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TIME & THE OTHERTIME & THE OTHER

TIME & THE OTHERTIME & THE OTHER

Johannes Fabian

TIME & THE OTHERHOW ANTHROPOLOGY MAKES ITS OBJECTForeword by Ma!i Bunzl / With a New Postscript by the Author

TIME & THE OTHERTIME & THE OTHER

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TIME & THE OTHER

Columbia University Press Publishers Since 1893 New York Chichester, West Sussex cup.columbia.edu Copyright © 2014, 2002, 1983 Columbia University Press Postscript © 2006 Sage Publications All rights reserved Fabian, Johannes. Time and the other : how anthropology makes its object / Johannes Fabian p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-231-16926-4 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-231-16927-1 (pbk. : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-231-53748-3 (e-book) Library of Congress Control Number : 2013953081 Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. This book is printed on paper with recycled content. Printed in the United States of America c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 p 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Cover design by Anna Fabian

Contents

Foreword: Syntheses of a Critical Anthropology, by Matti Bunzl vii

Preface to the Reprint Edition xxxiii

Preface and Ac know ledg ments xxxvii

Chapter 1: Time and the Emerging Other 1

From Sacred to Secular Time: The Philosophical Traveler 2

From History to Evolution: The Naturalization of Time 11

Some Uses of Time in Anthropological Discourse 21

Taking Stock: Anthropological Discourse and Denial of Coevalness 25

Chapter 2: Our Time, Their Time, No Time: Coevalness Denied 37

Circumventing Coevalness: Cultural Relativity 38

Preempting Coevalness: Cultural Taxonomy 52

Chapter 3: Time and Writing About the Other 71

Contradiction: Real or Apparent 72

Temporalization: Means or End? 74

Time and Tense: The Ethnographic Present 80

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In My Time: Ethnography and the Autobiographic Past 87

Politics of Time: The Temporal Wolf in Taxonomic Sheep’s Clothing 97

Chapter 4: The Other and the Eye: Time and the Rhetoric of Vision 105

Method and Vision 106

Space and Memory 109

Logic as Arrangement: Knowledge Visible 114

Vide et Impera: The Other as Object 118

“The Symbol Belongs to the Orient”: Symbolic Anthropology in Hegel’s Aesthetic 123

The Other as Icon: The Case of “Symbolic Anthropology” 131

Chapter 5: Conclusions 143

Retrospect and Summary 144

Issues for Debate 152

Coevalness: Points of Departure 156

Postscript: The Other Revisited 167

Notes 187

References Cited 203

Index 219

Foreword / Syntheses of a Critical Anthropology

FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1983, Johannes Fabian’s Time and the Other ranks among the most widely cited books of a critical anthropology that has, in the course of the past two de cades, gradually moved into the center of the discipline. But like other canonical texts written in this tradition (cf. Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986; Clifford  1988; Rosaldo 1989), Time and the Other continues to  hold theoretical relevance, retaining the radical " avor of an urgent polemic. Praised by many as a path- breaking critique of the anthropological project, while met with apprehension by others in light of its uncompromising epistemological stance, it has become a # xture in the the-oretical landscape of contemporary anthropology. The fol-lowing introduction leads from an exposition of the book’s argument and an analysis of its relation to Fabian’s earlier writings to its contextualization in the critical anthropolo-gy of the 1970s and early 1980s. The piece concludes with a brief overview of anthropological developments in the wake of the initial publication of Time and the Other.

The Argument

Time and the Other is a historical account of the constitutive function of time in Anglo- American and French anthro-pology. In contrast to prominent ethnographic accounts of culturally determined temporal systems (cf. Evans-

viii Foreword

Pritchard 1940; Bourdieu 1977), Fabian’s critical project operates on a conceptual level, interrogating and prob-lematizing the deployment and uses of time as such. In this sense, Time and the Other functions both as a meta- analysis of  the anthropological project at large and as a decon-struction of its enabling temporal formations.

Fabian’s argument is motivated by a contradiction inherent to the anthropological discipline: on the one hand,  anthropological knowledge is produced in the course  of # eldwork through the intersubjective communi-cation between anthropologists and interlocutors; on the other hand, traditional forms of ethnographic repre sen ta-tion require the constitutive suppression of the dialogical realities generating anthropological insights in the # rst place. In the objectifying discourses of a scientistic anthro-pology, “Others” thus never appear as immediate partners in  a cultural exchange but as spatially and, more impor-tantly, temporally distanced groups. Fabian terms this dis-crepancy between the intersubjective realm of # eldwork and  the diachronic relegation of the Other in anthropo-logical texts the “schizogenic use of Time,” and he expli-cates in the following manner:

I believe it can be shown that the anthropologist in the # eld often employs conceptions of Time quite different from those that inform reports on his # ndings. Furthermore, I will argue that a criti-cal analysis of the role Time is allowed to play as a condition for producing ethnographic knowledge in the practice of # eldwork may serve as a starting point for a critique of anthropological discourse in general. (21)

In Time and the Other, the interrogation of the schizo-genic use of time represents the beginning of a global cri-tique of the anthropological project. For the discrepancy between intersubjective # eldwork and the distancing rhet-oric of ethnographic discourse leads Fabian to an under-standing of anthropology as an inherently po liti cal disci-pline— a discipline that at once constitutes and demotes its objects through their temporal relegation. Fabian refers to this constitutive phenomenon as the “denial of coeval-

Foreword ix

ness”1— a term that becomes the gloss for a situation where the Other’s hierachically distancing localization suppresses the simultaneity and contemporaneity of the ethnographic encounter. The temporal structures so consituted thus place anthropologists and their readers in a privileged time frame, while banishing the Other to a stage of lesser devel-opment. This situation is ultimately exempli# ed by the deployment of such essentially temporal categories as “ primitive” to establish and demarcate anthropology’s tra-ditional object.

Fabian terms such denial of coevalness the “allochro-nism”  of anthropology (32). At once the product of an entrenched ethnocentrism and the enabling ideology of traditional discourses about the Other, anthropology’s allochronic orientation emerges as the discipline’s central problematic. Fabian’s project in Time and the Other follows from this premise, fusing a critical genealogy of allochron-ic  discourse in anthropology with a polemic against its un re" ected reproduction.

Fabian presents his critique of allochronism in the con-text of a comprehensive analysis of the function of tempo-ral systems in Western scienti# c discourses. In the # rst chap-ter of Time and the Other, he traces the transformation of time from the initial secularization of the Judeo- Christian notion of history during the Renaissance to its revolution-ary naturalization in the course of the nineteenth century. Anthropology’s establishment as an autonomous discipline in the second half of the nineteenth century was predicat-ed  on this transformation. The discipline’s evolutionary doctrine— constituted at the intersection of scientism, Enlightenment belief in progress, and colonially veiled eth-nocentrism—in turn codi# ed anthropology’s allochronic orientation. In this manner, contemporary “scienti# c” cate-gorizations like “savage,” “barbaric,” and “civilized” signi-# ed stages of historical development. Conceiving global his-tory in terms of universal progress, this allochronic logic identi# ed and constituted late- nineteenth- century “sav-ages”  as “survivals”— inhabitants of more or less ancient states of cultural development. At the same time, anthro-pology’s allochronism established a “civilized” West as the

x Foreword

pinnacle of universal human progress, an argument that helped to legitimize various imperialist projects.

Fabian views anthropology’s foundational allochro-nism  as an ongoing problem. For the onset of antievolu-tionary paradigms in twentieth- century anthropology notwithstanding, he regards the relegation of the ethno-graphic object to another time as the constitutive element of the anthropological project at large. Fabian substanti-ates this thesis in chapter 2 of Time and the Other through the analysis of two dominant theoretical orientations: Anglo- American cultural relativism and Lévi- Straussian structuralism. In these critical appraisals (followed in chapter 4 by a similar examination of symbolic anthropol-ogy), Fabian identi# es the denial of coevalness and ethno-graphic intersubjectivity as constitutive elements of an anthropology that authorizes itself through the creation of global temporal hierarchies.

These deconstructive readings are corroborated in chapters 3 and 4 by Fabian’s acute analyses of the strategic forms of repre sen ta tion and the epistemological founda-tions of allochronic discourse. In regard to the repre sen ta-tion of the Other, Fabian identi# es the “ethnographic present” (the “practice of giving accounts of other cultures and societies in the present tense” [80]) and the textually enforced elimination of the anthropologist’s autobio-graphical voice as allochronism’s central rhetorical # gures. As Fabian shows, the ethnographic present indexes a dia-logic reality— a reality, however, that is only realized in the communicative interaction between the anthropologist and  his readers. The anthropological object remains excluded from this dialogue, despite its constitution at the intersubjective moment of # eldwork. In this context, Fabian  identi# es the ethnographic present as a rhetorical vehicle that rei# es the Other as the inherently deindividu-ated object of the anthropologist’s observation.

Much like the po liti cally veiled deployment of the ethnographic present, the suppression of the anthropolo-gist’s autobiographical voice in scientistic texts constitutes part of an allochronic pattern. In this connection, Fabian points to the anthropologist’s manifest presence during

Foreword xi

# eldwork— a presence, however, whose undeniable effects on the very production of ethnographic knowledge remain   unacknowledged in most anthropological texts. Through the distancing and objectifying depiction of a seemingly unaffected Other, anthropologists forgo a criti-cal  self- re" ection that would render them a constitutive part of a hermeneutic (and thus “coeval”) dialogue.

Fabian’s interrogation of the epistemological basis of allochronic discourse returns him to a sweeping analysis of Western intellectual traditions. By way of astute interpreta-tions of Ramist pedagogy and Hegelian aesthetics, he iden-ti# es the “rhetoric of vision” as the privileged meta phor of a  scientistic anthropology. This sanctioning of the visual over the aural and oral, however, rests at the foundation of the allochronic predicament, for

As long as anthropology presents its object pri-marily as seen, as long as ethnographic knowl-edge is conceived primarily as observation and/or repre sen ta tion (in terms of models, sym-bol  systems, and so forth) it is likely to persist in denying coevalness to its Other. (151– 152)

Such sentences ultimately reveal the po liti cal agenda Fabian espouses in Time and the Other. Operating from a crit-ical premise that # gures anthropology, in light of its histor-ical interconnection to imperialist domination, as an inher-ently compromised discipline,2 Fabian regards allochronic discourse as a vehicle of Western domination, reproducing and legitimizing global inequities. In this context, Fabian’s critique of anthropological allochronism emerges as an overtly po liti cal intervention, effectively identifying the rhetorical elements of temporal distancing— such as ethno-graphic depictions of the Other as “primitive” or “tradi-tional”—as part and parcel of a (neo) colonial project.

Time and the Other seeks to confront this po liti cally pre-carious dimension of the anthropological project; and, in this manner, Fabian ultimately advocates the renunciation of the allochronism he has identi# ed as the constitutive ele-ment of traditional anthropological discourse. As a po liti-cally in" ected scholarly act, such an epistemologically

xii Foreword

grounded and textually enacted renunciation would allow a genuinely coeval and veritably dialogical relation between anthropology and its object.

In sketching the outlines of such a dialectical anthro-pology in chapter 5, Fabian focuses on the dimension of social praxis. On the one hand, he presents this emphasis on praxis as an epistemological alternative to the allochron-ic rhetoric of vision (thereby re# guring previously observed objects as active partners in the anthropological endeavor); on the other hand, he demands the conceptual extension of the notion of praxis to the ethnographic moment of # eld-work itself. In this sense, he not only propagates the critical textual re" ection of # eldwork as an intersubjective— and thus inherently dialogical— activity, but paves the way to a coevally grounded conceptual realignment of anthropolog-ical Self and ethnographic Other.

The Prehistory

Following its original publication in 1983, Time and the Other was praised as an original and important metacritique of the anthropological project (cf. Marcus 1984:1023– 1025; Hanson 1984:597; Clifford 1986:101– 102; Roche 1988:119– 124). Indeed, Fabian’s analyses of the ethnographic present, the suppression of the anthropologist’s autobiographic voice, and the rhetoric of vision opened new vistas for critical anthropology. But it would be wrong to date the critical project Fabian articulated in Time and the Other with the year of the book’s publication. By 1983, Fabian had grappled with  the temporal dimension and dialogical quality of ethnographic knowledge for more than a de cade. Many of the central themes of Time and the Other were, in fact, pre-# gured in the theoretical articles Fabian composed in the course of the 1970s— a corpus that, in turn, allows the delin-eation of the book’s intellectual genealogy.

In this manner, a rudimentary analysis of ethnographic allochronism can be found in the 1972 piece “How Others Die— Re" ections of the Anthropology of Death” (Fabian 1972; cf. Fabian 1991:xiii). It was on the occasion of this

Foreword xiii

overview of the anthropological literature on death that Fabian initially criticized the unre" ected tendency to con-struct and instrumentalize anthropological objects as embodiments of past times. As in his later analysis in Time and the Other, Fabian ascribed this tendency to anthropolo-gy’s evolutionary heritage. Despite the predominance of antievolutionary currents in twentieth- century anthropolo-gy, the ethnography of death continued to understand its object as a window onto human antiquity:

“Primitive” reactions to death may then be con-sulted for the purpose of illuminating ontoge ne tic development with parallels from man’s early his-tory. Or, more frequently, we will # nd attempts to identify contemporary reactions to death, espe-cially those that appear irrational, overly ritual and picturesque, as survivals of “archaic” forms. (Fabian 1972:179)

Even though primarily a critique of the existing anthropo-logical literature, the article closed with guidelines for a conceptually progressive anthropology of death. In con-cise propositions, Fabian spoke of the necessity for a com-municative and praxis- based approach to ethnographic realities (Fabian 1972:186– 188).

These demands, in turn, echoed conceptual and methodological considerations that had their origin in the critical re" ection of his # eldwork. In 1966– 1967, Fabian had undertaken ethnographic dissertation research on the religious Jamaa movement in the Shaba region of what was then Zaire.3 Initially under the in" uence of the Parsonian systems theory that had dominated his graduate education at the University of Chicago, Fabian quickly rejected reign-ing anthropological doctrine, embarking on a search for new and critical epistemologies. Fabian developed the # rst formulation of an alternative model in the path- breaking article “Language, History and Anthropology” (1971b), a text that anticipated the basic stance of Time and the Other in central aspects (cf. 164– 165).

Fabian’s polemic in “Language, History and Anthropology” was directed against a hegemonic “positivist-

xiv Foreword

pragmatist” philosophy of the human sciences (1971b:3). In  Fabian’s dictum, that orientation was marked by an uncritical, antire" exive posture that, on the one hand, derived so cio log i cal and anthropological insights from testable hypotheses and abstractly generated theoretical models, and, on the other hand, equated the relevance of such knowledge with its explanatory value vis-à- vis divergent bodies of data.4 To Fabian, such an approach was grounded in a naïve, pre- Kantian metaphysics that promised the dis-covery of objective truths through the deployment of for-malized and standardized methodologies (3– 4). Especially in the context of ethnographic # eldwork, such a mode of scienti# c operation was deeply problematic, requiring the negation of constitutive subjective factors:The positivist- pragmatist ethos calls for a con-scious  ascetic withdrawal as the result of which the scientist should be free from any “subjective” involvement as well as from the commonsense immediacy of the phenomena. The researcher attains objectivity by surrendering to a “theory,” a set of propositions chosen and interrelated according to the rules of a super- individual logic, and by subsuming under this theory those data of the external world which he can retrieve by means of the established procedures of his craft. (7)

But such a positivistic premise required the continuous supression of a critical epistemology that would recognize the production of ethnographic knowledge as an inherent-ly interactive and thus entirely context- dependent activity.

This problematic appeared in an especially acute form in  the ethnographic situation of Fabian’s # eldwork among the members of the Jamaa movement. A positivist approach  would have required a theory capable of organ-izing  the observed phenomena. Although Max Weber’s charisma theory was available, Fabian noticed early on the inherent dif# culties of a positivist ethnography of the Jamaa  movement.5 These dif# culties rested, on the one hand, in the ethnic and social diversity of its adherents (which  made it impossible to treat the movement as char-acteristic of a clearly de# ned group), and, on the other

Foreword xv

hand,  on their unprepossessing, unspectacular religious activities. The absence of a traditional collective object, as well as of ascertainable rituals, symbols, po liti cal, and eco-nomic elements, allowed Fabian only one means of access-ing  ethnographic information: the linguistic method of intersubjective communication (22– 26).

Two years after the completion of his dissertation, Fabian’s  “Language, History and Anthropology” presented his attempt to create a conscious epistemological basis for a nonpositivist, communicative anthropology. In this pro cess, Fabian was in" uenced by the German Positivismusstreit and especially by Jürgen Habermas. He based his work further on Wilhelm von Humboldt’s hermeneutic philosophy of language as a model for a linguistically grounded, inter- subjective epistemology. Above all, contemporaneous trends  in linguistic anthropology reinforced Fabian’s idea, especially papers by Dell Hymes on the “ethnography of communication” (cf. Hymes 1964). There Fabian found an ethnographic model of intersubjective objectivity— a model that proposed intersubjective pro cesses, rather than given rules or norms, as the key to social behavior of members of a culture (Fabian 1971b:17).

Building on Hymes, Fabian expanded the analytic and epistemological question of intersubjective objectivity to one  that centered on the “ethnographer and his subject” (18). He suggested that anthropological # eldwork could be understood as an always already communicative activity grounded in language. Accordingly, in a radical break from  then- current understandings, ethnographic knowl-edge could rest solely on intersubjective realities. Fabian formulated this epistemology in two theses:

1. In anthropological investigations, objectivity lies nei-ther  in  the logical consistency of a theory, nor in the givenness of data, but in the foundation (Begründung) of  human intersubjectivity. (9, emphases in original)

2. Objectivity in anthropological investigations is attained by entering a context of communicative interaction through the one medium which represents and constitutes such a context: language. (12, emphases in original)

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In “Language, History and Anthropology,” Fabian had already begun to elucidate the wide- ranging consequences of such an intersubjective anthropological epistemology (which became the basis of his critique in Time and the Other). The conception of # eldwork as continuing, interac-tive communication thus contained not only the model of a genuinely dialogical anthropology but also the dialectical element of a theory of self- re" exive ethnographic praxis:Understanding based on dialectical epistemology is always problematic- critical, for the simple reason that the very # rst step in the constitution of knowl-edge implies a radical re" ection on the student’s involvement in the communicative context to which the phenomena under investigation belong. (20)

Thus, a dialectical anthropology would never claim the po liti cal innocence of a positivist epistemology. Before the backdrop of a post- and neo co lo nial world, anthropology appeared as a rather questionable po liti cal act, a circum-stance that only intensi# ed the need for a dialectical con-ception of ethnography as intersubjective praxis (27– 28).

The path from “Language, History and Anthropology” to Time and the Other was thus sketched out. In between came a series of other theoretical contributions in which Fabian’s analyses of his ethnographic insights anticipated many of the themes of Time and the Other (Fabian 1974; 1975; 1979). Since its initial publication, the book has sometimes been criticized as too abstract and “unethno-graphic”; in the context of its prehistory, however, it emerges  as a constitutive part of Fabian’s work on the Jamaa movement (cf. Fabian 1990a). In the # nal analysis, Time and the Other was part of the dialectical project that found its theoretical beginning in “Language, History, and Anthropology” and that at the same time not only demanded but also demonstrated the direct connection between anthropological theory and ethnographic praxis.

Foreword xvii

The Intellectual Context

Time and the Other was not just the consequence of Fabian’s personal intellectual development. It was also part and product of a critical anthropology that markedly altered and  reshaped the discipline during the 1970s and early 1980s. This critical anthropology, in turn, had its roots in reactions to the po liti cal and social realities of the late 1960s.  The postcolonial in de pen dence movements in the Third World, the neoimperialist war in Vietnam, as well as the civil rights and student movements, could not leave unaffected a scienti# c discipline whose seemingly self- evident objects were the Others of a Western Self. At the conferences of the American Anthropological Association in the late 1960s, debates about the ethical and po liti cal responsibilities of anthropology arose, particularly in regard  to  the colonial power structures that had engen-dered the discipline in the # rst place and continued to sus-tain it in the context of neo co lo nial relations (cf. Gough 1968; Leclerc  1972; Asad 1973; Weaver 1973). These dis-cussions were subsequently conducted in the pages of established publications like Current Anthropology and the Newsletter of the American Anthropological Association. The fol-lowing years not only witnessed the forceful call for anthro-pology’s “reinvention” (Hymes 1972a) but also the estab-lishment of radical periodicals along these lines, such as Critical Anthropology (1970– 1972), Dialectical Anthropology (1975 ff.), and Critique of Anthropology (1980 ff.).

