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Assessed Essay Submission Cover Sheet

Essay Title: Western counter-terrorism policies since 9/11 are increasingly

depicted as having failed or as even having proved counter-

productive. How fair is this assessment?

Is the above title Pre-approved or

Negotiated? No

Word count 4861

Western counter-terrorism policies since 9/11 are increasingly depicted as

having failed or as even having proved counter-productive. How fair is this

assessment?

Abstract

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 debate has circulated around the

nature and success of counterterrorism policies. Considering after thirteen years, the

world has not faced a major attack on the same scale as those witnessed in 2001;1

counterterrorism policies by some have been argued to be a phenomenal success.

This article will focus on counterterrorism policies by the United States, positing the

argument that the success of these policies cannot be determined by the mere lack of

terrorist attacks, but by the effects of these policies. Thus, counterterrorism policies

in the United States predominately, have been counter-productive; where we have

witnessed an aggressive new national security discourse consisting of immorally

justified interventions and the extensive erosion of human and civil rights that has

been enshrined into international law. As a consequence these policies have created

the alienation and marginalization of particular groups in society, further

exacerbating the rise of terrorism both locally and internationally.

Introduction

Terrorism, whether locally or internationally, has been a prevalent problem for

1 The repugnant nature of terrorism has been witnessed on a global scale, exampled

in the terrorist attacks in Bali 2002, Madrid 2004, United Kingdom 2005, and

Mumbai 2008. They exemplify attacks that not only represent some of the worst

terrorist attacks historically, but also recalled the need to sincerely address the global

issue of terrorism.

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Western states historically, varying from the 1998 Omagh bombing by the real IRA

in Northern Ireland, the 2001 Ealing bombing, the 2003 suicide truck bomb in

Russia, to the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings.2 Nevertheless, the sheer scale of the

suicide attacks on September 11, 2001 exceeded any form of terrorist attacks seen

before in terms of the impact and mass casualties, resulting not in a new phenomenon

for counterterrorism policies, but a fundamental change in its nature. These attacks

culminated into an international commitment to counterterrorism within the national

and international realm, focusing on thwarting the capabilities and burgeoning

influence of radical terrorists groups such as al- Qa’ida. These policies featured an

intensification of surveillance measures, the expansion of policing powers, an

increasing presence within the Middle Eastern region, and clandestine operations

such as extraordinary rendition that consisted of the reformulation of international

norms, such as human rights in order to capture ‘enemy combatants’, imprison

citizens without trial and torture suspected terrorists. Although the death of ‘Osama

bin Laden marked the most important strategic milestone in global efforts to defeat

al- Qa‘ida, it only removed al-Qa‘ida’s founder and leader; his demise did not mark

the end of this group nor their influence’ (The White House, 2011: 3), which has

2 The attacks on September 2001 were ‘neither the first incidents of terrorism on U.S.

soil nor even the first attacks on the World Trade Center or the Pentagon’ (Jackson,

2011: 133). In 1993, ‘the World Trade Center was attacked with a vehicle bomb by

Ramzi Yousef, a ‘prolific terrorist subsequently connected to major plots aimed at the

aviation system; decades before, in 1972, the Weather Underground, a domestic

group, successfully detonated a bomb inside the Pentagon and previous to that, the

bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, killed and

injured hundreds of people’ (Jackson, 2011:133).

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remained focal to United States and various other Western countries efforts to

counterterrorism. Moreover, with the new presence of the terrorist group ISIS- the

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, an extremist rebel jihadist group within the Middle

Eastern region, the elimination of international threats remains far from gone. In

order to reduce international threats of terrorism, reforms and counterterrorism

policies have been aimed to prevent, pursue and protect civilians from terrorism and,

to ‘address the conditions that prove conducive to the proliferation of both radical

Islamism and terrorism’ (United Nations, 2005). However, the fluctuating nature of

the post-9/11 counterterrorism policies has raised condescension, thus the need for

examination.3

This article posits the argument that counterterrorism policies since the September 11

attacks have proved counterproductive, focusing primarily on the effects of American

counterterrorism policies and strategies.4 To successfully evaluate this assessment, I

3 American counterterrorism policies have been widely contested on the basis that

firstly, a state that has had the head role of universalizing human rights, and also

initiated humanitarian interventions based on the lack of human rights within

numerous states in the Middle East, have since the September 11, 2001 attacks shown

a sheer disregard to the importance of human rights through extraordinary rendition,

and curtailed international laws, through the illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003, showing

not only double standards but also initiating counterproductive policies and strategies

which would inevitably cause alienation and hatred. Secondly, the terroristic nature

of policies exemplified in Obamas drones war, which has resulted in the death of

thousands of innocent civilians, exemplifies the notion of countering terrorism

through terrorist strategies. Military strategies have been argued counterproductive as

they are initiated through false pretexts, exampled in the Libya intervention to

allegedly save civilian’s but resulted in the death of Gaddafi, and the instalment of a

Western accepted government. 4 To encapsulate counterterrorism policies of the Western community as a collective

would prove copious, reducing the ability to effectively evaluate the alleged counter-

productivity of counterterrorism polices. The case of the United States is unique due

to the aggressive nature of their counterterrorism polices and strategies, which are

