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The presentation of Essam Yassin Mohammed, senior researcher (Environmental Economics) with the International Institute for Environment and development (IIED), at a special session organised by IIED at the 16th Annual BIOECON Conference on Biodiversity, Ecosystem Services and Sustainability, 21-23 September 2014, Kings College, Cambridge, United Kingdom. In his presentation, Mohammed argues that examples from terrestrial environments, and a few from aquatic environments, suggest that economic incentive-based mechanisms such as payments for ecosystem services (PES) can work to protect both livelihoods and environments. But to succeed, PES or PES-like instruments need to be designed carefully by taking into account the preferences of the participating communities and households for compensation or payment packages – including payment types and levels. In this presentation, they present the case of a compensation scheme for hilsa (Tenulousa Ilisha) management in Bangladesh. A large-scale questionnaire-based survey with 750 households in the Lower Meghna region was conducted. They employed the choice experiment method to assess the preferences of the local fishers for compensation packages and to answer the question: who prefers what and why? In addition, they investigate potential effects of the use of pictograms on stated preferences. This is part of an ongoing research work funded by the Darwin Initiative and DFID that aims to enhance the effectiveness of the compensation scheme for hilsa management in Bangladesh. For more information, see: http://www.iied.org/bangladesh-protecting-hilsa-overfishing
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DOCUMENT TITLE 1
Author nameDateAuthor name
DateAuthor nameDate
Essam Yassin Mohammed1, and Roy Brouwer2 1 International Institute for Environment and Development2 Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Assessing Preferences for Compensation Packages using the Choice Experiment Method: The case of hilsa (Tenualosa ilisha)
management in Bangladesh
DOCUMENT TITLE 2
Author nameDateAuthor nameDate
Benefits and threats to marine and coastal ecosystems
• Major source of food: the main or only source of animal protein in some poor communities
• Some 45 million directly employed
• Up to 200 mill indirectly
• The most traded food commodity
DOCUMENT TITLE 3
Author nameDateAuthor nameDateFisheries in crisis
The majority of commercially/economically important fish species are fished beyond sustainable levels
DOCUMENT TITLE 4
Author nameDateAuthor nameDate
Fisheries management regimes
No take zones
Off season
Fishing gear restriction
Limited licensing
Allowable catches
DOCUMENT TITLE 5
Author nameDateAuthor nameDateShort-term economic loss
Socioeconomic gains
Management regimes (t)
How to overcome this short-term economic loss??
Not a panacea: • Equity/distributional issues• Targeting/mistargeting • Appropriation of natural
resources • Perverse incentives • Exit strategy
DOCUMENT TITLE 6
Author nameDateAuthor nameDate
Ways that direct economic incentives can be added to existing regulatory schemes
DOCUMENT TITLE 7
Author nameDateAuthor nameDate
Case study: Compensation for hilsa management in Bangladesh
- Anadromous fish - Bangladesh accounts for
about 60% of total hilsa catch in the Bay of Bengal
- 12% of total fish catch in Bangladesh
- 60% of marine capture fisheries
- 1% of GDP- Employs up to 2.5 mill
people along the supply chain (processing, marketing, transporting)
DOCUMENT TITLE 8
Author nameDateAuthor nameDate
Hilsa fishery is under threat
- Overfishing- Damming and river
diversion- Pollution - Climate change
DOCUMENT TITLE 9
Author nameDateAuthor nameDate
Case study: Compensation to manage hilsa fishery in Bangladesh
‘Hilsa fisheries management action plan’ 2003 juvenile hilsa
protection Conservation of gravid
hilsa 5 hilsa sanctuaries No take season 40kg rice/HH and
AIGAs provided
DOCUMENT TITLE 10
Author nameDateAuthor nameDate
