Download pdf - An Experimental Study of Black-White Negotiations1

Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 1971, 1, 3 , pp. 240-262

An Experimental Study of Black-White Negotiations'

EARL E. DAVIS' AND HARRY c. TRIANDIS3 University of Illinois

One hundred and forty variables tapping aspects of the subjective culture (characteristic way or perceiving the social environment) of 300 white male students were subjected to two-mode factor analysis. Five subject types emerged from the similarities in the responses of the students to these variables. In the next phase of the study, 88 representatives of these subject types participated in experimental negotiations. Before the negotiations, caucus groups, consisting of six students homogeneous in their pretest scores, decided what positions should be upheld during the negotiations. Following the caucuses, three two-member teams were formed, from each caucus group. The teams negotiated with two-member black teams of confederates of the experimenters. Negotiations focused on three issues, each of which was represented by 10 Thurstone successive-interval method scaled positions. Negotiation outcomes were predicted from the subjective culture measures (r = .42; p < .005). The negotiation outcomes tended to be more predictable from the reference group (caucuses) preferred positions ( r = .65) than from individual preferences (r = .36). Negoti- ators tended to overconform to caucus positions. Behavioral differential scale ratings of black negotiators predicted the outcomes better than semantic differential ratings of these stimuli. The more specific the attitude measured the more predictive it was of negotiation outcomes. Discussion focused on implications for understanding the relationship between attitudes and behavior and the process of black/white negotiations.

Social scientists have addressed themselves increasingly in recent years to the study of conflict resolution and negotiation. However, when one thinks of the

' Research reported in this paper was supported by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, ARPA Order No. 454, under Office of Naval Research Contract Nr 177-472, Nonr 1834(36), Fred E. Fiedlcr and Harry C. Triandis, Principal Investigators; and in part by Research Grant No. 12-P-55 175/5 from the Social and Rehabilitation Service, Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Harry C . Triandis, Principal Investigator).

2 N o ~ at the Health Services Mobility Study, Research Foundation of the City University of New York.

3 R e q u e ~ t ~ for reprints should be sent to Dr. H. C. Triandis, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, Champaign, Ill. 6 1822.

240

Copyright 01971 by Seripta Publishing Corporation.

EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF BLACK-WHITE NEGOTIATIONS 241

conflict evident in our society, it is surprising how few studies of negotiation have dealt with relations between black and white Americans.

Negotiation, viewed broadly, is a ubiquitous phenomenon in the modern world. Although most uses of the term connote some attempt at conflict resolution, there seem to be otherwise few restrictions on the types of behaviors or on the classes of participants involved. Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965), in their excellent review of the literature on bargaining and negotiations in international relations, exemplify this broad use of the term by specifying that “such negotiation is conducted not only between nations, but also between government departments, political factions, labor and manage- ment, gangs, neighbors and spouses (p. 467)” Such an interpretation of the term “negotiation” could lead the reader to the conclusion that a very large number, if not indeed the majority, of human behaviors are really some form of negotiation. Needless to say, Sawyer and Guetzkow did not intend any such interpretation, as their analysis of the other parameters of the negotiation process clearly indicates.

Nevertheless, this broad use of the term presents many difficulties, not the least of which lies in the comparability of‘ studies by different investigators using the term in quite different ways. Can the results of studies of interactions between spouses or other individuals acting on their own behalf be extrapolated to the process of formal negotiations, such as those that take place between groups or nations? While there are no doubt some similarities among the processes of interpersonal, intergroup, and international negotiations, there are unquestionably some important differences. Thus, for pur- poses of the present study, which deals with intergroup negotiations, we have chosen to use the term in a more circumscribed, formal sense. We shall take as our working definition the designation by Vidmar and McGrath (1970) of negotiation as “a situation in which representatives from two (or more) reference groups within an involved social community, come together with the intent of setting forth a mutually acceptable solution to one or more issues about which the reference groups are in confict (p. 154).”

This definition distinguishes formal negotiation from interpersonal conflict resolution by specifying that the negotiators function as representatives of two or more parties which are in disagreement or conflict. This means that the negotiators formally represent groups which are in some meaningful sense reference groups for them. McGrath and his coworkers (McCrath, 1964, 1966; Vidmar & McGrath, 1967, 1970), in their tri-forces model of negotiation, have emphasized the importance of reference group influence in determining the outcomes of intergroup negotiations. We shall say more about this point later.

In a further attempt to define and delimit the scope of what we mean by negotiation, we shall attempt to differentiate between the processes of negotiation and bargaining. This is rather difficult, since the two terms are

242 DAVIS AND TRlANDlS

often used interchangeably in the literature, and indeed, there is some degree of overlap between the two processes. Nevertheless, we feel that there is sufficient difference in emphasis and content to make a distinction between the two terms desirable. Bargaining typically involves objects possessing readily definable values, usually expressed in economic or material terms. Such objects have predictable “trade-off’ values in the bargaining situation. Negoti- ation, on the other hand, while it may involve some aspects of bargaining, in the economic sense, typically deals with less tangible “objects.” It usually deals with issues about which groups are in conflict, by reason of differing value systems, ways of life, etc. It is the attempt to come to terms on these “intangible” issues which constitutes the essence of negotiation. Simple bargaining frequently involves a zero-sum game with a pay-off matrix: the more one side wins, the more the other side loses. Negotiation, on the other hand, invariably involves a non-zero-sum game (although the parties involved in negotiations often see the process initially as a zero-sum game). While it is true that bargaining and game theorists have dealt extensively with non-zero- sum games in recent years (Some of this work is highly relevant to the study of negotiations.), and while it is also true that bargaining theorists have attempted to analyze political negotiations in terms of a bargaining process involving a modification of “subjective utilities” (e.g., IkIC, 1962), such mathematical and economic analogies applied to behavioral phenomena have not adequately dealt with social psychological variables.

