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Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe

UNDERSTANDIN G ARTA FACTOR

December 2001

Since the year 2000 the Arta Outcome has been a major factor in the Somali politics. Some saw this as destabliser and the return of the old clique of the former dictatorial regime (thus Arta Group), whilst others saw it as the 'route’ to the revival of the Somali state. Although both views are based on emotional assumptions, they demonstrate how little is known about Arta influence to the current Somali politics. To understand the Arta factor we should look how the Arta is pronged to two determinants: the 'ideals' of the peace initiatives and how the outcome contradicted the current Somali socio-political reality.

1. The 'Ideals' In theory, Arta was expected to stand for a movement that was born from the Djibouti sponsored Somali National Peace Conference (SNPC) held in mid 2000. Although this definition may seem mockery for Arta’s opponents, the principal guidance of the peace proposal included a ‘Convoy of Peace’ (Geeddi Socodka Nabadda), which was to involve a process to transform the Somali conflict into peace by sending the traditional leaders to all Somali regions. This approach was not only searching for a solution but hopefully a process within the society affected by conflict, with the aim of empowering actors within the affected society. Convoy of peace describes the progression of the process to peace movement.

President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti who proposed the initiative at the 54th General Assembly of the United Nations on 23 September 1999 triggered the proceedings of the SNPC. This novel proposal that was meant to open a new dawn and solution to the Somali crisis stimulated two factors. First the peace talks were to be shifted to the civil society. In other words, the victims of the civil war were to lead the peace process. Secondly, in reaction to the first factor, a popular interest by the Somali society was generated.

The period marked the tenth year since the central authority collapsed following the breakdown of the state institutions. The civil strife was reaching at the stage of abating and war fatigue. The poplar support for the solution to the Somali problem was expected to receive a positive response. Despite that the objectives of the initiatives of the peace process were directed towards a noble end and many of its participants were honest, what the outcome damaged was the approach of the resolutions. This has laid the ground for a typical leadership. What has sealed the outcome, if I can borrow Professor Abdi Ismail Samatar’s expression, is the “poverty of leadership’s imagination” (Samatar, 1992), and it

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is dubbed as the Arta Group, was as soon as the SNPC had finished, the leading actors began to compete for its manipulation.

1.1. Setting the Stage for the Civil Society

Generally, a common understanding of civil society is a partnership between the family and the state, which exists to pursue collective goals. This is usually taken to include civic, professional, trade union and other voluntary organisations. Civil society is also often referred as a 'third sector' alongside the state and the market. This definition perceives civil society as a form of organised individuals that strive to achieve an end for the good of the community. In this case the civil society should be organised to make sense of their aim and concern. When any part of civil society coalesces around a shared concern, the individuals involved start with voluntary action.

To function and probably grow, civil society needs an environment of relative peace to develop. For example, during the peace building stage, one of the elements required to be revived. Here peace building refers to the post-conflict social construction in a period of sustainable peace. It is during this period that restoration of civil society takes place. It also aims at “reviving a country’s economy, establishing participatory system of governance and accountable administrations” (Heinrich, 1997). Other important characteristics during this stage include disarmament and demobilisation of militia, and their sustainable social, psychological and economic rehabilitation.

Undertaking such as shifting from the warlords, it was theorised that the civil society is to take a major role. Setting the stage for the civil society at the theoretical platform seemed working well until the stage of implementation had arrived. In previous peace talks, the warlords were the leading figures of the peace talks that were to blame for spoiling the Somali peace attempts.

1.2 The Question of Representation The controversy over the civil society case opened again another important front, that of the representation. In previously held peace-meetings the faction leaders dominated the conference and as soon as they were concluded, they were prone to failure, as many of these leaders were not really representative of any constituents.

The SNPC was proceeded by two symposiums: the Technical Consultative Somali Peace Process Symposium attended by Somali intellectuals and the Traditional Peace Symposium attended by Somali traditional elders. The first symposium was to advise on the technical side of the proposed conference, while the latter was to decide on representation.

Since this question had been of the most contentious issue in Somalia, the Djibouti authority was very cautious about this matter. This is carefully expounded in Annex IV of “Somalia National Peace Conference: An Action Plan for the Peace Process, [1999]” as it

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uses extremely guarded words about the matter. At the heart of the representation stands the issue of legitimacy and who represents whom. It explains it as follows,

“In a such situation as the massive population displacement and the occupation of lands by force there is no easy answer to what may or may not constitute legitimate representation in a country such as Somalia, that has undergone a drastic breakdown… and where basic information on population is lacking, and where major population displacement as well as movement has occurred” (Annex IV, 2000).

In spite of the contrary advice the Traditional Peace Symposium decided that representation was to be based on clan. The plan took a sharp twist when the delegates of Puntland elders went back to Garowe, the capital of Puntland, and rejected the proceeding of the Traditional Peace Symposium. For fear that the proceeding conference was about to collapse, the plan was changed and delegates were asked to represent their own locals. The action of asking people to represent themselves called for consultation was a complete infringement of the logic of representation. The resolution also ignored the developments, which had taken place during the previous ten years as a mood of centralisation of Somalia was shaped.

2. The Outcome Initially, the scheme of Convoy of Peace (Geeddi Socodka Nabadda) was to advocate and lead to a peace process and not just one event, e.g. peace conference. Process defines a means to an end and not an end in itself. However, the initial plan had been diverted to be used as an end. The conference just concentrated on one of the thorniest issues which made the previous conference fail: a vision for rebuilding the Somali state from the rubble of the shattered statehood and country, before considering the rehabilitation of social fabrics. This also contradicted UNESCO’s approach to civil war solutions is first to rebuild the society. Rehabilitation of the state was supposed to be seen as a project, which needed to lay down first suitable foundations.

