Chapter 5—Religious and Mystical Chapter 5—Religious and Mystical ExperienceExperience

• For the last three chapters we have been considering arguments for the existence of God.– These arguments have been important in the shaping of our understanding of

God, but in an important way, they miss the point.• The arguments we’ve considered have been post hoc rationalizations,

attempts to give a rational foundation for a belief already held on other grounds.– Few, if any, people believe in God because of these arguments.

• A more common reason for believing in God is the claim that people have personally encountered God in some form or another.– Such encounters certainly seem to give us very good reasons for believing in

God.• But before we can jump to the conclusion that religious experience proves

God’s existence we have to ask several questions.– What is a ‘religious experience?’ How do we make sense of them? How do

we know we can trust them?

What is a ‘Religious Experience?’What is a ‘Religious Experience?’• Religious experiences are profound and ubiquitous.

– Every major religion includes them as a foundational aspect of their faith.

• Despite this, it is very hard to put our finger on exactly what makes an experience ‘religious.’– We seem to know them when we hear about them, but the common

thread remains elusive.• Rowe mentions the blinding of Saul on the road to Damascus

as a clear example of a religious experience.– But what makes it a religious experience? – What aspects of the case distinguish it from a regular experience?

The blinding light? The booming voice?• These don’t seem like either necessary conditions (you can

have a religious experience without them), nor do they seem like sufficient conditions (they do not, by themselves, amount to a religious experience.)– So what makes this a religious experience?

Schleiermacher on Schleiermacher on DependenceDependence• One important attempt to isolate the religious experience

comes from Friedrich Schleiermacher.– According to Schleiermacher, what makes a religious experience

distinctive is the feeling of absolute dependence.• Absolute dependence is an “immediate” feeling, one that

is not mediated by contemplation and not captured by articulated thoughts.– It can be contrasted with “that consciousness of self which is

more like an objective consciousness, being a representation off oneself, and thus mediated by self-contemplation.” (The Christian Faith)

• This distinguishes absolute dependence from relative dependence, a mundane feeling we all understand (e.g.—when we depend on a friend for a ride to the airport.)

Otto on Otto on OthernessOtherness• German theologian Rudolf Otto though Schleiermacher

was on to something.– But he hadn’t quite put his finger on the key aspect of religious

experience.• Otto had two problems with Schleiermacher’s definition.

– 1) It made religious experience dependent on my awareness of my self, rather than of God. (Subjectivism)

– 2) God is arrived at after the fact, by inference from my experience

• Otto suggests that what makes a religious experience distinctive is the sense of otherness:– An immediate perception of the divinity of another (God).– Our sense of absolute depends follows from this sense of

otherness, not the other way around.

Rowe on Union and MysticismRowe on Union and Mysticism• Rowe criticizes this idea on the basis that many of the

most profound religious experiences seem to obliterate the distinction between self and other.– Many mystics strive for a union with the divine, rather than an

awareness of the self-as dependent on the other.– This is prominent in Hinduism and Buddhism, but also Christian

mysticism as well.• Let’s distinguish this sort of mystical religious experience

from the experience Schleiermacher and Otto talk about (call that ‘non-mystical religious experience.’)

• The problem is that these two kinds of experience seem to preclude each other.– So how can we reconcile these opposing notions? Is one right

and the other wrong? Is there a way of bringing them together?

The Presence of the DivineThe Presence of the Divine• Rowe tries to resolve these questions by amending Otto’s definition

thusly:– A religious experience is an experience in which one senses the

immediate presence of the divine.• Rowe intends this to cover both cases otherness and of union, with

the divine where separation of self and other is obliterated. • This definition will exclude religious experiences that lack a divine

component.– In a sense, any time we go to church or read the bible we have a ‘religious

experience’ but in this context we mean something more profound.• It will also exclude experiences in which there is no awareness of the

divine.– If ‘God is everywhere’ then every experience is of the divine, but these

don’t seem to count, either.• Rowe also wants to distinguish believing that the divine is present (i.e.

—a reasoned inference from experience) from sensing the presence of the divine (i.e.—an experience unmediated by thought.)

Veridical and Delusory ExperiencesVeridical and Delusory Experiences• It is undeniable that many people have had religious

experiences of this kind.– But we cannot just assume that this means the divinities

experienced are therefore real. • We all know that sometimes we experience things that are

not real.– We have dreams, hallucinations, illusions, etc.

• When I dream (for example) it might seem as if there is an apple in my hand, but in fact there is no such apple.– Let’s call such experiences delusory, ones in which we experience

something that is not real independent of our experience.• Contrast that kind of experience with a veridical one, that

is, an experience in which what we perceive is real independent of us.– Hence, what we have to ask is whether any/which of these

religious experiences are veridical or delusory.

