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National Foreign Policy And The Common Security And Defence Policy:

The ‘Big Three’ And Large-Scale Military Operations Under The CSDP

Case studies: Libya and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

MA Thesis in European Studies

Graduate School for Humanities

University of Amsterdam

Author: Remmert Keijzer

Main Supervisor: dr. C.W.C. Reijnen

Second Supervisor: dr. mr A.C. van Wageningen

April, 2013

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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor, Dr. C.W.C.

Reijnen, for his guidance and support throughout this entire process. His encouragement and

generous assistance have contributed to the great pleasure I experienced writing this thesis.

It is to my mother and father that I dedicate this thesis and my diploma to. Throughout my entire

life my parents have unconditionally supported and loved me, regardless of the choices I

believed were best for me. Without their support and love I would not have been able to

accomplish what I have accomplished.

Mom, Dad, thank you for everything.

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List of Abbreviations

Council Council of the European Union

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

EEAS European External Action Service

EEC European Economic Community

ESDP European Security and Defence Policy

ESS European Security Strategy

EU European Union

FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

HHG Helsinki Headline Goals

HR High Representative of the Union for Foreign

Affairs and Security Policy

IR International Relations

LT The Lisbon Treaty

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

QMV Qualified Majority Voting

TA Treaty of Amsterdam

TEU Treaty of the European Union

TM Treaty of Maastricht

TNC Transitional National Council of Libya

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNOCHA United Nation Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs

UNSC United Nations Security Resolution

US United States of America

WEU Western European Union

WWII World War Two

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements I

List of Abbreviations II

Table of Contents III

1 Introduction 1

1.1 Research Design 3

1.2 Methods of Analysis 4

1.3 Case selection 4

2 Historical Overview of the CSDP 6

2.1 Development of the CSDP 6

2.1.1 Western European Union 6

2.1.2 Petersberg Tasks 7

2.1.3 The Maastricht Treaty 8

2.1.4 The Treaty of Amsterdam 8

2.1.5 The European Security Strategy 9

2.1.6 The Lisbon Treaty 10

2.2 Conclusion 11

3 National Foreign Policy and the CSDP 13

3.1 France and the CSDP 13

3.1.1 Post-WWII 14

3.1.2 Post-Cold War 15

3.1.3 Post-9/11 17

3.1.4 France’s CSDP 18

3.1.5 IR Theory and the CSDP 19

3.2 Germany and the CSDP 20

3.2.1 Post-WWII 20

3.2.2 Post-Cold War 21

3.2.3 Post-9/11 22

3.2.4 Germany’s CSDP 23

3.2.5 IR Theory and the CSDP 24

3.3 The United Kingdom and the CSDP 25

IV

3.3.1 Post-WWII 26

3.3.2 Post-Cold War 26

3.3.3 Post-9/11 27

3.3.4 The United Kingdom’s CSDP 28

3.3.5 IR Theory and the CSDP 29

3.4 Conclusion 30

4 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the CSDP 33

4.1 Operation Concordia 33

4.2 France and Operation Concordia 35

4.3 Germany and Operation Concordia 36

4.4 The United Kingdom and Operation Concordia 37

4.5 Conclusion 38

5 The Libyan crisis and the CSDP 41

5.1 The Libyan crisis 41

5.2 France and the Libyan crisis 42

5.3 Germany and the Libyan crisis 45

5.4 The United Kingdom and the Libyan crisis 47

5.5 Conclusion 48

6 Conclusion 53

References 60

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1 Introduction

In 2011 the world witnessed profound changes taking place in large parts of North-Africa and

the Middle-East. Autocratic leaders were brought down by their people who had enough of the

restrictive measures they had been a victim of for so many years. The civil unrest that had

spontaneously broke out in Tunisia soon spilled over to Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Syria.

Citizens demanded their leaders to step down in order for democracy to be introduced. These

civil uprisings have been met with violent responses from authorities and have, in some cases,

led to civil wars.

For many Western countries the events of the Arab Spring came unexpected. Although

many of them supported the people’s cry for democratic changes, no serious efforts were made

to actively involve themselves in these domestic conflicts. However, having witnessed the

atrocities committed by Colonel Gadhafi in Libya, an international coalition of the willing

intervened militarily which eventually led to the downfall of the dictator.

On 20 March 2011 this coalition of the willing conducted aerial bombardments after the

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1973. This Resolution permitted the

coalition to enforce a no-fly zone over the North-African country. After a week, mission control

was handed over from the coalition, which was mainly led by the United States of America in

military and intelligence contributions, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The civil war in Libya has proven to be a perfect test-case for the European Union (EU)

to see if it is able to fully maximise its military capabilities. Several preconditions that were most

favourable for the EU were made in the run-up to the military operation: Security Council

Resolution 1973 authorised the use of force; regional support in the form of a request made by

the Arab League; and the US made it clear that it would not take the lead as it has done so many

times before.

However, the possibility of an EU military intervention in Libya was quickly rejected

since no agreement could be reached between the 27 EU Member States. Considering that this

crisis has occurred near its periphery, and recollecting the EU’s total absence during the

Yugoslav wars, it is surprising that the EU did not respond to the Libyan people’s cry for help.

The European Union’s handling of the civil war in Libya has been labelled as passive, slow and

incoherent (Brattberg 2011, p. 1). This is most surprising considering the tough talks expressed

prior to the military intervention by France, the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent, Germany.

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The conflicting national foreign policies posed the biggest constraint on the EU’s effectiveness

to intervene in Libya. This thesis will therefore try to answer the following research question:

Will the different perceptions that the ‘Big Three’ have of the CSDP hinder the EU’s capability

to conduct future large-scale military operations?

By selecting two case studies, Libya and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

(FYROM), this study will try to answer this question by comparing two military operations.

Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), on the one

hand, was considered to be a successful military operation. On the other hand, the Libyan crisis

can be depicted as a large-scale military operation in which the EU, as a whole, did not

participate in. With the selection of the two case studies this thesis will show how the ‘Big

Three’, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, portray the EU’s Common Security and

Defence Policy (CSDP) during a moment of civil unrest near its borders and which preconditions

need to be in place in order for the ‘Big Three’ to approve EU military involvement.

Furthermore, this thesis will reconstruct the type of argumentation that played a role in their

considerations to help develop the CSDP throughout a time-period of sixty years. It will do so by

not just analysing the official political point of view but also by reviewing whether these official

statements were indeed matched by costly (in)action. These analyses can be linked to an

analytical framework that will focus on three aspects that are essential for European military

integration: the technical aspects of the CSDP; its decision-making structure; and EU-NATO

relations. These three aspects are areas in which a parallel position of Member States is essential

for further integration in security and defence and, above all, reflect essential features of national

strategic culture and hence help to identify how convergent, or divergent, the French, German

and British preferred versions of the CSDP are.

Chapter 2 of this thesis will provide an overview of the development of the CSDP

throughout the years. Chapter 3 will assess the CSDP’s development from a French, German and

British perspective in three different time-periods, whereby a clear distinction between these

Member States’ foreign policy shall be made visible. Special attention shall be given to the

events that helped shape and develop their perception of the CSDP in this chapter. In chapter 4 a

closer look shall be awarded to the type of reasoning these countries upheld prior and during

Operation Concordia that was deployed in the FYROM. It is essential to analyse the conditions

that led to the EU’s approval of this small-scale military operation as a comparison can be drawn

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with the Libya crisis, the case study that will be treated in chapter 5. By comparing the two case

studies in the final chapter, a conclusion can be drawn about the EU’s possibility to conduct

large-scale military operations. This thesis will argue that the EU is capable of conducting large-

scale military operations, but that certain preconditions need to be in place in order for the ‘Big

Three’ to give their approval.

1.1 Research Design

The primary objective of the Treaty of Lisbon (LT), which entered into force on 1 December

2009, was to allow the EU to become a more effective global actor. Compared to its predecessors

the LT contains several amendments which apply to the EU’s foreign and security policy, the

most important one being the expansion of the Petersberg Tasks which allows the EU to cover a

wide range of possible military options, including joint disarmament operations, post-conflict

stabilisation and the fight against terrorism. However, despite these amendments, the Libya crisis

has made it clear that these changes, which should have made it easier for the EU to act more

active and coherent, did not lead the EU to intervene militarily. The dependent variables in this

thesis, therefore, are the failure of an active and coherent European approach to the Libya crisis

on the one hand and the success of its first military operation, Operation Concordia in FYROM,

on the other hand.

By taking an in-depth look into the perceptions the members of the ‘Big Three’ have

towards the CSDP, several independent variables come in play which have resulted in Member

States’ cooperative or non-cooperative behaviour throughout the years. Some of these

independent variables are: attachment to multilateralism and pacifism; pursuing national interests

through the CSDP; geo-political events; Euroatlantic relations; US pressures; counterbalancing

Member States’ dominance; and strong focus on ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’. These

independent variables support the statement that the future development of a European defence

capability is driven more by external than by of ideological susceptibilities the ‘Big Three’ hold

(Giegerich & Wallace 2004, p. 178).

It should be noted that this thesis will deal primarily with the military and defence aspects

of the CSDP and its operations. The main argument for this is that the connection between

foreign policy and CSDP will be most apparent in its military operations. The ability to

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effectively use force to achieve political ends is of utmost importance for the EU’s plans to

maintain security through CSDP.

1.2 Methods of analysis

To answer the research question two different methods shall be applied. The method of process

tracing attempts to identify the intervening causal process between independent variables and the

outcome on the dependent variable, in this case Operation Concordia and the Libya crisis

(Bennett & Elman 2006, pp. 459-460). It is an indispensable tool which carefully maps the

process and explores the extent to which it coincides with prior expectations about the creation

of, for instance, national foreign policies (Ibid., p. 462). By using primary (official documents,

public statements etc.) and secondary sources (literature, press accounts etc.) it is believed that

the method of process tracing can be applied to its fullest.

This study also tries to provide a conceptual theoretical framework for each individual

member of the ‘Big Three’ by reconstructing the type of argumentation they upheld during the

development of the CSDP in a time-period of sixty years. Through this conceptual framework,

and by analysing the dominant approaches that other authors have constructed, a specific

International Relations theory to each individual member of the ‘Big Three’ can be applied

which helps to not only answer this thesis’ research question but also to see whether or not

theoretically based explanations of CSDP from a national perspective are possible. It is therefore

necessary to explain the variation among the three with regard to their preparedness to

communitarise security and defence affairs. This thesis will not provide the same IR frameworks

for the other policy fields in which the EU is involved such as economic and social integration.

1.3 Case selection

In order to analyse the dependent and independent variables that played a role during Operation

Concordia and the Libya crisis, a closer look shall be awarded to the responses of France,

Germany and the United Kingdom. This thesis shall focus solely on the member of the ‘Big

Three’ since they are seen as the countries that help shape and formulate the EU’s Common

CSDP (King 2005, p. 46). Because of their economic, historical and political size, these

countries have the biggest influence on other EU countries, notably the smaller to medium sized

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ones. With their combined military strength these countries are the only ones who can lead and

participate in a military operation.

The independent variables that led to the EU’s decision to support and deploy a military

operation in FYROM came about in a time when its Member States were aware of the US pivot

to the Asia-Pacific region, thereby devoting their attention away from Europe. Above all, the

EU’s absence during the Yugoslav Wars has raised awareness of the necessity of creating an

autonomous security and defence policy. The use of the word autonomy in this thesis is defined

in relation to NATO and the US.

During the Libyan crisis these Member States showed diverging views with regards to

the correct usage of the CSDP which eventually led to the EU’s absence during the crisis.

Notably France and the United Kingdom were the biggest advocates for military intervention,

although the latter preferred NATO as the most credible actor to intervene. Germany only

wished to support a humanitarian operation and strongly opposed military intervention.

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2 Historical Overview of the CSDP

Of the many external factors that have influenced the development of a common European

security policy, the most important one was the end of the Cold War from which a new European

security environment was born. With the end of the Cold War the bipolar world disappeared, the

Soviet threat vanished and the fall of the Berlin Wall led to the unification of East- and West

Germany (Sens 2007, p. 9). In recent years it has become clear in recent years that the dominant

American presence in Europe is slowly starting to diminish. The US favours a stronger economic

and military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, meaning that Washington expects the EU to

take responsibility over its own security (Howorth 2012). The Libyan crisis, however, has shown

that the EU is not yet capable of conducting large-scale military operations near its periphery.

Therefore, the main challenge for the EU in the upcoming years is to find common ground on

defence and security issues, the so-called ‘high politics’ or ‘ultimate bastion of sovereignty’

(Bretherton & Vogler 2006, p. 163; Smith 2011, p. 64).

This section will provide background on the development and creation of the CSDP up to

the Libya crisis and will provide special attention to the cornerstones that helped shape the CSDP

throughout the years.

2.1 Development of the CSDP

The development of a European security and defence policy in the post-World War II

environment was facilitated by the continued presence of a Soviet threat and the dream of

European integration (Sens 2007, p. 7). The European continent had been overwhelmed by

thousands of wars throughout its history and it was only since the end of WWII that Europe

started to consider cooperating in the field of security and defence. It is therefore important to

take a closer look to the development of the CSDP in order to understand the contemporary

issues in a more comprehensible manner.

2.1.1 Western European Union

After WWII several European countries were convinced about the necessity of creating a stable

European security environment. Therefore, in 1948 the Western European Union (WEU) was

founded in order to establish a firm basis for European economic recovery; to promote the unity

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and encourage social and economic integration of Europe; and it was a response to possible

Soviet involvement in the countries of Central Europe (Ibid.). Most importantly, the WEU was

intended to guarantee the safety of the Member States who had signed the treaty encompassing a

‘mutual assistance’ clause and demonstrated to the US that Europe was capable to participate in

a post-World War II security environment (WEU 2010).

However, in the years following the creation of the WEU it became clear to many that

NATO, which was founded in 1949, was the most credible actor in safeguarding European

security. Therefore, no serious commitments were made to the WEU by its Member States since

it would remain fully dependent on NATO for its practical capability. Considering the fact that

its military command structure was integrated into that of NATO and its military assets were

negligible, the WEU proved to have a more symbolic meaning (Rafnsson 2011, p. 14). The

European Economic Community’s (EEC) Member States clearly preferred the transatlantic

defence structure over a European one (Gross 2009, p. 4)

The WEU was considered to be the first step in the creation of the CSDP. There were,

however, many more steps to be taken as the Cold War period reflected the “desirability of

cooperating in the construction of a peaceful and prosperous Western Europe” (Bretherton &

Vogler 2006, pp. 163-164). Therefore, the focus of the EEC during the Cold War period was

placed on economic and social integration (Ibid., p. 164).

