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CANNABIS SOCIAL CLUBS: NORMALISATION, NEOLIBERALISM, POLITICAL
OPPORTUNITIES AND PROHIBITION
David Pere Martínez Oró (PhD)
Drug Policy Unit, Autonomous University of Barcelona
Abstract
In Spain, the cannabis movement has been demanding a review of prohibitionist policies for over thirty years. The movement has taken advantage of gaps in the legal framework to set out a formula for cannabis clubs, in order to supply cannabis collectively. Clubs, among other requirements, may not make a profit. This text analyses the influence of socio-‐cultural normalisation of cannabis, the current social context (economic crisis) and hegemonic discourse (neoliberalism, consumerism, etc.) as being responsible for the opening of hundreds of clubs since 2011, especially in Barcelona. This has led to the emergence of club management models which do not conform to jurisprudence. This situation, along with the undeniable reality of cannabis use, has offered the cannabis movement a political opportunity to regulate clubs, an opportunity in which synergies have emerged in Catalonia, Navarre and the Basque country. Finally, it reflects on how prohibition has hampered the activities of clubs despite social and legal advances that have occurred in recent years.
Key words: drugs policies, cannabis social clubs, political opportunities, regulation and neoliberalism.
INTRODUCTION
Drug prohibition policies maintained by the international control conventions of the United Nations1, show glaring evidence of failure due to the impossibility of achieving the intended goals (Arana, 2013: 130). In particular: reducing the plantations of coca, opium and cannabis, eliminating international drug trafficking, and precluding the consumption of controlled substances. All this means that it is a pipe dream to believe it is possible to achieve the Declaration of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), when in 1998 it declared "a drug-‐free world: we can do it!" (Wodak, 2014: 191). Global prohibitionist policy has also caused immense damage to vulnerable populations, and has continuously broken the International Bill of Human Rights (Mena and Hobbs, 2010: 66-‐67). In view of the meagre results, the economic costs are unsustainable. Rolles, Murkin, Powell, Kushlick and Slater (2012: 16) estimate the cost of the application of the law in the fight against drugs at least $100 billion a year. The market for controlled drugs generates
1 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, New York, 1961, which was supplemented by the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of Vienna, 1971, and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, also in Vienna.
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$330 billion a year. This turnover allows criminal organisations, especially in Latin American countries to "undermine government institutions and the state through corruption and intimidation, blurs the boundaries between legal and illegal economies and threatens the economic stability of nations and entire regions" (Rolles et al., 2012: 22).
Given the blatant disaster that is prohibition, activists, academics, professionals and a minority of politicians have spoken out about the need to find pragmatic and sensible alternatives to the classification of drugs in the international control system (Hallam, Bewley-‐Taylor and Jelsma, 2014; Monaghan, 2014). Over the last few years, more and more countries have joined the debate about new drugs policies, especially in relation to cannabis (Rolles and Murkin, 2014; Room et al, 2013, Rosmarin and Eastwood, 2012; Blickman and Jelsma, 2009; Jelsma, 2009). The result should be a revision of the United Nations drug conventions and the creation of a new legal framework that defeats drug trafficking, money laundering and the criminalisation of users (Bewley-‐Taylor, 2012). As Bewley-‐Taylor, Blickman and Jelsma (2014: 7) state, the 2016 UNGASS on drugs represents an excellent opportunity to modify the control treaties and also the current status of cannabis.
The winds of change in cannabis policy, following Montañés' metaphor (2014), have begun to break the ice at various points on the prohibitionist plane. Uruguay is the standard bearer of the new policies on cannabis. On 10 December the Uruguayan Senate approved the 19.172 law allowing access to cannabis under certain conditions. This model is social-‐democratic because it is the State, through the Institute of Regulation and Control of Cannabis (IRCCA), which oversees the process of controlling plantations supplying cannabis for personal use, the operation of cannabis clubs2 and the production and processing for sale in pharmacies3. In the United States it has been possible to buy cannabis legally in Colorado since January 2014 and in Washington since July 2014. In Alaska and Oregon on November 4, 2014 the sale of recreational cannabis was approved by referendum and in the next few years the system of how cannabis will be legally accessed will be specified. As Montañés (2014: 79) points out in relation to Colorado -‐ but extending to all the U.S. -‐ the model is based on neo-‐liberal policies and the free market, where regulation is due to a certain "fundraising spirit". The political-‐economic model to be adopted by new drug policies and regulatory framework derivatives represents a central aspect of the discussion. Other countries in Latin America such as Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Jamaica and Guatemala are also discussing alternatives to prohibition.
