The Man, The Girl and the Jeep - AIA: Nelson Rockefeller's Non-Profit Model for Private U.S. Foreign Aid

11/12/2014 PROFMEX-Consorcio Munidal para la Investigación sobre México

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Mexico and the WorldVol. 6, No 1 (Winter 2001)http://www.profmex.org/mexicoandtheworld/volume6/1winter01/01boardman1.html

The Man, The Girl and the Jeep AIA: Nelson Rockefeller's Precursor Non-Profit Model forPrivate U.S. Foreign Aid

Margaret C. Boardman, Ph.D.

Pepperdine University School of Public Policy

PROFMEX - Washington, D.C. Office

Table of Contents

Introduction A Model of Point IV Private Aid Mission Structure and Organization AIA Brazil and IRI Agricultural Research AIA Venezuela Inter-American Projects Working with USAID in Chile and Brazil (1961-68) Private Funds Reasons for Terminating AIA Conclusion

Introduction

AIA is an historical model of U.S. private foreign aid prior to the creation of permanent U.S.

government foreign assistance programs in 1961.1 Between 1946 and 1961, AIA representedwhat President Harry S. Truman described as "Point IV" aid. Under this policy, the United Statesgovernment encouraged the private sector to export U.S. technical expertise in an effort toincrease the standard of living in developing countries.

AIA exemplifies how aid programs functioned when budgets were smaller and overallobjectives were limited. As a small non-profit organization, it operated educational, agricultural,and healthcare programs on a shoestring budget of $11.75 million dollars allocated over a 22-year period. These funds were raised from private individuals and corporations that were anintegral part of civil society in the countries where the funded projects were based. Forexample, oil companies based in Venezuela that contributed to AIA were interested in promotingVenezuelan educational projects and socio-economic development.

AIA's initial approach was simple—a man, a girl, and a jeep. According to AIA's leadership,these three components offered an opportunity to “lower the cost of living, raise the standard ofliving, preserve freedom and human dignity, and improve life by increasing the production of

goods and services in demand on efficient economical basis."2 The man was an agriculturalextensionist, the girl was the home economist and the jeep was the only vehicle that could makeit through the backcountry roads. AIA's leadership believed this was all that was needed tomake the "most efficient use of private capital, management and technology to raise standard of

living and create more opportunity for people."3

AIA chose to concentrate on education, healthcare, and agriculture programs in rural areasbased on the philosophy that rural development needed to precede industrial development. Thiswas shaped by the fact that in the 1940s and 1950s, a majority of the population in developing

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countries still lived in rural areas and large-scale migration to urban centers was in an incipientphase.

AIA implemented its plans in Latin America, as this was the region best known to itsleadership and staff. A majority of the board of directors had worked as executives at the Officeof Inter-American Affairs during World War II. This agency was a special U.S. governmentagency set up to handle social, economic, and political relations with other nations in the

Western Hemisphere during the war.4 Latin America was the region that the board knew best,and this was where they were going to initiate their new AIA philosophy. They believed thattheir efforts came at a crucial point in Latin American development. If technology and educationcould rapidly modernize basic infrastructure and services people could attain a higher quality ofliving. If not, Latin Americans faced the prospect that an exploding population would exacerbatethe already disproportionate gap between the rich and poor.

Fundraising for AIA was never easy, even with the direct involvement of the Rockefellerfamily. However, it was not until the 1960's that it became virtually impossible due to PresidentJohn F. Kennedy's decision that socio-economic development should be institutionalized inpermanent, large-scale U.S. government aid agencies. Kennedy "technocrats" at new agenciessuch as the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Peace Corps proclaimed to haveall the answers. They had an unlimited budget to match their claims. Under thesecircumstances, private aid and participation from civil society gradually shrank as it was nolonger necessary or appreciated. AIA was closed in 1968 and a majority of its staff retired frominternational aid. A Model Example of Point IV Private Aid

AIA evolved at a time when President HarryS. Truman was crafting a new foreign policy toencourage the private sector to provideeconomic aid to foreign countries. W. AverellHarriman, Truman's Secretary of Commerceorganized a special executive committee on thisissue in 1947. Harriman, a wealthy railroadheir selected various influential businessmenfrom the President's Committee on EconomicDevelopment to assist him. Theirrecommendations resulted in the passage of theEconomic Cooperation Act of 1948. Thislegislation authorized the U.S. government tofight the spread of Communism with economicaid programs. Under this new directive, theUnited States implemented the Marshall Plan inEurope and began an effort to addressunderdevelopment in Africa, Asia, and LatinAmerica.5

Truman unveiled his new foreign policy to the American people in his 1949 Inaugural Address. Heexplained that he planned to rely on four strategies to fight the escalating Cold War. These included: 1)





unfaltering support for the United Nations; 2) programs for world economic recovery including theMarshall Program and tariff reduction; 3) defense pacts such as NATO and the United Nations Charter; and4) making the benefits of scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement andgrowth of underdeveloped areas.

Truman's Point IV policy was derived from the fourth point of this speech. He acknowledgedthat hunger, misery, and despair had to be combated in order to keep the developing world fromfalling under control of Communism. This fight would be launched by exporting U.S. technicalknowledge so that "the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, produce more food,more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens." This was to be achieved with the "cooperation of business, private capital, agriculture, and labor

in this country."6 By the early 1950s, AIA was frequently cited as a model of Point IV policy in

action.7

AIA's Mission

AIA is an acronym for American International Association for Economic and SocialDevelopment. Established in 1946, it aimed to "help people help themselves." AIA's founderswere imbued with youthful energy, growing concern about the Cold War, and a desire to seemodern American capitalism expand globally. They grappled with how to find permanent solutionfor poverty, disease, underdevelopment, and destitution in the Third World. They concludedthat these problems could only be solved by raising the standard of living. AIA's leaders believedthat this would only happen if people were taught to be active participants in harnessing theirresources and productivity.

AIA's leadership decided that the first projects would be launched in Brazil and Venezuela. Berent Friele, board member and senior vice president had years of experience in Brazil asPresident of the American Coffee Association. In this capacity he had spent many yearsstudying the production of this country's largest and most lucrative export. Venezuela's mostvaluable export was oil. Rockefeller was the majority shareholder of Creole Petroleum, thelargest exporter of Venezuelan petroleum. He owned a home at Monte Sacro ranch outside ofCaracas, Venezuela and had been interested in development planning for Venezuela since

launching the Venezuelan Development Company (VDC) in the late 1930s.8

An initial survey trip to Brazil in 1946 confirmed the board members' decision to firstconcentrate on agricultural development. This solidified their commitment to the "the man, thegirl, and the jeep" concept. In their opinion, this efficient team structure offered the best andmost cost effective way to "help people help themselves" in the rural backlands of LatinAmerica. The "man, the girl, and the jeep" enabled AIA to implement basic training relating to:

1. supervised farm credit programs; 2. extension services; 3. demonstration services; 4. vocational training; 5. agricultural research centers; 6. agricultural clubs; and 7. building community centers where nutritional and sanitation lectures could be held

Structure and Organization

AIA's management team consisted of Nelson Rockefeller and a Board of Directors. As notedin Figures 1 and 2, the board included Nelson's son Rodman Rockefeller and senior officersWallace K. Harrison, Berent Friele, and John Camp.






