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[This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the Social
and Environmental Accountability Journal on 2nd February, 2015, available
online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0969160X.2015.1007466]
Entitlements and time: Integrated Reporting’s double-edged
agenda
Dale Tweedie and Nonna Martinov-Bennie.
Macquarie University, Sydney
ABSTRACT
This paper argues that the Integrated Reporting (IR) framework developed by the
International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) is double-edged from a critical
sustainability perspective. The paper is based on qualitative content analysis of public
documents from four leading non-financial reporting organisations: the IIRC, the Accounting
for Sustainability Project, the Global Reporting Initiative and the King Committee on
Corporate Governance in South Africa. This analysis shows that IR moves away from three
key tenets of prior social and environmental reporting frameworks by privileging: (i)
communication over holding organisations accountable; (ii) organisational over social
sustainability; and (iii) the entitlements of providers of financial capital over other
stakeholders. Yet IR is also a practical attempt to shift financial capital from a short-term to
long-term investment horizon. As critical social and accounting theorists have argued,
extensive short-term investment is a threat to environmental and social sustainability. Hence,
IR has the potential to progress sustainability goals if it forms part of a broader re-
organisation of capital markets to reward longer-term perspectives.
KEYWORDS: Accounting for Sustainability, Global Reporting Initiative, Integrated
Reporting, King Committee, social and environmental accounting, sustainability
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Entitlements and Time: Integrated Reporting’s double-edged
agenda
Introduction
This paper argues that the Integrated Reporting (IR) framework developed by the
International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) is double-edged from a critical
sustainability perspective. For present purposes, a sustainability perspective views social and
environmental reporting as a means towards more sustainable societies, rather than as about
improving reporting quality to support financial investment decisions. In turn, a sustainable
society refers to a replicable and just use of shared resources. Take, for example, the World
Commission on Environment and Development’s (WCED, 1987: 15) well-known definition
of sustainability as ‘meet[ing] the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs’. Here, sustainable societies are defined as: (i)
able to reproduce their material and social conditions; and (ii) equitably distributing resources
between generations (Anand and Sen, 2000).
Although there are many alternative concepts of sustainability in social and environmental
reporting and research (e.g. Brown and Dillard, 2013; Burritt and Schaltegger, 2010; Samkin,
Schneider and Tappin, 2014), the idea that reporting should contribute to sustainability as
defined above has been consistently influential. For instance, one aim of early sustainability
reporting initiatives in Europe was to encourage organisations to fulfil social and
environmental responsibilities that were being ignored or overlooked by the state (Ioannou
and Serafeim, 2011a). The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2000: 2) has explicitly endorsed
the World Commission on Environment and Development’s definition of sustainability, and
so has by implication endorsed its environmental and equity goals. In academic research, the
importance of a replicable and just use of resources is indirectly seen in recurrent criticisms
of social and environmental reporting for failing to make organisations either more
environmentally sustainable or equitable in practice (e.g. Brown and Dillard, 2013; Correa
and Laine, 2013; Gray, 2013; 2010; Aras and Crowther, 2009).
An integrated report is not a sustainability report (Druckman, 2013; IIRC, 2013b: 18; GRI,
2013: 85). However, since the IIRC is an institutional product of the sustainability reporting
tradition, its IR framework is legitimately subject to critique on sustainability grounds. The
IIRC was founded by the GRI and the Accounting for Sustainability Project (A4S) in 2010.
Whereas a stated aim of sustainability reports like the GRI is to document how organisations
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impact natural and social environments, the stated aim of IR is to provide a concise
description of how organisations create value using six types of capital: financial, intellectual,
human, social and relationships, manufactured and natural. One of the more controversial
features of IR is that its intended audience is providers of financial capital (IIRC, 2013d: 7).
Thus, while IR draws concepts like natural capital from sustainability reporting, IR adopts its
aim and target audience from mainstream corporate reporting. The IIRC has also set out
ambitious objectives for IR’s dissemination and use: originally that IR should become
organisations’ ‘primary reporting vehicle’ (IIRC, 2011: 6), and more recently that IR should
become ‘the corporate reporting norm’ (IIRC, 2014a: 5).