Spain finds itself at the fringes of the discussion on new drug policies, due in large part to the emergence of hundreds of clubs4. A Cannabis club is a non-‐profit whose members can
2 From this point on, the word "clubs" will refer exclusively to cannabis clubs.
3 According to Montañés (2014: 65) "On 2 May 2014, the president of the JND, Diego Canepa, held a press conference to present the regulations of the law. Pharmacies will start selling recreational cannabis in November this year at $1 per gram" As of 1 July 2015 this had not yet happened and there appears to be no sign of imminent implementation.
4 It is impossible to find out the exact number of clubs but it is estimated that there are between 500 and 600, of which 350 are located in Catalonia and 75 in the Basque Country (Blickman, 2014). Although the first club was founded in 2001 it was not until 2011 when the number of clubs began to increase exponentially.
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acquire cannabis without entering the black market and whose operation is possible due to the jurisprudence of the Spanish legal system (Carmena, 2012). Despite the overtones, such clubs can be deemed to be conforming to the jurisprudence if they meet the following requirements: 1) It is a legally constituted association of adult consumers of cannabis. 2) Only members can access the association's premises, which must comply with health and safety standards. 3) The supply circuit is closed, i.e. only members are supplied from the association's plantations, ensuring planning for demand and avoiding excess. 4) No profit is generated. 5) No advertising strategies are executed to recruit members.
The existence of clubs is a result of the cannabis movement's long struggle to defend personal liberties (Marín, 2008: 222-‐223). The advance has been possible by repeated assaults on the Spanish wall of prohibition, with the objective -‐ amongst others -‐ of acquiring cannabis without breaking the law. As (Barriuso, 2012a) points out, the CSC model is based "on the gradual development of principles derived in piecemeal fashion from the Supreme Court's doctrine on so-‐called "shared consumption" […]. CSCs have been formed based on filling the gaps left by legislation, gaps whose dimensions are not yet clear. The path has been tortuous and full of vicissitudes due to the criminalising logic of prohibition, but the overlap between the cannabis movement, political opportunities and normalisation have enabled the current system of clubs to develop in the country. It has also fuelled political debate on how it should be regulated, which has been crystallised in regional regulations and bylaws
THE CANNABIS MOVEMENT VS THE WALL OF PROHBITION: THE EMERGENCE OF
CANNABIS CLUBS
The roots of the cannabis movement can be found in the youth counterculture of the sixties and seventies (Romaní, 2004: 88-‐94). But it was not until the death of the dictator Franco that the first voices openly favourable to the legalisation of cannabis were heard (González Duro, 1979, Usó, 1996: 299). The public faces of this debate were certain left-‐wing politicians and publications such as the legendary magazine Ajoblanco (Usó, 1996: 298-‐ 299). Since then the anti-‐prohibition movement has seen fluctuations in its activity and social visibility. During the eighties it was rarely taken into consideration and almost silenced as a result of the fight against "the Drug Problem" (Usó, 2013: 67-‐69). The dominance of the morality brigade prevented a sensible discussion from being maintained because it believed that the only valid strategy to address the "terrible problem" was a heavy-‐handed one (Gonzalez, Funes, Gonzalez, Mayor and Romaní, 1989: 45). Despite little public visibility and no political discussion on alternatives to prohibition, throughout the nineties more and more professionals and academics -‐ for the most part dedicated to harm-‐reduction -‐ began to criticise prohibition and demand a much-‐needed debate on drug policy (Romaní, 2005).
The first milestone of the cannabis movement was reached in 1993 with the collective plantation of the Ramon Santos Association for Cannabis Studies (ARSEC). According to (Barriuso, 2011: 3) ARSEC asked the anti-‐drug prosecutor if it was a crime to grow cannabis collectively to supply themselves, to which the answer came back that in principle it was not an offense to cultivate cannabis for personal consumption among adult consumers. However, the plantation was confiscated and the growers eventually convicted, following an appeal to the Supreme Court. The sentence concluded that "the cultivation of cannabis was dangerous per se and must be punished "(Barriuso, 2011: 3). The plantation
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opened up the so-‐called "Catalan Breach" (Borrallo, 1997) because it represented the first solid blow against the wall of prohibition, even though a priori the sentence implied that collective cannabis plantations were not possible (Barriuso, 2011: 3) .
The breach was widened by the Bilbao Kalamudia Association, which created collective plantations in 1997, 1999 and 2000. These were reported to the authorities but they were harvested without hindrance (Barriuso, 2011: 3). Another crack can be seen in the form of the Muñoz and Soto Report (2001), which analysed the legal feasibility of establishments whose activity would be the supply of cannabis for therapeutic purposes. In practice this report represents a "legal framework document" for clubs as it lists the characteristics that must be met to self-‐supply without breaking the law and is complemented by the Díez Ripollés and Muñoz obiter dictum (2012).