Figure 1 AIA Organizational Chart

Source: Margaret Carroll, The Rockefeller Corollary, The Impact of Philanthropyand Globalization in Latin America (Ph.D. diss., UCLA, 1999), 182 Figure 2 AIA Board of

Directors and Officers

Directors Officers

Louise A. Boyer President Wallace K. Harrison

Berent Friele Senior Vice President Berent Friele

Wallace K.Harrison

Executive Vice President John R.Camp

John E. Lockwood Vice President Louise A. Boyer

Lawrence H. Levy Treasurer Lawrence H. Levy

Arthur T. Proudfit Comptroller/Asst. Treasurer W.Neil Pierce

Nelson A.Rockefeller

Secretary Flor P. Brennan

Rodman C.Rockefeller Assistant Secretary John French

Assistant Secretary Sonia K.Schultz



Source: Martha Dalrymple, The AIA Story, Two Decades of InternationalCooperation (New York: American International Association for Economic and Social

Development, 1968)

AIA President Wallace K. Harrison was a world-renowned architect. During the course of hiscareer he worked on the Rockefeller Plaza (1932-40), the Avila Hotel in Caracas, Venezuela(1939), the General Assembly and Library at the United Nations Headquarters (1949), theMetropolitan Opera House at Lincoln Center (1966), and the Empire State Plaza in Albany, NewYork (1973). His architectural style earned him the distinction of having the New York Postascertain that he "single-handedly transformed New York into a forest of clean-lined rectangular

glass slabs."9 During World War II, Harrison worked closely with Nelson Rockefeller as Director ofCultural Affairs and member of a secret psychological warfare team at the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA). When Rockefeller was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for LatinAmerican Affairs in 1945, Harrison was made Director of OIAA. He returned to the private sectorin 1946 and immediately joined Rockefeller in creating AIA. For Harrison, AIA's was “all aboutpeople — not money, not administrative organization, not a fine headquarters setup, not even all

the publications.”10

During the first fourteen years of its existence, AIA had no formal headquarters. TheRockefeller family's personal space at 5600 Rockefeller Center served as an unofficialadministrative office. Senior Vice President Berent Friele and Executive Vice President JohnCamp oversaw the organization's day-to-day activities. Both were OIAA veterans like Harrison. Friele, a naturalized American citizen who had been born in Norway, worked with NelsonRockefeller on various other for-profit projects. In addition, he helped organize the Brazilian-American Chamber of Commerce and was also an active member of the National Foreign TradeCouncil, Scandinavian Airlines, the Pan American Society, and the Council on Foreign

Relations.11 John Camp, a veteran of OIAA's Food Supply program in Paraguay was the senioroperative in the field. It was his job was to negotiate contracts and agreements with localgovernments.

When Nelson Rockefeller initially called his attorney John Lockwood in 1946 and asked himto begin work on legally incorporating AIA, he explained that he wanted to establish a hybridcompany that was 33% for-profit and 66% non-profit. Conceptually, the for-profit section ofthe company would turn over its profits to fund the social service projects organized by the non-profit section. Lockwood told Rockefeller that this simply was not possible under American law. For-profit activities could not be co-mingled with non-profit activities. This strict legalseparation was necessary to distinguish between profit-making endeavors subject to U.S. taxesand philanthropic projects not subject to U.S. taxes. Lockwood advised Rockefeller to stick witha traditional structure with "[o]ne of these [companies] a Sunday company and one a weekdaycompany. ... That is in the historical, puritan, and Protestant tradition of this country — make

money all week and tend to your eleemosynary operations on Sunday."12 Based on this advice,Rockefeller organized AIA in 1946 and created a separate for-profit company, IBEC (InternationalBasic Economy Corporation) in 1947. He, his son Rodman Rockefeller, and Berent Friele served asboard members on both organizations.

AIA Brazil

AIA's first operations were launched in Brazil in 1946. Both Berent Friele and NelsonRockefeller had many personal contacts in Brazil, which facilitated establishing new projects andhiring staff. Brazil had been host to OIAA's largest operations during the World War II. As headof these activities from 1941-1944, Friele's responsibilities had included advising the U.S.Ambassador, interacting with the Brazilian press, coordinating efforts with the Brazilian military,and administering extensive medical, sanitation and food supply services in Brazil's Northeasternand Amazon regions. These activities had been closely followed in the Brazilian press and theBrazilian public had developed a very favorable image of OIAA and its leadership. As OIAA's chiefdecision-maker, Nelson Rockefeller was considered by most Brazilians to be the American most







interested in U.S.-Brazilian relations. When he visited Brazil in 1946 and again in 1948 to

promote AIA and IBEC, the Brazilian press hailed his arrival.13

During AIA's twenty-two year existence, the Brazilian projects totaled $3.48 or anapproximate 30% of the overall $11.75 million budget. This accounted for three distinct types ofoperations. Training and demonstration projects received the smallest part of the Brazilianbudget. Funding for farm credit projects (known as ACAR) ranked second. IRI discussed ingreater detail below received the bulk of the monies allocated to the Brazilian program.

Robert W. Hudgens, an expert from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Farm SecurityAdministration was hired to head AIA Brazil. Other employees included Walter Crawford, Dr. JohnB. Griffing, and Marcos Pereira. Crawford had worked with John Camp in Paraguay in OIAA's FoodSupply Division. He was responsible for developing AIA's farm credit program. Griffing, anagronomist and former Protestant missionary headed up agricultural demonstration projects withthe help of his Brazilian assistant Marcos Pereira.

It was Hudgens and Crawford who first conceived of the term "the man, the girl, and the

jeep."14 Their first efforts began in the small rural towns of Santa Rita do Passa Quatro and SãoJosé do Rio Pardo located in São Paulo state. AIA specialists trained local Brazilian farmers tospray cattle against infection and disease and to construct trench silos. They helped buildcommunity centers as a place to organize 4-S agricultural service clubs and organize homeeconomics training on nutrition and basic sanitation principles. As the program expanded mobilemedical units were purchased. A nurse and physician were hired to travel between communitycenters providing general medical services.

AIA Brazil's farm credit program generated a good deal of interest in government andacademic circles. It began in 1948 with a visit from Nelson Rockefeller and his brother David, anexecutive banker in the Latin American division of Chase Manhattan Bank. Working with theGovernor of Minas Gerais state, the Rockefellers signed an agreement to help provide Brazilianfarmers with credit to buy modern equipment including better hoes, mechanized tractors,fertilizers, and hybrid seeds. AIA agreed to guarantee the loans. This convinced the MinasGerais Savings Bank to provide the capital. Agricultural productivity increased leading Governor

Kubitschek to eagerly renew the original agreement in 1952 and 1955.15

The farm credit program was known as ACAR, Associação de Crédito e Assistência Rural. Itsoperations were carefully analyzed by academics Arthur T. Mosher and Clifton R. Wharton, Jr. InA Study of the Agricultural Program of ACAR in Brazil published in 1955, Mosher carefully studiedthe rate of agricultural increase and profiled the number and type of farmers enrolled in theprogram. In “Aiding the Community: A New Philosophy For Foreign Operations,” printed in theHarvard Business Review in 1954 Wharton provided an overall perspective on how the programcould stimulate rural and the overall Brazilian development. Both men concluded that AIA wasproviding a positive and crucial facilitation role.

