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CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

A Project on

INDO-SRILANKA RELATION BETWEEN 1950-1990

Submitted to:

DR. S.P. SINGH.

(FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE)

Submitted from:

NAGENDAR KUMAR RAM

1ST YEAR, 2ND SEMESTER,

ROLL NO. 945.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my teacher who gave me the

opportunity to do this project on the topic INDO SRI LANKA RELATIONS 1950-1990 which

has helped me in doing a lot of research and I came to know about this topic. I would also like

to thank my friends who helped me. By doing this project I have surely increased my

knowledge.

THANK YOU

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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Aims and Objectives:

The aim of the project is to present a detailed study of the topic.

To know India and Sri Lanka relationship.

To know their foreign policies.

To know both the countries in all aspects.

Sources of Data:

The following secondary sources of data have been used in the project-

Books

Websites

Research Methodology and Mode of Citation:

For the Research, the Researcher has basically relied upon the Doctrinal method of Research

and the mode of citation for this research is Universal Citation Style.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SERIAL

NUMBER CHAPTERISATION

PAGE

NUMBER

1 INDIAN- SRILANKA RELATION 5-7

2 INDIAN INTERVENTION INTO SRILANKAN CIVIL WAR 8-12

3 INDIAN PEACE KEEPING FORCE 13-16

4 INDO- SRILANKA ACCORD 17-18

5 OPERATION POOMALAI 19-22

6 CONCLUSION 23

BIBLIOGRAPHY 24

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INTRODUCTION

INDO- SRILANKA

IndiaSri Lanka

Bilateral relations between the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Republic

of India have been generally friendly, but were controversially affected by the Sri Lankan

civil war and by the failure of Indian intervention during the war. India is the only neighbour

of Sri Lanka, separated by the Palk Strait; both nations occupy a strategic position in South

Asia and have sought to build a common security umbrella in the Indian Ocean1. India is Sri

Lanka's closest and historically the most important neighbour. The two countries are

separated physically by the Palk Straits, amongst the narrowest waterways separates the two

countries. The two Governments have built upon a legacy of historic links, common culture,

shared commitment to democracy and a general orientation towards non-alignment in foreign

policy. India aims to maintain close, cordial and cooperative relations with Lanka at both

popular and government levels. As a close neighbour to which both Sinhala and Tamil

communities trace their roots, internal developments in Sri Lanka have major bearing on

India's policy towards that country, which consists of a commitment to unity, sovereignty and

territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and to the restoration of lasting peace through a peaceful,

negotiated settlement that meets the just aspirations of all elements of Sri Lankan society.

The immediate threat to any country arises in its neighbourhood. That is why the

maintenance of peace, stability and friendship with neighbouring states is considered basic to

1 India's Sri Lankan scars (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/735963.stm) last accessed on 21st March,2014 at 2:54 PM IST.

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a nation’s foreign policy. India’s relations with its neighbours therefore constitute a critical

component of its foreign policy. The specific geo-strategic location of Sri Lanka in the Indian

Ocean and ethnic affinity of the Indian Tamils with the Sri Lankan Tamils have been the

most important factor in their relationship2. India is the closest neighbour of Sri Lanka,

separated from it at its narrowest point by 22 miles of sea called the Palk Strait. The

implication of such a close proximity is that developments in each country have affected the

other. Sri Lanka’s strategic location caused concern to Indian security particularly because of

the possibility of the involvement of external powers in the ethnic conflict. The presence of

external powers there can possibly pose a serious threat to the security and unity and integrity

of India as well as to regional stability.

India-Sri Lanka relations in the post-1990 period have undergone a contextual change

together with changes in India’s foreign policy perceptions. After the end of the Cold War

and the emergence of the US as the sole superpower, India’s foreign policy perceptions too

have changed. In keeping with the changing global economic and trade scenario, India’s

strategic priorities in the Indian Ocean region have also undergone a change during the last

two decades. India’s national security perceptions have now been enlarged to include

economic security, free trade and commerce, energy security, and social security of the

population in addition to territorial integrity. The United States’ relations with India have

become an important component of New Delhi’s strategic linkages to globally safeguard its

interests. India-Sri Lanka relations are now also affected by the regional power dynamics,

with external powers seeking to increase their own influence and counter those of others.

India is the most important foreign supporter of Sri Lanka, and remains its largest trading

partner. China is currently one of Sri Lanka’s major military suppliers, but also has a

potential for economic investments and infrastructure projects. The Sri Lanka Government

under President Mahinda Rajapakse is exploiting the geo-political struggle unfolding in the

Indian Ocean between China and India, with the United States having its own agenda for

retaining its influence. While Pakistan is playing for stakes in Sri Lanka with Chinese

knowledge to queer the pitch for India, the Russians too are keeping a hawk eye on any

activity in the Indian Ocean3. Pakistan’s engagements in Sri Lanka are also strategically

sensitive to India. Strategically, it is in India’s interest to keep its rivals out of its sphere of

2 The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Hennayake S.K. Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 4. (April 2004), pp. 401-415.3 The Pakistani muscle behind Colombo (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI22Df01.html) last accessed on 21st March, 2014.