Closely related to the definition of the process of negotiation is the question of using experimental simulation in the study of this process. Simulation is a widely used technique in the social sciences to study phenomena not generally amenable to experimental control. Guetzkow (1962) provides an overview of the wide use of this technique. Experimental simulation usually implies the use of actual S’s, as opposed to other forms of simulation (e.g., computer simulation) which do not involve the use of S’s.

As was mentioned earlier, the study of negotiation usually involves some form of experimental simulation. Although such simulation is frequently involved in the study of interpersonal bargaining and negotiation (e.g., Deutsch & Krauss, 1962), we shall confine our discussion to instances where the negotiators are representing groups as per our definition. In this case, not only must the experimental situation, i.e., the “tasks” or issues being negotiated, be simulated, but the process of representing the groups must also be simulated. Some authors have expressed doubts concerning the extent to which one can extrapolate from findings obtained from such simulated groups to real world phenomena. For example, Druckman (1967) stated that, “at the current stage of empirical development, it is difficult to assess the relevance of findings from simulated groups for groups with their own developmental history (p. 289).”


We maintain that the extent to which findings obtained from experimental imulation are relevant to the real world is a direct function of the manner in which such simulation is carried out. Many studies of bargaining and negotiation present student S’s with an experimental situation contrived by the experimenter, but of little relevance to the S, who, consequently, has low ego involvement in the task. When a reference group is involved, it is usually an ad hoc group of individuals with whom the S may have little in common, either in terms of the issues themselves or in terms of other relevant social psychological variables. In such situations the doubts about extrapolation to real world phenomena would seem to have a certain amount of justification.

The present authors, following the lead of McGrath and his coworkers (McGrath, 1964, 1966; McGrath & Julian, 1963; Vidmar & McGrath, 1967, 1970), prefer to use what might be called “real-life” experimental simulation. This involves the use of S’s who are actual members of the broader reference groups being represented in the negotiations, who have in common with their reference group important attributes, such as stands on issues, attitudes, values, ways of life, etc., who are relatively ego-involved in the issues being negotiated and who, instead of being assigned a position to negotiate, choose a position which is either their own or that of their reference group. Although this procedure still involves simulation (and, hence, the experimental control which is usually not possible in the real world), it is somewhat closer to the real world situation than are the other forms of simulation described above.

The present study was largely exploratory in nature, measuring a large number of variables, holding others constant, and leaving still others in a state which was as systematically randomized as possible. The primary focus of the study was on a class of variables which may be considered measures of “subjective culture” (Triandis, Vassiliou, Tanaka, & Shanmugam, 197 1). These variables were studied with respect to their ability to predict the outcomes of the negotiations. We will discuss these in greater detail in reference to our definition of intergroup negotiation. A second major focus had to do with the importance of reference group influence in determining the outcomes of intergroup negotiations.

We are well aware that there are many other process variables that are important in determining the outcome of intergroup negotiations. However, it is obviously impossible to manipulate all of these in one study. The present study is one of what will hopefully be a series of interlocking and overlapping studies, systematically investigating these other variables within the context of what we have called real-life experimental simulation. McGrath (1964) and Davis and Triandis (1965) have outlined some of the other classes of variables which should be considered.

Subjective culture may be loosely defined as “a human group’s characteristic way of perceiving the man-made part of its environment (Triandis &


Malpass, 1970, p. l).” Two or more groups of individuals may be said to constitute a culturally heterogeneous group to the extent that the individual groups have different modal attitudes, behavior norms, values or, in general, different ways of perceiving, considering, and evaluating socially relevant aspects of reality. There are many ways in which these differences may come about, but a discussion of this is beyond the scope of our article. This problem has been discussed by Homans (1950), Newcomb (1931), and others.

The broad view of culture outlined above implies that groups may be considered to be culturally heterogeneous and, hence, manifest differences in subjective culture not only due to geographic separation, different languages, and different nation states, etc., but that these groups may be significantly different in subjective culture by belonging to different religions, races, social classes, occupations, sexes, ages, etc. Triandis et al. (1971) have summarized much recent research in the area of subjective culture and have described and operationally defined some variables used as measures of subjective culture. A major hypothesis of the present study was that some of these measures would be significant predictors of the outcomes of black-white negotiations.

A second focus of the study concerns the effect of relPrence groups on determination of the outcomes of negotiations. The literature on reference group influence on individual attitudes and behavior is voluminms and cannot be reviewed here. However, it is probably fair to say that most research has found significant reference group influence on individual behavior. More recently, some authors in the area of social influence have presented evidence that the conformity phenomenon, which has sometimes been assumed to be almost universal, frequently does not occur (e.g., Kogan & Wallach, 1966; Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969; Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Teger & Pruitt, 1967; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). While we would agree that more attention should be given to investigation of instances of non-conformity to the majority position, the evidence concerning the general importance of group influence can scarcely be ignored.

McCrath (McGrath, 1966; Vidmar & McGrath, 1970), in his tri-forces model of negotiation, has emphasized the importance of “forces” emanating from the reference groups of the negotiators as determinants of the negotiation outcomes. Druckman (1967) found, contrary to previous research findings, that “whether bargainers represented groups or themselves did not have a significant effect on compromise behavior (p. 279).” Vidmar (1971) criticized Druckman’s procedures by pointing out that even his “no group” condition involved a commitment to the reference group. Vidmar’s findings clearly indicated the importance of reference group influence. Fischoff (1971), agreeing with Vidmar’s criticism of Druckman’s procedure, also found a significant reference group effect.

