Privileged Access Manager Product Q&A

Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager

Frequently Asked Questions

© 2014 Hitachi ID Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.

http://Hitachi-ID.com/

http://Hitachi.com/

Contents

1 What business problems does Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager address? 1

2 How does Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager work? 1

3 How often does Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager change passwords? 2

4 How do we control who can sign into which privileged accounts? 2

5 How do we grant someone temporary or one-time access to a privileged account? 3

6 Can we configure a "two keys to launch" scenario for super-sensitive systems? 4

7 Can Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager manage password changes to Windows serviceaccounts? 4

8 Can Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager randomize passwords on ....? 6

9 Can Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager launch an administrator login sessions to ....? 7

10 What happens when an administrator needs to sign into the physical console of a server? 8

11 Which web browsers does Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager support? 8

11.1 Basic user interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

11.2 ActiveX components used to launch login sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

12 Can Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager you secure privileged passwords on laptops(which move around and get disconnected)? 9

13 How can we automate the setup and teardown of thousands of systems on Hitachi IDPrivileged Access Manager? 11

14 Can Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager assign privileges less than full-administrator tousers? 12

15 Can Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager interoperate with sudo on Unix/Linux? 13

16 Can Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager integrate with SIEM systems? 14

17 How does Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager defend itself against compromise of sen-sitive passwords? 14

i

Privileged Access Manager Frequently Asked Questions

18 How do we protect Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager against data loss? 15

19 Can Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager record what users do while signed into adminis-trator accounts? 15

20 How does Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager control access to recorded login sessions(privacy protection)? 17

© 2014 Hitachi ID Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.


Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager Frequently Asked Questions

1 What business problems does Privileged Access Manager ad-dress?

Many organizations have insecure processes for managing privileged accounts – IDs and passwords onservers, workstations, applications and network devices with elevated privileges. Inappropriate disclosureof these passwords would lead to serious security compromise:

• Hundreds or thousands of workstations and servers often share the same ID and password. If thepassword on one device is compromised, all of the devices that share the credential are compromised.

• Where a password is used on many systems or needed by many people, it is difficult to coordinatepassword changes. As a result, passwords on privileged accounts are often left unchanged for monthsor years, creating an extended window of opportunity for an attacker.

• If privileged passwords are rarely changed, when IT staff leave an organization, they retain access tosensitive systems.

• When many people know the password to a given account, it is impossible to reliably connect changes(or security compromises) to individual users.

2 How does Privileged Access Manager work?

There are several technological approaches to more securely managing privileged passwords:

Approach Pros Cons

1 Eliminate shared passwords entirely andassign personal administrator-levelaccounts to each IT user, on each asset.

Individual accountabilityfor configurationchanges.

Too many administrator-levelaccounts on each system.

2 Create and delete personaladministrator-level accounts for users ondemand.

Individual accountabilityfor configurationchanges.

Complex integrationbetween many systems andthe corporate directory.

3 Modify operating systems andapplications to check whether users areallowed to perform privileged actions, inreal time. Manage access controlpolicies centrally.

Fine-grained controlover user access.

Too many administrator-levelaccounts on each systemplus complex change controlon each system.

4 Use software installed on each device toperiodically change local passwords.Send a copy of these passwords to asecure vault, shared by many systems.

Works even in complex,segmented networks.

Requires software on eachmanaged system.

5 Software on a central system periodicallypushes new passwords to each deviceand keeps copies in a secure vault.

Minimal footprint onmanaged systems.

Requires connectivity from acentral application tomanaged systems.

© 2014 Hitachi ID Systems, Inc.. All rights reserved. 1


3 How often does Privileged Access Manager change passwords?

This is configurable, with the default being every 24 hours.

Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager secures sensitive passwords by periodically randomizing them:

1. On push-mode servers and applications:

(a) Periodically – for example, every night between 3AM and 4AM.

(b) When users check passwords back in, after they are finished using them.