Under the conviction that it was lawful to form members associations to self-‐supply cannabis and represented individual freedom, in 2001 the country's first cannabis club, the "Cannabis Tasters Club Barcelona", was established. The club split with previous research associations in explicitly specifying in its articles of association the intention of producing and consuming cannabis. The first cannabis clubs conformed strictly with the jurisprudence in carrying out their activities without breaking the law, but there was no guarantee of legal impunity. This left space for prohibitionists to thwart any activity related to controlled substances (Barriuso, 2012b: 174).
During the first decade of the 21st century clubs sprung up all around Spain, especially in the Basque Country and Catalonia (Blickman, 2014). The vast majority of these clubs joined the FAC (Federation of Cannabis Associations)5, whose members have a long history of anti-‐prohibition activism, argue for a cooperative model where members play an active role in decision-‐making and comply with the premise of the closed circuit (Barriuso, 2012a). Despite clubs' lack of relevancy among the general public, security forces and prosecutors were determined to crack down on them, as proven by the various seizures and arrests (Usó, 2009; 2005). In 2005 police seized marijuana belonging to the Pannah Association but it was returned in 2007 because a judge found that no crime had been committed. This incident reinforced the legitimacy of claims by the cannabis movement. Barriuso (2011: 4) notes that this fact "can be considered the starting signal for a boom of new associations that seek to set up their own production of cannabis."
A socio-‐historical analysis of events in recent years in the "cannabis world" shows the influence of various phenomena that are key to understanding the current situation, which is characterised by the increasing number of clubs and discussion on the regulatory framework. The elements are:
• The process of normalisation of controlled substances, especially cannabis.
5 The FAC website states that " The Spanish Federation of Cannabis Associations is a group of cannabis user associations from around the country who share ideas about regulation which should serve society. Thus, all associations in the federation, including growers, researchers and users, aim to provide safe access to cannabis for all users, respecting their rights as users and putting distance between themselves and the dangers of the black market". The bold highlighting is mine.
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• Defragmentation of the model proposed by the FAC for cannabis clubs, due to the influence of hegemonic discourses (entrepreneurship, neoliberalism, the consumer society, etc.), which has led to clubs becoming a niche business.
• Political opportunities for the cannabis movement arising from the undeniable reality of the clubs.
• Prohibition, which despite the changes in recent years poses a threat to the functioning of the clubs and limits personal freedom of consumers.
THE NORMALISATION PROCESS AS A CATALYST FOR CLUBS
Normalisation is a macro-‐social phenomenon which has enabled the emergence of clubs because, among the consequences, it implies accepting cannabis and cannabis clubs as part of social reality (Arana, 2005: 131-‐135). Taking place in Western Europe over the last twenty years (Parker, 2005), normalisation is the socio-‐historical process by which certain controlled substances, including cannabis, move from a marginalised position into mainstream society (Martinez Oró, 2014a: 95-‐98; Parker, Aldridge and Measham, 1998: 122-‐125). The core elements of normalisation are: decreasing the alarm caused by the "the Drugs Problem", the spread of consumption with a consequent increase in the number of consumers, changes in the way drugs are obtained, and above all, greater social tolerance and less stigmatisation of consumers (Martinez Oró 2014a: 99-‐122). All these elements have caused cultural integration of cannabis, i.e., society has adapted to the reality of cannabis use, allowing coexistence to become less problematic (Martinez Oró, et al., 2010; Aldridge, Measham and Williams, 2011). A clear example of how much social normalisation has been achieved can be observed in the fact that it now is the cannabis movement pressing public administrations to discuss the "issue of clubs" and not citizens worried about preventing the "virus" of drugs (Martinez Oró and Pallares, 2013: 32-‐33).
According to Vibeke, Christensen and Vibeke (2014) for most consumers, cannabis is a practial way to achieve desired pleasurable states of mind. To others, consumption is an action of self-‐care, a way to forget the suffocating reality of their daily lives (Martinez Oró, 2014b). The stigma attached to consumption has also been diluted and fewer people now stigmatise a person simply because of cannabis use (Aldridge, 2008: 199; Hathaway, Comeau and Erickson, 2011: 465). Normalisation is accentuated when people of all ages consume, regardless of socioeconomic level, gender (Zalakain, 2012: 60-‐66) or belief system -‐ unless it interferes with their daily duties (Romaní, 2015). Its presence is so ubiquitous that Bilckman (2014: 2) speaks of a de facto decriminalisation of cannabis.
