MetaphysicsU. 1

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Metaphysics

The Nature of Reality

Consider firstly, an ‘ontological’ exercise:

RealUnreal (place the following along this continuum)

Perfection Colours Time Shadows Imagination

God Maths Morality Air Pain

Trees Music Choice Minds Thoughts

Atoms Unicorns Aliens Dreams Souls

Bodies Germs Electricity Dogs Evil

Metaphysics

The Nature of Reality

Can something be real but not exist, and vice versa?Can something be real if the senses

cannot perceive it? Which items exist in perpetuity, and which do not? Are there different ‘modes’ of existence?

RealUnreal

What qualities, if any, do the similarly grouped items share?

Metaphysics

Mind

Body

Metaphysics

Body

Mind

What constitutes ‘you’?

Physical (assoc. w.

body)

Mental (assoc. w.

mind)

Both(body & mind)

Neither

Metaphysics

Body

Mind

Hair Brain Dreams Eyes Teeth

Memories

Pain Teeth Ideas Senses

Bones Ideas Taste Fingernails

Fear

Metaphysics

Body

Mind

What constitutes ‘you’?

Physical components

Incorporeal components

Blue eyes

Values

Brown hair

Thoughts

Bone & Sinew

Feelings

Metaphysics

Body

Mind

Ostensibly, we are composed of two parts: The

Corporeal Me The

Intangible Me

Are the two actually separate in a meaningful sense?

Metaphysics

Body

Mind

Dualism Monism

2 Approaches/Views

Metaphysics

Body

Mind

Dualists argue there are two modes/levels of

existence:

A physical level, in which the corporeal body operates

And an incorporeal level, where the mind resides.

Dualism

Metaphysics

Body

Mind

Monists hold that there is only a single reality:

An entirely physical reality where mind and body are corporeal. (Physicalism)

OR An entirely mental/non- physical reality where matter does not exist. (Idealism)

Monism

The Case for Dualism – Texts for Analysis

1.

2.

Greek Mythology

Greek Humanis

m

500 BCE

An Intellectual Revolution

Rise of Dualism Against a Monist Mythology

“Men find it very hard to believe. They think that after (the soul) has left the body it no longer exists anywhere, but that it is destroyed and

dissolved on the day the man dies.”

“No, by god, I haven't. Are you really in a position to assert that?”

Cebe

Glaucon

“Haven't you realized that our soul is immortal and never destroyed?”

A Monist attitude prevailed in ancient Greece:

The Phaedo - Platonic Dualism

1. Argument Concerning

Indestructibility2. Argument Concerning

Recollection

3. Argument Concerning Opposites

The Phaedo - Platonic Dualism

1. Argument Concerning IndestructibilityP1: There are two kinds of

existence; seen and unseen;

P2: The Seen is changeable and the Unseen is unchanging;

P3: The soul is most alike and akin to the unseen;

C: Therefore, the soul is most likely unchanging, and thus indissoluble

The Phaedo - Platonic Dualism

2. Argument Concerning RecollectionP1: We cannot derive knowledge

(of absolutes) from the material world;

P2: We have knowledge (of absolutes);

P3: This knowledge must be obtained prior to our physical life;

C: Therefore, our soul must exist prior to our physical existence, and thus is separate from it.

So true Socrates, gosh you’re so wise!

The Phaedo - Platonic Dualism3. Argument Concerning

OppositesP1: All things that have opposites are generated out of their opposites

P2: Life is the opposite of Death, and vice versa

P3: The dead are generated from the living, the living are generated from the dead

C: Therefore, the souls of the dead must exist in some place out of which they come again

The Phaedo - Platonic Dualism

1. Argument Concerning

Indestructibility2. Argument Concerning

Recollection

3. Argument Concerning Opposites

The Case for Dualism – Texts for Analysis

1.

2.

Metaphysics

Body

Mind

C.17th revival of Dualism

‘Cartesian Dualism’

Metaphysics

Body

Mind

C.17th Dualist Revival

1. Argument from Doubt 2. Argument from

Indivisibility ‘Cartesian

Dualism’

1. Argument from Doubt

Cartesian Dualism

P1: I can doubt my body (physical self) exists

P2: I cannot doubt that I exist

C: Therefore, I must be distinct (a different substance) from my body

Some Responses to ‘The Cogito’How, Monsieur Descartes, does the existence of ‘thinking’ extend to the existence of an ‘I’? Better had the

conclusion been “it thinks”, as in “it is raining”.

