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Presentation at Complex Systems Research Group at Medizinische Universität Wien, October 27, 2010
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Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Cooperation, Reputation & Gossiping
V.A. Traag1, P. Van Dooren1, Y.E. Nesterov2
1Department of Applied Mathematics
Universite Catholique de Louvain
2CORE
Universite Catholique de Louvain
27 October 2010
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Cooperation
Cooperation (and defection)
• Organizations (also Wikipedia, open source software, . . . )◮ Why do people contribute?
• Worker ants in colonies◮ Why do workers help without individual benefit?
• Prudents parasites in hosts◮ Why do parasites not replicate faster?
• Human body◮ Why do cells not replicate faster?
Central question
If defecting (not cooperating) is a real option, why (and how) hascooperation evolved?
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Formal cooperation (and defection)
Sort of Prisoner’s Dilemma
• The game knows two options, donating or not donating
• Donate b > 0 to someone at a cost c < b
• Agents are paired, and play a round of donating or not
• Cooperators C donate, defectors D do not donate
This can be summarized in the payoff matrix
A =
(C D
C b − c −c
D b 0
)
Defectors dominate
Whatever strategy you encounter (C or D), always better to defect
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Overview
What are possibly mechanisms to get cooperation? Payoff matrix
A =
(C D
C b − c −c
D b 0
)
Mechanisms
• Kin selection (r > cb)
Cooperate because offspring benefits from your cooperation.Basis of ‘selfish gene’, or ‘inclusive fitness’
• Direct reciprocity (w > cb)
Cooperate because of possible future payoffs
• Indirect reciprocity (q > cb)
Cooperate because someone else may cooperate with you in thefuture
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Some strategies
Example (Always)
Defect/cooperate on all rounds
Other CDDDDCC
AllD DDDDDDD
AllC CCCCCCCC
Example (Win-Stay, Lose-Shift)
Change strategy if losing, keep itotherwise
Other CDDDDCC
WSLS CCDCDCC
Example (Tit-for-tat)
Start cooperating, then imitateopponent
Other CDDDDCC
TFT CCDDDDC
Example (Generous Tit-for-tat)
As TFT, but cooperates afterdefection with probability p
Other CDDDDCC
GTFT CCDDCDC
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Insufficient explanation
Why is kin selection and direct reciprocity not sufficient?
Insufficient explanation
• Humans cooperate also with non-kin
• Humans cooperate in non-iterative situations
Indirect reciprocity
• Cooperate if cooperated with others in the past
• Brings reputation into play
• How to respond to reputation?
• How to determine new reputation?
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Indirect Reciprocity
Cooperate because others will return the favor
Simple reputation
• Cooperation increases reputation, defection decreases it
• Cooperate with those who have a good reputation
• Defect those who have a bad reputation
However. . .
• Many other possible interactions between cooperation andreputation.
• Should it be ‘bad’ or ‘good’ to cooperate with ‘bad’ agents?
• Should you cooperate only to increase your own reputation?
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Some reputation dynamics
Morals
• Defecting a defector: bad in image score
• What action should be regarded as good?
• When to cooperate, when to defect?
GG GB BG BB
C ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
D ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Reputation of donor and recipientAction of donor
New reputation can beeither Good or Bad
Action can be eitherCooperate or Defect
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Some reputation dynamics
GG GB BG BB
C G G G G
D B B B BImage scoring
C G G G G
D B G B BStanding
C G B G B
D B G B BJudging
C G B G B
D B B B BShunning
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Leading eight
Best strategies
• In total 2, 048 different possible strategies.
• There are 8 strategies (leading eight) that perform best (highestpayoff, and ESS)
GG GB BG BB
C G ∗ G ∗
D B G B ∗
C D C ×
Maintainance of cooperation
Mark defectors
Punish defectors
Forgive defectors
Apologize
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Subjective reputation
Subjective reputation
• Unrealistic that reputation is objective
• Introduce a subjective (private) reputation
• ‘Observe’ only a few interactions
Observing
• Probability q of observing an interaction
• Cooperation declines with lower q
• Diverging reputations cause further errors
• Good may defect bad, but not all agree on who’s bad
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Synchronize reputations
Synchronizing reputations
• Spread local information to synchronize reputations
• Players ‘gossip’ about each other to share information
• Start gossip, spread gossip and how to interpret gossip?