Governor Kubitschek was particularly pleased with the program. When he became Presidentof Brazil in 1956, he asked the Rockefeller brothers for help in expanding ACAR throughoutBrazil. ACAR's Brazilian director João Napoleão de Andrade was appointed head of a newnational project known as ABCAR. AIA's role was to assist with drafting financial applications tointernational organizations. Between 1956-1968, the Inter-American Development Bank and theBrazilian federal government donated $10 million to ABCAR. These funds were administered tostate agencies created on the ACAR model. With the creation of this national program, AIA wasable to relinquish its role as guarantor. It turned over all technical consulting to ABCAR andBrazilian federal government. In 1974, the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture reorganized ABCAR andits state members into a new agency called Empresa Brasileira de Assistência Técnica Extensão

Rural (EMBATER).16

IRI—Agricultural Research in Brazil (1957-1968)







IRI, the IBEC Research Institute was initially, as its name implies, a research division of theInternational Basic Economy Corporation (IBEC). This for-profit business venture invested in newindustries in developing countries. According to its official charter, its goal was to "developvarious parts of the world, to increase the production and availability of goods, things, andservices useful to the lives or livelihood of their peoples, and thus to better their standards of

living."17 IBEC's investments ranged from financial services to agribusiness. By 1967, it wasvalued at $200 million and had 130 subsidiaries in 33 countries around the world.

As a subsidiary of IBEC from 1947-1957, IRI's mission was twofold. First, it provided

scientific support to Sementes Agroceres, S.A. (SASA), a Brazilian hybrid seed company.18 Secondly, it performed research related to improving coffee productivity. The company owned a136,898-acre farm known as Cambuhy (Companhia Agricola Fazendas Paulistas) located near the

village of Matão, approximately 200 miles northwest of the city of São Paulo.19 Here IRIscientists experimented with weed control, labor use, irrigation, harvesting, chemicals, and

mechanization.20 They also worked on developing instant coffee and enhancing the flavor of

various different strains of Brazilian coffee.21 IRI's greatest scientific breakthrough during this"for-profit" period was the creation of a new vegetable hybrid called "IRI 1022," which helped add

nitrogen and thus rejuvenate soil that had been worn out by repeated coffee plantings.22

In 1956-1957, Nelson Rockefeller and IBEC's board of directors became increasinglyconcerned by the costs of IRI's experiments. As this unit was simply not generating revenue,

they approved legal advice to transfer it to AIA in 1957.23 This decision was based on thedetermination that IRI's main function was to provide educational and scientific research. According to U.S. law, this was a function of tax-exempt non-profit organizations such as AIA. By making the transfer, IBEC was guaranteed to receive tax credits for any donations it made tosupport IRI's research.

IRI's tax-exempt status allowed the exploration of new opportunities. Nelson Rockefellerhad long been fascinated by the potential productivity of the campo cerrados, the vaststretches of uncultivated scrub-brush lands of Brazil's central plateau. The area held a special,mystical lure in Brazilian culture. It represented a vast frontier that symbolized the future. Inthe late 1930's, Brazilian dictator Getúlio Vargas had begun to call for a "marcha para oeste"—amarch to the west that included the establishment of a new capital in this region. He believedthis policy would integrate the vast cultural differences between the Brazilian elite living on theeastern seaboard and the Brazilians living in the backlands of the interior. In the late 1950sBrazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek acted on Vargas' dream. His decision to break ground forBrasília, "city of the future" captured the imagination of Brazilians and people around the

world.24

Nelson Rockefeller was fascinated by the Brazilian challenge of creating a new capital onthe interior plateau lands of the campos cerrados. Over the years, he had endeared himself to acadre of Brazilian politicians by recounting that in 1942, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt hadtold him that if he were a young man he would pick up and move to this region because it

promised to “be the most important area of development in the world.”25 In 1958 Nelson joinedwith his brother David in establishing agricultural experimental research stations aimed at figuringout how to grow crops in this region's distinct soil. Initial experiments concentrated onidentifying phosphorous and lime fertilizers that could neutralize aluminum soil compounds that

inhibited crop growth.26

The Brazilian "march to the west" energized AIA's leadership. They believed that it notoffered the possibility of solving the disproportionate gap in wealth between the Brazilian upperand lower classes, it also provided a feasible manner to address land reform. The CubanRevolution in 1959 had encouraged the development of an active, leftist peasant league inNortheast Brazil that was increasingly becoming more violent. In February 1961, the unfoldingCuban Missile Crisis led concerned U.S. and Brazilian government officials to conclude that the













Northeast might explode into another region under Communist revolt.27 In this political climate,AIA senior vice president John Camp wrote to Rockefeller suggesting that if the uncultivatedscrub-brush of the campos cerrados could be developed, landless peasants from the Northeastcould migrate and prosper by creating fertile farms. According to Camp,

“The ‘campos cerrados’ or forest enclosed open lands, are level and can be mechanicallyfarmed. AIA’s research division has demonstrated that these lands, with proper treatment byfertilizer and certain trace mineral elements can be made productive. The orderly opening upand development of this area offers new settlement prospects for several million families andcorollary employment opportunities for millions more in related commerce and industry.

With the right approach, this could be one of the most dramatic and at the same timebeneficial enterprises ever undertaken anywhere. It would help resolve several basicproblems by developing new land and increasing food production for a growing population. This could be a land reform program developed in a democratic tradition that would answerthe ‘commune’ system of the Red Chinese and would dwarf the ‘virgin lands’ development

program of the Soviet Union.”28

Camp was unable to put this vision into action. Over the next two years, AIA's plans for IRI were

abruptly curtailed due to budgetary problems.29 In the six years since its transfer from IBEC to AIA, morethan $2 million dollars in expenses had been incurred. This was extreme given that the total budget for allAIA operations over twenty-two years only totaled $11.75 million. IRI was restructured in 1963 as anindependent non-profit organization. This forced it to function as a separate organization responsible forits own budget and fundraising activities. Work on the campos cerrados soil project was continued underspecial contract with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). This encouraged IRIresearchers to coordinate their work with scientists from various U.S. universities who were also underUSAID contract. Findings were shared with the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture. In 1967, the project

received a tremendous financial boost when USAID provided $10 million in funding.30

AIA Venezuela

AIA launched its Venezuelan office in the midst of a very negative government campaignagainst the oil industry. In 1945, Venezuelan President Rómulo Betancourt levied a 50% tax onall petroleum profits. Three years later, Venezuelan dictator Marcos Perez Jiménez’ came topower promising to “sembrar el petroleo”— sow the oil profits into development projects. Heacted on this promise by rewriting Venezuelan oil laws and acquiring a portion of the oil industry

for the Venezuelan public sector.31 He used royalties from the oil industry to underwrite large-scale public works projects. Corruption was rampant in his administration and the dictator

amassed a fortune by taking commissions from development projects.32

In this atmosphere Rockefeller, a majority shareholder of the largest oil company inVenezuela opened AIA's new Venezuela office. He persuaded other U.S. oil companies such asShell, Mobil, and Gulf that there was a public relations value in contributing to AIA Venezuela. He wanted AIA to serve as an example of his earnest and sincere commitment to help withraising the standard of living for all Venezuelans. For Rockefeller, funding AIA was a way todemonstrate that he, his oil company, and other American businessmen were sincerely interestedin the socio-economic development of Venezuela.