In recent years, social alarm caused by public safety concerns about "the Drugs Problem" (robberies, thefts, dumping of syringes...) has decreased to such an extent that it has reached the point where, in May 2014, only 0.1% of Spaniards felt that it represented a social problem (CIS, 2014). This decrease in social alarm has led to the question of drugs being dropped from the political agenda (Comas, 2002: 90-‐92). The interweaving of lesser hysteria with greater social tolerance has meant that in response to the emergence of clubs, part of the population tolerates them and the vast majority are indifferent to their presence as long as they are not affected by their existence. In this regard, a study by GESOP notes that 77.6% of Catalans believe cannabis clubs should be regulated; it also shows that 43.4%
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are in favour of legalising marijuana.6 In relation to the legalisation of cannabis, according to the August 2014 Euro barometer, 47% of young Spaniards (15-‐24 years) felt that cannabis should be legalised. And according to Rodríguez S, Megías V., Megías Q., Rodríguez F. and Rubio (2014: 76) 46.2% of Spaniards are of the view that "regulated sale to adults in pharmacies or other authorised sites should be allowed" while 5.9 per cent think "unrestricted sale to adults should be allowed". In total, 52.2% of Spaniards envisage some kind of regulated access to cannabis. These data show the high level of social acceptance and leaves social justification for prohibition in abeyance.
In Spain it is estimated that in 2013 2,093,000 people consumed cannabis at least once a month and some 602,000 did so every day. These data are far higher than in 1999, when the monthly figure was 1,238,000 and the daily figure 220,0007. The spread of consumption without an increase in problematic use is a clear sign of the normalisation of cannabis (Martinez Oró, 2014a: 195-‐196). To clarify, while the number of requests for treatment of cannabis-‐related problems has increased in recent years, from 4,772 in 2002 to 12,873 in 2011, The proportion of daily users asking for treatment has remained stable: in 2002 the percentage was 2.16% and in 2011 it was 2.3%.8. Given this volume of consumers it is logical that clubs flourished in Spain (especially in those areas where normalisation is more pronounced, as in the Basque Country and Catalonia. The vast majority of consumers wish to obtain cannabis of high quality, safely (Arana and Montañés, 2011: 172-‐173). Given the dangers inherent in the black market, some, therefore, saw in a club an excellent supply channel (Barriuso, 2012b: 178-‐179). The spread of consumption led to changes in the typical consumer profile and, consequently, to sale of cannabis to people outside marginal sectors of society.
At present, the perceived availability of cannabis in Spain is almost universal, with two out of every three Spaniards (67%) considering it easy or very easy to buy cannabis in less than 24 hours (OED, 2014). The clubs allow members to acquire cannabis in a pleasant environment, so less consumers feed drug trafficking networks, who are seeing their profits dwindle as a result (Decorte, 2015). Acquiring substances in socially accepted contexts, such as clubs, distances consumers from deviant practices and sub-‐cultural norms (Parker, Williams and Aldridge, 2002: 90 -‐ 92; Parker, 2005: 206-‐206).
6 77% of Catalans Believe It Is Better to Regulate than Veto Associations. El Periódico, 14 July 2014.
7 According to the 2013 Report of the Spanish Drug Observatory (OED, 2013), in 2013 6.6% of the Spanish population between the ages of 15 and 64 had used cannabis at some time in the month preceding the study compared with 4.5% in 1999. Daily consumption stood at 1.9% in 2013 and 0.9% in 1999. The Spanish population between the ages of 15 and 64 according to the INE (National Statistics Office) was 31,718,825 as of 1 January 2013 and 27,517,892 as of 1 January 1999. Drawing on these data the figures have been calculated for monthly and daily consumption.
8 From this percentage one should subtract the -‐ unknown -‐ number of consumers who are protected by paragraph 2 of Article 25 of the Protection of Public Safety Act 1992 (Ley 1/1992), which provides for the suspension of pecuniary sanctions if they undergo treatment for addiction. But one must also add those consumers who request treatment in private centres and do not appear in the official statistics, as well as those with problematic use who refrain from seeking help. Given these elements we believe that in no event would the percentage of problematic use exceed 5%.
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THE COMMERCIAL REINTERPRETATION OF THE COOPERATIVE MODEL
The experience of the pioneer clubs within the FAC environment gave wings to an amalgam of people, groups and entrepreneurs to open a club. In Barcelona between 2011 and 2014 there was a veritable cannabis boom, defined by a massive and almost indiscriminate opening of clubs. During the boom, a minority opened their doors with the intention of following the operating rules proposed by the FAC. But the vast majority reinterpreted this model and chose to work with less strict parameters, with the resulting increase in the risk of breaking the law. The legal grey area offered shadows in which to hide criminal practices under the guise of a not-‐for-‐profit association. For the militants who had opened up the cracks in prohibition, the emergence of clubs with "lax" rules or indeed purely motivated by profiting from the sale of cannabis, pose a threat to their co-‐operative model (Barriuso, 2012a).