This paper aims to clarify the IIRC’s agenda and to evaluate its implications for
sustainability. IR research is expanding rapidly, but IR remains under-explored compared to
the extensive analysis of preceding non-financial reporting frameworks (e.g. Barton, 2011;
Parker, 2005; Gray, Kouhy, and Lavers, 1995). Moreover, extant IR research has focused on
IR’s development (Adams and Simnett, 2011; Rowbottom and Locke, 2013) and impact
within organisations (Stubbs and Higgins, 2014; Higgins, Stubbs and Love, 2014), rather than
on the IIRC’s underlying philosophy and strategy. In response, this paper systematically
investigates the IIRC’s agenda, in four main sections. Section 1 develops the research
questions and method: Comparative content analysis of public releases from four major
standard-setters in non-financial reporting. Section 2 uses the research results to elucidate the
IIRC’s goals and strategies. Section 3 draws on critical research in both social and
environmental reporting and social theory to draw out IR’s double-edged implications for
sustainability. On one hand, IR moves non-financial reporting away from characteristic
sustainability goals by privileging the entitlements of financial capital and weakening formal
accountability to other stakeholders. On the other hand, IR aims to re-focus capital markets
on the longer-term time frame that more sustainable corporate practice requires. Hence, IR
has the potential to contribute to sustainability if it forms part of a broader re-organisation of
capital markets to prioritise longer-term investment.
1. Research approach and method
Despite releasing its first International IR Framework in December, 2013, the IIRC’s
underlying reporting philosophy remains opaque for three main reasons. First, the IIRC
explains IR as a development in corporate rather than sustainability reporting, and so as
providing a distinct agenda from conventional sustainability reporting frameworks. However,
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and second, there is no agreed theory of IR. Although the broad concept of integrating
financial and non-financial information has been referred to in social and environmental
reporting research for some time (e.g. Gray, 2010; Ranganathan, 1998), the only extended
discussion of IR’s justification and approach in the academic literature is Eccles and Krzus’s
(2010) One Report. Since this text largely pre-dates the IIRC, and since IR has been
developed through the IIRC’s own extended process of internal discussion and consultation,
One Report cannot be assumed to represent either the IIRC’s concept of IR or define the
IIRC’s agenda. Third, the academic literature that does analyse the IIRC’s version of IR has
been more focused on IR’s development and impact, rather than on its philosophy and
strategy. For example, Adams and Simnett (2011) outline drivers behind IR’s development
and its usefulness for not-for-profit organisations, while Rowbottom and Locke (2013)
analyse the IIRC’s growth and likely future. Higgins, Stubbs and Love (2014) and Stubbs and
Higgins (2014) evaluate IR’s effect on organisations, such as who is preparing IRs and why.
Yet as Wild and van Staden (2013) illustrate in South Africa, how organisations use IR may
not reflect the IIRC’s own intent or principles. While the IIRC’s principles are becoming
clearer through emerging critiques of its framework (e.g. Brown and Dillard, 2014, Milne and
Gray, 2013), these critiques do not set out to systematically elucidate IR’s distinguishing
features.
The paper explores two research questions:
1. What is distinctive about the IIRC’s reporting philosophy, especially in its
objectives and strategy?
2. What implications does the IIRC’s reporting approach have for sustainability,
defined as including a replicable and just use of resources?
The findings are based on comparative analysis of public releases and frameworks from four
organisations that issue non-financial reporting frameworks: the IIRC, GRI, A4S and the
King Committee on Corporate Governance in South Africa (henceforth, the ‘King
Committee’). The GRI and A4S were selected as the IIRC’s founders, and as the most
influential social and environmental reporting frameworks in the Anglo-American tradition.
The King Committee was selected as the IIRC’s most direct precedent and as the first IR
framework to gain regulatory support. The period of analysis was from 2000 to 2013, which
captured major revisions in each of the frameworks, including the IIRC’s entire development
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up until its first framework release, and two iterations of the GRI, A4S and King Committee
reports (see: Appendix A).