(c) When users request a specific password value.

(d) In the event of an urgent termination of a system administrator.

2. On pull-mode laptops and similarly configured devices:

(a) Periodically – for example, every day.

(b) At a random time-of-day, to prevent transaction bursts.

(c) Opportunistically, whenever network connectivity happens to be available from the workstationto a central server.

4 How do we control who can sign into which privileged accounts?

The most common form of access control in the Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager is based on managedsystem policies. These policies are named collections of managed systems containing privileged accountswhose passwords may be randomized and access to which is controlled.

Managed systems may either be attached to a policy explicitly (e.g., “attach workstation WKSTN01234 topolicy RGWKSTNS”) or implicitly, using an expression. Expressions may be based on the operating systemtype, IP address, MAC address or workstation name (e.g., “attach every workstation running Windows XPin subnet 10.1.2.3/24 to policy X”)

Managed system policies are configured with operational and access control rules, including:

1. Which accounts’ passwords to randomize on attached systems.

2. How often to change passwords.

3. How to compose random passwords (e.g., length, complexity, etc.).

4. What actions to take after successful or failed attempts to disclose a password.

5. What access disclosure methods to offer users who wish to sign into privileged accounts on attachedsystems (e.g., launch remote desktop, launch SSH, temporarily place user in security groups, displaycurrent password to user, etc.).



Privileged Access Manager users are organized into user groups, either explicitly or implicitly. In a typicaldeployment, users are assigned to Privileged Access Manager user groups by virtue of their membership inActive Directory or LDAP groups. Groups of users are then assigned specific rights with respect to specificmanaged system policies. For example, “every user in group A may launch RDP sessions to privilegedaccounts on systems in policy B.”

Business rules, such as segregation of duties between different sets of users, can also be enforced. Thisis done by examining, managing and limiting group membership on reference systems, such as ActiveDirectory or LDAP, that can be simultaneously assigned to the same user.

5 How do we grant someone temporary or one-time access to aprivileged account?

Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager includes the same authorization workflow engine as is used inHitachi ID Identity Manager. Workflow enables users to request access to a privileged account that wasnot previously or permanently authorized. When this happens, one or more additional users are invited (viae-mail or SMS) to review and approve the request. Approved requests trigger a message to the request’srecipient, including a URL to Privileged Access Manager where he or she can re-authenticate and “checkout” access.

The workflow process is illustrated by the following series of steps:

1. User UA signs in and requests that the then-current password to login account LA on system S bemade available to user UB at some later time T. UA may or may not be the same person as UB.

2. Privileged Access Manager looks up authorizers associated with LA on S.3. Privileged Access Manager may run business logic to supplement this authorizer list, for example

with someone in the management chain for UA or UB. The final list of authorizers is LA. There are Nauthorizers but approval by just M (M ≤ N) is sufficient to disclose the password to AZ.

4. Privileged Access Manager sends e-mail invitations to authorizers LA.5. If authorizers fail to respond, they get automatic reminder e-mails.6. If authorizers continue to fail to respond, Privileged Access Manager runs business logic to find re-

placements for them, effectively escalating the request and invites the replacement authorizers aswell.

7. Authorizers receive invitation e-mails, click on a URL embedded in the e-mail invitation, authenticatethemselves to the Privileged Access Manager web login page, review the request and approve orreject it.

8. If any authorizers reject the request, e-mails are sent to all participants (UA, UB and AZ) and therequest is terminated.

9. If M authorizers approve the request, thank-you e-mails are sent to all participants. A special e-mailis sent to the recipient – UB with a URL to an access disclosure page.

10. UB clicks on the e-mail URL and authenticates to Privileged Access Manager and displays the pass-word.

11. UB clicks on a button to “check-out privileged access.”12. UB then may click on a button to do one of the following (the options available will vary based on

policy):

(a) Display the password.(b) Place a copy of the password in the operating system copy buffer.



(c) Launch an RDP, SSH, vSphere or similar remote control session to the server in question.

