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o Frills Fare Warfare - Case Stud by Dr. Wali Mughni Federal University, Karachi AFFILIATED WITH

No frills fare warfare -- case study

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No Frills Fare Warfare - Case Study

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2. As the recession made inroads into the passenger trafficloads of the major airlines, Airline A attempted an experimentwith a discount of 35 percent from normal coach fares oncertain of its regularly scheduled routes. In an effort to buildup its load factor, Airline A tied its discount fare proposal tothe offering of no-frills service during the flight, includingdoing away with complimentary meals, snacks, soft drinks,and coffee, so as to reduce costs and partially offset thelower-priced fares.However, passengers using the no-frills plan couldselectively purchase these items in flight if they wished. Theno-frills fares were offered only Mondays through Thursdays. 3. Airlines B and C, both competitors of Airline A on some ofthe routes on which Airline A proposed to implement no-frillsfares, went along with the discount fares. Airline Aclaimed that 56 percent of the 133,000 passengers whoused its no-frills fare from mid April through June 30 wereenticed to travel by air because of the discount plan.According to Airline A, the new passenger trafficgenerated by discount fares increased its revenues by $4million during that period. Airline A said that its figureswere based on an on-board survey of 13,500 passengersand represented one of the most exhaustive studies it hadever conducted. 4. J. Smith, vice-president for marketing for Airline A, was quoted ata news conference as saying that the fare had been anunqualified success, had created a new air travel market, andhad generated more than twice the volume of new passengersrequired to offset revenue dilution caused by regular passengersswitching to the lower fare. He said that the stimulus of the faregave Airline A a net traffic gain of 74,000 passengers during theinitial two-and-one-half-month trial.He also cautioned that the success claims he was making for theno-frills fare did not mean that low fares were the answer to theairline industrys excess capacity problems. Yet Smith did go sofar as to state that what no frills has proved is that a properlyconceived discount fare, offered at the right time in the rightmarkets with the right controls, can help airlines hurdletraditionally so traffic periods. 5. Airline B reported a different experience. Its studies showed thatonly 14 percent of the 55,200 passengers who used its no-frillsfare between mid-April and May 31 represented newly generatedtraffic, with the remaining 86 percent representing passengersdiverted from higher fares who would have flown anyway. It saidthat the effect of the fare in the six major markets it studied was anet loss in revenue of $543,000 during the initial one and one-halfmonths.At the same time, Airline B attacked the credibility of Airline Assurvey, noting that its own data were based on an exhaustive andscientific blind telephone survey among persons who did not knowthe purpose and sponsor of the survey. Airline B claimed that thistype of study was more apt to produce unbiased results thanAirline As on-board survey. 6. Other airlines joined Airline B in challenging Airline As surveyresults. Airline C, for example, claimed that the no-frills fare didnot even come close to offsetting the dilution it experienced inrevenues. Other airline officials observed that although Airline Amight have succeeded through its heavy promotion of the no-frillsfares in diverting some business from other carriers, they felt thatAirline As claims of generating many passengers who otherwisewould not have flown were preposterous.Those airlines in direct competition with Airline A on the routes onwhich the discount fares were tried were vehemently opposed tocontinuing the discounts. In their view, the no-frills approachconstituted economic nonsense.They announced a policy of matching Airline As discount fareonly where forced to for competitive reasons. 7. Does Airline As experiment suggest that the demand for airlineservice at discount prices is elastic or inelastic?Do Airline Bs results indicate that demand is elastic orinelastic?Which of the two studies, Airline As on-board survey or AirlineBs telephone survey, do you think would yield the most reliableestimate as to the true elasticity of demand?Is it possible or likely that the elasticity of demand for Airline Ais different from the elasticity of demand for Airline B? Why?How would you account for the differences in the experiencesof Airline A and Airline B with discount fares?