However much the positions articulated in this con-text differed in their particulars, they nonetheless shared a common opponent: the assumptions and practices of a hegemonic anthropological project. Committed to a liber-al humanism, that project was based on the positivist belief in an unpo liti cal, unbiased science, whose objectivity was ensured through distanced neutrality. The constitutive analytical instrument of this anthropology was the founda-tional concept of a relativism that proclaimed the funda-mental equality of all cultural manifestations.

The critique of this position, which dominated the cul-tural orientation of American anthropology, the structural-

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functionalist approach of British social anthropology, and— with certain exceptions— the French varieties of structuralism, was carried out from scienti# c as well as po liti-cal perspectives. Appealing to recent arguments in the his-tory and philosophy of science, especially Thomas Kuhn’s theses on scienti# c paradigms (Kuhn 1962), critics like Bob Scholte argued against the possibility of a neutral and value- free anthropology. As a discipline rooted in concrete social and cultural power structures, anthropology could no more shut out po liti cal in" uences than any other # elds of inquiry. In the case of anthropology, however, the situation was par-ticularly precarious given that the relevant po liti cal context of its codi# cation was the imperialist expansion of the Western world— a reality whose structural consequences enabled the anthropological production of knowledge, both in post- and neo co lo nial situations (Scholte 1970; 1971; 1972). In view of the continuing repression of anthro-pology’s traditional “objects,” the discipline’s distancing objecti# cation not only ceased to # gure as an unpo liti cal scienti# c act, but it came to be seen as part of an aggressive colonial project that secured the West’s privileges at the costs of its Others. In this sense, the maxims of cultural re-lativism, with its profession of a value- free plurality, were lit-tle more than the hypocritical cloaking of a claim to hege-mony that allowed examination of the peoples of the world with benevolent condescension while failing to acknowl-edge or thematize their subjugation by Western powers (cf. Scholte 1971; Diamond 1972; Weaver 1973).

Alongside criticism of the po liti cal dimensions of social  and cultural anthropology, opposition arose against the reigning epistemologies of anthropological knowledge production. Fabian’s article “Language, History and Anthropology” (an original draft was tellingly entitled “ Language, History and a New Anthropology”) was one of the central texts of this opposition. Fabian, like Scholte, criticized the positivist focus on anthropological method-ology and the concomitant absence of re" ection on the discipline’s praxis (Fabian 1971b). For both critics, the ready  and seemingly unproblematic objecti# cation of Others (for example, as experimental objects of anthropo-

Foreword xix

logical hypotheses or as the embodiments of cultural types) # gured as a particularly questionable form of scien-ti# c imperialism, as it granted anthropologists unlimited and decontextualized control over data gained from the intercultural reality of ethnographic # eldwork. Such a posi-tivist approach not only evaded critical re" ection on rele-vant cultural and social contexts, but it also denied the Other the status of a subject who acts and interacts with the ethnographer.6

In turn, such critiques of ethnographic positivism served  as the basis for the formulation of a new, critical anthropology. At the center of this new anthropology stood the demand for a po liti cally relevant, morally responsible, and socially emancipatory direction. In place of the objec-tifying distance that reproduced neo co lo nial oppressions of the West’s Others, there would be a new form of ethno-graphic immanence, grounded in the intersubjective expe-rience and solidarity with the victims of imperialism (Hymes  1972b; Berreman 1972; Scholte 1971, 1972; Weaver 1973).

The epistemological basis of such a critical anthropol-ogy lay in the radical self- re" ection of all aspects of ethno-graphic praxis. In this sense, Scholte demanded not only the critical reevaluation of anthropology’s disciplinary his-tory as an always already po liti cally veiled activity, but the formulation of a self- consciously antipositivist, re" exive pro-gram of anthropological knowledge production (Scholte 1971; 1972). Much like Fabian had articulated in “ Language, History and Anthropology,” the core of this pro-gram was a vision of ethnographic # eldwork as an intersub-jective and hence inherently hermeneutic praxis. Such a praxis broke the analytic hegemony of the Western subject, replacing it with a conception of anthropological knowl-edge  as the dialogical product of concretely situated com-municative understanding. As a dialectical undertaking, it was thus part of an intersubjective totality that not only sus-pended the distinction between a researching Self and a researched Other but sought its permanent transcendence. In place of objectifying relativism, anthropology would fol-low an emancipatory ideal that understood and re" ected

xx Foreword

the  insights of ethnography as progressive and po liti cal tools (Scholte 1972; Fabian 1971b).

In the wake of the theoretical manifestos of the early 1970s, several scholars sought to enact the postulates in an effort to advance the project of critical anthropology. Such designs as Paul Rabinow’s systematic re" ections on his # eldwork in Morocco, as well as Kevin Dwyer’s and Vincent Crapanzano’s attempts— also based on Moroccan materi al– to develop a dialogic ethnography, date from that peri-od  (Rabinow 1977; Dwyer 1979; 1982; Crapanzano 1980; cf. Tedlock 1979). Fabian’s Time and the Other, whose com-position dates back to 1978, emerged at the same moment, and it constituted a seminal, even de# ning, contribution to the emerging tradition. The book’s wide- ranging criticism of allochronism as a constitutive element of anthropologi-cal  discourse was both a meta- analysis of the discipline based  on the principles of critical anthropology and a dialectic attempt at its Aufhebung through the demand for a re" exive ethnographic praxis.

At the same time, Fabian linked his investigation of allochronism to a powerful analysis of the discipline’s rhe-torical # gures. This path- breaking critique of the discur-sive construction of the anthropological object aligned the emancipatory claims of critical anthropology with post- structural investigations into the repre sen ta tion of the Other. For Fabian, Michel Foucault’s interventions func-tioned as an important inspiration— a clear parallel to Edward Said’s concurrent analysis of “Orientalism” that sim-ilarly focused on the discursive formations that imagined, packaged, and # xed the Orient as a sign of the Other in Western texts (Said 1978). Fabian himself noted “similari-ties in intent [and] method” between the two books (xiii). Much like Orientalism, Time and the Other represented the synthesis of a po liti cally progressive and radically re" exive epistemology with a critical analysis of the rhetorical ele-ments of textual production; and in light of its focus on ethnography, it constituted a crucial step on the way to Writing Culture, arguably the most in" uential book in turn- of- the- century American anthropology (Clifford and Marcus 1986; cf. Marcus and Cushman 1982; Clifford 1983).

Foreword xxi

The Consequences

The theoretical and practical effects of Time and the Other can be traced readily in Fabian’s own works, for example in  two books from the 1990s—Power and Per for mance (1990b)  and Remembering the Present (1996). Both texts are characterized by the attempt to overcome the allochronic dimension of anthropology. In Power and Per for mance, Fabian attains ethnographic coevalness through the devel-opment of a performative dialectic: anthropological knowledge is not only the discursive repre sen ta tion of cul-tural facts; it is also, and more importantly, constructed from  and within the conditions of # eldwork. Concretely, Fabian investigates the various dimensions of a theater production in 1986— a production that, as Fabian’s self- re" exive analysis makes clear, could only take place because of his own presence. The ethnographic and ana-lytic result of this situation underscores the central func-tion of anthropological coevalness by portraying observed reality itself as a constitutive moment of # eldwork.

Fabian pursues a similarly path- breaking ontology of anthropological knowledge production in Remembering the Present. Here too the overcoming of allochronism is the central focus, and, as in Power and Per for mance, the accor-dance of coevalness results from the mobilization and rep-resen ta tion of the ethnographic dialogue as a constitutive element of cultural production. Here, however, it is not actors who converse with the anthropologist and his read-ers  but rather an artist, Tshibumba Kanda Matulu. In the 1970s, Fabian encouraged him to depict the history of Zaire.  The reproduction of the resulting 101 paintings, along  with the artist’s descriptions of them, constitute the main part of the book. In its radical extension of anthro-pological authority, Remembering the Present thus exempli# es a concrete attempt not only to deconstruct allochronic methods of repre sen ta tion in anthropology but also to replace them with constructive alternatives.7

Beyond the expected conclusion that Time and the Other  # gured as a conceptual signpost for Fabian’s later work, it is quite dif# cult to prove the book’s concrete in" u-

xxii Foreword

ences on general tendencies in anthropology. Not only are the origins of individual ideas notoriously dif# cult to pin down, but their fragmented history precludes any contin-uous delineation (cf. Stocking 1968:94). Such a project would also be a contradiction of the argument, developed so prominently in Time and the Other, that anthropology is both a collective and context- bound project. In this situa-tion, the central conception of Time and the Other—anthro-pology as praxis— offers an essential aid, as it directs atten-tion to the effective production of ethnographic knowl-edge, “what its practitioners actually do” (Geertz 1973:5). In this regard, the question of the in" uence of Time and the Other may be posed more meaningfully: Has allochronism been transcended in anthropological discourse?

Even a cursory glance at some of the more in" uential ethnographies published in the past # fteen years can elu-cidate this question. Overwhelmingly, contemporary anthropological work follows Time and the Other in the deployment of pertinent methodological and rhetorical conventions. The consistent refusal of the traditional, objectifying ethnographic present, for example, is striking, as is its replacement by the imperfect as the preferred tense  in the narrative repre sen ta tion of ethnographic material. The use of the past tense, moreover, occurs in direct opposition to the danger of allochronic repre sen ta-tion, signaling instead to contemporary anthopologists’ widespread desire to historicize and particularize their ethnographic encounters. As a result, anthropological knowledge now appears as the product of speci# cally situ-ated, dialogical interactions between anthropologists and in for mants, further highlighted by the widespread appear-ance of the authorial “I.” The constitutive organ of ethno-graphic intersubjectivity, it is now typically present, func-tioning as the principal carrier of anthropological coeval-ness and re" exive praxis.

Anna Tsing’s In the Realm of the Diamond Queen (1993)— one  of the most widely hailed and emulated ethnographies of the 1990s— illustrates these principles paradigmatically. The book is in many respects a “classic” monograph of a small indigenous group, the Meratus

Foreword xxiii

Dayaks, who live in near isolation in the southeast of the Indonesian part of Borneo. In distinction from conven-tional  descriptions, however, Tsing does not take the rela-tive isolation of the group as a given, but rather analyzes its structure. The result is a complex interpretation of the production of marginality in the national context of the Indonesian state. In this way, the cultural existence of the Meratus Dayaks appears not as a remnant of “primitive” ways of life but as a function of national and transnational power structures. Indeed, Tsing resolutely protests the allochronic assumption that the Meratus Dayaks are “any-body’s ‘contemporary ancestors’ ” (Tsing 1993:x); more-over, her rhetorical strategies strive for the constant trans-mission of coevalness. Through the use of innovative narrative approaches (a creative symbiosis of analytical and re" exive elements), the concrete dialogical dimensions of her # eldwork remain accessible. In for mants thus become complex and grounded subjects, and to ensure this mode of  repre sen ta tion, the question of grammatical temporali-ty takes center- stage:

In what tense does one write an ethnographic account? This grammatical detail has considerable intellectual and po liti cal signi# cance. The use of the “ethnographic present” is tied to a conceptual-ization of culture as a coherent and per sis tent whole. It creates a timeless scene of action in which cultural difference can be explored (cf. Strathern 1990; Hastrup 1990). This removal of ethnographic time from history has been criti-cized for turning ethnographic subjects into exot-ic creatures (Fabian 1983); their time is not the time of civilized history. Many ethnographers are thus turning to a historical time frame in which action happens in the past tense.

Yet, here too, there are problems in describ-ing an out- of- the- way place. . . . To many readers, using the past tense about an out- of- the- way place suggests not that people “have” history but that they are history, in the colloquial sense . . .

I cannot escape these dilemmas; I can only maneuver within them. In this book, I # nd uses

xxiv Foreword

for both the historical past and the ethnographic present. I am inconsistent. Sometimes I use tenses in a counter- intuitive style to disrupt problematic assumtions. For example, in chapter 3, I put my entire discussion of Meratus gender expectations in the historical framework of developments in the early 1980s. I am working against accounts of timeless and unmovable gender systems. In con-trast, in chapter 9, my account of Uma Adang’s [Tsing’s main interlocutor’s] social movement, which I also encountered in the early 1980s, is written in the present tense; since I do not know what has happened to her in the 1990s, my goal here is to keep open the possibilities and dreams that her movement stimulated. (Tsing 1993:xiv– xv, emphasis in original)

From this example of ethnographic re" ection, the importance of Time and the Other for later developments in anthropology becomes quite clear. Tsing’s conscious choice of grammatical temporality is based in a re" exive epistemology that constantly probes the modes of ethno-graphic knowledge production. In this sense, it is of less relevance whether Tsing’s use of the present tense corre-sponds to the speci# c formulations of Time and the Other. What is more telling is the critical re" ection on the po liti-cal and intellectual dimensions of temporal rhetoric, as well as the search for nonallochronic strategies of af# rma-tive ethnographic representation— both of which follow Fabian’s project extremely closely.

Similar statements could not only be culled from other contemporary monographs, but they are in evidence throughout the academic # eld of Anglo- American anthro-pology. And much like in the case of Tsing, the question of ethnographic temporality poses itself not only from a grammatical, but also from a po liti cal and epistemological, viewpoint. This collective stance is centrally the result of Fabian’s intervention. Since Time and the Other, the tempo-ral  depiction of the Other is no longer an unproblematic aspect of ethnographic texts but rather a constitutive crit-erion of a critical and re" exive anthropology that has come to de# ne the mainstream of the discipline.8

Foreword xxv

At the turn of the century, the intersubjective coeval-ness  of anthropolgical Self and ethnographic Other is no longer in question. There are indications, however, for an even more lasting Aufhebung of the traditional con# gura-tions. For scholars like Arjun Appadurai and Ulf Hannerz, the global dimensions of cultural developments are at the center of anthropological inquiry (Appadurai 1996; Hannerz  1992; 1996), and, as such, their ethnographic descriptions require the development of concepts that can grasp and render the complex coevalness of cultural reali-ties. Appadurai famously identi# es # ve dimensions in this context— the “ethnoscapes,” “mediascapes,” “techno-scapes,” “# nancescapes,” and “ideoscapes” that con# gure transnational # elds and their cultural " ows (Appadurai 1996:33– 36). Like other anthropologists concerned with transnational pro cesses, Appadurai and Hannerz see all of the world’s groups as part of the global integration effect-ed by late capitalism, a circumstance that not only renews attention to power differentials but necessitates the effec-tive abandonment of particularized investigations of sup-posedly isolated peoples. As Hannerz asserts, there is no “really distant Other,” no “Primitive Man,” in the “global ecumene” but only combinations and continuities from “direct and mediated engagements” (Hannerz 1996:11).

The allochronic relegation of the Other is challenged even more fundamentally by the recent emergence of a theoretically ambitious, re" exive native anthropology. While Time and the Other— as a theoretical re" ection on Fabian’s # eldwork in Africa— takes the ethnographic real-ity  of a Western Self vis-à- vis a non- Western Other as its operative assumption, the proponents of a critical “native anthropology” have complicated this situation in radical ways. Formerly produced at the margins of the discipline as “indigenous anthropologists,” they have thus come to function as an important corrective against the rei# cation of  anthropology’s Self/Other dyad in terms of the West/ non- West dichotomy. Such “native anthropologists” as Kirin  Narayan and Kath Weston, moreover, have demon-strated that anthropological research in one’s own cultur-al  # eld presupposes the negotiation of binary oppositions

xxvi Foreword

in  ways that are similar to “traditional” ethnographic set-tings (Narayan 1993; Weston 1997). In this manner, they have suggested that all anthropological # eldwork is based on  forms of intersubjective communication that cross con-stitutive boundaries— an insight that might lead to the practical deconstruction of the ontological distinction between Western, scienti# c Self and non- Western, ethno-graphic Other. In taking the argument of Time and the Other to its ultimate conclusion, the result of this decon-struction  would be an anthropology that is no longer de# ned  as the science of non- Western Others (however progressively reformed) but as a discipline grounded in sustained, intersubjective # eldwork (cf. Gupta and Ferguson 1997).

Both the established status of a critical, re" exive anthropology and the current theoretical and method-ological trends of a “transnational” or “native anthropolo-gy” provide hope for an enduring end of allochronism in anthropology. We are not yet to this point, without even mentioning the po liti cal realities of allochronic rhetoric and the production of knowledge in other areas (from journalism to macroeconomics). In this sense, Johannes Fabian’s Time and the Other represents not only a milestone in the history of anthropological theory and practice but also a very timely contribution to ideas of the Other in the social sciences and in the public imagination.

Matti Bunzl

In its initial instantiation, this introduction was written and published in German (cf. Bunzl 1998). The present text is a revised and slightly expanded version of the origi-nal, which was translated into En glish by Amy Blau.

Foreword xxvii

Notes

1. Fabian deploys the designation “coevalness” in order to merge into one Anglicized term the German notion of “Gleichzeitigkeit,” a phenomenological category that denotes both contemporaneity and synchronicity/simultaneity (31).

2. As Fabian puts it, “Existentially and po liti cally, critique of anthropology starts with the scandal of domination and exploitation of one part of mankind by another” (Fabian 1983:x).

3. Fabian earned his doctorate from the University of Chicago in 1969 with a  dissertation entitled Charisma and Cultural Change, which was published in revised form as a monograph two years later (cf. Fabian 1969; 1971a).

4. Over the years, Fabian’s opposition against a positivist- pragmatist phi-losophy of science has turned into a critique of positivism— a re" ection of his gradually developed appreciation for certain pragmatist orientations (Fabian 1991:xii).

5. The Jamaa movement was founded by the Belgian missionary Placide Tempels. The author of “La philosophic bantou” (1945), a book important for many African in de pen dence movements, Tempels began to preach Christianity in terms of his “Bantu philosophy” in the 1950s. The message was well received among industrial workers in the copper mines of the Shaba region. Although they never broke completely with the Catholic church, Tempels’s followers con-sidered themselves an in de pen dent group— the name “Jamaa” means “family” in Swahili (cf. Fabian 1971b).

6. In view of this radical rede# nition of the anthropological project, the extreme reaction of established anthropology was hardly surprising. Above all, the publication of “Reinventing Anthropology” caused enormous controversy (cf. Scholte 1978). In 1975, Fabian himself became the main target of a polemic in the central organ of the anthropological profession (Jarvie 1975; cf. Fabian 1976).

7. In his recent book Moments of Freedom: Anthropology and Pop u lar Culture (1998), Fabian has extended his project to an even more general investigation of  cultural formations, demonstrating how allochronic conceptions have obscured the contemporaneity of African pop u lar culture. In another recent book, Out of Our Minds: Reason and Madness in the Exploration of Central Africa (2000), Fabian returns to a geneaological investigation of Africa’s construction in the Western imagination, # nding surprising traces of intersubjectivity in texts from the turn of the twentieth century.

8. Numerous contemporary ethnographies grapple with the question of the  anthropological object’s temporal repre sen ta tion, and nearly all of them reference Time and the Other as the central text in this regard. A highly incom-plete list of important recent ethnographies that are indebted to Fabian’s work in this manner includes: Ann Anagnost, National Past- Times: Narrative, Repre sen ta tion, and Power in Modern China (1997); Daphne Berdahl, Where the World. Ended: Re- Uni! cation and Identity in the German Borderland (1999); John Borneman, Belonging in the Two Berlins: Kin, State, Nation (1992); Fernando Coronil, The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela (1997);

xxviii Foreword

Kenneth George, Showing Signs of Violence: The Cultural Politics of a Twentieth- Century Headhunting Ritual (1996); Akhil Gupra, Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India (1998); Matthew Gutmann, The Meaning  of Macho: Being a Man in Mexico City (1996); Marilyn Ivy, Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan (1995); Liisa Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (1995);  Rosalind Morris, In Place of Origins: Modernity and Its Mediums in Thailand (2000); Elizabeth Povinelli, Labor’s Lot: The Power, History, and Culture of Aboriginal Action (1993); Lisa Rofel, Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China After Socialism (1999); Mary Steedly, Hanging Without a Rope: Narrative Experience in Colonial and Postcolonial Karoland (1993); Kathleen Stewart, A Space on the Side of the Road: Cultural Poetics in an “Other” America (1996).

References

Anagnost, Ann. 1997. National Past- Times: Narrative, Repre sen ta tion, and Power in Modern China. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Asad, Talal, ed. 1973. Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press.