In other words, display of a sensitive password is not a mandatory or even recommended part of thesolution.

6 Can we configure a "two keys to launch" scenario for super-sensitive systems?

Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager supports approval of change requests by multiple business stake-holders and/or by multiple groups of business stake-holders. This allows for typical scenarios such as“approve this request by recipient’s manager plus departmental IT contact plus application owner.”

Since individuals may be unavailable to respond to a request, authorization can substitute groups for singleapprovers. Thus, the above example may be reformulated as “approve this request by recipient’s manageror any of the manager’s peers; plus either of two departmental IT contacts; plus any of three designatedsecurity contacts for the indicated application.”

Change authorization is normally conducted by sending invitations to all authorizers at the same time. This“parallel” invitation process yields faster approval turn-around times but has no impact on security, since allrequisite approvers must respond before a request is completed. Sequential invitations are also possiblebut are not recommended by Hitachi ID Systems due to the longer total time elapsed before all participantswill approve or reject a request.

7 Can Privileged Access Manager manage password changes toWindows service accounts?

On the Windows operating system, service programs are run either using the SYSTEM login ID, whichpossesses almost every privilege on the system (and consequently can do the maximum harm) and whichhas no password or using a real user’s login ID and password, in order to execute with reduced privileges.This means that on each Windows workstation and server there are a number of service accounts, eachwith its own password, which are used to run service programs such as web servers, backup agents, anti-virus software, etc.

Service account passwords differ from administrator passwords in that they are stored in at least two places:

1. Hashed, in the security database – e.g., the local SAM database or Active Directory, just like all users.

2. Reversibly encrypted, in the registry or elsewhere, where the program that starts the service (e.g.,Service Control Manager or similar) can retrieve it when it needs to start the service.

Other Windows components besides the Service Control Manager also store passwords twice:

1. Virtual directories used to access web content from the IIS web server.



2. Programs scheduled to be run by the Windows Scheduler.

Third party programs may also require passwords to be stored outside the Security Accounts Manager(SAM) database.

Of the above passwords, all but those used in IIS are static and may represent a security vulnerability.

Privileged Access Manager can be configured to secure service account passwords. This means twothings, depending on the mode of operation:

1. In pull mode, the Privileged Access Manager workstation service periodically scrambles service ac-count passwords locally, in coordination with the central Privileged Access Manager server cluster.

2. In push mode, Privileged Access Manager servers periodically connect to Windows servers or ActiveDirectory in order to change the passwords of service accounts.

In both cases, Privileged Access Manager must notify the program that launches services – the subscriber– of the new password value, so that it can successfully launch the service at the time of the next systemrestart or when an administrator manually stops and restarts the service in question. In some cases,for example when domain accounts are used to run services, an immediate restart may be required oradvisable, due to Kerberos token expiry.

Privileged Access Manager includes extensive automation to discover subscribers and subscriber-to-service-account dependency. This allows Hitachi ID Systems customers to review what services are run in the se-curity context of what named users, on what systems. This is particularly helpful where services run in thesecurity context of domain accounts, since multiple services on multiple servers may rely on the same ser-vice account and may therefore require notification of the same new password in a quick and fault-tolerantfashion.

Privileged Access Manager includes several processes that support safe and secure changes to serviceaccount passwords:

1. Auto-discovery of subscriber/account dependencies for a variety of subscriber types: IIS, Scheduler,SCM, DCOM, at various OS and subscriber versions.

2. A white-list mechanism (usually table driven, but a plug-in is available for more complex scenarios) socustomers can control which service accounts should have their passwords randomized and when.

3. Built-in tools to notify known subscribers of new password values.

4. A transaction manager that can retry notifications to off-line subscribers.

The above are primarily used when managed systems are integrated with Privileged Access Manager in"push mode" – i.e., there is no locally installed software on the target system and Privileged Access Managerinitiates all connections remotely, over the network, directly or via a co-located Privileged Access Managerproxy server.

