Download pdf - POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: THREE PERSPECTIVES

POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: THREE PERSPECTIVES

1

Running head: POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: THREE PERSPECTIVES

Positive Psychology:

Three Perspectives

Robert Beshara

The University of West Georgia


2


Abstract

In this paper the attempt will be to discuss some of the main issues in positive psychology

(PP) from three perspectives: a medical one, a humanistic one, and an integrative one. To

answer some of the major questions pertaining to PP, references will be made when

possible to instances in the history of psychology in order to locate the origin of certain

philosophical positions, and hence, examine their trajectory and development, all to better

understand contemporary questions in PP.

Keywords: positive psychology, the medical model, humanistic psychology


3

Introduction

Perhaps, one should start by defining PP. According to Richard Gross (2009): “PP

can be defined as the scientific study of the positive aspects of human subjective

experience, of positive individual traits, and of positive institutions.” This paper will

address PP as it relates to the individual, particularly vis-à-vis psychotherapy. One

philosophical problem with the above-mentioned definition is that the scientific method

may not be the best method for studying subjectivity or qualia because after all the

scientific method is meant for studying the objective or ‘natural’ world—not that humans

are unnatural, but historically that has been the wording for the distinction between the

natural and social sciences. Gross’s definition could be regarded as vague because there

is no problem with studying qualia scientifically as long as we establish psychology as a

human science—which is akin to an art,1 particularly when applied clinically—, but not

as a life science since such a view would be biologically reductionist. It is worth noting

that Gross (2009) includes four other definitions of PP that frame PP as the study of

“ordinary human strengths and virtues”, “the conditions and processes that contribute to

the flourishing or optimal functioning of people, groups and institutions”, “aspects of the

human condition that lead to happiness, fulfillment and flourishing”, and/or “optimal

human functioning”.

PP is a fairly young field—fifteen years old—that was ‘founded’ by Martin

Seligman in 1998 around the time when he gave his presidential address at the American

Psychological Association (Gross, 2009); humanistic psychologists would dispute the

1 The use of the word ‘art’ here is in line with the following definitions from the Merriam-‐Webster dictionary: “1 : skill acquired by experience, study, or observation <the art of making friends> 2 a : a branch of learning: (1) : one of the humanities (2) plural : liberal arts b archaic : learning, scholarship”


4

history of PP, principally when no due credit is given to the third force in psychology.

Seligman made a valid point concerning how psychology had been largely obsessed with

mental illness for the last number of decades, which resulted in mental health being

pushed to the side. According to him, mental illness was only one of the three pre-Second

World War aims established by American psychologists at the time, the other two being:

1) “helping all people to lead more productive and fulfilling lives” and 2) “identifying

and nurturing talent and giftedness” (Gross, 2009). Clearly, these two forgotten aims are

the inspiration behind PP, which shifts psychology’s focus from mental illness to mental

health; a reasonable shift, but to what end and through which means?

Most historians cite 1879 as the year when psychology as an academic field was

born with the establishment by Wilhelm Wundt of the first laboratory dedicated solely to

psychological research in Leipzig, but others can trace the origin of psychology to the

earliest philosophical roots in world history, which would take us back to 1500 BCE—the

date of the Ancient Egyptian medical text known as the Edwin Smith Papyrus ("History

of Neuropsychology", n.d.). So, similarly, one can trace PP to its pre-1998 roots:

humanistic psychology; ultimately, when it comes to history, it depends who ones talks to

because historically historians have had their share of biases, which served as the lens

through which they recorded history, knowingly or unknowingly.

PP shares humanistic psychology’s emphasis on the fully functioning person and

the study of healthy individuals, as espoused by Carl Rodgers and Abraham Maslow,

respectively. But there are major differences between the two when it comes to

methodology, epistemology, and ontology. The opinions of a lot of humanistic

psychologists of PP are chiefly critical, as expressed in a special issue of the Humanistic


5

Psychologist (Volume 36, Issue 2, 2008) that was dedicated to a mostly unfavorable

scholarly evaluation of PP, a branch seen by the humanistic psychologists as an extension

of their project gone astray, especially since some proponents of PP condone “the

‘medicalization’ of human experience” (Gross, 2009)—an antithetical position to that of

the humanistic psychologists but not without its critics among the PP movement, who

would favor a dimensional approach to understanding psychopathology as opposed to a

categorical one. This last point could be a way to distinguish psychology from psychiatry,

for within a dimensional approach positive and negative experiences are looked at as

opposite ends of a continuum rather than as separate categories.

