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CLOUD 9: UNCOVERING SECURITY & FORENSICS DISCOVERY IN CLOUD [CLUB HACK 20 10 EDITION] Aut viam inveniam aut faciam Hannibal Barca by Manu Zacharia MVP (Enterprise Security), C|EH, ISLA-2010 (ISC)², C|HFI, CCNA, MCP Certified ISO 27001:2005 Lead Auditor Director – Information Security US Based Consultancy Firm

Cloud computing security & forensics (manu)

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Page 1: Cloud computing security & forensics (manu)

CLOUD 9:U N C O V E R I N G S E C U R I T Y & F O R E N S I C S D I S C O V E RY

I N C L O U D[ C LU B H A C K 2 0 1 0 E D I T I O N ]

CLOUD 9:U N C O V E R I N G S E C U R I T Y & F O R E N S I C S D I S C O V E RY

I N C L O U D[ C LU B H A C K 2 0 1 0 E D I T I O N ]

“Aut viam inveniam aut faciam ” Hannibal Barca

by Manu ZachariaMVP (Enterprise Security), C|EH,

ISLA-2010 (ISC)², C|HFI, CCNA, MCPCertified ISO 27001:2005 Lead Auditor

Director – Information SecurityUS Based Consultancy Firm

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• I am an Information Security Evangelist • For paying my bills – I work as Director – Information Security – US Based Consultancy.

• Awards• Information Security Leadership Achievement Award from International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium - (ISC)²

• Microsoft Most Valuable Professional (Enterprise Security)

• Author of a Book – Intrusion Alert – An Ethical Hacker’s Guide to Intrusion Detection Systems

• President – Information Security Research Association - NPO

#whoami

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• Developed an Operating System from Linux

kernel – Matriux – (www.matriux.com) - Asia’s

First OS for Hacking, Forensics and Security

testing – Open Source & Free

• Founder c0c0n – International Security &

Hacking Conf

• Extend service to police force as Cyber

Forensics Consultant

#whoami

Page 4: Cloud computing security & forensics (manu)

• The opinion here represented are my personal ones and do not necessary reflect my employers views.

• Registered brands belong to their legitimate owners.

• The information contained in this presentation does not break any intellectual property, nor does it provide detailed information that may be in conflict with any laws (hopefully...) :)

DISCLAIMER(S)

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• Information and resources from Internet (including publications from Cloud Security Alliance) were extensively used for the creation of this presentation.

REFERENCES

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CONCLUSION

EXPLOITING CLOUD & FORENSICS

CLOUD SECURITY & RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

INTRO & CLOUD ARCHITECTURE

AGENDA

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INTRODUCTION

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• So what is Cloud Computing?

• Do you know what is EC2 and S3?

• What is SPI Model?

QUESTION

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• cloud is loud

• Headline stealer

• Everybody is concerned about Cloud

Security

WHY THIS TALK?

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• Why handle cloud differently?

• Simple – power of cloud

WHY CLOUD IS DIFFERENT?

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TIGR - ??????• Barack Obama's Technology

Innovation and Government Reform Team (TIGR) describe the use of cloud computing as "one of the most important transformations the federal government will go through in the next decade."

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• A 64 node Linux cluster can be online in

just five minutes

• Forget about those sleepless nights in

your data centers

CLOUD POWER

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• Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud

(Amazon EC2)

• A web service that provides resizable

compute capacity in the cloud

EC2

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• Allows users to rent computers on which

to run their own computer applications.

• A user can boot an Amazon Machine

Image (AMI) to create a virtual machine,

which Amazon calls an "instance",

containing any software desired.

EC2 - WIKIPEDIA

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• A user can create, launch, and terminate

server instances as needed, paying by the

hour for active servers, hence the term

"elastic".

EC2 - WIKIPEDIA

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• Amazon S3 (Simple Storage Service) is

an online storage web service offered by

Amazon Web Services.

• Provides unlimited storage through a

simple web services interface

S3

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• $0.15 per gigabyte-month

• 102 billion objects as of March 2010

S3

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• The New York Times - Amazon EC2 and

S3 - PDF's of 15M scanned news articles.