Berdahl, Daphne. 1999. Where the World Ended: Re- Uni! cation and Identity in the German Borderland. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Berreman, Gerald. 1972. “ ‘Bringing It All Back Home’: Malaise in Anthropology.”  In Dell Hymes, ed., Reinventing Anthropology, 83– 98. New York: Pantheon Books.

Borneman, John. 1992. Belonging in the Two Berlins: Kin, State, Nation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge  University Press.

Bunzl, Matti. 1998. “Johannes Fabians ‘Time and the Other’: Synthesen einer  kritischen Anthropologie.” Historische Anthropologie 6(3):466– 478.

Clifford, James. 1983. “On Ethnographic Authority.” Repre sen ta tions 1: 118– 146.

———. 1986. “On Ethnographic Allegory.” In James Clifford and George Marcus, eds., Writing Culture, 98– 121. Berkeley: University of California Press.

———. 1988. The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth- Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Foreword xxix

Clifford, James and George Marcus, eds. 1986. Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Coronil, Fernando. 1997. The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Crapanzano, Vincent. 1980. Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Diamond, Stanley. 1972. “Anthropology in Question.” In Dell Hymes, ed., Reinventing Anthropology, 401– 429. New York: Pantheon Books.

Dwyer, Kevin. 1979. “The Dialogic of Ethnology.” Dialectical Anthropology 4(3)205– 224.

———. 1982. Moroccan Dialogues: Anthropology in Question. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Evans- Pritchard, E. E. 1940. The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and  Po liti cal Institutions of a Nilotic People. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fabian, Johannes. 1969. Charisma and Cultural Change. Dissertation. University  of Chicago.

———. 1971a. Jamaa: A Charismatic Movement in Katanga. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

———. 1971b. “Language, History and Anthropology.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 1: 19– 47. Citations are based on the reprint in Fabian, Time and the  Work of Anthropology: Critical Essays 1971– 1991, 3– 29. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishings.

———. 1972. “How Others Die— Re" ections on the Anthropology of Death.” Social Research 39: 543– 567. Citations are based on the reprint in Fabian, Time and the Work of Anthropology: Critical Essays 1971– 1991, 173– 190. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishings.

———. 1974. “Genres in an Emerging Tradition: An Anthropological Approach  to Religious Communication.” In Alan Eister, ed., Changing Perspectives in the Scienti! c Study of Religion, 249– 272. New York: Wiley. Citations  are based on the reprint in Fabian, Time and the Work of Anthropology:  Critical Essays 1971– 1991, 45– 63. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishings.

———. 1975. “Taxonomy and Ideology: On the Boundaries of Concept Classi# cation.” In Dale Kinkade et al., eds., Linguistics and Anthropology: In  Honor of C. F. Voegelin, 183– 197. Lisse: De Ridder. Citations are based on  the reprint in Fabian, Time and the Work of Anthropology: Critical Essays 1971– 1991, 31– 43. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishings.

———. 1976. “Letter to Jarvie.” American Anthropologist 78(2):344– 345.———. 1979. “Rule and Pro cess: Thoughts on Ethnography as Communi-

cation.”  Philosophy of the Social Sciences 9: 1– 26. Citations are based on the reprint in Fabian, Time and the Work of Anthropology: Critical Essays 1971– 1991, 87– 109. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishings.

———. 1983. Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object. New York: Columbia University Press.

xxx Foreword

———. 1990a. “Presence and Repre sen ta tion: The Other in Anthropological Writing.” Critical Inquiry 16: 753– 772. Citations are based on the reprint in  Fabian, Time and the Work of Anthropology: Critical Essays 1971– 1991, 207– 223. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishings.

———. 1990b. Power and Per for mance: Ethnographic Explorations Through Proverbial Wisdom and Theater in Shaba. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

———. 1991. Time and the Work of Anthropology: Critical Essays 1971– 1991. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishings.

———. 1996. Remembering the Present: Painting and Pop u lar History in Zaire. Berkeley: University of California Press.

———. 1998. Moments of Freedom: Anthropology and Pop u lar Culture. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.

———. 2000. Out of Our Minds: Reason and Madness in the Exploration of Central  Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books.George, Kenneth. 1996. Showing Signs of Violence: The Cultural Politics of a

Twentieth- Century Headhunting Ritual. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gough, Kathleen. 1968. “Anthropology and Imperialism.” Monthly Review 19(11): 12– 27.

Gupta, Akhil. 1998. Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Gupta, Akhil and James Ferguson, eds. 1997. Anthropological Locations: Boundaries of a Field Science. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gutmann, Matthew. 1996. The Meanings of Macho: Being a Man in Mexico City. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hannerz, Ulf. 1992. Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Or ga ni za tion of Meaning. New York: Columbia University Press.

———. 1996. Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places. New York: Routledge.

Hanson, Allan. 1984. Review of Time and the Other. American Ethnologist 11(3): 597.

Hastrup, Kirsten. 1990. “The Ethnographic Present: A Reinvention.” Cultural Anthropology 5(1): 45– 61.

Hymes, Dell. 1964. “Introduction: Towards Ethnographies of Communi-cation.” In John Gumperz and Dell Hymes, eds., The Ethnography of Communication, 1– 34. Menasha, Wis.: American Anthropological Association.

———, ed. 1972a. Reinventing Anthropology. New York: Pantheon Books.———. 1972b. “The Use of Anthropology: Critical, Po liti cal, Personal.” In Dell

Hymes, ed., Reinventing Anthropology, 3– 82. New York: Pantheon Books.Ivy, Marilyn. 1995. Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Foreword xxxi

Jarvie, Ian. 1975. “Epistle to the Anthropologists.” American Anthropologist 77: 253– 265.

Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. The Structure of Scienti! c Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Leclerc, Gérard. 1972. Anthropologie et Colonialisme. Paris: Fayard.Malkki, Liisa. 1995. Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology

Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Marcus, George. 1984. Review of Time and the Other. American Anthropologist

86(4): 1023– 1025.Marcus, George and Dick Cushman. 1982. “Ethnographies as Texts.”

Annual  Review of Anthropology 11: 25– 69.Marcus, George and Michael Fischer. 1986. Anthropology as Cultural

Critique:  An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Morris, Rosalind. 2000. In the Place of Origins: Modernity and Its Mediums in Northern Thailand. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Narayan, Kirin. 1993. “How Native Is a ‘Native’ Anthropologist?.” American Anthropologist 95 (3): 671– 686.

Povinelli, Elizabeth. 1993. Labor’s Lot: The Power, History, and Culture of Aboriginal Action. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rabinow, Paul. 1977. Re# ections on Fieldwork in Morocco. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Roche, Maurice. 1988. “Time and the Critique of Anthropology.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18: 119– 124.

Rofel, Lisa. 1990. Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China After Socialism. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rosaldo, Renato. 1989. Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis. Boston: Beacon Press.

Said, Edward. 1978. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books.Scholte, Bob. 1970. “Toward a Self- Re" ective Anthropology.” Critical

Anthropology (Fall 1970): 3– 33.———. 1971. “Discontents in Anthropology.” Social Research 38: 777– 807.———. 1972. “Toward a Re" exive and Critical Anthropology.” In Dell

Hymes,  ed., Reinventing Anthropology, 430– 457. New York: Pantheon Books.

———. 1978. “Critical Anthropology Since It’s Reinvention: On the Convergence  Between the Concept of Paradigm, the Rationality of Debate,  and Critical Anthropology.” Anthropology and Humanism Quarterly 3(2): 4– 17.

Steedly, Mary Margaret. 1993. Hanging Without a Rope: Narrative Experience in  Colonial and Postcolonial Karoland. Prince ton: Prince ton University Press.

Stewart, Kathleen. 1996. A Space on the Side of the Road: Cultural. Poetics in an “Other” America. Prince ton: Prince ton University Press.

xxxii Foreword

Stocking, George. 1968. Race, Culture, and Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Strathern, Marilyn. 1990. “Out of Context: The Persuasive Fictions of Anthropology.” In Marc Manganaro, ed., Modernist Anthropology: From Fieldwork  to Text, 80– 112. Prince ton: Prince ton University Press.

Tedlock, Dennis. 1979. “The Anthropological Tradition and the Emergence  of  a Dialogical Anthropology.” Journal of Anthropological Research 35(4): 387– 400.

Tsing, Anna Lowenhaupt. 1993. In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginality  in  an Out- of- the- Way Place. Prince ton: Prince ton University Press.

Weaver, Thomas, ed. 1973. Too See Ourselves: Anthropology and Modern Social Issues. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company.

Weston, Kath. 1997. “The Virtual Anthropologist.” In Akhil Gupta and James  Ferguson, eds., Anthropological Locations: Boundaries of a Field Science, 163– 184. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Preface to the Reprint Edition

MORE THAN TWENT Y Y EARS AGO, the manuscript of this book (completed in 1978) made its rounds among publishers. Some readers felt that it was too ambitious, touching on too many issues without developing them in depth, formulating an argument that was often dif# cult to follow. One of them thought it came “perilously close to denying the possibility of any anthropology.” Three press-es  rejected the manuscript. One editor, after a long pro cess  of  repeated evaluations, promised ac cep tance, provided I would make at least some of the revisions that critics had recommended. I refused and retracted. Every one of the essays that were presented as steps of a coherent argument had by then been rewritten at least three times. This was the best I could do. Walter Ong supported my resolve to stick to the text when he wrote (in his report to one of the presses): “Because the thinking is so fresh and comprehensive, it demands learning and high intelligence of the reader. I do not believe it can be made notably sim-pler and still remain effective.”

I confess that I never felt secure about this attempt to take on an entire discipline. Often I told myself and my friends  that I had written Time and the Other more with my guts than with my brain. It was, as one reader observed much later, a cri de coeur. An outcry that seems to have been heard and heeded, I feel now (and hope this will not be dismissed as a sign of conceit), should not and cannot be “improved” by updating and revisions. Therefore the orig-inal text remains unchanged in this edition.

By all indications, Time and the Other became a success, possibly less in anthropology than in several # elds that had

xxxiv Preface to the Reprint Edition

grown accustomed to leaning on anthropology for their own projects. It was, however, a success that came to haunt me when, again and again, I seem to get identi# ed with this one book.

Already in the preface to the original edition I insisted that it was never meant to be read as a self- contained the-oretical treatise. It grew out of my ordinary preoccupations as a teacher and ethnographer, I said, and meant that it should speak to such ordinary preoccupations in the future. As far as my subsequent work is concerned, after Time and the Other I knew that would have to “put up or shut up.” The many books and articles that followed show that, contrary to the fears some readers expressed, this cri-tique of anthropology made it possible for me to continue with old ethnographic (and later historical) projects and to  take up new ones. Especially two collections of essays and a recent critique of the # eld in the guise of a work on the scienti# c exploration of Central Africa toward the end of the nineteenth century can be consulted by those who would like to know more about what I claim to have been the practical context of Time and the Other and where I stand now (Fabian 1991, 2000, 2001).

I consider it a great privilege (and compliment) that a young historian of anthropology consented to having his appraisal of Time and the Other published as a new intro-duction to this reprint edition. Matti Bunzl’s essay (origi-nally written in German for a translation of the book that never materialized) provides the kind of detached and informative guidance that cannot be given by the author.

My gratitude is due, again, to Walter Ong, Edward Said,  and Charles Webel, editor of the # rst edition, who persuaded Columbia University Press to publish Time and the  Other. I thank John Michel and Wendy Lochner, who prepared the way for this reprint edition and saw it through production.

XantenJune 2001

Preface to the Reprint Edition xxxv

References

Fabian, Johannes. 1991. Time and the Work of Anthropology: Critical Essays, 1971– 1991. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers.

———. 2000. Out of Our Minds: Reason and Madness in the Exploration of Central Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.

———. 2001. Anthropology with an Attitude: Critical Essays. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Preface and Ac know ledg ments

“You see, my friend,” Mr. Bounderby put in, “we are the kind of people who know the value of time, and you are the kind of people who don’t know the value of time.” “I have not,” retorted Mr. Childers, after surveying him from head to foot, “the honour of knowing you— but if you mean that you can make more money of your time than I can of mine, I should judge from your appearance that you are about right.”

Charles Dickens, Hard Times

WHEN THEY APPROACH the problem of Time, certain phi los o phers feel the need to fortify themselves with a ritual incantation. They quote Augustine: “What is time? If no one asks me about it, I know; if I want to explain it to the one who asks, I don’t know” (Confessions, book XI). In fact, I have just joined that chorus.

It is dif# cult to speak about Time and we may leave it to phi los o phers to ponder the reasons. It is not dif# cult to show that we speak, " uently and profusely, through Time. Time, much like language or money, is a carrier of signi# -cance, a form through which we de# ne the content of rela-tions between the Self and the Other. Moreover— as the conversation between Mr. Bounderby, the factory own er, and Mr. Childers, the acrobat, reminds us— Time may give form to relations of power and in e qual ity under the condi-tions of capitalist industrial production.

It occurred to me that this could be the perspective for a critique of cultural anthropology. These essays, then, are offered as studies of “anthropology through Time.” The

xxxviii Preface and Ac know ledg ments

reader who expects a book on the anthropology of Time— perhaps an ethnography of “time- reckoning among the primitives”— will be disappointed. Aside from occasional references to anthropological studies of cultural concep-tions of Time, he will # nd nothing to satisfy his curiosity about the Time of the Other. I want to examine past and present uses of Time as ways of construing the object of our discipline. If it is true that Time belongs to the po liti cal economy of relations between individuals, classes, and na-tions, then the construction of anthropology’s object through temporal concepts and devices is a po liti cal act; there is a “Politics of Time.”

I took an historical approach in order to demonstrate the emergence, transformation, and differentiation of uses of Time. This runs counter to a kind of critical philosophy which condemns recourse to history as a misuse of Time. According to a famous remark by Karl Popper, “The his-toricist does not recognize that it is we who select and order the facts of history” (1966 2:269). Popper and other theo-rists of science inspired by him do not seem to realize that the problematic element in this assertion is not the consti-tution of history (who doubts that it is made, not given?) but the nature of the we. From the point of view of anthro-pology, that we, the subject of history, cannot be presup-posed or left implicit. Nor should we let anthropology sim-ply be used as the provider of a con ve nient Other to the we (as exempli# ed by Popper on the # rst page of the Open So-ciety where “our civilization” is opposed to the “tribal” or “closed society,” 1966 1:1).

Critical philosophy must inquire into the dialectical constitution of the Other. To consider that relation dialec-tically means to recognize its concrete temporal, historical, and po liti cal conditions. Existentially and po liti cally, critique of anthropology starts with the scandal of domination and exploitation of one part of mankind by another. Trying to make sense of what happens— in order to overcome a state of affairs we have long recognized as scandalous— we can in the end not be satis# ed with explanations which ascribe Western imperialism in abstract terms to the mechanics of power or aggression, or in moral terms to greed and

Preface and Ac know ledg ments xxxix

wickedness. Aggression, one suspects, is the alienated bour-geois’ perception of his own sense of alienation as an inevi-table, quasi- natural force; wickedness projects the same inevitability inside the person. In both cases, schemes of ex-planation are easily bent into ideologies of self- justi# cation. I will be searching— and here I feel close to the Enlighten-ment philosophes whom I shall criticize later on— for an “ error,” an intellectual misconception, a defect of reason which, even if it does not offer the explanation, may free our self- questioning from the double bind of fate and evil. That error causes our societies to maintain their anthropo-logical knowledge of other societies in bad faith. We con-stantly need to cover up for a fundamental contradiction: On the one hand we dogmatically insist that anthropology rests on ethnographic research involving personal, pro-longed interaction with the Other. But then we pronounce upon the knowledge gained from such research a discourse which construes the Other in terms of distance, spatial and temporal. The Other’s empirical presence turns into his theoretical absence, a conjuring trick which is worked with the help of an array of devices that have the common intent and function to keep the Other outside the Time of anthro-pology. An account of the many ways in which this has been done needs to be given even if it is impossible to propose, in the end, more than hints and fragments of an alternative. The radical contemporaneity of mankind is a project. The-oretical re" ection can identify obstacles; only changes in the praxis and politics of anthropological research and writing can contribute solutions to the problems that will be raised.

Such are the outlines of the argument I want to pursue. It lies in the nature of this undertaking that a great mass of material had to be covered, making it impossible always to do justice to an author or an issue. Readers who are less familiar with anthropology and its history might # rst want to look at the summary provided in chapter 5.

I don’t want to give the impression that this project was conceived principally by way of theoretical reasoning. On the contrary, it grew out of my ordinary occupations as a teacher working mainly in institutions involved in the re-production of Western society, and as an ethnographer

xl Preface and Ac know ledg ments

trying to understand cultural pro cesses in urban- industrial Africa (see Fabian 1971, 1979). In the act of producing eth-nographic knowledge, the problem of Time arises con-cretely and practically, and many anthropologists have been aware of the temporal aspects of ethnography. But we have rarely considered the ideological nature of temporal con-cepts which inform our theories and our rhetoric. Nor have we paid much attention to intersubjective Time, which does not mea sure but constitutes those practices of communica-tion we customarily call # eldwork. Perhaps we need to pro-tect ourselves by such lack of re" ection in order to keep our knowledge of the Other at bay, as it were. After all, we only seem to be doing what other sciences exercise: keeping ob-ject and subject apart.

Throughout, I have tried to relate my arguments to ex-isting work and to provide bibliographic references to fur-ther sources. W. Lepenies’ essay the “End of Natural His-tory” (1976) is closely related to my views on the uses of Time in earlier phases of anthropology (although we seem to differ on what brought about the phenomenon of “tem-poralization”); P. Bourdieu has formulated a theory of Time and cultural practice (1977) in which I found much agree-ment with my own thought. H. G. Reid has been, to my knowledge, one of the few social scientists to employ the notion of “politics of time” (see 1972). My indebtedness to the work of Gusdorf, Moravia, Benveniste, Weinrich, Yates, Ong, and others is obvious and, I hope, properly acknowl-edged. I made an attempt, within the limitations of libraries at my disposal, to read up on the topic of Time in general. The literature I consulted ranged from early monographs on primitive time reckoning (Nilsson 1920) to recent studies of time- conceptions in other cultures (Ricoeur 1975); from philosophical (Whitrow 1963) to psychological (Doob 1971) standard works. I looked at interdisciplinary projects from the “Time and its Mysteries” series (1936– 1949) to the work inspired by J. T. Fraser and the International Society for the Study of Time he founded (see Fraser 1966, Fraser et al., eds., 1972 ff). Special issues of journals devoted to Time have come to my attention from History and Theory (Beiheft 6:1966) to Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie (1979). I should

Preface and Ac know ledg ments xli

mention several highly original treatments of the topic, ex-empli# ed by G. Kubler’s The Shape of Time (1962) and the work of M. Foucault (e.g., 1973). The one bibliography I found (Zelkind and Sprug 1974) lists more than 1,100 titles of time research but is badly in need of completing and up-dating.

As could be expected, many of the questions I raise oc-cupied other writers at about the same time. This work came to my attention after these essays were completed (in 1978), too late to be commented on at length. Most important among these writings is undoubtedly Edward Said’s Orien-talism (1979 [1978]). Similarities in intent, method, and oc-casionally in formulations between his study and mine con-# rmed me in my ideas. I hope that my arguments will complement and, in some cases, elaborate his theses. Quite possibly, M. Foucault’s in" uence explains why there is so much convergence between our views. There may also be deeper analogies in our intellectual biographies, as we found out in later conversations. I believe we both struggle to re-store past experiences, which were buried under layers of “enculturation” in other societies and languages, to a kind of presence that makes them critically fruitful.

A remarkable study by Ton Lemaire (1976) provides background and much detail to chapters 1 and 2. Le-maire’s  is one of the best recent critical evaluations of cul-tural anthropology; unfortunately it is as yet not available in En glish.

Justin Stagl achieved in my view a breakthrough in the historiography of anthropology with his studies on early manuals for travelers and on the origins of certain social- scienti# c techniques, such as the questionnaire- survey (1979, 1980). His # ndings demonstrate a connection which I only suspected, namely a direct in" uence of Ramist thought in giving “method” to our knowledge of the Other. Much of what I discuss in chapters 3 and 4 takes on added signi# -cance in the light of Stagl’s writings.

Stagl drew on the seminal work of W. Ong, as did J. Goody in his book The Domestication of the Savage Mind (1977) which provides valuable illustrations to issues treated in chapter 4, especially regarding the role of the visual in the

xlii Preface and Ac know ledg ments

pre sen ta tion of knowledge. The section on Hegel’s theory of symbols in that chapter is complemented by F. Kramer’s essay “Mythology and Ethocentrism” (1977:15– 64).