The research method was qualitative content analysis, meaning 'subjective interpretation of
the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and
identifying themes or patterns’ (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 1278). This qualitative content
analysis had three stages. First, all documents were open-coded (in NVIVO 10) to generate
an independent hierarchy of goals and strategies for each standard-setter. Second, similar
codes that emerged for each organisation’s goals (e.g. sustainability) and strategies (e.g.
stakeholder engagement) were compared to identify similarities and differences in how each
organisation interpreted these concepts. Third, the overall hierarchy of goals and meanings
was compared and critically assessed. Coding was conducted by author one and reviewed by
author two, with differences in interpretation identified and discussed. Although open-coding
is more subjective than quantitative coding within a pre-determined scheme, this paper adopts
the hermeneutic view that social scientific research is always interpretative (e.g. Taylor,
1985), including when choosing a quantitative coding framework. More concretely, a key
assumption of quantitative content analysis – that a word’s frequency indicates its
significance (Guthrie et al., 2004) – is not met in this case, because standard settors had
different interpretations of key terms (e.g. sustainability). The method of qualitative content
analysis enabled the coding framework to be iteratively adapted to capture these differences.
2. Research results
How does the IIRC envisage IR improving reporting practice, and through what
mechanisms? This section elucidates the IIRC’s agenda by clarifying the ideas that underpin
its reporting goals (Section 2.1) and strategies (Section 2.2), and which emerged from the
coding process.
2.1 IR’s distinctive goals
1. Prioritising communication over holding organisations accountable
One recurrent issue in social and environmental reporting research is whether non-financial
reports promote organisational accountability (e.g. Gray, 2013; Unerman, Bebbington and
O'Dwyer, 2007). Accountability has numerous meanings, one of which is transparency or
openness (e.g. McKearnen, 2012; Kamuf, 2007). However, the social and environmental
accounting literature has emphasised a second sense of accountability, which focuses on
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whether organisations’ reports enable them to be held accountable for their social and
environmental impacts. For example, Gray (1996: 38) defines accountability as ‘the duty to
provide an account (by no means necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of those
actions for which one is held responsible’ (emphasis added). From this perspective, a key
requirement of non-financial reporting is to determine what information stakeholders need to
hold organisations responsible for their actions, and then to ensure that organisations provide
this information.
Since IR’s stated aim is to enable organisations to better communicate how they create value,
it is primarily concerned with accountability in the more limited sense of open
communication. For example, IIRC chairman Mervyn King defines IR as:
The language evidencing sustainable business. It is the means by which companies
communicate how value is created and will be enhanced over the short, medium and
long term (IIRC and Black Sun, 2012: 1).
This quote highlights how the intended function of IR is to provide a new channel through
which organisations can conceptualise and explain their activities, rather than to create a set
of reporting criteria that compels organisations to respond to stakeholders’ concerns. The
IIRC briefly cites Porter’s and Kramer’s (2011) theory of ‘shared-value’, but a fuller
explanation of the implicit logic of their communicative approach can be drawn from R.
Edward Freeman’s pragmatic model of organisational theory (Freeman et al., 2010; 2004).
For Freeman, the principal function of a new organisational concept, such as stakeholder,
natural capital or IR, is to enable organisations to tell more diverse and compelling stories
about how they create value. In turn, new forms of communication enable new actions. For
example, Freeman, Wicks and Parmar (2004: 365) claim that the stakeholder concept enables
value-creating collaboration between managers and other stakeholders by providing
‘language and action to show that they [managers] value relationships with other groups and
work to advance their interests over time’. Freeman does not claim that such value-creation is
always possible. Nor does he ignore inequities in organisational power. Rather, Freeman’s
point is that thinking of organisations as networks of stakeholders enables people to
collaborate in new and potential productive ways. The IIRC’s understanding of IR can be
explained in similar terms. That is, the IIRC contends that organisations that conceptualise
themselves as managing six inter-related capitals will think differently about how
organisations functions, and act and as well as report differently on this basis.