• NASDAQ uses Amazon S3 to deliver

historical stock information.

POWER OF CLOUD

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• Cloud separates:

• application and information resources

from the underlying infrastructure, and

• the mechanisms used to deliver them.

CLOUD

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Use of a collection of

• services,

• applications,

• information, and

• infrastructure

comprised of pools of compute, network,

information, and storage resources.

CLOUD

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• Components can be

• rapidly orchestrated,

• provisioned,

• implemented & decommissioned, and

• scaled up or down

• Provide an on-demand utility-like model.

CLOUD

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• From an architectural perspective; there

is much confusion

• How cloud is both similar to and

different from existing models of

computing?

CLOUD CONFUSION

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• How these similarities and differences

impact the• organizational, • operational, and • technological approaches

to network and information security

practices.

CLOUD CONFUSION

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Marcus Ranum - Same old,

Same old

CLOUD SECURITY – DIFFERENT?

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Same Client / Server paradigm from Mainframe days – Bruce Schneier

CLOUD SECURITY – DIFFERENT?

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So what is this cloud?

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CLOUD ARCHITECTURE

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• NIST (U.S. National Institute of Standards

and Technology) defines cloud computing

by describing:

• five essential characteristics,

• three cloud service models, and

• four cloud deployment models.

CLOUD

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• Five essential characteristics

• On-demand self-service

• Broad network access

• Resource pooling

• Rapid elasticity

• Measured service

CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS

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• On-demand self-service

• Unilaterally provision computing

capabilities as needed automatically,

without requiring human interaction with

a service provider.

• Computing capabilities include server time

and network storage

CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS

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• Broad network access

• Available over the network and

accessed through standard mechanisms

CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS

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• Can be accessed through

heterogeneous thin or thick client

platforms (e.g., mobile phones, laptops,

and PDAs) as well as other traditional or

cloud based software services.

CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS

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• Resource pooling

• The provider’s computing resources are

pooled to serve multiple consumers

using a multi-tenant model,

• Different physical and virtual resources

dynamically assigned and reassigned

according to consumer demand.

CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS

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• Degree of location independence -

customer has no control or knowledge over

the exact location of the provided resources

• Customer may be able to specify location

at a higher level of abstraction (e.g.,

country, state, or datacenter).

CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS

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• Examples of resources include:

• storage,

• processing,

• memory,

• network bandwidth, and

• virtual machines.

CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS

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• Rapid elasticity

• Capabilities can be

• rapidly and elastically provisioned to

quickly scale out ; and

• rapidly released to quickly scale in.

• In some cases this is done automatically.

CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS

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• Measured service.

• Metering capability at some level of

abstraction appropriate to the type of service

• Resource usage can be monitored,

controlled, and reported — providing

transparency for both the provider and

consumer of the service.

CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS

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• Example:

• storage,

• processing,

• bandwidth,

• active user accounts

CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS

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• Myths about Cloud Computing Essential

Characteristics

• Virtualization is mandatory

• Answer is No

• Cloud services are often but not always

utilized in conjunction with, and enabled by,

virtualization technologies

MYTHS - CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS

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• There is no requirement that ties the

abstraction of resources to

virtualization technologies

• In many offerings virtualization by

hypervisor or operating system

container is not utilized.

MYTHS - CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS

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• Multi-tenancy as an essential cloud

characteristic

• Multi-tenancy is not called out as an

essential cloud characteristic by NIST

but is often discussed as such.

MYTHS - CLOUD CHARACTERISTICS

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• Divided into three archetypal models.

• The three fundamental classifications are

known as the SPI Model.

• Various other derivative combinations are

also available.

CLOUD SERVICE MODELS

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• Cloud Service Models

• Cloud Software as a Service (SaaS).

• Cloud Platform as a Service (PaaS).

• Cloud Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).

CLOUD SERVICE MODELS

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• The client use the software / applications

running on a cloud infrastructure.

• Accessed through thin client interface

such as a browser.

CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - SaaS

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• User does not manage or control the

underlying cloud infrastructure including:

• network,

• servers,

• operating systems,

• storage, or

• even individual application capabilities

CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - SaaS

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• Possible exception - limited user specific

application configuration settings.

CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - SaaS

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• User can deploy onto the cloud

infrastructure consumer-created or

acquired applications created using

programming languages and tools

supported by the provider.

CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - PaaS

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• The consumer does not manage or control

the underlying cloud infrastructure including

• network,

• servers,

• operating systems, or

• storage,

CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - PaaS

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• Has control over the deployed

applications and possibly application

hosting environment configurations.

CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - PaaS

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• The user can provision

• processing,

• storage,

• networks, and

• other fundamental computing resources

CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - IaaS

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• The consumer is able to deploy and run

arbitrary software, which can include

operating systems and applications.

• The consumer does not manage or

control the underlying cloud infrastructure

CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - IaaS

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• Has control over

• operating systems,

• storage,

• deployed applications, and

• possibly limited control of select networking

components (e.g., host firewalls).

CLOUD SERVICE MODELS - IaaS

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• Regardless of the service model, there

are four cloud deployment models:

• Public Cloud

• Private Cloud

• Community Cloud

• Hybrid Cloud

CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS

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• There are derivative variations that

address specific requirements.

CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS

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• Public Cloud

• The cloud infrastructure is made

available to the general public or a large

industry group

• Owned by an organization providing

cloud services.

CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS

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• Private Cloud

• The cloud infrastructure is operated

solely for a single organization.

• It may be managed by the organization

or a third party, and may exist on-

premises or off-premises.

CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS

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• Community Cloud

• The cloud infrastructure is shared by

several organizations

• Supports a specific community that has

shared concerns

CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS

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• Examples:

• mission,

• security requirements,

• policy, or

• compliance considerations

CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS

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It may be managed by the:

• organizations or

• a third party

and may exist

• on-premises or

• off-premises.

CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS

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• Hybrid Cloud

• Composition of two or more clouds (private,

community, or public)

• They remain unique entities but are bound

together by standardized or proprietary

technology that enables data and

application portability

CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS

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• Example - Hybrid Cloud

• Cloud bursting for load-balancing

between clouds.

CLOUD DEPLOYMENT MODELS

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• New twist on an old concept :)

• Bursting into the cloud when necessary,

or

• using the cloud when additional compute

resources are required temporarily

CLOUD BURSTING

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• Example - used to shoulder the burden of

some of the application's processing

requirements.

• How it is done?

• Basic application functionality could be

provided from within the cloud

CLOUD BURSTING

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• More critical (e.g. revenue-generating or

mission critical) applications continue to

be served from within the controlled

enterprise data center.

CLOUD BURSTING

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• How it is different from the traditional

bursting?

• Traditionally been applied to resource

allocation and automated provisioning /

de-provisioning of resources

• Historically focused on bandwidth.

CLOUD BURSTING

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• In the cloud, it is being applied to

resources such as:

• servers,

• application servers,

• application delivery systems, and

• other infrastructure…

CLOUD BURSTING

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• …required to provide on-demand

computing environments that expand and

contract as necessary, without manual

intervention.

CLOUD BURSTING

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• Without manual intervention means?

• We generally call it - automation

• But is automation sufficient for cloud? or

is it the right thing for cloud?

CLOUD BURSTING

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Orchestration describes the automated

• arrangement,

• coordination, and

• management of

complex computer systems, middleware,

and services.

CLOUD ORCHESTRATION

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• Generally used in the context of:

• Service Oriented Architecture,

• virtualization,

• provisioning, and

• dynamic datacenter topics.

CLOUD ORCHESTRATION

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• Derivative cloud deployment models are

emerging due to the maturation of market

offerings and customer demand.

• Example

• Virtual Private Clouds

DERIVATIVE - DEPLOYMENT MODELS

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• Public cloud infrastructure in a private or

semi-private manner

• By interconnecting these resources to the

internal resources of a consumers’

datacenter, usually via virtual private

network (VPN) connectivity.

VIRTUAL PRIVATE CLOUDS

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• Providers that offer intermediation,

monitoring, transformation/portability,

governance, provisioning, and integration

services.

• They also negotiate relationships between

various cloud providers and consumers.

