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Covert Communication in a Dark P2P Network A major new version of Freenet Ian Clarke and Oskar Sandberg The Freenet Project Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.1/24

2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

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Page 1: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Covert Communication in a DarkP2P Network

A major new version of FreenetIan Clarke and Oskar Sandberg

The Freenet Project

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.1/24

Page 2: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Introduction

• We have long been interested in decentralised“Peer to Peer” networks. Especially Freenet.

• But when individual users come under attack,decentralisation is not enough.

• Future networks may need to limit connections totrusted friends.

• The next version of Freenet will be based on thisphilosophy, a so called dark network.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.2/24

Page 3: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Introduction

• We have long been interested in decentralised“Peer to Peer” networks. Especially Freenet.

• But when individual users come under attack,decentralisation is not enough.

• Future networks may need to limit connections totrusted friends.

• The next version of Freenet will be based on thisphilosophy, a so called dark network.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.2/24

Page 4: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Introduction

• We have long been interested in decentralised“Peer to Peer” networks. Especially Freenet.

• But when individual users come under attack,decentralisation is not enough.

• Future networks may need to limit connections totrusted friends.

• The next version of Freenet will be based on thisphilosophy, a so called dark network.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.2/24

Page 5: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Introduction

• We have long been interested in decentralised“Peer to Peer” networks. Especially Freenet.

• But when individual users come under attack,decentralisation is not enough.

• Future networks may need to limit connections totrusted friends.

• The next version of Freenet will be based on thisphilosophy, a so called dark network.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.2/24

Page 6: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Overview of “Peer to Peer” net-works

• Information is spread across many inter-connected computers

• Users want to find information• Some are centralised (eg. Napster), some are

semi- centralised (eg. Kazaa), others aredistributed (eg. Freenet)

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.3/24

Page 7: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Overview of “Peer to Peer” net-works

• Information is spread across many inter-connected computers

• Users want to find information

• Some are centralised (eg. Napster), some aresemi- centralised (eg. Kazaa), others aredistributed (eg. Freenet)

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.3/24

Page 8: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Overview of “Peer to Peer” net-works

• Information is spread across many inter-connected computers

• Users want to find information• Some are centralised (eg. Napster), some are

semi- centralised (eg. Kazaa), others aredistributed (eg. Freenet)

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.3/24

Page 9: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Light P2P Networks

• Examples: Gnutella, Freenet, Distributed HashTables

• Advantage: Globally scalable with the rightrouting algorithm

• Disadvantage: Vulnerable to “harvesting”, ie.people you don’t know can easily discoverwhether you are part of the network

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.4/24

Page 10: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Light P2P Networks

• Examples: Gnutella, Freenet, Distributed HashTables

• Advantage: Globally scalable with the rightrouting algorithm

• Disadvantage: Vulnerable to “harvesting”, ie.people you don’t know can easily discoverwhether you are part of the network

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.4/24

Page 11: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Light P2P Networks

• Examples: Gnutella, Freenet, Distributed HashTables

• Advantage: Globally scalable with the rightrouting algorithm

• Disadvantage: Vulnerable to “harvesting”, ie.people you don’t know can easily discoverwhether you are part of the network

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.4/24

Page 12: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Dark or “Friend to Friend” P2PNetworks

• Peers only communicate directly with “trusted”peers

• Examples: Waste• Advantage: Only your trusted friends know you

are part of the network• Disadvantage: Networks are disconnected and

small, they typically don’t scale well

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.5/24

Page 13: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Dark or “Friend to Friend” P2PNetworks

• Peers only communicate directly with “trusted”peers

• Examples: Waste

• Advantage: Only your trusted friends know youare part of the network

• Disadvantage: Networks are disconnected andsmall, they typically don’t scale well

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.5/24

Page 14: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Dark or “Friend to Friend” P2PNetworks

