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DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION AND THE INDIAN DEVELOPMENT SECTOR: Implications on Choice of Local Institutions Ajit Chaudhuri E & H Foundation 25 th October 2013

Ajit democratic decentralization

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Page 1: Ajit democratic decentralization

DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION AND THE INDIAN DEVELOPMENT SECTOR:

Implications on Choice of Local Institutions

Ajit ChaudhuriE & H Foundation25th October 2013

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Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 2

THE ARGUMENT - 1

• Development programmes require local institutions to work through

• Choice of local institution has implications for the work being done

• Choosing democratic institutions has positive externalities– Enhances quality of democracy in society– This in turn leads to better development

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THE ARGUMENT - 2

• Democratic decentralization has led to existence of local institutions with –– Constitutional responsibility for development– People’s mandate

• Development programmes that involve / strengthen / choose such institutions –– Help decentralization yield democratic dividends– Are in line with spirit of Part IX of Constitution

• Those that by-pass such institutions and create / empower / choose parallel, non-representative institutions do not

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THE PAPER

• Theoretical, but attempts to examine the practical implications of the argument

• Flow of presentation– Setting the context– Democratic implications of institutional choice– Policy options for donors and NGOs– Conclusions

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THE CONTEXT - 1

• Donor Organizations and Choices– Donor Organizations– Funding the state

• Direct Support• Project Funding

– Do It Yourself– Funding NGOs – the oft preferred option– Key Downsides

• PRIs with a development mandate exist• Creating parallel institutions and diffusing power may be not

be in the long term interests of democracy

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THE CONTEXT - 2

• Democratic decentralization– Transfer of political, administrative and fiscal

responsibilities to locally elected bodies and the empowerment of communities to exert control over these bodies (World Bank, 2000)

– In India, driven by 73rd and 74th Amendments• Setting up PRIs• Delegation of authority, responsibilities and financial

resources to them

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Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 7

THE CONTEXT - 3

• Why Democratic Decentralization– Brings political representatives closer to electorate– Policies more likely to represent actual needs and

preferences of communities BUT– Coordination problems & chances of elite capture– Measuring impact of DD is problematic – neither

governance nor decentralization are quantifiable• Indian experience with DD is (so far) mixed but

slow and inexorable movement towards it

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INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE - 1

• Choosing local institutions by –– Transferring power to them– Conducting joint activities– Soliciting inputs for programmes and policies

• Choice is recognition, it confers legitimacy and power, it transforms institutional landscape– Privatization – to private sector– Participatory/empowerment approach – to NGOs, CBOs, customary

authorities, etc.• Institutional choice effects more than efficiency and

effectiveness of public service provision – it impacts process of democratic decentralization

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INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE - 2

• Ribot, J.C; 2007; “Representation, Citizenship and the Public Domain in Democratic Decentralization”; Development 50(1), 43-49

• Institutional Choice and Representation– For an institution to be democratic, it must be

representative• Accountable to people – positive & negative sanctions• Equipped with power – people’s needs & aspirations

can be transformed into policy, and policy into practise

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INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE - 3

– By avoiding local governments• Deprive local authorities of powers being transferred to the

local arena• Empower parallel authorities• Force local governments to compete for legitimacy

– Means of power transfer shapes accountability – conditional or as a secure right

• Institutional Choice and Citizenship– Concept of ‘belonging’ infers citizenship – the ability to

be politically engaged and shape the fate of the polity – in democracy, this is residence based

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Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 11

INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE - 4

– In other institutions, belonging is different• Business, NGOs, User groups – shared interests• Customary or religious institutions – various forms of identity –

language, ethnicity, religion, place of origin

– Choosing interest or identity based institutions results in politics of recognition• Forces individuals to conform to group cultures• Sees cultural dissonance, experimentation and criticism as

disloyalty• Overshadows intra-group divisions of gender, class, etc.• Loses sight of role of redistribution in redressing injustice• Undermines residency based forms of belonging, i.e. democracy,

encourages separatism

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INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE - 5

• Institutional Choice and the Public Domain– Public domain – a public political space where –

• Citizens feel able and entitled to influence authorities• Maintains and re-enforces public belonging and identity• Enables the integrative collective action that constitutes

democracy• Necessary for the production of citizenship

– Important to retain substantial powers in the public domain for decentralization to produce democratic dividends – equity, efficiency and development

– Distributing public powers to interest and identity based groups encloses the public domain

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POLICY OPTIONS – DONORS

• Social development activities through non-representative institutions has implications on democracy BUT

• Is it viable to work through PRIs? 3 typical arguments against– PRIs are political (not development) institutions– PRIs are corrupt, unskilled, inefficient– For foreign donors, the law prevents funding PRIs– The arguments are valid and require consideration

• Bringing development into political space, electoral cycles, less administration cost, decentralized corruption vs. more corruption

– Working through PRIs – recognizing primacy of mandate

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Ajit Chaudhuri - IRMA 14

POLICY OPTIONS - NGOS• Traditional space still intact, business of public service provision

for money needs rethinking• Different types of local institutions – which scenario should

NGOs contribute to?– Pluralism of competition and cooperation that thickens civil society and

results in efficiency, better representation, and other positive externalities OR

– Divisive, undermining legitimacy of elected local governments, providing conditions for elite capture

• To strengthen democratic decentralization, NGOs can –– Use mechanisms outlined in Panchayati Raj– Enable PRI control over planning and implementation– Build capacity of PRIs

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CONCLUSION

• Paper –– Describes democratic decentralization in India– Theorizes on democratic implications of

institutional choices of donor organizations– Advises on the need to think through whether to

work within the spirit of Part IX of Constitution– Suggests that development space for PRIs will

increase, and others need to evolve to be relevant– Requests that others join this socio-political

movement and enable it to fulfill its potential