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2. Organisational not social sustainability
A second distinctive feature of the IIRC’s approach is IR’s focus on reporting what makes
organisations sustainable, rather than on what makes societies more broadly sustainable. For
example, the IIRC’s (2011: 11) early releases describe IR as ‘support[ing] resource allocation
decisions that are consistent with sustained value creation’ (emphasis added). In this quote,
what is being sustained is an organisation’s capacity to continue its value-creating activities,
rather than a society’s capacity to replicate and equitably distribute its resources. Of course,
since organisations are social sub-systems, it is tautologically true that organisations require a
society, such that sustainable organisations logically entail sustainable societies over the long
term. However, the well-known point of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968) is that
the efficient extraction of value from shared resources by any particular individual or
organization need not coincide with an efficient, sustainable or just use of resources by all
individuals. Hence, sustainable organisations and sustainable societies are distinct in both
theory and practice (see also: Gray, 2006; Milne and Gray, 2013).
More recent IIRC releases gesture towards a ‘thicker’ concept of social sustainability, but
retain a practical focus on sustainable organisations. For example, the IIRC’s (2013a: iii)
sustainability-themed yearbook quotes – without directly endorsing – a United Nation’s
definition of sustainability as ‘about recognizing, understanding and acting on
interconnections, above all, those between the economy, society and the natural
environment’. This United Nation’s definition encompasses environmental and social
sustainability. However, the IIRC’s discussion focuses on organisational sustainability. For
example, the report describes IR as a force for ‘financial stability and sustainability (IIRC,
2013a: iv, emphasis added), and repeatedly quotes organisations describing their ‘sustainable
value-creation story’ (IIRC, 2013a: 19). Similarly, although the IIRC (e.g. 2011: 18)
describes organisations as ‘stewards’ of non-financial capital, within a value-creation
framework stewardship essentially refers to the successful extraction of financial returns from
organisational assets over time.
By contrast, the King Committee, GRI and A4S all place greater emphasis on social and
environmental sustainability. GRI 3.1 (2000: 11) clearly distinguished sustainability reporting
from reporting on organisations’ long-term performance:
The underlying question of sustainability reporting is how an organization
contributes…to the improvement or deterioration of economic, environmental, and
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social conditions…Reporting only on trends in individual performance (or the
efficiency of the organization) will fail to respond to this underlying question.
GRI 4 introduces a more strategic focus by providing organisations with greater flexibility to
choose which categories of information are material to it. Yet the categories themselves
emphasise how organisations impact environments and societies; for example, in their regard
for human rights and in taking responsibility for consumers’ health (GRI, 2013). A4S’s
underlying objective is also to promote sustainability, which they define as ‘considering what
we do not only in terms of ourselves and today, but also of others and tomorrow’ (A4S, 2007:
1). Although A4S (2012: 5) does maintain that sustainability reporting can create value for
organisations, its strategy is to promote sustainable action by making the business case for
doing so (A4S, 2012: 3). The IIRC’s agenda is precisely the opposite. That is, where A4S
promotes the value of social and environmental reporting to organisations to encourage
sustainability, the IIRC incorporates sustainability reporting into IR only insofar as it creates
value for organisations.
3. Capturing financial value
A third distinctive feature of IR is the IIRC’s aim to report changes in just those non-financial
capitals that affect financial value over the long term. The IIRC (2013d: 10) explains value-
creation as any increase or decrease in the six capitals. As noted above, changes in value are
material to IR only if they affect an ‘organization's ability to create value for itself’ (IIRC,
2013d: 4). In theory, organisations may be interested in capturing numerous different kinds of
value depending on its stakeholders’ objectives and interests. However, the IIRC (2012: 22)
has previously stated that value is material to IR only where it eventually affects financial
capital:
IR encourages companies to communicate both tangible and intangible value, even
where value is not currently captured by financial statements, but could affect
financial performance (emphasis added).
The IIRC’s emphasis on financial value that is not currently captured by financial statements
highlights its objective of taking a longer-term perspective than conventional financial
reporting, because IR includes non-financial capital that may convert into financial capital in
future reporting periods. For example, training costs can be recorded as human capital where
they contribute to future revenue. However, the above quote also implies that IRs should
exclude changes in non-financial capital that will not eventually affect organisations’
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financial capital. Thus, changes to workplace health and safety policies that shift risks to
employees would be material to IR’s value-creation framework only insofar as this shift
benefited an organisation, such as by lowering future financing costs. The impacts of these
changes on workers are not material in themselves.