CBR — Consejo de Bienestar Rural

Like AIA Brazil, the Venezuelan office decided to concentrate first on agriculturaldevelopment. In 1948, the country was suffering from a severe food shortage that forced it toimport foodstuffs. AIA’s goal was to help put new lands into food production with the use of









technology and training. Its strategy was to implement the same "man, girl and the jeep"concept already in operation in Brazil. AIA Venezuela's initial goals were similar to programs thatwere already under development in Brazil. They emphasized:

1. creating and administering a farm credit system 2. constructing community centers 3. constructing roads linking rural villages with highway arteries and cities 4. developing vocational schools 5. developing extension programs 6. organizing agricultural clubs

To achieve these goals, AIA Venezuela joined into a partnership contract from 1948-1968

with the Venezuelan government's Technical Institute for Immigration and Colonization.33 UnderVenezuelan law, this contract could only be signed by two Venezuelan legal entities. To comply,AIA incorporated a Venezuelan subsidiary non-profit organization under Venezuelan law known asthe Consejo de Bienestar Rural (CBR).

Overall, CBR received 26% of AIA's total $11.75 million dollar budget. Its most successfulprogram was organizing agricultural clubs and disseminating basic nutrition and sanitationinformation. In 1954, with help from Venezuela's Ministry of Education, CBR developed atechnical training school in the state of Aragua that focused on agricultural, health andsanitation courses. At San Felipe in the Yaracuy valley, it stationed two mobile machinery-training units. Both training centers helped address Venezuela's lack of trained personnel and setthe standard for vocational training programs.

Unlike AIA's experience with ACAR, the Brazil's farm credit program, CBR was unable toacquire the full support of the Venezuelan government for this type of program. CBR tenouslyoperated a crdit project for six years from 1948-1954. It was ultimately shut down by PerezJiménez' restrictive banking laws. Following the dictator's ouster from government and return tocivilian constitutional rule under President Rómulo Betancourt in 1958-1959, CBR's farm credit

project was assumed by Edgardo Mondolfi at the Venezuelan Ministry of Agriculture.34

CIDEA — Consejo Interamericano de Educación Alimenticia

In the early 1950's, AIA Venezuela entered into a second contract with the Venezuelangovernment's Health Ministry and Institute of Public Nutrition (Instituto Pro-AlimentaciónPopular). The Venezuelan non-profit organization, Consejo Interamericano de EducaciónAlimenticia (CIDEA) was created to implement this contract. It was responsible for conducting amedia campaign on nutrition and sanitation using visual and written educational materials. H.Schuyler Bradt, a veteran industrial film producer who had started his career with the U.S. Navywas hired to design CIDEA’s public service announcements. In addition to radio and televisioncommercials, he successfully designed a mini-soap opera series and the comic strip JuancitoSalud. The soap operas ran five days a weeks and the content was approximately 80 percentagricultural and 20 percent home economics. CIDEA produced Venezuela's first comic books.

Three different books were produced with a combined distribution of nearly 300,000 copies.35

CIDEA eventually expanded its campaign to include mobile units that trucked film screensand projectors into rural areas to show informational films. When CIDEA's contract with theVenezuelan government expired in 1956 Dr. Ali Romero at the Venezuelan Institute of Public

Nutrition assumed responsibility for all ongoing activities.36

Inter-American Projects (1958-1968)

In 1958, AIA's Board of Directors decided to launch two inter-American programs. The first







program was only moderately successful. PIIP, the Programa Interamericano de InformaciónPopular aimed at providing Latin American government officials with basic communications and

media training.37 Schuyler Bradt, head of the Venezuelan CIDEA nutrition and healthcarecampaign was recruited to work on this program. U.S. newspaperman Calvert Anderson joinedhim in setting up a training center in Costa Rica. They offered courses in press, radio,publications, public relations, and presentation. As the program evolved, Brandt and Andersonbecame traveling consultants under contract to Peru's Technical Office of Agrarian Information,Colombia's Institute for Agrarian Reform, and Argentina's National Technical Agricultural

Institute.38

The second inter-American program was an extension of AIA's success in organizing localagricultural clubs in Brazil and Venezuela. The mission of PIJR, Programa Interamericano deJuventud Rural was to develop a network of 4-H agricultural club system throughout the WesternHemisphere. Howard Law, head organizer of AIA Venezuela's agricultural club system lobbiedprominent businessmen and policymakers to support this new regional program. Fortuitously hesecured sponsorship from O.A.S. officials Dr. José Mora and Galo Plaza, as well as U.S. businessgroups such as the North American Committee in Peru, Esso and Bank of America. PIJRcoordinated its efforts from the outset with other related non-profit organizations such as IFYE(International Farm Youth Exchange) and the U.S. National 4-H Club Foundation. In late 1967,the U.S. National 4-H Foundation agreed to incorporate all PIJR clubs and organizations asinternational chapters of its organization.

Working With USAID in Chile and Brazil (1961-68)

Between 1961-1968, AIA experimented with working under contract for USAID. ErnestMaes, former director of AIA Venezuela was sent to Chile to work with the Chilean governmenton rebuilding primary schools in Victoria province that had been destroyed by the 1960earthquake. AIA's budget for this project was $525,864 dollars with most of the funding comingfrom a donation by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. AIA signed a legal agreement with the ChileanMinistry of Education and Development Corporation (CORFO) to set up a Special Commission forRural Education for the province of Victoria. Under this contract, AIA paid for construction ofthe schools and the government paid for land, furniture, administrative and personnel expensesbetween 1962-1965. In addition to construction efforts, Maes assisted with the design of a newskills-based learning program.

Plan Victoria was so successful and popular that schools in the adjacent Chilean province ofNuble requested support to develop the same type of program. Not having the funds to committo another program, AIA arranged a contract with USAID in which AIA provided the consultingand USAID paid for the construction costs.

AIA tried to replicate the success it had with acting as a field consultant in Chile with PIDR(Programa Interamericano Desenvolvimento Rural). This was AIA's third inter-American program. It was established in 1961 to plan recolonization and land reform projects. Louis Heaton, amember of AIA Venezuela office was given the task of writing grant and contract proposals. Between 1962-1968, his successful proposals provided $31 million in funding from the Inter-American Development Bank and USAID. Of this amount, USAID provided $10 million to develop aVenezuela fruit industry and rehabilitate the Venezuelan farm credit system CBR had piloted from

1948-1954.39 The Inter-American Development Bank donated $5.1 million for re-colonization

projects in Costa Rica ($1.6 million) and Bolivia ($3.5 million).40

Walter Crawford former head of AIA Brazil's farm credit program oversaw PIDR's efforts inBrazil. His book Agriculture in Brazil, The Moods, The Reality and The Promise published in 1960provided a detailed analysis of how Brazil should implement land reform through planned

colonization projects.41 Crawford submitted this publication along with a $110 million proposal toKennedy’s Alliance For Progress team. AIA's Senior Vice President Berent Friele and ExecutiveVice President John Camp followed up with a concerted lobbying effort to consolidate political








support for the proposal. Friele met with Adolf Berle, head of the President Kennedy’s Alliancefor Progress team. He requested that Berle send Lincoln Gordon, Kennedy’s Ambassador in Brazila copy of Crawford's proposal. To reinforce AIA's interest, John Camp met with Richard Goodwin,

another senior member of Kennedy's Alliance For Progress team.42

President Kennedy assigned Merwin Bohan to review the PIDR proposal and AIA's Brazilianfield operations. After returning from a trip to the Brazilian Northeast, Bohan recommended thatthe Alliance For Progress allocate $150 million to AIA's rural development and colonization plans in

the central plateau region of the states of Goiás and Mato Grosso.43 This decision was reversedin 1961 when the Kennedy administration suspended all rural development funding in Brazil due topeasant unrest. The Brazilian government concurred with this decision adding a request thatany future USAID efforts be made in the state of Maranhão and not in the Central Plateau

region.44 This policy hurt PIDR's planned Jaíba recolonization project that envisioned relocating1,000 families in the São Francisco River valley at a cost of $7.5 million. Lack of state

government approval and outside funding forced PIDR to abandon this project in 1962.45

One successful PIDR venture in Brazil was a collaborative project with the Brazilian AntunesFoundation in 1964. Together these non-profit organizations funded the Campos Project, a planto diversify the sugar driven economy of Paraíba River delta in Rio de Janeiro state. The BrazilianBank for Cooperatives and the Inter-American Development Bank helped with funding for thisendeavor. They decreased the region's dependence on sugar exports by establishing a dairy co-operative. In the 1970's, the Antunes Foundation used this model to develop the DevelopmentInstitute in the state of Amapá.