Incentive-based management
Incentive-based
manag’t
40kg rice/hh/monthAIGAs (e.g. sewing
machines)Some cash
Jatka: Nov – MayBrood: 5 days before and after the full moon in the month of Ashvin (October)
Hilsa sanctuaries
Jatka conservation week: today’s jatka,
tomorrow’s hilsaTV, Radio, Print, boat
rallies, meetings, workshops
DOCUMENT TITLE 11
Author nameDateAuthor nameDateMethodology: The study site
DOCUMENT TITLE 12
Author nameDateAuthor nameDate
Methodology: Attributes and attribute levelsAttributes Attribute levels
Ban on adult hilsa
5 days 11 days 30 days
Ban on juvenile hilsa
4 months 8 months 12 months
In-kind compensation
40kg or rice/HH/4 months
AIGA
Cash 6,000Tk 12,000Tk 18,000Tk 24,000Tk
Frequency of payment
One-off monthly Annually
DOCUMENT TITLE 13
Author nameDateAuthor nameDate
Methodology: the choice experiment method- 750 households- 5 attributes- 120 permutations - 10 sets of cards- Each set 6 cards- Each card with 2
alternatives + opt out option- Within and outside
sanctuaries- Recipient and non-
recipient- With and without
pictograms
DOCUMENT TITLE 14
Author nameDateAuthor nameDateChoice behavior – all respondents
1 2 3 4 5 6 70
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3
Choice task
%
- No opt-out choices, only a few in choice task 7
- Choice task 7 is identical to choice task 1 to test choice consistency
- 93% of the respondents consistently chose same alternative in 1st and 7th choice task
DOCUMENT TITLE 15
Author nameDateAuthor nameDate
ML model - all respondentsChoice attribute Coeff
estSt error
St dev St error
MWTAC(BTK/hh)
St error
Juvenile fish ban (months)
0.109*** 0.013 0.094*** 0.023 -0.97 0.14
Adult fish ban (days) 0.016*** 0.004 0.033*** 0.008 -0.14 0.04
In kind comp is rice -0.932*** 0.299 9.660*** 0.662 8.28 2.66
Monetary comp is one off 2.812*** 0.242 1.652** 0.806 -25.00 2.52
Monetary comp is monthly
3.395*** 0.264 2.784*** 0.441 -30.18 2.82
Monetary compensation 0.112*** 0.008 0.074*** 0.012 - -
Log likelihood -2226.698
Pseudo R2 0.548
N 4488
Respondents 748
DOCUMENT TITLE 16
Author nameDateAuthor nameDateSplit samples
Inside sanctuary
Outside sanctuary
Total
Compensation 301 100 401
No compensation 297 50 347
Total 598 150 748
DOCUMENT TITLE 17
Author nameDateAuthor nameDate
Inside vs. outside sanctuaries
DOCUMENT TITLE 18
Author nameDateAuthor nameDate
Respondents already receiving compensation and those who do not
DOCUMENT TITLE 19
Author nameDateAuthor nameDateWith and without pictograms
Main difference in rice as in kind compensation, which is not significant without pictograms
DOCUMENT TITLE 20
Author nameDateAuthor nameDate
Conclusions and policy implications CE worked well (after thorough pre-testing and FGDs) Fishermen consider compensation a right (not conditional),
hence the reason for no opt-out choices Respondents were very consistent in their choices (93%) Sensitivity to financial compensation is remarkably similar across
the split samples We find significant differences between fishermen living inside
and outside the sanctuaries: (1) those outside the sanctuaries are less influenced by a ban for adult fish, (2) those inside the sanctuaries have no particular preference for either rice or AIG as in kind compensation
A similar result is found for those who do not yet receive compensation; they do not differentiate between rice or AIG
DOCUMENT TITLE 21
Author nameDateAuthor nameDatePolicy implications
• As also found from the FGDs, the preference is NOT either or when it comes to cash vs. in-kind
• Demand for level of compensation increases with increase in ban period >> negative MWTA
• fishermen who do not receive compensation do not distinguish rice from AIG, while those who already receive compensation show less preference for rice relative to AIG.
• Time value of money: higher preference for one off or monthly payments relative to annual payments: implicit discount rate?
DOCUMENT TITLE 22
Author nameDate
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