At the pinnacle of authoritarianism in Africa, social turmoil reigned when publics fell apart; when sheer anarchy spread; where the best, lost conviction, while the worst acted with brutal inten-sity and impunity. As the political space gets intricately turbulent, societies became permanently fluid and the task of avoiding distress becomes queerly indefinite. The mystified elite had grown

insensitive to change, but the cost of ignorance is indeed too ghastly to contemplate.

A youthful ‘joie-de-vivre’ Civic Protest Alliances against Venality:

Quo Vadis ‘Political’ Ethiopia Public Lecture - Respublica Literaria CXV, MMXVI

Costantinos Berhutesfa Costantinos, PhD Professor of Public Policy, School of Graduate Studies,

College of Business & Economics, AAU

Abstract Large student demonstrations in the 1970s demanded land to the tiller and the equality of nations &

nationalities. The ideological baggage that informed the era and that continues to „enlighten‟ politics heretofore is important to note in at least three ways: the ubiquity of imperious economic policy, the stress on political organization, and the national question. Half a century later, HRW (2016) states, a human rights crisis is taking place in Ethiopia, triggered by the Addis Ababa Master Plan. While the political state and its securi-ty apparatus are intact, Lefort (2016) asserts, ‘Since the spring of 2014, it has been shaken by a rising tide of popular discontent. A Front that was righteous, disinterested, devoted as it was during the armed struggle, ready to listen and to serve, is now accused of having succumbed to an unholy trinity: corruption, bad governance & unaccount-ability. The Prime Minster has apologised for the havoc wrecked by protests (BBC, 2016). Is this the beginning of the end of the omnipresent state and the rise of political openness?

While the prime role of the state is advancing the economy, it must focus on major infrastruc-ture, streamline the discretionary rule of its officials, eliminate monopolies and economic distortions that facilitate them and improve accountability. Leadership, political will and public support are es-sential to stemming any threats to stability. The causes and not just the consequences of these threats have to be addressed with urgency. The first requisite of good governance as a precursor of plural-ism is a spirit of tolerance that requires political and policy differences to be resolved in a spirit of respect for the views of citizens. The state’s legitimacy stems or should transpire from an acceptance of the fair-

ness and transparency of its procedures for choices to state offices and policymaking. Its sustainability depends on public confidence as well as the confi-dence in the fairness of its governing. Ethiopia can pursue its good governance transition goals consist-ently in varying contexts, but do so without resort-ing to a self-defeating, overly scripted and stage-managed political ploy? The protests and the apologies herald a new era of openness, albeit at a very high price.

Key words: Ethiopia, Oromia, authoritar-ianism, protests, good governance, pluralism, de-mocracy

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1. Introduction

Student in Ethiopia in the sixties and seventies demanded „land to the tiller‟ and equality of na-tions as a prerequisite for any participation in the development campaign. Scholarship students had come from abroad in the summer of 1974 and in early 1975. This gave momentum for the adoption of Marxism-Leninism by the students, as the panacea for Ethiopia's ills. In Ethiopia too, an almost imperceptible transition was made from religious orthodoxy to ideological dogmatism without the attenuating influence of an intervening period of free liberal thinking. Marxism, in its Leninist, Stalin-ist and Maoist editions, has been the dominant ideology of student movement and then of the left as a whole since the late sixties.

The ideological baggage that informed the seventies revolutionary process and that continues to „enlighten‟ politics heretofore is important to note in at least three ways: the ubiquity of imperious econom-ic policy, the stress on political organization, and the national question - self-determination up to and including cessa-tion. Compared to the camaraderie of the early twentieth century intellectuals and the disasters of a military coup who organized the abortive rebellion of sixties, the achievements of the post-sixties generation in the sphere of organization are nothing short of copious. The Junta had no option but initiate itself into the intellectual discourse began by the students if it wished to stay in power. Through a long and painful process of ideological schooling, the Junta was able to supplant the left and assume the mantle of authentic standard-bearer of Marxism-Leninism.

The Dergue adopted the rhetoric of the left and its recipe for the vanguard party to establish complete control of society that any state has been able to achieve. Young children were slaughtered in thousands; the torture chambers of the junta-cum-pseudo-Marxist elite were designed by the Stazi of the then East Germany and North Korean aid to the junta-cum-pseudo-Marxist elite. the slaugh-ter of prisoners in the corridors of Central Interrogation Prison (Ma’ ekelawi): at a time when cellular member of the students movement were assassinating in broad day light bandas, cadres and quebbelle chairpersons, who represented the junta killing machine, the Ma’ ekelawi murders resorted to killing young street combatants in front of other prisoners to show their brutal intensity. The torture ma-chine at the headquarters of the junta-cum-pseudo-Marxist elite (Dergue mirmera) in the former Men-elliqué Palace delimitated whatever was left from the quebelle murderers.

In 2005, donors suspended direct budget support to the government following a post-election crackdown on de-monstrators that left 200 people dead, 30,000 detained, and dozens of opposition leaders in jail. At the time, do-nors expressed fears of ‘political capture’ of donor funds by the ruling party. Yet aid was soon resumed under a new programme, ‘Protection of Basic Services,’ that channelled money directly to districts. During this period, the state has steadily closed political space, harassed independent journalists and activists into silence or exile. It violated the rights to freedom of association and expression. A 2009 law on civil society activity, bars non-state agencies from working on issues related to rights and governance if they receive more than 10% of their funding from foreign do-nors. The few independent organizations that monitored human rights have been eviscerated (HRW, 2010:1).