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influence4. India needs to invest more in Sri Lanka to keep China within its zone of influence.

India sought (tried) to eliminate these threats through various bilateral agreements with Sri

Lanka.

4 India's Sri Lanka power project runs into Tamil storm (http://in.news.yahoo.com/indiaabroad/20080510/r_t_ians_bs_india/tbs-india-s-sri-lanka-power-project-runs-46e8b08.html) last accessed on 28th March, 2014.

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INDIAN INTERVENTION INTO SRILANKAN CIVIL WAR

In the 1970s-1980s, private entities and elements in the state government of Tamil Nadu were

believed to be encouraging the funding and training for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,

a separatist insurgent force. In 1987, faced with growing anger amongst its own Tamils, and a

flood of refugees, India intervened directly in the conflict for the first time after the Sri

Lankan government attempted to regain control of the northern Jaffna region by means of an

economic blockade and military assaults. India supplied food and medicine by air and sea.

After subsequent negotiations, India and Sri Lanka entered into an agreement. The peace

accord assigned a certain degree of regional autonomy in the Tamil areas with Eelam People's

Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) controlling the regional council and called for the

Tamil militant groups to lay down their arms. Further India was to send a peacekeeping force,

named the IPKF to Sri Lanka to enforce the disarmament and to watch over the regional

council.5

Even though the accord was signed between the governments of Sri Lanka and India, with the

Tamil Tigers and other Tamil militant groups not having a role in the signing of the accord,

most Tamil militant groups accepted this agreement. The LTTE rejected the accord because

they opposed the candidate, who belonged to another militant group named Eelam Peoples

Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), for chief administrative officer of the merged

Northern and Eastern provinces. Instead the LTTE named three other candidates for the

position. The candidates proposed by the LTTE were rejected by India. The LTTE

subsequently refused to hand over their weapons to the IPKF.

The result was that the LTTE now found itself engaged in military conflict with the Indian

Army, and launched their first attack on an Indian army rations truck on October 8, killing

five Indian para-commandos who were on board by strapping burning tires around their

necks. The government of India then decided that the IPKF should disarm the

LTTE by force and the Indian Army launched number of assaults on the LTTE, including a

month-long campaign dubbed Operation PAWAN to win control of the Jaffna peninsula from

the LTTE6. When the IPKF engaged the LTTE, the then president of Sri Lanka, Ranasinghe

5 Balasingham, Adele, The Will to Freedom - An Inside View of Tamil Resistance. Fairmax Publishing Ltd(2003), 2nd ed.

6 Operation Pawan. The Battle for Jaffna (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1987/Chapter03.html) last accessed on 1st

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Premadasa, began supporting LTTE and funded LTTE with arms. During the warfare with

the LTTE, IPKF was also alleged to have made human rights violation against the civilians.

Notably, IPKF was alleged to have perpetrated Jaffna teaching hospital massacre which was

the killing of over 70 civilians including patients, doctors and nurses. The ruthlessness of this

campaign and the Indian army's subsequent anti-LTTE operations made it extremely

unpopular amongst many Tamils in Sri Lanka. The conflict India Sri Lanka relations 2

between the LTTE and the Indian Army left over 1,000 Indian soldier’s dead. The Indo-Sri

Lankan Accord which had been unpopular amongst Sri Lankans for giving India a major

influence now became a source of nationalist anger and resentment as the IPKF was drawn

fully into the conflict. Sri Lankans protested the presence of the IPKF, and the newly-elected

Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe Premadasa demanded its withdrawal, which was completed

by March 1990. On May 21, 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated and the LTTE was alleged

to be the perpetrator. As a result India declared the LTTE to be a terrorist outfit in 1992.

Bilateral relations improved in the 1990s and India supported the peace process but has

resisted calls to get involved again. India has also been wary of and criticised the extensive

military involvement of Pakistan in the conflict accusing the latter of supplying lethal

weaponry and encouraging Sri Lanka to pursue military action rather than peaceful

negotiations to end the civil war.7

The Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War was the deployment of the Indian Peace

Keeping Force in Sri Lanka intended to perform a peacekeeping role. The deployment

followed the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord between India and Sri Lanka of 1987 which was

intended to end the Sri Lankan Civil War between militant Sri Lankan Tamil nationalists,

principally the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the Sri Lankan military. The

original intention was the Indian Peace Keeping Force would not be involved in large scale

military operations.8

However, after a few months, the Indian Peace Keeping Force engaged the Liberation Tigers

of Tamil Eelam in a series of battles. During the two years in which it was deployed, the

IPKF fought numerous battles against the LTTE. The IPKF began withdrawing in 1989, and

completed the withdrawal in 1990.