The King Code of Corporate Governance in South Africa provides an instructive contrast to
the IIRC’s approach. The King Committee (2009: 11) also views IR as a better measure of
companies’ long-term financial value than conventional financial reporting. However, this
concept of IR does not limit reporting to organisational activities that affect financial value:
Sustainability considerations are rooted in the South African Constitution which is
the basic social contract that South Africans have entered into. The Constitution
imposes responsibilities upon individuals and juristic persons for the realisation of
the most fundamental rights (King Committee, 2009: 10).
Although couched in the legalistic language of social contract theory, this statement reflects
the uniquely African form of communitarianism embodied in the concept of ‘Ubuntu’, which
the King Committee (2009: 9, 61) explicitly endorses. Inter alia, Ubuntu stresses the value of
reciprocity and social co-operation (Andreasson, 2011; West, 2006), which the King
Committee extends to corporations as well as individuals. From their perspective, companies
are citizens of the South African community with a consequent ethical responsibility to
disclose their impacts on ‘other’ South African citizens. The practical implication is that
changes in non-financial capital that impact stakeholders may be material to IR even if they
have no long-term effect on financial capital. For instance, if safety at work is a fundamental
right, then it is ipso facto material irrespective of its impact on financial value.
2.2 Integrated Reporting strategies
1. Integrated thinking
Integrated thinking is the central concept of integrated reporting, because the IIRC defines IR
as ‘a process founded on integrated thinking’ (2013d: 33). In turn, the IIRC defines integrated
thinking as ‘the active consideration by an organisation of the relationships between its
various operating and functional units and the capitals that the organization uses or affects’
(IIRC, 2013d: 2). Thus, integrated thinking has two dimensions. First, it refers to
understanding and dialogue that spans across an organization’s operating units. For example,
reporting on natural capital might facilitate integrated thinking by requiring the accounting
team to collaborate with scientific experts in operational divisions. Second, integrated
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thinking refers to a more holistic understanding of an organization’s interactions with
external stakeholders. For instance, the IIRC (2013d: 18) claims that integrated thinking
promotes a ‘fuller consideration of stakeholders’ legitimate needs and interests’.
The IIRC’s emphasis on integrated thinking is consistent with its focus on communication
over holding organisations accountable. On one hand, both dimensions of integrated thinking
describe an increase in communication, either within organisations or between organisations
and external stakeholders. Yet integrated thinking is a relatively weak accountability
mechanism because the extent to which integrated thinking is occurring cannot be directly
disclosed, measured or audited. On this issue, the absence of the integrated thinking concept
from either GRI 41 or the King Code is indicative of the stronger concept of accountability in
these frameworks. For instance, the King Code requires South African organizations to report
on concrete governance processes, rather than on how they think about governance.
Similarly, GRI 4 (2013: 64-66) provides external benchmarks against which organisations’
performance can be evaluated, such as International Labour Organization’s labour standards,
rather than only requiring organisations to conceptualise human capital more holistically.
2. Stakeholder ‘responsiveness’
Although the primary purpose of IR is to communicate to investors, the IR framework also
requires organisations to ‘provide insight’ into how they respond to other stakeholders’
‘legitimate needs and interests’ (IIRC, 2013d: 17-18). Consistent with its emphasis on
integrated thinking, the IIRC does not stipulate external benchmarks against which
stakeholder responsiveness might be measured. Since the legitimate needs of stakeholders are
not defined, there is also no requirement for organisations to report on specific issues with
which stakeholders are typically concerned, such as work, health and safety. The IIRC’s
(2013e: 5-6) justification for this approach is that the interests of investors and stakeholders
are likely to align over the long-term, because ‘both are focused on the creation of value’. For
example, an IIRC (2013: 7-8) report suggests that work, health and safety is almost always
material to IR because a high-risk workplace will eventually have financial costs. By
contrast, the King Committee (2009: 12) does not assume that the interests of shareholders
and other stakeholders align, and so requires directors to give stakeholders’ interests
independent weight in governance and reporting.
1 Except for one reference to the IIRC’s concept of integrated thinking when discussing the relationship between
IR and GRI 4; see (GRI, 2013, p. 85)
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3. Governing value, not values.
The IR framework requires each organisation to explain how its ‘governance structure
support[s] its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term’ (IIRC, 2013d: 25).