For many, the states has proved to be the main channel for personal wealth accumulation and securing privileged position in society. As the result of the socialization of the means of production, state power was appropriated to the political elite. As the winner takes all and the looser is consigned to the political and economic wilderness, all the brutality of bitter fights ensure in every competition. It is a zero-sum game where the loser has no refugee. Added to this is the threat of a major drought in 2015. Ethiopia faces pressing issues and problems of development to be settled. The nation expe-rienced the effects of poverty and severe famines in many areas of the country, affecting millions. Suffering is greatest where the edges of the capacities of government dissolve into the periphery of marginalized populace; where in the near vacuum of administrative capacity, there are only periodic – but startling – indications of malnutrition, destitution and morbidity may never be known

“Since the spring of 2014, the regime has been shaken by a rising tide of popular discontent” (Lefort, 2016). The Oromo youth protests spurred by corruption and mal-governance, is a new chapter in civil disobedience in the nation, heralding a new era of demand for openness by the citi-zens and an opportunity for the state to open up to citizens voices, albeit at a very high price.

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2. Protest alliances against venality 2.1. Coups and counter coups in Africa More than a hundred coup d‟états and counter-coups have taken been recorded in Africa since

the independence efforts in the 60s. Recently, young military officers protesting the state‟s handling of governance staged a coup in Mali, CAR and Burkina. From Algeria and Egypt to Benin and Burkina Faso to Lesotho and Mauritania, Niger, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda and Zanzibar have experienced multiple coups and counter coups for various economic, political and social reasons. The looting of mineral, flora and fauna resources, economic adjustments, corruption and rising ethnic tensions co-incided with such unconstitutional power grab in much of Africa. These tendencies interact causally. The linkage between these and rising tensions is manifested in the distribution of power, wealth and ethnicity, especially under conditions of increasing scarcity. A core contention is that political ten-sions are arising both, as part of the general resistance to corruption and economic adjustment‟s pauperizing impact, and against states, which are increasingly coercive and negligent of their basic welfare responsibilities. While armed rebellion has been the trend, recently, people have risen against states in the Arab Spring that culminated in the removal of regimes in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia

2.2. Historical trends – the protest movement Social change movements erupted for several interrelated reasons. Since the 1930s, the role of

the state had become increasingly important in everyday lives. After World War II, the US emerged as a global power with both a political and moral crusade to convince the world that Western plural-ism was superior. The 1950s and 1960s were periods of relative economic prosperity for most of Ethiopia, making economic disparity more obvious and a factor contributing to the growth of social activism. National cultures were emerging that linked all more closely than ever before; television became common and allowed people to witness events taking place in other parts of the world. More students were going to college, creating a concentration of concerned and educated activists in universities. Activists asked difficult questions until equal opportunity and equal rights became the law of the land for citizens regardless of their race, ethnicity, or gender. Democratic activism at the local and national levels and citizen oversight of state officials became putative activities. In the 21st century, a new form of citizen insurrection, one not based on ideology are now unsettling our planet coupled with economic turmoil in much of the developed world and deadly conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Latin America is overwhelmed by the resurgence of leftist movements. Sixty million people are displaced from their homes, living in refugee camps and shelters in Africa, Middle East and Asia. One can observe the crisis in Ukraine stemming from months of citizen protests against transforming into Cold War II. .

3. The protests are on ‘everyone’s agenda’

HRW (2015) states, a human rights crisis is taking place in Ethiopia. It has received little attention interna-tionally, but it is the biggest political crisis to hit Ethiopia since the 2005 elections. Since November 12, 2015, pro-testers across Ethiopia’s Oromia region have been risking their lives and liberty in the face of a brutal—and sometimes lethal--response from security forces. Soldiers and police have used deadly force and killed several hundred peaceful pro-testers. Thousand have been detained. While there have been some incidents of violent clashes and some members of the security forces have been killed, the vast majority of the protests have been peaceful.

According to Lefort, (2016), the protests were triggered by the so-called Addis Ababa Master Plan, which envisioned expansion of Addis Ababa’s municipal boundary 20-fold. Protesters raised concerns that ethnic Oromos living in the area of that boundary expansion would be displaced from their farms. Ethnic Oromos have long felt politi-cally marginalized and culturally discriminated against by successive governments. However, the most disturbing warn-ing signal came from Oromia, the region that accounts for a majority of the total population and is the economic heart of the country. Since mid-November, its northern half at least has been in a ferment of dissent. Demonstrations were followed by riots as intense and extensive as to be described as a slide into a security crisis: the authorities lost control of entire areas abandoned or deserted by the security forces and began by reacting reflexively in their usual way: if it moves, hit it. The security forces’ disproportionate violence fuelled the protests. Killing is not an answer to our grievances, was the cry. For the first time on this scale, protest extended outside the elite milieu, students and teachers, to encompass not

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just high school and primary school pupils, but even farmers. The centralisation of power, in contradiction with authen-tic federalism, is exacerbated by the general perception of marginalisation and dispossession. The attendant centralisa-tion and its relative liberalisation favour the entrepreneurial economic elite, covering a range of beneficiaries stretching from the big foreign investors to the rich peasant or to businesspersons. The ascendancy of these elite is consubstantial with high positions in the partyi (Lefort, 2016).