Private Funds

Funding was from the beginning an issue for AIA. Overall, a majority of the organization'smonies came from Nelson Rockefeller’s personal fortune with additional support from othermembers of the Rockefeller family. The lack of outside resources proved problematic and in theend was one of several reasons for terminating the organization. Nelson found it difficult to raisefunds from other corporations and individuals. Robert Hudgens head of AIA Brazil recounts thatafter being rejected by Coca-Cola, Rockefeller came to the conclusion that other privatecorporations and individuals simply “did not want to put money into something that [was] going

to prove that Nelson Rockefeller is a world-wide philanthropist.”46

Surprisingly, Nelson Rockefeller was even rejected in his fundraising efforts for AIA by hisfather. John D. Rockefeller Jr. expressed disinterest in AIA in spite of Nelson assertion that theorganization carried “on with the courage and vision that led you and Grandfather to pioneer newfields and blaze new trails.” Nelson felt it was important for his father to support AIA as herepresented “a symbol to people throughout the world that democracy and the capitalisticsystem are interested in their well-being.” Finally, he explained that AIA offered hope in thefight against underdevelopment because it promised to give people a “reason to feel that theirbest interest and opportunity for the future were identified with our country and our way of

life.”47

In spite of his father's lack of interest in AIA, Nelson Rockefeller was successful in cajolinghis sister and brothers to contribute. In fact, 52.4% or $7,605,000 of AIA's overall budget camefrom the Rockefeller family or related charitable organizations such as the Rockefeller Brothers

Fund.48 The second largest contribution category amounting to $5,695,000 or 39.2% of totalfunding was donated by U.S. oil companies operating in Venezuela such as Creole, Shell, MeneGrande (Gulf), International and Mobil). Ultimately, Nelson Rockefeller was only able to persuadeother third-party corporations and individuals to contribute 8.4% or $1,224,000 to AIA’s total

funding.49

As noted below in Figures 3 and 4, over the course of 22 years, AIA's largest budget











expenditures (69%) were allocated to the Brazilian and Venezuelan programs. In Brazil, thecredit program (ACAR) received 12%, agricultural research under IRI was granted 17%, and only1% went to fund demonstration and training programs that ran on "the man, the girl, and thejeep" concept. In the end, the budget for the Brazil office comprised 30% of the total AIAbudget. Venezuela's CBR received the largest portion (26%) of the total budget. This coupledwith 6% of the funds going to CIDEA's nutrition program and another 7% for training, research,and grants equaled 39% of the final budget. The three inter-American projects launched in the1960s to address media training (PIIP), agricultural youth clubs (PIJR), and recolonization (PIDR)received 26% of the final budget. The remaining 5% was allocated to rebuilding schools in Chile(Plan Victoria, 4%) and other miscellaneous projects and grants (1%).

Figure 3 AIA Program Expenditures (1946-1968)

BRAZIL

Demonstration, training and experimentalprograms (1946-51)

63,557

ACAR, ABCAR and related activities (1948-63) 1,387,442

IRI program (1957-63) 2,029,820

Sub-total 3,480,819

VENEZUELA

Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences(1947-52)

189,861

Program planning (1949-53, 1954) 20,973

CIDEA (1948-56) 756,436

CBR (1948-68) 2,988,476

Vocational teacher training (1952-57) 311,484

Direct grants and misc. projects (1948, '49, '51,'52, '55, '56)

107,525

IRI program (1951-53) 140,000

Sub-total 4,514,755

INTER-AMERICAN PROGRAMS

PIIP - Information Program (1959-68) 1,402,020

PIJR - Rural Youth Program (1960-67) 1,015,983

PIDR - Recolonization/Rural DevelopmentProgram (1962-68)

640,548

Sub-total 3,058,551

OTHER PROGRAMS

Indian Cooperative Union Ltd. (1951-57) 102,146



Grants to other non-profit organizations (1953-54)

63,000

Chile-"Plan Victoria" rural education (1962-66) 525,864

Sub-total 691,010

TOTAL: 11,745,135

Source: Martha Dalrymple, The AIA Story, Two Decades of International Cooperation (New York:American International Association for Economic and Social Development, 1968), 269

Figure 4 Pie Chart - AIA Projects as Percentage of the Total Budget

Source: Martha Dalrymple, The AIA Story, Two Decades of International Cooperation (New York:American International Association for Economic and Social Development, 1968), 269

Reasons for Terminating AIA

AIA operated on a small budget. Although this was a challenge for AIA's staff, it only one ofseveral reasons for closing the non-profit organization in 1968. Three other factors coalesced infavor of termination. First, although AIA was Nelson Rockefeller's personal project, he did notbelieve his wealth could successfully underwrite a permanent development program for the ThirdWorld. Second, Nelson Rockefeller and AIA senior management quickly encountered pressure onthe limited financial resources because they rapidly expanded their original objective from theoriginal "man, girl, and the jeep" concept to agricultural research as well as credit and exchangeprograms. Third, Rockefeller had originally conceived of a hybrid structure with a 66% for profitsector that under wrote the non-profit projects of the other 33% of the company. Fundraisingwas not his strongest skill and he was not prepared to dedicate large amounts of his time to thisfunction.



Why did Nelson Rockefeller not allocate funds from his successful for-profit company IBECto underwrite AIA? It is odd that he did not do this given that he had originally conceived of AIAand IBEC as separate but equal units within one umbrella corporation. IBEC's mission was toinvest in basic industry projects in the Third World. As this company was quite successful, hecould easily have authorized donations that would have kept AIA in business and given IBECsizable tax deductions.

Nelson Rockefeller deliberately allowed AIA to wither away without providing assets fromIBEC or other sources because he believed that ultimately, the U.S. government (not the privatesector) was responsible for international development. During World War II he had been a strongproponent of developing permanent U.S. government programs to address global problems suchas hunger, poverty, and improper nutrition. The only reason he had backed away from thisagenda to create AIA as a private non-profit organization was because President Truman hadfired him as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs and abruptly curtailed thegovernment aid projects he had just spent four years building up. Rockefeller felt personallyresponsible for these projects. He was mindful of all the promises he had made in Latin Americathat he would help secure long-term development assistance following the war. He created AIAin order to continue the work of a handful of these projects with his own personal funds. It wasnever his intention use his entire fortune to fund long-term development. Rather, he believedthat U.S. government had a moral obligation to assume this responsibility.

