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Anatomy of an Attack

Anatomy of an Attack

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Every year, companies lose $100 billion to online fraud. In this deck, we detail an actual online attack by fraudsters on a prominent gaming website and how Kount identified and prevented fraudulent transactions.

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Page 1: Anatomy of an Attack

Anatomy of an Attack

Page 2: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

1. On December 27, 2012, a global top ten gamer website experienced a dramatic increase in the number of declined orders.

2. The decline rate went from the average of under 5% to over 35%

3. Kount detected and stopped a BOT attack that was attempting to infiltrate and fraudulently purchase goods on the website

4. The attack lasted approximately three days

5. During the attack and once the attack was over, the company’s website responded normally, as if nothing happened.

The Attack

Page 3: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

The AttackThis line represents the upper limit of declines. This is calculated daily based on a 14-day trailing average of daily variations to 99%. Generally, this line is 3 standard deviations from the “decline mean” rate.

Page 4: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

The AttackThis line represents the lower limit of declines. This is calculated daily based on a 14-day trailing average of daily variations to 99%. Generally, this line is 3 standard deviations from the “decline mean” rate.

Page 5: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

The Attack

This line represents the decline rate mean. This is calculated daily based on a 14-day trailing average of daily variations to 99%. The decline rate averages between 3% - 6% based on rules applied by Blizzard.

Page 6: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

The Attack

This line represents the actual decline rate.

Page 7: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

The Attack

Note: since these lines are created from a 14-day trailing average, we see them increase as a result. These will return to normal ranges in time.

Page 8: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

The AttackThis line represents actual # of approvals daily.

This line represents actual # of declines daily.

This line represents actual # of reviews daily.

Spike in sales on Christmas day, expected activity.No increase in declines, also expected activity.

Spike in declines over the next three days without corresponding increase in sales, unexpected, unusual activity.

Page 9: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

The Attack

RANK EMAIL # TRANSACTIONS1 [email protected] 47622 [email protected] 13493 [email protected] 1243

7,354

The attack was centered around three main email addresses which may indicate that a “bot” was running from hijacked or dedicated machines…

Declined orders

Page 10: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

The Attack

RANK IP ADDRESS TRANSACTIONS1 79.126.163.185 57392 79.126.172.135 1628

7,367

…and only two IP addresses

Page 11: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

The AttackEach dot represents the number of attempts made per minute, sometimes averaging nearly two and a half attempts per second.

This line represents the running average of attempts per minute.

Page 12: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

The Attack

From the email address [email protected]:

# TRANSATION DATE/TIME TRANSACTION COUNT1 12/27/2012 1:31:00 PM

1082 12/27/2012 1:32:00 PM

713 12/27/2012 1:33:00 PM

1004 12/27/2012 1:34:00 PM

415 12/27/2012 1:35:00 PM

856 12/27/2012 1:36:00 PM

114

Page 13: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

The AttackWhere did these “orders” originate?

Macedonia

Page 14: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

The Result

Kount responded to this attack exactly how it was designed.

• Detected the fraud, in real-time• Stopped the fraud, in real-time• Reported the fraud• Protected the customer• Kept exposure to fraud and fraud losses to ZERO $$$• All done automatically, without interrupting normal business activity• This type of fraud could not have been detected using old, look-up technology

Page 15: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

• World’s largest online distributor of independent music- Helps artist sell to iTunes, Amazon and Facebook

• Paying out 75% commissions• Over $200 million in commissions paid• Fraudulent artists & affiliates• Charge backs/Fraud 2.5%+, $26,000 lost in one month• Reputation at stake with some partner brands

Case Study – CDBabySituation

Page 16: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

Case Study - CDBaby

Fraudster posing as an artist post music for sale on CDBaby.com

1

Page 17: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

Case Study - CDBaby

Fraudster posing as an artist post music for sale on CDBaby.com

1

Fraudster joins CDBaby affiliate program, receives 75% commission

2

Page 18: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

Case Study - CDBaby

Fraudster posing as an artist post music for sale on CDBaby.com

1

Fraudster joins CDBaby affiliate program, receives 75% commission

2

Using stolen credit information, Fraudster purchases music from affiliate (Fraudster)

3

Page 19: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

Case Study - CDBaby

Fraudster posing as an artist post music for sale on CDBaby.com

1

Fraudster joins CDBaby affiliate program, receives 75% commission

2

Using stolen credit information, Fraudster purchases music from affiliate (Fraudster)

3Pays royalty to artist

4

Pays commission to affiliate (75%)

Pays fines, chargebacks

Page 20: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

Case Study - CDBaby

• Reduced fraud by 96%• Results in less than 30 days

• Fraud losses average $850/mo.• NO loss in revenue• Enhanced marketing opportunities• Great relationship with iTunes

Page 21: Anatomy of an Attack

KOUNT CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY

Questions

Don BushVP, Marketing, [email protected]