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REASSESSING THE NATURE OF IS DAVID KREPS

Reassessing the Nature of IS

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Page 1: Reassessing the Nature of IS

REASSESS ING THE NATURE OF IS

DAVID KREPS

Page 2: Reassessing the Nature of IS

DEEPER QUEST IONS

• What are the roots of positivism?

• How should we understand interpretivism after the development of critical IS?

• What philosophical grounding is most appropriate for critical IS?

• Part One:

• philosophical support for the reality of subjectivity

• Part Two:

• Combining the strengths of positivism, interpretivism and critical approaches - often already done, but through this philosophical lens made all the clearer

• Suggestion for the (positivist) What, (interpretivist) How and (critical) Why of IS.

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SC IENT ISM /POS IT IV ISM

• Descartes (1596-1650): thought and theology vs scientific materialism. Information derived from sensory experience, giving empirical findings, is deemed to be the exclusive source of evidential knowledge

• Comte (1798-1857) described this derived knowledge as ‘positive’ knowledge, giving birth to ‘positivism’ (Comte 1865).

• Positivism rejects all introspective or intuitive knowledge, and all metaphysics, as effectively theological (Russell 1914).

• Nature, therefore, is defined, by this scientific positivist approach, as something that does not include us: meaning not our bodies or brains, but the persons who observe, and experience the sensations we label ‘empirical.’

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3 PH I LOSOPHERS

• Three philosophical critiques of the specific claims of scientism to determine exclusively the nature of Nature

• Thomas Nagel - contemporary US philosopher

• Henri Bergson - 1859-1941 France

• Alfred North Whitehead - 1861-1947 Britain / US

• Benjamin Libet - contemporary US neuroscientist

and a neuroscientist

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THOMAS NAGEL

“THE SUB JECT I V ITY OF CONSCI OUSNESS I S AN IRREDUCI BLE FEATURE OF REAL I TY – W ITHOUT WH ICH WE COULDN’T DO PHYS ICS OR AN YTH ING ELSE – AND IT MUST OCCUPY AS FUNDAMENTAL A PL ACE IN ANY CRED IBLE WORLD V I EW AS MATTER , EN ERGY , SPACE , T IME AND NUMBERS” THE V I EW FROM NOWHERE (1986 :7 -8 ) .

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• Nagel: Physics is “the science in which we have achieved our greatest detachment from a specifically human perspective on the world. But for precisely that reason physics is bound to leave undescribed the irreducibly subjective character of conscious mental processes, whatever may be their intimate relation to the physical operation of the brain” (Nagel 1986:7).

• Libet: the “determinist materialist view” that would reduce us to ‘a pack of neurons’ “is a belief system; it is not a scientific theory that has been verified by direct tests” (Libet 2005:5).

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HENR I BERGSON

OUR PSYCHICAL LIFE, WHILE BOUND TO ITS MOTOR ACCOMPANIMENT, IS NOT GOVERNED BY IT MATTER AND MEMORY(BERGSON 1908:83)

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• Bergson: Reconception of time as duration.

• durée réelle : our conscious states are basically qualitative, and cannot be adequately described or measured in terms of quantities - homogeneous and measurable time is an artificial concept, formed by the intrusion of the idea of space into the realm of duration.

• consciousness experiences duration, and exercises free will - it interrupts otherwise automatic processes of perception-action, and is therefore intimately involved with matter : we are ‘centres of action’ who make choices

• Libet: “It is true scientific discoveries have increasingly produced powerful evidence for the ways in which mental abilities, and even the nature of one’s personality, are dependent on, and can be controlled by, specific structures and functions of the brain. However, the nonphysical nature of subjective awareness, including the feelings of spirituality, creativity, conscious will, and imagination, is not describable or explainable directly by the physical evidence alone” (Libet 2005:5).

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ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

‘A DURATION’ IS “A CONCRETE SLAB OF NATURE L IMITED BY SIMULTANEITY WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR DISCLOSED IN SENSE-AWARENESS” THE CONCEPT OF NATURE (1920:53)

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• Co-author with his former student Bertrand Russell the first volume of the famous Principia Mathematica (1910).