• Peers only communicate directly with “trusted”peers

• Examples: Waste• Advantage: Only your trusted friends know you

are part of the network

• Disadvantage: Networks are disconnected andsmall, they typically don’t scale well

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.5/24

Page 15: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Dark or “Friend to Friend” P2PNetworks

• Peers only communicate directly with “trusted”peers

• Examples: Waste• Advantage: Only your trusted friends know you

are part of the network• Disadvantage: Networks are disconnected and

small, they typically don’t scale well

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.5/24

Page 16: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

The Small World Phenomenon

• In "Small world" networks short paths existbetween any two peers

• People tend to form this type of network (asshown by Milgram experiment)

• Short paths may exist but they may not be easy tofind

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.6/24

Page 17: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

The Small World Phenomenon

• In "Small world" networks short paths existbetween any two peers

• People tend to form this type of network (asshown by Milgram experiment)

• Short paths may exist but they may not be easy tofind

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.6/24

Page 18: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

The Small World Phenomenon

• In "Small world" networks short paths existbetween any two peers

• People tend to form this type of network (asshown by Milgram experiment)

• Short paths may exist but they may not be easy tofind Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.6/24

Page 19: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Navigable Small World Net-works

• Concept of similarity or “closeness” betweenpeers

• Similar peers are more likely to be connectedthan dissimilar peers

• You can get from any one peer to any othersimply by routing to the closest peer at each step

• This is called “Greedy Routing”• Freenet and “Distributed Hash Tables” rely on

this principal to find data in a scalabledecentralised manner

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.7/24

Page 20: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Navigable Small World Net-works

• Concept of similarity or “closeness” betweenpeers

• Similar peers are more likely to be connectedthan dissimilar peers

• You can get from any one peer to any othersimply by routing to the closest peer at each step

• This is called “Greedy Routing”• Freenet and “Distributed Hash Tables” rely on

this principal to find data in a scalabledecentralised manner

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.7/24

Page 21: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Navigable Small World Net-works

• Concept of similarity or “closeness” betweenpeers

• Similar peers are more likely to be connectedthan dissimilar peers

• You can get from any one peer to any othersimply by routing to the closest peer at each step

• This is called “Greedy Routing”• Freenet and “Distributed Hash Tables” rely on

this principal to find data in a scalabledecentralised manner

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.7/24

Page 22: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Navigable Small World Net-works

• Concept of similarity or “closeness” betweenpeers

• Similar peers are more likely to be connectedthan dissimilar peers

• You can get from any one peer to any othersimply by routing to the closest peer at each step

• This is called “Greedy Routing”

• Freenet and “Distributed Hash Tables” rely onthis principal to find data in a scalabledecentralised manner

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.7/24

Page 23: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Navigable Small World Net-works

• Concept of similarity or “closeness” betweenpeers

• Similar peers are more likely to be connectedthan dissimilar peers

• You can get from any one peer to any othersimply by routing to the closest peer at each step

• This is called “Greedy Routing”• Freenet and “Distributed Hash Tables” rely on

this principal to find data in a scalabledecentralised manner

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.7/24

Page 24: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Application

How can we apply small world theory to routing in aDark peer to peer network?

• Just like on the Internet, we need a way to routethrough the network.

• If people can route in a social network, then itshould be possible for computers.

• Jon Kleinberg explained in 2000 how small worldnetworks can be navigable.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.8/24

Page 25: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Application

How can we apply small world theory to routing in aDark peer to peer network?

• Just like on the Internet, we need a way to routethrough the network.

• If people can route in a social network, then itshould be possible for computers.

• Jon Kleinberg explained in 2000 how small worldnetworks can be navigable.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.8/24

Page 26: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Application

How can we apply small world theory to routing in aDark peer to peer network?

• Just like on the Internet, we need a way to routethrough the network.

• If people can route in a social network, then itshould be possible for computers.

• Jon Kleinberg explained in 2000 how small worldnetworks can be navigable.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.8/24

Page 27: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Application

How can we apply small world theory to routing in aDark peer to peer network?