Background

April, 2014.7 http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India_-_Sri_Lanka_Relations.pdf last accessed on 1st April, 2014.8 http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1445888596RP16-Brian-SriLanka.pdf last accessed on 2nd April, 2014.

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The LTTE and other Tamil militant groups developed strong relationships with political

parties in South India, such as Dravidar Kazhagam (led by K. Veeramani), Kamaraj Congress

(led by Nedumaran) and Pure Tamil Movement (led by Perunchithiranar) during late 1970s.

These Tamil parties firmly backed the militants' cause of creating a separate Tamil Eelam

within Sri Lanka. Thereafter, LTTE developed relations with M. G. Ramachandran and M.

Karunanidhi, who served as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, succeeding one another. Although

Sri Lanka was a key member of Non-Aligned Movement in its initial stages, the Government

of Sri Lanka's policies became pro-western as J. R. Jayewardene was elected prime minister

with his landslide victory in 1977 parliamentary election. Subsequently he introduced a new

constitution and Open economy to Sri Lanka. Moreover, President J. R. Jayawardene did not

enjoy the same warm relationship with Indian Premier Indira Gandhi that he had enjoyed

with her father, Premier Jawaharlal Nehru. Thus, with the outbreak of Black July ethnic riots,

the Indian government decided to support the insurgent groups operating in Northern Sri

Lanka.9

Operation Poomalai

India became more actively involved in the late 1980s, and on June 5, 1987, the Indian Air

Force airdropped food parcels to Jaffna while it was under siege by Sri Lankan forces. At a

time when the Sri Lankan government stated they were close to defeating the LTTE, India

dropped 25 tons of food and medicine by parachute into areas held by the LTTE in a direct

move of support toward the rebels. Negotiations were held, and the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace

Accord was signed on July 29, 1987 by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan

President Jayewardene.10

Under this accord, the Sri Lankan Government made a number of concessions to Tamil

demands, including devolution of power to the provinces, a merger subject to later

referendum of the Northern and the Eastern provinces into the single province, and official

status for the Tamil language (this was enacted as the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of

Sri Lanka). India agreed to establish order in the North and East through a force dubbed the

Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and to cease assisting Tamil insurgents. Militant groups

9 http://asiastudies.org/file/pdf_new/Impact%20of%20the%20ethnic%20conflict%20in%20sri%20lanka%20on%20the%20india%20sri%20lanka%20relations.pdf last accessed on 3rd April,2014.10 https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/sri-lankas-terrorist-list-is-a-modern-version-of-mccarthyism-brad-adams/ last accessed on 3rd April, 2014.

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including the LTTE, although initially reluctant agreed to surrender their arms to the IPKF,

which initially oversaw a cease-fire and a modest disarmament of the militant groups.11

The signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord so soon after J.R. Jayewardene’s declaration that he

would fight the Indians to the last bullet led to unrest in south. The arrival of the IPKF to take

over control of most areas in the North of the country enabled the Sri Lanka government to

shift its forces to the south (in Indian aircraft) to quell the protests. This led to an uprising by

the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in the south, which was put down bloodily over the next two

years.

Conflict with the LTTE

While most Tamil militant groups laid down their weapons and agreed to seek a peaceful

solution to the conflict, the LTTE refused to disarm its fighters. Keen to ensure the success of

the accord, the IPKF then tried to demobilize the LTTE by force and ended up in full-scale

conflict with them. The three-year-long conflict was also marked by the IPKF being accused

of committing various abuses of human rights by many human rights groups as well as some

within the Indian media. The IPKF also soon met stiff opposition from the Tamils. Operation

Pawan was the codename assigned to the operations by the Indian Peace Keeping Force to

take control of Jaffna from the LTTE in late 1987 to enforce the disarmament of the LTTE as

a part of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord.12

In brutal fighting that took about three weeks, the IPKF took control of the Jaffna Peninsula

from the LTTE rule, something that the Sri Lankan army had then tried and failed to achieve

for several years. Supported by Indian Army tanks, helicopter gunships and heavy artillery,

the IPKF routed the LTTE. But this victory came at a price, as the IPKF lost around 214

soldiers.