In case push mode is inappropriate – for example because the relevant services (remote registry, WMI, etc.)are disabled or firewalled or because the end system is offline or inaccessible due to name resolution orIP routing issues (NAT, etc.), a pull mode service can be installed on the managed system, which performs



essentially the same functions but with much simpler connectivity (call home over HTTPS) and no need fornetwork accessible services on the local system.

Pull mode is normally used on laptops and in some cases desktop PCs, but works on any system runningany version of the Windows OS.

Any problems encountered in updating a service password can and should be configured to trigger an exittrap program on the Privileged Access Manager server, to notify an administrator of an imminent problemwhen the service in question is next started.

Both the discovery and notification mechanisms described above are extensible. This means that customerswho have other types of subscribers – for example, third party job schedulers – can add small programsthat discover their account dependencies and notify them of new service account passwords. These aretypically command-line programs (Windows executable or script) that run on the Privileged Access Managerserver. For pull mode, the equivalent form of extensibility is provided via deployment-specific DLLs.

8 Can Privileged Access Manager randomize passwords on ....?

Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager comes with built-in connectors for most common systems and appli-cations, as illustrated below. All connectors are included in the base price.

Directories: Servers: Databases:

Any LDAP, AD, NDS,eDirectory, NIS/NIS+.

Windows 2000–2012,Samba, NDS, SharePoint.

Oracle, Sybase, SQL Server,DB2/UDB, ODBC, Informix.

Unix: Mainframes: Midrange:

Linux, Solaris, AIX, HPUX,24 more variants.

z/OS with RAC/F, ACF/2 orTopSecret.

iSeries (OS400), OpenVMS.

ERP: Collaboration: Tokens, Smart Cards:

JDE, Oracle eBiz,PeopleSoft, SAP R/3, SAPECC 6, Siebel, BusinessObjects.

Lotus Notes, Exchange,GroupWise, BlackBerry ES.

RSA SecurID, SafeWord,RADIUS, ActivIdentity,Schlumberger.

WebSSO: Help Desk: HDD Encryption:

CA Siteminder, IBM TAM,Oracle AM, RSA AccessManager.

BMC Remedy, BMC SDE,ServiceNow, HP ServiceManager, CA Unicenter,Assyst, HEAT, Altiris, Clarify,Track-It!, RSA Envision, MSSCS Manager.

McAfee, CheckPoint,BitLocker, PGP.

SaaS: Miscellaneous: Extensible:

Salesforce.com, WebEx,Google Apps, MS Office365, SOAP (generic).

OLAP, Hyperion, iLearn,Caché, Success Factors,VMWare vSphere.

SSH, Telnet, TN3270,HTTP(S), SQL, LDAP,command-line.

Privileged Access Manager includes a number of flexible connectors, each of which is used to script in-



tegration with a common protocol or mechanism. These connectors allow organizations to quickly andinexpensively integrate Privileged Access Manager with custom and vertical market applications. The abil-ity to quickly and inexpensively add integrations increases the value of the Privileged Access Managersystem as a whole.

There are flexible connectors to script interaction with:

API binding: Terminalemulation:

Web services: Back endintegration:

Command-line:

• C, C++• Java, J2EE• .NET• COM,

ActiveX• MQ Series

• SSH• Telnet• TN3270,

TN5250• Simulated

browser

• SOAP• WebRPC• Pure

HTTP(S)

• SQLInjection

• LDAPattributes

• Windows• Power Shell• Unix/Linux

Organizations that wish to write a completely new connector to integrate with a custom or vertical marketapplication may do so using whatever development environment they prefer (J2EE, .NET, Perl, etc.) andinvoke it as either a command-line program or web service.

If the organization develops their own integrations, an effort of between four hours and four days is typical.Alternately, Hitachi ID Systems offers fixed-cost custom integrations for a nominal fee.