The approach of considering the state prior to the civil rehabilitation made the SNPC glad to see things evolve with the motto: “a bad government is better than no government”. At Arta, after six months the SNPC ended up with the formation of a Transitional National Government (TNG) and a Transitional Constitution.

Similarly, the principle of conference was supposed to be based on lessons learned from previous peace failures. The idea of giving priority to the formation of the central authority without first creates its essential components advocates a top-down approach. This perspective may also contradict the natural trend into which Somali regions have been moving since the collapse. The task of recreating the Somali state leads to the need to establish a body, which could represent the central authority of the Somali nation. The logical conclusion is that such a body could stem out from the sum of its parts. Instead, the SNPC has agreed to form an 'externally driven body' without parts or limbs. This 'bubble body' depicted as the central government is at odds with itself, let alone functioning with its 'would-be-component' (the regions).

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The Djibouti initiative was set at a time when the Somali regions and towns where passing through a different organisational level after a decade of lack of national government. Since the outbreak of the civil war, Somali regions developed apart in different directions. Some parts have made considerable progress towards institution building and provision of basic services to their communities. This situation let Somalia be distinguished by three different zones: recovery zones, transitional zones and crisis zones. Similarly, Mr Kofi Anan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, also uses the same classification. In his report to the Security Council of 16 August 1999, Mr Anan urged that this classification be considered for assistance in humanitarian and rehabilitation strategic aid (see S/1999/882, 16 August 1999). The Secretary-General’s concluding recommendations ranged from emphasis on providing basic and life-saving service in the zones of crisis, to the provision of the technical support for good governance and capacity building in the recovery zones.

From Mr Anan’s observations, the most realistic approach for the Somali peace process in Djibouti was to agree on a means or mechanism which could bring each of the three zones to a stage of effective local governance. This mechanism could stand as a national committee or a national operational body. For instance, this mechanism could help those regions in the crisis zones to move into the recovery stage. So each may develop its own unique institutions according to local need, within the overall framework of a federal Somali state.

2.1 Approaches to Reconciliation Many have doubted the viability of the Arta Outcome, particularly the formation of the central authority (TNG), which by now was to stand for the 'bubble body'. What they hoped from at most, however, was that the ‘spirit of Arta’ could open new paths towards the reconciliation process. However, what few could not anticipate was that the fate of the future reconciliation was sealed by the very outcome. For the TNG, the end of the process of the formation of the central authority has been reached. This principle seen as the solution to the Somali problem could be non-negotiable because as they see it, it would put in jeopardy the existence of the very ‘state’. According to them, what remained was to invite its rivals to be in a position of ‘either on board or die out’.

A policy of assimilation was set, and as a proof of its ‘success’, this was measured by the absorption of a few waning Mogadishu warlords. Its failure disguised as scapegoat, is what made the former TNG Premier Ali Khalif Galeyr a victim. This policy is what makes the Arta Outcome − now dubbed as ‘Arta Group − unable to be seen as the solution, but as an obstacle to the very principles, which was supposed to stand for. As one of the main purposes of the ‘Arta spirit’, the national reconciliation became a mockery of the peace process.

The dead-end policy opened another important issue: Legitimacy and social mistrust, which is seen as central to the failure of the state. For the TNG this option became a way to gain legitimacy by force and money. To this end it began to build the ‘national army’ (which is made of only one militia group) and import arms and ammunition on an

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unprecedented scale. Looking from the Arta perspective, while the TNG contravenes its own enchanted 'Arta spirit', the prospect of its policy looks bleak as its initial action signals that the myth of militarism is yet to die in Somali politics.

This policy also ran alongside another priority by the TNG which was to gain international recognition rather than getting the confidence of its people. Whilst this move has to do a lot with globalisation, it is also aimed at the resuscitation of an externally driven state structure where the local people’s involvement is rarely sought. Similar approaches have been applied many times since the breakdown of the Somali state in early 1991. Not only were they all unsuccessful but they were also counter-productive.

3. Conclusion Shifting the focus of the peace process to the victims of the civil war is a great achievement, which should help any future talks.

Although the SNPC has failed to come up with a resolution to a viable Somali central authority, many hoped that its outcome (Arta Outcome) would pave the way for a phased reconciliation process. This did not materialise, as the outcome itself sealed the fate of the future reconciliation to a dead-end. This in turn has determined that the Arta Outcome is not the solution to Somali problem. However, at best what the outcome could be is a lesson of a failed peace opportunity to the future peace talks.

This, however, should be realised before Arta group degenerates into what one observer described as “mindi aan daab lahayn” (a loose gun). Whatever a group or clan takes it over may use it as means to any end. This way may usher the Somali nation to another era of warlordism.

5. References

Heinrich, Wolfgang, Building the Peace: Experience of Collaborative Peacebuilding in Somalia 1993-1996, Uppsala: Life & Peace Institute, November 1997.

Report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, S/1999/882, 16 August 1999.

Samatar, Abdi Ismail, “Social Decay and Public Institutions: the Road to Reconstruction in Somalia” in Beyond Conflict in the Horn, Eds. Martin Doorbnos, Lionel Cliff, Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, Institute of Social Studies, the Hague, in association with James Gurrey, London, 1992.

Somalia National Peace Conference: An Action Plan for the Peace Process, [1999].