During the 1950's and 1960's while still acting as head of AIA, Rockefeller took everyopportunity to promote the creation of a government agency for development. In 1950,President Truman appointed him head of a long-term executive committee on "Point IV" known asthe International Development Advisory Board (IDAB). This group's findings were published in1951 as Partners in Progress. In this publication's foreword Nelson Rockefeller outlined ways thatprivate sector could support Truman's plan for private aid. However, he could not resist frominserting support for the eventually development of a strong government development agency to

led the way in this arena.50

Nelson Rockefeller's other activities, outside of AIA and the IDAB reveal his strongcommitment to persuading the U.S. government to develop a long-term, large-scale foreign aidprogram. In 1953, he left his position as Chairman of AIA to join the Eisenhower Administration. According to Martha Dalrymple, historian for AIA he "remain[ed] close to the organization

intellectually and emotionally."51 While this may have been true, his new activities must havesoon consumed his energies as they would earn him a reputation as “Coldest Warrior of Them All”

due to his staunch opposition to the international expansion of Communism.52 As PresidentDwight Eisenhower's Special Assistant from 1953-1955 he organized Quantico I and Quantico II. These conferences drafted a comprehensive plan for the Cold War that proposed spending $18

billion over the next six years.53 This bold proposal left fiscally conservative U.S. TreasurySecretary George Humphrey aghast, leading him to block Rockefeller's promotion within theDepartment of Defense because he was a “big spender."

Thwarted in his efforts to develop a large-scale military spending budget to fight the ColdWar, Rockefeller resigned and entered the political world. As Governor of New York he ran in1960, 1964, and 1968 for the Republican nomination for President. The majority of his positionswere developed during a special study project funded by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund from1957-1960 known as Prospect For America. This project brought together six policy panelscomposed of hundreds of experts. Participants such as Dean Rusk and Henry Kissinger laterbecame responsible for implementing these policies during the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford

administrations.54 Prospect for America reiterated Nelson Rockefeller's strong underlying beliefthat the United States government had a moral obligation to promote development in the ThirdWorld. Without out this, Nelson believed that poor nations were very susceptible to falling underCommunist control.

During the Republican Presidential primary in the spring of 1960, Richard Nixon defeated








Nelson Rockefeller to secure the Republican nomination. Later that fall, while DemocraticPresidential candidate John F. Kennedy prepared to debate Nixon on national television, hereviewed Prospect For America and Rockefeller's call for a permanent U.S. development agency. Within months of winning the election, Kennedy acted on this recommendation and established

the U.S. Agency for International Development.55 That same year, he allocated funds for theAlliance For Progress, a large-scale economic development plan that had been proposed byPresident Eisenhower and Rockefeller's friend, founder of Brasília, Brazilian President JuscelinoKubitschek. The Alliance for Progress was part of the Punta del Este Charter ratified by theOrganization of American States. It committed the United States and international lendingagencies to providing $10 billion in long-term development aid. This amount was to be matched

with funds from the private sector.56

Once President Kennedy established USAID as a permanent U.S. development agency andcommitted to the Alliance For Progress it was only a matter of time until Rockefeller closed AIA. As early as 1961, he noted in a letter to John Camp that "AIA was a pioneer [but]… [f]or the

long pull, it seems to me that this field is clearly a government field.”57 For the next sevenyears, AIA advocated a policy that promoted their employees as field consultants with years ofexpert experience in Latin America. Given AIA's tight budget and Nelson's commitment to otherprojects that precluded an aggressive fundraising campaign, AIA's leadership was interested infinding ways to tap into government funds flowing into USAID and Alliance for Progress projects. This approach worked in the case of the Chilean Plan Victoria earthquake school construction. Itworked to some extent with the IRI campos cerrados research project once IRI became its ownseparate legal entity. In the case of the PIDR recolonization projects this policy failed becauseU.S. and Brazilian government officials made other plans without including AIA leaders in thedecision-making process.

Conclusion

AIA's legacy is important to foreign policy experts in the 21st century for the followingreasons:

First, AIA provides a historical link between the first, nascent, U.S. developmentprojects established in Latin America under OIAA from 1942-1945 as wartimeemergency aid. Personnel that worked on these temporary projects were hired byAIA after President Truman terminated OIAA. This transferal of knowledge to AIAprovided an unbroken link that allowed these international development professionalsto offer their expertise to newly created USAID programs in 1961. This demonstrateshow private, non-profit organizations such as AIA may and can step in to providecontinuity during periods when public sector funding for international aid programsshrink due to changes in political and/or economic priorities.

Second, AIA provides a historical model of how small non-profit organizations canwork with large government programs such as USAID to foster development at local,state and national levels. From 1961 through 1968, AIA's small, well-trainedtechnical staff provided specific consulting services to enhance USAID's programs,which were still in a very early stage of development and oversee by inexperiencedstaff. Already in existence for fifteen years at the time USAID was founded, AIAserved as the first consultant service to this new permanent foreign aid agency. Inthis capacity AIA employees managed to the best degree they could the inherentconflict between a large bureaucratic institution and a small, privately funded non-profit. The Kennedy "New Frontiersmen" that staffed USAID in the 1960s wereendowed with a large budget and little practical field experience. In contrast, AIAemployees who had served with OIAA had at 15 to 20 years of practical knowledgein Latin America but were restricted by a tight budget. AIA's experience dealing withbureaucratic regulations and procedures provides a historical example for non-profit






organizations and civil society projects in similar situations today.

Thirdly, with its initial and simple "the man, the girl, and the jeep" concept, AIAdemonstrated that limited funds could achieve concrete results. This methodallowed for the successful implementation of targeted training programs in selectedtowns within a limited region of two given countries (Brazil and Venezuela). AIA'stermination provides an example of what happens when programs are expandedwithout the organization's leadership being committed to a concrete fundraisingplan. It demonstrates that any non-profit organization (even one funded by aRockefeller) can wither if its leadership moves on to other outside projects withoutfocusing on the establishment of an endowment to ensure future plans.

Lastly, AIA provides an historical example to local non-profit organizations interestedin enlarging the participation of civil society in policy decisions. When AIA arrived inVenezuela there were no other foundations, when it left in 1960s there were more

than 28 foundations in existence.58 In Brazil, the number of non-profit organizationsand foundations also grew. AIA was a pioneer in the fields of both internationaldevelopment and philanthropy. It paved the way for the creation and expansion ofthe non-profit section in the developing world.

Endnotes

1 The Foreign Assistance Act of September 4, 1961 separated military and non-military aid and authorized President John F. Kennedy to create a permanent agencyto administer economic assistance. He established the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) on November 3, 1961. Prior to this development, the UnitedStates had only established temporary aid programs beginning with the work of theOffice for Inter-American Affairs (OIAA). This agency's work was terminated in 1946and any ongoing projects were transferred to the U.S. Department of State. In1948, the Economic Cooperation Act created the Marshall Plan. This ended on June30, 1951. Under the first Mutual Security Act of October 31, 1951, military andeconomic aid programs were consolidated under the Mutual Security Agency, adivision of the U.S. State Department structure. In 1953, the Foreign OperationsAdministration was created as an independent government agency to consolidate allforeign programs administered by the federal government. This organization wasabolished by the Mutual Security Act of 1954, which ordered a reorganization ofprograms under the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), a division of theState Department. ICA generated several new concepts such as security aid andFood for Peace but it did not address long-range development planning. U.S.,Agency for International Development, A History of Foreign Assistance [March 2001]<www.usaid.gov/about/usaidhist.html>

2 Martha Dalrymple, The AIA Story, Two Decades of International Cooperation (NewYork: American International Association for Economic and Social Development,1968) 63.

3 Ibid, 64.

4 The Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA) was special wartime agency under theOffice of the Executive during World War II. It was created by order of the Councilof National Defense on 16 August 1940 and was terminated by Executive Order No.9710 on 10 April 1946.