The Jaffna University Helidrop was the first of the operations launched by the Indian Peace

Keeping Forces (IPKF) aimed at disarming the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) by force and securing

the town of Jaffna in the opening stages of Operation Pawan during the active Indian

mediation in the Sri Lankan Civil War. Mounted on the midnight of 12 October 1988, the

operation was planned as a fast heliborne assault involving Mi-8s of the No.109 HU, the 10th

Para Commandos and a contingent of the 13th Sikh LI. The aim of the operation was to 11 Research and Analysis Wing. Fas.org (http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/raw/) last accessed on 5th April,2014.12 http://cc.sjtu.edu.cn/G2S/eWebEditor/uploadfile/20120920095733759.pdf last accessed on 5th April, 2014.

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capture the LTTE. Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War 6 leadership at Jaffna

University building which served as the Tactical Headquarters of the LTTE, which was

expected to shorten Operation Pawan, the battle for Jaffna. However, the operation ended

disastrously, failing to capture its objectives -owing to intelligence and planning failures. The

helidropped force suffered significant casualties with nearly the entire Sikh LI detachment of

twenty nine troops falling to a man, along with six Para-commandos falling in battle.13

Withdrawal from Sri Lanka

Sri Lankan nationalist sentiment led many Sinhalese to oppose the continued Indian presence

in Sri Lanka. These led to the Sri Lankan government's call for India to quit the island, and

that culminated in a ceasefire. The LTTE and IPKF continued to have frequent hostilities.

Although casualties among the IPKF mounted, and calls for the withdrawal of the IPKF from

both sides of the Sri Lankan conflict grew, Gandhi refused to remove the IPKF from

Sri Lanka. However, following his defeat in Indian parliamentary elections in December

1989, the new Prime Minister V. P. Singh ordered the withdrawal of the IPKF, and their last

ship left Sri Lanka on March 24, 1990. During the IPKF's stay in Sri Lanka, there had been

many cases of massacres on innocent Sri Lankan Tamil civilians by the Indian army, such as

the 1989 Valvettiturai massacre and the Jaffna hospital massacre.14

INDIAN PEACE KEEPING FORCE

Indian Peace Keeping Force was the Indian military contingent performing a peacekeeping

operation in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990. It was formed under the mandate of the Indo-

Sri Lankan Accord signed between India and Sri Lanka in 1987 that aimed to end the Sri

13 https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/40305/3/sirimal.pdf last accessed on 5th April, 2014.14 http://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp154_destradi.pdf last accessed on 5th April, 2014.

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Lankan Civil War between militant Sri Lankan Tamil nationalists such as the Liberation

Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan Military.

The main task of the IPKF was to disarm the different militant groups, not just the LTTE. It

was to be quickly followed by the formation of an Interim Administrative Council. These

were the as per the terms of the accord signed between India and Sri Lanka, at the behest of

Rajiv Gandhi, then Prime Minister of India. Given the escalating level of the conflict in Sri

Lanka, and with the pouring of refugees into India, Rajiv Gandhi took the decisive step to

push this accord through. The IPKF was inducted into Sri Lanka on the request of then-Sri

Lankan President J. R. Jayewardene under the terms of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.15

The force was initially not expected to be involved in any significant combat by the Indian

High Command. However, within a few months, the IPKF became embroiled in battle with

the LTTE to enforce peace. The differences started with LTTE trying to dominate the Interim

Administrative Council and also refusing to disarm which was a pre-condition to enforce

peace in the island. Soon, these differences led to the LTTE attacking the IPKF at which

point the IPKF decided to disarm the LTTE militants by force if required. In the two years it

was in northern Sri Lanka, the IPKF launched a number of combat operations aimed at

destroying the LTTE-led insurgency. Given LTTE's tactics in guerrilla warfare and using

women and child soldiers to fight battles, it soon escalated into repeated skirmishes between

the IPKF and LTTE.16

The IPKF began withdrawing from Sri Lanka in 1989, following the election of the

Vishwanath Pratap Singh government in India and on the request of the newly elected Sri

Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa. The last IPKF contingents left Sri Lanka in March

1990.

Background

Sri Lanka, from the early 1980s, was facing increasingly violent ethnic strife in the Sri

Lankan Civil War. The origins of the Sri Lankan Civil War can be traced to the independence

of Sri Lanka in 1948, after the end of British rule. At the time, a Sinhalese majority

15 http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/1314/10/10_chapter%205.pdf last accessed on 6th April, 2014.16 http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA37/030/1990/en/1520f8d1-17d4-4b3b-b4d1-f948631bb10b/asa370301990en.pdf last accessed on 6th April, 2014.

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government was instituted. This government, which included the Tamil Congress, passed

legislation deemed discriminatory by some against the native Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. In

the 1970s, two major Tamil parties, the Tamil Congress and a split-off, the Federal Party

united to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a separatist Tamil nationalist

group that agitated for a separate state of Tamil Eelam in north and eastern Sri Lanka that

would grant the Tamils greater autonomy within the federal structure.