CLOUD SERVICE BROKERS

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• They take advantage of the

incompatibility issues prevailing and

provide an interface for customers.

• Acts as proxy (middle man)

CLOUD SERVICE BROKERS

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• Open and proprietary APIs are evolving

which seek to enable things such as

• management,

• security and

• inter-operatibility

for cloud.

OPEN AND PROPRIETARY API

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• Open Cloud Computing Interface Working

Group,

• Amazon EC2 API,

• VMware’s DMTF-submitted vCloud API,

• Sun’s Open Cloud API,

• Rackspace API, and

• GoGrid’s API,

OPEN AND PROPRIETARY API

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• Play a key role in cloud portability and

interoperability as well as common

container formats such as the DMTF’s

Open Virtualization Format (OVF).

• DMTF - Distributed Management Task

Force

OPEN AND PROPRIETARY API

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• Not an essential characteristic of Cloud

Computing in NIST’s model.

• Generally identified as an important

element of cloud.

MULTI-TENANCY IN CLOUD

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• Implies a need for

• policy-driven enforcement,

• segmentation,

• isolation,

• governance,

• service levels, and

• chargeback/billing models for different consumers.

MULTI-TENANCY IN CLOUD

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CLOUD

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CLOUD CUBE

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CLOUD REFERENCE MODEL

82

• Understanding the relationships and

dependencies between Cloud Computing

models is critical to understanding Cloud

Computing security risks.

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CLOUD REF MODEL

83

• IaaS is the foundation of all

cloud services, with PaaS

building upon IaaS, and

SaaS in turn building upon

PaaS

• As the capabilities are

inherited, so are information

security issues and risk.

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CLOUD REF MODEL

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CLOUD SECURITY

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• From an attackers point of view:

• The boxes,

• Storage,

• Applications

CLOUD – WHAT COULD BE TARGETTED?

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• With any new technology comes new risks

• New vectors - that we need to be aware of

• Confusion exists - how cloud is both similar

to and different from existing models of

computing

WHY CLOUD SECURITY IS DIFFERENT?

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• Cloud based security issues,

also commonly know as Cloud

Based Risk – CRISK

SECURITY ISSUES

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Lock-in• When a cloud user decides to migrate (due to various reasons including poor SLA) to another cloud service provider or to in-house IT

• Different cloud service providers use different API – not compatable with each other for migrating the data

SECURITY ISSUES

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Lack of:• Tools,• Procedures,• Standard data formats, and• Interfaces,

can considerably delay or prevent a successful migration.

SECURITY ISSUES

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Shared Service Consequences• Any kind of intentional and un-intentional malicious activity carried out or executed on a shared platform may affect the other tenants and associated stake holders.

SECURITY ISSUES

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Examples - Shared Service

Consequences:

• Blocking of IP ranges

• Confiscation of resources as

part of an investigation - the

availability is in question.

SECURITY ISSUES

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Examples - Shared Service Consequences: • The diversity of application running on the cloud platform and a sudden increase in the resource usage by one application can drastically affect the performance and availability of other applications shared in the same cloud infrastructure.

SECURITY ISSUES

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Sudden Acquisitions and Take-overs• Cloud is upcoming and promising domain for organizations to venture and expand.

• Sudden take over can result in a deviation from the agreed Terms of Use & SLA which may also lead to a Lock-In situation.

SECURITY ISSUES

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Run-on-the-cloud• Similar to the conventional run on the bank concept.

• Bankruptcy and catastrophes does not come with an early warning.

SECURITY ISSUES

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• What happens if the majority clients

withdraw the associated services from a

cloud infrastructure?

SECURITY ISSUES

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• The cloud service providers may try to

prevent that move through direct and

indirect methods – which may include a

lock-in also.

SECURITY ISSUES

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Maintaining Certifications & Compliance• Organizations need to ensure that they can maintain the same when moving to cloud.

• ToU prohibits VA/PT• This may introduce security vulnerabilities and gaps

• Result – Loose your certification.

SECURITY ISSUES

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Example - Maintaining Certifications:• In general scenario, the PCI DSS compliance cannot be achieved with the Amazon EC2/S3 cloud service.

