Reforming the European Commission:

is there a trade-off betweenefficiency and democratic

accountabilityin case of a non-

majoritarian institutuion

Anna Dekalchuk, POL,March, the 17th

OUTLINE

the European Commission: what kind of animal? the trade-off and non-majoritarian legitimacy reforming the Commission: „increasing

accountability/legitimacy‟ exercise? added value of the increased accountability and decreased

efficiency?

the European Commission: what kind of animal?

“Non-majoritarian institutions… [are] those governmental entities that possess and exercise some grant of specialised public authority, separate from that of other institutions, but are neither directly elected by the people, nor directly managed by elected officials”

(Thatcher & Stone Sweet: 2)

What for to create NMIs? The functions of the Commission

resolve commitment problems (NMIs areexpected to work to enhance thecredibility of promises)

exclusive competencies of the EU in competition policy and the super-role of the Commission (Art.3.1(b) of TFEU & Arts 101-109 of TFEU)

enhance the efficiency of rule making

(NMIs are expected to respond torelatively specific problems and issuesthat arise, and to develop and employexpertise in order to produce appropriatepublic policy)

delegated legislation and implementingacts: the Commission‟ s role in the secondary legislation (Arts 290-291 of TFEU)

avoid taking blame for unpopular policies(NMIs are expected to maximise policygoals that principals know may sometimesbe unpopular with important societalgroups)

right of legislative initiative (Art. 17.2 of TEU)

the European Commission: what kind of animal?

O

guns

butter

Y

X

. ..

X1

X2

Y1 Y2

A TRADE-OFF

Production possibility frontierguns and butter

O

Production possibility frontierefficiency and democratic accountability

Y

X

. ..

X1

X2

Y1 Y2

EFFICIENCY

DEMOCRATICACCOUNTABILITY

A TRADE-OFF

O

Production possibility frontierefficiency and democratic accountability

.

.

X1

X2

Y1 Y2

EFFICIENCY

DEMOCRATICACCOUNTABILITY

A TRADE-OFF

X1Y1 – trade-off in situation of solving commitment problem by NMI

X2Y2 – trade-off in situations of enhancing efficiency of rule-making process by NMI & blame-shifting

e.g. competition policy

e.g. implementation of the secondary legislation

nobody cares

Democratic/legitimacy deficit as defined by G.Majone:“technocratic decision-making, lack of transparency,insufficient public participation, excessive use ofadministrative discretion, inadequate mechanisms ofcontrol and accountability”

(Majone, 1998: 14-15)

Maastricht and its aftermath “was a great constitutional moment” for the EU because of “the public reaction, frequently and deliciously hostile... For four decades European politicians were spoiled by a population which was conveniently indifferent.” Maastricht “has had a transformative impact: public opinion... is no longer willing to accept the orthodoxies of European integration, in particular the imperative which demanded acceptance, come what may, of the dynamics of Union evolution.”

(Weiler: 3-4)

& beginning

input legitimacy

NO!

procedural legitimacy

YES!

output legitimacy

YES?!

Legitimacy of NMIs –the weak link of the system

O

Production possibility frontierefficiency and democratic accountability

.

.

X1

X2

Y1 Y2

EFFICIENCY

DEMOCRATICACCOUNTABILITY

A TRADE-OFF

.X3

Y3

X2Y2 – trade-off in situations of enhancing efficiency of rule-making process by NMI & blame-shifting

(Source: Szapiro, 2006b: 577)

The PRAC “is a fairly straightforward example of the well-known trade-off between democracy and efficiency…”

(Christiansen & Vaccari: 2006)

The European Transparency Initiative, 2005 & the Register of Interest representatives, 2008

“But will it be enough to restore citizens' confidence in the European project?”

Where is the added value of increased accountability and decreased efficiency when it comes to legitimacy?