The project of establishing a specifically Soviet or Chinese form of political domination has not succeeded in Ethiopia because of the determined resistance of culture. What the party has estab-lished in the cause of the state project is not so much a state in the Western sense as an apparatus of violent repression. The party needed a great deal of arbitrary power to subordinate the territory, to exploit it, and to protect it from the hostilities unleashed by its dehumanising treatment of its victims that put it in a permanent state of war against indigenous society. The logic and assumptions of the state is so unlike those of the indigenous societies, disconnected from their experience and so threat-ening that it has been fiercely resisted. Because of its licentiousness of the logic of the state interests, which controlled it, this force was replete with contradictions and kept the territory, which it was supposed to integrate, disorganised. The alienation of state from society and the perception of the state as a hostile force have bred a crop of informal polities parallel to and in a competitive mode with the state. People have politicised local communities, primary loyalties and ethnic groups as a political force to shield themselves against the state and to compete for the seizure of power. The state is not the quintessential public institution that it is assumed to be. As Claude Ake said, it is not really res publicae. It is not the state of all; it is at best, the state of some.

The organizational imperative of the bureaucratic machine is to command and control, preoccu-pied with its own survival and enrichment, as the state is the main channel for securing privileged position in society. Corruption cannot be seen in isolation, as its effects permeate societies, and in turn, societal attitudes can either encourage or discourage corruption. Consequently, the bureaucracy will no doubt fight democrats aggressively in order to obtain its patron‟s in positions of power by any means possible. Since public sector corruption and inefficiencies undermine political, economic, and social stability by undermining citizen‟s faith, the legitimacy of the state will depend in important ways on it being perceived as reasonably honest, predictable, transparent and accountable. In situa-tions where officials are seen to be using their positions to advance parochial interest and self-aggrandizement, a general loss of respect for authority and the law occurs and despondency in the population develops. It is apparent that as the nation stumbles into a new era of political pluralism, it needs to overhaul the executive to develop institutional alternatives to the corruption pyramid. 4. Discussion

4.1. Analytical challenges in current perspective on pluralism Current discussions and analyses of a pluralistic transition are marked by several limitations. The-

se include a tendency to narrow democratic thought and practice to the terms and categories of im-mediate, not very well considered, political and social action, infantile realism, as it were. This is further impaired by inattention to problems of articulation of democratic systems within local politics rather than simply as formal or abstract possibilities and ambiguity as to whether civil society as to whether it is the agent or object of change. A nearly exclusive concern in certain institutional perspectives on generic attributes of political agency, consequently, neglects analysis in terms of their specific strate-gies and performances and inadequate treatment of the role of international agencies in transitions.

4.1.1. The notion of naïve realism The notion of naive realism is invoked here to point to conceptual flaws in the perspectives of

political groups on political reform in Ethiopia. These shortcomings can be seen as outcomes of more or less conscious attempts to get their hands quickly on urgent or practical matters of pluralism of politics without worrying much about abstract theory. One manifestation of naive realism is the pre-emotive socialisation of democratic ideas and practices. A process which often spawns an attendant rhetorical over simplification of difficult concepts, this socialisation is disabling as a method of both grasping democratic ideas and rules in all their openness and complexity, and making the ideas trac-table to transparent and sustainable institutional practice. In sum, naive realism within existing per-spectives and projects of pluralism in Ethiopia emphasises the immediacies of institutional and polit-

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ical activity to the neglect of the constitutive and regulative concepts and norms that define, structure and validate democratic institutions and practices. It attempts to establish a direct relation to social experience, largely by passing the intangible yet no less significant terrain of critical political thought. Its immediate turn to the practical tasks of inducing people to participate in ostensibly democratic activities such as elections, the full meaning of which is often beyond the grasp of the participants, tends to become a substitute for the making of rules of democratic engagement.

4.1.2. Inattention to problems of articulation of democratic systems When it is not dissolved into the immediate reality of political, often partisan or ethnocentric ac-

tivity, democracy in Ethiopia is likely to be represented as pure principle that needs only proper appli-cation. Practitioners and analysts of politics tend to pass quickly over the particular nature of democ-racy in fragmentary presence in much of Ethiopia, adjusting it against an ideal-general conception of what it might be. On the implicit, theoretically complacent assumption that formalistic, rhetorical modes of circulation of democratic ideas and values nearly exhaust their articulation there, one often rushes to matters of implementation. Consequently, critical problems concerning the philosophical and practical entrenchment of democratic system and process in Ethiopia receive scant attention. The fundamental issues of how the concepts, standards and practices of democratic rule could be gener-ated and sustained under historically hectic conditions, and the manner in which they are likely to gain systemic integrity and autonomy and broad social currency are inadequately addressed.

This relative inattention leads analysts and practitioners to make internal observations and as-sessments in terms of the democratic or undemocratic performances of societies without raising the question of setting up or securing the polities as democratic systems in the first place. For example, in the face of the fact that past constitutions had never actually been effectively established, especial-ly as democratic structures, they are criticised for failing to protect the rights of the citizenry. Democracy must actually exist, take definite shape and structure and become a working process, before particu-lar criticisms, claims and demands can be based on it. Insofar as existing perspectives on political reform neglect to pose the problem of articulation of democracy as a relatively autonomous mode of analysis, pluralism would consist of a set of activities in which universal concepts and standards are neatly applied to, as distinct from produced or re-produced in Ethiopian contexts and conditions. Even at the level of application alone, it is largely overlooked that international models may enter societies through a proliferation of mechanisms that hinder the growth of open and effective transition pro-cess, that they may retard the growth of indigenous democratic-system experience and capacity.

4.1.3. Civil Society: Agent or object of pluralism In the current drive for democracy and development civil society and institutions within it are

foregrounded as the arena, agents and instruments of the movement. Internal and external demands for good governance and democratisation and the need to reform the indigenous state into a system of transparent practices have placed a heavy emphasis on social institutions as autonomous actors with-in democratic projects. While the co-operation of the state must be secured, it cannot be expected that pressure for regime transformation will come from above. The most likely and most effective initiative will come from below, outside the decrepit, authoritarian state, in civil society. Society yields the spontaneous interests, demands and institutional mechanisms of democratic transition. From this perspective, the state‟s function will not be to manage society's democratic aspirations and activities, but to create the enabling conditions for their free play. Nevertheless, rather than offering agents and arenas of transitions to democracy, civil societies are generally seen as objects and problems of re-form. Because of this view, the state is assigned the task of nothing less than cultivating civil society through political education and mobilisation.