In this sense, suffering/ill-being and happiness/well-being inter-are as Zen

Buddhist teacher Thích Nhất Hạnh would have put it, that is, the relief of suffering is also

the promotion of well-being. This alternative to the medical model is called ‘the strength

perspective’, wherein emphasis is put “on what works, on what is improving, strong and

effective” (Gross, 2009); sort of like the shift in language from ‘victim’ to ‘survivor’ in

relation to sexual abuse or from ‘patient’ to ‘client’ in the context of therapy, but of

course, the shift is not merely superficial, at the linguistic level, rather it is a shift in

approach, attitude, etc.

Most questions regarding happiness—an important concept in PP—can probably

be traced back to the Ancient Greeks, particularly Aristotle—the ‘father’ of

psychology—with his distinction between eudaimonic happiness and hedonic happiness,

with the former relating to the cognitive and the latter to the affective, generally speaking.

Gross (2009) writes about how hard it is to “measure” eudaimonia, which speaks to his

bias toward a quantitative paradigm, not the most appropriate way to study subjective


6

well-being. Clearly, defining happiness is not an easy task, but it is one that PP is up to,

and it is one that is relevant to therapy.

Let us now examine PP in the context of therapy from three perspectives starting

with the medical model.

The Medical Model

The medical model can also be framed as a ‘deficit model,’ wherein

“psychological problems are equated with biological problems within the individual,

rather than being influenced by a wider social context” (Gross, 2009); philosophically the

root of this position is labeled biological reductionism, when applied the focus in therapy

becomes on what is broken or dysfunctional (i.e., mental illness) as opposed to what is

whole or functional (i.e., mental health). This specific monist perspective is the modus

operandi of numerous psychiatrists around the world, and it is an extreme that PP is

tending toward as its empirical research findings and clinical approaches are gaining

more and more acceptance due to their being evidence-based, and hence, are seen as

more scientifically grounded in the positivist sense; it can be argued, however, that it is a

myth to assert that ‘evidence-based therapy’ (EBT) is more effective than other forms of

psychotherapy (Shedler, 2013).

The medical model as a position is ethically loaded, particularly when one

considers the socio-economic dimension of the relation between ‘Big Pharma’ and

psychiatry, that is, the asymmetric power dynamics between psychiatrist and patient,

prescriptiveness as instant diagnostics, and profiteering as a main priority as far as the

MDs—who can sometimes act like drug pushers—and pharmaceutical companies are

concerned.


7

Happiness, according to this view, would equal a neurochemically balanced brain,

which means that the idea of ‘the perfect drug’ is possible at least in theory à la Brave

New World. This might seem silly, but strangely, it is the dominant paradigm in

psychotherapy today with little to no concern to social and/or psychological factors, as if

human beings as biological machines are deterministic automatons that have no

consciousness, and who live in a vacuum.

When considering the different types of happiness, a neuroscientist may

distinguish between the different neurochemicals of happiness: endocannabinoids—‘the

bliss molecule’—, dopamine—‘the reward molecule’—, oxytocin—‘the bonding

molecule’—, and endorphin—‘the pain-killing molecule’ (Bergland, 2012). Of course,

the error here would be to confuse correlation with causation. Just because certain

neurochemicals fire during certain experiences does not mean they are the cause of those

experiences. Sometimes they are, but sometimes they are not; in other words, at this

stage, we do not know. One way of putting it would be, for example, that oxytocin is he

objective expression of bonding, but it does not mean that it more valid than the

subjective experience of bonding, which can also produce oxytocin. The knowledge

gained through neuroscientific research is invaluable, and no one can argue against that

because it is an important perspective, but interpreting the data as implying a

unidirectional, causal link as far as our biology is concerned is a philosophical

presupposition that has no basis except dogma.

There is so much to unpack regarding the paradigm of biological reductionism,

and perhaps, one could add to the mix some other philosophical affiliations that are


8

pertinent within said paradigm: namely, materialism and mechanism, to mention two

main ones.