9 Can Privileged Access Manager launch an administrator login ses-sions to ....?

Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager controls access by users and programs to privileged accounts onsystems and applications. By default, that means that when a user is authorized to connect to a privilegedaccount, the user is able to launch a login session directly to that account without ever seeing its password.

Display of current password values can be enabled through Privileged Access Manager policy configurationbut is not normally recommended.

Access disclosure options include:

1. IT staff can directly launch Terminal Services (RDP), SSH (PuTTY), VMWare vSphere, SQL Studio,web browser/form login and other connections to target systems from the Privileged Access Managerweb user interface, without displaying a password value.

2. IT staff can use an ActiveX control embedded in the Privileged Access Manager web portal to place acopy of a sensitive password into their Windows copy buffer, again without displaying the passwords.This password is automatically cleared from their copy buffer after a few seconds.

3. Privileged Access Manager can dynamically attach a recipient’s Active Directory domain login ID toa local security group on a target system and later remove it. This eliminates the need to disclose



passwords even to a software agent on the recipient’s workstation.

4. Privileged Access Manager can temporarily place a user’s public SSH key into the target account’s.ssh/authorized_keys file.

5. Where password display is required (e.g., a target system is currently offline), JavaScript in thePrivileged Access Manager web portal removes it from the screen after a few seconds.

A policy defined for each set of managed systems in Privileged Access Manager determines which of theseaccess disclosure mechanisms is available. For example, password display may be allowed for Windowsworkstations, since they may be inaccessible over the network, but RDP sessions with injected passwordsmay be mandatory on Windows servers.

10 What happens when an administrator needs to sign into the phys-ical console of a server?

Password display is supported. Hitachi ID Systems recommends limiting the set of people who have accessto this – i.e., only data center staff should be able to display passwords and perhaps only with workflowapprovals.

11 Which web browsers does Privileged Access Manager support?

11.1 Basic user interface

Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager presents a pure HTML user interface, with small JavaScript snippetsused only for non-essential functions (such as positioning the cursor or closing the current window).

This interface ensures compatibility with all web browsers. Privileged Access Manager’s web user interfaceis routinely and successfully tested using:

• Internet Explorer versions 7.x and later (IE6 works but with minor visual artifacts).• Firefox (any version released since about 2010 should be fine).• Safari, Chrome and other WebKit-based browsers.• Opera (full and mini versions).• Browsers on smart phones (BlackBerry native, Safari on iPhone, Android native, Dolphin, etc.).• Even text mode browsers such as lynx and w3m.

The Privileged Access Manager user interface is compatible and periodically tested with speaking webbrowsers (for the visually impaired).

In addition to standard HTML, Privileged Access Manager can take advantage of ActiveX componentsspecifically in IE to execute local code. Example uses of this optional capability include:



1. To launch login sessions to privileged accounts on managed systems and inject credentials into thoselogin sessions (e.g., PuTTY, RDP, SQL, vSphere, etc.).

2. To record screen, keyboard, webcam and other data during the life of such login sessions.

11.2 ActiveX components used to launch login sessions

ActiveX can be used (but is not required) to:

1. Launch connections from administrator PCs to target systems (RDP, SSH, SQL Studio, VMWarevSphere, etc.) without having to disclose privileged passwords to users and without users having totype login IDs and passwords for the privileged accounts on systems they need to sign into. Anycommand-line client software, plus the RDP control built into Windows, can be activated in this way.

2. Place a copy of a privileged password in a user’s copy buffer and automatically remove it after a shorttime, without having to display it. This allows administrators to (briefly) paste a sensitive passwordinto a login prompt without having to see it.

IE7 and later are supported as a platform to launch connections via ActiveX (IE6 also works but like allvendors, Hitachi ID Systems would prefer that IE6 disappeared as soon as possible).

Using ActiveX to launch administrator login sessions means the connection is directly from the user’s PCto the managed system – not though a proxy. This means there is no bottleneck for performance or serviceavailability. It also means that Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager can launch a variety of client/serveradministration tools and is not limited to specific versions of specific protocols.