4.1.4. Overplay of generic institutional variables Institutional approaches to the study of democratic reforms call for analysis of effectiveness of

organisations in contributing to the reforms in terms of the generic characteristics. The characteris-tics include organisational autonomy, capacity, complexity and cohesion. Presumably, the more or-ganisations are endowed with these attributes, the greater their strength, and the more likely they are to promote democratic transition. The stress on organisational dimensions and traits, which borders on over-emphasis, is problematic. First, it assumes or requires a level of development and strength of institutions

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in societies. The emphasis on generic organisational attributes begs the crucial question of how societies not very well endowed with strong indigenous institutions will make successful transitions to democracy. Second, it makes the rather questionable connection between the strength of institutions and the likelihood of their promotion of democratic transi-tion. Third, the stress on generic traits of state and non-state institutions largely overlooks substantive gaps in organisa-tions’ knowledge of democratic ideas and practices as a source of problems of pluralism along with structural incapaci-ties of organisations. While differences in general institutional characteristics provide a significant measure of effective-ness of contribution to political reform, they cannot account for advances in democratic impact, which can only happen via institutional learning and practice (Costantinos, 1996:276).

4.1.5. Inadequate analysis of the role of external agencies and agents External agencies have in recent years taken a large number of initiatives aimed directly or indi-

rectly at helping Ethiopia democratise its way out of economic chaos and political instability. In doing so, they rely on a wide variety of policies and institutional mechanisms. Indeed, growing external in-volvement in projects of pluralism has resulted in increasingly challenging problems of conceptualis-ing and understanding their role and function. The growth of foreign interventions seems in marked contrast to the limited thought and effort exerted by democratisers of Ethiopian polity to put the interventions in coherent theoretical or strategic perspective.

4.2. Self-determination and its ‘discontents’ Indubitably, the single most important influence over how political liberalisation in Ethiopia has

been conceived, initiated and is being formalised is the politics of ethnicity. The urban and rural lib-eration war waged by the people of Ethiopia and the particular form of political consciousness ac-quired at the inception and in the course of that struggle has made ethnic-based self-determination the linchpin of the strategy. Consistent with this strategy, a major restructuring of the polity has been undertaken, cutting it up into a score of regional states based on linguistic, ethnic and cultural identi-ty. Although swiftly executed, the strategy appears to have been effective not only in allowing to car-ry out a specific political agenda; but also in setting the tone for political agency and activities of al-ternative groups, i.e., in channelling their activities along specific social-anthropological formations.

Whilst, in this sense, the political leadership can be said to have instituted a new paradigm of political discourse, agency and ideology, this is not to suggest that the strategy is uncontroversial or uncontested. Today major political par-ties organised along ethnic and regional lines may arouse the danger of mutual mistrust and polarisation. According to some in the elite circles, this has resulted in deep ethnic hostility and national division varying in degrees ranging from self-determination to outright secession. Because the idea of self-determination has radically transformed the old image and replaced it with a completely ‘new’ vision of national unity, it may have raised worries and fears among certain social strata where the values, sentiments and symbols of unity they cherished and took for granted have suddenly be-come objects of deconstruction. Many grumble that more than that it is our everyday social and economic life, which has come under strain in the highly ethnicized political order that could result in centripetal implosion of the nation.

They argue that „Ethiopia‟ is not a newly coined lingo – it traces its history back several millennia; though the territory and the ethnic groups it embraced have varied from time to time, depending upon the outcome of battles fought among rival fiefdoms. The modern state that emerged was a heterogene-ous society comprising of major ethnic groups, with no meaningful efforts undertaken to integrate the indigenous popula-tions into the political system.ii Yet, notwithstanding the doubts and worries it has raised, ethnocentric nationalism re-mains the bedrock of the political strategy; representing a larger issue having to do with the restructuring of the polity as a whole. It is not one of simply changing or improving the position and status of nationalities; but the radical transfor-mation of the values, traditions and institutions of the state itself in its historic and contemporary forms. It is wrestling at once with the question of the self-determination of nationalities and the vision of unity based on people’s equality, connected with it. The above points indicate, with a genuine and dedicated endeavour on the part of the political leader-ship, pluralism under one geographical entity and nationhood could be preserved. A proper resolution through dialogue is not only decisive for deepening the democratic unity, but also an agenda long overdue.

4.3. Political openness How could the nation pursue its governance transition goals consistently in varying contexts, but

do so without resorting to a self-defeating, overly scripted and stage-managed political ploy? In other words, how could the democratic transitions combine immediately programmed intentionality with a

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more open, process-based purposefulness? One can draw a conceptual distinction between political openness and pluralism. Political openness would relate in part to various conditions or develop-ments in state and civil society, only some of which may be necessary for or comparable with plural-ism. This is illustrated by processes such as decline or liberalisation of authoritarian regimes and/or ideologies resulting in increased opportunities for political participation and competition and trans-formation of state-society relations. Democratisation refers to an entire distinctive form of political thought, discourse and practice, which underlies popularly elected and controlled government. Polit-ical openness may or may not lead to full-fledged democratisation, but the two are better understood as overlapping, possibly mutually supportive, processes rather than self-contained phases.