2.1.2 Petersberg tasks

With the breaking-up of the Soviet Union a new security environment in Europe was created in

which the EU could no longer solely depend on American security guarantees. The possibility of

a Western-Eastern war had vanished which meant the EEC had to adapt to this new environment

in which it had to approach the newly independent eastern European states and in which it had to

respond to the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia (Sens 2007, p. 9). In light of these changes

the EEC chose to set a list of military and security priorities. In practice, this meant that the

Member States agreed to deploy their troops and resources under the authority of the

reinvigorated WEU.

The Petersberg tasks, which were adopted at the Ministerial Council of the WEU in 1992,

cover a wide range of possible military missions which were formulated as followed:

humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks for combat forces in crisis

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management, including peace-making. These tasks were eventually incorporated into the Treaty

of the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty of Lisbon (LT) which now includes ‘joint

disarmament operations’, ‘military advice and assistance tasks’, ‘post-conflict stabilisation’ and

‘the fight against terrorism’ (Article 43, paragraph 1 LT).

2.1.3 The Maastricht Treaty

The reinvigorated WEU, however, was quickly submerged by larger attempts to infuse the now

called EU with a stronger and more independent external policy component which became

known as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), one of the three pillars of the EU

under the Maastricht Treaty. The CFSP was intended to create synergies between its Member

States by creating common strategies through joint actions and common positions (Sens 2007, p.

12).

However, there were some serious limitations to the CFSP, more specifically the

consensual decision-making procedures which meant that every Member State reserved the right

to veto a military operation under the CFSP. The Yugoslav Wars, in which the EU was absent,

exposed the lack of a cohesive foreign policy (Ibid., pp. 12-13). During these wars NATO was

the only security actor capable of providing security in the Balkans. The failure of the EU of

providing military support to NATO underlined the shortcomings of the CFSP which led to some

unprecedented changes (Bretherton & Vogler 2006, p. 5; Gross 2007, p. 4). The Balkan Wars

can even be seen as the raison d’être of the CSDP in its early years.

2.1.4 The Treaty of Amsterdam

With the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam (TA) the post of High Representative (HR) for the

CFSP was created. The HR would advise the Presidency of the Council on all CFSP matters and

could represent the Council of Ministers abroad. The TA also provided for the gradual

development of a common defence policy although it did not commit its Member States to a

common defence (Sens 2007, p. 13).

The deep split over the creation of a common EU defence policy was shown by France

and the United Kingdom who, bilaterally, signed an agreement which called on the EU to “have

the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to

use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (Franco-British

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Joint Declaration 1998). In light of the Yugoslav Wars, the decline of American security

presence on European soil, British fear that NATO’s role would be diminished and French desire

to create an autonomous security identity eventually led to this joining of forces. The 1998 Saint

Malo agreement, however, did start discussions on the then called European Security and

Defence Policy (ESDP) and sought out, for the first time in its history, to create an autonomous

European military capability (D.R. Smith 2011, p. 13).

During this same period, the EU launched the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG),

encompassing the deployment of an army corps consisting of 50,000-60,000 troops, 100 ships

and 400 aircraft deployable at 60 days’ notice and sustainable for one year. Its aim was that, by

2004, the EU would be capable of conducting two military operations, under the Petersberg

tasks, simultaneously. In 2004, however, due to a lack of political commitment, the EU approved

the Helsinki Goal 2010, extending the timeline with six years. This lack of political commitment

was made evident by the signing of a joint EU-NATO declaration in 2002, named the Berlin Plus

agreement. This agreement guaranteed the EU the use of NATO’s structures and assets but it

also highlighted the lack of political will to the ESDP project as it seriously strained the

development of a real autonomous defence capability. The US and other Atlanticist countries

were concerned that the development of an ESDP threatened the existence of NATO (Sens 2007,

p. 13). Therefore, it was in their interest that the ESDP would be subsumed under the Alliance.

Some Member States’ desires for an autonomous ESDP were driven by the wish to free

themselves from their reliance on the US (Ibid.).

2.1.5 European Security Strategy

The events of 9/11 had a significant impact on the European security environment (Sens 2007, p.

15). The US post-9/11 discourse of unilateralism, as witnessed by its invasions of Iraq and

Afghanistan, provided the EU the opportunity to adopt new roles and responsibilities which were

acknowledged in the European Security Strategy (ESS) (Bretherton & Vogler 2006, p. 27).

European divisions over the US unilateralism prompted discussions over setting up a common

European threat assessment based on diplomatic and strategic interests (Sens 2007, p. 17). The

ESS created cohesion and a strategic roadmap for the Union which was looking for ways to give

weight and authority to its common foreign policy (Gross 2007, p. 46; Ojanen 2006, p. 86). It

was at this time that the EU, for the first time in its history, conducted both small-scale military

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operations and civilian operations in Africa and the Balkans, ranging from a police-training

operation in Kosovo to a peace-keeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The Iraq war and the ESS pushed the EU towards a softer, civilian/military side of ESDP

(Simón 2012, p. 104) which was, according to the French and the Germans, necessary for the EU

to promote an alternative to the “dominant Washington Consensus within the existing global

institutions” (Habermas 2009, p. 57). As was the case in the Cold War period, the US’

dominance on the international scene allowed the Europeans to distance themselves from US

military unilateralism while benefiting from it for their own economic development and social

integration (Simón 2012, p. 109). Furthermore, during this period the EU expanded with several

new Member States as a result of which the Union gained more economic and political power.

But this enlargement also hampered the development of a military ESDP since most of these new

Member States viewed the Alliance as the only actor capable of guaranteeing them from a

possible post-Soviet hostile Russia (M.A. Smith 2006, p. 11).

2.1.6 The Lisbon Treaty

The final chapter in the history of a European common defence capability in the run-up to the

Libya crisis is the impact the Treaty of Lisbon (LT) had which renamed the ESDP into the

CSDP. This treaty introduced some prominent changes which have affected the CSDP greatly.

Some of these changes were: expanding the Petersberg tasks (as mentioned in paragraph 2.1.2);

the introduction of the mutual assistance and solidarity clause; the creation of a Permanent

Structured Cooperation (group of Member States who commit themselves to cooperation in the

area of capability development); and it created the position of High Representative of the Union

for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) who oversees the European External Action

Service (EEAS).

The wording of the mutual assistance- and solidarity clause, however, are labelled as

rather vague since it does not refer to military means and most importantly, it says that it “shall

not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States”

(e.g. giving NATO a higher status) (Art. 42-7 TEU; Simón 2012, p. 105). It is not, however, the

wording of these clauses that pose the biggest constraints to an effective CSDP but the

incoherence of many Member States’ security policies and a lack of material contributions

required for military intervention (Menon 2011, p. 76). The problem of the CSDP under the LT

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is Member States’ willingness to spend the amount of money required for defence and to spend it

wisely (Ibid, p. 86). Some go even further by arguing that the changes the LT brought about

made the situation even worse as it did not take into account the evolution of the geopolitical

environment, as the crisis in Libya so clearly have shown (Simón 2012, p. 112). The fact that

Member States retained the ‘unanimity rule’ in the LT for military missions revealed the still

present ‘sovereignty reflex’ which hamper effective and speedy decision-making (Alecu de Flers

2008, p. 12) and it thus represented a weak compromise between different national preferences

and priorities (Menon 2011, p. 78).

2.2 Conclusion

During the Cold War Europeans did not felt the need to construct an autonomous military and

defence capability since NATO provided them with security guarantees in a bipolar world. The

focus of the EU was put on economic and social integration as a consequence of which it was the

only multilateral framework with no security policy of its own (Rieker 2006, p. 512).

The post-Cold War period and the events of 9/11, however, dramatically changed the

way in which Europeans constructed their identity in an ever more US unilateral led world. The

Balkan Wars and the sudden appearance of independent central and eastern European states and

their desire to join the EU led to some significant changes allowing the EU begin formulating in

what is now known as the CSDP.

The subsequent treaty changes have awarded the EU with the possibilities to conduct

large-scale military operations but it is because of political will and material shortcomings that

the EU was, and perhaps still is, incapable of conducting these operations. It has shown,

however, that it is capable of conducting CSDP missions ranging from civilian missions and

(small-scale) military missions to police training missions since it has been engaged in 25

different operations. The fact that Member States could find agreement on approving these

missions made it clear that the EU adapted to the global demand for various forms of

international security (M.E. Smith 2011, p. 2). Although some of these missions have proven to

be successful, a large part of them have not achieved their political objectives and, above all,

have not created the lasting political impact the EU set out to accomplish (Bickerton et al. 2011,

p. 5; French Defence White Paper 2008, p. 76l; M.E. Smith 2011, pp. 60-61). Furthermore, the

softening of the CSDP may have had negative effects on Europe’s military credibility as the EU,

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especially in the 2000s, put more emphasis on multilateralism and comprehensiveness than on

providing ‘hard’ security (Simón 2012, p. 104).

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3 National Foreign Policy and the CSDP

This chapter highlights the manner in which EU foreign policy was or was not used as a way of

managing a transition away from identifiable national strategies to a common European strategy.

A closer look shall be given to the foreign policies of the ‘Big Three’ during the CSDP’s

development, cutting it in three periods, all prior to the Libyan crisis. These periods are: the post-

World War II period, the post-Cold War period and the post-9/11 period. These different periods

cut across a time-frame of 60 years. Moreover, this chapter will reconstruct the type of

argumentation that played a role in their considerations to help develop the CSDP and attempts

to frame these types of argumentation into an IR theory from which a clear distinction between

the three can be observed. It will do so by not just analysing the official political point of view

but also by looking at the specific national interests in play through which it becomes possible to

review whether these official statements were indeed matched by costly (in)action. In addition,

the analyses will also look at the specific national interests at play which can be linked to the

independent variables.

As mentioned before, the ‘Big Three’ occupy a leading role in the construction of a

CSDP. As this section will show, the positions of these countries vis-à-vis the development of

the CSDP and its usage has changed over time. Since they are considered as the main drivers

behind the CSDP, it is important to analyse this pattern of behaviour from which it becomes

possible to deduct their rationales behind the construction of the CSDP.

3.1 France and the CSDP

France’s relationship with Europe, more in particular with the CSDP, has shifted in recent

decades. In order to understand these changes, France’s foreign policy is best explained in terms

of its domestic politics and the ideological structure of international politics. Therefore, this

paragraph seeks to assess the nature of these changes in French strategy and identifies its driving

factors in three different periods.

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3.1.1 Post-World War II

During the Cold War the EU underwent a period of strong economic growth, political stability

and European integration. This, however, left France excluded from what they perceived was an

American directorate (Simón 2013, pp. 9-10). The humiliating defeat in World War II and the

dominating US influence in Europe over the next decades was a severe blow to the French

grandeur and its self-perceived global status (Ibid). The French would never allow another

country to dominate its security interests and therefore, Charles de Gaulle, president of France

from 1959 to 1969, committed himself to restoring French pride, meaning national strategic

autonomy and European autonomy under French leadership (Ibid.).

France’s foreign policy during this period became known as Gaullism, consisting of the

following two components: military independence from both the US and the Soviet-Union; and

creating and maintaining a strong relationship with its former colonies (Bickerton 2011, p. 47).

In short, France had only one foreign policy goal in the Cold War period: to restore its position

in world politics (Rieker 2006, p. 515). This French notion of grandeur has even been traced

back to the outbreak of the French Revolution, a time in which they believed that spreading

French norms and values through Europe was considered a moral obligation (Belkin 2009, pp. 3-

4).

For the French, autonomy of a European defence capability was considered a top priority

as it was believed that by strengthening Europe its national interests and its position in the world

would be best served. This means that the EU was meant to be used as a tool for a ‘French-led

block against US and Soviet dominance by a German-French entente” (Bickerton 2011, p. 50).

However, German reluctance to join this block was hampered by the fact that it preferred a close

relationship with the US over a French-led block with strong anti-American sentiments (Ibid.)

Despite strong French anti-US sentiments, France relied heavily upon US security

guarantees which deterred the Soviet Union and assured that Germany would remain weak and

dependent to the West, ensuring French leadership in Europe (Simón 2013, pp. 10-11). It realised

that the only way for the EU to become a credible security actor was through either

supranationalism or working closely together with Germany. Both solutions were not an option

to France since this would have meant it would have to give up its leading role in Europe (Ibid,

p. 11). Therefore, it did not choose to actively push for an autonomous European security

strategy.

15

French foreign policy was a product of the turbulent political times in the 1950s and

1960s in which a deep social conflict broke out by the collapse of the French empire. This,

combined with the impact of the colonial wars and the diminishing French role on the global

scene all led up to the Gaullist vision of grandeur (Bickerton 2011, p. 50). This vision, however,

was not ideologically driven but was a ‘realist’ view of what France believed were to be part of

International Relations as France sought out to create a European defence capability, fully aware

that the US provided them with security guarantees against a possible hostile Soviet Union

(Menon 1995, p. 20). By using the EU as a tool the French hoped that they could retain back

their role on the international scene.

3.1.2 Post-Cold War

The end of the Cold War changed the geopolitical realities that were in existence ever since the

end of World War II and it raised the issue of the role of the EU in providing European security

and France’s preservation of her status. Especially the prospect of a reunified Germany and the

resulting concerns over a French marginalisation in Europe led to a different French foreign

policy attitude. But perhaps most importantly, the American troop withdrawals from Europe and

the possibility of threats that would no longer hit the US but Europe, for instance the Yugoslav

Wars, played a key role in the change of French policy (Menon 1995, p. 22).

With the fall of the Soviet Union a unilateral world order was created in which the US

became the dominating actor. In this new world order France saw the necessity to push for the

creation of an autonomous European security strategy, bearing in mind the Soviet exclusion,

Germany’s strengthening, NATO’s rule and the absence of any clear security threats (Menon

1995, p. 20; Simón 2013, p. 13). A European security strategy would fulfil all of France’s

wishes: placing a strong and unified Germany within a multilateral setting and opposing US

dominance (Ibid., p. 12). France and Britain joined forces by signing the Saint Malo agreement

which was an expression of French desire to form an autonomous security capability. France and

Britain, however, differed greatly on the ESDP’s level of autonomy and its implications for

Euroatlantic relations (Bickerton et al. 2011, p. 3). Whilst many in France saw the agreement as

the birth of a ‘Europe politique’, in Britain it was viewed as an instrument to improve European

military capabilities and to revitalise NATO (Ibid.).