However, the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka, enacted in August 1983,

classified all separatist movements as unconstitutional. Outside the TULF, Tamil factions

advocating more militant courses of action soon emerged, and the ethnic divisions eventually

led to violent civil war.17

Indian involvement and intervention

Initially, first under Indira Gandhi and later under Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian Government

sympathised with the Tamil insurrection in Sri Lanka because of the strong support for the

Tamil cause within the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Emboldened by this support, supporters in

Tamil Nadu provided a sanctuary for the separatists and helped the LTTE smuggle arms and

ammunition into Sri Lanka, making them the strongest force on the island. In fact in 1982,

the LTTE Supremo Prabhakran was arrested by the police in Tamil Nadu, for a shoot-out

with his rival Uma Maheswaran in the middle of the city. Both of them were arrested and

later released by the police. This activity was left unchecked as India's regional and domestic

interests wanted to limit foreign intervention on what was deemed as a racial issue between

the Tamils and the Sinhalese. To this end, the Indira Gandhi government sought to make it

clear to Sri Lankan president Junius Richard Jayewardene that armed intervention in support

of the Tamil movement was an option India would consider if diplomatic solutions should

fail.18

The first round of civil violence flared in 1983 when the killing of 13 soldiers of the Sri

Lanka Army sparked anti-Tamil pogroms ‘the Black July riots’ in which approximately 400

Tamils were killed. The riots only aided in the deterioration of the ethnic relations. Militant

factions, including the LTTE, at this time recruited in large numbers and continued building

on popular Tamil dissent and stepped up the guerrilla war. By May 1985, the guerrillas were

17 http://www.tamilsydney.com/content/view/865/37/ last accessed on 6th April, 2014.18 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-03-21/news/48438527_1_indian-peace-ipkf-disappearances last accessed on 6th April, 2014.

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strong enough to launch an attack on Anuradhapura, attacking the Bodhi Tree shrine,a sacred

site for Buddhist

Sinhalese followed by a rampage through the town. At least 150 civilians died in the hour

long attack. Rajiv Gandhi's government attempted to re-establish friendly relations with the

various factions in Sri Lanka while maintaining diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the

conflict as well as limiting overt aid to the Tamil fighters. The Sri Lankan government,

deducing a decline in support for the Tamil rebels from India, tried to rearming itself

extensively for its anti-insurgent role with support from Pakistan, Israel, Singapore, and

South Africa. In 1986, the campaign against the insurgency was stepped up. In 1987,

retaliating against an increasingly bloody insurgent movement, the Vadamarachchi Operation

(Operation Liberation) was launched against LTTE strongholds in Jaffna Peninsula. The

operation involved nearly 4,000 troops, supported by helicopter gunships as well as ground-

attack aircraft.19

In June 1987, the Sri Lankan Army laid siege on the town of Jaffna. This resulted in large-

scale civilian casualties and created a condition of humanitarian crisis. India which had a

substantial Tamil population in South India faced the prospect of a Tamil backlash at home,

called on the Sri Lankan government to halt the offensive in an attempt to negotiate a

political settlement. However, the Indian efforts were unheeded. Added to this, in the

growing involvement of Pakistani advisers, it was necessary for Indian interest to mount a

show of force.

Failing to negotiate an end to the crisis with Sri Lanka, India announced on 2 June 1987 that

it wound send a convoy of unarmed ships to northern Sri Lanka to provide humanitarian

assistance but this was intercepted by the Sri Lankan Navy and forced to turn back.20

Following the failure of the naval mission the decision was made by the Indian government

to mount an airdrop of relief supplies in aid of the beleaguered civilians over the besieged

city of Jaffna. On 4 June 1987, in a bid to provide relief, the Indian Air Force mounted

Operation Poomalai. Five Antonov An-32s under fighter cover flew over Jaffna to airdrop 25

tons of supplies, all the time keeping well within the range of Sri Lankan radar coverage. At

the same time the Sri Lankan Ambassador to New Delhi, Bernard Tilakaratna, was

summoned to the Foreign Office to be informed by the Minister of State, External Affairs, K.

19 http://www.nation.lk/edition/lens/item/26706-how-ipkf-%E2%80%98kept%E2%80%99-peace-in-sri-lanka.html last accessed on 13th April, 2014.20 http://revisitingindia.com/2013/10/03/ipkf-in-sri-lana-war/ last accessed on 13th April, 2014.

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Natwar Singh, of the ongoing operation and also indicated that the operation was expected

not to be hindered by the Sri Lankan Air Force. The ultimate aim of the operation was both to

demonstrate the seriousness of the domestic Tamil concern for the civilian Tamil population

and reaffirming the Indian option of active intervention to the Sri Lankan government.21

INDO-SRI LANKA ACCORD

The Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord was an accord signed in Colombo on July 29, 1987,

between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene.