• Major downfall in performance and quality metrics may affect your certifications.

SECURITY ISSUES

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Technical and Procedural Vulnerability• Vulnerabilities applicable to the conventional systems & networks are also applicable to cloud infrastructure.

• Lack of could based security standards and non-adherence to procedures may affect the CIA of customer data.

SECURITY ISSUES

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Confidentiality is @ Risk• The information deleted by the customer may be available to the cloud solution provider as part of their regular backups.

• Insecure and inefficient deletion of data where true data wiping is not happening, exposing the sensitive information to other cloud users.

SECURITY ISSUES

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Lack of transparency in cloud•The service provider may be following good security procedures, but it is not visible to the customers and end users.

• May be due to security reasons.

• But end user is finally in the dark.

SECURITY ISSUES

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Lack of transparency in cloud• End user questions remains un-answered:• how the data is backed up, •who back up the data, •whether the cloud service provider does it or has they outsourced to some third party,

SECURITY ISSUES

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• how the backup is transferred to a remote site as part of the backup policy,

• is it encrypted and send, • is the backup properly destroyed after the specified retention period or

SECURITY ISSUES

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• is it lying somewhere in the disk,

• what kind of data wiping technologies are used.

• The lists of questions are big and the cloud users are in dark

SECURITY ISSUES

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• Problems testing the cloud?• Permission• How do you get permission to test your application running on Amazon EC2 when the results of your testing could show you data from another client completely?

SECURITY TESTING

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• Getting black hole or getting kicked-off

• "In networking, black holes refer to places in the network where incoming traffic is silently discarded (or "dropped"), without informing the source that the data did not reach its intended recipient." - From Wikipedia

SECURITY TESTING

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• How do you track version?

• How do you do regression

testing?

• How do you know what

version of the search engine

google is currently running on?

SECURITY TESTING

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• If you test an application

today and find it vulnerable or

not vulnerable, how do you

know that the app you testing

tomorrow is the same one that

you tested yesterday? - You

don't

SECURITY TESTING

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If its not good, safe or not even new, then why cloud adoption

happening?

Then why we move?

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FEW TOP REASONS

• Management by in-flight

magazines

• Management version –

something new and promising

– let’s try it out

• Geek version – It’s really cool • There is nobody to put a break when these two people join together.

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• Poor uptime and service

delivery experience from IT

department.

• Economical factors

• Multi-tenancy means cost

sharing

Other reasons

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• Cost saving makes it attractive

during recession.

• Cloud computing allows you to

move from CAPEX to OPEX.

• Save 30% of IT Operational

Cost

Other reasons

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• Variable cost subscription model – rapidly scale up and scale down.

• Go Green or Green IT also influenced many.

• Powerful - A 64 node Linux cluster can be online in just five minutes - forget about those sleepless nights in your data centers

Other reasons

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ADDRESSING SECURITY ISSUES IN CLOUD – RISK

ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK FOR

CLOUD115

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•Adopt a risk based approach

• Evaluate your tolerance for

moving an asset to cloud

• Have a framework to

evaluate cloud risks.

ADDRESSING CLOUD SECURITY

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• Identify the asset for cloud.

• Evaluate the asset

• Map the asset to cloud deployment

models

• Evaluate cloud service models & providers

• Sketch the potential data flow

RA FRAMEWORK FOR CLOUD

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• Two types of assets are supported by

cloud:

• Data

• Applications/Functions/Processes

• Either partial functions or full

applications

1 - IDENTIFY THE ASSET

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• In cloud, we do not need data and

application to reside at the same location.

• We can shift parts of functions to the

cloud.

1 - IDENTIFY THE ASSET

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• Example:

• Host the main application and data in our

own data-centre.

• Outsource a portion of its functionality to

the cloud through Platform as a Service

(PaaS).

1 - IDENTIFY THE ASSET

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• First step in evaluating risk for the cloud -

determine exactly what data or function is

being considered for the cloud.

• Include potential use of the asset once it

moves to the cloud

1 - IDENTIFY THE ASSET

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• This will help you account for scope creep

• Data and transaction volumes are often

higher than expected.