• Just like on the Internet, we need a way to routethrough the network.

• If people can route in a social network, then itshould be possible for computers.

• Jon Kleinberg explained in 2000 how small worldnetworks can be navigable.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.8/24

Page 28: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Kleinberg’s Result

• The possibility of routing efficiently depends onthe proportion of connections that have differentlengths with respect to the “position” of thenodes.

• The proportion of connections with a certainlength should be inverse to the length.

• In this case a simple greedy routing algorithmperforms in O(log2

n) steps.• But in a social network, how do we see if one

person is closer to the destination than another?

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.9/24

Page 29: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Kleinberg’s Result

• The possibility of routing efficiently depends onthe proportion of connections that have differentlengths with respect to the “position” of thenodes.

• The proportion of connections with a certainlength should be inverse to the length.

• In this case a simple greedy routing algorithmperforms in O(log2

n) steps.• But in a social network, how do we see if one

person is closer to the destination than another?

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.9/24

Page 30: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Kleinberg’s Result

• The possibility of routing efficiently depends onthe proportion of connections that have differentlengths with respect to the “position” of thenodes.

• The proportion of connections with a certainlength should be inverse to the length.

• In this case a simple greedy routing algorithmperforms in O(log2

n) steps.

• But in a social network, how do we see if oneperson is closer to the destination than another?

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.9/24

Page 31: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Kleinberg’s Result

• The possibility of routing efficiently depends onthe proportion of connections that have differentlengths with respect to the “position” of thenodes.

• The proportion of connections with a certainlength should be inverse to the length.

• In this case a simple greedy routing algorithmperforms in O(log2

n) steps.• But in a social network, how do we see if one

person is closer to the destination than another?

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.9/24

Page 32: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Application, cont.

Is Alice closer to Harry than Bob?

• In real life, people presumably use a large numberof factors to decide this. Where do they live?What are their jobs? What are their interests?

• One cannot, in practice, expect a computer toroute based on such things.

• Instead, we let the network tell us!

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.10/24

Page 33: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Application, cont.

Is Alice closer to Harry than Bob?

• In real life, people presumably use a large numberof factors to decide this. Where do they live?What are their jobs? What are their interests?

• One cannot, in practice, expect a computer toroute based on such things.

• Instead, we let the network tell us!

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.10/24

Page 34: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Application, cont.

Is Alice closer to Harry than Bob?

• In real life, people presumably use a large numberof factors to decide this. Where do they live?What are their jobs? What are their interests?

• One cannot, in practice, expect a computer toroute based on such things.

• Instead, we let the network tell us!

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.10/24

Page 35: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Application, cont.

Is Alice closer to Harry than Bob?

• In real life, people presumably use a large numberof factors to decide this. Where do they live?What are their jobs? What are their interests?

• One cannot, in practice, expect a computer toroute based on such things.

• Instead, we let the network tell us!

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.10/24

Page 36: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Application, cont.

• Kleinberg’s model suggests: there should be fewlong connections, and many short ones.

• We can assign numerical identities placing nodesin a grid, and do it in such a way that this isfulfilled.

• In other words, we “reverse engineer” the nodespositions based on the connections in thenetwork.

• Then greedy route with respect to thesenumerical identities.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.11/24

Page 37: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Application, cont.

• Kleinberg’s model suggests: there should be fewlong connections, and many short ones.

• We can assign numerical identities placing nodesin a grid, and do it in such a way that this isfulfilled.

• In other words, we “reverse engineer” the nodespositions based on the connections in thenetwork.

• Then greedy route with respect to thesenumerical identities.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.11/24

Page 38: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Application, cont.

• Kleinberg’s model suggests: there should be fewlong connections, and many short ones.

• We can assign numerical identities placing nodesin a grid, and do it in such a way that this isfulfilled.

• In other words, we “reverse engineer” the nodespositions based on the connections in thenetwork.