In social and cultural terms one can observe how the socio-‐economic context of the recession, which has brutally punished part of Spanish society, has set the stage for the cannabis boom. The feeling of being trapped combined with hegemonic discourse on the subject (Alonso and Fernández Rodríguez, 2013) helps explain the boom. Contributing to this feeling of being trapped are the major stumbling blocks faced by young Spaniards: unemployment9, over-‐qualification, lack of work and job insecurity. These elements create instability and uncertainty, place them in a vulnerable position (Romaní and Casadó, 2014) and also affect their emotional state (Martínez-‐Hernáez, 2009). As far as hegemonic discourse is concerned, one can see that it is neoliberal and consumerist logic that defines social reality (Ramonet, 2009). Another issue deserving special attention is the discourse surrounding entrepreneurship in the context of neoliberal hegemony, that espouses risk-‐taking in work and business, where success is celebrated individually but failure also, without the Welfare State providing any kind of safety net (Byung-‐Chul Han, 2012: 25-‐32).
In a labour market that offers no opportunities, opening a cannabis club represents a way of earning a living through self-‐employment. During the boom all kinds of cannabis clubs opened. Some, despite opting out of FAC model, have adhered to the jurisprudence, and have operated as a non-‐profit association trying to go unnoticed since avoiding problems is crucial to maintaining operations and work. Other, more ambitious, entrepreneurs have stretched the boundaries of jurisprudence, undertaking unlawful practices under the guise of a non-‐profit association. In a society where one can market any product, "cannabis entrepreneurs" have had no qualms about making money from cannabis or supplying themselves on the black market, to fulfil the capitalist dream of being rich. Entrepreneurship, consumerism, business, buying and selling, commercial transfers, customers, brand and competition, among other staples of hegemonic discourse, have also been incorporated into the language of some clubs. Following the cannabis boom, the influence of business logic has seen some clubs competing like companies. These maintain a strictly business relationship with cannabis users -‐ in other words, they become mere customers. This can be seen in the free services offered, such as lending video-‐game
9 The unemployment rate in the last quarter of 2014 stood at 23.7% for the general population and 51.8% for young people, but the all-‐time high was in the first quarter of 2013, with rates of 26.94% and 57% respectively.
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consoles, offering DJ sessions, organising football matches, etc., to improve member-‐client satisfaction, in order to build customer loyalty.
It was not by chance that the cannabis boom took place in Barcelona but an unintended consequence of the political-‐economic model. The Barcelona Brand has for some time been in vogue in political and economic discourse as a way of presenting the city as cosmopolitan, business friendly, touristic and socially and culturally attractive. Sponsors stress its benefits but citizens are suffering the unintended consequences of this highly criticised model (Delgado, 2007, VVAA, 2004). Barcelona received 1,732,902 tourists in 1990 and that figure increased every year following the 1992 Olympics, reaching a record high in 2013 of 7,571,766 tourists (Tourism Barcelona, 2014). This volume of tourism makes Barcelona an ideal place to do business, so it is not surprising that cannabis entrepreneurs have chosen Barcelona.
Some "commercial clubs" have not missed the opportunity to grow their businesses, with illegal practices like attracting tourists online or in the street. When these methods of capturing clients came to light and people noticed how some niche media were calling Barcelona the world marijuana capital 10 , Barcelona City Council took steps to stop "cannabis tourism", for example a moratorium on new club licences and an increase in inspections, which led to the closing down of 59 clubs11. Avoiding cannabis tourism appears to be a high priority, from the new regulations approved by both Barcelona City Council and by the Generalitat (autonomous government) of Catalonia.
Commercial clubs have created an aura of "undesirability" because they transgress jurisprudence. There is no doubt that these clubs do not conform to the legal framework, but if we consider classical sociological theories of Deviance (Becker, 2009; Matza, 1981), we see how they can also act as normalising agents for consumers because they enable safe supply, avoid contact with deviant practices and withdraw smokers from public spaces, with the consequent effect of stopping potential complaints and reporting to the police by local residents. This in turn implies less policing and so a reduction in cost and public disorder.
THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES OF THE CANNABIS MOVEMENT.
Taking Toch's (1971: 5) classic definition, it is clear that the cannabis movement is a social one because it is "an effort by a large number of people to solve collectively a problem they feel they have in common." As Marín (2008) points out, the cannabis movement, in its fight for the "normalisation" of cannabis, has undergone a long journey over the past two decades to reach this point. According to Tarrow (1994) and his interpretation of "political opportunity theory", the probability of a social movement achieving its goals is determined by the how the social system opens up to their demands and objectives (Buechler, 2000). In recent years, demands by the cannabis movement have been heard by certain governments and opened up the debate on a regulatory framework for clubs (Renovatio, 2013). This
10 The Marijuana Capital. El Periódico, 30 May 2014.
11 Barcelona City Council Closes 59 Cannabis Associations, 35% of the Total. La Vanguardia, 21 November 2014.
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political opening up (unprecedented in more than thirty years of pressure) is, first of all, the result of years of struggle by the cannabis movement, but such opening up has been accelerated by the cannabis boom and the malpractice of commercial clubs. The current situation has forced the movement's anti-‐prohibition campaigning to be put on hold while regulation of the operations of clubs is pursued. In the near future, we should find out if the initial demands are resurrected, or if the movement is evolving towards other goals than anti-‐prohibition propositions.
