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This presentation by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission was made during a hearing on Enhanced Enforcement Cooperation held at the 119th meeting of the Working Party 3 of the Competition Committee on 17 June 2014. Find out more at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/enhanced-enforcement-cooperation.htm
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Australia-New Zealand Enhanced
Co-operation
ACCC-NZCC cross-appointments
Background: a long history of Trans-Tasman Economic Co-operation
• Australia and New Zealand close geographic and economic neighbours and many companies operate in and/or trade between both countries
• 1983 Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (CER Agreement)
• 1988 MOU on the Harmonisation of Business Law between Australia and New Zealand
• 1990 introduction of s.46A of the Competition and Consumer Act (CCA) and s.36A of the Commerce Act (NZ) – misuse of substantial market power in a trans-Tasman market
• Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 – mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments
17 June 2014 OECD Competition Committee – WP3 2
Single Economic Market Outcomes Framework 2009
• Agreed between the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers 20 August 2009
• Competition policy stream proposed three outcomes: – Firms operating in both markets face the same consequences
for the same anticompetitive conduct
– Competition and consumer law regulators in both jurisdictions are able to share confidential information for enforcement purposes
– Cross-appointment of associate members on the ACCC and NZCC
17 June 2014 OECD Competition Committee – WP3 3
Long history of co-operation between the ACCC and the NZCC
• Many similarities in the structure of the CCA and the Commerce Act (mergers and agreements that SLC, taking advantage of SMP for an anti-competitive purpose, authorisation on public benefit grounds)
• 2006 Cooperation Protocol - merger review
• 2007 Cooperation Agreement – general
• 2013 Cooperation Agreement – provision of compulsorily acquired information and investigative assistance
• Tripartite arrangements with each of Canada, UK and Taiwan
17 June 2014 OECD Competition Committee – WP3 4
ACCC-NZCC Cross-appointments
• Cross appointments intended to enhance co-operation and increase alignment in the administration of competition law
• Inaugural cross-appointments commenced December 2010
• Mark Berry (Chair of the NZCC) and Jill Walker (Chair of the ACCC Merger Review Committee) cross-appointed as Associate Commissioners
• Initial focus on consideration of trans-Tasman mergers
• In the first three years we have considered 8 mergers under these arrangements and one currently under consideration
• Also considered revised Merger Guidelines and Authorisation Guidelines in New Zealand, revised Authorisation Guidelines and Merger Process Guidelines in Australia
17 June 2014 OECD Competition Committee – WP3 5
How it works in practice
• New Zealand has a Formal Merger Clearance regime • Australia has both a Formal and an “Informal” Merger Clearance regime, but
only the latter has been used to date • ACCC and NZCC staff have a long history of co-operation in merger reviews -
informal discussions and use of waivers • When a merger clearance application is received on both sides of the Tasman,
we now routinely consider that merger under the cross-appointments • ACCC Commissioner appointed to the NZCC Division considering the merger in
New Zealand with regular meetings • NZCC Commissioner invited to MRC and Commission meetings in Australia for
agenda items relating to consideration of the merger • Meetings generally occur by VCU • Cross-appointed Commissioners have full access to confidential information • In parallel, staff teams have regular discussions relating to markets, theories of
harm and development of potential remedies
17 June 2014 OECD Competition Committee – WP3 6
Benefits of the Cross Appointments
• Deepens cooperation at Commissioner and staff level
• Greater alignment of analytical frameworks, theories of harm and effective remedies – general and specific
• Pooling of knowledge, experience and expertise
• Consistent decisions – but may not be the same decision
• Markets may not always be the same (differences in product and geographic substitution)
• Competition concerns may arise in one country but not the other, e.g. differences in number of remaining players, or both
• Remedies may be required in one country or both
17 June 2014 OECD Competition Committee – WP3 7
Going Forward
• Commitment to review after initial 3 years
• Review and discussions re future arrangements ongoing
• Positive feedback from stakeholders
• Look forward to future announcements
17 June 2014 OECD Competition Committee – WP3 8
Thank You