The IIRC therefore views governance as a cog in the value-creation process. By contrast, the
King Committee (2009: 9) defines governance as about values (i.e. ethics) rather than value-
creation:
Good governance is essentially about effective leadership. Leaders should rise to the
challenges of modern governance. Such leadership is characterized by the ethical
values of responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency (emphasis added).
The King Committee’s concept of governance is closer to the mainstream academic position.
Ever since Berle and Means (1934), the primary function of governance has been viewed as
ensuring that management meet their obligation to shareholders rather than pursuing their
own agenda. More abstractly, the mainstream view of the function of governance is ensuring
a fair distribution of value between stakeholders, rather than creating value as such. Although
formal governance structures are also under-emphasized in A4S’s reporting framework, the
requirements in A4S and the GRI for organisations to report against external performance
benchmarks (e.g. labour standards) is consistent with the King Committee’s concept of
governance as about ‘responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency’. By
comparison, the IIRC’s value-centric governance model reinforces its prioritisation of
financial interests over other stakeholders. Interestingly though, since IR does not stress the
accountability of managers to shareholders like mainstream governance theory (e.g. Jensen
and Meckling, 1976), it also subtly privileges the interests of managers over owners of
financial capital.
4. Voluntary external assurance
Although all four organisations supported some degree of external assurance, the IIRC’s
endorsement in its draft and final frameworks is the most qualified. The IR Framework
(IIRC, 2013: 32) mentions assurance as the last of five processes that can enhance a report’s
reliability, while their preceding consultation draft stated that:
organisations may seek independent, external assurance to enhance the credibility of
their reports. Independent, external assurance may also provide comfort, in addition
to the internal mechanisms, to those charged with governance (IIRC, 2013c: 32).
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Thus, while the IR framework states that external assurance can benefit providers of financial
capital and directors, it neither requires nor recommends such assurance. Recent releases
suggest that the IIRC (2014a, b) is now focusing more closely on assurance. However,
although these releases stress that assurance can improve the credibility of an IR, the IIRC
stops short of recommending or requiring such assurance. GRI 4’s (2013: 13) position is
marginally stronger; it recommends external assurance, but does not require assurance to be
‘in accordance’ with the Guidelines. The King Committee (2009: 49) provides the strongest
guidance, stating that: ‘sustainability reporting and disclosure should be independently
assured’. The gap between the IIRC’s and the King Committee’s statements on assurance are
consistent with the underlying conceptual difference between their frameworks. On the
IIRC’s value-creation framework, assurance is indirectly valuable insofar as it increases
investors’ confidence in organizations’ performance. By contrast, the King Committee’s
accountability-based framework views external assurance as constitutive of good governance.
3. Discussion and Conclusion: Evaluating Integrated Reporting’s double-edged agenda.
Section 2 has drawn out three key shifts in how the IIRC represents social and environmental
information, with the IIRC privileging: (i) communication over holding organisations
accountable; (ii) organisational over social sustainability; and, (iii) providers of financial
capital over other stakeholders. This final section evaluates implications of the IIRC’s agenda
for sustainability. In assessing this transition, one foundational question is whether the IIRC
is justified in its contention that the interests of investors and other stakeholders tend to align
over the long term. If this claim is plausible, then the IIRC can legitimately argue that a
rigorous application of IR will incorporate the interests of non-financial stakeholders as a by-
product.
However, although there is some evidence that corporate social responsibility can improve
organisations’ long-term performance (e.g. Garcia-Castro, Ariño and Canela, 2011; Ioannou
and Serafeim, 2011b), more critical accounting and social theory has persistently highlighted
structural conflicts between financial and other interests. For example, it is axiomatic in
deep-green theories that natural systems have intrinsic rather than solely instrumental value
(Gray, 1992; Samkin, Schneider and Tappin, 2014), such that a singular focus on creating
capital for humans threatens non-human values or ecosystems. Critical social and accounting
theorists identify structurally similar conflicts between human stakeholders. For instance,
given the influence of Marxist theories in social and critical accounting (Parker, 2005, Gray,
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1992), it can be argued that while investors and employees have a shared interest in value-
creation, they have opposing interests in how value is distributed between profit and wages.