The authors of the present study predicted not only that there would be a significant reference group effect in the outcomes of the negotiations, but


ppecifically, that the preferred outcome of the reference group would be as predictive or more predictive of the negotiations outcome than would be the individual’s preferred outcome.

METHOD

Pre-Test I

Subjects. Initially 300 white, male University of Illinois undergraduate S’s from the introductory psychology subject pool were pre-tested for one hour in February 1964.

Questionnaire. The major sections of the Pre-Test I questionnaire may be summarized as follows:

(1) Eight complex person stimuli-constituting a 2 x 2 x 2 analysis of variance design, varying in two levels of race (Negro-white), two levels of sex (male-female), and two levels of position with regard to civil rights issues (“favors strong civil rights legislation” vs. “opposes change in the status quo with respect to civil rights legislation”)-were judged on 12 semantic differential (SD) scales (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957), representing the three classic factors of evaluation, activity, and potency.

(2) Forty Likert-type items consisting of (a) ten positive F items from the original California F-Scale (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), (b) ten negative F items, five of them from Couch and Keniston (1960) and five from Triandis and Triandis (1962), (c) ten items from the Davis, Wrigley, & Costelein (1960) Tolerance for Minorities scale, and (d) ten items from the Davis et al. (1960) Criticism of Social Institutions scale.

(3) Thirty-five “issues” or “concepts” (primarily related to civil rights, but partially related to other domestic and foreign policy issues) were judged on SD scales measuring evaluation and importance.

(4) The same eight complex person stimuli as in (1) above were rated on 15 behavioral differential (BD) scales representing the 5 BD factors reported by Triandis (1964).

(5) A final section dealt with biographic and demographic items.

f ie - Test II

Subjects. A second pre-test, lasting approximately one hour, was adminis- tered in March, 1964, to 217 of the 300 S ’ s who had received Pre-Test I. The discrepancy in Ns was probably due to normal attrition rather than any selective factor, since the S’s were fulfilling requirements as part of the introductory psychology subject pool and were unaware of any relationship between Pre-Test I and Pre-Test I1 until they arrived to take Pre-Test 11.

246 DAVIS A N D T R l A N D l S

Questionnaire. The main portion of this questionnaire was devoted to obtaining the attitudes of S’s on four issues, three of which were to be the subject of the subsequent experimental negotiations. The S’s were told to imagine themselves as representatives of a community’s city council in a situation in which they were going to meet with representatives of a civil rights organization to negotiate points of conflict concerning interracial relations in the community. They were told that there has been considerable interracial strife in the community and that the civil rights organization was making certain demands of the city council. They were then presented with the four issues which dealt with (1) Establishment of a Bi-Racial Committee, (2) Integration in Housing, (3) Integration in Schools, and (4) Integration in Hospitals. For each of the four issues the S’s were presented with a set of 10 statements, each of which represented a position which the city council could take with respect to each issue. Each of the four sets of 10 position statements was selected from a larger pool of statements which had been subjected to Thurstone scaling, along the dimension of “unfavorable” to “favorable” with respect to the demands of the civil r&hts group. Thus, for each issue, statement 1 represented the most anti-civil right; stand that could be taken and statement 10, the most pro-civil rights stand that could be taken. For example, on Issue I (Bi-Racial Committee) the first statement was “The City Council should irrevocably reject the establishment of a bi-racial committee”; statement 10 was “The City Council should establish a bi-racial committee nominated by civil rights groups with the power to legislate and enforce nondiscriminatory policies”; statements 2 through 9 represented intermediary positions along this continuum.

For each of the four issues the S’s were asked to respond to each of the 10 statements by indicating whether they would accept or reject the statement as an outcome in the civil rights negotiations in which they were representing the City Council. In addition, they were asked to indicate their most preferred statement as an outcome of the negotiations.

Preliminary Analyses of Pre-Test Results

Preliminary analysis of Pre-Test I data-factor analysis of subjects. Most of the responses obtained from the S’s in Pre-Test I were designed to tap relevant (for interracial negotiations) dimensions of subjective culture. However, their number was quite large and needed to be reduced to manageable proportions. This occurred in two stages. The various parts of Pre-Test I , which were described above, consisted of sets of items whose factor structures were known. This made it possible to obtain composite scores based on the factors. In this manner the 472 responses from each S (excluding biographical data) were reduced to 140 variables, as follows:


Three semantic differential composite scores for eight stimulus persons = 24 One summated evaluation plus one importance score for 35 issues = 70 Five behavioral differential scores for eight stimulus persons = 40 The two Davis et al. (1960) scales; the positive and negative F-scales scores, plus measures of response set (P + Q ) and authoritarianism corrected for response set (P - Q) derived from the F-scale responses and computed in a manner described by Triandis and Triandis (1962). = 6

TOTAL =140

A second stage in the summarization of the data consisted of analyzing these 140 variables for the 300 S’s by means of a modified (cf. Davis & Triandis, 1965) version of the Tucker and Messick (1963) procedure for factor analyzing an individual differences matrix. This technique results in subject factors of “idealized subject types” determined by the co-variances responses of the S‘s to the variables. Five sulqect types were obtained from this procedure. A more complete description of the technique of factoring S’s, including a technical presentation of the matrix operations involved, as well as detailed descriptions of the five subject types, are contained in Davis and Triandis (1965). We will briefly summarize the five types here.

Subject Factor I. This factor was determined primarily by responses to the behavioral differential (Triandis, 1964). S’s loading high on this factor tended to reject all stimulus persons, regardless of their characteristics; thus, we tentatively labeled this factor “Misanthropy.”

Subject Factor II. S’s loading high on this factor tended to reject all stimulus persons who were black, regardless of their stand on civil rights. They also considered civil rights issues umimportant. We termed this factor “Con- ventional Race Prejudice.”

