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The Three Paths to Sustainability
Mark Gibson, PhD StudentMichigan State University
May 2015
Overview
1. The Ideal vs. the Real2. A Sea Monster to the Rescue3. All We Need is an (Invisible) Hand4. Trust Me, We Can Do This Together5. Traversing the Conservation Reality
The Ideal vs. the Real
Theories, Frameworks & Models
Three tools in social science Theory (explanatory/predictive) Frameworks (descriptive) Models (normative)
Today we’ll focus on the types of models used in conservation
At it’s most basic, there are three narratives about how we achieve sustainability
Three Types of Models
These three narratives emphasize: Coercion Incentives Cooperation
I term these narratives: “A Sea Monster to the Rescue” “All We Need is an (Invisible) Hand” “Trust Me, We Can Do This”
A Sea Monster to the Rescue
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651
The State as Sovereign
Basic argument: State of nature is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and short” To overcome, we need an absolute sovereign
Today, the leviathan is not a king, but the state
This argument can be applied to conservation
Modern Tragedies Garrett Hardin. 1968. “The Tragedy of the
Commons”. Science
Individually rational, collectively irrational Commons: fish, forests, freshwater, etc. Conclusion
Free access & unrestricted demand for a finite resource ultimately reduces the resource through over-exploitation
Hardin’s Solutions
Hardin suggested two possible solutions: Strong state intervention – coercive force limits
exploitation Privatization – gives incentive to enforce
sustainable use
A Coercion Function
Possible Examples
Yellowstone National Park, est. 1872 Endangered Species Act of 1973 Fuel Economy Standards, first in place in 1978
All We Need is an (Invisible) Hand
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1776
The Market Produces the Best Outcomes
Basic argument: “by directing that industry in such a manner as
its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is…led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.”
Limit the role of government to administration of justice and provision of public goods
This argument can be applied to conservation
Free Market Environmentalism
Terry Anderson & Donald Leal, 1991 Focus on:
Tort law Property Rights Market incentives
The state is often the problem Fuel subsidies Free access to national parks Lack of property rights
Possible Examples
High Efficiency Light Bulbs Erin Brockovich Pacific Gas & Electric Case North Pacific Halibut, catch shares in 90s
Trust Me, We Can Do This Together
Elinor Ostrom, 1990
Modern Origins?
Recent scholars have noted that sometimes individuals are able to cooperate and overcome the tragedy
This has led to the rise of modern models of conservation based on “cooperation”
It could perhaps be argued that a philosophical precursor can be found in both socialist and religious thought
Marx, 1867
An Institutional Theorist
Elinor Ostrom (1933-2012) 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics, shared with Oliver
E. Williamson Indiana University and Arizona State University Founded the Workshop in Political Theory and
Policy Analysis at IU
Common Pool Resources Ostrom’s Law: A resource arrangement that
works in practice can work in theory. Most famous work is on how communities
are able to create their own solutions to manage common pool resources for long time periods
Private Goods (food, clothing, cars)
Common-pool Resources
(fish stocks, timber, coal)Club Goods
(golf course, satellite TV)Public Goods
(roads, air, national security)
Excludable/Non-excludable*
Rivalrous/ .
Non-rivalrous
Example: Alanya, Turkey
Highly Sophisticated Community-Solution
Alanya, Turkey 100 local fishers using 3-person boats Half members of fishing cooperative
Set up rules Every September, list of eligible fishers is prepared Fishing area divided into zones Fishers assigned zones by lots for Sept. to May
period Sept. to Jan., each fisher moves each day to the
next easterly location, after Jan., switch to moving westward
Eight Principles for Cooperative Solutions
P1: Clearly defined boundaries. P2: Rules adapted to local social and biological conditions. P3: Collective choice arrangements. P4: Accountable monitoring. P5: Graduated sanctions. P6: Provide accessible, lost cost means for dispute
resolution. P7: Recognition of rights to organize. P8: Nested systems.
Traversing the Conservation Reality
Conservation is Not “Either/Or”
In practice, we see a mix of these three models Which model dominates? Consider what matters most:
Coercion Incentives Cooperation
For example: Fisheries conservation often requires restructuring
property rights (incentives), but which are enforced by the state (coercion), and typically cannot be set up without fishermen’s support (cooperation)
Conserving Madagascar
Is any model more popular? Scales (2014) argues that there is a “fortress
conservation policy Establishment of protected areas has led to
severe restrictions on natural resource use and the disruption of livelihoods, property systems and cultural values
Horning (2012) notes the ineffectiveness of the the state, the “tame leviathan”
Conserving Madagascar (cont.)
Is another model likely to be more successful? Market Incentives?
Tourism-led conservation But geographically limited: Four national parks
(Andasibe-Mantadia, Isalo, Ranomafana, Montagne d’Ambre) and one special reserve (Ankarana) attracted over 88% of the visitors between 1992 and 2000.
Little employment generation Eco-labeling for fish
Conserving Madagascar (cont.)
Community Cooperation Co-management of nature reserves
Reserves mainly limit access to natural resources
Can Malagasy and conservation biologists agree?
Concessions for fisheries Blue Ventures suggests benefits are possible
Horning (2012) notes “some communities are conserving forests successfully while others are not”
Questions? Thoughts?