Non-mystical Religious ExperienceNon-mystical Religious Experience• Can experiences like these provide us with a good

reason for believing in God?• A cynical reaction might be to dismiss such

experiences as mere feelings.– A profound emotion, such as joy, might be misconstrued

by a religiously inclined person as experience of the divine.

• No doubt this is true of some such experiences, but we cannot dismiss all such experiences in this way.– They occur to a diverse array of intelligent, perceptive

people, who can distinguish ‘mere’ feeling from something more profound.

– Also, not everyone who has such an experience is predisposed to religiosity (e.g.—Saul).

Assessing Religious ExperiencesAssessing Religious Experiences• The deeper problem is the suggestion that all such

experiences are delusory, like Macbeth's knife.• There is something profoundly bizarre about such

experiences.– They do not conform to our common-sense, everyday understanding

of the world.• Occam’s razor might seem to suggest a simple way of

understanding these experiences:– They are hallucinations, schizophrenic breaks with reality.

• On the other hand, we typically accept experience as giving us a good reason to believe, so long as there isn’t some particular reason to doubt the experience.– Illusion or no, Macbeth has a good reason to believe there’s a dagger

before him; unless he has a reason to suspect he’s hallucinating then it’s reasonable for him to think the knife is real.

Do experiences give us good Do experiences give us good reasons to believe?reasons to believe?

• We often mistake the true meaning of experiences (e.g.—when we see a white wall under red light.)– We also can mistake the substance of experiences (e.g.

—when we see a snake under hallucinogens.) • But these cases seem to be the exception, not the

rule. • Most of the time, we assume our experiences are

veridical, unless we have some reason to think otherwise.– Let’s call such reasons defeating reasons for trusting our

experiences.• There seem to be two kinds of defeating reasons

– (A) a reason to think the experience mistaken– (B) a reason to doubt the reliability of the context in which

we have it.

The Principle of CredulityThe Principle of Credulity• If I see a snake in front of me, but all of you say

they see nothing, this gives me a (Type A) reason to think my experience is delusory.

• Knowing that there are tinted lights, or that we’re on hallucinogens count as (Type B) reasons for doubting the veracity of our experience.

• In the absence of such defeating reasons, it is rational to trust experience.

• Richard Swinburne calls this the ‘Principle of Credulity.’– He argues that if we accept it in general, then it would

be arbitrary to reject it when it comes to religious experience.

The Problem of CalibrationThe Problem of Calibration• Rowe suggests there may be non-arbitrary reasons for not

applying the principle of credulity to religious experiences.• We accept the principle of credulity in general because

most experience is very regular.– I know that if there is a snake in front of me, then other sighted

people will be able to see it.• Religious experiences, however, are decidedly irregular.

– There seems to be no way of ‘calibrating’ religious experience, since it is so idiosyncratic.

– Without some way of checking religious experience, how could we ever know if we have a reason to trust it or not?

• Perhaps we can get some measure of comparison based on our common understanding of God.– Anyone who claims God told them to kill innocent children for fun

has probably NOT had a veridical experience.• But it doesn’t seem like this will be enough to truly calibrate

religious experiences to the degree necessary to rely on them.

The Problem of Many ReligionsThe Problem of Many Religions• There is another problem with the Principle of Credulity

with regard to religious experience:– We cannot be credulous towards ALL such experience, because

they are logically incompatible.– If we trust the Christian who has a religious experience then we

have to reject the Hindu who has an equally profound religious experience.

• Is there any impartial way we could arbitrate between such experiences?– Unless we have a religious experiences ourselves, how do we

know which reports to trust?• Perhaps we could appeal to some other standard to help

break the tie.– But what standard? Scientific? Moral? Political? Artistic?– It would take the rest of our lives to investigate ALL religions on All

of these bases.

Extrovertive Mystical Religious Extrovertive Mystical Religious ExperienceExperience

• Mystical experiences are typically divided into two types, extrovertive and introvertive.

• An extrovertive mystical religious experience is one in which the external world is presented to the mystic (through the 5 senses) in a divine way.– Everyday objects are ‘transfigured and transformed’ in

such a way that their inner essence shines through.• Everything is seen as beautiful, sublime.

– The division between self and non-self melts away.– The mystic becomes one with the true, divine reality.– A sense of timelessness, peace and bliss overwhelms

the mystic.

Introvertive Mystical Religious Introvertive Mystical Religious ExperienceExperience

• By contrast, an introvertive mystical religious experience is one that ‘looks inward’ instead of outward.– It is a transformation, not of perception, but of consciousness

itself.• The normal contents of consciousness (feelings, desires,

thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, etc.), even thoughts of God, disappear.– In it’s place there is… nothingness. A divine tranquility, a peace,

a bliss that is indescribable, a union that even the word “God” is inadequate to capture.