The political opening up has occurred in three regions: the Basque Country, Catalonia and Navarre. In each case, the political means used is different, the common element being wanting to regulate clubs. In the Basque Country, through a parliamentary commission that lasted from April 2012 to October 2014, the Basque Government was urged to regulate clubs via the future Law on Addictions. In Navarra, the discussion of clubs arose through a people's legislative initiative that culminated on 27 November 2014 with the approval of the "Regional Law 24/2014 of 2 December, regulating cannabis user collectives in Navarra." The law is seen as a triumph by the cannabis movement, led by the political party "Cannabis Representation of Navarre", although in light of the text, the law does not appear to resolve the "question of cannabis", i.e., the text omits any explicit reference to cultivation, transport or supply. Despite the approval, the Spanish Interior Ministry considers the law illegal and a violation of state powers12. That is, once again, prohibition is on the attack with alarmist arguments such as that clubs "entail an increase in problematic drug use, especially among teenagers", and discredits those who defend individual freedoms and pursue fairer laws.
In Catalonia, following the media impact of the Rasquera plantation13, in full cannabis boom, the Generalitat of Catalonia began legislative work through the Health Commission of the Parliament of Catalonia which ended in January 2015 with the ratification of regulation14 in the form of a code of practice to be followed by clubs and councils. Minimal regulation once again as it does not solve the "question of cannabis", but that was the maximum possible given the powers available to the Generalitat. The Spanish state reserved and maintains legislative competencies over controlled substances like cannabis. Therefore, despite this first step, greeted positively by Catalan cannabis federations, the regulation does not clarify the jurisprudential grey area and clubs remain vulnerable. Furthermore, the Catalan regulation transfers the responsibility for regulating clubs to local councils. This may lead certain councils to adopt ordinances containing conditions with which it is impossible to comply, thus de facto vetoing their activity.
12 The Interior Ministry Puts a Halt to Cannabis Clubs. El Diario, 23 December 2014.
13 Rasquera village council submitted civic plans for a cannabis plantation in the municipality to cater for a Barcelona based club with more than 10,000 members. Despite a “yes” vote in the village plebiscite, the public prosecutor in Tarragona censured the action and it was dismissed by the Provincial Assembly.
14 RESOLUCION SLT/32/2015, 15 January, approving public health standards to guide cannabis associations and their social clubs and the conditions under which they are permitted to operate, for the guidance of councils in Catalonia.
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At the local level, Sarrià de Ter was the first council in the country to enact a bylaw on clubs15, published in the Official Gazette of the Province of Girona on November 12, 2014. The next day the Official Gazette of the Province of Guipúzcoa published the San Sebastián Ordinance16. Both emphasise location, especially the distance between clubs and various public facilities. In Catalonia, council activity in relation to clubs has been quiet but prolific. 21 councils have approved decrees suspending the granting of licences for cannabis-‐related activities, including Barcelona, Lleida, Mataró, Sabadell, Gavà and Vilafranca del Penedès. Other councils have approved decrees relating to the initial approval of bylaws regulating cannabis activity, including Girona, Castelldefels, Sitges and Vilanova i la Geltrú. Councils which have made declarations in relation to clubs have chosen to publish a moratorium: some with the intention of planning the definitive bylaw and others to limit the opening of cannabis clubs. It is clear, therefore, how the cannabis boom has accelerated council activity to avoid conflictive situations. This is true of the councils of La Jonquera and Vilamalla (municipalities bordering with France) who have suspended the granting of licences after noticing a proliferation of clubs with French members who cross the border to buy cannabis due to the difficulties of supplying themselves in their country (Massin, Carrieri and Roux, 2013).
SHOULD WE PERSEVERE WITH PROHIBITION?
If one examines current law, the Spanish wall of prohibition began to come up with the ratification of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 in 1966 and the passing of the Law 17/1967 which prohibited all use of drugs. The wall was reinforced by successive laws like the Royal Decree 2829/1977 which banned the use of psychotropic substances and articles (368, 369, 370 and 371) of the Criminal Code (Statutory Law 1/1988). It was completed by successive reforms and the Protection of Public Safety Act 1992 (Ley Orgánica 1/1992) (Muñoz, 2007: 34-‐36). As a result of these laws, as Muñoz (2007: 36) notes, "our legal system forms a purely prohibitionist model characterised by repressive strictness and legislative intransigence against any contact with drugs". And this is the legal framework on which the clubs have tried to develop their activity. Despite the progress of the cannabis movement and the political opening up of some administrations, prohibition is still in good health in Spain and seems unwilling to capitulate easily and will prevent any change to the current status quo (Arana, 2012). Prohibition poses a threat to clubs that can lead to cessation of activity and criminal prosecutions (Renovatio, 2014: 18-‐19).