When it comes to physics—a field psychology has historically been envious of—,

objectively studying nature makes sense because there is a categorical separation between

human beings and their environment although we are part of nature, too. After all we are

not unnatural, are we? But that dualistic distinction, which was realistic in the realm of

classical physics, is now nominal at best, especially in the context of the findings in

quantum mechanics regarding how the world really works on the scale of particles. On

the quantum level, a photon can be a particle or a wave—which is influenced by the act

of observation and measurement—, particles are nonlocal, and entangled particles can

affect each other at a distance. How does all of this do anything with what is being

presently discussed? Even though the psychological realm is functioning at a much larger

scale than that of elementary particles, the human being is made up of billions and

billions of particles, and for this reason we must factor in the knowledge gained from

physics, quantum or other, since it constitutes our fundamental understanding of reality,

of which psychological reality is a part. But biological reductionists in particular, since

they are physicalists, must take into consideration the findings of quantum mechanics;

whereto their reductionism will eventually take them

The human being is both the subject and object of her study, which speaks to the

immense complexity of the field—how is it that psychology is a ‘soft’ science,

particularly in the context of the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness that is presently

befuddling all philosophers of mind and that will continue befuddling them for time to

come? Although, the brain/body is undoubtedly an important cause of and correlates with


9

our human experience, particularly unconsciously, we ought not to also overlook the

enormous roles of consciousness, the environment, and other possibly undiscovered

factors in shaping our human experience, whether toward the positive or the negative.

Philosophers have identified at least three types of reductionism: ontological,

methodological, and epistemic (Brigandt et al., 2012). Ontological reduction (OR) is a

metaphysical assumption that has no basis in reality, or at least does not follow the

scientific method. Biological reductionists, who take that to be their presupposition,

knowingly or unknowingly, are going against some of the main principles of science,

because a ‘true’ scientist ought to be modest by default since they should be uncertain

until there is evidence supporting their theory. This type of monism, i.e., OR, implies a

belief which unfortunately can lead scientists to the trap of dogmatism, regardless of

proof; and for this very reason, this sort of arrogant, know-it-all attitude that some

scientists hold has come to be labeled ‘scientism’ since it is almost religious in nature, but

in a fanatical way. For example, the mind-body problem in philosophy is far from having

been solved, and so at this point there are different theoretical approaches (e.g., dualism,

physicalism, and idealism) aimed toward resolving said problem. A psychiatrist who

holds a physicalist position will diagnose and ‘treat’ her patient through that lens, which

is at best philosophical and not less or more valid than, for instance, Cartesian dualism.

However, because the current scientific paradigm has a physicalist bias, that is where the

momentum is. Therefore, it would be a major error to regard physicalism as the factual

key to the mind-body problem because we are not there yet as far as the evidence goes.

Maybe there is a lot of evidence that points in that direction, but there is not enough

evidence to say: problem solved, end of question. And again, this takes us back to the


10

difference between correlation and causation. Max Velmans (2009) adds a third

dimension to the discussion, which is hardly addressed but clearly is of great importance:

ontological identity, that is to say, oxytocin correlates with most experiences of bonding,

certain positive experiences cause oxytocin to be released and oxytocin can cause us to

feel certain positive feelings; however, none of this suggests that oxytocin equals said

experiences or feelings!

Methodological and epistemic reductions in biology are quite valid as theoretical

positions because they are dependent on knowledge generated through experimentation

and interpretation. And in that sense, they are in congruence with scientific principles,

that is, one should go where the evidence is with the most minimal presuppositions; this

is in line with Baconian science. If new evidence shows that reductionism is misguided in

terms of how we understand human experience, a paradigm shift will then be unavoidable

in the social, or even life, sciences due to the unsolvable challenges afforded us by

anomalies in the current paradigm, and for this reason, a new ‘normal science’ will have

to be born, to use Kuhnian terms.