• This is a remarkably hard state to achieve.– It usually takes a lifetime of training, meditation, prayer and

asceticism.

The Unanimity ThesisThe Unanimity Thesis• Ordinary religious experiences seem to propose different

and mutually exclusive.– E.g.—either Jesus is the one begotten Son of God (Christianity), or

he is a prophet of Allah (Islam.)– Thus, accepting one tradition as true seems to amount to denying

the truth of the other traditions.• Introvertive mystical experiences are sometimes taken to

point to a common, underlying commonality that all religions point to.– For all of the differences between religions, mystics seem to

describe the same sort of experience, regardless of what tradition they come from.

• Hence, this suggestion, is called “The Unanimity Thesis.”• This apparent agreement seems to give us a good reason

for thinking that the mystical experience is veridical.– Independent confirming testimony is a good reason to trust the

account.

Experience vs. InterpretationExperience vs. Interpretation• Is the Unanimity Thesis true? Are all introvertive mystical

experiences basically the same?– Some mystics talk of experiencing God, some of Nirvana, some of

Brahman, etc.– It sure seems like they’re talking about different things.

• W.T. Stace introduces a useful distinction, between experience and interpretation.– “On a dark night out of doors one may see something glimmering

white. One person may think it a ghost. A second person may take it for a sheet hung out on a clothesline. A third person may suppose that it is a white painted rock. Here we have the same experience with three different interpretations.

• Mystics in different traditions may interpret their experience in terms of their tradition, but the underlying experience is the same.

Can We Have Experience Without Can We Have Experience Without Interpretation?Interpretation?

• There’s an old maxim in the philosophy of science: All observation is theory laden.– In other words, you can’t have a pure experience.– Even something as seemingly basic as ‘something glimmering

white’ is an interpretation.• If we consider some of the examples of religious

experience we’ve talked about thus far (St. Teresa, Samuel, Saul, Moses) this becomes apparent.

• But perhaps this is a distortion caused by language.– Of course we can’t TALK or THINK about experience without

interpreting it, but we can HAVE experiences without interpretation.

• d

Russell: Mystical Experience is Russell: Mystical Experience is Delusory Delusory

• Even if we grant the Unanimity Thesis, this isn’t proof that the mystical experience is veridical.– Certain drugs can bring about a unanimous experience, that

doesn’t mean that what’s experienced is real.• Bertrand Russell rejects mystical experiences on the

grounds that they can only be reached in highly abnormal circumstances.– To test an experience we need to be able to control and

understand the conditions in which it is experienced.• But Russell is just assuming that normal human conditions

in fact perceive reality the way it is.– Mystics deny this; they claim that we are normally enshrouded in a

miasma and only the mystical state can peel back this deception.• Consider H.G. Well’s “The Country of the Blind”

– The one-eyed man isn’t King; he’s considered insane.

Broad: Mystical Experience is Broad: Mystical Experience is VeridicalVeridical

• C.D. Broad offers the following argument:1) There is considerable agreement among mystics

concerning the reality they have experienced.2) When there is considerable agreement among

observers as to what they take themselves to be experiencing, it is reasonable to conclude that their experiences are veridical, unless there be some positive reason to think them delusive.

3) There are no positive reasons for thinking that mystical experiences are delusive.

4) Therefore it is reasonable to believe that mystical experiences are delusive.

• But how could we ever test premise (3)? – The mystic seems to cheat; they place their

experiences beyond the possibility of testing or verification by the non-mystic.

James’ Middle PathJames’ Middle Path• William James offers a compromise.

– A mystical experience is sufficient for anyone who has one to be justified in believing in the divine.

– But those of us who don’t have mystical experiences are not rationally compelled to believe the testimony of the mystic.

• This way we don’t have to answer the question of whether or not mystical experiences are veridical or delusive.– They’re good enough to be convincing for those who experience them

first hand, but not good enough for those who hear about them second hand.

• Such a move is a nice compromise, but it’s also rather unsatisfactory.– It seems to say ‘there’s no point in discussing this unless you’ve had a

mystical experience.’

Rowe’s ConclusionRowe’s Conclusion• Even if we grant that mystical experiences are veridical,

there’s a larger underlying problem.– The original question we set out to answer was whether or not

religious and mystical experiences give us good reasons to believe in God.

• We saw the problem of many religions creates serious difficulties for religious experiences.– Mystical experiences tried to avoid this problem by appealing to the

Unanimity Thesis.• But by doing that we strip out any sort of God from the

equation.– At best, mystical experiences give us a reason to believe in a divine

reality not readily accessible to our every day consciousness.– But it’s a long stretch from that to God.