The accord was expected to resolve the ongoing Sri Lankan civil war. Under the terms of the

agreement, Colombo agreed to devolution of power to the provinces, the Sri Lankan troops 21 Sri Lanka- war without end, peace without hope. Colonel(retd) A A Athale (http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/may/22lanka.html) last accessed on 13th April, 2014.

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were to be withdrawn to their barracks in the north and the Tamil rebels were to surrender

their arms.

Importantly however, the Tamil groups, notably the LTTE (which at the time was one of the

strongest Tamil forces) had not been made party to the talks and initially agreed to surrender

their arms to the IPKF only reluctantly. Within a few months however, this flared into an

active confrontation. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) declared their intent to

continue the armed struggle for an independent Tamil Eelam and refused to disarm. The

Indian Peace-Keeping Force found itself engaged in a bloody police action against the LTTE.

Further complicating the return to peace was a burgeoning Sinhalese insurgency in the

south.22

Among the salient points of the agreement, the Sri Lankan Government made a number of

concessions to Tamil demands, which included Colombo devolution of power to the

provinces, merger of the northern and eastern provinces, and official status for the Tamil

language. More immediately, Operation Liberation the successful ongoing anti-insurgent

operation by Sri Lankan forces in the Northern peninsula was ended. Sri Lankan troops were

to withdraw to their barracks in the north, the Tamil rebels were to disarm.

India agreed to end support for the Tamil separatist movement and recognise the unity of Sri

Lanka. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord also underlined the commitment of Indian military

assistance on which the Indian Peace Keeping Force came to be inducted into Sri Lanka.

In 1990, India withdrew the last of its forces from Sri Lanka, and fighting between the LTTE

and the government resumed23. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and government forces

committed serious human rights violations against one another In January 1995, the Sri

Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam agreed to a cease fire as a

preliminary step in a government-initiated plan for peace negotiations. After 3 months,

however the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam unilaterally resumed hostilities.

The government of Sri Lanka then adopted a policy of military engagement with the Tigers,

with government forces liberating Jaffna from LTTE control by mid-1996 and moving

against LTTE positions in the northern part of the country called the Vanni. An LTTE

22 The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka.Hennayake S.K. Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 4. (Apr., 1999), pp. 401-415.23 Sri Lanka in 1987: Indian Intervention and Resurgence of the JVP. Pfaffenberger B. Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in1987: Part II. (Feb., 2005), pp. 139

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counteroffensive, begun in October 1999, reversed most government gains and by May 2000,

threatened government forces in Jaffna. Heavy fighting continued into 2001.

Assault on Rajiv Gandhi

On the eve of the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, Rajiv Gandhi was assaulted by

Leading Rate Vijitha Rohana at the Guard of Honour held for Gandhi in what seemed an

attempted assassination. Four years later, in 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a LTTE

suicide bomber. This radically reduced support for the LTTE within India. In 2009, 19 years

after his assassination, the Sri Lankan army mounted a major military offensive in the north

and eradicated the LTTE. The operation was not opposed by India and received Indian

diplomatic and military support, despite condemnations from state of Tamil Nadu and

Western nations for alleged human rights violations. Rajiv Gandhi's widow, Sonia Gandhi

was the chairperson of India's ruling coalition at the time.24

OPERATION POOMALAI

Operation Poomalai or Eagle Mission 4 was the codename assigned to a mission undertaken

by the Indian Air Force to air-drop supplies over the besieged town of Jaffna in Sri Lanka on

4 June 1987 in support of Tamil Tigers during the Sri Lankan Civil War.

24 http://www.newindianexpress.com/world/No-regrets-for-attack-on-Rajiv-says-Lankan-guard/2013/07/30/article1708707.ece last accessed on 15th April, 2014 at 05:45pm IST.

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Jaffna was at the time under blockade by Sri Lankan troops as a part of Colombo's offensive

against the Tamil separatist movement. Concerned over alleged violations of interests of the

Tamils, who had broader support among the Tamil population of South India as well as the

government, India attempted to negotiate a political settlement but the Indian offers had been

rebuffed by Colombo. As civilian casualties grew, calls grew within India to intervene in

what was increasingly seen in the Indian (and Tamil) media as a developing humanitarian

crisis, especially with reports of aerial bombardment against rebel positions in civilian areas.

The Indian Government under Rajiv Gandhi decided to attempt to deliver aid to the northern

area of Sri Lanka as a symbolic act of support to the rebels. The first of these efforts, a small

naval flotilla, was thwarted by the Sri Lankan Navy. Two days later, in a show of force, India

mounted the airdrop over Jaffna.25

Background

The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka can be traced to the independence of the island in 1948 from

Britain. At the time a Sinhala majority government was instituted that passed legislation

deemed discriminatory by the substantial Tamil minority population. In the 1970s two major

Tamil parties united to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) that started agitating

for a separate state of Tamil Eelam within the system in a federal structure in northern and

eastern Sri Lanka that would grant the Tamils greater autonomy. Outside the TULF, however,

factions advocating more radical and militant courses of action soon emerged, and the

divisions started flaring into a violent civil war.

