Bello Gallico (Caesar) 7, 36, 58, 83, 89

Bellovaci 38, 40, 60, 63Besançon 35Bibracte 13–15, 14Bibrax 38Bituriges 60Boii 30, 33, 35, 40, 52, 69Bourges see Avaricumbridges 34, 46Britain, Caesar’s invasions (55 and 54 BC) 44, 46–50, 54,

63, 75–79, 80, 81Brutus, Decimus 41

Caelius, M. 67Caesar, Julius 8, 86

building works financed 87–88career 9, 16–17, 71, 75–79, 88, 90character 17, 71and Helvetian migration 31–35and publicity 7, 71, 86quoted 16, 23, 36, 70soldiers, relations with 66, 71and weapon development 57, 90

Caesar, Julius:Gallic campaigns 33–41, 42–50, 51, 52–53, 58–60,61, 65, 71, 83and Britain 44, 46–50fact finding 80–81gains from 72–73, 87–88, 92Gallic revolt (52 BC) 52–53, 58–60Gallic War 7, 36, 58, 83, 89later conciliation of Gauls 84–86, 90–91manpower 17, 18massacre of German tribes 46, 70, 90subordinates 38triumph 86–87‘war crimes’ 46, 70, 89–90

Camillus 11

90

Caninius 60, 61Carnutes 52, 60carnyces 25Cassivellaunus 49Casticus 30casualties 71, 89catapults 53–57, 56, 57Catavellauni 49cavalry 20, 22, 22, 25, 36

Celtic warriors 25casualties 71, 89cavalry 25equipment 24–25fighting style 22, 27–29organisation 24status 23, 25strategies and tactics 26–27, 90training 28weapons 24, 28

Cenabum (Orleans) 13, 15, 52centurions 19, 66–68, 67chariots 25, 49Cicero, Marcus Tullius 31, 50, 73, 79Cicero, Quintus Tullius 50, 68, 80Cimbri 13, 89Cisalpine Gaul 11, 17Cita, Gaius Fufius 81civilians, life during warfare 70–71Claudius, Roman emperor 92Cleopatra 88coins 16, 37, 43, 52–53, 86, 87

Gallic manufacture 13–15Commentaries (Caesar) see Gallic WarCommius 63, 83consuls 43–44Cotta 49Crassus, Publius Licinius 18, 36, 38, 42Crassus , Marcus Licinius 17, 43–44Crete 20Curiosolites 41–42

Diodorus Siculus 15Diviciacus 15, 40Domitius Ahenobarbus 11 Altar of 13, 21, 22Drappes 60–61druids 15, 52, 75Dumnorix 15, 16, 23, 30, 40

Eburones 49, 51, 60

Fabius Maximus 11–13Florus, Julius 91food supplies see Roman army, suppliesforts, Celtic 46–47Frontinus 83

Galba 40, 68Gallic revolt (52 BC) 51–53, 58–60, 74Gallic revolt (AD 21) 91Gallic War (Caesar) 7, 36, 58, 83, 89Gaul

early history 9, 11–17effects of wars 70–71, 73–74, 89, 90–92life in 7, 13–15provincial status, reduction to 83, 84–86, 90–92slaves, use of 71tribal administration 15urbanisation 13–15see also Cisalpine Gaul;Transalpine GaulGauls 12, 63casualties 71, 89height 28warfare, attitude to 69weaknesses 9see also Celtic warriors

Gergovia 55, 58, 66, 71Germanic tribes 13, 15–16, 35–36, 38, 44–46, 49, 50, 51,

69, 81Germany

Caesar’s invasions (55 and 53 BC) 46, 51later campaigns 90, 91

Gorgobina 52Gundestrup Cauldron 25

Hannibal 11helmets 19, 19, 24, 25, 48Helvetii 16, 17, 30–35

battle against (58 BC) 33–35, 35, 70human sacrifice 75

Illyricum 17

javelins see pila

Labienus 18, 33, 38, 51, 58, 63Latobrigi 30legates 18–19, 38legions 18–19, 66

INDEX 91

Lexovii 41–42Lingones 50Lucan 75Lucterius 60–61Lugdunum (Lyons) 91

Mandubii 58, 71maniples 28maps

Alesia, siege of (52 BC) 59campaigns 31, 42, 51, 54

Marius 13, 90Marseilles 11, 15, 75medicine, Roman treatment of casualties 22, 23Menapii 15, 27, 42–43, 50, 73–74Metellus 31Morini 27, 42–43, 63, 73–74

naval engagements 41Nervii 27, 29, 38–39, 50

battle against (57 BC) 39–40, 39, 67–68Normandy, engagements in 41–42Noviodunum 38, 52Numidia 20