Thus, in the absence of a widely open political space in which parties of various ideological persuasions are al-lowed to exist legally and to compete freely and peacefully for state power, democratic elections of true uncertainty cannot be held. Nor can formal constitution writing and satisfying efforts led by incumbent regimes attain broad and deep legitimacy as democratic activities. Political openness and democratic transition are possibly, not necessari-ly, mutually supportive because a project of democratisation managed by a governing elite may also narrow the po-litical space below the level where citizen’s groups can freely operate, restricting the dimensions and elements of a broadly enabling transition process. It is easy to advocate pluralism as a desirable system of government. Nor is it difficult to make normative judgements about how the ruling strata should behave if pluralism is to flourish. Yet, it is not so easy to conceptualise pluralism as a working process, which is balanced against strategy, to determine what makes for real, as opposed to vacuously formalistic processes. This is particularly the case where parties tend to view their particular political schema with their broader governing roles as relatively simple and direct, unprob-lematically reducing the latter to the former (Costantinos, 1996:221)

Although the series of constitutive mechanisms of pluralistic system cannot be seen in isolation from the strategic moves of participants, the former retain their relative autonomy that can be grasped accordingly. The range of actual and possible elements that characterise process openness is greater than what might be represented within a single strategy. There is always an excess of potential - number, variety and forms of articulation of political ideas and institutions possible - in open transition processes relative to any one strategic actualisation. There are of course, historical limits. Ideologically fledgling and institutionally weak democracies in economically distressed contemporary Ethiopia could not be expected to exhibit as wide a variety of elements and forms of articulation as does historically sedimented, robust pluralism in highly developed Ethiopia. Nevertheless, there is still, within the limits imposed by history, potential for openness in the transition process than any single participant strategy can actualise.

4.4. Dynamic interaction of strategy and process - political agency and ideology As a way of contributing to the overcoming or lessening of these difficulties, we may theorise

democratic transition as the dynamic interaction of strategy and process. It is possible to see it as the playing out of objective and critical standards, rules and concepts of political conduct in the transi-tion goals and activities of all participants, those of public officials who make and administer the rules as well as those of ordinary citizens. The issue here is not simply one of application of rules to particular activities. Nor is it one of dissolving agent-catered strategies of reform into objective princi-ples and norms. It is rather the production or articulation of process elements and forms within and through the strategic (and non-strategic) activities of various participants. Highlighting the mutually constitutive and regulative articulation of strategy and process, we shift the centre of analysis away from the two as separate formations that enter only externally to each other. This shift of analytical focus serves to emphasise the critical point that the task of broadly structuring pluralism is more im-portant than that of promoting it within the specific agenda of a particular party or ruling party.

The latter, which may manifest itself in a variety of efforts ranging from constitution drafting ef-forts to convening elections, is or should be only a second - order concern compared to the former, which is primarily specific reform measures taken under the leadership of a given ruling party are important. However, the best direct action of a single party by itself in democratisation is no substi-tute for what democratic impact the action can have as a component of a system of activity in which alternative groups are able to participate freely to achieve a share of political power. The making of broadly inclusive democratic transitions should consist of an articulation of process and agency,

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which can be sustained, in its system by any political party operating within it. Process openness or transparency can be analysed at two distinct but closely related levels: political agency and political ideology. The former refers to the full range of significant participants and their activities and rela-tions in political reform. The latter relates to complex ideas, beliefs, goals and issues that can come into competitive and co-operative play. During any political transition events, actors and circum-stances of action are likely to be uncertain and unsettled. This uncertainty imposes a significant de-gree of openness, creating objective conditions that can spawn democratic (but also non-democratic) forums of a network of organised actors and ideas, one of which will commonly be dominant.

This determinacy makes for as certain degree of closure and problems of political transition in the context of both agency and ideology can be grasped in terms of this basic tension within the process. The concern here is not so much the number and diversity of ideas, values and opinions allowed to gain currency during transition as modes of their competitive and co-operative articula-tion. For example, does pluralism enter transition processes in Ethiopia as external ideologies, constructing and deploying their concepts in sterile abstraction from the immediacies of indigenous traditions, beliefs and values? In the case of Ethiopia in particular, do ideas of pluralism come into play in total opposition to, or in co-operation with his-toric national values and sentiments? In the struggle over the establishment of democratic rules of political engagement, do leading parties equate the articulation of their ethnocentric ideas with the production of broad-based concepts, norms and goals, which should govern their leadership of national transitions?

4.5. Representation of specific interests vs. democratic concepts, principles and rules In the light of these questions, it is possible to draw a conceptual distinction between two levels

of articulation of ideology in the political pluralising process and to note the implications of their relations for process openness. There are first, representations of specific interests, identities, needs, wishes, goals, claims and demands, different in diverse groups and communities that we can desig-nate as particular representations or contents. These are to be distinguished from a second level of production and circulation of democratic ideology where broad-based concepts, principles and rules take shape and come into play that we can designate as explicit forms. Particular representations have to do with ideologically loaded articulations of interests, needs and activities, which may appear or become so immediate as to be taken for spontaneous realities. Explicit forms refer to systemic categories and mechanisms that objectively mediate and generalise particular representations.

In examining or assessing the ideological possibilities and problems of openness of transition process, general forms and particular representations need to be addressed in terms of their relation, even as they retain their dis-tinct conceptual status. The two levels of ideology formations tend to incorporate each other in a more or less uncer-tain and complex process, as well as constituting relatively autonomous coherence in them. The breadth and depth of generic democratic forms cannot be grasped or judged simply on their own worth, i.e., on their theoretical correct-ness or the rigour of their formal construction. Our understanding should not overlook the matter of how far par-ticular representations or constructs inform and condition democratic concepts and rules; but have to conceptualise the relation between the two levels of production of ideology and its implications for openness of political transitions in Ethiopia? One way is to think of it in terms of concrete instances and abstract system. A system of democratic concepts, principles, rules and procedures provides objective standards to which every instance of representation of in-terests, needs, demands and intentions must conform.