Stakeholder perspectives are typically more managerial than critical in orientation (Gray,
1992), but even moderate stakeholder theorists like Freeman argue only that stakeholder
theory provides a vocabulary with which common ground between shareholders and other
groups can be sought, not that these interests are aligned. Thus, even a thorough application
of IR cannot be relied on to automatically incorporate organisations’ social and
environmental impacts, even if IR has the reporting categories to do so.2
Nonetheless, there are three ways that IR might contribute to sustainability even granting
structural conflicts between investors and other stakeholders. First, IR might engage
organisations that would not otherwise disclose any social and environmental information.
For example, the GRI has been criticised for only engaging a low proportion of companies,
despite a sharp rate of growth in users (Levy et al., 2010). One strategic response to this poor
take-up is to align social and environmental reporting more closely to investor and
management interests, and thereby trade-off sustainability reporting rigor for greater use of
frameworks that include some sustainability information. This strategic trade-off may explain
why GRI and A4S endorse IR despite their different reporting philosophies.
Second, IR might enable non-financial stakeholders to informally advance sustainability
goals within organisations. As outlined above, the IIRC conceptualises its six capitals model
as a means of better communicating how organizations affect different stakeholder groups,
both internally and externally. Consequently, IR might allow stakeholders to raise
sustainability issues at management or board level that would otherwise be excluded from
organisational discourse, by providing a vocabulary and format in which these conversations
can occur. Since abstract internal processes like integrated thinking are difficult to disclose or
audit, external stakeholders have only a weak capacity to insist on accountability on
sustainability issues. But by the same token, focusing only on stronger forms of formal
accountability risks missing the pragmatic potential IR might offer for internal and external
stakeholders to advance social and environmental issues ‘on the ground’ in organisational
discourse.
2 Although the concept of ‘capitals’ would of course be too anthropocentric for deep-green model. This issue
was also raised in public feedback to the IIRC.
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Third, IR might improve sustainability outcomes if it forms part of a broader shift in
corporate reporting and investment towards a longer-term perspective. In particular, while the
IIRC (2013d: 2) insists that IR ‘supports value creation over the short, medium and long
term’, it also acknowledges that IRs are most useful over the longer term (IIRC, 2013c: 29;
2013d: 33), and it is also over the longer term that interests of investors and other
stakeholders are most likely to intersect. For example, the financial risks that the IIRC
associates with poor work, health and safety practices, such as lost-time injuries and
reputational damage (IIRC, 2013e: 1-2; 2013d: 11) are most likely to occur over the medium
and long term. Conversely, IR is likely to be least useful to investors with a short-term
horizon. For example, the sustainability of natural capital and organizations’ relationships
with local communities are of little interest to the quantitative day-trader or hedge fund.
Hence, the IIRC’s objective for IR to become the corporate reporting norm constitutes an
active agenda to ‘shift the primary focus of providers of financial capital from the short term
to the long term’ (IIRC, 2013e: 11, emphasis added).
The significance of the IIRC’s longer-term and interventionist agenda is that critical
sustainability theorists have persistently implicated short-term investment in unsustainable
social and environmental practices. For example, Peetz’s and Murray’s (2012) analysis of
international share ownership and climate disclosures found that longer term ‘climate-
interested’ investors could exert considerable influence on organisation’s carbon behaviour
(see also: Ioannou and Serafeim, 2011b); however, their capacity to do so depended on the
relative power of short versus long-term investors. In social sustainability, Richard Sennett
(2006) has argued that increasing demands from investors for short-term financial returns
have destabilised organisations and increased employment insecurity, but without delivering
the promised increase in efficiency (see also: Stiglitz, 2013). From both perspectives, IR can
be viewed as an intervention in the struggle between short-term and long-term interests in
financial capital in favour of the latter, and where long-term investment is a necessary –
although by no means sufficient – condition of more sustainable corporate practice.