In recent years, despite the efforts of many clubs to be transparent and their willingness to adhere to the jurisprudence, this has not been enough to put them out of danger and stop them being targeted by the police (Barriuso, 2012b: 169-‐172). As Brión and del Valle (2015: 23) point out, the associations feel that "their insecurities about the lack of regulation is like the sword of Damocles that threatens their ventures. " The legal grey area allows security forces to act if they observe, in their judgment, evidence of a crime. These
15 “Edict of final approval of the Bylaw regulating the activity of Cannabis Clubs"
16 "Bylaw regulating the location of cannabis social clubs".
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operations occur both at the headquarters of the association and at the plantations, where cannabis is seized and managers detained, accused of various crimes, especially against public health. Transportation of cannabis is also a dangerous activity because at any roadblock members can be subject to inspection and arrest (Barriuso, 2012b: 175). Despite the fact that clubs show documentation certifying that the cannabis is shared and complies with prevailing jurisprudence, in reality this does not, in most cases, prevent the club members being arrested and later released on bail pending trial. Typically trials end in acquittal but are a cause of hardship as preparing for a trial involves looking for a lawyer and appearing before a judge to give evidence, a situation that generates anxiety, malaise and uncertainty.
The current framework of prohibition also leaves cannabis clubs vulnerable to outside interference, such as theft from the association's plantations (Brión and del Valle, 2015: 28). The grey area makes it impossible for them even to think about reporting the theft to the police to prevent further interference. Clubs can also receive threats or pressure from criminal groups who take advantage of the grey area.
Regarding the prohibitionist pressure on consumers, despite the change in culture, security forces have remained relentless (Arana and Germán, 2004). The number of cases of reported drug use or possession under Article 25 of the Public Safety Act 1992, has increased steadily since the law came into force. The earliest statistic provided by the Interior Ministry on drug-‐related police reports is for 1998, when 81,64417 were detained or fined for drugs. In 2006 the number of administrative sanctions increased to 218,656, 77.32% of which were for cannabis, and in 2013 they reached a record high of 401,289 police reports, of which 87% were cannabis related (Ministry of Interior, 2014: 322).
The new Public Safety Act18 also puts pressure on cannabis consumers and, implicitly, on clubs. In relation to possession and consumption in public, consumers are now liable to more hefty fines, ranging from €601 to €30,000 -‐ in other words double the previous minimum fine of €301. Furthermore, the new act includes a point absent in the previous one in regard to plantations. Paragraph 20 of article 36 refers to "illicit acts of planting and cultivation of toxic drugs, narcotics or psychotropic substances in publicly visible places, even if it does not constitute a criminal offence to do so". This leaves the security forces free to sanction any plantation destined for personal use. It remains to be seen what the expression "publicly visible" implies, but in the worse case scenario, any visible plant would incur a minimum fine of €601. This situation is a clear persecution of consumers as it prevents self-‐supply and puts them in a vulnerable position. To avoid problems, they are more likely to purchase on the black market.
Until now, seizure of marijuana plants has been adjudicated in court, with the judge deciding whether it was destined for trafficking, with the resulting fine or prison sentence, or whether it was destined for personal use or shared consumption, in the case of clubs, which normally results in acquittal. With the previous Public Safety Act, if the police saw
17 This statistic does not differentiate between drugs or between arrests or fines, so the actual figure for cannabis-‐related police reports is much lower.
18 Approved by the Congress of Deputies in December 2014, it entered into force on 1 July 2015.
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one or two plants, they would have been unlikely to act because they knew that the judge would apply the Supreme Court's jurisprudence which allowed cultivation for personal use and acquit the accused.
Prohibition is not sustained exclusively by the law. Public anti-‐drug opinion also plays a major part. Public opinion against drugs is based on discourses by 'experts', especially doctors, extolling the dangers of controlled substances. It is also influenced by socio-‐historical elements recorded in the collective memory. Hence, despite normalisation, the image of compulsive consumption of heroin still survives among the population. And in these "anti-‐drugs" discourses in general, the media have played a key role (Gayo, 2013: 146-‐148).