Since we mentioned the mind-body problem, it is relevant to bring in mechanical

philosophy into the discussion since it is a historical antecedent to physicalism. Greek

atomism can be seen as an early form of mechanical philosophy, but it took two 17th

century philosophers, Pierre Gassendi and Robert Boyle, to rigorously shape mechanical

philosophy so that it reflected nature in a way that was in alignment with the ethos of the

scientific revolution (Chalmers, 2012). René Descartes is an important name to add this

conversation, with his work in anatomy and his theories on consciousness. Descartes

usually gets a bad rap these days, especially among philosophers of mind, because he is


11

seen as the progenitor of dualism, but if one takes a close look at the history of world

philosophy, it will be clear that ontological dualism as a theory existed before Descartes

was born in many parts of the world, whether in Chinese philosophy or even in

Christianity. Descartes’s effort to philosophically explain consciousness through a

marriage between Christian theology and science must have been very appealing in his

time, as Europe was shifting from religious dogmatism to scientific enlightenment,

rendering his theory a soft bridge between both worlds: the supernatural/metaphysical

and the natural/physical. This visibly left a deep imprint on the collective consciousness

of Westerners, as the problem of dualism is still with us till this very day, at least in terms

of discourse. Speaking of which, Friedrich Nietzsche (Nietzsche, In Kaufmann, &

Nietzsche, 1967), more than a century ago, addressed the type of false, or nominal,

dualism that is a result of grammar. In grammar, there is always a subject and predicate,

but sometimes such categorical dualism is not found in nature. For example, we say:

‘lightning flashes’, but is there a separation from the lightning and the flashing? No, this

is simply a function of language. This discursive trap is important to mention here

because just like physicalists can have metaphysical assumptions, whether they are aware

of them or not, they can also reify words and concepts in their research and practice. This

is another old philosophical problem, which goes back to medieval times with earlier

roots in Ancient Greek philosophy, that has to do with language vis-à-vis reality with the

three main positions being: realism, conceptualism, and nominalism (Hergenhahn, 2000).

Realism, broadly speaking, is concerned with universals regardless of the subject.

In application, this would be the objective study of the natural world in an attempt to get

at its essence, whether via empiricism/material monism (e.g., neuroscience) or


12

rationalism/idealism (e.g., the Platonic forms). Methodologically, a realist can be a

quantitative research or a theorist. Nominalism is more concerned with subjectivity, and

hence, consciousness and discourse. In essence, nominalism, with its contemporary

counterpart, qualitative research, is largely concerned with epistemological issues almost

in a postmodern way, but nominalists can still fall into the trap of solipsism amidst their

language games. Perhaps, one can argue, following this line of analysis, that quantitative

research is more ontological than qualitative research. Conceptualism is the best of both

worlds in that reality exists via but also beyond our linguistic constructions. This is very

similar to Immanuel Kant’s position on reality vis-à-vis knowledge, for he saw a gap

between our phenomenal experience of the world and the world itself. Because of this

very limitation, we must be very careful as scientists, or researchers, to not be too naïve

or too dogmatic in our study of anything, whether of a physical or metaphysical nature.

Our attitude must be one of healthy skepticism, but also of openness to new ideas and

discoveries with a dash of modesty and uncertainty.

On those accounts, we can learn from people as different as Socrates and Richard

Feynman. Socrates, in his dialectics, claimed that he knew that did not know, which is a

valid form of knowledge, more honorable than claiming to know what we do not know.

In The Meaning of It All, Feynman (1998) stressed uncertainty as a fundamental principle

of science. This notion is very clear to most contemporary physicists in the context of the

baffling fact that all of what we know about the universe represents 4% of it; the rest

being dark matter and dark energy, which physicists today cannot begin to explain

(Moskowitz, 2011). Even Descartes, in his oft-quoted cogito ergo sum, suggested that we

can only be sure about the fact that we are in doubt. One can differ with Descartes


13

regarding his conclusion that there is a self, for a Buddhist reinterpretation of the

previously-mentioned quote by Zen teacher Thích Nhất Hạnh goes like this: “I think

therefore I am not” (Hanh, 2007). This is not tangential; this is an extremely important

point, especially in the context of psychiatry, and the mind-body problem in general.

Hạnh, based on his understanding of anattā or the concept of no-self, is suggesting that

there is thinking without a thinker. In other words, he abandons the notion of a separate,

fixed self—one of the foundational pillars in psychology—, which leaves us with self-as-

process, hence, resolving an unnecessary dualism to begin with, a fiction of the

imagination. This is very pertinent in the context of psychiatry, because you need a

separate self to have a Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.

Otherwise, the whole pharmaceutical enterprise, which needs suffering to make business,

would crumble. The myth of individualism is that you need to create a fictional

individual—fictional because she is operating in a vacuum—in order to have consumers

and voters, etc. There is no question that the human condition includes all kinds of

suffering as preconditions, but the question becomes, are psychiatrists and

pharmaceutical companies reducing the suffering of people or increasing it?