Lying, cheating and defecting
• Possibly ‘false’ gossips spread
• Spread rumours unconditionally allows liars to invade
• Liars cannot invade conditional rumour spreaders
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Proposed model
Basics
1 Each agent has a reputation of the other: Rij(m)
2 Everybody plays and cooperates/defects based on reputation
3 Everybody gossips the result of the interaction
4 New reputation Rij(m + 1) based on own observation and gossip
Decision to cooperate
• The decision to cooperate αij(m) (0 - Defect, 1 - Cooperate)
• Possibly logistic function (or others), but for now
αij(m) =
{0 if Rij(m) < 01 if Rij(m) ≥ 0
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Example
i j
k
Cooperate
Defect
Hmm. . .j defected
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Example
i j
kCooperate
Defect
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Example
i j
k
Cooperate
Cooperate
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Example
i j
k
Gossip D
efect
Did youknow j
defected?
So j defected k
also. And I likek! That bastard!
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Individual strategy
C D
C + −
D − +
Action of j , or αji (m).
Action of j , or αij(m)
Action is considered aseither Good or Bad
Individual strategy
• +1 for ‘good’ actions, −1 for ‘bad’ actions to reputation
• We currently study WSLS-like: Consider CC and DD as good.
∆Iij(m) = (2αij(m)− 1)(2αji (m)− 1)
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Gossiping
Consider all neighbours k when updating the reputation Sij
i j
k
The link tobe updated.
Does i ‘like’ k?
Will k gossip to i?
What actionhas j takento k?
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Social strategy
G B
C G B
D B G
Reputation of k , or αik(t).
Action of j , or αjk(t)
Action is considered aseither Good or Bad
Social strategy
• Cooperation vs. good agent and defection vs. bad agent is good
• Change in reputation due to gossiping with neighbour k
∆Sij(k ,m) = αki (m)(2αik(m)− 1)(2αjk(m)− 1)
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Reputation dynamics
Combine individual & social strategies
Combine with social influence parameter 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
∆Rij(m) = (1− λ)
Individual strategy︷ ︸︸ ︷
(2αij(m)− 1)(2αji (m)− 1)+
λ1
n − 2
∑
k 6=i ,j
αki (m)(2αik(m)− 1)(2αjk(m)− 1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Social strategy
Reputation dynamics
Rij(m + 1) = Rij(m) + ∆Rij(m)
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Cooperative fixed points
Fixed point
• For which networks do we have αij(m + 1) = αij(m)?
• Positive reputation remains positive,negative reputation remains negative
Undirected case
• If αij(m) = αji (m), fixed points are groups
• Cooperate within groups, defect between groups
• Implies it is (weakly) social balanced
• Can have q groups if
λ >q
q + 1
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Evolutionary dynamics
Four different regimes (Cooperate with prob p on first round)
p < 1/2 p > 1/2
λ < 1/2 Individualistic prejudiced
• Defect vs. cooperators
• Cycles of cooperation vs.defectors
Individualistic trusting
• Cooperate vs.cooperators
• Cycles of cooperationvs. defectors
λ > 1/2 Social prejudiced
• Cooperate vs. cooperators(except second round)
• Defect vs. defectors(except second round)
Social trusting
• Cooperate vs.cooperators
• Defect vs. defectors
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Phase portraits Individual
C D
Gossipers
Individual PrejudicedC D
Gossipers
Individual Trusting
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Phase portraits Social
C D
Gossipers
Social PrejudicedC D
Gossipers
Social Trusting
Introduction Indirect Reciprocity Proposed model Conclusions
Conclusions
Proposed model
• Proposed model for gossiping and reputation dynamics
• Interesting possible cooperative network structure
• Evolutionary stable for some parameter range
• More socially oriented strategy could have developed fromindividual strategy
Shortcomings
• Actual convergence to fixed point not investigated
• Characterize directed fixed points
• Evolutionary dynamics investigated in limit of large n
• Interact all-to-all unrealistic, e.g. restrict to graph
• Gossip perhaps passed on further (cascades of gossip)