In this light, pluralism emerges as an extension of the ideological and institutional contents of the model for lo-cal democratic reform. This conceptualisation may not be entirely mistaken, but it is far from satisfactory. Generic democratic forms are not simply pure ideology devoid of practical content; and particular constructs are not merely points of application of systemic elements, which are wholly external to them, and in whose articulation they have no role to play. If general forms are seen as pre-given standards to which every instance of representation of particu-lar interests must conform, the effect will restrict transition openness. For that will mean pushing ideas and values produced in the plenitude of social experience to the background and accord primacy to a mere system of abstract categories; giving primacy to the ideologies of activists. We need to note here that the conceptual and institutional mechanisms cannot come alive in local contexts merely as generic forms.

They make themselves felt only in addressing citizens’ concerns, through them. Hence, alternative way of look-ing at the relation between general forms and particular contents would give precedence to the latter over the former,

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where parties have leeway articulating systems of abstract categories fitting to their specific appeals. Pluralism as a system of universal concepts and practices will necessarily be instantiated in local contexts, but only in line with the specific strategies of a party rather than within a simple application of its concepts in their pre-given abstract form. Instead of being applied to local contexts, global models provide ideological materials for construction in those con-texts. This perspective has merits. It can work as a corrective to the view of pluralism as a mere extension of a system of abstract categories to concrete instances. However, the issue here is not one of simply giving primary to specific contents over general forms. The principles of pluralism may allow particular interests and intentions to permeate them, yet should take shape through such particularities as distinct, relatively autonomous articulationsiii (Costantinos, 1996:334).

5. Resolving the impasse 5.1. Anti-corruption agencies and watchdogs Anti-corruption watchdogs are significant components of good governance. These include spe-

cialized anti-corruption agencies, offices of the inspector general and ombudsman, independent hu-man rights and electoral commissions and special committees of inquiry. To be truly effective, such bodies have to be independent and protected from political manipulation, and should report to par-liament. They also need to have sufficient financial and professional resources, and to be afforded adequate powers to enforce ethical codes and standards. They need to enjoy the confidence of the public and their decisions have to be respected by the political elite. They obviously themselves have to maintain high standards of conduct and guarantee privacy and protection of whistle-blowers.

Without the active involvement of civil society, it will not be possible to combat corruption. Cor-ruption cannot be seen in isolation: its effects permeate societies, which in turn can either encourage or discourage corruption. Professional and consumer associations, civil society watchdogs and reli-gious bodies can build coalitions against corruption, demand greater state accountability by inform-ing the public on the cause and impact of corruption, and galvanise public opinion to persuade citi-zens to combat venality. Corruption thrives on secrecy, which can be countered by a free press. The media has a very important role to play in educating people, exposing corruption and building support for efforts to combat it. The threat of negative publicity and the fact that political corruption is frequently exposed in the press serve as strong deter-rents. A free press fulfils an important public information function and can help counteract public perceptions that cor-ruption is inevitable and officials are immune from investigative journalism.

5.2. Leadership involves personal commitment and concrete actions.

There is simply no alternative to the establishment of sound institutional capacity in government for real-time strategy development, sensitivity analysis, policy coordination, and attention to the de-tails of implementation. Strategic objectives must be clearly defined and specific measures made con-sistent with overall polices of a good national economic management. Provision of incentives to en-trepreneurs must be subject to periodic review, continuation and expansion made conditional upon performance criteria established in advance. Liberalisation of units providing services that would be more efficiently provided in a competitive, multi-channel environment, force account activities, and private sector involvement in finance, telecommunications, etc. will provide more employment.

Evidence of sufficient knowledge and information about the business sector is another indicator. Progress in information systems on micro-economic behaviour including labour market networks, and the specific requirements of technology transfer and adaptation are all preconditions for sound policy and strategy analysis, formulation and management. Planning and policy-making must be characterized by on-going dialogue between the state and various economic actors and regular ex-change of information on their specific needs. It also requires a coordinated approach between state agencies and flexibility in response to changing circumstances, attention to detail and emphasis on high performance.

Entrepreneurs that are expected to employ the vast army of labour and that operate on a small-to intermediate-scale exhibit fairly sophisticated executive skills. However, as their businesses grow along, the small-to intermediate-scale continuum, they often face constraints such as limited managerial capabilities; difficulties with technology transfer and adaptation; and, as in the case of informal mi-cro-entrepreneurs, inadequate or inappropriate provision of enterprise-level support. If entrepre-neurship is to become the vehicle of growth, graduation of informal sector micro-enterprises to better

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9 | A youthful ‘joie-de-vivre’ - Protest Alliances against Venality – Quo Vadis Ethiopia

endowed and higher levels of value-added and economic diversification is to be achieved, it is clear that the deficit of skills that are necessary to establish managerial capabilities must be surmounted.iv

5.3. Credit and capital markets and finance & employment

An efficient and a development-oriented private sector provide the nourishment, which markets require to grow and function effectively. Markets themselves provide the credit ingredients, which the private sector requires to grow, expand and contribute to development. Thus, there is a re-ciprocal and mutually productive relationship between the private sector and credit and capital mar-kets. Responsibility for their implementation is assigned to stakeholders at the national levels. Fur-ther analysis suggests that we should incorporate the requirements of establishing capital markets and strengthening the private sector in the list of priorities on its economic reform programmes. The banking system must be functioning as efficiently as planned - taking care of the money market and hence the credit market needs of private sectors.