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will need to question the primary purpose of the counterterrorism agenda under

scrutiny, as without, leads to the deviation of succinctly analyzing the forth going

argument of its counter-productivity. Therefore, this article will be divided into three

parts. The first, will explore the conceptual understanding of counterterrorism, to

provide the platform of understanding what these policies sought to achieve. The

second section will analyze the alleged success of counter terrorism policies.5 Lastly,

the third section will analyze the counter- productivity of American counterterrorism

policies and international operations, using references to the United Kingdom to

corroborate this argument. This section will focus on the PATRIOT Act, and its

effects on human rights and civil liberties, the War on Terror, primarily foreign

policy aspects of such in Afghanistan and Iraq, to later the adoption of drone warfare

that derives from the War on Terror strategy. This will focus on the extent to which

such policies have created the alienation and marginalization of particular groups in

society, further exacerbating the rise of terrorism both locally and internationally.

Conceptualizing Counterterrorism

There remains, no overarching definition of counterterrorism, as it continues to be a

exemplified in their illegal Iraq war in 2003, the erosion of international human rights

norms through extraordinary rendition and torture, and national policies that

encourage social cohesion and alienation. In order to corroborate the counter-

productivity of counterterrorism policies, in the case of the United States, references

will be made to policies in the United Kingdom, whose policies are too, argued to be

problematic, exacerbating the issue of radicalization and anti-Westernism. 5 In the article ‘9/11 Lessons: Counterterrorism’ authored by Max Boot and Jeane J.

Kirkpatrick, the argument is that U.S. counterterrorism policy since 9/11 has been a

phenomenal success, as ‘who could have imagined in 2001 that ten years later there

would not have been a single successful attack on the American homeland? And yet,

apart from a few lone-wolf attacks such as the shootings by Major Nidal Hasan at

Fort Hood, the record has been close to perfect’ (Boot and Kirkpatrick, 2011).

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‘difficult concept to define’ (Rineheart, 2010: 32).6 According to the U.S. Army Field

Manual, counterterrorism is defined as ‘operations that include the offensive

measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism’ (Rineheart,

2010: 32). This definition, though all-encompassing as it includes the main doctrines

necessary to deal with terrorism, still fails to include the whether this is a national or

international operation, as defensive measures and domestic policy used to respond to

terrorism, have been essential to tackle issues of home grown extremism and

radicalization. The threat of radicalization remains to be a challenging issue, where

‘groups and individuals supporting al-Qa’ida’s vision7 attempt to lure Americans to

terrorism in order to create support networks and facilitate attack planning, by

preying on those who are disenchanted and alienated within the American

community’ for an example (The White House, 2011: 2). Similarly, in the United

Kingdom, a significant emphasis has been placed on tackling radicalization, due to

the wakeup call from home-grown terrorism in the events of 7/7, which ‘provided

6According to The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, ‘established by the

Secretary-General in 2005, counterterrorism involves measures to address the

conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; measures to prevent and combat

terrorism; measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to

strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard; measures to ensure

respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the

fight against terrorism’ (United Nations). This originates from the UN

Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force, http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/ 7 The susceptibility of citizens to radicalization is not exclusive to the likes of al-

Qa’ida; for example, the UK deplores and will fight terrorism of every kind, whether

based on Islamist, extreme right wing or any other extremist ideology. It is argued

that extremist activity of any sort will not be tolerated. (HM Government, 2013: 1).

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evidence that there is a complex web of radicalized people within Muslim

communities in some parts of the country, although these threats come from a tiny

and marginal minority, these individuals are integrated within their communities’

(Briggs, 2010: 972). Hence, the importance of community-based approaches evident

in the ‘Prevent’ strand of the government’s counterterrorism strategy CONTEST,

allowing communities to play a central role in many different areas of the

counterterrorism strategy’ (Briggs, 2010: 972).8 The definition of counterterrorism

stipulated by the U.S. Army Field Manual is weakened by the failure to indoctrinate

the upholding of the respect for human rights for all and the rule of law (United

Nations), which is fundamental to guiding an effective counterterrorism policy and

strategy.9 Counterterrorism can therefore be defined as ‘measures taken whether

offensive or defensive, to prevent, deter, protect, preempt and respond to terrorism

both domestically and internationally, whilst upholding the respect for both human

and civil rights, and international law’ (United Nations; Rineheart, 2010: 32). While

8 The killing of British soldier Lee Rigby, by two British born Islam converts,

recalled the severity of combating home grown extremism and radicalization. See

‘The Report from the Prime Minister’s Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and

Extremism’ by the HM Government. 9 The failure to incorporate the significance of human right norms and international

law within the spectrum of counterterrorism, allows states to initiate policies ‘by all

means and measures’, creating disillusion, alienation and animosity to those these

policies are meant to protect. It is essential to remember that counterterrorism

measures, whether policies or operations are ‘subject to change as specified by

Rineheart, due to the nature of terrorism, the diversity of characteristics in any

conflict involving terrorism and the fact that there remains no universally applicable

counterterrorism policy for democracies’ (Rineheart, 2010: 32).