The first round of violence flared in 1983 when the killing of 13 Sri Lankan soldiers sparked

anti-Tamil riots in which nearly 400 Tamils died. The riots only aided in the deterioration of

the already worsening ethnic strife. The militant factions, notably the LTTE, at this time

recruited in large numbers and continued building on popular Tamil dissent and stepped up

the guerrilla activities. By May 1985 the guerrillas were strong enough to launch an attack on

Anuradhapura, attacking the Bodhi Tree shrines a sacred site for Buddhist Sinhalese followed

by a rampage through the town. At least 150 civilians died in the hour-long attack.

The government stepped up its campaign against the insurgency, and the Sri Lankan army in

1987 laid siege to the town of Jaffna, an LTTE stronghold, as part of its campaign against the

25 "Operation Poomalai - India Intervenes" Bharat-rakshak.com (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1987/Chapter02.html) last accessed on 16th April, 2014 at 5:54 pm IST.

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Tamil bases. This resulted in large-scale civilian casualties and created a condition of

humanitarian crisis.

India, which had a substantial Tamil population in the southern part of the country, had been

aiding the Tamil factions and particularly the LTTE and called on the Sri Lankan government

to halt the offensive in an attempt to negotiate a political settlement. However, the Indian

efforts were futile. Failing to negotiate an end to the crisis with Sri Lanka, India announced

on 2 June 1987 that it wound send a convoy of unarmed ships to northern Sri Lanka to

provide humanitarian assistance but this was intercepted by the Sri Lankan Navy and turned

back.

Following the failure of the naval mission, the decision was made both as a show of force to

the Sri Lankan government of symbolic support for the Tamil rebels as well as an act to

preserve the credibility of Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi among the country's Tamil

population by the Indian Government to carry out an airdrop of the humanitarian supplies,

designated Operation Poomalai (Tamil: Garland) or Eagle Mission 4.26

Mounted on the evening of 4 June 1987, the operation involved five An-32s of the Paratroops

Training School in Agra, escorted by five Mirage 2000s of the No. 7 Squadron. On the

morning of 3 June No. 7 Squadron was directed to send a five-ship detachment to Bangalore

Airport, where they were re-directed to Yelahanka airbase north of the city. At the same time,

under the supervision of the (then) Vice-Chief of Air Staff Air Marshal S. Raghavendran, five

An-32s were loaded with the relief supplies and took off for Bangalore at 0800 hours. These

were to fly out—led by Gp. Capt. B.K. Sunder, CO of Paratroops Training School after dawn

and carry out the supply drop under the cover of the Mirages, which were led by Wg. Cdr.

Ajit Bhavnani, CO of No. 7 Squadron.27 A group of 35 national and international journalists

also joined the flight. The Mirages were armed with two Matra Magic II AAMs as a measure

against any opposition by the Sri Lankan Air Force, and also carried three drop tanks.

The Sri Lankan Ambassador to New Delhi was summoned to the Ministry of External Affairs

at 1500 hours, where the message was conveyed by Minister of External Affairs Natwar

Singh that the Indian Air Force would be flying a mission at 1600 hours to drop supplies over

Jaffna. The ambassador was told that the aircraft were expected to complete their mission

26 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Operation-Poomalai last accessed on 16th April, 2014. At 2:15 PM IST.27 "IAF drops relief supplies over Jaffna". The Hindu, 5 June 1987. on 18 April, 2014

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unhindered and any opposition by the Sri Lankan Air Force "would be met by force" by the

escorting mirage 2000s.28

The first of the flights left Bangalore at 15:55 hours and flew towards the Coramandal coast

where they were met by four Mirage escorts. One Mirage stayed back acting as radio relay

along with two additional An-32s over Tamil Nadu which acted as radio relay to Bangalore.

The flight leader attempted radio contact with Colombo ATC over the civilian air traffic radio

channel at 1647 hours, but was unable to establish contact. The mission approached Jaffna

peninsula at about 1650 hours and sighted Jaffna Town itself at 1700 hours. The aircraft

descended from 12000 feet to about 1500 feet and carried out the drop at the drop zone about

7 km from the town of Jaffna. The aircraft then turned in a western direction flying over

Palay airbase before turning north, heading for the Indian coast.

Unopposed by Sri Lankan forces, the mission arrived back over Bangalore at 1813 hours,

where they were greeted with much jubilation.29

Aftermath

In the wake of Operation Poomalai, Sri Lanka accused India of violating its sovereignty.