Subject Factor ZII. S’s loading high on this factor were characterized primarily by marital acceptance of Negro females, marital rejection of white females and positive evaluation of interracial marriage. This factor was tentatively labeled “Interracial Marriage”; however, there were indications that the S’s loading high on this factor showed certain “illiberal” tendencies, together with some apparently “liberal” ones.

Subject Factor IV. This factor was not easily interpretable and might have resulted from negativism or lack of cooperativeness on the part of a number of S‘s. S’s loading high on this factor positively evaluated and considered important “extreme” issues, reflecting both “right” and “left” political orientations. This may be an “Extremism” factor.

Subject Factor I/. S’s loading high on this factor resembled S‘s loading high on Factor I1 in that they were clearly “prejudiced” and anti-civil rights. They differed, however, in that the prejudice was based primarily on the belief of the stimulus person. This factor was, therefore, named “Belief Prejudice.” Additional data, comparing these beliefprejudiced S’s with the race-prejudiced


S’s, represented by Subject Factor 11, are presented in Triandis & Davis (1965).

Preliminary analysis of Pre-Test II data An inspection of the distribution of S’s responses to the position statements on the four civil rights issues, with respect to their most preferred (P) statement, revealed that Issue IV, Integration in Hospitals, would not make a very good issue for negotiation. Apparently, social desirability factors were operating so strongly with respect to this issue that most S’s indicated a seemingly very “pro-civil rights” stand. However, the other three issues, namely Bi-Racial Committee, Integration in Housing, and Integration in Schools, showed a greater degree of variance, indicating that they would be appropriate issues for negotiation.

The S’s were divided into quartiles with respect to their responses on these three issues. The fourth (most pro-civil rights) quartile of the distribution was eliminated from further consideration, since the outcomes of negotiations with this group would be quite easily predictable. The median position on Issue I (Bi-Racial Committee) was 7.03; for Issue I1 (Housing) the median was 4.87; for Issue 111 (Schools) the median was 6.27 (On all issues 10 was the most pro-civil rights position.)

Relationship between Loadings of Ss on Subject Factors and Their Stands on Issues

Since the Ss’ loadings on the five subject factors constitute somewhat of an abstraction from the raw data, it would seem to be advisable to examine the relationship between this type of measure and another, more direct, set of independent variables represented by the positions of S’s stands (Preference values) on the issues to be negotiated. Table 1 presents the intercorrelations of Ss’ stands on the three civil rights issues (a summated score) and their loadings on the five subject factors. As may be seen from an inspection of Table 1, significant correlations exist between the Ss’ stands on the civil rights issues

TABLE 1 INTERCORRELATIONS O F Ss’ CIVIL RIGHTS POSITION

SCORES (CR) AND THEIR LOADINGS O N 5 VARIMAX ROTATED SUBJECT FACTORS*

‘CR, Factor I = -.43, p < .001 ‘CR, Factor I1 = -.63, p < .001 ‘CR, Factor I 1 1 = .18 ‘CR, Factor 1V = .07 ‘CR, Factor V = - .54,p < .001

*N = 202.


and their loading on tliree of the subject factors. The significant negative correlation between Ss’ loadings on Factor I (Misanthropy) and Ss’ positions on civil rights issues would seem to constitute a partial concurrent validation of the interpretation of this subject factor. It would seem to follow that S’s who were high on Misanthropy would be less likely to be pro-civil rights in their stands on issues. The rather high negative correlation between civil rights stands and loadings on Subject Factor I1 is completely consistent with our interpretation of this factor as representing Conventional Race Prejudice. The significant negative correlation with Ss’ loadings on Subject Factor V is, likewise, completely consistent with our interpretation of this factor as representing Belief Prejudice. As has been mentioned, a more detailed comparison of Subject Factors I1 and V is presented in Triandis & Davis (1965), and we will make reference to these differences at a later point. The marginally significant correlation with Ss’ loadings on Factor I11 is consistent with the interpretation of this factor as representing Interracial Marriage, but the low magnitude of the correlation reflects the countervailing tendencies which made this factor difficult to interpret. The nonsignificant correlation with subject loadings on Factor IV reinforces the interpretation that this factor is related to artifacts not directly relevant to the issues under consideration.

Experimental Procedures

Subjects. From among the 217 subjects who completed both Pre-Test I and Pre-Test 11, 88 subjects were selected who participated in the actual experimental situation. Subjects were selected on the basis of their being representative of six types of subjects, namely those with high loadings on the five subject factors described above plus a sixth group of “neutrals,” i.e., S’s who had neither high nor low loadings on any of the five subject factors.

During the second pretest S’s were toid that they would be contacted and asked to participate in a further experiment relating to the negotiations issues dealt with in Pre-Test 11 and their cooperation was solicited at that time. For those selected by the experimenter for participation in the experiment this appeal was followed up a week or two later with a mimeographed letter requesting their cooperation. Then each subject was contacted personally via telephone by a pleasant (and persuasive) female assistant of the experimenter who requested the subjects’ cooperation and scheduled all of the experimental sessions. The refusal rate was less than 20% with every indication that more than half of these S’s had “legitimate” reasons for refusal (lack of time, schedule conflict, etc.), so that the true “refusal” rate was probably less than 10%. The S’s were paid for participation in the experimental session; in addition there was the opportunity to win a small cash prize, which will be described later.

250 DAVIS A N D TRlANDlS

Procedure. (1) Six subjects, homogeneous with respect to subject type, were brought together for the ’2-hour experimental session, which was scheduled at a convenient time in the evening and at a location within walking distance for most of the subjects from their residences.