16

Throughout the 1990s, France opposed all NATO expansion outside the field of

territorial defence and resisted any EU-NATO cooperation which it saw as hampering EU

autonomy in the field of foreign policy (Meimeth & Göler 2011, p. 195; Simón 2013, p. 2). This

French behaviour was a continuation of a Gaullist notion born out of distrust of American

motives (Meimeth & Göler 2011, p. 195). The possibility of eastern enlargement in the 1990s

was first expressed by NATO and France was convinced that this would benefit the US and

Germany greatly as both countries supporteds NATO’s enlargement. French involvement in the

EU and NATO enlargement process during the 1990s was therefore motivated by their desire to

exert some influence over NATO’s enlargement (Simón 2013, p. 13). This non-cooperative

behaviour of France resulted in American unwillingness to support an autonomous ESDP,

thereby aided by the United Kingdom, which has led to the reform not of the ESDP but that of

NATO.

However, during the 1990s France realised that the EU was incapable of conducting

large-scale military operations as became visible during the Yugoslav Wars. French fears over a

passive EU with its German ‘soft power model’ posed a serious threat to the EU’s strategic

autonomy. It therefore reached out to NATO to counterbalance this pacifist trend as was

expressed by French support for the NATO operation in Kosovo (Ibid., p. 14).

In the post-Cold War period France has struggled to create its own foreign policy

identity. On the one hand it opposed NATO expansion which would hamper the creation of an

autonomous ESDP, but on the other hand supported the Alliance to oppose German pacifism.

This attitude was best expressed by French president Chirac who stated that “[...] the

construction of a European defence is a major ambition of our country. We want the Europeans

to get the capacity to take common decisions and to undertake military operations within the

framework of comprehensive crisis management. [...] This does not mean that it will replace the

Atlantic alliance, which remains a legitimate framework for collective defence.” (Chirac, as cited

in Rieker 2006, p. 14).

An attachment with Gaullism still remained but with neither the domestic nor the

international support for it (Menon 1995, p. 24). EU foreign policy was no longer considered to

be a tool for French interests but was seen as a substitute for an unclear French foreign policy.

17

3.1.3 Post-9/11

The events that took place on 9/11 and the resulting US unilateralism rule would, according to

the French, damage European autonomy in foreign, security and defence policy. The French

believed that a greater emphasis on an independent ESDP was needed and was extremely

hesitant on any EU-NATO cooperation (Simón 2013, p. 5). French foreign policy in this period

was born out of a need to balance US unilateralism and it therefore identified multilateralism as

its core objective (Ibid.). Earlier concerns over German ‘pacifism’ and its influence on Europe

were put in the backburner in the early 1990s. France had additional concerns over US’ support

for Israel in an anti-Western Middle Eastern region. By opposing this dominant US behaviour

the French political elite enjoyed great support from France’s large Muslim population

(Čmakalová 2010, p. 119).

As a result of US unilateralism the EU started to develop a ‘comprehensive approach’

which represented a clear shift towards the softer, civilian/military side of ESDP (Simón 2012,

pp. 103-104). This approach does not only consist of the use of force but allows the EU to use its

diplomatic and economic tools.

Although French focus was put on the ‘comprehensive approach’, they feared that too

much focus on the civilian aspect would come at the expense of a military ESDP (Simón 2013,

p. 17). Under president Sarkozy France reached out to the US to mitigate the consequences of

US focus on the Asia-Pacific region and German reservations to the use of force. By reaching

out to the US, amongst others by re-joining NATO’s military command structure, France hoped

that the advance of ‘civilian power’ Europe and the ‘crippling’ of the EU’s strategic potential

could be stopped (Ibid., p. 19). Some, however, believe that France’s Atlanticist turn was used in

order to enhance European defence cooperation. By re-joining NATO’s military structure France

believed that it could convince the EU’s eastern Member States to develop an autonomous ESDP

(Bickerton 2011, p. 54). Moreover, by re-joining the NATO command structure France would be

able to align itself with countries of its policy choice and through NATO it could constrain US

dominance (Čmakalová 2010, pp. 119-120).

As was the same during the post-World War II and the post-Cold War period, France is

too dependent on American security to truly support an autonomous CSDP although calls have

been made to ”reinforce the European defence capability and play an active role in the dynamic

renewal of NATO” (French Defence White Paper 2008, p. 96). The EU’s apparent inability to

18

use its military tools to address instability in its neighbourhood poses a problem for France and

the Atlantic connection guarantees stability and French influence in Europe’s region (Simón

2013, p. 22). However, France is still convinced that through the EU it is able to uphold its status

as an international actor (Čmakalová 2010, p. 118).

3.1.4 France’s CSDP

In the French Defence White Paper 2008 and its 2013 update, the French government has spelled

out its ambitions for the CSDP as it strives for a more "united, stronger and more assertive

Europe" (French Defence White Paper 2013, p. 69). With regards to the CSDP’s technical

aspects it wants the EU being able to conduct military operations at the highest intensity, with an

intervention capacity of 60,000 troops or up to three medium military as well as several small

civilian operations simultaneously for a minimum period of one year (French Defence White

Paper 2008, p. 82). The Permanent Structured Cooperation, as mentioned in paragraph 2.1.6,

should not have a minimum threshold of participating countries (Ibid.). In its 2013 update,

France is in favour of “developing and consolidating European partnerships […] aimed at

reinforcing the CSDP” (French Defence White Paper 2013, p. 69). The bilateral defence

agreement it has signed with the UK supports this statement (Ibid., p. 70). France wishes to go

even further by expressing the desire to introduce rules for the procurement of common defence

equipment and by introducing financial solidarity within the CSDP (Ibid., pp. 84-87).

Furthermore, France believes that an autonomous permanent European capability for steering

and planning should be placed under unified strategic leadership in Brussels from which the

EU’s military and civilian missions should be guided (Ibid., p. 84). Additionally, calls have been

made to create a jointly built weapons system; air mobility capabilities; aero-naval capabilities; a

European statute for reservists for civilian and military personnel; and to boost capabilities for

analysis and anticipation (Ibid., pp. 82-85).

The second aspect of the analytical framework focuses on the Euroatlantic relations.

France expresses the wish to “close the recurring debate over a putative a priori division of

labour” between the EU and NATO as these divisions have damaged EU-NATO relations

(French Defence White Paper 2008, p. 95). France hopes to forge a renewed strategic partnership

between Europe and the US as NATO needs an EU capable of shouldering a growing share of

the burden in the stabilisation of external crises, as the Libyan crisis has made clear and, on its

19

turn, the EU needs an Alliance capable of performing its defence missions and which strengthens

the links between Europe and North America (Ibid., p. 96). The drop in defence budgets in

Europe following the financial crisis poses serious operational constraints on NATO. These

problems should be addressed by the pooling and sharing of resources (French Defence White

Paper 2013, p. 73).

With regard to the decision-making aspect of the CSDP, France argues that a collective

approach to decision-making and action should be promoted (French Defence White Paper 2008,

p. 115). It is remarkable, however, that in the 2013 update it stresses its independence in

decision-making as it clearly identifies the option to use military instruments unilaterally (French

Defence White Paper 2013, p. 55). It therefore prefers CSDP to be of an intergovernmental

nature (Ibid., p. 71).

3.1.5 IR theory and the CSDP

French investment in the CSDP-project can be framed into a ‘structural realist’ IR theory. From

the analysis, two clear features can be deducted which are in line with the ‘structural realist’

theory such as: using the CSDP as a balance of American power; and using the CSDP to balance

German power in the EU (Rynning 2011, p. 27). It is argued that the development of the CSDP

represented an act of ‘balance of power’ on behalf of France and was caused by the dominant US

security discourse during and after the Cold War (Cladi & Locatelli 2012, p. 271; Weiss 2012, p.

660). This position was exemplified by French President Chirac who stated that: “any

community with only one dominant power is always a dangerous one and provokes reactions.

That’s why I favour a multipolar world in which Europe obviously has its place” (Ford 2003).

The Balkan Wars have made it clear to France that the EU should autonomously manage security

problems on Europe’s periphery since it does not believe that the US to will always be present

and because the French, unlike the British, simply do not agree in the way the US addresses

these problems as was made visible in the early 2000s (Posen 2006, pp. 150-151).

At the same time, however, France never really departed from bandwagoning with

NATO, thereby locking-in the US in European security affairs. This is indicative of the logic

underpinning French involvement in the CSDP: as long as the EU is willing to contribute France

is willing to work through the EU (Cladi & Locatelli 2012, p. 280).

20

French fears over a dominant (unified) Germany and the threat it could pose for European

security led France to believe that containing German power within an institutionalised setting

would ensure long-term peace in Europe (Rynning 2011, p. 27; Weiss 2012, p. 660). In the

2000s, fears over possible German aggression faded but was soon replaced with the dramatic

effects the ‘comprehensive approach’ could entail for the EU’s credibility as a security provider.

The claim that French involvement in the CSDP can be framed into a ‘constructivist’

theory, in which the sharing and diffusing of common ideas, norms and beliefs among Member

States lead to some sort of common identity, insufficiently covers the aspects the ‘structural

realist’ approach offers (Cladi & Locatelli 2012, p. 66; Wagnsson 2010, p. 1090). It has been

argued that France advocated and promoted a European military policy which resulted in a

paradigm change taking place within the EU (Dyson 2010, p. 160). French involvement in

multilateral frameworks, in which their Gaullist ideas, norms and beliefs are shared, was simply

born out of ‘structural realist’ notion in which France wanted to restrain US dominance and

create a division of labour between the two (Cladi & Locatelli 2012, p. 82).

3.2 Germany and the CSDP

This paragraph will provide a brief overview of Germany’s stance towards the development of

the CSDP ever since its defeat in WWII. Germany quickly adapted to the new security

environment in which institutionalism and multilateralism were considered key components of

its foreign policy. It will become clear that not much has changed over the past 60 years in which

German public guilt over its violent history played a pivotal role in its attitude towards the

CSDP.

3.2.1 Post-World War II

During the Cold War West Germany relied heavily upon US security guarantees against a

possible hostile Eastern-Germany which was under Soviet control and it was during this time

that West-Germany maintained a solid and strong relationship with the US. However, during the

Cold War West-Germany had to find a balance between US demands to contribute to NATO and

West-German public hostility against military participation (Speck 2011, p. 4). This public

hostility became known as ‘principled pacifism’ resulting in a West-German defensive role

within NATO (Ibid., p. 3). West-Germany preferred a commitment to social market democracy

21

and multilateralism over the development of an autonomous European and/or German military

strategy (Chen 2012, p. 21).

Maintaining a close relationship with the Western powers became the leading policy in

the Cold War as Germany believed that a strong relationship and commitment to multilateralism

would serve German interests best: dismantling of discriminatory measures and support for re-

unification (Ibid., p. 140). This policy of multilateralism led to a European integration whereby

Germany developed a co-operative image. This co-operative image of Germany helped develop

the German ‘civilian character’ that became leading in the decades to come (Ibid., p. 142). There

was a consensus in West-German politics not to develop and restructure their armed forces, like

France had done, arguing that a collective defence, under NATO, was preferred over the

protection of its national interests (Meimeth & Göler 2007, p. 197). Like so many other EU

Member States, West-Germany did not support an autonomous European defence capability

since NATO already fulfilled this role during the Cold War.

3.2.2 Post-Cold War

One of the biggest challenges for Germany in the post-Cold War period was dealing with rising

international expectations about its re-unification and its reluctance to take on the leading role in

Europe (Bickerton 2011, p. 39). Its new status as the most powerful and biggest country in

Europe did not mean that Germany looked for a new security identity. It still accepted NATO as

the only actor capable of providing hard security (Chen 2012, p. 157). In the 1990s continuity in

the field of German foreign policy became a key component: its relationship with the US

remained important for Germany and it made sure that the US, under the umbrella of NATO,

stayed involved in European security affairs (Ibid., p. 157); and Germany stayed involved in

multilateral frameworks which was seen as a key element of German post-World War II

economic and political success (Speck 2011, p. 4). It therefore did not actively push for an

autonomous European defence strategy.

However, German support towards an autonomous ESDP became visible during the

Kosovo War which created a sense of public vulnerability and made it clear that Europe could no

longer depend solely on US military power (Bickerton 2011, p. 45; Dyson 2010, p. 168). In the

latter half of 1999, when Germany had the EU Presidency, it helped bridge the gulf between the

British and French interpretations of the CSDP (Howorth 2004a, p. 224). German support for the

22

ESDP was motivated by its wish to stay actively involved in security issues within an

institutionalised and multilateral framework without itself having to militarise as it was believed

that through these multilateral institutions its interests could be best served (Haftendorn &

Kolkmann 2004, p. 476). Moreover, Germany feared to be left out in the agreement as the UK

and France forged a close relationship during the negotiations (Ibid., p. 470; Howorth 2004a, p.

220).

Its image of a co-operative ally failed to offer them with the tools to act effectively in

times of international upheaval. Its participation in the Kosovo operation did not change the

German security identity since continuity was still its main goal, but it did change the means in

achieving this goal, leaving the ‘civilian power’ identity of Germany intact (Chen 2012, p. 159).

In the 1990s the ESDP helped Germany adapt to its status as Europe’s powerful country

but without having to change its strategic culture which was based on non-intervention and non-

military tools.

3.2.3 Post-9/11

Anti-US sentiments in Germany started to rise when the US decided to invade Iraq without a UN

mandate. Germany, together with France, publicly opposed the war thereby showing a great

divide between the ‘Big Three’ as Britain supported the decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein.

With its decision to oppose the Iraq War, Germany had not just given up its traditional middle

ground in transatlantic and European affairs but it had also given up its role as ‘balancer’ within

the EU as a direct consequence of US unilateralism (Duke 2009, p. 406). It cannot be excluded,

however, that part of the German motivation to oppose the Iraq War were electoral

considerations as Chancellor Schröder was elected for a second term during the run-up to the war

(Speck 2011, p. 3). It should be noted that the Iraq War, according to Germany and France, was

not really about the war itself but about the "authorisation of coercion in global security

governance by the most powerful country and the threat it posed to international co-operation"

(Lindley-French 2004, p. 11).

By opposing US unilateralism and supporting a ‘comprehensive approach’, Germany

joined forces with France thereby constructing a new German security identity: that of a ‘civilian

power’ Germany which concentrated more on the other tools that were available in managing

(rising) conflicts (Chen 2012, p. 156). This ‘civilian power’, however, did damage European

23

citizens’ desires to address humanitarian crises through military intervention (Youngs 2002, p.

106).

Although Germany was capable of taking the lead role in Europe to develop an

autonomous ESDP, Germany still preferred NATO over the ESDP to provide Europe with

security guarantees. Instead, it wanted the EU to concentrate on the civilian power aspect of the

CSDP as became clear during the 2000s when the EU conducted 25 out-of-area operations.

Strengthening European defence autonomy was considered an addition to NATO, not an

alternative, as opposed to what France believed.