• Whitehead protests against “the bifurcation of nature into two systems of reality, which, in so far as they are real, are real in different senses…[they] bifurcate nature into two divisions, namely into the nature apprehended in awareness and the nature which is the cause of awareness.” (Whitehead 1920:29-31).

• Rather than distinguishing between quantities and qualities, Whitehead focuses upon the notion of the ‘event’ as a core unit of existence, in a “structure of events” (Whitehead 1920:52), but which contains both the physical and nonphysical elements we currently describe in separate ways, as they unfold.

• “What sense-awareness delivers over for knowledge is nature through a period” (ibid p57).

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PART ONE : SUMMARY

• Libet: “conscious mental phenomena are not reducible to or explicable by knowledge of nerve cell activities” (2005:5).

• Nagel-Bergson-Whitehead: The reality of subjective consciousness, for all the links with physico-chemical processes in the brain, is not reducible to them, fundamentally nonphysical in relation to them, and wrapped up, somehow, with the unfolding of time itself.

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PART TWO: IMPL ICAT IONS FOR I S

• Implications for Positivist IS - the What

• Implications for Interpretivism - the How

• Implications for Critical IS - the Why

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POS IT IV IST I S

“ GE N E RA L LY S P E A K I N G , I S R E S E A RC H C AN B E C L AS S I F I E D A S P O S I T I V I S T I F T H E R E I S E V I D E N C E O F F O R M AL P R O P O S I T I O N S , Q U AN T I F I A B L E M E A SU R E S O F VA R I A B L E S , H Y P O T H E S I S T E S T I N G , A N D T H E D RAW I N G O F I N F E R E N C E S ABO U T A P H E N O M E N O N F RO M A R E P R E S E N TAT I VE S A M P L E T O A STAT E D P O P U L AT I O N ” ( K L E I N A N D M Y E R S 1 9 9 9 : 6 9 ) .

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IMPL ICAT IONS : POS IT IV IST I S

1910s/20s Principia Mathematica, and logical positivism: verificationism

1930s Gödel and the limits of logic vs. Hilbert and the Göttingen School

1940s/50s von Neumann: applied science, explosives, cybernetics, computing and computational economics at Cowles

1959 Gordon and Howell’s Higher Education for Business report: “proposed that business schools needed to gain academic rigour and credibility by moving away from the vocational emphasis towards a strong disciplinary base with an empirical and scientific grounding – essentially economics” (Mingers 2015:317)

1960s Cowles verificationist economics - discounts the subjective as unverifiable

IS grew up as a discipline in Business Schools under this influence

A strictly positivist approach in IS encounters problems with “real managers” because it continues a verificationist discounting of the reality of subjectivity.

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PO S IT IV IST I S W IT H IN T H E ‘ ST RU CT UR E O F EVEN T S - T HE WHAT

• Positivist IS need only limit the scope of its ambition : it is not the whole picture, merely a part of it

• Derived empirical knowledge must be joined with subjective experience to turn data into information, to turn facts into meaning, to make systems relevant to “real managers”

• Positivist approaches provide the What of IS: the IT artefact in its context

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INTERPRET IV IST I S

INTERPRETIVE IS RESEARCH IS CONCERNED WITH “HUMAN THOUGHT AND ACTION IN SOCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXTS,” KLEIN AND MYERS (1999:67),

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IMPL ICAT IONS : INTERPRET IV ISM• Often overly focussed upon the personal, upon the

subjective: as if the nonphysical nature of consciousness divorced it from physical reality altogether!

• “IS research can be classified as interpretive if it is assumed that our knowledge of reality is gained only through social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, documents, tools, and other artifacts” (Klein and Myers 1999:69) (my emphasis).

• Inverse Positivism in Interpretive IS : continuing the subject/object divide from the opposite shore?