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broad in nature, this definition encompasses the mutually inclusiveness of domestic

and international measures, and the respect for civil liberties and the rule of law,

which allows countries to remain adherent to policies that are morally acceptable,

reinforcing the importance of accountability (Rineheart, 2010: 32).

Counterterrorism has changed over the past few decades, hence the strategies and

policies to deal with terrorism have consisted of continuity and change.10

According

to Rineheart, counterterrorism has been structured around two approaches- the

military model and the criminal justice model (Rineheart, 2010: 37). The military

model, in contrast to the criminal justice model, concentrates on the ‘militaristic

nature of the struggle against terrorism, whereas the criminal justice model frames

around the rule of law and democratic values’ (Rineheart, 2010: 37). However, to

account for the new trends and characteristics of counterterrorism, it would be best to

reconstruct the framework around direct “hard power” and indirect “soft power”

approaches. As postulated by Rineheart, the direct approach consists of offensive and

hard power tactics such as ‘Predator and Reaper drone strikes, special forces

operations, increased policing and intelligence operations; on the other hand, indirect

‘soft power’ approaches to counterterrorism coalesce around population-centric

methods, featuring measures such as capacity building, economic development, and

10

Counterterrorism policies, as evaluated by Rineheart, ‘tend to structure around two

approaches: the war or military model and the criminal justice model’ (Rineheart,

2010: 32), See Rinehart’s Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency article, where he

focuses primarily on these frameworks.

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counter-radicalization’ (Rineheart, 2010: 38).11

Counterterrorism policies go beyond the simplistic need to fight terrorism, as it

requires the need to merge both military centric and population centric methods. This

article will evaluate the effectiveness of American counterterrorism policies in

accordance to five criteria:12

1. The reduced freedom of terrorists to operate (achieved via the elimination

of safe havens),

2. Increased levels of domestic support for counter- terrorism (where the

population is ever vigilant),

3. The disruption of terrorist recruitment (in order to stem, over time, the flow

of new blood into the organisation), this also includes reduction of

radicalization and extremism that highly correlates with terrorist

recruitment;

4. The reduced number of terrorist attacks (as attack capability reflects both

the threat posed by a group as well as its very viability),

5. Upholding core American values, including the respect for human rights for

all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against

terrorism (Schmid and Hindle, 2009: 43; Byman, 2003; United Nations;

The White House, 2011: 8).13

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Counterterrorism strategies are generally the amalgamation of soft and hard power

policies. The successes of counterterrorism policies have primarily focused on hard

power approaches, which are arguably used to isolate and destroy terrorist groups

both domestically and internationally. Nevertheless, this approach has ‘raised

questions regarding ethics, human and civil rights and the legality of the use of force’

(Rineheart, 2010: 38). On the contrary, when evaluating the failures of

counterterrorism policies, soft power policies including counter- radicalization

methods which if effectively used could address some of the root causes of terrorism,

have been deemed counterproductive. 12

Please note: the following indicators for analysing counterterrorism policies in the

United States are not in any hierarchal order. 13

The fifth indicator of success remains to be one of the most important criteria to

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Measuring the success of American counterterrorism

Terrorism, has always been considered important, however the strategic demand to

counterterrorism was far from necessary, especially since the end of the Cold War,

which left the United States ‘experiencing a threat deficit’ (Buzan, 2006: 1101). The

struggle against communism presented itself as the biggest threat to American power,

‘neither Japan, China, nor rogue states came close to replacing the Soviet Union as

the enemy’, until the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Buzan, 2006: 1101). Contrary to the

arguments posed by Kenneth- Pipe and Rengger,14

the events taking place on

September 11, 2001 ensued the urge to ‘develop a new and comprehensive strategy to

eliminate the al Qaeda terrorist network and other interrelated factors connected with

radical Islamism' (National Commission, 2004).

The United States have seen numerous attempted terrorist attacks on their homeland,

contrasting from the John F. Kennedy International Airport Plot in June 2007, the

2009 shootings by Major Nidal Hasan at Fort Hood15

, to the 2013 Boston Marathon

meet, which many who determine the success of counterterrorism never include.

However, counterterrorism groups and organizations under the United Nations have

implemented the requirement to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of

law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism (United Nations). 14

Both posit the argument that 9/11 changed nothing fundamental in world politics

(Buzan, 2006: 1102) Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Nicholas Rengger, ‘Apocalypse

now? Continuities or disjunctions in world politics after 9/11, International Affairs

82: 3, 2006, pp. 519-52 15

November 5, 2009 –Major Nidal Hassan kills 13 and wounds 32 in a shooting

rampage at a military processing centre at Ford Hood (CNN, 2014).