To hint at an unsettling trend, let us simply take a look at the title of Peter R.

Breggin’s—who is a psychiatrist himself—recently published book: Psychiatric Drug

Withdrawal (2013). One must be critical of the methodology of this paradigm, i.e., the

medical model, because psychiatric drugs target a statistical average, that is, it is tested to

work on a high percentage of people, but it has adverse effects on a small percentage of

people, which in numbers amounts to many people. If a pill works for, that is, addresses

the symptoms of, let us say 90% of users; that is seen as compelling evidence, and as a


14

testament to its efficacy. But are we individuals with unique fingerprints and

psychological imprints, or are we just figures on some statistical chart in some random

study?

The above analysis was meant to show the complexity of some of the issues that

are inherent in the medical model, and which are frequently overlooked by proponents of

said model. Also, some of the key ideas associated with the medical model were traced

back to their philosophical and historical origins.

Humanistic Psychology

Just like we have analyzed the medical model vis-à-vis PP to understand it by

historically situating some of its key philosophical concepts—that are taken for granted in

the dominant psychiatric discourse, for instance, or in other applied areas, such as in

neuroscientific research—, we will attempt to do the same with humanistic psychology.

According to the medical model perspective, at least in its extreme version,

psychological conditions are reduced to biological mechanisms, and in that sense the

human subject can be objectified or eliminated entirely—since free will is thrown out the

window in favor of a more deterministic framework that allows for greater predictability

and repeatability as far as scientists are concerned—, and human experience can be

quantified. This paints an ugly picture of the medical model because in many cases it can

go against what it means to be human. This becomes an ethical issue, and also an issue of

power dynamics. Clearly, the way the medical model is set up here in the United States of

America, as far as psychiatry is concerned, is very much hierarchical with the

pharmaceutical industry at the top of the pyramid making the largest amount of profit,

with psychiatrists as the middle men making a decent amount of profit, and with the


15

‘patients’ being victims of a Capitalist system that prioritizes profit over health—which

by default explains the current status of the health care system in this country. A similar

sentiment was what led many authors—the most prominent of whom was R. D. Laing,

who, along with others, was categorized under what came to be known as the ‘anti-

psychiatry movement’ in the 1960s and 1970s—to write against said system, which they

regarded as oppressive.

Bruce Levine (2013) sheds a light on possibly what can be considered one

political agenda of psychiatry as a pharmaceutical industry, at least in the USA, and this

should be read in the context of the Occupy movement: “One reason that there is so little

political activism in the United States is that a potentially huge army of anti-

authoritarians are being depoliticized by mental illness diagnoses [e.g., oppositional

defiant disorder (ODD) and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)] and by

attributions that their inattention, anger, anxiety, and despair are caused by defective

biochemistry, not by their alienation from a dehumanizing society. These diagnoses and

attributions make them less likely to organize democratic movements to transform

society”. All of this was meant as a contrasting preface to the ethos of the human

potential movement, which is at the heart of humanistic psychology and which coincided

with the counterculture of the 1960s.

Humanistic psychologists can be caricaturized as anti-scientific touchy-feely

types, but that stereotype fails to include the achievements of many humanistic

psychologists, whether in the field of qualitative research or in the applied world of

therapy. There is a lot of contention between humanistic psychologists and positive

psychologists because the former see PP basically as a ‘medicalized’ form of humanistic


16

psychology to oversimplify. It is fair to mention that several positive psychologists are

critical of this ‘medicalization’ process, so PP is a host of a diverse community where

there are many different, and sometimes opposing, views, as would be expected from any

serious field of study. Humanistic psychologists are against the quantification of human

experience—anywhere on the continuum from negative to positive—, and they are

critical of pathologization. Instead, they focus on the core values of what it means to be

human in the most universal sense, and in that way they believe in our inherently good

nature, and our untapped potential.

To offer a rebuttal to that, the humanistic psychology project can be seen as

anthropocentric, vague with its generalizations since cultural variations are hardly

addressed, ego-inflating and non-scientific. Even though psychology is primarily dealing

with the individual, to place the individual at the center of the cosmos is as erroneous as

thinking the Earth is at the center of the universe. There is an appeal to universality, but

does universality give us a better understanding of reality or is it just an ideological filter?