1 - IDENTIFY THE ASSET

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• What is scope creep?

• Also known as

• focus creep,

• requirement creep,

• feature creep,

• function creep

1 - IDENTIFY THE ASSET

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• Refers to uncontrolled changes in a

project's scope.

• Can occur when the scope of a project is

not properly defined, documented, or

controlled.

1 - IDENTIFY THE ASSET

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• Determine how important the data or

function is to the organization.

• A detailed valuation is recommended only

if the organization has an existing process

for that.

2 - EVALUATE THE ASSET

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• If not, a rough assessment of the following

is recommended:

• how sensitive an asset is, and

• how important an application / function /

process is.

2 - EVALUATE THE ASSET

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• How do we do it?

• For each asset, ask the following

questions:

• How would we be harmed if the asset

became widely public and widely

distributed?

2 - EVALUATE THE ASSET

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• How would we be harmed if an employee

of our cloud provider accessed the asset?

• How would we be harmed if the process

or function were manipulated by an

outsider?

2 - EVALUATE THE ASSET

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• How would we be harmed if the process

or function failed to provide expected

results?

• How would we be harmed if the

information/data were unexpectedly

changed?

2 - EVALUATE THE ASSET

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• How would we be harmed if the asset

were unavailable for a period of time?

2 - EVALUATE THE ASSET

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• What are we doing basically with the

above process?

• Assessing confidentiality, integrity, and

availability requirements for the asset;

and

• how those are affected if all or part of the

asset is handled in the cloud.

2 - EVALUATE THE ASSET

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• Step 3 - Map the asset to potential cloud

deployment models

• Determine which deployment model is

good for the organizational requirement.

3 – MAP THE ASSETS

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• Decide whether the organization can

accept the risks implicit to the various

deployment models (private, public,

community, or hybrid); and hosting

scenarios (internal, external, or combined).

3 – MAP THE ASSETS

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• For the asset, determine if you are willing

to accept the following options:• Public.• Private, internal/on-premises.• Private, external (including dedicated or shared infrastructure).

• Community• Hybrid

3 – MAP THE ASSETS

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• End of this phase you should have answer

to the following:

• Deployment models and locations that fits

your security and risk requirements.

3 – MAP THE ASSETS

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• Focus on the degree of control you’ll have

at each SPI tier to implement any required

risk management.

4 – EVALUATE MODELS & PROVIDERS

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• Map out the data flow between:

• your organization,

• the cloud service, and

• any customers/other nodes.

5 – SKETCH DATA FLOW

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• High-level design can be adopted for the

same.

• Absolutely essential to understand

whether, and how, data can move in and

out of the cloud before finalizing.

5 – SKETCH DATA FLOW

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• You should have a clear understanding of

the following:

• the importance of what you are

considering moving to the cloud,

• risk tolerance,

RA - CONCLUSION

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• which combinations of deployment and

service models are acceptable, and

• potential exposure points for sensitive

information and operations.

RA - CONCLUSION

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• For low-value assets you don’t need the

same level of security controls

• Can skip most of the recommendations —

such as on-site inspections, discoverability,

and complex encryption schemes.

• A high-value regulated asset might entail

audit and data retention requirements.

RA - CONCLUSION

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EXPLOITING CLOUD FOR IW /

ATTACKS

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DO YOU KNOW THIS?

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• Clue:

• Kendo (kumdo in korean)

INFORMATION WARFARE

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風 - Swift as the wind

林 - Quiet as the forest

火 - Conquer like the fire

山 - Steady as the mountain

INFORMATION WARFARE

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• Battle strategy and motto of Japanese feudal lord Takeda Shingen ( 武田信玄 ) (1521–1573 A.D.).

• Twenty-Four Generals - famous groupings of battle commanders• (Takeda Nijūshi-shō ) 武田二十四将

INFORMATION WARFARE

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• Came from the Art of War by

Chinese strategist and

tactician Sun Tzu (Sunzi)

• A sort of abbreviation to

remind officers and troops

how to conduct battle

INFORMATION WARFARE

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• This is what we need in

information warfare or when

launching an attack

INFORMATION WARFARE

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• Sample Task

• Break PGP passphrases

• Solution

• Brute forcing PGP

passphrases

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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•Try – ElcomSoft Distributed

Password Recovery (with

some patches to handle PGP

ZIP)

•Two elements - EDPR

Managers & EDPR Agents

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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• Dual core Win7 box - 2100

days for a complex

passphrase.