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bombings16

. Nevertheless, who could have imagined in '2001 that ten years later there

would not have been a single successful attack on the American homeland?' (Boot

and Kirkpatrick, 2011). Precisely, there have been no attacks that mildly compare to

the September 11 attacks in the United States, or the 7/7 attacks in the United

Kingdom. This section will evaluate the alleged successes of American

counterterrorism policies, though remaining to be a controversial topic of analysis; to

a fair degree American counterterrorism strategies have made laudable

achievements.17

With the vast ‘flow of resources into areas at the FBI, CIA, NSA and other relevant

agencies, the support from crucial investigative tools like the PATRIOT Act18

and the

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, an overwhelming success has been made in

foiling terror attacks against the United States’ (McNeill et al, 2011: 19). The

enhancement of policing powers and intelligence gathering tools, whilst arguably a

product of alienation and marginalisation through the hierarchising of limiting civil

liberties19

to ensure national security, has undeniably worked. According to the

16

Taking place on April 15, 2013, where twin bomb blasts explode near the finish

line of the Boston Marathon, killing three and wounding at least 264. Neither of the

former attacks compare to those on September 11, 2001 in terms of its coordination,

nor scale of impact (CNN, 2014). 17

The arguments posited to corroborate American counterterrorism success, has been

widely used to also justify counter productivity arguments, this argument will be

explored in the last section in more depth. 18

President George W. Bush signed the PATRIOT Act, into law on October 2001.

Featuring enhanced domestic law enforcement, investigatory authority, including

sweeping surveillance and search powers. This act has proven highly controversial,

and has been used to substantiate the argument of that American counterterrorism

policies are both cohesive and counter-productive. 19

The analyzing of intelligence and investigative measures coalesce around enhanced

surveillance authority, arguably an excellent tool for disrupting numerous terror plots

11

Heritage Foundation for example, the reformulation of domestic intelligence and

investigative policies have been essential for law enforcement agencies that have

thwarted more than 39 terrorist plots. This is exampled in the case of ‘Iyman Faris in

2003 and Zazi in 2009 where laws such as the PATRIOT Act were essential for

provisions to gather information to investigate these potential terrorist attacks’ 20

(McNeill et al, 2011: 19). The reality remains, without policies and laws such as the

PATRIOT Act, enforcement authorities and governmental agencies would ‘have

insufficient intelligence or late intelligence thus resulting in severe consequences’

(McNeill et al, 2011: 19).

Although counterterrorism policies encountering the reduction of terrorist attacks in

the United States have been credibly successful, the ability to diminish attack

capabilities through both the threat posed by a group as well as its very viability

remains questionable. What remains to be a ‘striking trend in global affairs in the last

through rigorous checks and balances. Irrespective of the alleged aims of these

measures, the culmination of a draconian surveillance state has curtailed civilian

liberties through the endemic surveillance, with selective surveillance, policies in

order to prevent terrorism, as reflected in the United Kingdom’s Prevent strategy,

focusing on a specific group creates communal seclusion, and further exacerbates the

prospects of radicalization. This strand of argument will be explored in-depth in the

latter section, which focuses predominantly on human rights and policies both

domestic and international that result in the proliferated vision of anti-Westernism

and more importantly radicalization. 20

Laws such as the PATRIOT Act gather information both nationally and

internationally, which provides a vast scope of intelligence to investigate and prevent

potential targets against terrorism. In order to, successfully prevent domestic attacks,

cooperation on an international level, can help to obtain and provide information on

individuals whom have been radicalized or trained abroad to further a later terrorist

attack on their homeland, which in this case is the United States.

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four years, is the real and perceived threat of terrorism to international peace and

security’ (Hyslop, 2014). Whilst the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 marked the

‘most important strategic milestone in global efforts to defeat al- Qa‘ida, as many

anticipated the demise of al- Qa’ida, their influence and threat of international

jihadism, this has been far from the case’ (The White House, 2011: 3; Hyslop, 2014).

This significant achievement to date, as praised by President Obama on May 2011,

has not resulted in the end of terrorism, which has proven substantially right, as ‘

whilst al-Qa’ida has been degraded and become far more decentralized in recent

years, its Salafist ideology continues to resonate among jihadis in many corners of the

world’ (Patrick and Kerr, 2013). Unfortunately, Al- Qa’ida and the ideology it

promulgates remains stronger than American policy makers anticipated, with the

unprecedented growth and expansion of the Islamic State and al-Qa’ida, the

counterterrorism strategies by the United States remains dire.

Although progression may be recognised when focusing on the lack of attacks on the

United States homeland, global Jihadist groups such as the Islamic State and al-

Qa’ida have shown to be elusive in nature and can expand to the United States

(Zimmerman, 2014).21

. Furthermore, we have witnessed ‘Islamic militants join forces

21

According to Zimmerman, ‘we must develop a strategy that addresses all

13

with al-Qa’ida of the Islamic Maghreb to seize northern Mali declaring the short-lived

independent state of Azawad and imposing harsh sharia law; increased violence from

al-Qaeda-linked jihadist groups Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria; and the

alignment of the al Nusra Front rebel group in Syria with al-Qaeda’ (Patrick and Kerr,

2013). Regardless of the many interventions that have taken place, whether under the

pretexts to remove or halter al-Qa’ida influences, exemplified in the major

interventions in both Somalia and Mali in 2011 and in 2013, or to protect the lives of

civilians noted in the 2011 Libya intervention22

; the threat of terrorism remains

undeterred. Exemplified by the Global Terrorism Index report (GTI) from the

Institute for Economics and Peace, which shows that ‘between 2012 and 2013, the

number of people killed in terrorist incidents saw the largest increase in history, to

18,000 lives lost, which is a 61 percent increase from one year to the next’ (Hyslop,

2014). Considering only ‘five percent of total global terrorist deaths from 2000- 2013

occurred in OECD nations, such as September 11, 2001, the Beslan school siege, the

components of the Islamic State and al-Qaida, and then, Americans home and abroad

will be safe’ (Zimmerman, 2014). Removing the threat of terrorism within the United

States remain counterintuitive, as it fails to address the roots causes of the global

jihadi ideology that thrives in the Middle East, and Africa. 22

The 2011 Libya intervention will be used to substantiate the counter productivity

of counterterrorism strategies with the purpose of humanitarian or military

intervention. This is proven by the case of Libya where although the “lead-from-

behind” strategy overthrew Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, the current situation

remains dire, discarding the once ’model intervention’ as Islamic militants including

those reportedly behind the September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in

Benghazi, Libya, remain active in the east (Zimmerman, 2014).