• Then greedy route with respect to thesenumerical identities.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.11/24

Page 39: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Application, cont.

• Kleinberg’s model suggests: there should be fewlong connections, and many short ones.

• We can assign numerical identities placing nodesin a grid, and do it in such a way that this isfulfilled.

• In other words, we “reverse engineer” the nodespositions based on the connections in thenetwork.

• Then greedy route with respect to thesenumerical identities.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.11/24

Page 40: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

The Method

• When nodes join the network, they choose aposition randomly.

• They then switch positions with other nodes, soas to minimize the product of the edge distances.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.12/24

Page 41: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

The Method

• When nodes join the network, they choose aposition randomly.

• They then switch positions with other nodes, soas to minimize the product of the edge distances.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.12/24

Page 42: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Simulations

We have simulated networks in three different modes:

• Random walk search: “random”.• Greedy routing in Kleinberg’s model with

identities as when it was constructed: “good”.• Greedy routing in Kleinberg’s model with

identities assigned according to our algorithm(2000 iterations per node): “restored”.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.13/24

Page 43: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Simulations

We have simulated networks in three different modes:

• Random walk search: “random”.

• Greedy routing in Kleinberg’s model withidentities as when it was constructed: “good”.

• Greedy routing in Kleinberg’s model withidentities assigned according to our algorithm(2000 iterations per node): “restored”.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.13/24

Page 44: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Simulations

We have simulated networks in three different modes:

• Random walk search: “random”.• Greedy routing in Kleinberg’s model with

identities as when it was constructed: “good”.

• Greedy routing in Kleinberg’s model withidentities assigned according to our algorithm(2000 iterations per node): “restored”.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.13/24

Page 45: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Simulations

We have simulated networks in three different modes:

• Random walk search: “random”.• Greedy routing in Kleinberg’s model with

identities as when it was constructed: “good”.• Greedy routing in Kleinberg’s model with

identities assigned according to our algorithm(2000 iterations per node): “restored”.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.13/24

Page 46: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Simulations, cont.

The proportion of queries that succeeded within(log2 n)2 steps, where n is the network size:

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

1000 10000 100000

Succ

Network Size

randomgood

restored

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.14/24

Page 47: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Simulations, cont.

The proportion of queries that succeeded within(log2 n)2 steps, where n is the network size:

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

1000 10000 100000

Succ

Network Size

randomgood

restored

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.14/24

Page 48: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Simulations, cont.

The average length of the successful routes:

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

1000 10000 100000

Step

s

Network Size

randomgood

restored

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.15/24

Page 49: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Simulations, cont.

The average length of the successful routes:

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

1000 10000 100000

Step

s

Network Size

randomgood

restored

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.15/24

Page 50: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Results

• Simulated networks are only so interesting, whatabout the real world?

• We borrowed some data from orkut.com. 2196people were spidered, starting with Ian.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.16/24

Page 51: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Results

• Simulated networks are only so interesting, whatabout the real world?

• We borrowed some data from orkut.com. 2196people were spidered, starting with Ian.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.16/24

Page 52: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Results, cont.

• The set was spidered so as to be comparativelydense (average 36.7 connections per person).

• It contains mostly American techies andprogrammers. Some are probably in this room.(No Brazilians...)

• The degree distri-bution is approxi-mately Power-Law:

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0 50 100 150 200 250 300Degree

Frequency

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.17/24

Page 53: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Results, cont.

• The set was spidered so as to be comparativelydense (average 36.7 connections per person).

• It contains mostly American techies andprogrammers. Some are probably in this room.(No Brazilians...)

• The degree distri-bution is approxi-mately Power-Law:

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0 50 100 150 200 250 300Degree

Frequency

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.17/24

Page 54: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Results, cont.

• The set was spidered so as to be comparativelydense (average 36.7 connections per person).

• It contains mostly American techies andprogrammers. Some are probably in this room.(No Brazilians...)