• Not acceptable – too long

• Lets exploit the cloud.

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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• First things first – Create an

Account on Amazon. Credit

Card Required

• Install Amazon EC2 API Tools

on your linux box.

sudo apt-get install ec2-api-

tools

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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• Select an AMI

• Example - use a 32 bit

Windows AMI - ami-df20c3b6-

g

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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• Start an instance from the

Linux shell as follows:

ec2-run-instances -k ssh-

keypair ami-df20c3b6-g

default

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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• Enumerate the instance ID &

public IP:

ec2-describe-instances

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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• Instance status change from “pending” to “running”

• Extract the admin password for the instance

ec2-get-password -k ssh-

keypair.pem $instanceID

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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• Configure EC2 firewall to permit inbound RDP traffic to the instance.

ec2-authorize default -p 3389

-s $trusted_ip_address/32

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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• Configure the firewall in front

of the EDPR manager system

to permit TCP/12121 from

anywhere.

• RDP into the instance &

configure EDPR

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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EXPLOITING CLOUD

• Login using the password obtained from ec2-get-password command

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• Install EDPR Agent,

• Configure the Agent to

connect to the Manager.

• 3 points to configure mainly

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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• Configure the public IP address or hostname of the EDPR manager you have configured.

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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•Interface tab - Set the Start-up Mode to "At Windows Start-up".

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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• Registry hack• EDPR creates a pair of registry values which are used to uniquely identify the agent when connecting to the manager.

• We need to scrub these

values – why?

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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• If we don’t, every single

instance we initiate will

appear to be the same agent

to the manager.

•Output = The job handling will

be totally corrupted.

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\

Software\ElcomSoft\Distributed

Agent\UID

• Set the value of the UID key

to null, but DO NOT DELETE

THE KEY.

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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• Let’s bundle the EC2

instance.

• Remember in cloud, bundle is

similar to creating a

‘template’ in VMware

terminology.

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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• Install and configure EC2 AMI

Tools

• Command: ec2-bundle-instance $instance_id -b $bucket_name -p $bundle_name -o $access_key_id -w $secret_access_key

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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• Bundling process runs

sysprep on the Windows

instance, compress and copies

the instance to S3.

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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• Check the progress of the

bundle task:

ec2-describe-bundle-tasks

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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• Register the bundled AMI:

ec2-register

$bucket_name/$bundle_name.

manifest.xml

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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• The register command

returns AMI ID

• Used to spawn instances of

the EDPR agent. Example:

IMAGE ami-54f3103d

EXPLOITING CLOUD

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•Start EDPR manager &

configure task.• to brute an password composed of uppercase letters, lowercase letters, and the numbers 0-9, with a length of between 1 to 8 characters against a PGP ZIP file.

ACTION TIME

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ACTION TIME

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• Start a single instance of our

EDPR agent:

ec2-run-instances -k $ssh-

keypair ami-54f3103d -g

default

ACTION TIME

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• Agent check in with the EDPR manager.

ACTION TIME

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• We started it with default

parameters

• EC2 “small” instance

• Trying 500K keys per second

• How long will it take?

ACTION TIME

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•Whattt???? 3600 days? = 10

years!!!!!

ACTION TIME

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• Let’s scale up – deploy 10

additional instances:

ec2-run-instances -n 10 -k ssh-

keypair ami-54f3103d -g

default -t c1.medium

ACTION TIME

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• The -n 10 parameter tells EC2

to launch 10 instances.

• c1.medium instance = “High

CPU" instance

ACTION TIME

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ACTION TIME

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• Now we have more cracking

agents in the party!!!

• 2+M keys/second

• So what's the time required

now???

ACTION TIME

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• Down to 122 days

ACTION TIME

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• Kickoff another 89 to hit a

century.

ec2-run-instances -n 89 -k ssh-

keypair ami-54f3103d -g

default -t c1.medium

Note: Check your EDPR

License.