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Madrid bombings, the London 7/7 attacks, and the 2011 Norway Utoya attack’

(Hyslop, 2014); terrorism prospects are relatively low. In comparison to lower

income nations where the real threat, impact and risk of terrorism are thriving,

varying from the increased terrorist activity from ISIS, whom have developed beyond

the conventional terrorist organization23

. The proliferation of 'terrorist activity has

increased dramatically, where in Syria for instance, embroiled in its civil war since

2011, moved from zero recorded terrorist events in 2010 to the country with the

5th highest level of terrorist impact in the world in 2013' (Hyslop, 2014); more

importantly signifying the under evaluated nature of real threats and risks. The

success of counterterrorism policies and strategies, not only in the United States but

within the Western community, suggests that current approaches need to be

readdressed. Where ‘only five countries amount to 82 percent of the totaled global

terrorist activity, counterterrorism policies need to address the factors that enable

radicalisation, intergroup cohesion and grievances, as stipulated in the Global

Terrorist Index report which postulates the same factors that create broader societal

conflict also drive terrorist activity’ (Hyslop, 2014).

Despite the expanding influence of global terrorism, there have been some

considerable counterterrorism successes displayed by the United States, and the

international community that should not go unrecognised. The United States, have

23

The Islamic State is argued to be a serious, yet unique threat to Americans in the

‘broader Middle East, with the exemplary acts or barbarism and brutality, exampled

in the mass killings in both Syria and Iraq, and the public murder of two Americans,

Jim Foley and Steven Sotloff’ (Zimmerman, 2014).

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made progress to a degree in developing both counter radicalization strategies and

policies to ‘reduce al-Qa’ida’s attraction, and active measures to ensure that terrorists

never get their hands on weapons of mass destruction or the materials necessary to

build them; more conspicuously their effective international collaboration to crack

down on terrorist financing, by stemming the flow of funds to terrorists' hands and

providing legal frameworks to prosecute those providing them’ (Patrick and Kerr,

2014). Focusing beyond the military successes against al-Qa’ida through the removal

of Osama Bin Laden, and other affiliates killed through various air strikes and

counterinsurgency measures, the United States have made exceptional progress in

eliminating safe havens. Unsurprisingly controversial, the consistent use of

unmanned drones have been argued to be strategically successful, both short and long

term.24

In 2010 alone, ‘the Obama administration had authorized over one- hundred

drone strikes worldwide, killing Mohammed Atef, AQ’s top military strategist, in

2001 in a drone strike near Kabul, two months after the 9/11 attacks; and

additionally, since 2008 killing dozens of lower-ranking militants and at least ten

mid-and upper-level leaders within Al Qaeda or the Taliban’ (Rineheart, 2010: 37).

Regardless of the supposed successes of American counterterrorism measures, such

strategies like the use of drones have produce unintended consequences, through the

killing of unarmed and innocent civilians, which have alienated local and

24

The use of drones have been widely used to corroborate claims of counterterrorism

policies in respect to the United States, with the subsequent feature of collateral

damage, radical Islamic groups such as al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State have used this

consequent feature to promulgate their ideology.

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international populations.

Since the September 11 attacks, the United States have been condemned for its

extraordinary response to the attacks on their homeland, military strategies and

domestic policies have been deemed counterproductive as they have provoked the

prevalence of global terrorist. When analysing the use of drones, interventions,

enhanced securitization policies and laws, neither have reduced the prospects of

radicalization, but instead created alienation, communal cohesion and anger which

groups such as al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State thrive off, especially in regards to

recruitment. The latter section will focus predominantly on the counter productivity

of American counterterrorism policies and strategies by analysing the human rights

and international law debate and the consequent creation of alienation and

marginalization through both domestic policies and foreign strategy.25

Counterterrorism or Counter Productivity?

The former analysis of American counterterrorism policies demonstrates whilst some

success has been made to deter homeland attacks in the United States, the measures

taken to reduce terrorist capabilities, more so of al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State have

proved unequivocally counterproductive. This section will argue that,

counterterrorism policies by the United States have to a degree met the criteria to

reduce the freedom of terrorists to operate (achieved via the elimination of safe

havens), and reduce the number of terrorist attacks within the compound of the

25

References to the United Kingdom will be made to support the creation of

alienation and radicalization, which has been exemplified more recently by the

murder of Lee Rigby, by former radicalized British citizens.