12 Can Privileged Access Manager you secure privileged passwordson laptops (which move around and get disconnected)?

A password management system can easily make connections to servers, which have fixed network ad-dresses, are always on and are continuously connected to the network. It is much harder for a centralpassword management server to connect to mobile laptops, for several reasons:

• Laptops frequently move from site to site.

• Even when they remain in one place, laptop IP addresses may change dynamically, due to use ofDHCP.

• Laptops are often turned off and do not respond to network inquiries when deactivated.

• Laptops may be unplugged from the network, either to move them or for periods of disuse.

• Laptops may be protected by a firewall that blocks network connections inbound to the PC.

In short, while it is easy for laptops to contact a central server, it is nearly impossible for the reverse tohappen reliably.



To secure privileged accounts on mobile workstations (typically laptops), Hitachi ID Privileged AccessManager includes a service, which installs on the relevant PCs and which contacts a central server tocoordinate local password changes.

This architecture has several important advantages:

• The workstation service uses only HTTPS to communicate with the central server and works evenwhen the workstation is connected behind NAT devices, firewalls or application proxies.

• The workstation service does not randomize passwords unless it has established connectivity with thecentral privileged access management server. This avoids a situation where the central server doesnot know the new password value for a workstation.

• Dynamic IP addresses have no impact on this architecture.

• Physical relocation and long periods of detached network connectivity may delay updates to localpasswords, but do not introduce a failure whereby the local administrator passwords on a workstationare unknown.

Privileged Access Manager supports management of passwords on laptops, which may be mobile, havedynamic IP addresses, get unplugged, etc. This is done using client software, which works by ”pulling” new,passwords from the Privileged Access Manager server cluster. Client software is available for:

1. Windows 2000, XP, Windows Vista/7/8, 2003, 2008 and 2008R2.

2. Unix (various vendors) and Linux (IA86).

The Windows pull-mode service includes plug-ins to notify operating system components of new serviceaccount passwords. Plug-ins are provided for the Windows Service Control Manager, Windows Schedulerand IIS.



13 How can we automate the setup and teardown of thousands ofsystems on Privileged Access Manager?

In organizations with large numbers of servers or other systems (e.g., databases, routers, etc.), clearly itis desirable to auto-discover and auto-maintain a list of systems and lists of accounts to manage on eachmanaged system, rather than manually adding and maintaining thousands of separate target systems andaccounts.

To auto-discover systems, most organizations pull data from an Active Directory or LDAP directory. Com-puter objects discovered in the directory are classified based on their attributes and automatically managed(or not) and attached to appropriate managed system policies, which specify password change frequency,access control rules, access disclosure methods, etc.

A second auto-discovery process probes each managed system to find accounts that should be managed.On most systems, a list of local users and groups is generated. Specifically on Windows systems, thisprocess also lists services, scheduled jobs, IIS objects (e.g., anonymous users, application pools, etc.) andDCOM objects and see what accounts are used to run each of them. Import rules determine which of theseaccounts will be managed by Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager (e.g., based on account attributes,group membership, security IDs, account/service relationship, etc.) and which managed system policies toassign to each managed account.

Alternatives to Active Directory- or LDAP-driven computer object lists include DNS queries or zone transfers,IP port scans of specific subnets and data imports from an inventory management system.

Privileged Access Manager also includes an automated mechanism to inform programs that store a copyof passwords of new password values. A plug-in program is provided to connect to Windows servers aftereach password change and automatically update Service Control Manager, Windows Scheduler, IIS orDCOM with new password values.

The Privileged Access Manager auto-discovery process is able to list, classify and probe over 10,000 sys-tems per hour. It is normally scheduled to run daily.



14 Can Privileged Access Manager assign privileges less than full-administrator to users?

Yes. For Unix/Linux, please refer to the next question.

For Windows, see below.

Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager can be configured to disclose privileged access to Windows serversby temporarily placing an administrative user’s unprivileged Active Directory domain account into a privi-leged security group on the target computer.

This process works as follows:

1. Administrator A requests privileged access to computer C.

2. The request is approved either because A has been pre-approved for such access (typically via mem-bership in an AD group) or because some other user, with ownership rights to computer C, approvesthe request.

3. Administrator A “checks out” access to computer C.

4. Privileged Access Manager places A’s AD account into a privileged group on computer C, such as(local group) “Administrators.”

5. A connects to C using RDP. This connection might be mediated by Privileged Access Manager, whichcan launch the RDP session directly from its web portal using an Active-X control.

6. Depending on how Privileged Access Manager and C are configured, A may or may not have to typehis personal AD password to establish the RDP connection to C. For example, if C trusts Kerberos-authenticated RDP sessions or if Privileged Access Manager has an agent on A’s workstation toacquire his login password, then no manual authentication step will be required.

7. Eventually A will either check-in the session or the session will time out. When either event happens,Privileged Access Manager will remove A’s AD account from the privileged group on C.

This approach of manipulating group memberships rather than disclosing password has the advantage thataudit logs on the target computer (C in the example above) show activity by the individual administrator (Ain the example above) rather than by a generic local administrator account.

The limitations of this approach are:

1. It does not help with non-Windows machines or non-domain-members.

2. It does not help with machines which are disconnected from the network.



15 Can Privileged Access Manager interoperate with sudo on Unix/Linux?

Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager can be configured to disclose privileged access to Unix and Linuxcomputers by temporarily placing an administrative user’s personal SSH public key into the trusted keys fileof a functional account on the target computer.

This architecture works as follows:

1. The Privileged Access Manager server gets its own SSH public and private keys.

2. Every user who may require privileged access to Unix/Linux systems must have:

(a) An SSH client package on his PC.

(b) Defined SSH private and public key.

3. A copy of the public SSH key for every user is kept on the Privileged Access Manager server.

4. Each managed Unix/Linux computer is configured with:

(a) An SSHD listener.

(b) The SUDO package.

(c) A set of functional, unprivileged accounts (more on this later).

5. The /etc/sudoers file on each managed Unix/Linux computer is configured to grant a set of prede-fined privileges to each functional account. For example:

• The account dba might be allowed to perform DB-related tasks.

• The account backup might be allowed to perform filesystem backups.

• The account procmon might be allowed to perform runaway processes.

• The account monitor might be allowed to perform stats from /proc.

6. The .ssh/authorized_keys file of each of the functional accounts is configured to trust the publicSSH key of the Privileged Access Manager server.

7. At access checkout time, Privileged Access Manager modifies the .ssh/authorized_keys file ofthe functional account to which access was granted to include the public key of the user who needsaccess to that account.

8. At access checkin or expiry time, Privileged Access Manager modifies the .ssh/authorized_keysfile of the relevant functional account to remove the public key of the user who had access to thataccount.

The access disclosure process works as follows:

1. Administrator A requests access to functional account F on computer C.



2. The request is approved either because A has been pre-approved for such access (typically via mem-bership in an AD group) or because some other user, with ownership rights to F@C, approves therequest.

3. Administrator A “checks out” access to F@C.

4. Privileged Access Manager retrieves a copy of the .ssh/authorized_keys from F@C, adds A’spublic SSH key to the file and puts the new .ssh/authorized_keys back in F@C’s home directory.

5. A connects to F@C using SSH. This connection is authenticated using an SSH key exchange (not apassword).

6. A may have to type a password to access his own SSH private key, depending on how whether hisSSH key is encrypted with his password.

7. Eventually A will either check-in the session or the session will time out. When either event happens,Privileged Access Manager will remove A’s public SSH key from F@C’s .ssh/authorized_keysfile.