Descartes, you scoundrel, your cogito already pre-supposes the existence of "I“ (which is doubting), and

therefore concluding with existence is logically trivial!

Descartes, old boy, I agree with Nietzsche; your process allows you to claim simply that “thinking is occurring” – you cannot attribute that thinking

to an entity.

2. Argument from Indivisibility

P1: The body is divisible into parts.

P2: The mind is not divisible into parts

C: Therefore, the mind is of a different nature to the body.

Cartesian Dualism

Metaphysics

Body

Mind

Even if we ‘suppose’ Dualism – problems arise: How does the incorporeal mind ‘control’ the

physical body?

Dualist Theories

Epiphenomenalism Interactionism

Occasionalism Parallelism

Consider the following theories regarding dualist mind-body

interaction:

How sufficiently do these theories account for the co-existence of a mental and

physical realm/reality?

Set this one to the side for

now

Property Dualism

The ONLY ‘substance’

The objective experience of ‘me’

The subjective experience of ‘me’

Property Dualism ‘Supervenience’

(pp.76-77 of Phelan)

Challenging Substance Dualism

The numerous cases of physical damage to the brain resulting in an alteration to personality and the function of the mind is a common

refutation of dualism

To view the mind as a thing which exists in addition to the body is a mistake in classification.

- My football team won the game - The team is made up of 15 members

- The team exists in addition to its members

Is it justified to speak of the mind as an ‘entity’, a ‘thing’ which exists? Consider:

Person Y did this for person X’s sake The ‘sake’ is not an entity in itself – just a term of reference

Challenging Substance Dualism

Genuine

Article

Category Error

Scientific

Evidence

MeaningfulMeaningle

ss

Thirsty

Physicalism P s

Behaviourism

Functionalism

Unverifiable statements about interior mental life are senseless.

For the behaviourist, ‘mental states’ are just descriptions of behaviour or dispositions to behave in certain ways

Pain Wincing, shrieking, hopping around, clutching the wound

Would be inclined to drink water if it were available

Problems?

- Pretence? - Paralysis? - Qualia?

Physicalism P s

Behaviourism

Functionalism

The role of the brain is purely functional:The brain responds to some stimuli (input) and processes a responses

(output)Problems?

- The Chinese Room

- Zombies & Mutants

- The Two Marys - Qualia

(Phelan pp. 87-88)

Mary Maryhttp://people.brandeis.edu/~

teuber/philsyllabus2.html

Physicalism P sUsing the Phelan textbook (pp.77 – 83) and internet

resources… (internet encyclopaedia of philosophy & Stanford university philosophy website are

good starting places)Write a brief explanation of the following Materialist

theories: 1. Reductive Materialism 2. Eliminative Materialism 3. Biological Naturalism

In addition to your ‘summary’ of the

theories, make some notes about any

problems with these theories.

Enjoyment of ice-cream

Experience of ‘redness’

Love

Thoughts about life

1. Reductive Materialism

BUT: Correlations are not explanations

2. Eliminative Materialism

Enjoyment of ice-cream

Experience of ‘redness’

Love

Thoughts about life

C-fibres firing

Stimulation of frontal

lobe

Neural transmitters

firing

Increase of

dopamine

Notions of thoughts and minds are old fashioned ‘hornswaggle’

BUT: ‘I am only what I can be proved to be through science’ =

fallacy

3. Biological Naturalism

MM

MM

‘Dualism in sheep’s

clothing’?

Physicalism P s

Idealism‘It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing

amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects have an existence

natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how

great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world; yet

whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it to

involve a manifest contradiction. ‘P1: We perceive ordinary objects (houses, mountains, etc.);

P2: We (are able to) perceive only ideas;

C: Therefore, ordinary objects are ideas.

M s

Idealism M s

Berkeley does not deny the existence of ordinary objects such as stones, trees, books,

and apples - he holds that only an immaterialist account of such objects can avoid scepticism about their existence and nature. What such

objects turn out to be, on his account, are bundles or collections of ideas.

Where is the texture of an

apple?Where is the colour of the

apple?

Where is the ‘sweetness’ of an

apple?

Where does the sound of eating an

apple exist?

Hierarchy of Ideas

Substance Dualism

Property Dualism

Monism

M s P s

M p

P s

P p

P s

Interactionism

Parallelism/Occasionalis

m

Epiphenomenalism

No exp. of interaction necessary.

M sOR

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