( 2 ) Subjects individually filled out a pre-negotiation questionnaire, which consisted essentially of their specific behavioral intentions with respect to the experimental negotiations on the civil rights issues which were to follow. This was very similar to the instrument used in Pre-Test I1 in which the subjects were asked to indicate on the three issues of negotiation (a) whether they would accept or reject each of the 10 position statements for each issue, (b) what the preferred (P) position statement as a result of the negotiations would be, and (c) the statement which constituted the Zimit (L) to which they would be willing to go in order to arrive at an agreement in the negotiations.

(3) The six subjects then met together for approximately 3/4 of an hour, with a white male confederate who acted as a “neutral” chairman, in a C ~ C U S

in order to arrive at a determination of the stands they would take on the issues of negotiation. The use of a confederate chairman who played a neutral, non-directive role was intended to minimize the undue effect which one of the subjects might have had, if another of the subjects chaired the group. The subjects were told to be “guided” by the caucus decision but not to be “bound” by it. They were told that, in addition to being guided by the caucus position, they should make every effort to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution with their opponents. In the determination of the caucus position the subjects were role-playing a situation in which they were members of the City Council about to enter into negotiations with representatives of a Civil Rights group demanding sweeping changes in the community.

(4) Following the caucus the six subjects were randomly divided into three teams of two members each; the three teams then negotiated for approximately one hour with two-man teams of black negotiators who were confederates of the experimenter. The black confederates were instructed to make every effort to move the white naive subjects in the pro-civil rights direction with respect to the outcome of the negotiations. On Issue I (Bi-Racial Committee) the black confederates were instructed to compromise as far as position 8 in order to reach agreement, if necessary. However, on Issues I1 and I11 (Housing and Schools) they were instructed to take position 10 (the most pro-civil rights positions) and not budge from this position throughout the negotiation, yet t o make every effort to move the white subjects toward an agreement on position 10 or to a position as close to 10 as possible. Immediately following the negotiations the subjects recorded the outcomes on sheets representing the 10 possible position statements for each of the three issues. If there was agreement, then the position statement at which there was agreement was the outcome. If there was no agreement, the


subjects were asked to indicate how far they would have been Willing to go in order to reach an agreement; this was then recorded and considered the ourcome measure, since it was a measure of how far the black confederates had been able to “move” the white naive subjects.

(5) Next the subjects filled out a brief post-negotiation questionnaire, in which they expressed evaluations of and behavioral intentions toward the black confederates with whom they had just negotiated, as well as their satisfaction with the negotiations on a ten-item satisfaction questionnaire.

(6) Finally, the six naive subjects reconvened in the original caucus group, together with the confederate chairman, to present and evaluate each other’s outcomes. They were asked to evaluate the outcomes of all three groups, partly from the point of view of the agreed upon caucus position, partly with respect to the good of society as a whole, and considering the racial strife in the community, the desirability of arriving at mutually satisfactory solutions with the black negotiators. The one team which was rated as having the “best” overall outcome was awarded a $3 prize. The subjects knew in advance that they would be returning to a post-negotiation caucus, that the outcomes would be evaluated and that this cash prize would be awarded to the team judged to have the best outcome. However, the experimenters imposed the restriction that a team would be disqualified from winning the cash prize unless it reached agreement on at least two out of the three issues. Thus, in terms of McGrath’s (1966) tri-forces model, the subjects were clearly under pressure from three directions.

RESULTS

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables which emerged for possible further study may be summarized as follows. (1) Outcomes by issue-for each of the three issues there was an outcome measure representing the Thurstone scaled position statement (ranging from 1 to 10) OR which the two groups agreed, or in the case of no agreement, the dependent variable was the limit to which the naive subjects would have been willing to go in order to achieve a compromise. (2) Summated outcome-the above measure was summated over the three issues to obtain one summated outcome measure. (3) Total number of agreements- this value could vary from 0 to 3 since there was a total of three issues involved. (4) Post-negotiation questionnaire factors-the post-negotiation questionnaire consisted of 37 items (12 semantic and 15 behavioral differential judgments of the “opponents” and 10 satisfaction questions). In order to reduce this number of variables the 37 items were subjected to factor analysis and five varimax rotated factors emerged. These factors were: I. Affect toward Opponents; 11. Affect toward Experiment; 111. Social Distance from


TABLE 2 INTERCORRELATIONS O F NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES AND POST-NEGOTIATION

QUESTIONNAIRE VARIABLES

I ~ ~~~

1. z Outcome- 3 Issues

2. Outcome Issue I 3. Outcome Issue I1 4. Outcome Issue 111 5. Z Agreement-

3 Issues 6. PNQ Factor 1 7. PNQ Factor 2 8. PNQ Factor 3 9. PNQ Factor 4

10. PNQ Factor 5 I

- 2

.I 3

- 3 -

.I 7

.47

.5 3

- 6

.44

.5 1

.3 1

.30

-.43

- 7 -

-.12 -.17 -.13 -.03

.19

.oo

Note.-Outcome Issues: I = Bi-racial committee; I1 = Housing; I11 = Schools. PNQ = Post- negotiation questionnaire. PNQ Factors: 1 = Affect toward opponents; 2 = Affect toward experiment; 3 = Social distance from opponents; 4 = Dynamism of opponents; 5 = Marital rejection of opponents. For caucus variables, N = 17; df = 15; for outcome variables, N = 44 teams; df= 42; for individual variables, N = 88 Ss; df= 86. Significance levels are for 1-tailed tests.

p < .05 when r > .41 p < .01 when r 2 .56 p < .005 when r 3 .61

p < .05 when r > .25 p < .01 when r > .35 p < ,005 when r 2 .39

p < .05 whenr > .18 p < .01 when r > .25 p < .005 when r > .28

Opponents; IV. Dynamism of Opponents; and V. Marital Rejection of Opponents (details may be seen in Davis & Triandis, 1965).