One of the most immediate consequences of the cannabis boom was the painting of a negative picture of clubs, caused by media reports of bad practices such as attracting tourists via the Internet19and selling to minors20. Such reporting also induced fear among citizens by claiming that Barcelona had become the new Amsterdam21 and so was attracting cannabis tourism22. In this respect, news reports are one-‐sided. They do not mention the complaints of the movement, which was trying to guarantee the survival of the closed supply circuit -‐ which had already, in part, been recognised by the jurisprudence. The media have repeatedly used their sources to run stories on the arrests of club bosses and the charges brought against them of crimes against public health and even criminal conspiracy23, theft of electrical supply24 and money laundering25. They have also used alarmist and tendentious discourse, as in the case of the reports on the arrest of "the ringleaders" of cannabis associations26 that used exactly the same discourse as that of reports on the arrests of members of ETA.
The amalgam of news of this kind leads, among a large swathe of the population, to an image being portrayed of clubs as criminal and delinquent organisations. They are considered responsible for facilitating consumption, of trivialising the risks of cannabis and of normalising inherently dangerous practices. That is, prohibitionist arguments are used to justify the persecution and closure of clubs in the name of public health and social cohesion, because contrary to pro-‐cannabis arguments, they claim that clubs enhance drug
19 "Cannabis Clubs" Advertise on the Internet to Sell the Drug. El País, 22 May 2014.
20 Leaders of a Cannabis Club in Barcelona Arrested for Selling to Minors. La Vanguardia, 5 May 2014.
21 Sunny Amsterdam. El País, 7 December 2013.
22 The Cannabis Club Boom Attracts Reefer Tourism to Barcelona. La Vanguardia, 20 January 2014.
23 Owners of Four Cannabis Associations Arrested for Supplying Drugs to 200 People. ABC, 26 July 2014.
24 Police Detain Two Bosses from a Cannabis Association in Maresme County. La Vanguardia, 1 December 2014.
25 Bosses of the Biggest Marijuana Club Arrested for Money Laundering. El Periódico, 12 July 2014.
26 Ringleaders of the Cannabis Associations Arrested for Money Laundering. El País, 11 July 2014.
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trafficking and offer no improvement to "the Drugs Problem" and do not benefit society in any way.
CONCLUSION
In Spain the cannabis movement has been fighting for fairer drugs policies for more than thirty years. This fight led to cracks in the wall of prohibition which enabled the creation of cannabis clubs. The combination of a lack of clear regulation and normalisation of cannabis, along with certain hegemonic discourses (consumerism and entrepreneurship) has led to a boom in cannabis clubs. Recognition of the reality of consumption, a result of the process of normalisation, made it possible for clubs to operate. Normalisation led to a proliferation in the profiles of consumers, regardless of age, sex or socioeconomic status. Acquiring cannabis from clubs has enabled these consumers to distance themselves from the black market and purchase from a safe and quality-‐assured supplier.
The cannabis boom began in Barcelona in 2011. The majority of the new clubs disassociated themselves from the co-‐operative FAC model and began to operate without adhering to the jurisprudence. During the recession, some young people saw clubs as an opportunity to make a living. Others, influenced by contemporary neoliberal thinking, saw them an investment opportunity. Commercial clubs are a product of consumerist and capitalist thinking which has found a good business niche in the newly transformed cannabis capital, Barcelona. This type of club is a threat to co-‐operative clubs because they undermine decades of work, but bad practices have also created a political opportunity to demand clear regulations.
Given this situation, the cannabis movement has pressured the authorities to accelerate the regulation of clubs, establishing itself as a valid interlocutor in the political debate. The presence of the "issue of clubs" on the political agenda has produced results in three regional parliaments: the Basque Country, the Autonomous Community of Navarre and Catalonia and in some municipalities in these territories. However, the regulations obtained so far are insufficient as they fail to resolve the issues of cultivation, transport and access to cannabis, and could be considered a "patch" for the prohibition model. At some point we should evaluate the results of their implementation and whether they have led to an improvement for clubs and have fulfilled the objective of eliminating bad practice, or on the contrary, they have caused the bureaucratisation of activity and control by the authorities which also fails to prevent bad practice. These first regional regulations are seen as an extremely symbolic first step towards continued discussion about drugs policies.
An obstacle to the opening up of some local administrations is the belligerence towards and rejection of regional and local regulations27 by Central Government, which seems unwilling to make any changes to the wall of prohibition28. Spanish prohibition has been and is an element of harassment which prevents the smooth operation of clubs. Fines, seizures, arrests and prosecutions have formed part of clubs' existence in recent years. Prohibition
27 State Counsel Studies Impugning Cannabis Clubs. El Diario, 11 December 2014.
28 Legalising Marijuana "is not a path that Spain is willing to follow." El Diario, 11 February 2015.
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sees clubs as perverse spaces, when in truth the task they are performing is to weaken drug trafficking, keep consumers normalised and ensure their safety.
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