German security strategy was, and is, based on two different aspects: on the one hand the

German political elite has to adhere to its international obligations as one of the leading countries

in the EU, but on the other hand it has to take into account the pacifistic nature of the German

public (Göler 2011, p. 1). This reluctance to contribute militarily to any out-of-area operation is a

clear consequence of the Westpolitik policy that originated during the Cold War. The success of

this period, expressed through German economic growth and re-unification, did not lead the

country to change its role on the international military scene; continuity and multilateral

cooperation, albeit it with a new discovered self-awareness was its main ambition.

3.2.4 Germany’s CSDP

The German Defence White Paper of 2006 does not give much clarity about the manner in which

Germany portrays the CSDP with regards to its technical aspects. It reconfirms the developments

made throughout the years as references have been made to the HHG and the EU Battle Group

concept, an EU force consisting of 1,500 troops designed for rapid and resolute action at any

given moment. The German Federal coalition agreement of 2009 states that the EU should be

equipped with its own planning and leadership capabilities (Coalition Agreement 2009, p. 168).

As like France, Germany also believes that the pooling and sharing of resources would benefit

the EU greatly but it does not elaborate on this as it fails to provide clear-cut recommendations.

It does, however, show support for the creation of a European army under full (EU)

parliamentary control, but with a strong focus on civilian crisis management capabilities (Ibid.;

German Defence White Paper 2006, p. 38).

Euroatlantic relations are considered to be of great value as NATO remains the EU’s

strongest element of common security (Coalition Agreement 2009, p. 169). Therefore, Germany

24

is determined to remove all obstacles which hinder EU-NATO cooperation and tries to exploit

common potential between the two and will particularly campaign for a more efficient

coordination of EU-NATO activities since this will benefit the efficiency of both organisations

and conserves resources (Ibid.; German Defence White Paper 2006, p. 40). It is unclear,

however, how it will achieve this since it fails to provide concrete suggestions.

With regards to the CSDP decision-making structure, Germany is a strong advocate of a

European Security and Defence Union as part of a fully developed Political Union as they

believe that “only a strong, united Europe […] can help to shoulder responsibility in overcoming

the challenges to collective security” (German Defence Policy Guidelines 2003, p. 11; German

Defence White Paper 2006, p. 33).

3.2.5 IR theory and the CSDP

The development of the CSDP from a German perspective can, according to some, be attributed

to different IR theory approaches. For instance, Germany’s co-operative image, its strong belief

in multilateralism and its focus on ‘civilian power’, can be framed into a ‘neofunctionalist’ IR

theory (Risse 2005, p. 304). This theory argues that integration in one sector will create strong

incentives for integration in other sectors (Chen 2012, p. 8). It has even been said that the

German federal state structure explains this ‘neofunctionalist’ CSDP integration as federal states

are more prepared to share sovereignty (Ibid.). However, when reviewing the development of the

CSDP from the three national perspectives, it is hard to agree with the ‘neofunctionalist’ theory

since the evolution of the CSDP was the result of negotiations and geo-political events, such as

the Balkan Wars and the Iraq War. Some have even stated that it is impossible to create a spill-

over effect in a supranational setting, especially in the field of ‘high politics’ (Bickerton et al.

2011, pp. 8-9). Furthermore, it does not correlate with German resistance over forming an

autonomous European defence capability during the Cold War while embracing it after

unification.

Others say that German perception of the CSDP can be framed in the theory of ‘social

constructivism’ since Germany invested in international security institutions such as NATO and

the CSDP, and it enabled states to gain security by negotiating a shared sense of international

order with its allies (Berenskoetter & Giegerich 2010, p. 410). With regards to the CSDP, it

strongly conformed to Germany’s identity as a ‘civilian power’ (Ibid., p. 411). Framing Germany

25

into a ‘(neoclassical) realist’ and a ‘institutionalist’ theory is unconvincing since their

involvement in the CSDP was neither a balancing act against the US nor to constrain them as the

former theory would argue (Rynning 2011, pp. 26-27). Only in the early 2000s did Germany

oppose US unilateralist behaviour but it kept on preferring US involvement in security matters.

There is, however, one feature of this theory that can be applied to German involvement in the

CSDP: the shaping and using of the ideologies of ‘Atlanticisation’ and ‘Europeanisation’ by the

German political elite for their own domestic political agenda, as was the case in the early 2000s

(Dyson 2010, p. 192). The theory of ‘institutionalism’, however, is unconvincing since this

would have meant that Germany considered NATO to be insufficient and therefore invested in a

new security institution (Berenskoetter & Giegerich 2010, pp. 410-412).

This study argues that German investment in the CSDP can be framed into the ‘social

constructivist’ IR theory. The analysis presented above shows that the German co-operative

attitude in multilateral frameworks was shaped by the interaction of history, tradition and culture

which allowed Germany to preserve its identity (Ibid., p. 452; Schmidt & Zyla 2011, p. 486).

The logic of ‘social constructivism’ is to negotiate one’s favoured norms in order not to

undermine a strong international community that can act effectively and Germany did just that

(Wagnsson 2010, p. 1096). Through ‘social constructivism’ a collective identity within a

multilateral world-order was created which eventually led to security and institutional loyalty

expressed through ‘civilian power’ Europe.

3.3 The United Kingdom and the CSDP

In recent years the United Kingdom has opposed many of the reforms drafted to put a halt to the

crisis the EU has been in for the last years. Not only did the UK oppose these financial reforms

but it also opposed the creation of an autonomous CSDP for a long period of time. This

paragraph will show that British behaviour towards the EU was partly constructed in order to

protect the ‘special relationship’ it enjoys with the US and their fear of being marginalised in

Europe.

26

3.3.1 Post-World War II

With the end of WWII the British Empire and its influence in the world slowly started to

diminish and the United Kingdom had to adapt to a changing security environment in which the

United States took a leading role. However, the UK continued to define its foreign policy from a

global perspective and because of the fact that the UK only joined the EU in 1973 they could not

contribute to the development of a European defence capability (Chen 2012, p. 109). It was

during this time that the UK favoured a strong UK-US relationship with the US while neglecting

UK-EU relationships (Ibid.). As a consequence of this preferred relationship the UK played a

pivotal role in NATO’s dominance in Europe’s security environment since no other viable

security actor was present (Dietl 2003, p. 157). Also, by using American strength the UK hoped

to reinforce its threatened global status which also provided them with an alternative to a

European commitment (Wallace 1991, p. 71).

This independent position from and in Europe during the Cold War became a key aspect

of British foreign policy as it considered committing itself to an autonomous European defence

capability. The UK believed that the transatlantic link provided them with security and, above

all, would prevent the US from returning to ‘isolationism’ which could result in a French-led EU

(Bartlett 1992, p. 16). It perceived any attempts made by France to promote a European defence

capability as competing with NATO which, for the UK, was the only actor capable of deterring a

nuclear Soviet-threat (Dietl 2003, pp. 156-157).

3.3.2 Post-Cold War

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the changing global security environment did not change the way

in which the UK viewed the ESDP in the early 1990s. It went on to prefer the ‘special

relationship’ it had with the US over an autonomous European security strategy as it blocked any

supranational initiatives that could weaken or undermine NATO, resulting in the qualified

majority voting decision-making procedure in the Maastricht Treaty and its veto over a French-

German proposal to merge the WEU with the EU (Gowland & Turner 200, p. 216). Additionally,

further institutionalisation of the CFSP might result in more sovereignty being transferred to

Brussels, a feature the British opposed (Chen 2012, p. 127).

It was not until 1998 when the UK made a monumental shift towards the development of

the ESDP. The Yugoslav Wars had made it clear that they could no longer solely depend on US

27

military strength. By joining forces with France at Saint Malo the UK hoped that by

strengthening the European defence pillar, most notably the crisis management aspect, the

survival of NATO could be guaranteed as Blair argued that “strengthening European defence

capability will [...] strengthen NATO” (Blair 1998; Howorth 2004a, p. 221). Another plus side to

this agreement was to ensure British involvement in European affairs so it could counterbalance

French-German dominance (Gross 2009, p. 5). The UK and France, however, differed greatly in

the correct usage of the ESDP as the former considered the ESDP to be complementary to

NATO and not autonomous. According to Blair: “[...] On defence, we are engaged in a debate

that will ensure Europe’s defence policy proceeds absolutely consistently with NATO” (Blair

2000). By supporting the ESDP the UK hoped to permanently lock the US into the European

security structures and to revitalise NATO (Dietl 2003, p. 153; Howorth 2004a, p. 222). This

pro-European policy undertaken by Blair could not be interpreted as a change in policy for he did

not alter British stance towards the intergovernmental framework, it was rather a tactical shift in

policies (Dover 2007, p. 24).

British foreign policy was not just based on the ‘special relationship’ it enjoyed with the

US but was also based on the biased ideological assumptions of the great British Empire which

collapsed in the second half of the 20th

century (Wallace 1991, p. 70). Nostalgia for the past had

become an obstacle for the British political elite since it encountered difficulties in adapting to a

changed geopolitical environment.

3.3.3 Post-9/11

The US’ decision to invade Iraq posed a severe blow to British rapprochement expressed in the

Saint Malo agreement. The UK supported the ‘War on Terror’, thereby distancing itself from

Germany and France who opposed the US’ unilateral approach. Since 9/11 the UK moved away

from Europe which it considered to be a new and untried ally, and focused on the Atlantic

relationship (Howorth 2004a, p. 228). The divergence between the ‘Big Three’ seriously

constrained the further development of the ESDP as it became clear that the UK, once more,

preferred the Atlantic relationship over the European one (Chen 2012, p. 132). However, the UK

soon realised that by taking a non-cooperative stance it would be marginalised in Europe as it

had experienced during the Cold War (Chen 2012, p. 137). By staying involved the UK, on the

one hand, hoped to add value to the crisis-management aspect of ESDP while on the other hand

28

oppose any big changes in the decision-making procedures of the ESDP. It has even been said

that the UK is hampering ESDP’s development to prevent other countries from further deepening

military cooperation (Biscop 2012, pp. 1303-1304).

For the UK, the development of an autonomous European defence capability is

unacceptable for it will most likely undermine NATO’s role (Ibid., p. 136). The UK chooses

instead to work within NATO or through bilateral agreements as this offers more decisive action

in tackling problems without gaining consensus from states which have historically objected to

military intervention (Hurst 2011). The 2010 bilateral defence agreement with France is a clear

example of this working-method. Through this agreement, the UK is convinced that it can do

business with a country that has participated in many military operations in the past and reaching

consensus with only one EU Member State is easier than with all 27 (Ibid.)

3.3.4 The United Kingdom’s CSDP

The UK has supported the instalment of several technical aspects of the CSDP, such as the Batlle

Groups, the Berlin Plus agreement and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (UK National

Security Strategy 2009, p. 71). It believes, however, that the CSDP should solely focus on

specialised areas such as conflict prevention, mediation, stabilisation, recovery and peace-

building by using a permanent comprehensive political and strategic planning capability with

civilian and military strategic planners working together (Ibid., pp. 71-109). In its 2003 Defence

White Paper the UK expresses its support for coordinating common acquisition policies (UK

Defence White Paper 2003, p. 6). In its 2012 National Security Technology White Paper it

reconfirms this statement by saying that harmonising requirements, the pooling of resources, the

sharing of facilities and overhead costs will benefit the EU, but in particular the UK, greatly (UK

National Security Through Technology 2012, p. 30). However, the bilateral defence agreements

it has signed with France and the US have proven to be of great value to the UK and it therefore

no longer prefers doing so under the CSDP as the UK made it clear that they “generally favour

bilateral collaboration on technology, equipment and support issues, as we believe this offers the

best balance of advantages and disadvantages” (Ibid.). The UK is only supportive of CSDP

military operations when it is clear that NATO is not planning to intervene (UK Strategic

Defence and Security Review 2010, p. 62). Only then it is willing to lead and acts as a

framework nation for the CSDP (UK Defence White Paper 2003, p. 8).

29

British support for the CSDP is mainly regarded as an instrument for improving military

capabilities in order to strengthen Euroatlantic relations. Accordingly, the British government

stressed that the “UK is a strong supporter of developing EU capabilities in order to complement

NATO” (Ibid., p. 6). Furthermore, it argues that both operations should share their expertise and

develop complementary, rather than duplicate, skills and capabilities (UK Strategic Defence and

Security Review 2010, p. 62).

Similar to France, the UK stresses the importance of multilateral governance structures to

address (potential) conflicts but it explicitly mentions the “ability to act alone where we cannot

expect others to help” (UK National Security Strategy 2009, p. 62). Although it is in favour of an

intergovernmental approach to the use of military force, as the intervention in Libya and the

peace-keeping operation in FYROM have made clear, when its national interests are in play it

will remain the right to use armed force (UK Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010, p.

17).

3.3.5 IR theory and the CSDP

In response to French President Chirac’s wish to see a multipolar world in which the EU took a

firm place, Blair replied saying “the multipolar world would very quickly develop into rival

centers of power.” Instead, Blair preferred a “one polar power but which encompasses a strategic

partnership between Europe and America and other countries too” (Blair, as cited in Posen 2006,

pp. 167-168). In the post-Cold War period the UK was convinced that the US would no longer

automatically guarantee European security as it had done before (Howorth 2000, p. 34). By

actively involving themselves in the CSDP it would secure American engagement in European

security affairs and it would be on the fore-front of the future development of a European

defence capability.

The degree of satisfaction that Britain enjoyed with the power asymmetry during the

Cold War was gradually shifting as a consequence of French yearning for a European defence

capability independent from NATO (Cladi & Locatelli 2012, p. 282). The UK sought out to

balance this by strengthening NATO through the CSDP since it was aware of the fact that NATO

would not automatically involve itself in European security affairs (Art et al. 2005, p. 190). This

approach has been labelled as ‘reformed bandwagoning’: to prove yourself useful to the US it is

30

better to involve yourself in the CSDP (Cladi & Locatelli 2012, p. 282). It did so, amongst

others, by preserving the intergovernmental structure of the CSDP (Dover 2007, p. 3).

British involvement in the CSDP-project can therefore be framed in the ‘neoclassical

realism’ IR theory. A key aspect of this theory is demonstrating an active problem-solving

approach through which the status-quo can be restored as was exemplified with its support for

the Iraq War and to a lesser degree the CSDP missions (Wagnsson 2010, p. 1091). It has even

been argued that the CSDP was used by the UK as an instrument of government policy (Dover

2007, p. 80). The ‘neoclassical realism’ theory excludes the ‘social constructivist’ approach

which Germany personifies since restoring and preserving the status-quo for the British was

considered to be of greater importance than the sharing of common ideas, beliefs and norms as

the analysis above has made clear.