Interestingly, those working within the framework of the medical model attempt to come

across universal knowledge by digging deep via biological reductionism, while the

humanistic psychologists, not too differently, espouse universal truths by also digging

deep via a different method: intellectual reductionism, which is to say, opinion. For

example, let us take a look at the circularity of the methodology used by one of the giants

of humanistic psychology—who happens to be the grandfather of the psychology

department at the University of West Georgia. Here is a critique of Abraham Maslow’s

investigation of self-actualization: “In attempting to identify the core components, he

began by identifying people he regarded as high self-actualizers (such as Albert Einstein


17

and Eleanor Roosevelt), then used interviews, biographical and autobiographical

accounts to distil the core characteristics. The problem with this approach is that, by

deciding in advance who is and isn’t a self-actualizer, the whole theory is based on

Maslow’s personal opinion” (quoted in Gross, 2009). Another example, Maslow’s theory

of motivation, the hierarchy of needs, is seen today as inaccurate—since the new

understanding of needs is that they are “like most other things in nature, an interactive,

dynamic system […] anchored in our ability to make social connections” (Rutledge,

2011)—, and also ethnocentric (Hofstede, 1984). This is not an attempt to pull the rug

from under humanistic psychology’s feet, but rather it is an attempt to challenge

humanistic psychology’s standards of rigor in qualitative research.

If we establish that the self is a social construct, then we can see humanistic

psychology’s task of ego strengthening or inflation as the promotion of a delusion.

Clearly, the ego has a functional utility in terms of our social interactions, but it can also

be a great source of suffering as we have learned from Buddhist psychology, analytical

psychology, Psychosynthesis, and Internal Family Systems. If one of the main aims of PP

is the reduction of suffering or the increase of well-being then a critical investigation of

the taken-for-granted notion of selfhood is a must. This is not to take away from strength,

the question is, what are we strengthening: the ego or the body-mind-complex?

Now, regarding the status of humanistic psychology as a non-science, there is nothing

wrong with that. The view of psychology as an art as opposed to a science does not take

away from it. This whole notion of human science2 versus natural science, or qualitative

research versus quantitative research, points to the difference between art and science.

2 Human science can function as a useful transdisciplinary discipline like cognitive science, and it would include the humanities and the social sciences. So art is being used in the broadest sense of the word as previously defined.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/234021602_The_Cultural_Relativity_of_the_Quality_of_Life_Concept?el=1_x_8&enrichId=rgreq-3d6cacfa-0d51-4150-8345-1a7cd6d382d3&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzI4MTQ1NDU4ODtBUzoyNjk2ODg2MzQ2MDU1NzNAMTQ0MTMxMDE4OTk5NA==


18

Science can be, and is, very useful to psychology; psychologists do not need, out of an

inferiority complex however, to constantly prove the status of psychology as a life

science. This, for example, explains the split of neuroscience as a field separate from

psychology because the latter is an umbrella term that is too generic, which is a mark of

the field’s diversity but also of the major disagreements among psychologists as to what

they are up to. We have established that to be non-scientific, or artistic, when it comes to

psychology, especially vis-à-vis clinical work, is not less valuable than doing ‘normal

science’.

Sometimes humanistic psychologists are not just non-scientific; conversely they

can also be anti-scientific. If said psychologists are critical of scientism, that is a valid

position to take, but to be against one of the most important fields in human history is a

huge mistake. This is the difference between ignorance and critique. To criticize, we must

be informed, and when we are questioning the assumptions of let us say a certain

scientist, who is not really giving much thought to philosophical problems but rather is

engaged in some serious esoteric work, we must do so from a place where we are

intending to contribute constructively to the scientific, or artistic, enterprise, since it is to

the benefit of all humankind.

An Integrative Approach

In this section, the attempt will be to reconcile the medical model with humanistic

psychology vis-à-vis PP. An integrative perspective is like the vesica piscis in a Venn

diagram. This means that we are looking at what is in common between the two

paradigms examined above, while also acknowledging their irreconcilable differences.

This sort of approach discussed here is very useful because it is the beginning of a


19

productive dialogue that would naturally include constructive criticism, and that could

foster greater understanding between both camps. Instead of speaking at each other—as

enemies often do—, they can learn to speak with one another in a friendly manner.