ACTION TIME

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• Error:

Client.InstanceLimitExceeded:

Your quota allows for 9 more

instance(s). You requested at

least 89

ACTION TIME

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• Option 1

• Request to instance amazon

EC2 Instance Limit -

http://aws.amazon.com/conta

ct-us/ec2-request/

ACTION TIME

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• Option 2

• Amazon spot instances -

allows us to bid on unused

Amazon EC2 capacity and run

those instances.

ACTION TIME

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• Option 3

• Create custom python script

to bypass this limitation

ACTION TIME

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• With a couple more of

instances, we can reduce it to

hours

• A successful cloud based

distributed cracking system.

ACTION TIME

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CLOUD FORENSICS

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• Mixed Responses• Bad guys have started using cloud based services and infrastructure for launching attacks

• Cloud do provide a good platform for incidence response and forensics investigations

CLOUD FORENSICS

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• By utilizing the inherent

features of cloud computing,

computer forensic can become

an on-demand service under

certain circumstances.

CLOUD FORENSICS

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• Regular business and operations are not affected when a cloud environment needs to be forensically examined.

• Not the case with the traditional infrastructure where the equipments are seized.

• Cloud Example – Amazon EBS

CLOUD FORENSICS

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• Cloud based forensics took a new turn when Amazon introduced Elastic Block Store (EBS) volumes

• Enables the user to launch an instance with an Amazon EBS volume that will serve as the root device.

CLOUD FORENSICS

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• When there is a need to preserve a cloud environment, EBS can create an exact replica of the cloud instance & put it on the same cloud for forensics evaluation and examination.

• Since the forensic investigators will be working with another instance of the environment, the regular operations is not affected in any way.

CLOUD FORENSICS

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• Replication process achieved in few minutes.

• Forensic evidences are invalid if they are not cryptographically hashed.

• This can be easily achieved using the on-demand feature of cloud.

CLOUD FORENSICS

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• Replication process achieved in few minutes.

• Forensic evidences are invalid if they are not cryptographically hashed.

• This can be easily achieved using the on-demand feature of cloud.

CLOUD FORENSICS

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•The cloud based hashing takes less time and is much faster when you compare it with the traditional cryptographic hashing process.

• Amazon Web Services is already providing a good forensic feature where it can provide a MD5 hash of every file that is on the cloud system.

CLOUD FORENSICS

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• What this practically means is that when a bit by bit copy is initiated (forensic duplication), you have systems in place which can ensure that you made the exact replica and not even a bit has changed during the replication and copying process.

CLOUD FORENSICS

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• Even though you have all the above services available, cloud forensics is still challenging.

• Virtualization of various entities like the applications and host systems, which once used to be in-house is now scattered on the cloud.

CLOUD FORENSICS

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• Makes evidence gathering a challenging task

• Since we are acquiring data from a virtual environment, the forensic investigator should have a clear and precise understanding of how they work and what files are interesting and required to acquire.

CLOUD FORENSICS

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• Near to impossible to acquire the complete hard disk due to various reasons including but not limited to:• multiple data owners on the same disk,

• remote geographical location,• jurisdictional difficulties,• RAID configurations etc

CLOUD FORENSICS

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• Questions also arise on the compatibility and reliability of the tools used for investigating cloud forensics - because most of the tools are meant for real time systems and not for virtualized environments.

• A collaborative and collective effort is required to address what we discussed.

And finally

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CONCLUSION

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• The architectural mindset used when

designing solutions has clear implications

on the:• future flexibility, • security, • collaborative capabilities, and • mobility

of the resultant solution.

CONCLUSION

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• With so many different cloud deployment

and service models, and their hybrid

permutations — no list of security controls

can cover all these circumstances.

CONCLUSION

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A good security professional is someone who always looks both ways before crossing a one-way street.

GOOD SECURITY PROFESSIONAL

206

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207

Manu Zacharia

[email protected]

[email protected]

or

QUESTIONS??

Page 208: Cloud computing security & forensics (manu)

thank you !