• The degree distri-bution is approxi-mately Power-Law:

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0 50 100 150 200 250 300Degree

Frequency

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.17/24

Page 55: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Results, cont.

Searching the Orkut dataset, for a maximum oflog2(n)2 steps.

Success Rate Mean StepsRandom Search

0.72 43.85

Our Algorithm

0.97 7.714

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.18/24

Page 56: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Results, cont.

Searching the Orkut dataset, for a maximum oflog2(n)2 steps.

Success Rate Mean StepsRandom Search 0.72 43.85Our Algorithm

0.97 7.714

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.18/24

Page 57: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Results, cont.

Searching the Orkut dataset, for a maximum oflog2(n)2 steps.

Success Rate Mean StepsRandom Search 0.72 43.85Our Algorithm 0.97 7.714

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.18/24

Page 58: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Results

Clipping degree at 40 connections. (24.2 connectionsper person.)

Success Rate Mean StepsRandom Search

0.51 50.93

Our Algorithm

0.98 10.90

Our algorithm takes advantage of there being peoplewho have many connections, but it does not dependon them.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.19/24

Page 59: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Results

Clipping degree at 40 connections. (24.2 connectionsper person.)

Success Rate Mean StepsRandom Search 0.51 50.93Our Algorithm

0.98 10.90

Our algorithm takes advantage of there being peoplewho have many connections, but it does not dependon them.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.19/24

Page 60: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Results

Clipping degree at 40 connections. (24.2 connectionsper person.)

Success Rate Mean StepsRandom Search 0.51 50.93Our Algorithm 0.98 10.90

Our algorithm takes advantage of there being peoplewho have many connections, but it does not dependon them.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.19/24

Page 61: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Results

Clipping degree at 40 connections. (24.2 connectionsper person.)

Success Rate Mean StepsRandom Search 0.51 50.93Our Algorithm 0.98 10.90

Our algorithm takes advantage of there being peoplewho have many connections, but it does not dependon them.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.19/24

Page 62: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Practical Concerns

• So the theory works, but how does oneimplement such a network in practice?

• Key concerns:• Preventing malicious behaviour

• Ensuring ease of use

• Storing data

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.20/24

Page 63: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Practical Concerns

• So the theory works, but how does oneimplement such a network in practice?

• Key concerns:

• Preventing malicious behaviour

• Ensuring ease of use

• Storing data

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.20/24

Page 64: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Practical Concerns

• So the theory works, but how does oneimplement such a network in practice?

• Key concerns:• Preventing malicious behaviour

• Ensuring ease of use

• Storing data

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.20/24

Page 65: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Practical Concerns

• So the theory works, but how does oneimplement such a network in practice?

• Key concerns:• Preventing malicious behaviour• Ensuring ease of use

• Storing data

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.20/24

Page 66: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Practical Concerns

• So the theory works, but how does oneimplement such a network in practice?

• Key concerns:• Preventing malicious behaviour• Ensuring ease of use• Storing data

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.20/24

Page 67: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Preventing Malicious Behaviour

Threats:

• Selection of identity to attract certain data

• Manipulation of other node’s identities

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.21/24

Page 68: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Preventing Malicious Behaviour

Threats:

• Selection of identity to attract certain data• Manipulation of other node’s identities

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.21/24

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Ensuring ease of use

• Peers will need to be “always on”

• Peer introduction• Email• Phone• Trusted third party

• What about NATs and firewalls• Could use UDP hole- punching (as used by

Dijjer, Skype)• Would require third- party for negotiation

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.22/24

Page 70: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Ensuring ease of use

• Peers will need to be “always on”• Peer introduction

• Email• Phone• Trusted third party

• What about NATs and firewalls• Could use UDP hole- punching (as used by

Dijjer, Skype)• Would require third- party for negotiation

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.22/24

Page 71: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Ensuring ease of use