Consequential growth response of the latter should give a boost to capital markets and provide capital for sustained human development. Central banks need to create incentives to commercial and merchant banks to provide employment loans of various dimensions. Businesses would hire workers for below minimum wages. Apprentices will gain experience and knowledge to enter the labour mar-ket more easily. The advantage to the business is extra labour hand, interest free loans and a balance of loans that can be utilized for other priorities.

Ethiopia must develop clear-cut action plans for youth employment that match young people to the labour market and financing policies that would ensure production of viable skilled work force. They must put in place policies on science, technology, research and innovation that improve educa-tional curricula to respond to real needs and train human power that competitive at all levels in the labour market. Ethiopia must institute investment policies that would provide financial support to institution of higher learning including tertiary colleges as well as policies that would strengthen Sci-ence, Mathematics, Engineering and Technology (SMET) in the educational curriculum to ensure the 1:3:7 ratio is attained and maintained. Institution of higher learning must ensure multi-sectoral training in order to produce a multi-skilled labour force. Ethiopia will have to continue with their programs to decentralize and devolve services, embrace the opportunities brought by ICT as well as capacity building in education and health, and promote mobile services to hard-to-reach communities and embrace social accountability for service delivery and empower citizens to demand quality services.

6. Conclusion 6.1. State building The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance e objectives of the Charter are to pro-

mote adherence, by each State Party, to the universal values and principles of democracy, human rights, rule of law premised upon the respect for, and the supremacy of, the Constitution. The state building presupposes systems by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, ca-pacity of the state to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies, and respect for citizens and governing institutions - a state that involves civil society in its decision-making process and accountability. While the prime role of the state in advancing the economy is acknowledged, right sizing the state, streamlining the discretionary decision-making authority of its officials, elimi-nate monopolies and economic distortions that facilitate them. Leadership, political will and public support are essential to stability and that the causes and not just the consequences of these threats have to be addressed. Upholding the rule of law is important to guarantee protection of human rights, ensure judicial predictability.

Creating a merit based and metric civil service is a basic requirement for limiting any threats of corruption and rebuilding public confidence. A culture of professionalism needs to be created and thus, incentives as well as sanctions have to be employed. Watchdogs are significant to increase in-tegrity and transparency. Active involvement of civil society is a sine qua non as corruption thrives on secrecy, which countered by a free press that counteracts public perceptions that corruptions inevi-table and important people are immune from investigative journalism.v

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10 | A youthful ‘joie-de-vivre’ - Protest Alliances against Venality – Quo Vadis Ethiopia

6.2. The political space Political organisations partaking in a democratic transition may use strategies of interest articula-

tion or identity construction that in effect displace or distort the generic forms that provide the standards for their pluralising efforts. A given organisation may operate the formal concepts and rules in such a way as to maximise their openness and transparency. Nevertheless, the opposite is not uncommon: a theoretically open and free reform may, in actuality, be dominated and narrowed by the particular ideological agendas of assignable participants.

The relation between explicit forms and particular representations in transition process can best be grasped as their dynamic, mutually constitutive or regulative articulation. It is well to recognise that the former do not have ef-fective generality or objectivity of their own, independently of particular elements and contents. If they were wholly independent, the forms will be vacuously and practically irrelevant. Moreover, specific representations are not pas-sive external targets of application of generic forms of pluralism but in part constitutive of them. In other words, neither one nor the other level has elements, features and functions that it owes entirely to itself, thus articulation and structuring of elements occur, or should occur, continually across the two levels. Hence, pluralism here entails conceptualisation in global categories that are invested with varying local meanings that are themselves in part ac-tualisation of trends in international political (and development) thought. Openness, transparency and complexity will depend on the extent to which and how global and local dimensions are articulated with each other.vi Converse-ly, democratic transition strategy or strategies must take on generic elements, dimensions and functions of the pro-cess. In order to have significant constitutive or regulative effects on the plenitude of particular representations, it must be allowed to attain coherence and integrity even as it comes into play in varied contexts of activity. While it may be tied to the initiatives and leadership of assignable organisations in its emergence, it nonetheless gains cur-rency as a relatively autonomous system that other, competing, organisations can also participate in and operate. As a set of distinctly general categories and mechanisms of democratic thought, discourse and practice, transition process takes the diversity of particular political ideas and activities into itself and makes them a vital part of its conceptual and institutional economy. It medicates and channels specific actors and their activities by means of an objectification and generalisation that works on and through themvii (Costantinos, 1996:176). The first requisite of good governance as a precursor of pluralism is a spirit of tolerance. Good

governance requires that political and policy differences are resolved in a spirit of respect for the views of others, more specifically, citizens. The spirit of tolerance is particularly important during a period of transition to good governance to entrench democratic values and practices at a time when a new political order is being established. The spirit of tolerance is enhanced if there is a proper recognition of the responsibility of the state to administer the nation. It also entails the recognition by the state of the right of civil society to criticize and influence government policy and administra-tion, to offer alternative ideas and policies, and to lobby for them. The rights valued here are right of association and freedom of expression. Its legitimacy comes from an acceptance of the fairness and transparency of its procedures for elections to state offices and for policy making. The sustainability of good governance depends on the maintenance of public confidence as well as the confidence of political groups in the fairness of these procedures.

