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Presentation from Institute of Development Studies Nutrition Group and Transform Nutrition seminar on 19 February - 'Effective Governance and Policies to Improve Nutrition Outcomes: A Cross Comparison of Nine Country Cases'
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Effective Governance and Policies to Improve
Nutrition Outcomes:
A cross comparison of nine country cases
Andrés Mejía Acosta (IDS)
Jessica Fanzo (Columbia University)
Institute of Development Studies
Brighton, 19 February 2013
The Nutrition Paradoxes Nutrition and GDP growth
economic growth does not lead to
improved nutrition
India vs Brasil vs Peru
Nutrition and food security
policies designed to boost food
production are not sufficient to reduce under
nutrition
The Maradi Paradox
Pakistan, Niger
A political economy approach
Analysing policy change…
Number of stakeholders involved
Ideological differences
Winset = space for policy change
PEA of Nutrition
Why some countries that are strongly committed to reducing
malnutrition can effectively deliver on nutrition outcomes while others
make insufficient or no progress at all?
Why and when do government officials become accountable to the
needs of the most vulnerable?
How are advocacy coalitions formed around a single narrative to
reduce under nutrition?
Stunting levels across nine countries
Source: WHO Global Database on Child Growth and Malnutrition
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
1990-92 93-95 1997-99 00-02 2003-05 2006-08 2009-11
Rate
of
Stu
nti
ng
Bangladesh
Ethiopia
India
Kenya
Niger
Pakistan
Peru
Zambia
Roadmap
Analysing Nutrition Governance
We are not the first ones but…
Building a dashboard of indicators
Intersectoral cooperation
Vertical articulation
Sustainable funding
Looking at and measuring the comparative
evidence
What is perceived as good
Nutrition Governance?
According to the WHO, Strong 'nutrition
governance' countries are those
where governments are committed to having a
national nutrition plan,
which is also part of the national development
strategy,
they have set up inter-sectoral coordinating
committees,
maintain regular surveys and data collections,
and
allocate budget lines for nutrition strategies and
plans, among other criteria
How do we measure governance?
Governance Indicators (World Bank)
Governance scores on the
commitment and willingness (WHO
Landscape)
How do we measure accountability
and incentives?
Performance budgeting
Institutional and capacity building
Translating Governance Analysis
to effective interventions and
Scaling Up
Multisectoral nutrition
planning (1970s)
WHO Landscape Analysis
(2009)
World Bank (2002-2011)
Undernutrition: What Works?
Action Against Hunger (2010)
Mainstreaming Nutrition
Initiative (Pelletier et al 2011)
Scaling Up Nutrition
movement
REACH country process
Analysing Nutrition Governance
–our framework-
The fieldwork
Nine countries, since 2010
A dozen researchers
Nearly 230 interviews
Four languages
Similar questionnaire adjusted to country
specific concerns
Working papers, research reports and policy
briefings posted at
http://www.ids.ac.uk/nutritiongovernance
ANG: Intersectoral cooperation
How (-and why-) do government actors,
donors and other stakeholders cooperate
with one another?
Are there any formal or informal cooperation
instances/coordinating bodies?
Is there direct involvement of the Executive?
Is nutrition part of the national development
and poverty reduction agenda?
In Peru: Initiative Against Child Malnutrition (CNI)
Multisectoral coordination in Ethiopia FMOH
National Nutrition
Coordinating Body
(line ministries chaired by
MoH)
NDPG
Nat. Nutrition
technical
committee
(experts)
Agenda-
setting
Individual
donors
Emergency
nutrition
Nutrition
working group
(DPs and MoH)
Coordination/
implementation
forum
PSNP
Food
Security
Program
Source: Taylor 2012
Min of
Women &
Child Affairs
Min of Local
Government Min of
Educ.