17

United States (Schmid and Hindle, 2009: 43; Byman, 2003; United Nations; The

White House, 2011: 8). Nevertheless, failure has been recognised to accomplish the

criteria to increase levels of domestic support for counter- terrorism (where the

population is ever vigilant), disrupt terrorist recruitment (in order to stem, over time,

the flow of new blood into the organisation), also including the reduction of

radicalization and extremism that highly correlates with terrorist recruitment; and

uphold core American values, including the respect for human rights for all and the

rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism (Schmid and

Hindle, 2009: 43; Byman, 2003; United Nations; The White House, 2011: 8).

Through the exertion of power on securitization, influencing the demise of human

rights and civil liberties, to pre-emptive measures and increased presence

internationally in the Middle East; American counterterrorism policies have fostered

anti-American sentiments and marginalised particular groups in society resulting in

increased terrorist recruitment both at home and abroad.

“Any society that would give up a little liberty to gain a little security will deserve

neither and lose both” Benjamin Franklin26

The debate around the counter productiveness of counterterrorism policies have

promulgated around the suspension of human rights and civil liberties that

democracies such as the United States have proscribed to. After the September 11

attacks, the ‘Bush administration argued that certain international norms did not apply

26

See Thomas Birkland (2010) An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories,

Concepts and Models of Public Policy Making, Third Edition, Routledge, pp. 239

18

to United States conduct because the United States faced a situation of exceptional

insecurity’ (Ralph, 2013: 1). This involved enhanced security measures to catch the

culprits or anyone affiliated with al-Qa’ida, the Afghanistan War to later the Iraq

invasion that all roundly annihilated international law. The introduction of the 2001

PATRIOT Act27

was ‘initially well received as an expeditious and comprehensive

governmental response to the continued threat on national security’, comprised of a

range of surveillance powers for governmental agencies to ‘use video cameras, wire-

tapping and bugs that could be used to detect, prevent and investigate alleged crimes’

(Fura and Klamberg, 2012: 463; Ahmadi, 2011; Doyle, 2004)28

. This act also

included the extension of policing powers in terms of stop and search both in public

and private surroundings; such policies have not been confined to the United States,

but reflected in the United Kingdom’s CONTEST strategy, and legislations including

the Terrorism Act 2000, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and the Terrorism Act

2006 which was introduced in response to the 7/7 London bombings.

The US administration have sought to 'create a society that is protected by

27

Irrespective of government officials who claim that 'security and liberty are

interrelated and mutually reinforcing, which the PATRIOT Act is allegedly dedicated

to serve' (Birkland, 2010: 239). The PATRIOT Act has done the opposite, through

the erosion of constitutional liberties and rights. 28

The New York Times revealed in December 2005 that President Bush had

authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to intercept communications

entering or leaving the United States without first obtaining a warrant even if the

communication concerned a person located in the United States (Fura and Klamberg,

2012: 473).

19

impenetrable physical and electronic barriers, however such delusion has arguably

also jeopardized important liberties by suggesting a hierarchy of rights, and invited a

situation in which limits imposed by extraordinary laws become increasingly

portrayed as ordinary' (Bigo, 2001). In addition, the ambiguous discourse of policies

such as the PATRIOT Act to reassure the public safety have constructed what

Hillyard terms ‘suspect communities’ (Hillyard, 1993: 33).29

Prevalent in the late

1990’s in the United Kingdom due to the terrorist attacks by the IRA, policies that

enhanced surveillance as witnessed in the United States focus solely on the social

group that favour those who perpetrated the attacks. The war on terror discourse in

the United States have constructed a Muslim suspect community, where they have

been racially profiled in accordance to the PATRIOT Act, and continuously viewed

29

Hillyard ‘explained the concept of ‘suspect community’ as the process of

identification of a threat and of a sign of abnormality which exemplified and

legitimated the politics of exception put in place by the state’ (Hickman and Thomas,

2011: 10; Hillyard, 1993: 7). This term was widely used during ‘the communisation

of the Irish community during the terrorist attacks perpetrated by the IRA, where ’ a

person who is drawn into the criminal justice system, not as a suspect in a normal

sense, but suspected primarily because they are Irish’ (Hickman and Thomas, 2011:

10; Hillyard, 1993: 7). Hillyard’s conceptualisation of the ‘suspect community’

proved prevalent in the United States, where if you attributed any features associated

with the stereotypical understanding of an Muslim, you were targeted by

governmental agencies for surveillance purposes‘, such treatment has not been

confined to policing purposes only, the general public enacted discriminative

behaviour to Muslim individuals. With continuous media outlets focusing on Islamic

extremism, the psychological reaction by many would be to fear those who are

closely associated to such perception envisaged by the media, which in the case of

the September 11, attacks or even the July London bombings, Muslim communities.

The counter productivity of policies such as the PATRIOT Act or when referring to

the United Kingdom terrorism legalisations introduce in 2000, 2005 and 2006 that

continue draconian measures to reinforce the idealistic thought of preventing terrorist

radicalisation.

20

with suspicion of being a potential terrorist.

Although there remains a scarcity of empirical evidence on how counterterrorism

policies in the United States have affected Muslims whom reside there, there a

relevant, yet few studies that show how counterproductive domestic policies to tackle

terrorism can be. A prime example substantiating the effects of policies that exert the

suspect community or individual follows from the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings.