3.4 Conclusion

Throughout its history, Europe has been engulfed by thousands of wars and it was only since

1945 that Europe started concentrating on economic and social integration thereby creating a

prosperous Europe for all its 27 Member States. These successful results stand in stark contrast

with its foreign and security policy. As mentioned earlier, the ‘Big Three’ are considered to be

the main contributors to the CSDP as they possess the military, political and financial means to

influence EU foreign and security policy. By analysing their viewpoints towards the CSDP

throughout its history, it becomes clear that they all have different national foreign policies

which, unsurprisingly, result in the CSDP’s ineffectiveness.

Although the EU has been involved in many civilian/military operations outside its

border, it has not proven to be capable of conducting large-scale military operations in the 1990s

and the 2000s when the CSDP truly started being developed. For too long it has remained too

dependent on American military support as was evidenced during the Yugoslav Wars. Many

attempts have been made in order to promote the EU from being a ‘civilian’ or ‘soft’ power to a

‘hard’ power but because of specific national interests this shift has not become visible.

From the first, CSDP was characterised by marked disagreements amongst its creators as

to its ultimate nature and purpose. What becomes clear from these analyses is that the British and

German governments, in opposition to the French, understand CSDP as one institutional option

among many, and saw it as playing a supporting role to NATO. In creating a Common Security

31

and Defence Policy-identity it is necessary for the ‘Big Three’ to come to an agreement as to the

correct usage of the CSDP.

The divergent normative approaches towards this, still relatively young, EU instrument

play a damaging role in its development and usage. The analysis demonstrates that each member

of the ‘Big Three’ has tried to advance its version of normatively appropriate behaviour in the

field of International Relations. The conflicting IR theories and the ‘Big Three’s’ preferred

version of the CSDP signal a high degree of practical sophistication of the CSDP and are

difficult to combine. For the French, the CSDP was seen as balancing American power in a

unipolar world. For the British, restoring the status-quo legitimised their involvement in the

CSDP. Lastly, for the Germans, developing a sense of shared values, norms and beliefs through

the EU’s ‘civilian power’ was their motive for participation. France and the UK clearly identify

the option to use military force unilaterally, thereby denouncing Germany’s wishes to see a

CSDP Union under full parliamentary. But despite these differences the ‘Big Three’ supported

every CSDP mission that has been deployed since 2003. However, considering that these were

all relatively small in size it is difficult to make a comparison between hard military operations in

which the EU is yet to be involved in. The next chapters will provide this study with a

comparative analysis of two military operations.

From the analyses made above, clear differences can be observed between the ‘Big

Three’, the most important ones are the focus that Germany and the UK put on its crisis

management approach in comparison to the ‘hard’ security approach that France prefers and the

fact that France and Germany consider the completion and usage of CSDP as an end instead of a

means to serve national interests. In short, they disagree on the key functional role of the CSDP:

the UK believes it should act as a support arm for NATO, the Germans believe that it should

solely act as a peacekeeping/humanitarian force and the French view it as being an independent

force (M. Smith 2004, p. 258). The main point of agreement, however, is that they all have

shown to place more value to NATO in providing security than to the CSDP as the analyses so

clearly have shown. Although the US has always hoped that the EU would become a more

relevant actor in international politics it never really desired an autonomous defence capability

that would potentially represent a serious competitor to NATO (Peterson 1998, p. 11). It has

even been argued that the failure to develop a common strategy for the CSDP is linked to the

continuing dependence on the US (Kempin & Mawdsley 2013, pp. 55-56).

32

In the next chapter a closer look shall be given to Operation Concordia which has had a

positive effect on the EU’s capability of becoming a security actor. By analysing the type of

arguments the ‘Big Three’ upheld prior and during this operation, it can be shown that a certain

degree of continuity among their viewpoints towards the correct usage of the CSDP can be

observed.

33

4 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the CSDP

In 2003 the EU conducted a small military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia (FYROM) to coordinate international efforts in support of the correct implementation

of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. For many, Operation Concordia was labelled a success

since, for the first time in EU defence history, a military operation was conducted. It is the aim of

this chapter to analyse the type of reasoning the ‘Big Three’ upheld in giving their support to the

operation. Furthermore, it will try to answer the question why the EU was capable of approving

this relatively small-scale military operation? The answer to this question is important because it

can be compared to the EU’s absence in Libya. What are the preconditions that need to be in

place in order for the ‘Big Three’ to conduct a military operation? First, however, a brief

overview of the operation will be given as it represented a decisive shift in the balance of power

between the US and the EU and it laid the groundwork for the EU’s growing profile as a military

security actor.

4.1 Operation Concordia

As a direct outflow of the Kosovo War, civil unrest started to grow in FYROM due to ethnic

tensions between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority in which the latter group

aimed to gain more autonomy. In the late 1990s the Albanian minority was concerned about their

lack of representation in state institutions and feared that discrimination was rooted in the

Macedonian state (Mace 2004, p. 475). The Macedonian majority, however, feared that due to

these grievances, Albanian separatism could split the country in two and therefore viewed their

demands with suspicion (Ibid.).

In January 2001 the ethnic tensions came to the surface when members of the National

Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Albanian minority, attacked Macedonian police and

army units, which, eventually, led to a civil war that lasted until Augustus 2001 leaving many

dead. The international community was aware of the serious ramifications the Macedonian

conflict could have for the Balkan region. The EU and NATO, therefore, actively sought out to

mitigate the possible destabilising consequences the civil war could have which resulted in the

Ohrid Framework Agreement (Papavizas 2012, p. 56). This agreement called for the immediate

“cessation of hostilities”, the “development of a decentralized government” and securing “non-

discrimination and equitable representation” of the Albanian minority in FYROM’s state

34

institutions (Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001). The EU was appointed to facilitate, monitor

and assist in the implementation of this agreement. However, since the agreement appointed

NATO as the organisation tasked with overseeing the disarmament process, the EU could do

nothing more but focus on the civilian crisis management aspects of the agreement. It was not

until the completion of the Berlin Plus agreement, which allowed the EU to use NATO structures

and assets, that the EU was capable of providing military assistance under the Petersberg tasks.

Due to prolonged Greek-Turkish negotiations regarding the EU’s use of NATO assets and

structures Operation Concordia could not be launched at an earlier stage (McNamara 2007, p. 2).

The Berlin Plus agreement was considered essential in handing over supervision of the

Ohrid agreement in a time when France and the UK stood opposite from one another concerning

the correct usage of the CSDP and its future development. It was agreed that NATO’s assets and

capabilities had to be used as it helped maintain the transatlantic consensus on the development

of a European defence capability (Mace 2004, pp. 481-482).

On 31 March 2003, under Council Decision 7537/03, Operation Concordia was launched

and lasted until 15 December 2003 to make room for EUPOL Proxima, a police mission charged

with overseeing the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Concordia’s

predecessor, NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony, proved to be of great value to the EU’s troops

stationed in FYROM as it provided legitimacy to the EU’s presence with the Macedonian public

(Ibid., p. 481).

The effectiveness of Operation Concordia can be depicted as successful as it a) was the

first autonomous mission under the then ESDP, b) put EU troops (approximately 400) on foreign

soil and c) maintained peace in the operation’s duration (D.R. Smith 2011, p. 45). Above all, this

operation has proven to be a symbolic victory for the EU since its Member States were able, for

the first time in EU history, to agree on deploying a military mission, thereby making use of the

much contested Berlin Plus agreement. Furthermore, it demonstrated that it was able to conduct

small-scale military crisis management operations both with and without recourse to NATO

assets and showed that the EU had a longer-term view on crisis management and conflict

prevention. Concordia was therefore seen as the EU’s first step in developing a comprehensive

crisis management approach (Pentland 2011, p. 558).

35

4.2 France and Operation Concordia

As mentioned earlier in this thesis, during the late 1990s and early 2000s France hoped to, on the

one hand, counterbalance German pacifism and its economic and political power, but on the

other hand develop a strong European defence capability that was able to oppose US

unilateralism by using a more ‘comprehensive approach’. The changes in the European security

landscape had dramatic consequences for the EU and its lack of coherence and ability to

intervene in the Yugoslav Wars led France to take the lead in developing a European security

narrative (Giegerich 2007, p. 48). The then Minister of Defence, Alliot-Marie, stated that “[...]

The development of the ESDP is the only real chance for the US to see Europeans accepting at

last their full share of responsibilities and increasing their capabilities” (Alliot-Marie, as cited in

Gärtner 2002, p. 66). French consent to the deployment of a military operation in FYROM was

therefore born out of an awareness of waning US devotion to European security.

The necessity to construct a suitable mechanism under which a coherent and common

foreign policy could be carried out eventually led to the signing of the Berlin Plus agreement

which was severely delayed due to Turkish and Greek bickering. French views towards the

Berlin Plus agreement were two-fold: on the one hand it believed that it blocked the development

of a truly autonomous European defence policy since the agreement de facto meant that US

involvement was a given (Cornish 2004, p. 74). On the other hand, through Berlin Plus,

European security policy could begin to acquire substance thereby giving it potential autonomy

from the US (Ibid.). Because of the small size of Operation Allied Harmony France argued that

the finalisation of the Berlin Plus agreement should not hinder the deployment of Operation

Concordia, Germany and the UK believed otherwise (Menon 2004, p. 636).

For the French, supporting Operation Concordia was closely tied to the EU’s wider

strategy of the Stabilisation and Association Process which offered FYROM membership

perspectives into the Euroatlantic structures (Aybet 2004, p. 7; Gross 2007, p. 109). For both the

EU and NATO, their support for the Balkan region was to prevent instability spilling over that

could have had serious ramifications for the region (Ibid.).

The divide over the Iraq War, which had split Europe in two camps, also played a

significant role in French approval of the operation as they deemed it necessary to show their

international counterparts, more in particular the US, that the EU could reach coherence and

36

agreement externally over its security and defence policy in a time when France, together with

Germany, stood opposite from the UK (Haftendorn 2007, p. 171).

4.3 Germany and Operation Concordia

In the 2002 Bundeswehr outlook paper it is stated that Germany’s military commitment in

international peacekeeping missions remains on the Balkans (German Defence Policy Guidelines

2003, p. 7). The Yugoslav Wars have made Germany realise that it is necessary for them to

contribute to the multilateral frameworks it is a member of, and, above all, that the EU should be

able to act quickly and effectively across the entire spectrum of its crisis management tools

(Bickerton 2011, p. 45; Meiers 2005, p. 154). According to the 2003 Defence Policy Guidelines,

the new security environment should lead to the “[...] progressing development and

strengthening of the Euroatlantic security structures” (German Defence Policy Guidelines 2003,

p. 7). Furthermore, as was the case in the 1990s, Germany still regarded US contribution to

European security as ‘indispensable’ and believed that CSDP should supplement NATO to form

a European pillar within the Alliance (Ibid., p. 8).

Germany’s opposition to the Iraq War has, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, led them to

not just give up its traditional middle ground in transatlantic and European affairs but it had also

given up its role as ‘balancer’ within the EU. It was during this time that Germany started to

develop and support the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ towards crisis management, as was

expressed through its support for, among others, Operation Concordia. Furthermore, the EU-

NATO tensions, a direct result of the changed American security discourse after 9/11, have

strengthened German belief in multilateralism as cooperation in multilateral institutions

remained the main pillar of German foreign policy (Haftendorn & Kolkmann 2004, p. 467). For

the Germans, Operation Concordia was the perfect example of their perception of this new form

of multilateralism as several preconditions were in place: a NATO mandate served as legal basis

for the operation; the request to deploy troops came from FYROM itself; NATO’s assets and

instruments through Berlin Plus were utilised; and the Council unanimously approved the

deployment of EU troops.

Similar to France, by supporting a small military mission, with minimum risks involved

for German troops, it was able to visualise European unity and was therefore highly symbolic in

nature (Gross 2009, p. 133). Above all, prior and during Concordia Berlin wanted to retain the

37

Alliance as a transatlantic framework for action and as an instrument for crisis management

(Haftendorn & Kolkmann 2004, p. 476). It therefore deemed it essential that the Berlin Plus

negotiations were to be completed prior to deployment of Operation Concordia since this could

jeopardise Euroatlantic relations (Menon 2004, p. 636).

4.4 The United Kingdom and Operation Concordia

The UK’s special relationship with the US and NATO has always been an important aspect of

British foreign policy. In the previous chapter it was made clear that, especially after the events

of 9/11, UK support for the US became more distinctive in Europe as was expressed by British

involvement in the Iraq War and the ‘War on Terror’. With regards to the development of a

European ‘hard power’ security component the British Defence White Paper 2003 stated that

“The UK is a strong supporter of developing an EU military capability to complement NATO,

rather than competing with it” (UK Defence White Paper 2003, p. 6). Fully in line with its

European foreign policy, which was adopted during the Cold War era, the UK still recognised

the pre-eminence of NATO in providing collective defence over the ESDP. It was in the early

2000s when Britain stopped building a close relationship with its European counterparts and that

fears about the future of the ESDP started to grow (Menon 2004, p. 640).

As mentioned before, the UK, together with Germany, blocked an earlier deployment of

Concordia since the negotiations of the Berlin Plus agreement were not completed. For the UK,

completion of the agreement was deemed necessary since they feared an earlier deployment

would seriously hamper Euroatlantic relations and there still was the possibility of violent

escalation in FYROM (Ibid., p. 636). If another outbreak of violence would occur, the UK

strongly believed that the EU was not able to address this since the EU was considered to be

under-equipped and ill-trained (Howorth 2004b, p. 179). Also, as mentioned in this chapter’s

introduction, NATO enjoyed a higher level of public legitimacy in FYROM and the EU had yet

to prove itself. Concluding Berlin Plus was therefore born out of “utilitarian considerations rather

than out of a principled transatlantic preference” (Gross 2009, p. 67). Considering that the

outcomes of Berlin Plus were closely tied to British preferences of the ESDP, since it remained

bound to NATO, the UK therefore chose to support Concordia, thereby bearing in mind

Europe’s need to be capable of responding to imminent crises (Menon 2004, p. 643).

38

Furthermore, by staying actively involved in the operation, the UK believed it could shape the

ESDP to its own specifications (Watt & Norton-Taylor 2002).

The UK was aware of the fact that if it would not make concessions the EU would not be

capable of buttressing possible crises in its periphery, such as the Yugoslav Wars. The British

were convinced that their support for Concordia would enable the EU to pursue a more effective

and capable foreign and security policy (Gross 2009, p. 67). Most importantly, however, a non-

cooperative posture would marginalise their involvement in European politics, something which

they have experienced throughout the Cold War (Chen 2012, p. 137). British support for

Concordia was a pragmatic acceptance of a strategic reality and for the other European countries

British involvement in the operation was considered reassuring (Howorth 2004b, pp. 187-188).