Min of
Ag
Min of
Livestock
Min of Health
and Family
Welfare
Min of
Finance
Min of
Planning
Min of Food
and Disaster
Management
Min of
Sanitation and
Water
National Nutrition
Programme
1) Coordinating cttee (NGO implementers)
2) Monitoring group (NGO mgrs & NNP
monitors)
National Nutrition
Programme
management
committee
IPHN
BNN
C
Food
policy
Community level interventions
ISC in Bangladesh
What makes ISC work?
H1: improved ISC will contribute to (the
formulation of) improved nutrition
governance
H1a: “policy dictators” can make swift policy
changes but are not sustainable over long run
(Niger)
H1b: broad and inclusive “nutrition coalitions”
(…) are likely to make nutrition policies more
sustainable (Brazil)
ANG: Vertical articulation
Why would local elites want to implement
national level policies?
Are there decentralised structures (regional
and local) that facilitate local implementation
and coordination?
Are local elites motivated to comply with and
influence national level policies (upwards)?
Are they accountable to demands of voters
(downwards)?
Vertical Coordination in Brazil
Kebele development
committee Health
ext.
worker
Ag.
Ext.
worker
Woreda development
committee
Regional health bureau Regional agriculture office
Woreda health
officials
Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Heatlh
Dev.
Army
Dev.
Army
Dev.
Army Dev.
Army
Dev.
Army Dev.
Army
EPRDF (party)
Regional agriculture
officials
6x
Ag
Dev.
Army
Vertical coordination in Ethiopia
What makes vertical articulation
work? H2: effective Vertical coordination is likely
to contribute to improved nutrition
governance (implementation)
H2a: when it builds on existing decentralized
structures
H2b: when it generates greater local
ownership
H2c: when it reproduces intersectoral
cooperation at the national or subnational
level
ANG: Sustainable Funding
How do funding mechanisms facilitate
inter sectoral and vertical cooperation?
Are there centralised (pooled) or coordinated
funding schemes or funding sources are
fragmented?
Are there independent monitoring and
oversight mechanisms that promote efficient
use of revenues?
Are there additional, unexplored sources of
revenue? private sector funding; taxation;
natural resource revenues?
Pooled funding in Niger
Several types of pooled funds:
Bilateral Funds – discretionary
Programmatic – coordinated
Emergency - OCHA
New embedded funding line in the budget
How to make long term use of emergency funds?
Siloed funding in Bangladesh
Fragmented funding encourages isolation
and duplication
Multiple recipients: “Anyone can get funded”
Funding is source of political influence
It can privilege relations with MPs or local goverments
What makes funding work?
H3. Sustainable Funding is likely to
contribute to (financing) improved nutrition
governance
H3a: greater government ownership – greater
government share in nutrition funding - into
state budgets and political process (ie.
Nutrition line?)
H3b: when funding allocations are at least
coordinated to avoid corruption or overlap
H3c: when there are institutional provisions
(earmark, taxes, multiyear budgets) that
ensure long term funding
How does it all add up?
Intersectoral coordination
inclusive, partially inclusive, not inclusive
Vertical Articulation
Effective, partially fragmented, fragmented
Funding
Pooled, coordinated, uncoordinated
Towards a comparative analysis
of nutrition governance Country studies Inter Sectoral
cooperation
Vertical coordination Funding Outcome
(or path
process)
Brazil Inclusive Effective Coordinated O
Peru Inclusive Partly fragmented Coordinated O
Kenya Partially inclusive Partly fragmented Coordinated O
Niger Inclusive fragmented Coordinated and
Pooled
--
Bangladesh Not inclusive Effective Uncoordinated --
Ethiopia Partially inclusive Effective Uncoordinated --
Zambia Inclusive Partly fragmented Uncoordinated --
India Not inclusive Fragmented Uncoordinated X
Pakistan Not inclusive Fragmented Uncoordinated X
Advantages of a process driven
nutrition governance approach
Unpacks the notion of “political will” to look
into specific mechanisms of political
commitment around nutrition
Focuses on the formation and
sustainability of nutrition coalitions
Seeks to measure and extract practical
policy advice for scaling up nutrition efforts