A Saudi national was seen like many other bystanders ‘running, badly hurt’ but was

tackled by a bystander as he was suspected to be the bomber, due to his apparent

suspicious outlook’ (New Yorker, 2013). According to the Boston police, it is

reported that ‘he smelt like explosives’ (New Yorker, 2013). The problem starts here,

due to the middle Eastern appearance of this man, the public and law enforcement

irrationally suspected this man as the terrorist, the effects of policies that inherently

racially profile Muslims imply the not only relevance of Hillyard’s suspect

community, but furthermore contributes to the growing fear towards Muslims. The

reality of the Boston Bombings in 2013, is that these attacks were perpetrated by the

Tsarnaev brothers who had been radicalised, which introduced a new challenge of

‘how to counter online radicalization, a known recruitment tool used by terrorist

networks overseas, which appeared to have a significant impact on the suspected

perpetrators of the attacks that left three dead and hundreds injured’ (Huffington Post,

2013). The case of the Tsarnaev brothers may be unique, as there was no evidence

that they had worked with a terrorist group, but still brings to light that policies at

21

home and abroad can influence ones choice to radicalise, as shown in an ‘apparent

confession note by Dzhokar Tsarnev, as he justified his role in the Boston bombings

as retribution for the American-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan’ (Huffington Post,

2013). When policies that sought to protect individuals, consequently normalise

alienation, victimisation and also the suppression of civil liberties and human rights,

counter-productiveness arises when those prophesied to be terrorist actually become

one.30

American policy makers have tried to justify what they deem pre-emptive

intelligence as a ‘more proactive, preventive measure against threats such as

terrorism’ (Fura and Klamberg, 2012: 463). Nevertheless, this has remained far from

the reality, policies such as the PATRIOT Act have infringed upon the rights

stipulated in the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8, which ‘protects

the individual’s right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his

correspondence’ (Fura and Klamberg, 2012: 467), and the Fourth Amendment to the

30‘The Christmas tree bomber’ corroborates claims of radicalization and raises the

question to whether entrapping low-level wannabe jihadists with elaborate FBI sting

operations the best way of handling domestic radicals? See Raffaello Pantucci’s

article ‘Counter- productive counter-terror’. Available from:

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/nov/30/mohamed-

osman-mohamud-portland

22

United States Constitution.31

The sheer disregard to these given rights have caused a

rejection of domestic support for terrorism, and alienated those, who these rights are

introduced to protect.32

The former champions of democratic values, and human

rights have illogically used clandestine operations both domestically and

internationally, obliterating of one of the most robust norms, 1984 UN Convention

against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

(Dunne, 2007: 277; Richards, 2014), with the authorization of the torture of many

detainees, whom were detained without charge or public hearing in a court (Dunne,

2007: 278; Richards, 2014). This is exemplified in the exposure of Guantanamo Bay

and Abu Ghraib, which revealed stories of abusive treatment and interrogation

methods used by the United States on detainees.33

The US administration has justified and rationalised the use of torture under the

analogy of terrorists as inhuman, and something that requires all means possible to

defeat. Once known as the states leading in the role of universalising human rights,

morals and ethically acceptable norms, their counter terrorism policies when focusing

on such facets not only reflecting double standards, but furthermore, reinforce a

'contradictory (and often superfluous) nature, as well as the illusions they have about

31

‘The Fourth Amendment provides the following: The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches be

seized’ (Fura and Klamberg, 2012: 471). 32

The targeting of Islamic groups to respond to the central security concern of

terrorism has ‘blurred the boundaries between ‘moderate Muslims’ and ‘extremist

Muslims’, such a political discourse has impacted the lives of those who identify

themselves as Muslim in an multi ethnic United States’ (Hickman and Thomas, 2011:

3). 33

See generally, John T Parry ‘The shape of Modern Torture: Extraordinary rendition

and Ghost detainees, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol 6.

23

their own power' (Bigo, 2001). This is shown in strategic measures within the War on

Terror, from the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was neither in accordance with the

UN's founding charter, nor sanctioned by the UNSC. The 'manipulation of

international laws, such as ‘Resolution 1368’ 34 and international measures abroad

resulting in forced regime change, through the jargon of humanitarian interventions,

which in reality serve as a pretext carry out a “war without borders”, a global war of

conquest' (Chossudovsky, 2014; Marks, 2006: 46; Richards, 2014). Considering,

extremist groups such as al-Qa'ida have made it explicit clear about their aim to 'evict

foreign forces from the Islamic world, especially in the Middle East, and terminate

elite, corrupt and pro-western countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan'

(Rogers, 2007), American counterterrorism strategies in the Middle East have proved

counterproductive. In spite, of all the 'military actions in the Middle East and South-

West Asia, the al-Qa'ida movement has remained resilient and active', regardless of

the fact 'many of Al-Qa’ida’s early leaders, like Osama Bin Laden, have been either

killed or captured, new generations have come to take their place', and the Islamic

State have gained strong prominence in various sections of the Middle East (Rogers,

2007).