Some of the points I make in chapters 3 and 4 receive support from a recent study by Arens (1979) on cannibal-ism, one of the most per sis tent topics in anthropology, which is shown to have been primarily an “oppressive mental con-struct” derived from cosmological ideas about other times and places.

Finally, I found much con# rmation, albeit of a negative sort (from the position taken in this book) in the work of G. Durand (1979; see also Maffesoli, ed., 1980). He seems to emerge as the major proponent of a neohermetic move-ment in French anthropology whose strategy it is to play the “imaginary” against prosaic positivism and pseudoscienti# c evolutionism. The effect is to revitalize “orientalism” and to reinstate the visualist rhetoric whose history has been criti-cally studied by Yates and Ong (see chapter 4).

With few exceptions I shall not refer to these and other recent publications in the text or in the notes. I mention some of them now because they con# rm my conviction that we are on the threshold of some major change in our con-ceptions of the history and present role of anthropology. Elements of a new understanding are being formulated here and there; mine is one attempt to show how they might be put together.

Much as I am indebted to readings, I owe most to my conversations with African workers and intellectuals. I hope that V. Y. Mudimbe, P. Lalèyê, Wamba- dia- Wamba, M. Owusu, and many others will recognize in these essays some of the exchanges we had through the years. A version of chapter 1 (including the plan for the book) was # rst read at the Department of Anthropology at Harvard University and I want to thank Michael Fisher for giving me the opportu-nity to formulate my thoughts. Perhaps even more impor-tant was to me another occasion when I presented these ideas in a panel discussion with the African phi los o pher M. Towa at the National University of Zaire in Kinshasa. I discussed chapter 3 with J. Habermas and his collaborators at the Max- Planck- Institute in Starnberg.

Preface and Ac know ledg ments xliii

To Wesleyan University I am grateful for a sabbatical leave giving me time to write, and to students at Wesleyan University and the University of Bonn for letting me try out my thoughts in courses on the History of Anthropological Thought.

Ilona Szombati- Fabian helped generously with sugges-tions and critical response. Fredric Jameson, Martin Silver-man, Bob Scholte, and Walter Ong read the manuscript and encouraged me. Although this may come as a surprise to him, I think that the time of close collaboration with Hay-den  White at the Center for the Humanities at Wesleyan University was important in giving shape to this project.

I want to thank Valborg Proudman and Hanneke Kos-sen for help and competent assistance of which typing ver-sions of the manuscript was but a small part.

AmsterdamNovember 1982

Postscript The Other Revisited

WHEN I PROPOSE TO “revisit the other” in this post-script, 1 I do this as someone who has been credited with, and sometimes accused of, contributing to a certain discourse on alterity that is current in anthropology as well as in cultural studies and postcolonial theory. Most of the thoughts I will have to offer, therefore, are afterthoughts. It could be said that I am returning to familiar ground. True, but I am return-ing only to discover that the issues and problems raised by the concept of anthropology’s other are as dif# cult, complex, and numerous now as they were then. Four limitations apply to my re" ections: First, I shall stick to cultural or social anthro-pology in its Anglo-American varieties; with one exception, I will not discuss the writings of our French colleagues. Sec-ond, although it will not be possible to ignore philosophical ideas regarding others or otherness altogether, I will discuss them only as they arise within my discipline. Third, because the theoretical re" ections I may have to offer are inspired by ethnography—that is, by attempts to produce and represent knowledge of other(s)—I shall keep the focus on my own empirical work within anthropology. Finally, I shall be retro-spective, concerned more with taking stock rather than with proposing new directions.

A Glance at Beginnings: The “Other” in Anthropology

There were times in anthropology when speaking of “others” went, as it were, without saying. Those times are gone. In order to understand what happened one should take a look at its beginnings. As far as I remember, the “other”—the term

168 Postscript

and presumably a concept behind it—began its career in Anglo-American anthropology rather inconspicuously. It did not enter the stage with a blast; one could say it sneaked up on the # eld. As a designation of anthropology’s object, “other” (adjective or noun, capitalized or not, singular or plural, with or without quotation marks) did not seem to require more than a common sense understanding; the term was handy because it was so general, and its very vagueness allowed us to keep talking about topics of research while avoiding expressions that had become unsavory as a result of (then) recent decolonization. Savages, primitives, tribal peoples, and the like were disguised as others.

Those are my recollections. The period of beginnings I have in mind stretched roughly from the early sixties when “other” appeared in the title of John Beattie’s Other Cultures (1964) to the early eighties when we # nd it in James Boon’s Other Tribes, Other Scribes (1982). My observations regarding the all-purpose meaning of the term are con# rmed by Edmund Leach, writing in the middle of that period: “We started by emphasizing how different are ‘the others’ and made them not only different but remote and inferior. Sentimentally we then took the opposite track and argued that all human beings are alike . . . but that didn’t work either, ‘the others’ remained obstinately other. But now we have come to see that the essen-tial problem is one of translation” (1973:772). 2

Surprisingly enough—given Clifford Geertz’s penchant for hermeneutics (and the concern of hermeneutics with alterity)—“other” did not # gure in the index of his Interpreta-tion of Cultures (1973). Nor is it mentioned there among the “mega-concepts with which contemporary social science is af" icted—legitimacy, modernization, integration, con" ict, charisma, structure . . . ” (23). 3 Well into the seventies, speak-ing of other(s) in anthropology, where it was done, may have been indicative of nothing more than the discipline’s aware-ness of a wider intellectual trend, as characterized by Susan Sontag: “Modern thought is pledged to a kind of applied Hege-lianism: seeking its Self in the Other. Europe seeks itself in the exotic . . . among preliterate peoples. . . . The ‘other’ is experienced as a harsh puri# cation of ‘self’ ” (Sontag 1970 [1966]:185). 4

Postscript 169

As one would expect, the index of Writing Culture (Clif-ford and Marcus 1986)—widely considered a milestone on the road to post-modern anthropology—does have entries on other and otherness. It directs us, # rst, to Clifford’s in-troduction. There we # nd a statement indicating that the discipline had by then moved from simply using otherness as a disguise or cover toward facing it as a philosophical prob-lem: “Ethnography in the service of anthropology once looked out at clearly de# ned others, de# ned as primitive, or tribal, or non-Western, or pre-literate, or nonhistorical. . . . Now ethnography encounters others in relation to itself, while seeing itself as other. . . . It has become clear that every version of an ‘other,’ wherever found, is also the construc-tion of a self” (1986:23).

Then there is a reference to George Marcus’s essay in the volume. He addresses the issue in a footnote as follows:

It is the traditional subject matter of anthropology—the primitive or alien other—that primarily repels, or, rather, undercuts the full potential of anthropology’s relevance in a widespread intellectual trend, which it has long anticipated. The # gure of the primitive or alien other is no longer as compelling. . . . Global homogenization is more credible than ever before, and though the challenge to discover and represent cultural diversity is strong, doing so in terms of spatio-temporal cultural preserves of otherness seems outmoded. Rather the strongest forms of difference are now de# ned within our own capitalist cultural realm . . . (1986:167–68n)

Again, this comment echoes earlier observations as well as Clifford’s statement, but it also adds another twist with the suggestion that not only the terms that otherness disguised but the disguise itself had become outmoded and that an-thropology better drop its fascination with exotic otherness if the # eld was to survive as a global player. 5

Looked at from an angle provided by some exemplary statements from anthropology’s recent history, other and otherness may appear as mere notions that came and went. Did they cause—or, at least, were they indicative of—a theo-retical debate and reorientation? Did “speaking of others”

170 Postscript

change the discipline’s practices of research? And how does anthropological talk of others relate to the " oating and in-" ationary use of “other,” “otherness,” “othering,” and, let’s not forget, the umbrella term “alterity” in the social sciences and humanities? I have neither the competence nor the cour-age to offer even a sketch of the critical history which answer-ing these questions would require. 6 What I would like to do instead is a sort of case study, a report on how and why this anthropologist came to “speak of others.” This will be followed by some remarks intended to clarify my position in view of criticism in, and apparent similarities with, the work of other writers.

The Road to the Other in Time and the Other

My attempt to trace the beginning of talk about other/oth-ers in anthropology proved dif# cult and its results are some-what inconclusive. It was all the more disconcerting to # nd out that tracking down the term and concept in my own work was anything but easy. Here is the story as best I can recon-struct it from memory and the casual checking of half-forgotten early writings.

I came to my training in American anthropology with a solid and, some have observed, obstinate background in the-ology and philosophy, both of which I studied in Austria and Germany. Put on the spot, I would have to declare that the position I took away from my readings in Europe was that of a Marxist—if learning from Marx’s early writings justi# es, and a heavy dose of phenomenology and hermeneutics does not invalidate, such a label. A vaguely Husserlian idea of der Andere , the other, was part of my intellectual baggage and it was only to be expected that it would inform the critical atti-tude I developed toward the predominantly “scienti# c,” that is, positivist and system-oriented modernist paradigm—Tal-cott Parsons tempered by Max Weber—that reigned in those days at the University of Chicago where I received my degree.

Soon after ful# lling my duties, as it were, with a disserta-tion on a charismatic religious movement, I felt the need (or had the temerity) to formulate an alternative approach in an

Postscript 171

essay titled “Language, History, and Anthropology” (1971a; repr. 1991). The argument, developed through re" ection on recent empirical work I had done in the Congo, was that an-thropological research of the kind we call # eld work is car-ried out through communicative interaction mediated by language and that whatever objectivity we can hope to attain must be founded in intersubjectivity. Support for the two theses I formulated came from Wilhelm von Humboldt’s philosophy of language and Jürgen Habermas’s (then) re-cent critique of positivism in the social sciences (1967) and the new approach to a language-centered ethnography devel-oped by Dell Hymes (1964). Phenomenology is only men-tioned once, just barely, and references to phenomenologi-cal writings are made only indirectly by citing Radnitzky (1968, 1970), whose book was at the time the only short and handy introduction to “Continental schools of metascience” in English.

I did not use “other” or any related terms (except in a quo-tation from Humboldt) in that article but the epistemologi-cal position I took opened, as it were, a semantic space to be # lled by that term later. What counted then, and still counts now, is that it was not a generalized or exotic other I envis-aged but an other as interlocutor: alterity as a prerequisite for the kind of knowledge production we call “ethnography.” This was a step away from a scientistic conception of anthro-pology as natural history, but it was only a # rst step. It postu-lated a kind of alterity that is required by, or implicit in, any theory of intersubjectivity (and this may have been the phe-nomenological element in my critique, a stance that moved Ian Jarvie—a Popperian and, incidentally, the editor of the journal that published the article—to accuse me of being the leader of a “phenomenological putsch” in anthropology). 7

If discovering the epistemological other was a # rst step, the next one was to face alterity as it had historically emerged in the discursive practices of representing anthropological knowledge. How deeply ingrained the image of anthropol-ogy as the provider of, let us call it, contrastive otherness was brought home to me by an invitation to contribute some ex-otic ethnographic stuff—not expressed in these precise words but almost—to a special issue of the journal Social Research

172 Postscript

on “Death in American Experience.” I resented the role assigned to me and embarked on a critique of conceptions I thought lay behind the assignment, which the editor (Arien Mack) was gracious enough to accept. This essay, “How Others Die—Re" ections on the Anthropology of Death” (1972, repr. 1991), not only had capitalized “Others” in its title but restated the idea of an “epistemological conception of the other” (1991:177–78) 8 and anticipated much of Time and the Other , for instance, in statements about “attempts to identify contemporary reactions to death, especially those that ap-pear irrational, overly ritual and picturesque, as survivals of “archaic” forms.  .  .  . Primitive and folkloric death-customs may then be located in a nostalgic past—which is yet another way of relegating reactions to death to “the others,” or at least the other that has survived in us” (1991:179). In addition, the concluding sentences of this essay formulated an insight that I would like to quote at length because I believe it contains a challenge we still have yet to meet:

There simply is no way of getting directly at “the others.” Anthropologists and other analysts of modern reactions to death must # nd or construct a meta-level of interpretation if they are to share their # ndings. In the late nineteenth century, this may have been the idea of a natural science of man in search of universal laws of progress to be veri# ed by ethnographic “data” whose “objective” otherness was not seriously doubted. Today we seem to be left with the task of constructing a social hermeneutic, an interpretation of social reality (no matter whether it is primitive or modern) which conceives of itself as part of the processes it attempts to understand. Lévi-Strauss was right: the anthropology of death is a form of dying, or of conquering death—which, in the end, may be the same. (190)

It is now time for some remarks on Time and the Other . The aim of the book was not to develop a theoretical concept of the other (or to give an anthropological twist to a philosoph-ical concept). Nor was the other proposed as a sort of meth-odological device—as if I had deployed the concept in order to see where it would get me. Though it was a short book, it

Postscript 173

told a complicated story, but it is not dif# cult to state the major points of its argument. It began with a simple observa-tion: As a discipline of practices of making and representing knowledge, anthropology is marked by a contradiction. Anthropology has its empirical foundation in ethnographic research, in inquiries which even hard-nosed practitioners (the kind who like to think of their “# eld” as a scienti# c labo-ratory) carry out as communicative interaction. The sharing of time that such interaction requires demands that ethnog-raphers recognize the people whom they study as their coevals. However—and this is where the contradiction arises—when those same ethnographers represent their knowledge in teaching and writing, they do this in terms of a discourse that consistently places those who are talked about in a time other that of the one who speaks. I called the effect of such strategies a “denial of coevalness” and quali# ed the result-ing discourse as “allochronic.” The contradiction was stated succinctly in the preface: “The Other’s empirical presence turns into his theoretical absence, a conjuring trick which is worked with an array of devices that have the common in-tent and function to keep the Other outside the time of an-thropology” (2002a:xli). 9 The rest of the book was devoted to a critical analysis with the help of whatever theoretical support I found in historiography, linguistics, literary criti-cism, and philosophy. What was perhaps distinctive about my undertaking was that it anchored critique in anthropol-ogy’s ways with time, something I quali# ed as a “political cosmology.”

I have no regrets about Time and the Other . It was necessary to throw the wrench into the wheels of allochronic discourse. But what about the “collateral damage” that this critique of an-thropology may have caused? Never mind that it irritated those honest fellow anthropologists who saw their discipline, if not endangered, then unjustly maligned. (After all, one may be both honest and wrongheaded.) But what about “savage,” “primitive,” “traditional,” and all the other others that I took to be evidence for unwarranted allochronism? Radical cri-tique should not make us forget that, like Rousseau’s and Lévi-Strauss’s sauvage , most of them were at one time also part of discourses that were critical of blind faith in reason

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or civilization and of a mindless celebration of modernity. “Radical” means going to the roots, not ignoring them.

With these remarks, I believe, I am expressing agreement rather than disagreement with a more recent critic of Time and the Other , Marc Augé (1994a, espec. 76f, and 1994b), who fears that my emphasis on denial of coevalness remains within the very frame I am trying to break down and that I fail to appreciate the real issues, namely modernity and contempo-raneity. I can think of two responses. First, if Augé, writing after Time and the Other , could be read as simply taking an-other step in re" ecting on the other in anthropology—if his critique were but an argument that re" ection has to go even farther—there could be hardly an argument. But the real question is: Does the argument he has with me invalidate the overall argument of Time and the Other ? That comes down to another question: how valid is the further step he takes (arguing for contemporaneity) when he seems to invalidate the # rst step (denouncing denial of coevalness)? Of course, there is also the possibility that the things we are concerned with may really have little to do with one another (analogous to what I say about Levinas later). Second, I could point out that the emphasis on coevalness in Time and the Other did lead me to be concerned with contemporaneity in the sense propagated by Augé. Evidence may be found in my struggles with the concept of popular culture (summarized in Fabian 1998; see also the following section).

The Other after Time and the Other

Even if I believed that a book can change a discipline, it would be disingenuous to say this about mine. Modesty comes easy in this case because I fully subscribe to that maxim of soccer philosophy which says that after the match is before the match. Time and the Other de# nitely was not the end of the game as some early readers feared, neither for the discipline nor for myself if my continued ethnographic and theoretical writing during the past three decades can count as an indi-cation. In the retrospective and somewhat autobiographic stance I am taking here, I now would like to continue the

Postscript 175

story of speaking of the other in anthropology and pass in brief review some of the more recent twists of the plot.

Presence and Representation

As a symptom or a cause, as the case may be, Clifford and Marcus’s Writing Culture (1986) was a landmark of a “crisis of representation” that hit anthropology at about the same time as it raged in other social sciences, the humanities, and cultural studies. The ensuing debates struggled with com-plex problems, most of which regarded the politics of literary conventions used in representing anthropological knowl-edge. At issue was not so much the truth value of anthropo-logical discourse but the question to what extent generally, and how speci# cally, ethnography both expressed and en-acted power relations. Proposals ranged from “experiment-ing with genres” (repairing the means) to pronouncements about the end of representation (abandoning the end). In response to an essay by Edward Said, in which he argued that only a change in power relations between an imperial West and its anthropological other—its interlocutors, as he put it—could lead to a way out of our crisis of representation (1989), I posited that “[p]erhaps it is possible to continue the debate  .  .  . if one locates the problem with representations not as a difference between reality and its images but as a ten-sion between re-presentation and presence ” ( 1990c:755, repr. 1991). Ultimately, anthropology’s task is to give presence to those who, if at all, are spoken of only in absentia . I am still nowhere near to understanding all the implications of this nor do I know how to resolve the quandary that such an ambition puts us into: if we were to succeed in making others present would that not put us out of business as their representers / representatives? 10

We can distinguish between a production-side and repre-sentation-side of ethnographic knowledge: While co-pres-ence is a condition of inquiry, it makes limited sense to think of it as a requirement of representation. Writing that gives, as it is said, the other a voice and engages in and acknowledges co-authorship, even by presenting texts written by those whom

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we study or transcribed from recordings made in the # eld—all this is still representation and makes us, if anything, more worried about what we are doing than we were before we abandoned naive scientism. In other words, we are not likely to make ourselves super" uous by good ethnography.

Remembering the Other

I did not let these worries paralyze me. On the contrary, research into ways, among other things, in which culture is made present through performance, in which the past is made present through memory and the present is remem-bered, all this based on studies of African contemporaneity under the heading of “popular culture,” have kept me writ-ing ethnographies. These in turn have led to more thought about alterity. 11 One has been an insight I came close to in the essay on “Presence and Representation,” though it was scarcely more than a hunch at the time. I observed that, for the ethnographer, there is a kind of experiencing the other “that may grow with time and, at any rate, needs time to grow” (1990c:769, repr. 1991:221). In fact, a similar idea had occurred to me in Time and the Other , where I said that in or-der to be knowingly in each other’s presence we must some-how share each other’s past. Tentative and cryptic as this may have been, eventually it made me realize how important a role remembering plays in the kind of speaking of others we call “ethnography.” This idea began to take shape when I worked on a study of reports on the exploration of Central Africa, # rst discussed in a paper called “Remembering the Other” (1999, repr. 2001). Essentially, it was a continuation of my argument regarding coevalness as a condition of com-municative research, now with a focus on recognition. What made this concept productive was that it led me to think about ethnographic inquiry as re -cognition, as cognizing and remembering.

With that, questions regarding the other enter the orbit of thought and talk about memory—a mega-concept if there ever was one, which could be a mixed blessing. Still, it has helped me to realize just how much memory and remember-

Postscript 177

ing are involved in every step of ethnography, from # eld research to documentation, interpretation, and presenting our # ndings. Here I can do no more than just mention this interesting aspect 12 but something should be said brie" y about the theoretical gain to be had from pairing memory and alterity.

Sooner or later, thinking about memory gets us to consider identity, individual as well as collective, psychological as well as cultural. 13 Not only that, if it is true that recognizing oth-ers also means remembering them then we should see rela-tionships between Self and other as a struggle for recogni-tion, interpersonal as well as political. Invoking struggle for recognition means invoking Hegel, allowing us to reformu-late the contradiction between coevalness and allochronic discourse explored in Time and the Other as one reason (and there are many others) to think of ethnography dialectically. Only then, as I put it elsewhere, “will self and other be drawn into a process of mutual recognition based on the kind of knowledge that changes the knower and that by the same to-ken re-constitutes his or her identity” (Fabian 1999:68, repr. 2001:117). Of course, the point is that in such a relationship both parties must be recognized as knowers as well as known.