5 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Economic CooperationAdministration, Hearings Before The Committee On Appropriations, United StatesSenate, Eightieth Congress, Second Session On Economic CooperationAdministration, H.R. 6801, A Bill Making Appropriations For Foreign Aid For The Period




Beginning April 3, 1948, And Ending June 30, 1949 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.Government Printing Office, 1948).

6 Papers of Harry S. Truman, Inaugural Address of 20 Jan. 1949, The Avalon Projectat the Yale Law School [February 2001]<www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/inaug/truman.htm>

7 Robert W. Hudgens, "Planning A Development Program," and Robert P. Russell,"Exporting American Agricultural Technology," in Beardsley Ruml, ed., The Manual ofCorporate Giving (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1952), 385-398;and Jonathan B. Bingham, Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy: Point 4 In Action(New York: J. DayCo., 1953).

8 VDC was also known by it Spanish name Compañía Anónima de FomentoVenezolano. It was only in existence between 1938-1939. It was organized byNelson Rockefeller, Wallace K. Harrison, social scientist and econo-mist BeardsleyRuml, Chase Manhattan Bank executive Joseph Rovensky, and President Roosevelt’snephew, E. H. Robbins. They persuaded several American oil companies to provideinitial funding for the organization. Their first plan was for construction of a modernhotel in Caracas. Building began on the Hotel Avila in Caracas in late 1939.Unfortunately, all other plans were curtailed when Rockefeller joined the Office ofInter-American Affairs (OIAA) in late 1939.

9 "Wallace K. Harrison," Celebrity Register, An Irreverent Compendium of AmericanQuotable Notables (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 274.

10 Dalrymple, 187.

11 "Berent Friele," Who's Who in America, 38th ed. (Chicago: Marquis Who's Who,Inc., 1974).

12 Dalrymple, 9-10.

13 “Rio Hails Rockefeller; Ex-Diplomat to Foster Better Crops and Herds inBrazil," New York Times, 7 Sept. 1948, p. 35, col. 5; and "Returns From Brazil; NelsonRockefeller Reports Living Standards Up," New York Times, 20 Sept. 1948, p. 9, col.7.

14 Dalrymple, 43.

15 "Rockefellers Guests In Brazil," New York Times, 13 Apr. 1956, 4; and “FactsAbout ACAR,” 29 Dec. 1955, Folder 115, Box 16, Series E, AIA-IBEC, Record Group 4(RG 4), Rockefeller Archive Center, Tarrytown, New York (RAC).

16 Arthur T. Mosher, A Study of the Agricultural Program of ACAR inBrazil (Washington National Planning Association, 1955 and Clifton R. Wharton Jr."Aiding the Community: A New Philosophy for Foreign Operations,"Harvard BusinessReview, 32:2 (March/April 1954), 64-72. Wharton expounded on his articlein Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Development (Chicago: Aldine, 1969).

17 Dalrymple, 12.

18 SASA was organized in 1948 with Brazilian partners Antonio Secundino andGladstone Drummond. IBEC provided the initial capital for setting up a corn seedcompany in Minas Gerais. In 1967, total output reached 14,300 tons making SASAone of the largest hybrid seed producers in the world. IBEC sold its portion of SASA



to the Secundino family in 1972. At this time, the Brazilian National DevelopmentBank (BNDE) estimated its value at $9 million. Secundino’s son Ney Bittencourt deAraujo followed in his father's footsteps and was named 1986 “Brazilian Agronomist ofthe Year.” In 1990 SASA was valued at $90 million and it was exporting corn seed toneighboring Bolivia and Paraguay. For more on SASA see Elizabeth Ann Cobbs,“‘Good Works at a Profit,’: Private Development and United States-Brazil Relations1946-1960 (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1988), 220 citing O Estado de SaoPaulo, 22 Oct. 1986; and Elizabeth Ann Cobbs, Rich Neighbor: Rockefeller and KaiserIn Brazil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 156-157 and 184-85.

19 IRI’s agricultural farm was acquired by the Rockefellers’ partner, Brazilian financierand banker, Walther Moreira Salles and his business group Cia. Santo Anselmo. Walther Moreira Salles was one of two foreigners on IBEC’s Board of Directors.

20 “Companhia Agricola Fazendas Paulistas General Description of Property,” 1,Folder 15, Box 2, Series B, AIA-IBEC, RG 4, RAC; “New Techniques in CoffeeProduction,” 1 June 1956, John Griffing, Folder 2, Box 2, Series B, AIA-IBEC, RG 4,RAC; AIA-IBEC Progress Report, 3, Box 2, Series B, AIA-IBEC, RG 4, RAC; and Letterfrom Robert Purcell to Nelson Rockefeller, “Brazilian Acceptance of IRI Information,”25 April 1958, 2, Folder 75, Box 8, Series B, AIA-IBEC, RG 4, RAC.

21 In hopes of generating new revenue for the Brazilian coffee industry, IRI’S Dr.Mehrlich began extensive coffee taste-testing experiments at the Cambuhy farm in1954. The plan was to create a new soluble coffee product for the U.S companyTenco. Letter From John Lockwood to Nelson Rockefeller re Soluble Coffee - IBECResearch Institute, 13 Jan. 1954, Folder 15, Box 2, Series B, AIA-IBEC, RG 4, RAC.

22 Dalrymple, 26.

23 Letter from Lawrence H. Levy to John French re IRI - Coffee Flavor, 12 Nov.1953, Folder 15, Box 2, Series B, AIA-IBEC, RG 4, RAC.

24 For more on the concept of Brazilian westward expansion see Lewis Tambs,“March To The West: A Geopolitical Analysis Of Brazilian Expansion” (Ph.D. diss.,University of California, Santa Barbara, 1967). For more on Juscelino Kubitschek’splans for Brasília see Hélio Silva, Juscelino, o Desenvolvimento, 1956-61 (São Paulo:Grupo de Comunicação Três, 1983).

25 Dalrymple, 169.

26 IRI 1959 Progress Report, Folder 61, Box 7, Series B, AIA-IBEC, RG 4, RAC; andJohn Camp, “Tierras desaprovechadas; los vastos campos cerrados delBrasil” Americas (Aug. 1963), 13-14; and Letter from President Jerome Harrington toResearcher Jonathan Garst, 18 October 1961, Series B, AIA-IBEC, RG 4, RAC.

27 For more on labor and peasant unrest in Northeast Brazil in the early 1960’s seeSerafino Romualdi,Presidents and Peons; Recollections Of A Labor Ambassador InLatin America (New York, Funk & Wagnalls, 1967).

28 Letter from John R. Camp to Nelson Rockefeller, 24 Feb.1961, 9, Folder 6, Box 1,John Camp Papers, Series I, AIA-IBEC, RG 4, RAC. For more background on Camp’sconcept of developing the Brazilian interior see Camp, “Tierras desaprovechadas,"11-14.