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IN T ERPRET IV IST I S W IT H IN T H E ‘ ST RU CT UR E O F EVEN T S - T HE H O W

• “The IS is not the IT and the formal processes being used. The IS is not the people using the IT and the formal and informal processes. The IS is what emerges from the usage and adaptation of the IT and the formal and informal processes by all of its users.” (Paul 2007:193)

• “as Parmenides observed, ‘you cannot swim in the same river twice.’ Interpretivists argue that organizations are not static and that the relationships between people, organizations, and technology are not fixed but constantly changing. As a consequence, interpretive research seeks to understand a moving target” (Klein and Myers 1999:73).

• Processes are themselves in process, contingent upon a structure of other processes - durée réelle

• Interpretivist approaches can provide the How of IS: the context an IT artefact must embed itself in

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CR IT ICAL I S

“CAN BE CL ASS IF IED AS CR IT ICAL I F THE MAIN TASK IS SEEN AS BE ING ONE OF SOC IAL CR IT IQUE , WHEREBY THE RESTRICT IVE AND AL IENAT ING CONDIT IONS OF THE STATUS QUO ARE BROUGHT TO L IGHT” (KLE IN AND MYERS 1999:69 )

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IMPL ICAT IONS : CR IT ICAL I S

• Habermas, Foucault, Bourdieu…. conservatism in Critical IS?

• These three streams are all social - close to the interpretivist inversion of the positivist divide

• “Critical researchers… often have a cause – for example, feminism, environmentalism, less developed economies – so they may see a particular conflict and focus on that, downplaying other potential interpretations” (McGrath 2005:86).

• Some critical IS scholars are interpretivists with a particular ‘beef,’

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CR IT IC AL I S W ITH IN TH E ‘ ST RU CT UR E O F EVEN T S - T HE WHY1. positivist systems are ubiquitous in our societies

• they need to be challenged for the way in which they can depersonalise those who use them.

• A ‘structure of events’ approach

• acknowledges that positivist systems in fact promote their own (philosophical and economic) agenda

• foregrounds the need for genuine personalisation in systems.

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CR IT IC AL I S W ITH IN TH E ‘ ST RU CT UR E O F EVEN T S - T HE WHY

2. a Foucauldian understanding of subjectivity is not at odds with the subjectivity described by Nagel, Bergson and Whitehead.

• Foucault moved from a highly disciplinated social structure, towards the possibility of shaping the self through key choices made within the contingent milieu of an otherwise co-determined subjectivity.

• A ‘structure of events’ approach accentuates the contingency of subjectivity

• the mind determined albeit not governed by the brain

• situated at every point within interlocking and interpenetrating events that are both personal and concrete, chosen and determined.

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CR IT IC AL I S W ITH IN TH E ‘ ST RU CT UR E O F EVEN T S - T HE WHY

3. Critical IS as a political project can sometimes be guilty of somewhat parochial concerns, focussed

• in some Green IT upon the preciousness of the natural environment at the expense of the people living there

• in some ICT4D on either the benefit to the Western economy of third world development, or the benefits locally to small communities

• in World Systems Theory upon the shifts and movements of commodities at the expense of the environment

• A ‘structure of events’ approach might help contextualise all these Critical IS concerns within an openness characteristic of the metaphysical – and thus ontological – concerns upon which it rests : Bergson’s ‘open’ societies: far deeper and more inclusive than the more parochial concerns above.

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CR IT IC AL I S IN ST RUC T URE O F EVEN T S

Calling attention to the agendas within positivist IS

Encouraging personalisation

Understanding subjectivity as radically contingent yet incorporating – by metaphysical necessity – the freedom of the will, however curtailed

Promoting an openness not just to incorporating the subjective within our scientific understanding of reality, but to each other, across the boundaries we are otherwise wont to place between our groupings

A ‘structure of events’ approach in Critical IS promises a transnational emancipatory social critique, applicable to the entire range of information systems at work in our societies

Critical approaches provide the Why of IS: reasons to make an IT artefact in the first place

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CONCLUS ION : WHAT , HOW, WHY• Tech for Good movement already doing it

• Carefully and cleverly worked out systems with robust coding (the positivist what)

• Rigorously user tested with UX research techniques and in continuous beta constantly iterating and improving (the interpretivist how)

• Geared towards improving people’s lives in one way or another (the critical why).

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THANKS

• Dr David Kreps• http://david.kreps.org • [email protected]

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