Octavian see AugustusOctodurus 40Orgetorix 30Orleans see Cenabum

Parisii 58pila 29, 56, 90Polybius 24Pompey 9, 17, 38, 43–44praetors 38prisoners, treatment of 64, 65Pullo, Titus 68Punic Wars 11

quaestors 38

Raurici 30religion 75, 78Remi 36, 38, 60Rhine, bridge across 34, 46Roman army

auxiliaries 20–22, 28camps 32, 44–45, 55casualties in Gaul 71

casualties, treatment of 22, 23cavalry 20, 22centurions 19, 66–68, 67enemy leaders, treatment of 64equipment 19–20fighting style 27–29, 90hangers-on 80legionaries 19–20, 21, 22, 28organisation 18–19, 18, 66pay 20recruitment 13, 20supplies 15, 17, 22–23, 36, 40, 52, 58, 74, 76–77, 81tactics 33training 29veterans 91weapons 20, 21, 23, 28, 29, 54–57, 56, 57, 90

Roman army:legionsVII 39, 46–48VIII 39IX 39X 39, 46–48XI 39XII 39, 40, 66–68XIV 68

Roman fleet 41Rome and Romans

Aedui, alliance with 16class system 15, 81Gallic capture (390 BC) 11Gaul, early relations with 11–15and Helvetian migration 30–31life in 7–9merchants abroad 70–72officials 18–19, 38, 43–44slaves, use of 71, 73warfare, attitude to 69, 89–90

Sabinus 41–42, 49, 71, 89Sacrovir, Julius 91saddles 20, 25scorpions 53–57Senones 50, 58, 60Sequani 15–16, 24, 30, 69Sertorius 42, 90shields

Celtic 24–25, 24, 37Roman (scuta) 20, 21, 23, 29

ships 17, 41, 43, 81

92 INDEX

shrines, Gallic 75, 78siege warfare 38, 50, 52–57, 58–59, 60–65, 60–61, 62,

70–71slaves and slavery 15, 40, 41, 71–73, 72slingers 20, 25Sontiates 42Spanish tribes 42, 90Suebi 15–16, 30, 45

battle against (58 BC) 35–36Suessiones 38Suetonius 87, 90Switzerland 30swords

Celtic 24, 28Roman (gladii) 20, 21, 23, 28, 28, 29

Tacitus 74Taranis 37Tarusates 42Telamon, battle of (225 BC) 11Tencteri 44–46, 70Teutones 13, 89Tigurini 89trade 7, 15, 80–82Trajan’s Column 22, 32, 44–45, 64, 76–77Transalpine Gaul 13, 17transport

rivers 17, 22–23roads 23

Trebatius 79Trebia, battle of the (218 BC) 11Treveri 50, 51, 60triremes 43triumphs 86–87Tulingi 30, 33, 35

Usipi 44–46, 70, 90Uxellodunum 57, 60–65

Vellaunodunum 52Venelli 41–42Veneti 15, 27, 40–41, 73, 74, 82Venus Genetrix, Temple of 87–88Vercingetorix 9, 25, 27, 52–53, 52–53, 58–60, 71, 85, 87Via Domitia 13Viromandui 38, 39Vocates 42Volusenus 81, 83Vorenus, Lucius 68

warfareand civilians 70–71contemporary view of 69, 89–90

weapons Celtic 24, 28Roman 20, 21, 23, 28, 29, 54–57, 56, 57, 90Roman auxiliaries 20

wine 15, 23

INDEX 93

Education

Caesars Gallic Wars - Essential Histories (58-50 BC)