4.5 Conclusion

Operation Concordia was the first EU military operation since the construction of the ESDP in

the 1990s and was considered to be a success as it showed that the EU was, despite the

pessimistic nature of some countries, capable of conducting a military operation in a time when

Europe was divided due to the Iraq War (Gross 2009, pp. 91-92). The fact that the first European

military operation took place in the Balkan region should hardly come as a surprise. A sense of

moral guilt and bad conscience over the EU’s lack to intervene during the Yugoslav Wars played

an important role in approving the operation (Pohl 2012, p. 12). The small size of the operation

and the absence of any serious threats in FYROM to the EU’s troops was another key aspect that

led to the ‘Big Three’s’ decision to approve Operation Concordia, an operation in which France

served as framework nation as they provided the bulk of the troops (Gross 2009, pp. 99-133;

Menon 2004, p. 641).

In the previous chapter a closer look was given to the development of the CSDP from a

French, German and British perspective. When comparing these viewpoints with the viewpoints

expressed prior and during Operation Concordia, it can be observed that all three Member States

have shown a pattern of continuation in their views towards the correct usage of the CSDP. Fully

in line with its policy of counterbalancing US unilateralism in the early 2000s, the method of

process tracing shows that France has adopted norms and policies shaped by the geo-political

events of the Balkan Wars, the Iraq War and US retreat from Europe. These events, the so-called

independent variables, resulted in France’s support for Concordia, the dependent variable. A

39

truly autonomous ESDP in the early 2000s was never a real option since France soon realised

that, as the previous chapter has shown, it needed the Atlantic connection to guarantee stability

and American involvement in European security affairs. Most importantly, Germany and the UK

did not share French views on the development of CSDP.

Similar to France, Germany adopted norms and policies that were a direct result of the

Yugoslav Wars and US unilateralist behaviour in the early 2000s. These events have

strengthened German belief in multilateralism which, on its turn, was a direct result of

Germany’s Westpolitik born in the Cold War period. Additionally, the Yugoslav Wars have

enabled the Germans to reconsider their pacifistic nature and has allowed them to discuss the

acceptability of deploying troops abroad which was also in congruence with its goal to a) assume

more responsibility on the international scene, b) to become a more credible and influential

player and c) to prevent France and the UK from dominating the ESDP (Giegerich & Wallace

2004, p. 166; Gross 2009, pp. 123-128). The Iraq War convinced Germany about the necessity of

creating a European military capability, albeit with a strong focus on civilian crisis management

(Menon 2004, p. 645). Although Germany did not approve of US unilateralist behaviour, it did

welcome the involvement of NATO in Concordia as this guaranteed continued US participation

in the Balkans, a region in which the US is considered to be an important political player (Gross

2009, pp. 130-131).

In the case of Operation Concordia the method of process tracing makes it clear that

several independent variables were in play that led the UK to support the operation. Not only did

the Yugoslav Wars contributed greatly to British consent but also the lack of actual risks present

for British troops, the small size of the operation and the fear of being marginalised in European

affairs. Furthermore, the political symbolism of the operation, in a time when the ‘Big Three’

were divided about the Iraq War, paid testimony to British political determination to contribute

to the ESDP. British involvement in concluding the Ohrid Framework Agreement and its support

for Concordia, therefore, ran counter to arguments made in the past that the UK would avoid

committing itself to European military cooperation (Gross 2009, p. 67). British motives for

involvement in FYROM were best expressed by Blair who stated that: “[…] once the EU-NATO

links are in place, I am keen to see an ESDP operation in Macedonia, to show that Europe can

play its part in bringing security and stability to this part of the continent” (Blair, as cited in

Gross 2009, p. 70).

40

By the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, the ‘Big Three’s’ views regarding the ESDP

had sufficiently converged to not just allow the deployment of the EU’s first military operation

but to also create a common strategy towards the economic development of the Balkan region

(Ibid., p. 104). Apart from the ‘Big Three’s’ individual arguments, several preconditions can be

observed that are depicted essential in order for any EU military operation to be approved: a)

when the consent of (local) influential actors is secured; b) when a conflict can be identified as

an opportunity rather than a challenge since France, Germany and the UK both believed that

strengthening the CSDP militarily was necessary in order to address any possible future crises

occurring near Europe’s periphery; and c) when resources are aligned in terms of command and

control arrangements as the completion and usage of the Berlin Plus agreement was testimony of

(Engberg 2013, pp. 155-156). The development of the ESDP was both the price to be paid for

continued US engagement and hence the viability of future NATO relevance, as well as the

insurance policy for limited military action in case the US proved to be reluctant (Giegerich

2007, p. 45).

In the next chapter attention shall be given to the Libyan crisis. This study shows that

although there are several differences noticeable between the two case studies which affect

Member States’ decision to approve or disapprove the missions, various similarities can be

observed. The results obtained from the cases are time-specific and the conditions prevalent are

not likely to be reproduced in their entirety. Several prerequisites for military intervention were

not in play in Libya but were present in the ‘Big Three’s’ decision to approve a military mission

in FYROM. It is therefore important to underline these differences and similarities in order to

bring forward the preconditions that need to be in place for the ‘Big Three’s’ approval of a

CSDP military operation.

41

5 The Libyan crisis and the CSDP The aim of this chapter is to firstly give a brief overview of the events that took place during the

Libyan crisis in which a coalition of the willing took the lead in aerial bombardments aimed at

ousting Libya’s leader, Colonel Muammar Gadhafi, who had brutally struck down civilian

uprisings in the North African state. A closer look shall be given to the type of reasoning the

‘Big Three’ upheld during this crisis. This chapter will try to show that different domestic and

foreign policy considerations have played a decisive role in the failure of the EU’s handling of

the Libyan crisis.

5.1 The Libyan crisis

The Libyan crisis started on February 17 2011 with massive protests in Benghazi. The uprising

was soon followed by United Nations (UN) Resolution 1970 which froze assets, banned travel of

Libyan high-placed officials and put into place an arms embargo. Despite these measures the

humanitarian situation worsened which raised the question about a possible military intervention.

On March 17 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 which implemented a no-fly

zone over Libya thereby “taking all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack

in the country, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on

any part of Libyan territory” (UN Security Council, 17 March 2011). A few days later French

airstrikes destroyed a Gadhafi regime column about to storm the eastern city of Benghazi and

attacks on Libyan air defences followed quickly. On March 24 the military command that was in

the hands of the coalition of the willing, spearheaded by the United Kingdom, France and the

United States, was handed over to NATO since the US made it clear that they would not take the

leading role in the operation (Simón 2012, pp. 112-13).

The EU decided to go further than Resolution 1970 by sanctioning dozens of persons and

financial entities affiliated with the Gadhafi regime and it was one of the first to recognize the

Transitional National Council (TNC) as the ‘political interlocutor’ of Libya (Council Decision

2011/137/CFSP). At the extraordinary European Council session, France and the UK tried to

convince the other Member States to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya but since no agreement

could be reached the CSDP could not be used other than providing humanitarian assistance to the

Libyan people. On April 1 the Council adopted a decision on EUFOR Libya, a military operation

to support humanitarian assistance operations in Libya. However, this mission would only be

42

deployed if the UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs would request so; to date this

request has not been made.

The EU’s handling of the Libyan crisis has been depicted as “too slow, too weak, too

divided and essentially incoherent” (Koening 2011, pp. 12-13). The efforts made by the UK and

France to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya by using the CSDP’s tools did not succeed and once

again NATO did the heavy lifting by taking over the command of the operation. Although

several EU Member States contributed to the NATO-led operation, the CSDP was never

considered a viable option to intervene militarily (Menon 2011, p. 75). The belated decision to

approve EUFOR Libya can be judged as an act of symbolism or face saving rather than effective

intervention (Ibid., p. 22; Menon 2011, p. 75). Although all EU Member States agreed that

Gadhafi had to step down they differed in the way how to best achieve this. The adoption of

Resolution 1973 is a perfect example of this since Germany abstained from voting, evoking

memories of the divide during the Iraq War. The following paragraphs will analyse the role and

motivations of the ‘Big Three’ in their choice to either support or disapprove of any CSDP

involvement in Libya.

5.2 France and the Libyan crisis

According to the 2008 French Defence White Paper, the northern African region is perceived as

a “main strategic axis of special importance for historic reasons, the presence of North African

communities, language, learning, energy and economic co-operation” (French Defence White

Paper 2008, p. 45). Furthermore, it calls for the “EU to play a greater role in defence and

security” (Ibid., p. 104) and it sees itself as the driving force behind major European initiatives in

all areas of security and defence. Above all, it believes that Franco-German co-operation is the

best tool to achieve this (Ibid., pp. 75-82). What becomes clear from the White Paper is that

France is still highly supportive of an independent European security identity able to intervene

militarily in its neighbourhood. The question now rises: why was the EU unable to live up to

these French expectations? And what role did France play during the crisis?

To answer the second question one has to take into account the specific (national)

interests and motives that were in play before, during and after the Libyan crisis. The French

response to the Arab Spring has not been easy to follow. In Tunisia, where the Ben Ali-regime

was backed by French ‘policing expertise’ during the civil uprisings, France failed to act in

43

coherence with other Western states. With Egypt, France took the form of a wait-and-see

approach (Henry 2011, pp. 411-412). Having learned from these lessons, Sarkozy decided to

compensate these inadequacies during the Libyan crisis by taking on the lead role and he did so

by being the first one to unilaterally recognise the TNC as Libya’s only legitimate government, a

move unappreciated by many Member States, and the first one to use military force against

Gadhafi’s troops (Ibid., p. 412; Erlanger 2011; International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011,

p. 3). He stated that “[…] the continuing brutal and bloody repression against the Libyan civilian

population is revolting [...] the international community cannot remain a spectator to these

massive violations of human rights” (Watt & Wintour 2011).

By actively taking on a leading role he hoped to save France’s bad image in the Arab

world, prove that France still matters on the global stage, save his re-election in 2012 and defend

global human rights (Chrisafis 2011). Furthermore, the possibility of state failure would likely

increase the influx of illegal immigrants into Europe (Goldhammer 2011). But perhaps most

importantly, at a time when Washington is stepping back from its Cold War commitment to

European security, Europe has to assume responsibility for its neighbourhood. During the Libya

crisis, US Secretary of Defence Gates lamented the European allies for “shortages of spending

and political will” and a possible “irrelevance for the Alliance” (Shanker & Erlanger 2011). As

was made clear in an earlier section in this thesis, France was highly dependent on American

security guarantees. Therefore, by taking the lead role, France, together with the UK, wanted to

show the US that Europe was in fact capable of conducting military operations.

Prior to the crisis, France’s economic relationship with Libya was rather modest although

Sarkozy announced the endorsement of contracts worth €10 billion (Zoubir 2009, pp. 412-413).

This improved relationship developed in the early 2000s when French economic rapprochement

to Libya was based on the fear that American hegemony in the Middle-Eastern and North

African markets represented a genuine threat to French interests in Libya (Ibid., p. 412). The

endorsements and rapprochement, however, did not stop Sarkozy from taking the lead role. After

the crisis it was reported that the TNC had signed an agreement with France in which the former

gave Paris the right to exploit 35% of Libya’s oil resources in return for French support, claims

which both parties immediately denied (Rousseau 2011).

On a European level, by taking the lead in the Libyan crisis, France hoped to reassert to

the EU, notably Germany, that it was still leading the continent on foreign and military affairs

44

(Stratfor 2011). Still cautious about Germany’s increasing economic and political power, by

joining forces with the UK France hoped to counterbalance this German EU dominance. By

unilaterally recognising the TNC, which goes against the EU’s principle of not recognising

governments but states and which prevented the EU from developing a common strategy towards

the TNC, Sarkozy aimed to make France’s role in the conflict a leading one despite objections

from several Member States (Europa-Kolleg Hamburg 2011, p. 51; Koening 2011, p. 21). The

bilateral defence agreement that France and the UK had signed in 2010 was for the former the

perfect tool to engage itself in a joint operational and political leadership during the Libya crisis

(International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 3). In their joint letter they called on their

“European partners, our Allies, and our Arab and African friends to [...] provide support for all

possible contingencies [...] This could include a no-fly zone or other options.” (Sarkozy &

Cameron 2011). This, combined with France’s return to NATO’s military structure, would

strengthen the CSDP and not weaken it (Simón 2013, p. 22).

Since it became clear that several EU Member States did not support a military

intervention under the CSDP, an EU military operation was not an option. Aware of this, France

and the UK drafted a UN Resolution which called for the implementation of a no-fly zone which

was adopted by the UNSC on March 17. The handing over of operation-command to NATO was

a move not welcomed by France as they preferred an Anglo-French command since, according

to French foreign minister Juppé: “[...] the Arab League does not wish the operation to be

entirely placed under NATO responsibility” (Erlanger 2011). Furthermore, by working closely

together with the UK under the bilateral defence agreements and other countries in a ‘coalition of

the willing’, France hoped to diminish the role of NATO in favour of a European defence

capability (Watt et al., 2011). However, the entire operation was quickly handed over to the

Alliance which, surprisingly, Sarkozy portrayed as a Franco-American success. Sarkozy stated

that “[...] the two presidents have come to an agreement on the way to use the command

structures of NATO to support the coalition” (Ibid.). France, however, did manage to keep the

political oversight of the operation with the members of the coalition. The military command, on

the other hand, was transferred to the Alliance.

Once more, France has proven to be too dependent on American assets since the latter

one was the only actor capable of compensating European military deficiencies even though the

US took a back-stance in the conflict by withdrawing forces from direct combat already on April

45

4 (Barry 2011, p. 5; De Young & Jaffe 2011). But for France, bilateral and trilateral co-operation

offer great flexibility as the EU has proven to be incapable of providing hard security guarantees

in its neighbourhood. Not surprisingly, it is easier to convince only a small amount of countries

than 26 countries.

For France, the Libyan crisis was used to develop a strong and autonomous European

defence capability without having to recourse to NATO. According to Sarkozy: “[...] The war in

Libya is a lesson for EU foreign policy [...]. Europeans have shown for the first time that they are

capable of intervention in a decisive way, with their allies, in an open conflict on their doorstep.”

He went on saying that “[...] the world is changing. President Obama has presented a new vision

of American military engagement which involves the Europeans assuming their responsibilities”

(Rettman 2011). He may be right on the latter part of his speech but certainly not on the former

since only a limited amount of Member States contributed to Operation Unified Protector and a

military operation under CSDP was never an option. It was a French diplomat who said: “CFSP

died in Libya- we just have to pick a sand dune under which we can bury it” (Menon 2011, p.

76).