Let us assume that what I called an epistemological con-ception of an other is now # rmly established and let us hope that the other as an ideological construct has been recog-nized for what it is—anthropology will still be involved in struggles for mutual recognition. Our practices of knowledge making will always also be enactments of relations of power. Yet it is important that we don’t lose sight of the historical speci# city of such relations and that we do not sociologize al-terity by making of others strangers or aliens, a confusion for which phenomenologists and psychologists may already have been responsible before it af" icted anthropologists. 14

On the point of the historical speci# city of conceptualizing others, one decisive element of difference between previous philosophical concerns with otherness and the introduction of the concept into social science, literary criticism, cultural studies, etc., has been the historization-cum-politicization of the other (the colony, the Orient). That other is not opposed to a Self. To assume that all talk about otherness is (ultimately)

178 Postscript

about identity would amount to re-philosophizing other-ness. Self-assertion through domination, exploitation, or even “stylization” (the invented Orient), or what I called “devices of temporal distantiation” (the invented “primitive”)—to call these practices and conceptualizations acts of identity-af# rmation would be analogous to examples of insane social scienti# c positivity, such as declaring South Africa under apartheid a pluralist society, or proposing to analyze concen-tration camps as social systems.

What I meant with the warning against sociologizing others is this: As ethnographers we experience others as our interlocutors; to experience them as strangers is not a logical, psychological, and certainly not a political requirement of ethnography. Of course I don’t want to dismiss sociological theory of the stranger as exempli# ed in Simmel’s famous essay (1908). But I do have reservations about recent efforts in cultural studies to make of anthropology a science of “expe-riencing strangers” (an awkward gloss for Fremderfahrung) , impressive as they may be as readings of the recent history of our discipline (Därmann and Jamme 2002).

Afterthoughts: Alterity—Inside, Outside, Between, and T out court

Recently I was reminded that Latin distinguishes between alius and alter . 15 Not that this clari# es much; both terms have several possible and possibly overlapping meanings, hence the difference between them is not clear. But when I compare the entries in my Latin–German dictionary, I sense support for my insisting (in discussions I had about anthropology as Fremdenwissenschaft ) that being a stranger or “exotic” (visibly different) is not a necessary attribute of alterity.

Perhaps it helps to ponder the following: one of the likely misunderstandings of my critique of “denial of coevalness” is that it was an attempt to “overcome” otherness, alterity. 16 The confusion arises when what I called allochronism is equated with creating alterity. The failure of anthropological dis-course has been a failure to recognize the epistemological signi# cance of alterity. Here is a possible way to argue this: Recognizing an other = alius as other = alter is a condition of

Postscript 179

communication and interaction, hence of participating in social-cultural practices (or whatever sociological categories, from group to society, apply), or of sharing a Lebenswelt . With-out alterity, no culture, no Lebenswelt . Even in phenomeno-logical thought, I assume, this concept makes sense only if Lebenswelt exists in the plural (compare this with anthropol-ogy’s “discovery” of culture in the plural). If there was only one Lebenswelt , we would have no need for this concept. The unresolved problem is the relationship between the recogni-tion of alterity that is part of (perhaps constitutive of) one Lebenswelt and the kind of alterity that allows us to recognize (in the case of anthropology: to identify, describe, under-stand, represent) other Lebenswelten. What, to condense this, is the relationship between alterity within / inside and alterity without / outside, or between?

This may be the crucial point where philosophical re" ec-tion alone comes to its limits because history and politics inter-vene. “Plurality” is a purely formal attribute; substantially, every conceivable realization of plurality is due to history (to events), processes of differentiation (resulting in “structures”), as well as to con" icts over differential access to resources and power; the list is incomplete, of course. Anthropology’s role (and ambition) has been to address “alterity without” in such a way that alterity outside can, # rst, be faced as alterity between and ultimately as alterity tout court .

On Levinas’s Le temps et l’autre

The answer to a question I have learned to anticipate is: No, my work was not in" uenced by knowledge of Levinas’s Le temps et l’autre (or of other writings of his which, I must confess, had escaped my attention). But other questions may be asked: beyond the titles being identical, are there other resemblances or convergences? 17 I # nally read Le temps et l’autre some years ago and found indeed similarities that are accounted for by a shared intellectual background (Hegel, phenomenology). Beyond that, and in spite of a " attering comparison made by an African philosopher (Bongmba 2001), I see differences that may be more important. Without

180 Postscript

being able to go into detail here I would like to state them, taking off from the following statement: “Emmanuel Levinas has argued that Western philosophy has consistently denied the alterity of the other, i.e. the other as other. As a result Western philosophy is ‘essentially a philosophy of being’, and hence of ‘immanence and of autonomy, or atheism.’ ” 18 So how does Levinas’s indictment of Western philosophy com-pare to what I called denial of coevalness? The obvious dif-ference is one of intent and scope. I don’t aim my critique at “Western philosophy” but at anthropological discourse. The thesis is therefore narrower in two respects: It is limited to a discipline that thinks of itself as an empirical science and it is addressed not only to theoretical “thinking” but to a discourse consisting of theories and speci# c practices within a discipline. This is crucial to the argument in Time and the Other which, it bears repeating, is about a contradiction between empirical research and the representation of # ndings.

On the other hand, there may be also be convergence. When I argue that alterity is constitutive of the project/object of anthropology this could also mean that denial of coeval-ness is denial of otherness in the Levinasian sense. Without otherness there would not be a problem of coevalness. Like Levinas I probably want to overcome a philosophy of imma-nence and autonomy, or, as I would prefer to put it, of identity. Except that my target of critique is not so much a philosophy as an ideology of identity. Therefore there is no contradiction when I criticize anthropology for constructing in its allo-chronic discourse an other with the help of conceptual and rhetorical devices that deny coevalness to that other.

We part ways when Levinas moves from an other who is transcendental as a condition without which we could not con-ceive of a thinking/acting as Self, 19 to a transcendent Other—God. When I plead for recognizing the other my concern is not with overcoming “atheism.” If I understand Levinas’s ulti-mate concern correctly then, all convergence notwithstand-ing, there is no agreement between us. It is another question whether the position I take as an anthropologist and the one Levinas developed as a philosopher or theologian can coex-ist peacefully. As someone whom anthropology enabled to outgrow theology I have my doubts.

Postscript 181

Conclusion: Other, Others, Othering—Concepts Afloat and Inflated

A concept’s proliferation may be indicative of its fertility. Yet sometimes I get a feeling that, I imagine, must be somehow like what my parents’ generation experienced when they lost their savings during “the in" ation,” as they put it. Speaking of the other without backing up what one has to say with some kind of value becomes like printing money; perhaps this accounts for the in" ation of the term’s concept. Will the thought and argument we put into exploring “the Other” become worthless? Perhaps it is time to get out of game. And should one hesitate to jump ship just because it might look undigni# ed?

As I think about reasons for continuing the struggle with alterity in an in" ationary intellectual economy, I am trying to remember what brought me to the topic to begin with. It was not the philosophical problem of Self and other, not even in the soft version that Susan Sontag long ago called “applied Hegelianism” (1970:185). It was the realization that we (the West, whoever wants to be included in that We, or, for histori-cal and political reasons, belongs to that We) seem to require alterity for sustenance in our efforts to assert or understand ourselves. What, to stay with the metaphor of in" ation, would be the gold that gives the conceptual paper money circulating in discourses about the other its value? As far as anthropology is concerned, the short answer is: speaking about others needs to be backed up by speaking with others. We will do this as long as we do ethnography.

182 Postscript

Notes

1 . Based on a previously published article (Fabian 2006), revised from notes for a Wolfson College lecture, delivered at Wolfson College, University of Oxford, on March 1, 2005.

2 . I took this quote from Talal Asad’s essay in Writing Culture (Asad 1986:142). 3 . “Other” and “otherness” made it into the index and appeared in few

(somewhat acerbic) remarks here and there in a later collection of essays, Avail-able Light (Geertz 2000).

4 . I found this only recently, quoted in an unpublished paper by E. Wilmsen, hereby acknowledged.

5 . What I called “another twist” was one only in the context of the statements just quoted. That talk of otherness was somehow indicative of its disappearance as a human experience due to globalization was not a novel insight. It was stated explicitly and in terms similar to those used by Marcus and by Beattie in his in-troduction to Other Cultures (see 1964: 3–4).

6 . A history of the term and concept “other” in anthropology remains to be written—a project that would be monumental, especially if closely related work (to name but two examples: Hartog 1980 and Todorov 1982) was to be included in the discussion.

7 . See Jarvie’s “Epistle to the Anthropologists” (1975), and also our earlier polemic exchange caused by what I felt was a sociologization of alterity (the an-thropologist in the role of the stranger), which he proposed as a solution to the problem of “ethical integrity in participant observation” (1969, Fabian 1971b).

8 . With a reference to an article by Donald C. Campbell (1969), an eminent psychologist with phenomenological leanings and a colleague at Northwestern University who encouraged my youthful critical fervor.

9 . Quoted from the second edition. The # rst part of the passage is almost identical with a statement in Edward Said’s Orientalism : “In discussions of the Ori-ent, the Orient is all absence, whereas one feels the Orientalist and what he says as presence; yet we must not forget that the Orientalist’s presence is enabled by the Orient’s effective absence” (1978:208).

10 . See also the elegant formulation given for this quandary by J.-P. Dumont (1986:359), cited in “Presence and Representation” (Fabian 1990c).

11 . See Fabian 1990a on popular historiography, 1990b on performance and popular theater, 1996 on popular historical painting, and 1998 on anthropology and popular culture, all of them based on research in the Shaba region of the former Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The textual material presented in these studies has taken on a new kind of presence by being deposited in a virtual archive publicly accessible on the internet: http://www.lpca.socsci.uva.nl/. See also my conjectures regarding the possible effect of such virtual presence and an experiment in ethnographic writing as commentary (Fabian 2002, 2008).

12 . For a more comprehensive statement, see chapter 11 of Fabian 2007. 13 . Even the most cursory look at recent literature on memory will con# rm

this. Especially in Germany, connections between identity and memory have been debated around the concept “culture of memory” ( Erinnerungskultur ). See, for example, J. Assmann 1992, A. Assman 1999, and A. Assmann and Friese 1998.

Postscript 183

14 . See on this the essay on Freud, Husserl, and Lacan by Därmann (Där-mann and Jamme 2002:277–320).

15 . The occasion was a remark by a philosopher quoted in a review of a congress or symposium in a German newspaper. I forgot to take a note and thus cannot properly acknowledge the source of this reminder of a well-known distinction.

16 . Or, worse, that I pursued a “homochronic” project, as if what I call “shared time” presupposed imposing one and the same (conception, experience of) time; see Birth 2008.

17 . Those who would like to know how it came about that my book had the same title as Emmanuel Levinas’s essay, I refer to an earlier statement (Fabian 1991:227–28n). A new edition of the French original (Levinas [1946] 1979) ap-peared after Time and the Other was written (which then still had its working title, “Anthropology and the Politics of Time”). The English translation, also titled Time and the Other , came out four years after the publication of my book (Levinas 1987).

18 . This programmatic statement came with the invitation to the Wolfson Lecture.

19 . For an exploration of self-making in anthropology, see a collection of essays edited by Battaglia (1995).

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Assmann, Aleida. 1999. Erinnerun gsräume. Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses . Munich: Beck.

Assmann, Aleida and Heidrun Friese, eds. 1998. Identitäten. Erinnerung, Geschichte, Identität . Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Assmann, Jan. 1992. Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen . Munich: C. H. Beck.

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———. 1994b. Les sens des autres. Actualité de l ’ anthropologie . Paris: Fayard. Trans-lated into English by Amy Jacobs as A Sense for the Other: The Timeliness and Rel-evance of Anthropology (1998. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press).

Battaglia, Debbora. 1995. Rhetorics of Self-Making . Berkeley: University of Califor-nia Press.

184 Postscript

Beattie, John. 1964. Other Cultures. Aims, Methods , and Achievements in Social An-thropology . London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Birth, Kevin. 2008. “The Creation of Coevalness and the Danger of Homochro-nism.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 14:3–20.

Bongmba, Elias K. 2001. “Fabian and Levinas on Time and the Other: Ethical Implications.” Philosophia Africana 4:7–26.

Boon, James A. 1982. Other Tribes, Other Scribes : Symbolic Anthropology and the Com-parative Study of Cultures, Histories, Religions, and Texts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Campbell, Donald T. 1969. “A Phenomenology of the Other One: Corrigible, Hy-pothetical, and Critical.” In Theodore Mischel, ed., Human Action: Conceptual and Empirical Issues , pp. 41–69. New York: Academic Press.

Clifford, James. 1986. “Introduction: Partial Truths.” In James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., Writing Culture : The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography , pp. 1–26. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Clifford, James, and George E. Marcus, eds. 1986. Writing Culture : The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography . Berkeley: University of California Press.

Därmann, Iris, and Christoph Jamme, eds. 2002. Fremderfahrung und Repräsenta-tion. Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft.

Dumont, Jean-Paul. 1986. “Prologue to Ethnography or Prolegomena to Anthro-pography.” Ethos 14:344–67.

Fabian, Johannes. 1971a. “History, Language, and Anthropology.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 1:19–47. Reprinted in Fabian, Time and the Work o f Anthropol-ogy: Critical Essays, 1971–1991 (1991. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers).

———. 1971b. “On Professional Ethics and Epistemological Foundations: Com-ment on I.C. Jarvie.” Current Anthropology 12:230–32.

———. 1972. “How Others Die —Re" ections on the Anthropology of Death.” Social Research 39:543–67. Reprinted in Fabian, Time and the Work o f Anthropol-ogy: Critical Essays, 1971–1991 (1991. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers).

———. 1983. Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object . New York: Co-lumbia University Press.

———. 1990a. History F rom Below: The ‘ Vocabulary of Elisabethville ’ by André Yav ; Texts, Translation s and Interpretive Essay . Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishers.

———. 1990b. Power and Performance : Ethnographic Explorations through Proverbial Wisdom and Theater in Shaba (Zaire). Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press.

———. 1990c. “Presence and Representation: The Other and Anthropological Writing.” Critical Inquiry 16:753–72. Reprinted in Fabian, Time and the Work o f Anthropology: Critical Essays, 1971–1991 (1991. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers).

———. 1991. Time and the Work of Anthropology: Critical Essays 1971–1991 . Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers.

———. 1996. Remembering the Present: Painting and Popular History in Zaire . Berke-ley: University of California Press.

Postscript 185

———. 1998. Moments of Freedom: Anthropology and Popular Culture . Charlottes-ville: University Press of Virginia.

———. 1999. “Remembering the Other: Knowledge and Recognition in the Ex-ploration of Central Africa.” Critical Inquiry 26:49–69. Reprinted in Fabian, Anthropology with an Attitude: Critical Essays (2001. Stanford: Stanford University Press).

———. 2000. Out of Our Minds: Reason and Madness in the Exploration of Central Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.

———. 2001. Anthropology with an Attitude : Critical Essays. Stanford, Calif.: Stan-ford University Press.

———. 2002. “Virtual Archives and Ethnographic Writing: Commentary as a New Genre?” Current Anthropology 43:775–86.

———. 2006. “The Other Revisited: Critical Afterthoughts.” Anthropological The-ory 6:139–52.

———. 2007. Memory A gainst Culture : Arguments and Reminders . Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

———. 2008. Ethnography as Commentary : Wr iting from the Virtual Archive . Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures . New York: Basic Books. ———. 2000. Available Light : Anthropological Re# ections on Philosophical Topics.

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phische Rundschau . Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. Hartog, François. 1980. Le mi roir d ’ Herodote. Paris: Gallimard. Hymes, Dell. 1964. “Introduction: Towards Ethnographies of Communication.”

In John J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes, eds., The Ethnography of Communication , pp. 1–34. Menasha, Wis.: American Anthropological Association.

Jarvie, Ian C. 1969. “The Problem of Ethical Integrity in Participant Observa-tion.” Current Anthropology 10:505–8.

———. 1975. “Epistle to the Anthropologists.” American Anthropologist 77:253–65. Leach, Edmund R. 1973. “Ourselves and Others.” Times Literary Supplement , July

6, 771–72. Levinas, Emmanuel. 1979. Le temps et l ’ autre . Paris: Presses Universitaires de

France. ———. 1987. Time and the Other . Richard A. Cohen, trans. Pittsburgh: Duquesne

University Press. Marcus, George E. 1986. “Contemporary Problems of Ethnography in the Mod-

ern World System.” In James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., Writing Culture : The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography , pp. 165–93. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Radnitzky, Gerard. 1968. Contemporary Schools of Metascience , Vol. 2 : Continental Schools of Metascience . Dissertation. Göteborg: Akademiefövlaget.

———. 1970. Contemporary Schools of Metascience. Revised and enlarged edition. New York: Humanities Press.

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———. 1989. “Representing the Colonized: Anthropology’s Interlocutors.” Criti-cal Inquiry 15:205–25.

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Notes1. Time and the Emerging Other

1. ‘Ausser der Zeit gibt es noch ein anderes Mittel, grosse Veränderungen hervorzubringen, und das ist die— Gewalt. Wenn die eine zu langsam geht, so tut die andere öfters die Sache vorher’ (Lichtenberg 1975:142). All translations into En glish are my own unless an En glish version is cited.

2. Tylor 1958:529.3. The most in" uential modern statement of this idea was Mircea Eliade’s

Mythe de l’éternel retour (1949). How much the linear- cyclical opposition continues to dominate inquiry into conceptions of time is shown in a more recent collection of essays edited by P. Ricoeur (1975). Similar in outlook and somewhat broader in scope was the volume Man and Time (1957).

4. The point that philosophy and the social sciences missed the Copernican revolution or, at any rate, failed to produce their Copernican revolution was made by G. Gusdorf: ‘Ainsi la Re nais sance est vraiment, pour les sciences humaines, une occasion manquée’ (1968:1781, see also 1778).

5. For Gusdorf’s discussion of Bossuet see 1973:379 ff. See also an essay by Koselleck, on “History, Stories, and Formal Structures of Time” in which he points to the Augustinian origins of Bossuet’s “order of times” (1973:211– 222) and a study by Klempt (1960).

6. These are connotations, not strict de# nitions of universal. They indicate two major tendencies or intentions behind anthropological search for universals of cul-ture. One follows a rationalist tradition and often takes recourse to linguistics. The other has an empiricist orientation and seeks statistical proof for universal occur-rence of certain traits, institutions, or customs. The most obvious example for the former is the work of Lévi- Strauss (especially his writing on the elementary struc-tures of kinship and on totemism). For a statement of the problem from the point of view of anthropological linguistics see the chapters on “synchronic universals” and “diachronic generalization” in Greenberg 1968:175. A major representative of the “generalizing” search for universals has been G. P. Murdock (1949).

7. The continued in" uence of both traditions will be discussed in chapter 4. On the rhetorical devices used by Bossuet see O. Ranum in his introduction to a recent En glish edition of the Discours (1976:xxi– xxviii).

8. Concise and informative overviews over the opening of “human space” and the pro cessing of that information in a vast literature during the eigh teenth cen-tury may be found in the # rst two chapters of Michèle Duchet’s work on anthro-

188 1. Time and the Other

pology and history during the Enlightenment (1971:25– 136). See also a disserta-tion, “The Geography of the Philosophes” by Broc (1972).

9. W. Lepenies does not seem to take into account this possibility in his im-portant essay on temporalization in the eigh teenth century (1976). As he tells the story, the breakthrough into the dimension of time responded to “empirical pres-sure” (Erfahrungsdruck); the mass of available data could no longer be contained in spatial, achronic schemes. I do not # nd this very convincing, especially not in the case of anthropology, where it is manifest that temporal devices have been ideo-logically mediated, never direct responses to experienced reality.

10. The term episteme was introduced by M. Foucault. Much of what I will have to say about “spatialized” Time has been inspired by a reading of his The Order of Things (1973; originally published as Les Mots et les choses 1966).

11. First published in 1874 by the British Association for the Advancement of Science. The project goes back to the work of a committee of three physicians (!) initiated in 1839 (see Voget 1975:105).

12. On the Société, see Stocking 1968: ch. 2, Moravia 1973:88 ff, Copans and Jamin n.d. [1978]. On Degérando (also written de Gérando) see F. C. T. Moore’s translator’s introduction to the En glish edition (1969). On the Institutio, see Mora-via 1967:958. Lepenies also mentions this work and links it to later treatises by Blumenbach, Lamarck, and Cuvier (1976:55). As recent work by J. Stagl shows, however, Linnaeus was by no means an “ancestor.” He wrote in an established tradition whose roots must be sought in humanist educational treatises and Ramist “method” (Stagl 1980). On Ramism see chapter 4.