• Peers will need to be “always on”• Peer introduction

• Email

• Phone• Trusted third party

• What about NATs and firewalls• Could use UDP hole- punching (as used by

Dijjer, Skype)• Would require third- party for negotiation

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.22/24

Page 72: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Ensuring ease of use

• Peers will need to be “always on”• Peer introduction

• Email• Phone

• Trusted third party• What about NATs and firewalls

• Could use UDP hole- punching (as used byDijjer, Skype)

• Would require third- party for negotiation

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.22/24

Page 73: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Ensuring ease of use

• Peers will need to be “always on”• Peer introduction

• Email• Phone• Trusted third party

• What about NATs and firewalls• Could use UDP hole- punching (as used by

Dijjer, Skype)• Would require third- party for negotiation

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.22/24

Page 74: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Ensuring ease of use

• Peers will need to be “always on”• Peer introduction

• Email• Phone• Trusted third party

• What about NATs and firewalls

• Could use UDP hole- punching (as used byDijjer, Skype)

• Would require third- party for negotiation

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.22/24

Page 75: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Ensuring ease of use

• Peers will need to be “always on”• Peer introduction

• Email• Phone• Trusted third party

• What about NATs and firewalls• Could use UDP hole- punching (as used by

Dijjer, Skype)

• Would require third- party for negotiation

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.22/24

Page 76: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Ensuring ease of use

• Peers will need to be “always on”• Peer introduction

• Email• Phone• Trusted third party

• What about NATs and firewalls• Could use UDP hole- punching (as used by

Dijjer, Skype)• Would require third- party for negotiation

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.22/24

Page 77: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Conclusion

We believe very strongly that building a navigable,scalable Darknet is possible. And we intend to do it!

• There is still much work to do on the theory.• Can other models work better?• Can we find better selection functions for

switching?• It needs to be tested on more data.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.23/24

Page 78: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Conclusion

We believe very strongly that building a navigable,scalable Darknet is possible. And we intend to do it!

• There is still much work to do on the theory.

• Can other models work better?• Can we find better selection functions for

switching?• It needs to be tested on more data.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.23/24

Page 79: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Conclusion

We believe very strongly that building a navigable,scalable Darknet is possible. And we intend to do it!

• There is still much work to do on the theory.• Can other models work better?

• Can we find better selection functions forswitching?

• It needs to be tested on more data.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.23/24

Page 80: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Conclusion

We believe very strongly that building a navigable,scalable Darknet is possible. And we intend to do it!

• There is still much work to do on the theory.• Can other models work better?• Can we find better selection functions for

switching?

• It needs to be tested on more data.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.23/24

Page 81: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Conclusion

We believe very strongly that building a navigable,scalable Darknet is possible. And we intend to do it!

• There is still much work to do on the theory.• Can other models work better?• Can we find better selection functions for

switching?• It needs to be tested on more data.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.23/24

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Conclusion, cont.

• We have learned the hard way that practice ismore difficult than theory.

• Security issues are very important.• How the network is deployed will affect how

well it works.

People who are interested can join the discussion athttp://freenetproject.org/.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.24/24

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Conclusion, cont.

• We have learned the hard way that practice ismore difficult than theory.• Security issues are very important.

• How the network is deployed will affect howwell it works.

People who are interested can join the discussion athttp://freenetproject.org/.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.24/24

Page 84: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Conclusion, cont.

• We have learned the hard way that practice ismore difficult than theory.• Security issues are very important.• How the network is deployed will affect how

well it works.

People who are interested can join the discussion athttp://freenetproject.org/.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.24/24

Page 85: 2009 Covert Communication In A Dark P2 P Net Work A Major New Version Of Freenet

Conclusion, cont.

• We have learned the hard way that practice ismore difficult than theory.• Security issues are very important.• How the network is deployed will affect how

well it works.

People who are interested can join the discussion athttp://freenetproject.org/.

Ian Clarke & Oskar Sandberg - 2005 – p.24/24