Interrelationships Among Dependent Variables

Since it would have been cumbersome to retain all of the possible dependent measures in further analyses with the independent variables, and since some of these measures may be more stable than others, it was deemed useful to look at the interrelationships among the dependent measures just described. Table 2 presents a matrix of correlations among the 10 dependent variables described above.

As may be seen from an inspection of Table 2, the summated outcome over the three issues (variable 1) correlates very highly with the outcomes on the three individual issues (variables 2, 3, and 4) at or about the same level, indicating that the three issues contribute approximately equally to the summated measure. Also, as might be expected, there is a correlation between the summated outcome and the summated agreements over the three issues (variable 1 with variable 5) . The post-negotiation questionnaire factors do not


show appreciable correlation with the other dependent measures, with the exception of Factor I (Affect toward Opponents). The relationship here is rather interesting. On the one hand, Affect toward Opponents correlates positively and significantly (p < .005) with the summated outcomes, our basic criterion measure. This is to be expected, since dissonance theory and other cognitive principles would predict that if the subjects moved in a more pro-civil rights direction, they would express more positive affect toward their black pro-civil rights opponents.

On the other hand, although the summated outcomes and the summated agreement scores correlated positively with each other, the measure of affect toward opponents correlated negatively with the summated agreement scores. A plausible explanation of this apparent discrepancy would seem to be as follows. The summated outcome measure was based on the extent to which the subjects moved in a pro-civil rights direction, whether or not there was agreement at the end of the negotiations. This would be compatible with subsequent positive affect toward the opponents. The summated agreement measure, on the other hand, was much more difficult to achieve. To reach agreement the subjects had to acquiesce to rather “extreme” demands on the part of the black confederates. Although on Issue I the confederates were allowed to compromise as far as position 8 to reach agreement, on Issues I1 and 111 they were instructed to remain adamant at position 10, the most pro-civil rights position. Hence, subjects who compromised to the extent of total agreement, within the framework of the confederates’ demands, might have felt that they had been “pressured” or “coerced” by the confederates. This could have resulted in subsequent negative affect toward the confederate opponents. Suggestive substantiation for this interpretation may be seen by looking at the differential correlations between the Affect toward Opponents and the Outcomes on the Three Issues. On Issue I there is a higher positive correlation than in the case of Issues I1 and 111. It will be recalled that on Issue I the confederates showed more cooperative behavior, whereas on Issues I1 and 111 they were “uncooperative.” These findings are consistent with previous research showing that initially cooperative behavior followed by uncooperative behavior has negative effects in a bargaining or negotiation situation (eg., Deutsch, 1962).

Group Influence on Negotiation Outcomes

One would expect the subjects’ explicitly stated behavioral intentions, as expressed in their preferred outcome position statements, assessed immediately prior to the negotiations, to be highly predictive of the actual negotiations outcomes. Table 3 presents the intercorrelations between the negotiation outcomes, the caucus outcomes and the individual positions, summated over the three issues of negotiation.


TABLE 3 INTE RCO R RELAT I 0 NS 0 F NEGOT IAT I 0 N 0 UT CO MES, CAUCUS OUTCOMES. AND INDIVIDUAL STANDS ON

ISSUES

1. C Outcome-3 Issues 2. Z Caucus positions 3. C Caucus limits 4. C Individual positions 5. Z Individual limits

qqz .84 .59

.44

.66

Note.-For caucus variables, N = 17; df = 15; for outcome variables, N = 44 teams; df = 42; for individual variables, N = 88 Ss; df = 86. significance levels are for 1-tailed test.

p < .05 when r > .41 p < .01 when r > .56 p < .005 when r 2 .61

p < .05 when r 2 . 2 5 p < .01 when r 2 .35 p < .005 when r 2 .39

p < .05 when r 2 .18 p < .01 when r 2 .25 p < .005 when r 2.28

As may be seen from this table, the individuals’ preferred position, summated over the three issues (variable 4) predicts the main dependent variable of the negotiation outcomes, summated over the three issues, (variable 1) at .36. While this is significant at the .01 level, it is scarcely a very impressive degree of predictive validity, given the manifest relatedness of the two variables. As might be expected, the summated individuals limits (variable 5) predicts the outcome measure at a slightly higher level.

Earlier we predicted a significant reference group effect on the outcomes of the negotiations, and furthermore, specifically predicted that “the preferred outcome of the reference group would be as predictive or more predictive of the negotiations outcome than would be the individual’s preferred outcome.” As an inspection of Table 3 reveals, the caucuses’ preferred position, summated over the three issues, predicts the summated outcome measure at .65, which, in spite of the lower df, due to the smaller number of caucuses involved, is significant beyond the .005 level. This strongly suggests support for the hypothesis put forth. Due to the lower df involved in the caucus measures, the absolute difference between the correlation coefficients of .36 and .65 falls short of statistical significance; nevertheless, the trend is clearly in the predicted direction.

Of further interest is the fact that the limits to which the caucuses were willing to go in order to reach a mutually acceptable agreement (variable 3) is less predictive of the summated outcome variable than the caucuses preferred


position. Thus, it would appear that many subjects in their negotiations behavior “overconformed” in the sense that they adhered more closely to the preferred position expressed by the caucus than to the limits which the caucus had agreed would be acceptable.