13. L. White’s The Evolution of Culture (1959) has been hailed as “the modern equivalent of Morgan’s Ancient Society” by M. Harris who, in the same sentence, shows how little it matters to him that Morgan’s historical context was quite differ-ent from White’s. We are told that the “only difference” between the two works is “the updating of some of the ethnography and the greater consistence of the cultural- materialist thread” (1968:643). This is typical of Harris’ historiography. His tale of anthropology is confessional, aggressive, and often entertaining, but not critical. Sahlins and Ser vice’s Evolution and Culture (1960) and Julian Steward’s Theory of Culture Change (1955) have been among the most in" uential statements of neoevolutionism in anthropology.

14. Numerous publications attest to a renewed interest in Vico; see for in-stance the collections of essays assembled in two issues of the journal Social Research (Giorgio Tagliacozzo, ed., 1976).

15. Perhaps there is a tendency, fostered by Darwin, to give too much credit to Lyell. The “crisis of chronology” goes back to the sixteenth century and courage to think in millions of years was demonstrated by Kant and Buffon, among others, in the eigh teenth century (see Lepenies 1976:9– 15, 42 ff). Nevertheless, it remains important that evolutionist thought owed its temporal liberation to geology, a sci-ence which perhaps more than any other, astronomy excepted, construes Time from spatial relation and distribution. On pre de ces sors of Lyell, see Eiseley 1961.

16. Peel uses naturalizing in a similar sense. Although he does not develop this further, his statement is worth quoting here: “In an obvious sense social evo-lution is easily the most time- oriented style of sociology, and many writers, Coll-ingwood and Toulmin among them, have seen the dominance of evolutionary modes of thought as a sign of the conquest of science by history. Up to a point

1. Time and the Other 189

this is doubtless so; but it must not blind us to a profoundly anti- historical bias in social evolution. For in one respect evolution was not so much a victory of the historical style of explanation as a denaturing, or rather naturalization, of the proper study of society and history” (1971:158).

17. Kroeber attacks those who invoke biological or mechanical causality in order to explain history (his term for cultural anthropology). But when he says (in Profession 16) “History deals with conditions sine qua non, not with causes” (1915:287), he seems to concur with Morgan.

18. A fair historical and historiographic appreciation of what is customarily lumped together as “German diffusionism” is another matter. Remarks on that school in recent textbooks usually betray a dismal ignorance of its intellectual sources and background. Close links between German Kulturkreis- thought and early Amer-ican anthropology are all but forgotten, as is Edward Sapir’s work, Time Perspective in Aboriginal American Culture: A Study in Method, published only # ve years after Graebner’s Methode (in 1916).

19. For Parsons see the book edited by J. Toby (Parsons 1977). Peel discusses the revival of evolutionism in contemporary sociology and anthropology (1971:ch. 10); Toulmin coauthored a major work on conceptions of Time (see Toulmin and Good# eld 1961); Donald T. Campbell stated his position in an essay titled “Natu-ral Selection as an Epistemological Model” (1970). Much of the Habermas- Luhmann controversy and the literature it generated remains all but inaccessible because it is expressed in a forbidding jargon. For a statement of the importance of evolu-tionary arguments see an essay by Klaus Eder (1973). Halfmann (1979) identi# es the opponents as Darwinists vs. critical theories of development.

20. However, when the necessity to consider Time arises, anthropologists in the culturalist tradition remember the eigh teenth century. D. Bidney states in The-oretical Anthropology: “The problem still remains, however, as to the relation of historical, evolutionary culture to human nature. If culture is a direct, necessary expression of human nature, how is one to explain the evolution of culture pat-terns in time? In my opinion the problem remains insoluble as long as one does not admit that human nature, like culture, evolves or unfolds in time. This may be understood on the assumption that while the innate biological potentialities of man remain more or less constant the actual, effective psychophysical powers and capabilities are subject to development in time. What I am suggesting is compara-ble to the eighteenth- century notion of the perfectibility of human nature, which seems to have dropped out of the picture in contemporary ethnological thought” (1953:76).

21. Radiocarbon dating was fully established by W. F. Libby (1949); its wider ac cep tance in anthropology was aided by symposia and publications sponsored by the Wenner- Gren Foundation. By 1964 (the date of publication of works by Oak-ley and Butzer) it had attained “normal scienti# c” status (in T. S. Kuhn’s terms) on the level of textbooks. While it was revolutionary in the sense of providing hitherto unattainable chronometric certainty, it changed little as regards certain long- established convictions about the relatively “timeless” nature of early human evolution. Compare the following statement by Oakley with the passage from Graebner (1911) quoted above: “At the present time, in almost all parts of the world, cultures of many kinds and varying levels of complexity occur within short distances of one another, but before the Neolithic Revolution this was not so. The

190 1. Time and the Other

cultures of the early hunters and foodgatherers evolved slowly and their traditions spread widely long before there was any marked change. Where a paleolithic cul-ture can be de# ned and identi# ed on the basis of suf# ciently large assemblages of artifacts, it is legitimate to regard its “industries” as approximately contempora-neous throughout their area of distribution. Until recently this view was based wholly on theory, but radiocarbon dating of early archeological horizons in Africa at least supports the conclusion that in pre- Neolithic times cultural evolution was proceeding contemporaneously over very large areas. To that extent paleolithic industries may be used as means of approximate synchronic dating of Pleistocene deposits” (1964:9). Of course, both Graebner and Oakley base their statements on the little disputed assumption that material, technical products of culture (“indus-tries”)—those that result in a record of spatial distribution— are key indicators of the evolution of human culture tout court.

22. Originally published in 1966 and reprinted in Geertz 1973: ch. 14. An analysis of time conceptions in Zulu myth and ritual, based on Schutz, was made by I. Szombati- Fabian (1969). Among the writings of A. Schutz see especially 1967. One of his more accessible essays, ‘Making Music Together’ (originally published in 1951), was reprinted in the reader Symbolic Anthropology (J. L. Dolgin et al., eds., 1977:106– 119). Whereas Husserl and Heidegger were primarily concerned with Time as it needs to be thought in the context of human perception and “internal consciousness,” Schutz analyzed its role in communication. He states in the conclu-sion of the essay just cited: “It appears that all possible communication presup-poses a mutual tuning- in relationship between the communicator and the addres-see of the communication. This relationship is established by the reciprocal sharing of the Other’s " ux of experiences in inner time, by living through a vivid present together, by experiencing this togetherness as ‘We’ ” (Schutz 1977:118). It is in this context of intersubjectivity and of the problem of shared Time that some of the insights of phenomenological philosophy continue to in" uence anthropology, sociology, and also linguistics. Examples for this are R. Rommetveit’s incisive cri-tique of generativist hegemony in linguistics (1974) and my own reappraisal of sociolinguistics (Fabian 1979a). This paper should be consulted by readers who are interested in the practical- ethnographic problematics of intersubjective Time.

23. In a thoughtful book on the intellectual history of anthropological re-search among Australian “aborigines,” K. Burridge develops this point at greater length (1973:13 ff). However, where I see breaks and discontinuity, he regards the Christian conception of otherness as the main continuous source of anthro-pological curiosity. This leads him to ascribe a fundamental role to missionary practice as a model for anthropology (1973:18, 83 f). I don’t think that his view is borne out by the history of our discipline. Throughout, Burridge stresses moral commitment as the common element of religious and scienti# c encounter with the Other which, in my view, prevents him from properly appreciating the intellectual, cognitive side of it.

24. K. G. Jayne notes that Prince Henry the Navigator used the myth of Pres-ter John to justify an enterprise designed to “out" ank” Islam through the circum-navigation of Africa (1970 [1910]: 13). For an historical and literary analysis of the Prester John myth as a “spatial” dream and a utopia before Moore see ch. 5 in F. M. Rogers (1961; with references to the voluminous literature on the subject).

2. Our Time, Their Time, No Time 191

The story came to a conclusion of sorts with a Portugese mission to Ethiopia in 1520, the account of which was written by Father Francisco Alvares, an extraor-dinary document for the transition from myth to ethnography (see Beckingham and Huntingford 1961).

25. Marshall Sahlins uses this formula with disarming frankness in his recent attempt to set up a basic opposition between “practical reason” (the West’s) and “culture” (the Rest’s); see Sahlins 1976 and my comments in chapter 4.

26. David Bohm states in a textbook on relativity theory: “The notion that there is one unique universal order and mea sure of time is only a habit of thought built up in the limited domain of Newtonian mechanics” (1965:175). Ernst Bloch, citing developments in physics and mathematics, proposed to extend the notion of relativity to human time. We must recognize its “elasticity” and multiplicity. This, he argues, will be the only way to subsume Africa and Asia under a common human history without stretching them over the Western linear conception of progress (see 1963:176– 203).

27. Apparently it is not dead in philosophy either, at least to judge from K. Wagn’s What Time Does (1976). For an especially lucid “outline of the argument from time to space” see Lucas 1973:99 ff.

28. Malinowski’s candid revelation about his obsession with sex, drugs, race and po liti cal chauvinism caught the prurient interest when the diary was # rst pub-lished. Its importance as an epistemological document was overlooked by most (but not by C. Geertz, see 1979:225 f). Malinowski carefully recorded his struggle with “the uncreative demon of escape from reality” by reading novels rather than pursuing his research work (1967:86). At least twenty times he reports on situa-tions where the present with its demands became too much to bear. Once he notes: “Profound intellectual laziness; I enjoyed things retrospectively, as experiences re-corded in memory, rather than immediately, because of my miserable state” (1967:35). All this, I believe, is not only evidence of Malinowski’s psychological problems with # eldwork, it documents his struggle with an epistemological pro b-lem—coevalness.

2. Our Time, Their Time, No Time: Coevalness Denied

1. ‘Überhaupt ist der Primat des Raumes über die Zeit ein untrügliches Kennzeichen reaktonärer Sprache’ (E. Bloch 1962:322).

2. Lévi- Strauss 1963:39.3. In my own development, critical questioning of ethnoscienti# c procedures

as to their ability to deal with the “irruptive force of time” has been crucial. My views are expressed in an essay “Taxonomy and Ideology” (1975), one reason why I do not want to address this issue again. M. Durbin’s paper “Models of Simul-taneity and Sequentiality in Human Cognition” (1975) in the same volume might be read as an attempt to raise the problem of Time within the con# nes of a tax-onomic approach.

4. For a critical appraisal of functionalist inability to deal with change and a plea for the Popperian approach see Jarvie (1964). In his partisan defense of func-tionalism (“Without any doubt, the single most signi# cant body of theory in the

192 2. Our Time, Their Time, No Time

social sciences in the present century”) R. A. Nisbet ignores critiques such as Jar-vie’s and speaks of functionalism under the heading of Neo- Evolutionism (see 1969:223 ff).

5. See Malinowski 1945:34. At the same time he relegates that element to the study of change which, with the straightforwardness that was characteristic of him, he identi# es as anthropology’s response to problems of maintaining po liti cal power over colonized populations (see 1945:4 f).

6. Georges Gurvitch, one of the few sociologists comparable in stature to T. Parsons, summarized his views in a treatise on social time. His “dialectical” orien-tation produced insights of great depth and comprehensiveness. But he, too, starts from an unquestioned assumption: Some societies are “promethean,” i.e., history- and time- centered, while others, notably those that are studied by “ethnography,” are not (see 1964 [1962]:6). In the end his typological approach to the problem leads him to assert a relativist “temporal pluralism.” Similar in approach and intent is the excellent, if fragmentary, essay “On Social Time” by V. Gioscia (1971). Gio-scia, however, is aware of the po liti cal nature of social conceptions of Time as well as of the visualist bias resulting in theoretical suppression of Time (see chapter 4).

7. A valuable summary of different genres of anthropological studies of Time (including a bibliography containing references to most of the important articles and monographs) may be found in the essay “Primitive Time- Reckoning as a Symbolic System” by D. N. Maltz (1968). R. J. Maxwell’s contribution to the Yaker volume is less useful (1971). To the list of Frazerian compilations of cul-tural conceptions of Time one could add the three volumes of F. K. Ginzel’s “Manual of Mathematical and Technical Chronology” (1906, 1911, 1914)— a misleading title because the work examines only early historical, ethnographic, and folkloric evidence. A paper by W. Bogoras (1925) is remarkable mainly for an early attempt to show similarities between relativity theory and primitive Time concepts. Among more recent work one could cite Bourdieu (1963), a volume edited by Lacroix (1972), an important paper by Turton and Ruggles (1978), and an essay by Kra mer (1978). The list is by no means complete.

8. For a succinct summary of philosophical arguments relating to time and communication see Lucas 1973:44 ff.

9. For instance by D. Bidney in his critique of Herskovits (1953:423 ff) and more recently in a devastating essay by Nowell- Smith (1971). Relevant writings by Herskovits were republished, with a positive introduction, by D. T. Campbell (Herskovits 1972). Book- length appraisals were given by Rudolph (1968) and Ten-nekes (1971) and above all by Lemaire (1976). Serious counterarguments continue to be formulated with respect to the question of linguistic relativity; see the volume of essays edited by Pinxten (1976). See also Hanson’s proposal for “contextualism” as a mediation between relativism and objectivism (1979).

10. And, one might add, the outlook of American politics: “We cannot hope to discharge satisfactorily to ourselves or to other peoples the leadership that his-tory has forced upon us at this time unless we act upon reasoned and clearly stated standards of evaluation. Finally, all talk of an eventual peaceful and orderly world is but pious cant or sentimental fantasy unless there are, in fact, some simple but powerful beliefs to which all men hold, some codes or canons that have or can obtain universal ac cep tance.” This is not an American president preaching his doc-

2. Our Time, Their Time, No Time 193

trine of human rights in 1982, but Clyde Kluckhohn in a cold war essay “Educa-tion, Values, and Anthropological Relativity” (1962 [1952]:286 f).

11. It is intriguing to note that a coherent critical account of the “war effort” in American anthropology is conspicuously absent from M. Harris’ history of an-thropology, although he gives a cursory review of some studies of that period (1968:413– 418). The same holds for Honigman, who mentions “national charac-ter” in connection with Vico, Montesquieu, Hume, and Herder (1976:99 f), and for Voget who does, however, provide an informative section on Kluckhohn’s project of “covert” value studies in # ve cultures of the Southwest (1975:414– 421). It is even more surprising that, as far as I can see, none of the contributors to Hymes’ Reinventing Anthropology (1974) felt the need to drag that par tic u lar skele-ton out of the closet. Incidentally, no reference is made in these books to the Mead and Métreaux manual on which I will comment below. One important critical ap-praisal, focusing on studies of Japa nese national character by W. La Barr, was recently made by P. T. Suzuki (1980).

12. But this is only a passing impression. Elsewhere M. Mead stated: “These contemporary national character studies of culture at a distance resemble attempts to reconstruct the cultural character of societies of the past . . . in which the study of documents and monuments has to be substituted for the direct study of individu-als interacting in observable social situations. However they differ from historical reconstruction in that, whether they are done at a distance or through # eld- work in the given nation, they are based primarily on interviews with and observation of living human beings” (1962:396). Note that the allochronic intent of the state-ment is reinforced, not mitigated by reference to living human beings.

13. This intent is expressed in the title of a paper by Hall and William Foote Whyte (1966): “Intercultural Communication: A Guide to Men of Action.” The section on time provides a cata log of how- to recommendations for American busi-nessmen having to deal with Latin Americans, Greeks, Japa nese, and Indians and concludes with this anthropological malapropos: “If you haven’t been needled by an Arab, you just haven’t been needled” (1966:570).

14. Margaret Mead formulated that presupposition as follows: “Cultural un-derstanding of the sort discussed in this Manual can only be achieved within a frame of reference that recognizes the internal consistency of the premises of each human culture and also recognizes that much of this consistency is unconscious; that is, is not available to the average member of the culture” (Mead and Métreaux 1953:399 f).

15. Perhaps one should not even attempt a bibliographic note (a useful work-ing bibliography on Lévi- Strauss and his critics— containing 1,384 titles!— is now available: Lapointe and Lapointe 1977). Nevertheless, here are some titles, all pri-marily concerned with a systematic interpretation of Lévi- Strauss’ work, which I would recommend for consultation. In En glish: Leach (1970)— readable but to be taken with caution; Scholte (1974a), the most concise and differentiated introduc-tion by an anthropologist; Rossi (1974); and most recently Jenkins (1979). In French: Simonis (1968) and Marc- Lipiansky (1973), the latter being mainly a study guide. In German: Lepenies and Ritter (1970), a collective volume especially valuable as a study of Lévi- Strauss’ intellectual sources and af# nities. Generally, I have found F. Jameson’s The Prison House of Language (1972) to be a most convincing critique

194 2. Our Time, Their Time, No Time

of structuralism (including related movements such as Rus sian formalism and the Prague school). He is especially insightful with regard to the problem of Time.

16. See Lévi- Strauss 1976:12. It should be clear that taxonomic is here being used to designate an episteme (see Foucault 1973 and Lepenies 1976) and not in a narrow technical sense of one type of classi# cation (see Durbin 1975).

17. See also the excellent essay on Lévi- Strauss and Sartre by Rosen (1971).18. One of Lévi- Strauss’ most famous statements should be quoted here.

Speaking of myth and music, he observes that both require “a temporal dimension in which to unfold. But this relation to time is of a rather special nature: it is as if music and mythology needed time only in order to deny it. Both, indeed, are instruments for the obliteration of time” (1970 [1964]: 15 f). Incidentally, when Lévi- Strauss later tries to correct misunderstandings with regard to the distinction of synchrony and diachrony he reaf# rms the antitemporal intent; see 1976:16 f.

19. G. Bachelard argues similarly and concludes: “Subrepticement, on a remlacé la locution durer dans le temps par la locution demeurer dans l’espace et c’est l’intuition grossière du plein qui donne I’impression vague de plénitude. Voilà le prix dont il faut payer la continuité établie entre la connaissance objective et la connaissance subjective” (1950:27).

20. In this respect, Lévi- Strauss’ position is identical to L. H. Morgan’s (see the quotation from Morgan, chapter 1). Appropriately, The Elementary Structures of Kinship is dedicated to Morgan.

21. Absence of a theory of production is not a mere side effect of a radically taxonomic approach. Structuralism is a theory of non- production: ostensibly, be-cause it is a theory tailored to non- or preindustrial societies which are based on symbolic exchange; in reality, because it is a theory produced by a society whose “industrial” phase has long been terminated by what Baudrillard calls the “end of production.” As the writings of Baudrillard show (see especially 1976) structural-ism as the theory of the “simulation of the code” can be put to use for a shattering critique of late capitalist “culture” but only at the expense of primitive society from which it must continuously extract its insights. Lévi- Strauss expresses awareness of this in his famous bon mot on anthropology as entropology (1963:397).

22. See also a statement from the introduction to The Raw and the Cooked: “Throughout, my intention remains unchanged. Starting from ethnographic ex-perience, I have always aimed at drawing up an inventory of mental patterns, to reduce apparently arbitrary data to some kind of order, and to attain a level at which a kind of necessity becomes apparent, underlying the illusion of liberty” (Lévi- Strauss 1970:10).

23. Elsewhere I argue that the silence and secrecy surrounding the ethno-graphic act are comparable to the removal of fundamental religious acts from the everyday sphere. I then ask: “Could it be that in anthropology, as in many reli-gious movements, there is a censoring- out of its constitutive acts, expressing con-scious or unconscious efforts to protect the discipline from realizing that, after all, it rests on a historically situated praxis, a mode of producing knowledge in which personal mediation is essential and must be ‘accounted for’ instead of being simply presumed in such fuzzy axioms as ‘anthropology should be based on # eld work’ ” (Fabian 1979b:25).

24. The colonial involvement of British anthropology has been well docu-

3. Time and Writing About the Other 195

mented, which is one reason why it will be little discussed in these essays. See Asad 1973, Leclerc 1971, Kuper 1973.

3. Time and Writing About the Other

1. Bohm 1965:175 f.2. La Fontaine 1962:Fable X.3. Evans- Pritchard found it “surprising that, with the exception of Morgan’s

study of the Iroquois [1851] not a single anthropologist conducted # eld studies till the end of the nineteenth century.” He undoubtedly exaggerated, but his obser-vation underscored the insight that the eventual incorporation of # eld research into the praxis of anthropology was not so much due to a need for empirical con# rmation as it was expressive of the professionalization of a discipline: “An-thropology became more and more a whole- time professional study, and some # eld experience came to be regarded as an essential part of the training of its students” (see 1962:71 f, 73).

4. For a recent statement of this see an otherwise disappointing essay by F. A. Salamone (1979, with useful bibliographic references to the literature on # eldwork). Notice a remarkable shift in these debates from a scienti# c orientation inspired by an “Einsteinian” notion of epistemology in Northrop and Livingston (1964) toward the communicative legitimation of anthropological knowledge.