Ultimately, both sides are trying to comprehend the same things (e.g., happiness) from

different perspectives; both members of the medical and humanistic camps are using

different methodologies, and as a result, different epistemological and ontological

frameworks/lenses. Perhaps, a systemic approach is key here, wherein an issue is

examined from different perspectives (à la Heidbreder, 1933), which can result in a richer

and more complex multi-perspectival paradigm, or a complete mess. In any case, it is

worth the effort if the aim in general is a deeper and wider understanding of what ‘the

good life’ means, for instance. In terms of research, this would manifest as a mixed

methods approach, combining qualitative with quantitative. An excellent example of a

research methodology that does just that and even more is neurophenomenology, wherein

two types of data are generated: objective data using neuroimaging, and subjective data

using the participant’s verbal account of their experience during the experiment. This

fascinating research methodology was invented by the late Francisco Varela who

recognized the importance of neuroscience as well as contemplative practice, especially

as informed by Buddhism.

Someone like Kirk Schneider (2011) thinks that PP should categorically fall

under, and hence be informed by, humanistic psychology and so he suggested that we use

the following label: ‘humanistic positive psychology’, But counter-arguments could be

made that humanistic psychology should fall under PP since the latter is more scientific

and up-to-date, whereas the former is out-of-date and non-scientific. Clearly, some


20

humanistic values in PP could be useful in deepening the research, but also some science

in humanistic psychology would not hurt either. The integrative perspective argues for

both/and not either/or transcending in the process false dichotomies, which can

sometimes be linguistic or philosophical problems, as examined earlier.

Perhaps, the question becomes why is science, or the medical model in particular,

not open to humanistic psychology? And why is humanistic psychology not open to PP?

They have more in common than they have differences. If the differences are mainly

ideological then there needs to be the equivalent of an inter-faith (inter-branch?) dialogue

in the psychology community. A medical model without humanistic values can reduce

the human being to a biological machine, and a humanistic psychology without science

can reduce the human being to a primitive animal. PP can be a ‘happy’ middle addressing

the human being holistically while not overlooking her machine-like and animal-like

attributes.

Conceivably, there is something to be said for Ken Wilber’s Integral Psychology

with its integral model of consciousness. Wilber, drawing inspiration from Sri Aurobindo

and others, came up with his integral theory, which is a very ambitious developmental

model akin to a theory of everything, to explain the interconnectedness of all things in a

systemic and rational way. Although, he was considered a transpersonalist for decades, in

1999 he distanced himself officially from the transpersonal movement by declaring that it

was dead. One interpretation of this dramatic statement is that he did so to promote his

own brand of transpersonal: that is, ‘integral’. Wilber did that very successfully,

especially for one man versus a whole movement. His theoretical contribution is unique,

but the difference between integral and transpersonal is fuzzy because in many ways they


21

mean the same thing, but perhaps one key difference between the two is that wherein in

transpersonal one transcends the personal, i.e., ego and self, in integral one transcends the

personal, yet includes the ego and the self. It is a subtle difference, but this is also an

oversimplification. The contention between transpersonal psychologists and integral

theorists is in many ways similar to the one between humanistic psychologists and

positive psychologists. Integral theory grew out of transpersonal psychology and then

became its own field by killing its predecessor. Maybe one would ask the following

questions in the context of the previous comparison between transpersonal

psychology/humanistic psychology and integral psychology/PP: is humanistic

psychology dead? Is PP the rebirth of humanistic psychology?

To illustrate the importance of a multi-perspectival approach, let us take a look at

an example. In a panel on the brain versus the mind ("Paul Bloom Talks Mind vs. Brain,

Temple Grandin Talks Prozac"), animal science professor Temple Grandin spoke about

how psychoanalysis did not help her at all with the enormous anxiety she was struggling

with as someone with autism. When she got her brain scanned, the scientists showed her

that she had an amygdala that was larger than average. After that, she decided to take

pills that would help her reduce her anxiety, and that medical approach worked for her.

On the topic of anxiety, it is worth adding that Grandin invented a therapeutic, stress-

relieving device called ‘the hug box’. So clearly, she is using more than one approach to

relieve herself from her anxiety and so she is not a biological reductionist, it would be

nonsensical however to deny that the root of her anxiety is biological given the unusual

size of her amygdala, the brain’s ‘fear central’.