Communes and political groups are vehicles through which good governance is practiced. This logic should have made the acceptance of the civil society a sine qua non. Unfortunately, the tendency to disregard civil society and its associations has disempowered the most important stakeholders to participate meaningfully in building national consensus. It is therefore neither unusual nor surprising that situation is one of acrimony rather than reconciliation. The great strength of good governance over other political systems encourages the expression of different points of views, and all ideas and beliefs are constantly subjected to review and criticism.viii

Indeed, there is no more compelling raison d'être nor a mission-objective so utterly entrenched in the preservation and, even advancement of human-kind, than good governance and leadership that can lead a social league to relate cogently to an epidemic of ignorance that has spun out of con-trol. Hence, we assert that, the widespread incidence of poverty, diseases, and human under-develop-ment and displacement in the poor world is directly attributable to basic weaknesses of social and political leadership, rules of the game and political institutions.

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References

Addis Fortune, Ethiopia - Unavoidable truth, (Addis Ababa, Addis Fortune, December 28, 2015) BBC. Ethiopia's Oromo protests: PM Hailemariam Dessalegn apologises (London, BBC, 10 March 2016) Costantinos, Berhutesfa. Collateral Damage: Stemming the Threats of Counter Corruption Measures to

Good Governance (Addis Ababa, FEACC, Dec 16, 2007) Costantinos, Berhutesfa. Political Transition in Africa – Ethiopia case study (ALF/GCA, 1996) FDRE. Revised Federal Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission Establishment Proclamation No

A33/2005. (FDRE, Proclamation No. 433/2005 - 11th Year No.18, Addis Ababa, 2 Feb 2005) HRW. Development without Freedom: How Aid Underwrites Repression in Ethiopia, (HRW, 2010) HRW. Ethiopia: Lethal Force Against Protesters (Nairobi, HRW, Dec 18, 2015)

Lefort, René. Unrest in Ethiopia: the ultimate warning shot. (UK, openDemocracy, 2 February 2016) i The regime is now reaping the price for the accrued lapses of its ethnic policy. This original fault line under-

mines the federal construct at the heart of the constitution, but the reality is hyper-centralised, the primacy of the elite, even if increasingly under stress, undeniable in the political, economic and even more so the military and secu-rity spheres. The national question boomerangs back on those who claim to have settled it for good

ii One may hasten to add here that it does not mean that this will inevitably lead to the breakdown of the state. iii It is important to recognise here that there are various ways of connecting particular interests and goals to

global concepts and principles of pluralism, and that certain ways may be restrictive of transition process openness and transparency. In some cases, to tie democratic systems to specific ideological intentions and constructs, like projects of ethnic self-determination, is not to appreciate the systems’ inherent breadth and complexity; it is, rather, to operate at levels and within forms of knowledge that encompass only a limited part of the systems’ full range

iv Human capital is the stock of competencies, knowledge, habits, social and personality attributes, including crea-tivity, cognitive abilities, embodied in the ability to perform labour to produce economic value. It is an aggregate eco-nomic view of the human being interacting with economies, which is an attempt to capture the social, biological, cul-tural and psychological complexity as they interact. Many theories explicitly connect investment in human capital development to education, economic development, productivity growth and innovation; a justification for state subsi-dies to skills training. Ethiopia has a youthful population benefitting from positive economic growth and increased investment in education. With effective policies and programmes in place to harness their enthusiastic and energy, young women and men will lead the drive toward social and economic prosperity. Each year growing numbers of young people are entering the labour market with higher levels of education. Yet still, even the more educated youth find that a future of stable, well-paid employment remains the impossible dream. The lack of prospects for secure em-ployment, alongside increased education, access to social media and exposure to the perceived advantages of devel-oped economies, creates the risk of frustration among youth, culminating in political unrest and external migration.

v Experience has shown that preventing and combating corruption requires a consistent, coherent, broad-based approach and a long-term perspective, as collateral damages can stumble on constitutionally defined rights.

vi the attempt to subsume democratic transition by some particular agenda or ideological intention (indigenisa-tion, ethnic self-determination, etc.,) must, therefore, limit rather than enhance openness of transition process. If what explicit general forms signify is no particular transition strategy but the very process of pluralism itself, then any particular agenda or intention must, to the extent it is democratic, allow general forms to work out through it.

vii In this light, openness of pluralism process can be understood as a dynamic two-way operation of generic forms on particular contents and particular contents on generic forms. This is in which the deployment of the conceptual and institutional machinery of pluralism is at the same time the representation of specific needs, interests, motiva-tions, claims, rights and obligations by individuals and groups. Going beyond structuring or rearranging Ethiopian political actors and institutional activities in their spontaneous, often turbid reality, this operation should result in their transformation into forms of transparent agency and practice within a democratic political system

viii Errors in policy and programs are exposed and greater accountability is achieved. The values of tolerance are also emphasized by the fact that governing is not merely a matter of majority rule. Raising the standards of govern-ance is vital to political development by abandoning state ownership in favour of strategies that encourage private sector activity and increased investment, reward good organizational and individual performance, increase produc-tivity and use and manage resources more efficiently. Globally, states are recognizing that they need to enable rather than control, to facilitate rather than interfere, to manage less but more effectively. The legitimacy of such reform will depend in important ways on it being perceived as reasonably honest, transparent and accountable in the execution of responsibility. The crux of the challenge therefore, being able to create, retains and put to productive use of people with such qualities throughout the economy. It is about having the ability and willingness to locate and execute hu-man-centred priorities and programmes. It boils down to formulating and executing policies that would enhance aggregate commitment, determination and capacities to mobilize, develop, and utilize all segments of society. To meet these challenges is synonymous to meeting the development challenge at large. Hence, the need to develop in-dependent think thanks that deploy professionals with focus on staff with strong credentials, devoid of expressed ideology and objective that can undertake non-partisan research.