5. My own contribution to this debate was an essay, “Language, History and Anthropology” (1971), which occasioned an article by Jarvie (1975). Bob Scholte contributed several important essays (see 1971, 1974b) as did K. Dwyer (1977, 1979), J. P. Dumont (1978), B. Jules- Rosette (1978), and D. Tedlock (1979), among others.

6. This can be done in a critical and fruitful fashion, as, e.g., by Hayden White (1973). His analyses of historical discourse in terms of meta phorical strate-gies permit, at the very least, interesting comparisons between different historians. However, when all discourse on Time, history, and change is denounced, rather than analyzed, as meta phorical the results can be stultifying; see Nisbet (1969). Used judiciously or not, I # nd meta phor to be of limited use for the critical project of this book. No doubt many allochronic devices are metaphoric— but that is, I am tempted to say, no excuse.

7. This has been asserted, incidentally, about “Time and Physical Language.” According to Schumacher, who quali# es special relativity as a “rule of communica-tion” in a frame separating subject and object, “the idea of the progress of time is an outgrowth of the linguistic forms for physical communications” (see 1967:196, 203).

8. What Greimas has in mind seems to be illustrated by Evans- Pritchard when he states: “Every kind of social relationship, every belief, every technological pro-cess— in fact everything in the life of the natives— is expressed in words as well as in action, and when one has fully understood the meaning of all the words of their language and all their situations of reference one has # nished one’s study of the society” (1962a:79 f).

9. For a radical critique of claims that historical discourse might, or should

196 3. Time and Writing About the Other

be, viewed as self- contained see Mairet (1974). A similar concern, combined with a critique of the “positivist illusion” akin to that expressed by anthropologists (see note 5 above), characterizes the work of B. Verhaegen (see 1974). The many facets of the problem of history qua discourse are discussed in a collective vol-ume edited by Koselleck and Stempel (1973; see also Greimas’ essay “Sur l’histoire év énementielle et l’histoire fondamentale” in that collection).

10. Two sentences from Herodotus’ Histories, chosen at random, illustrate this. Notice that they could also occur in modern ethnographies: “The only deities to whom Egyptians consider it proper to sacri# ce pigs are Dionysus and the Moon” (1972:148); “It is the custom [of the Lybian tribes], at a man’s # rst marriage, to give a party, at which the bride is enjoyed by each of the guests in turn. . . .” (1972:329). On early ethnological theorizing, see Müller 1972. Examples of recent criticism in anthropological textbooks are Vansina (1970, see p. 165 where he calls the ethnographic present a “zero- time # ction”) and Anderson (1973:205 f).

11. This does not cancel earlier remarks on terminological allochronism; it makes them more precise. A further point of clari# cation: What is gained or changed if primitive is used in quotation marks, or preceded by so- called and sim-ilar disclaimers (see some random examples in Lévi- Strauss which are representa-tive of a widespread usage: 1966:222, 243, 267; 1976:19 [in his Inaugural Lec-ture])? Perhaps these modi# ers signal the label- character of the term, its conventional, classi# catory function in a technical vocabulary. But disclaimers may be indexical rather than referential. In that case they point to the position of the primitive in anthropological discourse. Who calls the primitive so- called? Anthro-pologists. In that case the modi# er may not dissociate its user from anthropologi-cal praxis; nor does it soften the blow of allochronism. Because the use of primi-tive is not just a matter of de# nition but expressive of a historically established praxis, the term may become a starting point for fruitful philosophical analysis (see Dupré 1975:16ff) and, indeed, for a general critique of Western society (see Diamond 1974), an intention that must also be granted to Lévi- Strauss. Yet there remains the question to what extent the po liti cal conditions of established anthro-pological praxis legitimate the use epistemologically, even if ethical intentions are beyond doubt. For the wider history of primitivism see the standard work edited by Lovejoy et al. (1935).

12. I believe that this is illustrated by a statement from one of anthropology’s ancestors: “I have studied men, and I think I am a fairly good observer. But all the same I do not know how to see what is before my eyes; I can only see clearly in retrospect, it is only in my memories that my mind can work. I have neither feeling nor understanding for anything that is said or done or that happens before my eyes. All that strikes me is the external manifestation. But afterwards it all comes back to me, I remember the place and the time, nothing escapes me. Then from what a man has done or said I can read his thoughts, and I am rarely mis-taken” (J. J. Rousseau 1977 [1781]:114).

13. Hermeneutics (much like phenomenology) retains a distinctly European- continental " avor. When it crosses the Atlantic it seems to arrive as a fashionable jargon rather than a style of thought with serious practical consequences. Never-theless, there are now signs that it begins to have substantial in" uence on the social sciences in the English- speaking world. G. Radnitsky’s Continental Schools of Metas-cience (1968, with later editions), K. O. Apel’s Analytic Philosophy of Language and

3. Time and Writing About the Other 197

the Geisteswissenschaften (1967), and Palmer’s Hermeneutics (1969) provide clear and compact introductions in En glish. Two recent publications, an historical study by Z. Bauman (1978) and a reader edited by Rabinow and Sullivan (1979), attest to the reception of hermeneutics in the social sciences, including anthropology.

14. See also the re" ections on # eldwork and time by J. P. Dumont (1978:47 f) but notice his taking recourse to visual- spatial repre sen ta tion when he reports on “Social Time and Social Space as Context” (ibid., ch. 5). Dumont illustrates my point regarding “contradictions” between temporal sensibility in doing research and visualist distancing in writing anthropology (see ch. 4).

15. The pro cess by which money and language, merchandise and informa-tion, become less and less distinguishable had been observed by thinkers at least since the seventeenth century. Kant’s critic, J. G. Hamann noted (with a reference to Leibniz): “Money and language are two things whose study is as profound and abstract as their use is general. Both are more closely related than one would suspect. The theory of one explains the theory of the other; it appears, therefore, that they derive from common grounds” (1967 [1761]:97). Incidentally, this was written almost a century and a half before de Saussure found in the economic theory of value a model for his structural linguistics (see, e.g., 1975 [1916]: 114 f, 157). Data storage and computer use in anthropology are discussed in a volume edited by Dell Hymes (1965).

16. On Trilles’s fraudulent ethnography of West- African pygmies see Piskaty (1957); for a useful survey of the muddled debates concerning Castaneda see Murray (1979).

17. For a theoretical discussion of this last point see our essay “Folk Art from an Anthropological Perspective” (Fabian and Szombati- Fabian 1980).

18. Dell Hymes considers this in his introduction to Reinventing Anthropology (1974:48 ff) and quotes J. Galtung on “scienti# c colonialism”: “There are many ways in which this can happen. One is to claim the right of unlimited access to data from other countries. Another is to export data about the country to one’s own home country for pro cessing into ‘manufactured goods,’ such as books and articles. . . . This is essentially similar to what happens when raw materials are exported at a low price and reimported as manufactured goods at a very high cost” (Galtung 1967:296). See also the introduction to A. Wilden (1972, “The Scienti# c Discourse: Knowledge as a Commodity”).

19. G. Gusdorf gives an account of the rise of modern linguistics in a context of struggle between old and new interpretations of the Western “tradition” (1973: part 3). See also Gadamer on the connection between theological and philological hermeneutics (1965:162 ff; based on an earlier study by Dilthey). Gadamer notes that the origins of the modern concept of “system” must be sought in attempts to rec-oncile the old and the new in theology and in a phase that prepared the separation of science from philosophy (1965:164n2). In other words, “system” always has served as a # gure of thought related to Time. Its currency in taxonomic anthropology (and other approaches stressing the scienti# c character of our discipline) is indic-ative of allochronic tendencies. (We will have more to say about these connections in the following chapter).

20. The following re" ections were inspired by my reading of an essay by Michel Serres, “Le Jeu du Loup” (1977:89– 104). I am grateful to Josué V. Harari who brought the piece to my attention. He has since published an En glish version of

198 4. The Other and the Eye

Serres’ essay which includes the text of La Fontaine’s fable “The Wolf and the Lamb” (see Harari 1979:260– 276).

4. The Other and the Eye: Time and the Rhetoric of Vision

1. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1962 [1651]:21).2. Karl Marx, “First Thesis on Feuerbach” (1953:339).3. Without attempting to document here what is by now a considerable liter-

ature on # eldwork and methods one may note a development from the catalogue- genre of the eigh teenth and nineteenth centuries (see chapter 1, note 12) toward more and more “graphic” instructions. Thus Marcel Mauss declared in his Manuel d’Ethnographie: “Le premier point dans l’étude d’une société consiste à savoir de qui l’on parle. Pour cela, on établira la cartographie complète de la société ob-servée” (1974:13). Notice the massing of visual- graphic and tabular material in the sections on # eld methods in the Naroll and Cohen (1970: part 2) and the Honig-mann handbooks (1976: ch. 6); also in the more recent manual by Cresswell and Godelier (1976). Much less frequently does one come upon statements like “Un-derstanding in # eld research is very much like the aural learning of a language” (Wax 1971:12). But Rosalie Wax does not develop her insight and her own ac-count is dominated by the spatial image of inside/outside.

4. See Givner’s essay “Scienti# c Preconceptions in Locke’s Philosophy of Lan-guage” (1962).

5. On “The Sense of Vision and the Origins of Modern Science” see Lindberg and Steneck (1972); see also Lindberg’s book Theories of Vision from Al- Kindi to Kepler (1976).

6. See Feyerabend 1975:157 (with a reference to Koyré’s studies of Galileo); Kuhn 1970 [1962]:47 f seems to restrict the importance of “debates” to prepara-digm periods. Wilden analyses “binarism” fashionable in anthropology and else-where under the heading “The Scienti# c Discourse as Propaganda” (1972: ch. 14).

7. Perhaps one should distinguish several ways in which topoi and topical logic inform anthropological discourse: (1) Through time, often with astonishing continuity down to the beginnings of recorded Western intellectual history, phi-los o phers, philosophes, and anthropologists have returned to the same common places (often copying from each other)— savagery, barbarism, cannibalism (see the latest fashion in books on that topos) and certain tenacious elements of ethnographic lore (see Vajda 1964). (2) At any given time, anthropologists have been visiting and revisiting familiar intellectual places— matriarchy, couvade, mana, incest, totem and taboo, culture heroes, kula, potlatch, Crow kinship systems, and so on. (3) Finally, there have been attempts to chart topoi— Murdock’s ethnographic sample, pre-ceded by Tylor’s classical study of marriage and descent, is an instrument for sta-tistical calculations but also an atlas mapping topoi (see Tylor 1889, Murdock 1949: app. A). The Hall and Trager inventory may be read as a sort of periodic chart of culture elements; its mnemonic character is obvious (Hall 1959:174 f). Even Hymes’ “SPEAKING”— the mnemonic summary of components in a speech event— may belong here (Hymes 1972:65 ff).

8. For further references to the ars mnemonica, to the history of scienti# c il-lustration and related currents in the eigh teenth century, see Lepenies 1976:32 ff.

4. The Other and the Eye 199

9. This had ancient pre ce dents in the Pythagorean and (neo- ) Platonic tra-ditions. Iamblichos (who died around 330 ad) reports in his book on Pythagoras that the master “called geometry ‘history.’ ” He also notes that his followers avoided common and pop u lar expressions in their publications; rather, “following the command of Pythagoras to be silent about divine mysteries, they chose # gures of speech whose meaning remained incomprehensible to the non- initiated and they protected their discussions and writings through the use of agreed- upon symbols” (see Iamblichos 1963:97, 111; my emphasis).

10. Notice that in this chapter I concentrate on tracing a general history of visualism. For an account of Re nais sance attempts to incorporate the newly found savage into such visual- spatial schemes as the “chain of being” see Hodgen 1964: ch. 10 (especially the tree- and ladder- diagrams of hierarchy, pp. 399, 401, both from works by Raymond Lull, one of Ramus’ precursors).

11. See Goody (1977) on tables, lists, formulae, and other devices.12. This evokes, of course, the “medium- is- the- message” slogan to which M.

McLuhan’s brilliant insights seem to have been reduced by now. Ong, by the way, acknowledges intellectual debts to McLuhan who in turn builds on Ong’s studies in his The Gutenberg Galaxy (1962:144 ff., 159 f., 162 f.).

13. Because methodology remained tied to the business of disseminating and transmitting knowledge. Rhetoric as pédagogie, incidentally, was the “narrow door” (M. Halbwachs) through which Durkheim— and with him sociology— gained ad-mission to the Sorbonne. He was # rst hired to teach education. His lectures on the history of higher education in France up to the Re nais sance were later published as a book (Durkheim 1938).

14. Especially in his The Presence of the Word (Ong 1970 [1967]) to which I have paid little attention in these essays.

15. See Derrida 1976, especially part 2, ch. 1. At this point, I am not pre-pared to confront Derrida’s undoubtedly important theses regarding writing and violence. Inasmuch as he seems to equate writing with taxonomy (see 1976:109 f.) our arguments may converge. As regards his charge of “epistemological phonol-ogism” (against Lévi- Strauss) I would think that his critique is aimed in the same direction as my views on visualism.

16. On the ritual- initiatory character of # eldwork see chapter 2; on its rela-tively late appearance as a required practice, see chapter 3. Notice that in both these contexts the point was to stress the institution of # eld research as a routine, as something that was almost incidental to the rise of anthropology. This indicated the tenuous practical integration of empiry and theory. Ideologically, it became all the more important to insist on a tough, visualist ideal of scienti# c observation. However, this was ideologization with a vengeance insofar as our clinging to # eld- work also produced the aporetic situation which allowed us to identify denial of coevalness as the key to anthropology’s allochronism (see chapter 1).

17. T. Todorov (1977) traces theories of symbols to the origins of our West-ern tradition. J. Boon explores connections between symbolism and French struc-turalism (1972). R. Firth’s study is the most comprehensive attempt by an anthro-pologist to provide a systematic treatise on symbols (1973). Works by Victor Turner (e.g. 1967) and Mary Douglas (1966), as well as the writings of C. Geertz (e.g., 1973), among others, have been in" uential. Geertz, especially, acknowledges the in" uence of Susanne K. Langer (e.g., 1951 [1942]). There exists a reader on sym-

200 4. The Other and the Eye

bolic anthropology (Dolgin et al. 1977), perhaps a symptom of its aspiring to nor-mal scienti# c status. Several works document the many points of contact and con-trast between structuralism and symbolic approaches, see Sperber (1975), and Basso and Selby (1976). The latter, incidentally, evokes a related trend, expressive of the in" uence of K. Burke, which concentrates on the notion of meta phor and on rhet-oric models for cultural analysis (see the seminal article by Fernandez, 1974, and the collection of essays edited by Sapir and Crocker, 1977). A concise overview of “symbolic interactionism,” a movement closely related to symbolic anthropology, was given by Meltzer et al. 1975. On symbol in social anthropology see Skorupski 1976.

18. I am using the three- volume study edition, Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik (1970) referred to in the following as Aesthetic i, ii, iii.

19. Hegel refers to Friedrich von Schlegel and to Friedrich Creuzer. Kramer traces Creuzer’s in" uence in creating the “myth of the Orient” (1977:20 ff.).

20. See the commentary by Kojève (1969:134 f.) especially the important re-mark on Hegel’s historical Time being conceived as a movement that starts with the future and moves through the past into the present. Kojève notes “It may be that the Time in which the Present takes primacy is cosmic or physical Time, whereas biological Time would be characterized by the primacy of the Past” (1969:134n21).

21. In fairness to Whitehead and to contemporary symbolic anthropologists one must acknowledge a critical intent directed against crude empiricism and posi-tivism. As has been noted by others (e.g., Apel 1970, Habermas 1972: chs. 5 and 6) there are many points of contact between pragmatic philosophy, herme-neutics, and critical theory inspired by a Marxist theory of praxis. Roy Wagner’s original and insightful approach to symbolization (e.g., 1975) exempli# es critical and autocritical symbolic anthropology. See also V. Turner’s essay reviewing cur-rent symbolic studies (1975).

22. Ironically, in view of the critique expressed here, I must express my grat-itude to J. Boon for having brought to my attention, with much enthusiasm, the work of Frances Yates. I also know of his interest in the history and semiotics of ethnographic illustration and I look forward to the results of his research.

23. For a critique of a similar argument expounded in another account of conversion to symbolic anthropology see my review of R. Rappaport’s Ecol ogy, Meaning, and Religion (1979), Fabian 1982.

24. That is done in the writings of J. Baudrillard (whom Sahlins quotes), es-pecially in his L’Échange symbolique et la mort (1976). To realize that Baudrillard, too, feeds on the primitive- civilized dichotomy is perhaps the best antidote against the spell cast by this brilliant new proponent of “philosophy with a hammer” (see S. K. Levine’s review of Baudrillard’s Mirror of Production, Levine 1976).

5. Conclusions

1. “Man muss diese versteinerten Verhältnisse dadurch zum Tanzen zwin-gen, dass man ihnen ihre eigene Melodie vorsingt!” (Marx 1953:311).

2. “Toute connaissance prise au moment de sa constitution est une connais-sance polémique” (Bachelard 1950:14).

3. A document for the spirit of that time is an essay by Julian Huxley titled

5. Conclusions 201

“Unesco: Its Purpose and its Philosophy” (1949). He had been the executive sec-retary of the Preparatory Commission to Unesco in 1946. Although he insists that he is speaking only for himself he clearly was in" uential in shaping policies and, above all, in providing them with a temporal perspective. The objective basis for international cultural politics, he argues, must be an “evolutionary approach” based on “scienti# c method,” i.e., a transcultural theory of change. He undoubtedly had anthropology in mind when he stated that “the necessary bridge between the realm of fact and the realm of value . . . can be strengthened by those social sciences which utilize the scienti# c method but endeavor to apply it to values” (1949:315).

4. Northrop presumably quali# ed for that role as the author of The Meeting of East and West (1946) and editor of Ideological Differences and World Order (1949). The latter included contributions by D. Bidney (“The Concept of Meta- Anthro-pology”) and C. Kluckhohn (“The Philosophy of the Navaho Indians”).

5. Northrop’s view is expressed obliquely in this remark about Bergson: “It was because Bergson assumed that a publicly meaningful neurological epistemic correlate of introspected memory is impossible to # nd that he relapsed into his purely intuitive philosophy which accounted for impressionistic art and the intro-spected private " ow of time which he confused with public time and called ’du-rée,” but which left no meaning for public space and time, the public events and objects in it or a public self, all of which he called ‘falsi# cations of fact’ or the ‘misuse of the mind’ ” (1960:51). The quotation is from the essay “The Neurolog-ical Epistemic Correlates of Introspected Ideas.”

6. This is the heading of a chapter on De Maillet, Buffon, and others in Loren Eiseley’s Darwin’s Century (1961).

7. Remember that Montaigne ended his essay “Des Cannibales” (based, inci-dentally, on conversations with one of them) with this ironical remark: “All this isn’t so bad but, imagine, they don’t wear breeches” (“Tout cela ne va pas trop mal: mais quoy! ils ne portent point de hault de chausses.” See Montaigne 1925 [1595]:248). Two centuries later, Georg Forster noted: “We never consider how similar we are to the savages and we call, quite improperly, everyone by that name who lives on a different continent and does not dress according to Pa ri sian Fash-ion” (“denn wir bedenken nie, wie ähnlich wir den Wilden sind und geben diesen Namen sehr uneigentlich allem, was in einem anderen Weltteile nicht parisisch gekleidet ist.” See Forster 1968 [1791]:398 f).

8. On “Linguistic Method in Ethnography” see Hymes 1970; on “Ethnogra-phy of Communication” see Schmitz 1975. On epistemological problems with the “ethnography of speaking” see my paper “Rule and Pro cess” (1979a).

9. Although this was recognized by F. Fanon and others there is a need to remind ourselves of the fact that colonial regimes “aim at the repeated defeat of re sis tance” (see Wamba- dia- Wamba in an essay on philosophy in Africa, 1979:225). On the general issue of sustained oppression see S. Amin 1976.

10. This was noted by many critics of anthropology, especially in France; see the critical account of African Studies by Leclerc (1971) and of ethnology in Latin America by Jaulin (1970). In a similar vein are the essays by Duvignaud (1973) and Copans (1974). More recently, a collection of articles (many of them discussing the thesis of Jaulin) was edited by Amselle (1979).