5.3 Germany and the Libya crisis

As mentioned before, Germany was the only country of the ‘Big Three’ to abstain from voting

on UNSC 1973. Although Foreign Minister Westerwelle stated that “He (Gadhafi) has to go”, he

excluded the use of “outside intervention or foreign troops” (Westerwelle 2011). Furthermore, he

said that “every military operation claims civilian victims” (Ibid.). He was supported by

Chancellor Merkel who said: “I see no need for military intervention” (Mock & Morris 2011).

German reluctance to support this Resolution was, to some, borne out of its strategic

culture of reservation and rejection of military deployments (Göler 2011, p. 9). It has even been

argued that Germany has lacked a strategic culture ever since its re-unification (Speck 2011, p.

4). What becomes clear is that the reluctance of policy-makers to develop a military strategy

correlates with German public opinion that has shown to oppose military intervention ever since

the end of World War II. A survey had shown that 61% of the population supported Germany’s

abstention. Electoral considerations could have played a role in Germany’s decision to abstain.

However, this abstention did not do Merkel much success in the regional elections in which her

party suffered a defeat (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 2; Louati 2011).

46

When looking to geo-political interests, Germany does not appear to have any specific

interests in North Africa. Germany’s African policy is aimed to develop its economy and

military capabilities (German Africa Policy 2009). In its Defence White Paper of 2006 it does list

possible military deployment scenarios but no clear priorities have been named (Göler 2011, p.

4). The same applies for its geographical prioritisation which is labelled as “global” (German

Defence White Paper 2006, p. 33). Furthermore, it says that “[...] now and in the future, the

fundamental issues of European security can be only addressed together with the USA.” (Ibid., p.

21). Since Germany was the country calling for the imposition of economic sanctions, it is highly

unlikely that economic relations with Libya were reasons to oppose military intervention,

although Germany was Libya’s second-largest trading partner prior to the crisis (Miskimmon

2012, p. 402; Zoubir 2009, p. 406). To this date it is too early to determine what possible

commercial advantages for Germany or German companies there are in post-war Libya although

early reports find that German businesses are unwelcome in Libya (Buse & Würger 2012).

During the crisis Germany deviated from its cooperative behaviour in multilateral

institutions by abstaining on Resolution 1973 as electoral considerations and the pressures from

the Eurozone have overwhelmed German foreign policy (Miskimmon 2012, pp. 404-405). By

abstaining it “privileged short-term calculations over traditional multilateral commitments”

(Ibid., p. 405). Furthermore, non-compliance with the Libyan common position did not elicit

any sanctions for Germany concerning its international relations (Wagner 2003, p. 585).

It was made clear by Germany that a military operation under the CSDP was not an

option. Its refusal to do so has made it clear that its focus still lies on civilian crisis management,

made visible by its support for EUFOR Libya, and it was a clear sign to France and the UK that

Germany will continue to assess each military operation on its own terms: It shall not mimic

French and British policy (Ibid., p. 393). Its abstention has damaged Germany’s cooperative

image since it becomes more difficult to conduct large-scale military operations with a Member

State who is reluctant on the use of force. Moreover, the much applauded French-German axis,

which has proven to be successful in tackling the Euro-crisis, has been severely damaged by

Germany’s abstention (Weiland & Nells 2011). It has even been said that “Germany turned the

idea of a unified European foreign policy into a farce” (Erlanger & Dempsey 2011).

German handling of the crisis was a clear sign to all their European partners that it would

not participate in a military operation. German concerns were not to be found in the ends but in

47

the means of how to deal with the situation. Its increasing economic role did not lead Germany to

exert its will on EU foreign security policy and, although Germany is supportive of an effective

CSDP, the best way to address security and defence situations appeared to be through civilian

methods, a concept strengthened by the EU’s successful civilian missions and Berlin’s

preference of NATO providing hard security over the CSDP.

5.4 The United Kingdom and the Libyan crisis

During the outburst of the conflict in Libya, Prime Minister Cameron, at first, held out the

prospect of imposing sanctions instead of a military intervention. In an interview Cameron stated

that “[...] sanctions are always an option for the future if what we are seeing in Libya continues.

Of course, if Libya continues down this path, there will be a very strong argument [for

sanctions]” (Watt & Wintour 2011). When asked about the prospect of military action he stated:

“I do not think we are at that stage yet” (Ibid.). At the emergency EU summit Cameron and

Sarkozy tried to persuade their European partners to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya. Since it

became clear that Germany, amongst others, opposed a no-fly zone, Cameron quickly stated that:

“[...] the EU is not a military alliance and I don’t want it to be a military alliance. Our alliance is

NATO” (Watt et al., 2011). During the summit Cameron had made it clear that continued

planning with NATO allies should be supported to enforce a no-fly zone (Waterfield 2011).

Eventually the UK managed to endorse a no-fly zone over Libya through Resolution 1973 and

on March 24 command of the operation was handed over to NATO. For the UK, the EU would

only be utilised to impose political and economic sanctions on Libya (Chen 2012, p. 208).

Aware of the US’ pivot to the Pacific and their reluctance to take on a leading role in the

operation, the UK sought out to, as a major European military power, take the lead in the crisis

as it was the first country to call for the imposition of a no-fly zone (BBC News 2011;

International Institute for Strategic Studies 2011, p. 3). Unlike the French, who favoured a

Franco-British command structure, the UK remained an ‘Atlanticist’ in nature. This attitude

presents no surprise since the UK has unconditionally stayed on the side of the US throughout

the years. The UK’s special relationship with the US and NATO is at the centre of Britain’s

foreign policy as becomes clear when examining the British Defence White Paper. With regards

to the role of the CSDP it says that “The UK is a strong supporter of developing EU military

capability to complement NATO, rather than competing with it” (UK Defence White Paper

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2003, p. 6). Furthermore, it says that “The UK recognises the pre-eminence of NATO as the

Alliance upon which Europe and North America depend for collective defence and global crisis

management” (Ibid.) In a House of Commons debate, prior to the military intervention, Cameron

went even further by saying that “[...] the EU is not a military alliance and there is always

hesitation about discussing military options” (Cameron 2011). This statement means that after

more than twenty years the UK still did not see the EU able to play a military role. Consequently,

similar to what the UK experienced during the Kosovo crisis, it still depended on NATO to carry

out military operations. The bilateral defence agreement signed with France was for the UK a

genuine choice that opted for bilateral cooperation instead of European cooperation with a

partner that could be relied upon, as the Libyan crisis eventually has made clear (Biscop 2012, p.

1306). Additionally, by excluding Germany in this agreement, France and the UK wanted to

profile Franco-British defence dominance in a European context (Miskimmon 2012, p. 401).

Several motives were in play for British involvement in the Libyan military operation.

Firstly, a weak state on Europe’s border would pose an imminent security threat to Europe and

other countries surrounding Libya as the UK feared a spill-over effect. Secondly, they viewed

this crisis as an opportunity to complete political reform in the Arab world. Foreign Secretary

Hague has even stated that “the gain for the British security and prosperity will be enormous”

(Hague 2011). Finally, by taking the lead in the conflict, the UK, together with France, wanted to

demonstrate their political will and military capability to NATO and the US by solving this crisis

(Chen 2012, p. 210). Just as France, the UK did not seem to have any clear specific economic

interests in Libya as it was the first country to publicly call for the implementation of a no-fly

zone. Prior to the crisis, rumours were in circulation about possible secret oil deals the British

government had struck with Libya in exchange for the release of the Lockerbie bomber

(Macalister 2009). However, as was the case for Germany and France, it is too early to analyse

what the economic advantages for the UK were by co-leading the military operation, although,

soon after the conflict ended Britain sent trade officials to Libya to ensure lucrative oil contracts

(Kirkup & Waterfield 2011).

5.5 Conclusion

The Arab Spring was the first test for the CFSP under the changes introduced by the LT but it

has failed to create a common understanding on the correct use of the CSDP by the ‘Big Three’.

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Although it is said that the Arab Spring came unexpected for many Western countries the EU

was fully aware of the atrocities committed by Gadhafi, even prior to the Arab Spring. It has

been argued that Libya’s international rehabilitation in the 2000s, after being accused of

supporting terrorism, manufacturing nuclear weapons and cruel domestic authoritarianism, was

facilitated by trade, security and energy contributions that have served Europe well (Zoubir

2009, p. 414). Libya has proven to be Europe’s ‘perfect storm’, thereby revealing all of Europe’s

weaknesses. The EU was unable to conduct an autonomous military operation under the CSDP

as some Member States publicly opposed military intervention. Divisions among the ‘Big Three’

on how to act in Libya have caused that no serious military proposal was put on the table.

When applying the method of process tracing to the UK’s decision to support a military

intervention in Libya, several independent variables can be observed. Firstly, the UK was aware

of the fact that the US was bent on stepping back from its Cold War commitment to European

security and it hoped to gain support from several EU Member States in order to conduct a

military intervention. It therefore saw the Libyan crisis as an opportunity to take the lead in an

international conflict on Europe’s doorstep. Secondly, Cameron hoped to counterbalance

German economic and political dominance by taking the lead in Europe’s foreign and security

affairs. Thirdly, the gross violation of human rights and the possible spill-over effects to other

countries in the region left Cameron no other choice than to intervene militarily. Finally, the

British ‘Atlanticist’ nature, which has been in existence ever since WWII automatically, seems to

give preference to NATO over the CSDP. The Libyan crisis has made it clear that the UK still

sees NATO as the only actor capable of leading the operation as, according to the UK, the CSDP

should complement rather than compete with NATO. British perception of the CSDP has shown

a pattern of continuation throughout the years and Libya has not done much to change this.

Sarkozy has portrayed the Libyan intervention as a European success because of the fact

that several Member States joined the ‘coalition of the willing’. French involvement in Libya can

be attributed to several independent variables. Firstly, by taking on the lead role France hoped to

counterbalance the German economically and politically dominated EU by showing that France,

similar to the UK, is fully in charge with regards to Europe’s foreign and security affairs.

Secondly, France hoped to diminish NATO’s role as the only actor capable of providing security

and to push for an autonomous EU military operation. Thirdly, French handling of the Arab

Spring had received much criticism domestically and by intervening Sarkozy hoped to repair

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France’s bad image in the Arab world, prove that France still matters on the global stage, save

his re-election in 2012 and defend global human rights. The crisis has reinforced the claim for

both France and the UK that further military cooperation between the two is essential to address

imminent security threats near its periphery (Barry 2011, p. 10). Therefore, although France still

favours a European military capability and it actively pushed for a common EU approach

towards Libya, the crisis has reconfirmed the fact that the EU cannot come to an agreement on

the use of force in times of international upheaval. During the run-up to the crisis French

viewpoints towards the CSDP have been consistent with the same pattern of behaviour it has

expressed throughout the years but it failed reaching its goal. In the end Europe was too

dependent on American assets to truly function autonomously.

The German role during the crisis has been a remarkable one but can be best explained by

analysing the independent variables that were in play. Firstly, its pacifistic nature played a key

role in its decision as it preferred the EU’s civilian crisis management tools as the best way to

address the crisis. Its cooperative image in multilateral fora has always characterised German

international behaviour but the Libya crisis has slightly damaged this reputation. Secondly, its

economic and political weight has created a new political conscience in which it shall no longer

mirror French and British policy. Its growing self-confidence in foreign policy means that it will

only commit itself to international operations if they are in its direct national interest

(Miskimmon 2012, p. 393). Thirdly, since WWII Germany has been very reluctant on the use of

force. During the post-Cold War period but especially during the post- 9/11 period, Germany has

put more focus on the ‘soft power’ narrative of the EU. Its non-cooperative image during the

Libya crisis and its refusal to contribute militarily can therefore be seen as a continuation of its

policy towards the CSDP: an autonomous EU military capability which should solely focus on

civilian crisis management.

The Libya crisis showed that the EU was unable to conduct a large-scale military

operation without the support of all members of the ‘Big Three’ which can be attributed to their

conflicting approach to European security and defence integration. Instead of creating a common

European approach, several Member States have chosen to join forces, thereby creating a divide

within the EU as some Member States were unable or unwilling to contribute to the operation.

An important aspect that has contributed to this unwillingness were the austerity measures

resulting from the current financial and budgetary crunch (Simón 2012, p. 111). Not surprisingly,

51

it will become more difficult for a fully operational CSDP when Member States are reluctant to

contribute financially to it. Libya has shown that the cracks in relations between the ‘Big Three’

become more visible in a moment of crisis when rapid deployment of armed forces is needed

(Miskimmon 2012, p. 398). Furthermore, those who are motivated to contribute to the success of

the CSDP are neutralised by those who oppose its strengthening (Perruche 2011, p. 1). The crisis

did show, however, that several EU Member States are capable of conducting a military

operation by joining forces, albeit said that without US support enforcing the no-fly zone would

have posed serious problems.

When comparing the Libya crisis with Operation Concordia several similarities can be

observed: a) both crises occurred on Europe’s doorstep with a high-risk of instability spilling

over to the region; b) the waning American commitment to European security was a given in

both crises; c) NATO played a supportive role in both operations; and d) both crises offered the

EU the possibility to profile itself as a ‘hard security’ actor. Despite these similarities no CSDP

operation was ever considered a feasible option. The German reluctance on the use of force and

the British preference of NATO providing ‘hard security’ played a decisive role in their handling

of the crisis.

It is not only important to highlight the similarities between the crises but also the

differences that led to the distinctive decisions in both operations. The circumstances that were

present during the crisis in FYROM and which led to the approval of Operation Concordia were

not present in Libya: a) there was no divide between the Member States of the EU on a major

geo-political event, unlike the divide resulting from the Iraq War in the early 2000s; b) the ‘Big

Three’ were under enormous pressure during the Libya crisis as the atrocities committed by

Gadhafi worsened by the day while it took the EU eighteen months to finally approve Operation

Concordia; c) the absence of any real risks of civilian casualties stands in stark contrast with the

Libya crisis, an argument that justified Germany’s abstention; d) Concordia was a relatively

small military mission; and e) the EU, unlike in FYROM, was unable to take the leading role in

the Libya crisis as it did not possess the military resources required for hard intervention.

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6 Conclusion The development of a Common Security and Defence Policy has been characterised by different

interpretations and visions about the correct usage of this instrument. The Treaty of Lisbon has

tried to give impetus and weight to this field by trying to create a coherent and active EU foreign

policy. The civil war that broke out in Libya was the CSDP’s first test under the changes

introduced by Lisbon. However, the EU could not find agreement on the best way to address this

crisis in its neighbourhood.