However, India defended its actions as a mercy mission in aid of what were termed as the

deteriorating conditions of the civilian population, refusing at the time to rule out further

missions. Within India, the actions were endorsed across the political Diaspora. In India, it

was seen at the time as an act of support against the beleaguered and besieged Tamil

population of the north an opinion that was destined to undergo a drastic reversal after the

assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE in 1991. At that time, Colombo deemed it as a

blatant show of support for the Tamil Tigers.30

The total supply air dropped by India during the operation amounted to little over 25 tons,

and this was clearly not sufficient to sustain a besieged city.

Faced with the possibility of an active Indian intervention, Sri Lankan President J. R.

Jayewardene offered to hold talks with the Rajiv Gandhi government on future moves. The

siege of Jaffna was soon lifted, followed by a round of negotiations that led to the signing of

28 http://www.sangam.org/2007/06/Operation_Poomalai.php?uid=2402 last accessed on 18th April, 2014 at 6:45 AM IST.29 New Delhi & the Tamil Struggle. The Indo Sri Lanka Agreement. Satyendra N. Tamil Nation (http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/india/88saty.html) last accessedon 19th April, 2014 at 9:55PM IST.30 http://indianairforce.nic.in/show_page.php?pg_id=108 last accessed on 19th April, 2014 at 11:44 AM IST.

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the Indo-Sri-Lankan accord on July 29, 1987 that brought a temporary truce. The terms of the

truce specified that the Sri Lankan troops withdraw from the north and the Tamil rebels

disarm, and saw the induction of the IPKF as a peace keeping force in Sri Lanka.

CONCLUSION

India-Sri Lanka relations are based on a deep and abiding friendship based on shared

historical experience and common civilisation and cultural values sustained by geographical

proximity and ethnic affinity. There have been shifts and changes in the pattern of the

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relationship marked by mutual differences, irritants, cooperation and friendship. But, both the

countries have developed adequate strength to withstand the stresses and strains; this is a

notable feature of their bilateral relationship. India-Sri Lanka relations are multifaceted and

interconnected; invariably, therefore, they have implications for domestic politics and

economy in the two countries. Nearly every bilateral issue between them is intertwined with

some domestic issues and therefore become a matter of domestic political debate. There is

interdependence but, at the same time, the smaller partner also complains of asymmetry in the

relationship.

Inevitably the changes in India’s strategic perception were reflected in its present approach to

Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE, particularly after the failure of the peace process, The

INDIAN PEACE KEEPING FORCE, and the Operations undertaken by the Indian Army. Its

role had been limited as an advisor and counsellor not only to Sri Lanka but to the four co-

chairs—the European Union, Japan, Norway and the USA which promoted the peace

process. India scrupulously kept out of Sri Lanka’s war with the LTTE despite strong internal

political pressures from the ruling Congress’ coalition partners in Tamil Nadu. India’s agenda

for Sri Lanka had mainly focused on strategic security cooperation and the building of trade

linkages.

Permanent peace in Sri Lanka requires institutional restructuring aimed at creating ethnic

equality; a power sharing arrangement to satisfy the ‘aspirations of all the Sri Lankan

communities, especially those of Sri Lankan Tamils and Sri Lankan Muslims’ is considered

the most desirable democratic option. This pro-minority position underlines the need for

devolution of powers to counter the majority community’s entrenched position on ethnic

democratic centralism.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

SITES REFFERED:-

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The Pakistani muscle behind Colombo (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI22Df01.html) last accessed on 21st March, 2014.

India's Sri Lankan scars (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/735963.stm) last accessed

on 21st March,2014 at 2:54 PM IST.

India's Sri Lanka power project runs into Tamil storm

(http://in.news.yahoo.com/indiaabroad/20080510/r_t_ians_bs_india/tbs-india-s-sri-lanka-

power-project-runs-46e8b08.html) last accessed on 28th March, 2014.

Operation Pawan. The Battle for Jaffna (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-

FORCES/Army/History/1987/Chapter03.html) last accessed on 1st April, 2014.

http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1445888596RP16-Brian-SriLanka.pdf last accessed on

2nd April, 2014.

http://www.tamilsydney.com/content/view/865/37/ last accessed on 6th April, 2014.

Sri Lanka- war without end, peace without hope. Colonel(retd) A A Athale (http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/may/22lanka.html) last accessed on 13th April, 2014.

BOOKS REFFERED:-

The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Hennayake S.K. Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 4. (April 2004), pp. 401-415.

Balasingham, Adele, The Will to Freedom - An Inside View of Tamil Resistance. Fairmax Publishing Ltd(2003), 2nd ed.

Sri Lanka in 1987: Indian Intervention and Resurgence of the JVP. Pfaffenberger B. Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1987: Part II. (Feb., 2005), pp. 139