Whilst it's been established that domestic counterterrorism policies have backfired

through energising radicalization and anti- Westernism, American foreign policy

through the War on Terror has proved to make 'anti-Americanism in particular a

34

Resolution 1368: recognized ‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-

defence...’ provided the principal legal basis for the use of force (Marks, 2006: 46).

24

common place in many parts of the world' (Rogers, 2014). Preemptive

counterterrorism strategies through the use of drones, for example, have

'disproportionately killed civilians and generated anti-American sentiments that aid

al-Qaeda recruitment efforts' (Hopkins, 2013). This is corroborated by Doyle and

McCarthy,35

who rather adroitly explained that drones are having 'adverse strategic

effects by causing hatred among the local populations where US bombs fall, as for

every innocent person you kill, you create 10 new enemies' (Hopkins, 2013; Glaser,

2014). More importantly, the current drone programme is encouraging a new arms

race that will empower current and future rivals and lay the foundations for an

international system that is increasingly violent' (Hopkins, 2013; Glaser, 2014). As

supported by McCarthy, strategies like the drone programme, have been

propagandistic tools for both Al-Qa'iad and the Islamic States, where the systematic

killings of many Muslims have both fuelled the anti- American view and proved to be

an excellent tool for recruitment to al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State36

. The strength and

persistence shown by the Islamic State, shows not only that counterterrorism policies

35

Michael Boyle, who was on 'Obama's counter-terrorism group in the run-up to his

election in 2008', argues the use and over reliance on drone warfare not only

undermines the rule of law, but also has proven ineffective and counterproductive,

this is substantiated by Stanley McChrystal, the former military general to Obama,

who stated drone warfare has exacerbated the perception of American arrogance

which had generally fuelled anti-Americanism (Hopkins, 2013; Glaser, 2014). What

remains unsurprising is that 'US use of drones has soared during Obama's time in

office, with the White House authorising attacks in at least four countries:

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. It is estimated that the CIA and the US

military have undertaken more than 300 drone strikes and killed about 2,500 people'

(Hopkins, 2013; Glaser, 2014) within all the mentioned countries, terrorism is

resilient and proliferating higher than expected considering the variety of

counterterrorism policies in hand. 36

The United States involvement with Israel has fuelled anti-American sentiments,

who by many Palestinians have been viewed as a terrorist state. Israel have been

widely 'depicted by the West as victims of terrorism, however in reality they are

major perpetrators of state terrorism which is consistently downplayed or ignored'

(Herman, 1982).

25

in the United States need to change but more importantly, the 'inconvenient truth is

that ISIS actually represents a dangerous new chapter in the global war being waged

by Al Qaeda and its affiliated and inspired group', which has been bolstered by

policies both domestic and international by the United States (Gottlieb, 2014).

Consequently, counterterrorism policies by the West, specifically the United States,

have sought to deal with the upsurge in extremist terrorism by fighting terrorism with

terror, matching assassination with assassination, and torture with torture, hence its

counter productivity (Ignatieff, 2005).37

Conclusion

American counterterrorism policies have proved counterproductive, where various

measures to deal with the proliferating threat of radical Islamism and both national

and international terrorism have resulted in allegiances to international morals and

laws to be disregarded to further national security gains, and the actual increase of

terrorist activity. This has been validated when revising the abuse of human rights,

civil liberties and international law, within the United States and the United Kingdom

in particular. Irrespective of the considerable successes that have been displayed

through domestic and international policies, terrorism persists to be a serious threat to

the international community notably when analyzing the current activity of Al-

Qa’ida and the Islamic state.38

37

See generally, Michael Ignatieff (2005) The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age

of Terror. Available from: http://press.princeton.edu/titles/7578.html 38

See Thomas Ricks, A view from Pakistan. Available from:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/15/a-view-from-pakistan-isis-and-the-u-s-look-the-

same-to-me-both-thinking-they-enjoy-a-form-of-divine-exceptionalism/

26

This article sought to analyse American counterterrorism policies in respect to five

criteria39

, although such policies whether domestic or international have reduced

attacks on American homeland, complying with criteria four, there has been a failure

to reduce extremist terrorist attacks internationally where we witness weekly attacks

more so in the Middle Eastern region, by Al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State. When

exploring the reduced freedom of for terrorist to operate, referred to formerly as

criteria one, counterinsurgency strategies, the deployment of American soldiers, and

the excessive use of drone warfare have to a degree reduced safe havens used by

extremist groups such as Al-Qa’ida, but consequently too, helped to them to

proliferate. American counterterrorism policies have unequivocally failed to meet

criteria two, three and five. Through various interventions that have tried to impose

western values, also referred to a Humanitarian Imperialism by Jean Bricmont,

exampled in the Afghanistan war in 2001, and the Libyan intervention in 2011, the

use of drone warfare, the use of extraordinary rendition, and domestic policies such

as the PATRIOT Act; the adherence to morally inclined Liberalistic values have been

disregarded, terrorism recruitment has upsurge since 2001, and domestic support has

severely declined. To conclude, the American stance to counterterrorism, have had

many repercussions, their over reliance on hard power and offensive strategies have

not countered terrorism but proved to be an excellent propaganda tool for terrorist

recruitment, energized the current trend of anti-Americanism and Westernism.

39

Refer to page 6, where the five criteria are specified in detail.

27

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