22

A humanistic psychologist could offer a rebuttal to the above-mentioned example

by pointing out that humanistic psychology and psychoanalysis are like apples and

oranges, and there is truth to that. But the reasoning behind the use of that example is to

show the importance of the medical model in treating conditions that are indeed

biologically rooted. Now, humanistic psychology and psychoanalysis are indeed two

different branches of psychology, but what they have in common, perhaps among other

things, is that they are both mentalistic in their emphasis, with the former focusing on

positive human attributes and the latter on negative ones.

This takes us back to the inevitable philosophical conundrum known as the mind-

body problem. The mind should not be seen as more important than the body, or the

brain, because that could lead us into the solipsistic position of idealism, which is absurd

and out of phase with reality. Similarly, the brain, or the body, should not be seen as

more important than the mind because that could lead us to the biological reductionist

position of the medical model, which can result in asymmetric power dynamics and

questionable ethics due to ineffective prioritization—with profit being more important

than taking care of the ecosystem, for instance. The integrative perspective recognizes the

equal importance of the body and the mind as well as their interconnectedness, for after it

all it is a bidirectional feedback loop of sorts. The plentiful research that has been done,

and that is still being done, on meditation is an excellent case in point, for to do a gross

simplification, the findings all allude to the fact that with our minds we can change our

physiology to some extent, thanks to neuroplasticity, and also our physiology is

extremely important in terms of our experiences. To separate the body from the mind is a

major error so is to value one at the expense of the other. Perhaps, the contention between


23

positive psychologists and humanistic psychologists is childish at heart. Evidently, there

are hard feelings on both camps, and it seems like the problem exists on the level of the

ego, which is not to say that it is a non-problem for this reason, but rather that it is

solvable through some forgiveness and love.


24

References

Bergland, C. (2012, Novemeber 29). The neurochemicals of happiness. Psychology

Today. Retrieved from: http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-athletes-

way/201211/the-neurochemicals-happiness

Breggin, P. R. (2013). Psychiatric drug withdrawal: A guide for prescribers, therapists,

patients, and their families. New York: Springer Pub. Co.

Brigandt, Ingo and Love, Alan, "Reductionism in Biology", The Stanford Encyclopedia

of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Retried from

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/reduction-biology/

Chalmers, Alan, "Atomism from the 17th to the 20th Century", The Stanford

Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),

Retrieved from: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/atomism-

modern/

Feynman, R. P. (1998). The meaning of it all: Thoughts of a citizen scientist. Reading,

Mass: Addison-Wesley.

Gross, R. (2009). Themes, Issues, and Debates in Psychology, Third Edition. Hodder

Education.

Hanh, T. N. (2007, September). This silence is called great joy. Shambhala Sun.

Retrieved from

http://www.shambhalasun.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3

124&Itemid=247

Heidbreder, E. (1933). Seven psychologies. New York: Century Co.


25

Hergenhahn, B. R. (2000). An introduction to the history of psychology. Fourth edition.

Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub. Co.

History of Neuropsychology. (n.d.). Retrieved from

http://schatz.sju.edu/neuro/nphistory/nphistory.html

Hofstede, G. (1984). The cultural relativity of the quality of life concept. The Academy of

Management Review, 9(3).

Moskowitz, C. (2011, May 12). What's 96 Percent of the Universe Made Of?

Astronomers Don't Know. Retrieved December 7, 2013, from

http://www.space.com/11642-dark-matter-dark-energy-4-percent-universe-

panek.html

Nietzsche, F. W., In Kaufmann, W. A., & Nietzsche, F. W. (1967). On the genealogy of

morals. New York: Vintage Books.

Paul Bloom Talks Mind vs. Brain, Temple Grandin Talks Prozac [Video file]. (n.d.).

Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lsv2HL-89ms

Rutledge, P. (2011, November 8). Social networks: What Maslow misses. Psychology

Today. Retrieved from: http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/positively-

media/201111/social-networks-what-maslow-misses-0

Schneider, K. (2011). Toward a humanisitic positive psychology: Why can’t we just get

along?. Existential Analysis, 22(1).

Shedler, J. (2013, October 31). Bamboozled by bad science. Psychology Today.

Retrieved from http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/psychologically-

minded/201310/bamboozled-bad-science

Velmans, M. (2009). Understanding consciousness. Second edition. London: Routledge.