One difficulty with this third potential contribution of IR is that it moves against a historical
trend towards more mobile global investment with faster investment turnover (Castells, 2000;
Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011). Indeed, the erosion of long-term investment by mobile global
capital is precisely what provokes the critical animus of theorists like Sennett (2006). There
are countervailing trends, such as the dramatic growth of sustainability funds since the 1980s
(Ioannou and Serafeim, 2011a). However, while sustainability funds are comparatively robust
15
against fluctuations in capital markets, they are still dwarfed by more conventional financial
capital (Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang, 2011; US SIF, 2012). Consequently, a widespread
adoption of IR within a longer-term investment framework cannot simply mobilise existing
investors, but requires substantial changes in the composition of contemporary capital
markets.
Against this background, the IIRC needs to reconsider what level of compulsion is consistent
with its currently voluntary framework. The South-African model of IR, which requires listed
companies to provide an integrated report or explain why not, provides a strong incentive for
organizations to provide integrated reports, but at the cost of substantial regulatory
‘interference’. A completely voluntary IR framework provides freedom from regulation, but
provides few incentives for short-term investors to use or endorse it. It may be then that a
voluntary adoption of IR is only possible with regulatory changes in global financial capital
that cultivates and rewards the long-term investment horizon that IR both assumes and
requires. For example, Peetz and Murray (2012: 16) find that ‘shifting the balance of power
from the short-term to the long-term’ would require international regulation that rewards a
long-term perspective; namely, an international carbon trading framework. This suggests that
whether IR advances or undermines sustainability depends not only on whose interests it
serves, but also on whether IR can contribute to a broader social transformation in
corporations and financial markets, rather than becoming just another reporting framework.
16
Appendix A: Non-financial reporting texts reviewed.
International Integrated Reporting Council
1. IIRC (2013) Busines and Investors Explore the Sustainability Perspective of Integrated
Reporting. London: International Integrated Reporting Council.
2. IIRC (2013). Basis for Conclusions. London, International Integrated Reporting Council.
3. IIRC (2013). Summary of Significant issues. London, International Integrated Reporting
Council.
4. IIRC (2013). The International IR Framework. London, International Integrated Reporting
Council.
5. IIRC (2013). Consultation Draft of the International IR Framework. London, International
Integrated Reporting Council.
6. IIRC (2013). Capitals - Background Paper for <IR>. London, International Integrated
Reporting Council.
7. IIRC (2013). Capitals - Background paper for <IR>. London, International Integrated
Reporting Council.
8. IIRC (2013). Materiality - Background paper for <IR>. London, International Integrated
Reporting Council.
9. IIRC (2013). About Integrated Reporting. from http://www.theiirc.org/about/. Accessed
16th March, 2013.
10. IIRC & GRI (2013) ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, IIRC, London, 1st February.
11. IIRC (2012). Pilot Programme Yearbook: Capturing the experiences of global businesses
and investors. London, International Integrated Reporting Council.
12. IIRC and Black Sun (2012). Understanding Transformation: Building the Business Case
for Integrated Reporting. London, International Integrated Reporting Council.
13. IIRC & International Federation of Accountants (2012), ‘Memorandum of
Understanding’, IIRC, London, 7th September.
14. IIRC (2011). Towards Integrated Reporting: Communicating Value in the 21st Century
London, International Integrated Reporting Council.
17
Global Reporting Initiative
15. GRI (2013). GRI 4, Part 1. Amsterdam, Global Reporting Initiative.
16. GRI (2013). GRI 4, Part 2. Amsterdam, Global Reporting Initiative.
17. GRI (2012), Exposure Draft for Public Comment, Global Reporting Initiative,
Amsterdam.
18. GRI (2012), G4 Development, Full Survey Report, Global Reporting Initiative,
Amsterdam.
19. GRI (2000). Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 3.1. Amsterdam, Global Reporting
Initiative.
Prince’s Accounting for Sustainability Project
20. A4S (2012). Future proofed decision making. London, Prince's Accounting for
Sustainability Project.
21. A4S (2007). Accounting For Sustainability Princes' Accounting for Sustainability Project.
King Committee on Corporate Governance in South Africa
22. King Committee (2009), King Code of Governance for South Africa. Johannesburg, The
Institute of Directors in Southern Africa.
23. King Committee (2009), King Report (III) on Governance for South Africa.
Johannesburg, The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa.
24. King Committee (2002). King Report (II) on Corporate Governance for South Africa.
Parklands, Institute of Directors in South Africa.
18
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