11. C. Geertz (with a reference to G. Ryle) posited that thought consists of “a traf# c in signi# cant symbols,” a view which “makes of the study of culture a posi-tive science like any other” (1973:362). I suspect that he would rather not be re-

202 5. Conclusions

minded of statements such as the one just quoted since he has been advocating a hermeneutic stance in recent writings. Whether one really can hold both, a rep-re sen ta tional theory of culture and a hermeneutic approach in the sense in which it is intended, for instance, by Gadamer (1965) is in my view an open question.

12. A. Kroeber and L. White used animism as an invective in their debates (see Bidney 1953:110). Lévi- Strauss says about Sartre’s notion of the practico- inert that it “quite simply revives the language of animism” (1966:249), and in the same context he dismisses Sartre’s Critique de la raison dialectique as a myth and therefore an “ethnographic document” (What does this make of Sartre— a “primitive”? See also Scholte’s comments on this, 1974a:648).

13. I am sure that the glaring absence of the issue of race from these essays will be noted. It would be foolish to deny its importance in the rise of anthropol-ogy (see Stocking 1968). Upon re" ection, my failure to discuss race may have something to do with the fact that it was not considered a problem in the training I received (and that may be indicative of the rift between academe and the wider American society). Apart from offering the lame excuse that one cannot speak about everything, I would argue that a clear conception of allochronism is the prerequisite and frame for a critique of racism. Refutations of racist thought from ge ne tics and psychology are useful, but they will not as such do away with race as an ideological and, indeed, cosmological concept.

14. Without any doubt, the politics of Time which provided a motor for the development of anthropology is somehow connected with the phenomena ana-lyzed by I. Wallerstein (1974). But I see a major dif# culty in the notion of system itself. Can it ever accommodate coevalness, i.e., a dialectical concept of Time? N. Luhmann seems to think so but I # nd his arguments inconclusive to say the least. See his important essay “The Future Cannot Begin: Temporal Structures in Modern Society” (1976).

15. And it remains problematic in the minds of anthropologists whose oeuvre is commonly recognized as Marxist; see the preface to Godelier 1973; see the vol-ume edited by M. Bloch (1975; especially R. Firth’s contribution), and the # rst chapter in Abeles 1976.

16. As far as Soviet ethnology is concerned, the situation is unclear to say the least. We owe to Stephen and Ethel Dunn an important Introduction to Soviet Eth-nography (1974) but their interpretations have been hotly disputed by Soviet émigré anthropologists such as David Zil’berman (see 1976, including replies by the Dunns).

17. There are signs that anthropologists have begun to develop elements of such a theory, see Bourdieu (1977) on a theory of practice, Friedrich (1980) on the material- chaotic aspects of language, Goody (1977) on the material conditions of communication, to name but three examples.

18. In this respect, Bourdieu’s quasi- synonymous use of hermeneutic inter-pretation and structuralist decoding is justi# ed (see 1977:1). It is another question whether this does justice to recent proposals for a critical hermeneutic.

19. E. Bloch formulated thoughts on Gleichzeitigkeit and Ungleichzeitigkeit which are too complex to be dealt with in this context. I want to note, though, that totality was central to him and that he anticipated the critique of visualism when he insisted that use of the concept of “totality must not only be critical, but above all non- contemplative” (1962 [1932]:125).

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Index

achronicity, 77, 188n9 Adorno, T., 159 Agricola, 115 allochronism, 32, 33, 37–38, 49, 68, 74–75, 76,

82, 104, 123–24, 125, 127, 143, 148, 150, 152–53, 155, 156, 199n16

Althusser, L., 158 anachronism, 4, 32 animism, 152, 202n12 anthropology: American, 38, 45–51, 62, 69,

189n18 ( see also culturalism); British, 39–40, 45, 194–95n24; critique of, viii, 32–33; French, 38, 45, 69, 79, 124, 141 ( see also struc-turalism); German ( see diffusionism); and politics, 28, 48, 52, 64, 67, 68–69, 79, 95–96, 120, 143, 149; symbolic, 123–24, 133, 134–39, 151, 199–200n17; Time and the object of, 28, 30 ( see also Other); visual, 123

aporetic, 33, 35, 148, 199n16 Augustine, xxxvii, 167 autobiography, 84, 102. See also past:

auto biographic Bachelard, G., 143, 194n19 Barthes, R., 76, 140 Bastian, A., 122 Bateson, G., 50, 99, 134 Baudrillard, J., 140, 194n21, 200n24 Becker, C. L., 5 Benedict, R., 46–48 Benveniste, E., 82–86 Bergson, H., 201n5 Bidney, D., 189n20 Bloch, E., 44–45, 52 Bloch, M., 42–44 Boas, F., 20, 64

Bogoras, W., 192n7 Bohm, D., 71, 191n26 Boon, J., 134–36, 199n17 Bossuet, J. B., 3–6, 10, 111 Bourdieu, P., 141, Burridge, K., 190n23 Burrow, J. W., 11 Campbell, D. T., 20 Castaneda, C., 94 change, 42–43, 144–45, 154, 200–201n3 Chomsky, N., 97, 116, 162 chronology, 13, 15, 22, 28–29, 111, 147, 159,

188n15; biblical, 12, 13; as a code, 14, 57–58; and dating, 22, 28, 189–90n21

class, and Time, 23 clock time, 29 coevalness, coeval, 30–31, 34, 37, 38, 68,

134–35, 146, 152, 156, 159, 161, 202n14; circumventing, 41 (de# ned); denial of, 25, 31 (de# ned), 33, 34, 39, 45, 50, 62, 65, 72, 86, 92, 108, 121, 124, 150, 152–53, 154, 156, 199n16: preempting, 52 (de# ned)

colonialism, colonization, 17, 27, 29, 32, 47, 63, 69, 95–96, 144, 149, 155–56, 192n5, 194–95n24, 197n18

commodi# cation, and Time, 95–96, 197n18 communication: and ethnography, 32, 33,

92, 124, 148, 164; and Time, 30–31, 32, 42–43, 50–51, 71, 190n22. S ee also dialog, dialogic

comparative method, 16–17, 27, 139 Comte, A., 44, 129 contemplation, contemplative, 67, 125, 202n19 contemporaneity, contemporary, 31, 34, 143,

148, 152

220 Index

contradictions, in anthropological praxis, 33, 37, 72–73, 148–49, 159, 197n14

Copernicus, 3, 115, 187n4 cosmology, political, 35, 74, 87, 111, 113, 120,

152, 159, 202n13 culturalism, 20–21, 78, 113, 150, 189n20 Darwin, C., 11, 12, 13, 16, 188n15 data, and Time, 72–73, 88, 92–93, 95, 132, 155,

159–60, 197n15 Degérando, J.-M., 6–7, 148 Derrida, J., 119, 199n15 Descartes, R., 13, 106 devices: discursive, 5; methodological, 4;

rhetorical, 5; of temporal distancing, 31, 32, 74, 78, 124–25, 129, 152

diachrony, diachronic, 54, 55–56, 76, 187n6, 194n18

dialectic, dialectical, 47, 119, 129, 136, 154–55, 157, 159, 162, 192n6

dialog, dialogic, 73, 85, 90, 118–19 Diderot, D., 6 difference, as distance. See distance: and method diffusionism, 18–20, 30, 55, 153, 189n18 discourse: anthropological, 1, 21, 28, 68, 97,

148; subject versus object of, 30, 50, 71, 75, 124–25, 143, 150–51. See also coevalness, denial of; Other

distance, distancing: and hermeneutics, 89; and method, 30, 47, 48–50, 52, 62, 64, 65, 68, 76, 89, 92–93, 111, 160; and Time, 16, 25–26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 35, 39, 44, 62–63, 68, 72, 75, 88–90, 111, 121, 129, 135–36, 147, 151, 159; and writing, 72, 89

Dolgin, J., 137 Douglas, M., 4, 41 Dumont, J.-P., 197n14 Durkheim, E., 20, 31, 34, 42–44, 45, 53, 58,

116, 129, 160, 199n13 Duvignaud, J., 155 Einstein, A., 145, 195n4 empiricism, 106, 112, 120, 133, 136, 160 Engels, F., 56, 155, 159, 163 Enlightenment, 9, 10, 16, 17, 26, 27, 39, 57,

111–12, 117, 146–47, 187–88n8. S ee also Philosophes

episteme, epistemic, 26, 38, 123, 188n10

epistemology, epistemological, 25, 33, 41, 51, 65, 79, 87, 90, 96, 118, 124, 140, 147, 152, 159, 195n4

ethnography, ethnographic, 45, 59, 60, 80, 83, 94, 108, 116, 134, 148, 160, 194n22, 194n23; and Time, 50, 61, 72, 107; of Time, 41, 107–8, 153–54, 192n6. See also # eld research

ethnography of speaking, 31, 181 ethnomethodology, 31 ethnoscience, 38, 78, 97, 116, 191n3 Evans-Pritchard, E. P., 40, 41, 195n3 evolution, evolutionism, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 20,

22, 27, 30, 35, 39, 56, 61, 101, 104, 124, 129, 137, 139, 147, 153, 188n15, 188–89n16

evolutionists, social, 14–15, 188–89n16 exoticism, 135 experience, personal, 33, 61, 65, 73, 88–89,

91–92, 99, 108, 124 Eyck, Jan van, 115 Fabian, J., 164, 194n23 fact, and the past, 73, 88–89 Feuerbach, L., 103, 140 Feyerabend, P., 109 # eld research, # eld work: and language, 105–6;

and professionalization, 66–67, 122, 148, 195n3, 198n3, 199n13; and Time, 50, 63, 89, 107, 197n14

Forde, D., 35 Forster, G., 96, 201n7 Fortes, M., 35, 41 Foucault, M., 54, 139, 188n10 Freyer, H., 24 functionalism, 20, 42–43, 113, 150, 191–92n4 future, as project, 93, 153, 200n20 Gadamer, H.-G., 197n19 Galileo, 3 Geertz, C., 24, 45, 125, 201–2n11 Gellner, E., 38–39 Gestalt psychology, 45 Gluckman, M., 41 Graebner, F., 18–19, 20, 189–90n21 Greimas, A. J., 77–79, 97, 101, 103, 195n8 Gurvitch, G., 192n6 Gusdorf, G., 3, 5, 187n4, 197n19 Gutenberg, 115

Index 221

Habermas, J., 20, 189n19 Hall, E. T., 37, 50–52, 193n13 Hamann, J. G., 197n15 Harris, M., 157, 188n13, 193n11 Hegel, Hegelian, 56, 58, 103, 123, 125–31, 132,

137, 156–57, 159, 165, 200n20 Herder, J. G., 19, 20, 159 hermeneutics, 89 (de# ned), 90, 97, 134,

196–97n13, 197n19, 200n21, 201–2n11, 202n18

Herodotus, 80, 196n10 hierarchy, and order, 99–101, 133, 164 history: natural, 8, 16, 26, 57, 87, 123–24;

philosophical, 5, 7, 23, 111–12; sacred, 2; and temporality, 77–78; universal, 3–6, 159, versus anthropology, 40, 53–54, 59–60, 64, 98

Hobbes, T., 105, 106 Huizer, G., 32 Huxley, J., 200–201n3 Hymes, D., 32, 197n18, 198n7 Iamblichos, 199n9 icon, iconism, 131–35 ideology, and Time, 74, 76, 104, 123, 137,

149 imperialism, 17, 35, 149, 150 Jarvie, I. C., 191–92n4 Jayne, K. G., 190–91n24 Kaberry, P., 35 Kant, I., 34, 160 kinship, 116; as temporalizing concept, 75–76 knowledge: anthropological, 28; ethnographic,

21, 28, 32; theory of, 106, 108–9, 112, 121, 151, 159, 160

Kojève, A., 200n20 Kroeber, A., 15, 20, 157, 160, 189n17, 202n12 Kuhn, T. S., 20, 102, 109, 114 La Fontaine, 71, 103–4 language, 157, 161–62, 197n15; and Time,

1, 14, 25, 42, 50–51, 163 La Pérouse, J. F., 8 Leach, E., 41, 124 Leibniz, G. W., 112 Lenin, W. I., 163

Lepenies, W., 188n9, 188n12 Lévi-Strauss, C., 14, 37, 38, 52–69, 90–91, 94, 97,

98, 99, 101, 122, 146, 160, 187n6, 193–94n15, 194n18, 194n20, 194n21, 194n22, 196n11, 199n15, 202n12

Lichtenberg, G. C., 1 linguistics, 45, 56–57, 74, 79, 81, 84–86, 148,

150, 187n6, 190n22, 197n15, 197n19 Linnaeus (Carl von Linné), 8, 16, 188n12 literature, literary, 33, 72, 74, 81, 86, 87–88,

96, 135, 151 Locke, J., 3, 108, 160 Luhmann, N., 20, 189n19, 202n14 Lyell, C., 12–13, 14, 16, 188n15 Mair, L., 35 Malinowski, B., 20, 33, 35, 40, 41, 160, 191n28,

192n5 Mannheim, B., 32 Marx, Marxism, 44, 58, 59, 95, 103, 105, 139–40,

143, 155–59, 162–63, 165, 202n15 materialism, 125, 138, 156, 158, 159, 161–63 Mauss, M., 20, 62, 68, 198n3 Mead, M., 38, 48–50, 134, 193n12, 193n14 memory, 110; art of, 3, 109–13, 125, 136, 151,

164; and re" exion, 91–92 metaphor, 195n6, 199–200n17; visual-spatial,

45, 134, 160 method, and printing, 115–16. S ee also vision:

and method Métreaux, R., 48, 68, 73 Montaigne, M. de, 181 Moravia, S., 6–7, 8, 117 Morgan, L. H., 15, 188n13 national character, 46, 193n11 Niebuhr, R., 145 Nietzsche, F., 45 Newton, I., 3, 16, 191n26 Northrop, F. S. C., 145–46 Oakley, K. P., 189–90n21 objectivity. See distance, distancing: and method observation, 25, 45, 60, 67, 86–87, 91, 107–8,

117, 122, 132, 136, 151, 199n16; participant, 33, 60, 67, 95

Ong, W., 114–22 Orient, 10, 123, 126–27

222 Index

Other, 2, 16, 51, 63, 64–65, 85–86, 87–92, 121–22, 125, 127–28, 130, 136–37, 143, 148, 149, 152–54, 156, 157, 164, 165, 190n22. See also discourse: subject versus object of

Owusu, M., 32, 35 Parsons, T., 20, 23, 40–41, 157, 169 past: autobiographic, 87–97, 150; possessive,

93–96. See also fact, and the past Peel, J. D. Y., 11, 12, 15, 23, 188–89n10 Peirce, C. S., 124, 126 Perry, W. J., 59 person, personalism, 119–20 Philosophes, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 117, 147, 198n7 polemic, 38, 143, 152–53, 202n7 Popper, K., xxxviii, 40 Port Royal, 116 power: and knowledge, 1, 48, 144, 149; and

Time, ix, 28–29 pragmatism, 124, 126, 200n21 praxis, 137, 143, 156–57, 161, 165, 196n11,

200n21. S ee also contradictions, in anthro-pological praxis

present, ethnographic, 33, 76, 80 (de# ned), 87, 97, 150, 196n10

Prester, John, 26, 190–91n24 primitive, 17–18, 30, 39, 59, 61, 77, 82, 91, 121,

137–39, 165, 196n11 production, 59, 62–63, 97, 138, 162, 194n21;

versus representation, 62, 79, 87, 137, 139–40, 151, 161–63

Proudhon, P.-J., 158 Pythagoras, 199n9 race, 202n13 Radcliffe- Brown, A. R., 39, 43 Ramus, Ramism, 114–16, 118–22, 132, 151 Ranum, O., 5–6, 167 Ratzel, F., 19–20, 159 re" exivity, 90–91, 101 relativism, cultural, 34, 38–52, 62, 67, 78, 145,

150, 153, 192–93n10 relativity, 22, 29, 38, 145, 191n26, 195n7 representation. See production: versus

repre sentation rhetoric, visualist, xliii, 109–13, 114, 117, 120,

124, 136, 151 Ricardo, D., 139

Rivers, W. H. R., 116 Romanticism, 9, 18–19, 45, 126, 129–31, 137,

159 Rousseau, J. J., 196n12 Ruby, J., 123 Sahlins, M., 125, 137–40, 157, 191n25 Sartre, J.-P., 52, 55, 58, 59, 202n12 Saussure, F. de, 20, 53, 55, 56, 68, 124, 161,

177n15 savagery, savage, 17, 27, 30, 75, 77, 95, 121, 147 Schapera, I., 35 Scholte, B., 38 Schumacher, D. L., 195n7 Schutz, A., 24 semiology, semiological, 68, 75, 124, 151 semiotics, semiotic, 77–79, 124, 139, 150–51 Serres, M., 101–4, 151 sight, versus sound, 108, 110, 115, 119, 131 sign, 45, 77, 79, 127–28, 150–51 signi# er, signi# ed, signi# cation, 45, 77, 79, 88,

150 simultaneity, simultaneous, 31, 67, 145–46, 147 space: and consciousness, 111, 113, 132, 164;

distribution in, 18–19, 25, 29, 54, 55, 58, 64, 188n15, 189–90n21; tabular, classi# catory, taxonomic, 19, 54, 57, 116, 121, 147

Spencer, H., 11, 12, 15 Spengler, O., 44–45 Stagl, J., xli structuralism, 20, 52–69, 97–104, 116, 124,

133, 137, 153, 194n21 structuralism-functionalism, 39–44, 78 subjectivity, 59–60, 84–86, 88–89 symbol, symbolization, 45, 113, 123, 199–200n17,

201–2n11; Hegel’s theory of, 125–31 synchrony, synchronic, 20, 31, 39–40, 54, 56,

76, 99, 121, 161, 187n6, 194n18 system, and Time, 197n19, 202n14 taxonomy, taxonomic, 52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 62–63,

79, 97–104, 132, 147, 148, 151, 194n16. S ee also structuralism; tree, taxonomic

teaching, and visualism, 114, 117, 120–22. S ee also Ramus, Ramism

temporal: illusion, 78, 148; pluralism, 29, 144, 192n6; reference versus connotation, 74–75, 82; slope, 17, 103–4, 151, 152

Index 223

temporalization, temporalizing, 6, 7, 11, 24, 28, 59, 74 (de# ned), 77–78, 79, 87, 95, 125–26, 129, 150, 160; lexical-semantic, 75, 82; stylistic- textual, 76, 82; syntactic, 76, 82

Time: cyclical versus linear conception of, 2, 41; elimination of, 56–57, 68; encapsulation of, 41, 150; intersubjective, 24, 30–31, 42, 92, 123, 147; Judeo-Christian conception of, 2, 26, 146; mundane, 22–23, 30; naturaliza-tion of, 11, 13, 14, 16, 25, 26, 56, 147, 188–89n16; perception of, 43; physical, 22, 29–30, 56, 145–46, 147; politics of, 1–2, 28, 35, 46, 48–50, 52, 69, 97, 144, 202n14 ( see also colonialism; imperialism); public, 144–45, 201n5; and relations between cul-tures, 45, 49–50, 145–46, 149; seculariza-tion of, 6–7, 11, 26, 146; spatialization of, 2, 16, 25, 58–59, 111, 147, 160, 188n15; and tense, 80, 82–87; typological, 23–24, 30, 33, 147; universalization of, 2–3; uses of, 21–25, 32, 34, 37, 38, 44, 46, 51, 56, 80, 145

Todorov, T., 199n17 topos, topoi of discourse, 109–10, 117, 136,

198n7 totality, 47, 156–58 Toulmin, S., 20, 188–89n16 Trager, G. L., 198n7 travel: as science, 6–9, 113, 146, 187–88n8; as

topos, 6, 113

tree, taxonomic, 15, 19, 116, 121 Trilles, P., 94 Turnbull, C., 33 Turner, V., 41, 133–34 Tylor, E. B., 1, 5, 198n7 unconscious, 51–52, 65 universal, universals, 3–4, 187n6 value studies, 46–47, 193n11 vision: and method, 106–9, 110, 117–18,

119–20, 121–22, 198n4; and space, 7, 106, 113

visualism, 67, 87, 106, 107, 110–11, 118, 121, 134–35, 151, 199n10, 202n19. See also obser-vation; sight, versus sound

Volney, C. F., 6, 9–10, 11 Weber, M., 23, 24, 161 Weinrich, H., 82–86 Weizsäcker, C. F. von, 88–89 White, L., 11, 188n13, 202n12 Whitehead, A. N., 132–33, 200n21 Whorf, B., 106 Wilson, G. and M., 35, 41 writing, anthropological, and Time, 21–22,

71–72, 76, 80 Yates, F., 109–13, 117