29 Between 1957-1963, the private and corporate donors listed below madecontributions to IRI. Robert Purcell oversaw the 1958 fundraising campaign. This led



to prospective meetings with the Junqueira Foundation, Anderson Clayton Brazil,other Brazilian industrial groups, and U.S. agricultural chemical companies. AmericanExport Potash was the first to grant a small modest research grant. Letter fromRobert Purcell to Nelson Rockefeller, “Fund Raising Activities,” 15 March 1958, 1-4,Folder 75, Box 8, Series B, AIA-IBEC, RG 4, RAC. A list of IRI contributors includes:Amaral, Machado & Cia, Ltda., American Export Potash; Anderson Clayton & Cia.,Ltda., Banco do Comércio e Indústria de São Paulo; Climax Molybdenum Co.;Companhia de Superfosfatos C Produtos Químicos; Companhia Industrial eAdministrativa S. Francisco; Companhia Itaú de Fertilizantes; Companhia Paulista deAdubos; Companhia Rhodia Brasileira; Copas S.A.; Cotton Association; ElekeirozProdutos Químicos; Esso Brasileira de Petroleo S.A.; Esteve Irmãos S.A. Comércio eIndústria; Fazenda Alvorada; Fazenda Santa Tereza; Fazenda Ubatuba; FilibraProdutas Quimicas Ltda.; Ford Foundation; Frigorifico Anglo S.A.; Gesso NacionalTapuyo Ltda.; Indústrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo S.A.; James V. Zucchi; Manah S.A.Comércio e Indústria Adubos e Rações; McFadden & Cia., Ltda.' Moinho Sta.Francisca S.A. Indústrias Gerais; Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.; Pfizer Corporationdo Brazil S.A.; Potash Export Association, Inc.; Produtos Guarany S.A.; QuimbrasilQuímica Industrial Brasileira S.A.; Refinações de Milho Brasil; Sanbra SociedadeAlgodoeira do Nordeste Brasileira; Sigurd W. Schindler; Sociedade Brasileira deParticipações e Financiamento Sofibraz; Stauffer Chemical Co.; Sulphur Institute;United Nations Techinol; Volkart Irmãos Ltda.

30 It was not until 1999-2000 that a significant breakthrough was made regardingfertility of the cerrados region. Scientists at the University of California at San Diegodiscovered a gene that allowed plants to detoxify heavy metals such as the toxicsoluble aluminum found in the cerrados soils. These findings were reported in the 15June 1999 issue of European Molecular Biology Organization Journal.

31 For more on the development of the Venezuelan oil industry see RómuloBetancourt, Venezuela's Oil(London: Allen & Unwin, 1978); Judith Ewell, Venezuelaand the United States: From Monroe’s Hemisphere to Petroleum’s Empire (Athens:University of Georgia Press, 1996); John Lombardi, Venezuela: The Search For Order,The Dream of Progress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); James Petras,Morris Morely, and Steven Smith, eds. The Nationalization of Venezuelan Oil (NewYork: Praeger Publishers, 1977); Stephen G. Rabe, The Road To OPEC: U.S. RelationsWith Venezuela, 1919-1976 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987); LauraRandall, Venezuelan Oil (New York: Praeger, 1987); Jorge Salazar-Carrillo, Oil AndDevelopment In Venezuela During The Twentieth Century (Westport, Conn.:Praeger, 1994); and Wayne Chatfield Taylor, The Creole Petroleum Corporation inVenezuela (New York: Arno Press, 1955).

32 Richard A. Haggerty, ed. "The Transition To Democratic Rule," Venezuela, ACountry Study, (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1990) [February 2001] <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ve0000)>

33 After the return of civilian government in 1959 this became the National AgrarianInstitute.

34 Dalrymple, 115.

35 Ibid, 102.

36 Ibid, 77.

37 "PIIP," Folder 98, Box 10, Series B, AIA-IBEC, RG 4, RAC.



38 Dalrymple, 140.

39 Heaton's knowledge of Venezuela's agriculture was captured in a 1967 publicationentitled, Present Status and Possibilities of Agricultural Development in Venezuela. This was published with assistance from the Ford Foundation and CBR.

40 Costa Rica received $1.6 million and Bolivia $3.5 million.

41 Walter Crawford, Agriculture In Brazil, The Moods, The Reality And The Promise,1960, Folder 58, Box 7, AIA, RG 4, RAC.

42 Berent Friele to John Camp, 10 Feb. 1961, Folder 59, Box 7, AIA, RG 4, RAC.

43 Northeast Brazil Survey Report, Feb. 1962, 16, Folder 62, Box 7, AIA, RG 4,RAC.

44 Crawford, Agriculture in Brazil.

45 A rural development project was eventually completed in the late 1960's at Jaíbaunder direction of the Brazilian state-controlled Rural Foundation. This organizationreviewed and built on PIDR’s original plan.

46 Dalrymple, citing Papers of Robert W. Hudgens, Columbia Oral History Project.

47 Letter from Nelson Rockefeller to John D. Rockefeller Jr., 6 Sept. 1946, Series B,RG 4, RAC.

48 The Rockefeller Brothers Fund is a separate foundation set up in 1940 tocoordinate the interests of the Abbey, John III, Nelson, Laurence, Winthrop andDavid Rockefeller.

49 Dalyrmple, 11; “AIA and the U.S. Balance of Payments Situation,” 8 Dec. 1967,Folder 251, Box 24, Series B, AIA-IBEC, RG 4, RAC; and “AIA Program Expenditures1946-66,” Folder 251, Box 24, Series B, AIA-IBEC, RG 4, RF, RAC. There is adiscrepancy of $2.774 million between the monies raised and the monies allocated tothe budget. These funds were most likely either spent on a combination of personnelsalaries and taxes.

50 Partners in Progress: A Report to President Truman by the InternationalDevelopment Advisory Board(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1951).

51 Dalrymple, 187.

52 This label was given to Rockefeller by New York Times reporter Thomas Wickerwhile investing his career and background in 1975 prior during his Vice Presidentialconfirmation. Peter Collier and David Horowitz, The Rockefellers: An AmericanDynasty (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976).

53 One of the ideas proposed by these conferences was the concept of “openskies.” This was radical and new proposal as it suggested that in order to prevent asurprise attack both the United States and USSR each provide one another withmilitary establishment blueprints. Walt W. Rostow, Open Skies (Austin: University ofTexas Press, 1982). For an analysis of Rockefeller's Cold War plan see Davis Merwin,“An Analysis Of The Rockefeller-Kissinger Report,” Marine Corps Gazette, 43:3(1958), 20-31.



54 The list of experts included Dean Rusk, Roswell Gilpatric, Eugene Rostow, PaulNitze, Chester Bowles, Philip Coombs, Harland Cleveland, Richard Gardner, RogerHilsman, Lincoln Gordon, William Attwood, Adolf Berle, McGeorge Bundy, WalterRostow, and Henry Kissinger. For more see Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Prospect forAmerica: the Rockefeller Panel Reports, (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1961).

55 Adlai E. Stevenson, The Alliance For Progress, A Road Map To NewAchievements (Washington, D.C.: GPO, U.S. Dept. Of State, Inter-American Series,no. 72, 1961), 2; and Thomas C. Wright, Latin America in the Era of the CubanRevolution (New York: Praeger, 1991), 72.

56 By most accounts, the Alliance for Progress was unsuccessful at providing therequired level of funding or achieving the ambitious goals agreed to in 1961. Formore on how and why the plan failed see Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, TheAlliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress(Chicago:Quadrangle Books, 1970) and Ronald L. Scheman, ed. The Alliance for Progress: ARetrospective(New York: Praeger, 1988).

57 Letter from John R. Camp to Nelson Rockefeller, 24 Feb.1961, 9, Folder 6, Box 1,John Camp Papers, Series I, RG 4, RAC.

58 Dalrymple, 115.

Government & Nonprofit

The Man, The Girl and the Jeep - AIA: Nelson Rockefeller's Non-Profit Model for Private U.S. Foreign Aid