Predictive4 Value of Subjective Culture Measures

As will be recalled from our earlier discussion, the 472 responses in Pre-Test I , which were reflective of subjective culture measures, were reduced to 140 variables by obtaining composite scores based on known factor structures of subsets of items. These variables were, in turn, summarized by obtaining five subject factors or “idealized subject types.” Each subject had some loading, high or low, on each of the subject factors, and thus, subjects’ loadings on each of the five subject factors can be treated as condensed measures of subjective culture variables. As we discussed earlier, some of these subject factors were more interpretable anpl more relevant to the issues of interracial negotiations than others.

Table 4 presents the intercorrelations of the negotiation outcomes, individual and caucus positions summated over issues, and subjects’ loadings on the five subject factors. In our previous discussion of the concurrent validity of subjects’ loadings on the subject factors with their positions on the civil rights issues (Table I), we saw that only Subject Factors I , 11, and V were significantly related to the civil rights issues. Thus, not surprisingly, an inspection of Table 4 shows that subjects’ loadings on these three factors are also predictive of the main criterion variable, namely the summated outcome of the three issues of negotiation.

Subjects’ loadings on Subject Factor I (Misanthropy) predict the summated outcome measure at -.33 (p < .05). It is not surprising that subjects who are more “misanthropic” would be less likely to arrive at a pro-civil rights negotiation outcome. However, the level of significance is not high and the usefulness of this factor would seem to be limited.

On the other hand, subjects’ loadings on Subject Factors 11 and V predict the outcome measure more substantially ( r = -.42 and -.43, respectively; p < .005), which is in line with our earlier interpretation of their direct relevance to the issues of interracial negotiations. As will be recalled, both of

4The research reported in this paper is of correlational nature, and causal relationships between measures and behaviors cannot be established. However, the situation is similar to the classic case of the psychologist who measures abilities in the fall and finds that this measure predicts grades in the spring. Clearly the ability variables do not cause the grades but can be used to predict the grades. Prediction as used in this paper is specifically meant in this fashion.


4 5 6

.36 .42 -.33

.59 .44 -.41

.54 .44 -.41 .66 -.32

-.37

TABLE 4. INTERCORRELATIONS 0 F NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES, INDIVIDUAL AND

CAUCUS POSITIONS AND Ss’ LOADINGS ON FIVE SUBJECT FACTORS

7 8

-.42 .06 -,62 .19 -.54 .25 -.59 .17 -.60 .07

.48 -.06 -.01

I 1

1. c Outcome-3 Issues 2. c Caucus Positions 3. c Caucus Limits 4. E Individual Positions 5. c Individual Limits

_.

2

.65 -

6. Subject Factor I 7. Subject Factor I1 8. Subject Factor 111 9. Subject Factor IV

- 3

.52

.84

-

Note.-Subject Factors: I = Misanthropy; I1 = Race prejudice; 111 = Interracial marriage; IV = Extremism; V = Belief prejudice. For Caucus variables, N = 17; df = 15; for outcome variables, N = 44 teams; df = 42; for individual variables, N = 88 Ss; df = 86. Significance levels are for 1-tailed test.

p < .05 when r > .41 p < .01 when r > .56 p < .005 when r 2 .61

p < .05 whenr > .25 p < .01 when r > .35 p < .005 when r > .39

p < .05 whenr > . I8 p < .01 when r > 2 5 p < ,005 when r > .28

these subject types represented “prejudiced” subjects, in the sense of being anti-civil rights, with Subject Type I1 being “race-prejudiced’’ and Subject Type V being “belief prejudiced.” Although these two subject types (i.e., subjects’ loadings on the two subject factors) predict the outcome measure at approximately the same level, they would appear to do so for different reasons. Triandis & Davis (1965) have discussed the differences between these two types in greater detail.

In light of the difficulty or ambiguity of their interpretation and their possible artifactual nature, it was not unexpected that subjects’ loadings on Subject Factors I11 and IV would have no predictive validity in terms of the outcome measure.

As may be further observed from an inspection of Table 4, the concuxent validity of subjects’ loadings on the three relevant factors, I , I1 and V as evidenced by their correlations with the individuals’ and the cauci x s ’ positions and limits on the issues, was somewhat greater than their predic Live validity, i.e., the correlation with the summated negotiation outcome. ‘.’lus latter dependent variable is obviously affected by numerous interven , I

influences, many of which could not be controlled in the experiment situation.

The results presented in Table 4 demonstrate conclusively that subjective culture measures, as summarized by subjects’ loadings on subject factors or

EXPERlMENTAL STUDY OF BLACK-WHITE NEGOTIATIONS 257

“idealized subject types,” are predictive of actual behavior in black-white interactions, as manifested by the outcomes ~f these negotiations. However, the condensation of the large number of subje<tive culture variables into the two or three relevant subject factors described ahove does constitute a certain abstraction from the raw data. A detailed examination of the simple and multiple correlations of all of the independent variables with the major dependent variables has some value but would exceed the scope of this article. The reader is referred to Davis & Triandis (1965) for such detailed analyses; however, we will briefly highlight some of the more salient findings.

One finding which has been discussed by Davis (1964) was that behavioral differential judgments of stimulus persons were significantly more predictive of the outcome measure than were semantic differential judgments of stimulus persons. I t was hypothesized that semantic differential judgments of stimulus persons were relatively susceptible to social desirability influences, whereas behavioral differential judgments, which t?,) the behavioral component of social attitudes, would be expected to be I I )re predictive of actual behavior. Triandis (1967) has discussed the necessit of differentially analyzing the components of social attitudes.