This thesis has attempted to shed some light on the EU’s failure to act in Libya by

reconstructing the type of argumentation the members of the ‘Big Three’ upheld during this

crisis. It has done so by using the method of process tracing in two different case studies:

Operation Concordia in FYROM, a relatively small-sized military operation, and the Libya

crisis, a large-scale military operation. Through this method, and by analysing the dominant

theoretical approaches other authors have constructed, a specific International Relations (IR)

theory to each individual member of the ‘Big Three’ was applied. The analysis has shown that

each member of the ‘Big Three’ has tried to advance its version of normatively appropriate

behaviour in the field of International Relations, some more active than others. The conflicting

IR theories that were presented in this thesis signal a high degree of practical sophistication of

the CSDP and provide more insight to the difficulties the CSDP faces.

By having analysed their viewpoints towards the CSDP throughout a time-period of sixty

years, it has become clear that all three members of the ‘Big Three’ have shown consistency with

regards to their views on the correct usage of the CSDP throughout this entire period. But most

importantly, it has shown that these viewpoints differ too greatly to fully exercise the

possibilities that the CSDP has offered them as crucial differences in foreign policy among the

‘Big Three’ have created barriers to what can and cannot be accomplished.

France can be depicted as the biggest advocate for the creation and development of an

autonomous European defence capability. This support was a direct consequence of its swift

defeat in WWII and its following dependency on the US. Restoring its lost grandeur through the

notion of Gaullism has remained intact throughout the years. Their desire to act autonomously on

the international scene from the US and NATO, through the CSDP, is considered to be the main

driving force in their support for the CSDP and was the biggest motive for supporting Concordia

and a military intervention in Libya. By strengthening Europe it was believed that its national

53

interests and its position in the world would be best served. Another important independent

variable that led to continuous support for the CSDP was to counterbalance German political and

economical power in Europe. By focussing too much on the ‘comprehensive approach’ and

neglecting the ‘hard power’ component of the CSDP, the French feared the EU would be unable

to address possible crises with military means. However, France realised that American

involvement in European security matters was vital to address not just the crises in FYROM and

Libya but also the Soviet threat during the Cold War, the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s and the

stabilisation of the Balkan region in the 2000s. The independent variables that helped identify the

intervening causal process with its outcome on the dependent variables were:

a) restoring the lost French sense of grandeur;

b) US dominance in European and global security affairs;

c) the awareness of French dependence on American security guarantees;

d) the US pivot towards the Asia-Pacific region;

e) the Yugoslav Wars;

f) rising German economic and political power in Europe;

g) US unilateralist behaviour and the divide over the Iraq War;

h) counterbalancing the EU’s focus on the CSDP’s ‘soft power’ component.

French investment in the CSDP-project can be framed into a ‘structural realist’ IR theory. From

the analysis, it became clear that France wanted to restrain US dominance and create a division

of labour between the two. Additionally, it used the CSDP to balance German power in the EU.

French involvement in multilateral frameworks, in which their Gaullist ideas, norms and beliefs

were shared, was born out of ‘structural realist’ notion. French support for Operation Concordia

and a military CSDP intervention in Libya was in full harmony with its perception of the CSDP.

Ever since Gaullism became part of the French way of life on the international scene, France has

devoted itself to create an autonomous European security and defence identity with the tools to

act militarily and independently from the US and NATO.

German views towards the security and defence policy of the EU have shown a pattern of

continuation ever since the end of WWII. Maintaining a close relationship with the Western

powers became the leading policy in the Cold War as Germany believed that a strong

relationship and commitment to multilateralism would serve German interests best. This policy,

which became known as Westpolitik, proved to be of great success as its economic development

54

and its re-unification were testimony of. The success of its Westpolitik-policy has strengthened

German belief in multilateralism as cooperation in multilateral institutions remained the main

pillar of German foreign policy throughout the 1990s and 2000s, albeit it with a new discovered

self-awareness. Germany, however, did need to find a balance between, on the one hand, its

growing awareness to contribute to NATO and the CSDP and, on the other hand, German public

hostility towards the use of force. The successful ‘civ/mil’ CSDP operations, combined with US

unilateralist behaviour in the 2000s and the German pacifistic nature, led to a new German

security identity, one in which it was believed that by using the EU’s ‘soft power’ and its

‘comprehensive approach’, crises in its neighbourhood could be best addressed. Part of

maintaining a close relationship with Western powers led to German preference of NATO over

CSDP in providing Europe with security. Just like France it was aware of the necessity of

American involvement in European security affairs. The independent variables that helped shape

German perception of the CSDP and which can be linked to its support for Concordia and its

disapproval of a military intervention in Libya were:

a) its awareness of German and European dependence on American security guarantees;

b) its successful Westpolitik which has led to great economic success and German re-

unification; c) the Yugoslav Wars that highlighted the lack of a European defence and

security capability;

d) the successful CSDP missions in the 2000s that strengthened German belief in the ‘soft

power’ component of the CSDP;

e) US unilateralist behaviour in the early 2000s and the following divide over the Iraq

War;

f) its culture of reservation and rejection of military deployments.

The German perception of the CSDP can be framed in the theory of ‘social constructivism’ since

Germany invested in international security institutions such as NATO and the CSDP, and it

enabled them to gain security by negotiating a shared sense of international order with its allies.

Furthermore, it strongly conformed to Germany’s identity as a ‘civilian power’. Through ‘social

constructivism’ a collective identity within a multilateral world-order was created which

eventually led to security and institutional loyalty expressed through ‘civilian power’ Europe. In

retrospect, its refusal to participate militarily in the Libya crisis should not have come as a

surprise, its abstention in the UNSC, however, did but was a consequence of its new discovered

55

self-awareness in which it shall no longer mirror French and British policy. By abstaining it

privileged short-term calculations over traditional multilateral commitments.

Of the three, the UK can be labelled as the staunchest opponent of the CSDP. During the

Cold War period the UK developed a strong relationship with the US which it shared a similar

foreign policy with. Britain believed that by involving the US in European security affairs it

would stop the US from returning to its ‘isolationist’ status. During this period UK-EU tensions

were exemplified by French veto’s over British admission to the then EEC, as a consequence of

which the UK became marginalised in European affairs. After the Cold War the UK kept

preferring NATO over the creation of a European security and defence capability but it soon

realised that Europe needed to be able to address humanitarian crises in its neighbourhood.

British rapprochement to the EU in the late 1990s and early 2000s was born out of its awareness

of the American pivot away from Europe and to guarantee the survival of NATO since many

believed that with the dissolution of the Soviet Union the Alliance had lost its raison d’être.

After 9/11 Europe became divided once more as Britain opted for closer cooperation with the US

in the ‘War on Terror’. However, the fear of being marginalised once again in Europe and the

highly symbolic nature of Concordia, led the UK to support the CSDP but with close ties to

NATO. By intervening militarily in Libya, not through the CSDP but via NATO, the UK hoped

to regain its former glory as a global player by showing the US that it was capable of handling

crises as the former made it crystal clear that it would take a back-seat in managing the conflict.

In the run-up to the aerial bombardments on Libya Britain actively sought out to find allies in

Europe. This move should not be interpreted as a complete turnaround in support for a military

CSDP but was aimed at convincing their European counterparts to act swiftly and decisively in

the light of the waning American commitment to European security affairs. Throughout a time-

period of sixty years the UK has remained sceptic towards the development of an autonomous

CSDP. The ‘special relationship’ it enjoyed with the US was the main reason it opposed the

CSDP’s development as it believed the US, through NATO, was the only actor capable of

providing security. The CSDP, according to the UK, should serve as a support-arm for NATO

rather than competing with it and the independent variables that helped shape this perception

were:

a) the ‘special relationship’ it enjoyed with the US coupled with its dependency on the

US in the Cold War period;

56

b) fear of marginalisation in European affairs;

c) securing American involvement in European security affairs;

d) the Yugoslav Wars;

e) counterbalancing French-German dominance in the EU;

f) the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific region.

British involvement in the CSDP-project can be framed in the ‘neoclassical realism’ IR theory.

The UK demonstrated an active problem-solving approach through which they hoped the status-

quo, as it was during the Cold War, could be restored. The degree of satisfaction that Britain

enjoyed with the power asymmetry during the Cold War was gradually shifting as a consequence

of French yearning for a European defence capability independent from NATO. The UK sought

out to balance this by strengthening NATO through the CSDP since it was aware of the fact that

NATO would not automatically involve itself in European security affairs.

Comparative research has tried to answer the question under what circumstances the EU

is likely to undertake military operations. The preconditions that were depicted as essential are:

a) when the consent of (local) influential actors is secured;

b) when a conflict can be identified as an opportunity rather than a challenge:

c) when a individual Member State or the EU has intervened in the past;

d) when resources are aligned in terms of command and control arrangements;

e) when the involvement of each member of the ‘Big Three’ is guaranteed (Engberg

2013, pp. 155-157).

When comparing Operation Concordia with the Libya crisis it can be observed that not all of

these preconditions were present as Libya did not meet preconditions c, d and e. This shows that

the results that can be deducted from both case studies are time-specific and the conditions are

not always likely to be reproduced in their entirety. For both of the case studies it is therefore

important to put them in context. During the time of Operation Concordia, the EU was deeply

divided due to US unilateralist behaviour and the Iraq War. The ‘Big Three’s’ approval to deploy

EU troops in FYROM was therefore considered to be highly symbolic and showed that the EU

was capable of conducting a military operation, although fairly modest in scale. The fact that no

actual risks were present in FYROM for European troops and NATO was deeply engaged in the

region played an important role that led to the approval of the operation. A sense of moral guilt

and bad conscience over the EU’s lack to intervene during the Yugoslav Wars also played a role

57

in approving the operation. Following Concordia, the EU conducted over 25 operations not just

in Europe but also in Africa and Asia. The successes of these operations reinforced the British

and German claim that the EU should solely focus on (civilian) crisis management operations.

The fact that no serious military operation under the CSDP in Libya was even considered by a

large part of the EU damaged the EU’s credibility as a ‘hard security’ actor. In Libya, when

compared to FYROM, the humanitarian situation on the ground worsened by the day and in

order to successfully enforce the implementation of the no-fly zone, a large amount of military

force was required. The difference with FYROM was that the members of the ‘Big Three’, in the

case of Libya, were under great pressure. The process that led to the approval of Concordia took

eighteen months as the Berlin Plus agreement had to be finalised prior to the operation. It seems

that not only the above-mentioned preconditions need to be present in order for the EU to

involve itself in a military operation, but also the direct presence of the US and NATO in the

operation. As the analyses have shown, the German culture of reservation towards the use of

force and its new discovered self-awareness, combined with British preference of NATO over

CSDP, led to the EU’s inability to cope with the crisis.

The EU’s lack of effectiveness in Libya has posed serious questions regarding the future

of the CSDP. To some it confirms that the EU’s ambitions as a military power have experienced

a setback and its future as a hard security provider hangs on the line for its emphasis on soft

crisis management is entrenching Europe in a general reluctance on the use of force (Brattberg

2011, p. 3; Simón 2012, pp. 13-14). CSDP has declared itself irrelevant and has even handed

back the responsibility to address crises in Europe’s neighbourhood to NATO (Howorth 2013).

The future of the CSDP should thus lie in lower-intensity crisis management and not on ‘hard

power’ (Koenig 2012, p. 4). The austerity measures taken by European governments further

diminish the prospects for an autonomous CSDP, which, according to some, can even be dubbed

as ‘CSDP fatigue’ and another twenty years of the same processes will most likely not produce

different results (Howorth 2012, p. 4; Howorth 2013; Koenig 2012, p. 1). It has even been

argued that the EU has proven itself not to be a credible player in international security and the

CSDP should therefore cease to exist (Seidler 2011). For others, Libya does not necessarily mean

a change of long-standing commitments as the EU is gradually developing itself as a hard

security actor (Schmidt 2012, p. 187). The crisis has shown that several EU Member States are

willing to join forces and it can continue to do so in the future, thereby creating ad hoc coalitions

58

(Brattberg 2011, p. 3). The Libya crisis could be viewed as path redefining as it can be

interpreted as new twists on past discourse (Schmidt 2012, p. 172). It is therefore unclear in

which manner the CSDP will develop in the future for it raises questions for the future of

European defence and security integration which cannot be answered so easily, especially since

the Libyan crisis is time-specific and the conditions that were present during that time are

unlikely to be reproduced in their entirety. The analyses made of FYROM and Libya are

illustrative of this. Moreover, the process of strengthening the EU’s foreign policy derived from

changes in the geopolitical environment.

The EU itself is aware of the “growing demand for the EU to become a more capable

and strategic global actor” and it “emphasizes that further progress in CSDP is necessary” and it

therefore expressed its determination to take the CSDP forward as new CSDP missions in the

Horn of Africa, Sudan and the Sahel region were announced and deployed after the Libyan crisis

(Council of Foreign Affairs 2011, pp. 1-5). The EU, however, must realise that they are facing a

“do or die” moment (Jankowski 2012) for the future of the CSDP as the alternative to the CSDP

will increasingly reveal itself to be an empty box, for as the US turns away from Europe and

NATO, even that alliance will become meaningless without an enhanced collective European

effort. Libya has shown that the US is no longer as committed to Europe as it was during the

Cold War. The ‘Big Three’ will have to confront their divergent attitudes in Europe in order to

fill in the hole the US will leave behind. Only a jointly led CSDP will be more comprehensive

and have greater critical mass as the French will certainly go ahead anyway, as the military

intervention in Mali has shown. In their Defence White Papers, France and the UK explicitly

mention the possibility of unilateral military intervention when certain national interests are in

play. This stands in stark contrast with Germany’s wishes to resolve conflicts through

multilateral frameworks and to create a Political Union in which all CSDP operations are under

full (EU) parliamentary control. Despite these differences only Paris, London and Berlin are able

to initiate the major collective turnaround which can enable the EU to act coherently and

effectively. One option that has been mentioned is the pooling and sharing of scarce resources

which enables Member States to work closely together so differences could be overcome. The

individual members of the ‘Big Three’ must find a way to bridge their different and in many

ways conflicting EU foreign policy cultures. The future of a successful CSDP with a ‘hard

59

power’ component, which is able to address crises in its neighbourhood, depends on the

acceptance and appreciation of these conflicting views.

For the moment, it can be concluded that the ‘Big Three’ are capable of conducting

military operations under the CSDP as Concordia and several other military missions have

shown, but that strict preconditions need to be in place in exchange for their support for large-

scale military operations. The high-risk military crisis management under the CSDP will not be a

feasible option until some fundamental issues between the members of the ‘Big Three’ are

resolved as their perception of this instrument differs too greatly. The deeply rooted “security-

cultural heritage” remains an obstacle to mutual understanding (Howorth 2000, p. 35). As long

as France, Germany and the UK hold strong individual normative approaches, the EU risks

becoming hampered from acting rapidly and united. However, the EU’s failure to act coherent in

Libya does not automatically mean that it is not able to intervene militarily as the EU still shows,

that it is capable of conducting small civilian crisis management operations.

60

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