On the other hand, semantic differential judgments of issues, especially those relating to the issues of negotiation, were generally predictive of the outcome measure. Semantic differential evaluations of negatively phrased issues (which may have been more “emotionally charged”) tended to predict the outcome better than evaluations of positively phrased issues. Thus, the evaluation of “segregated housing” predicted the summated outcome at -.49 0, < .005), whereas the evaluations of “integrated housing” predicted at .37

In considering the semantic differential and behavioral differential judgments of stimulus persons as predictor variables, it is of importance to consider not only the nature of the measuring instrument but also the characteristics of the stimulus person. In general, attitudinal measures toward stimulus persons who were characterized as being both “Negro” and “pro-civil rights” were more predictive of the outcome variable than were attitudinal measures toward stimulus persons characterized as being “white” and/or “anti-civil rights.” This seemingly obvious finding has been overlooked by many researchers. Since the behavior which was being measured, namely the outcome of negotiations on civil rights issues, was vis-a-vis a “Negro male who was pro-civil rights” (the black confederates of the experimenters), it would seem logical that attitudinal measures toward stimulus persons who most closely approximated these characteristics would be most predictive of the outcome behaviors. The failure of many attitudinal measures to adequately predict behavior lies largely in the failure to tap attitudes toward stimulus persons specifically representative of groups of individuals with respect to

0, < .01).


whom the behavioral criteria will be measured. For example, attitudinal measures toward the general stimulus object “Negro” may not be highly predictive of behavior resultkg from interactions with Negro male college students of middle-class background who are pro-civil rights and highly articulate-especially since the average white subject may not associate many of these characteristics with the stimulus “Negro.” Similarly “attitudes” toward the general category “Chinese” may not be predictive of behaviors toward a Chinese couple who are well-educated, well-dressed, speak English fluently, etc. Apart from more general methodological criticisms, the purported lack of relationship between attitudes and behavior reported by LaPiere (1934), Kutner, Wilkins, and Yarrow (1952), and others may be explained on the basis of this phenomenon.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Utilizing a technique which may be referred to as “real-life” simulation the experimenters had 88 white naive subjects, who were male undergraduates, negotiate with black confederates on three civil rights issues. The experimental subjects were selected from a larger pool of 300 subjects on whom large numbers of measures were obtained, which may be described as indices of subjective culture (Triandis et al., 1971). The selection took place on the basis of the subjects’ loadings on five subject factors obtained by factor analyzing a covariance matrix of the subjects’ responses to 140 variables.

A major hypothesis of the study was that subjective culture measures would be significant predictors of the outcomes of the negotiations. A second major hypothesis had to do with the effect of reference group influence on the outcomes. I t was hypothesized that the outcome preferences of the subjects’ reference group, in the form of a six-man caucus which met prior to the negotiations, would be significantly predictive of the negotiation outcomes, and indeed would be as predictive, or more predictive, than the individual’s own preferred outcome position.

Subjective culture measures included such things as perceptions and evaluations of and attitudes toward members of other groups and social issues, as well as basic value and belief systems, etc. The large numbers of variaLles which we used to tap these various aspects of subjective culture v cre summarized in terms of subjects’ loadings on the subject factors. Subjezts’ loadings on two of these factors in particular, which were designated as Conventional Race Prejudice and Belief Prejudice and which are discussed 5~. greater detail by Triandis & Davis (1965), were shown to be hghly prr. dictive of the negotiation outcomes. Thus, the hypothesis that subjectiv! culture measures would predict the outcomes of black-white negotiations, particularly for certain classes of these measures, was confirmed.


The hypothesis concerning the influence of the reference group on the negotiation outcomes, as manifested by the caucus’s preferred position, was supported by a correlation of .65 (p < .005) between the caucus position and the summated outcome measure, compared to a correlation of .36 (p < .Ol ) between the individual’s preferred position and the dependent variable. Though the difference between these two correlation coefficients falls short of statistical significance, due to the relatively small number of caucuses involved, the tendency is clearly in the predicted direction.

More detailed analyses of the importance of particular subjective culture measures in predicting outcomes showed that behavioral differential judgments of person stimuli were more predictive than semantic differential judgments of such stimuli. On the other hand, semantic differential judgments of issues, particularly “highly charged” ones, were predictive of the outcome variables.

In considering the predictive validity of subjective culture measures, involving attitudes toward person stimuli, it was shown that significant prediction is achieved when the stimulus persons involved in the attitude measurement are identical or very similar to the persons with respect to whom dependent measures (behaviors) zre obtained. I t was pointed out that the purported lack of a significant relationship between attitudes and behavior (e.g., Kutner et al., 1952; LaF’iere, 1934; et al.) may well be due to the lack of correspondence between the attitude object and the object(s) involved in the (behavioral) dependent measure.

The results of this study have obvious implications of an applied and practical nature for intergroup relations generally, and particularly for interactions between black and white Americans. The findings that subjective culture measures are predictive of the outcomes of black-white negotiations suggest the possibility that such variables could be systematically taken into account in the selection, training, and other preparation of intergroup negotiators and mediators. In general, the more the “gap” between the subjective cultures of two groups can be reduced, the greater the probability that interactions between the groups will lead to successful conclusions. Although the present study dealt with subjective culture measures obtained from white naive subjects, other research is in progress obtaining comparable measures from black subjects (Triandis, Feldman, & Harvey, 1970; 1971a, b, c; Triandis & Malpass, 1970). To facilitate the exchange of information concerning the subjective culture of two groups, modern technological ad- vances could be utilized. For instance, once the key variables have been thoroughly identified, computerized programmed instruction techniques could be employed to facilitate such an exchange (Fiedler, Mitchell, & Triandis, 1971). Such an approach, termed a “cultural assimilator,” could go far in reducing the gap in the understanding of the subjective cultures of two groups. While it may be desirable for two groups to maintain their identities,


and thus their own subjective cultures, an increase in the understanding of each other’s subjective culture would lead t o more positive interactions between members of the two groups.

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