16 Can Privileged Access Manager integrate with SIEM systems?

The logging service in Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager can be configured to forward SYSLOG mes-sages to a network logging system, including services exposed by all popular SIEM applications.

17 How does Privileged Access Manager defend itself against com-promise of sensitive passwords?

Encryption is used to protect stored Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager data as follows:

Data stored on the Privileged Access Manager server

Data Algorithm Key

Privileged passwords,used to log into targetsystems

128-bit AES 128-bit random

Answers to securityquestions

128-bit AES 128-bit random

User old passwordhistory

SHA-1 64-bit random salt



18 How do we protect Privileged Access Manager against data loss?

Once deployed, Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager becomes an essential part of an organization’s ITinfrastructure, since it alone has access to privileged passwords for thousands of networked devices. Aninterruption to the availability of Privileged Access Manager or its password vault would mean that adminis-trative access to a range of devices is interrupted – a major IT service disruption.

Since servers occasionally break down, Privileged Access Manager supports load balancing and datareplication between multiple physical servers and multiple credential vaults. Any updates written to onedatabase instance are automatically replicated, in real time, over an encrypted communication path, to allother Privileged Access Manager servers and all other credential vaults.

In short, Privileged Access Manager incorporates a highly available, replicated, multi-master architecturefor both the application and the credential vault.

To provide out-of-the-box data replication, Privileged Access Manager includes a database service thatreplicates updates across multiple database instances. This service can be configured use either Oracleor Microsoft SQL Server databases for physical storage. Hitachi ID Systems recommends one physicaldatabase per Privileged Access Manager server, normally on the same hardware as the Privileged AccessManager application.

The Privileged Access Manager data replication system makes it both simple and advisable for organiza-tions to build a highly-available Privileged Access Manager server cluster, spanning multiple servers, witheach server placed in a different data center. Replication traffic is encrypted, authenticated, bandwidth-efficient and tolerant of latency, making it suitable for deployment over a WAN.

This multi-site, multi-master replication is configured at no additional cost, beyond that of the hardware foradditional Privileged Access Manager servers, and with minimal manual configuration.

19 Can Privileged Access Manager record what users do while signedinto administrator accounts?

Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager includes a sophisticated infrastructure for monitoring, recording andplaying back privileged account login sessions. This includes capturing:

1. Successive screen shots of the interactive administrator login session (RDP, SSH, vSphere, etc.).

2. Periodic photographs of the user (presumably) if a web-cam is present.

3. Many types of input events, including key presses, mouse clicks, copies and pastes.

4. Process names started and stopped.

5. UI text elements (labels, text input fields, drop-downs, etc.) displayed on the screen.

6. Mapping and disconnecting file shares (currently under development).

7. Initiating file transfers, especially to removable media such as USB flash drives (currently under de-velopment).



Capture sources can be individually enabled, disabled or configured.

This data is stored in a secure database and can be accessed later:

1. Search by user, target system, time, date or meta data.

2. Play back movies of user interaction.

3. Report on events during the session (copy, paste, transfer file to removable media, etc.).

This data can be extracted, for example for use in a forensic audit or as courtroom evidence.

Two forms of this session monitoring/recording infrastructure are being developed concurrently:

1. One runs when a privileged account login session is initiated via the Privileged Access Manager webportal, by launching an RDP session, SSH session, SQL Studio, a 3270 emulator, VMWare vSphere,etc.

2. Another (in Beta release) can be installed on an individual Windows workstation or server (WindowsXP, 2003, Vista, 2008, 2008R2, 7, 8) and can record user interaction during an interactive loginsession by a specified user, even if the session was not initiated using Privileged Access Manager atall.

Recorded sessions are stored in a combination of the Privileged Access Manager database (session metadata, keyboard input and other text events, etc.) and on server or network filesystems (video captures,web-cam snapshots, etc.).

Playback data is packaged as a ZIP file with XML files representing textual data, standard MP4 video filesrepresenting screen movies and JPEG files representing web-cam images. These ZIP files are intended tobe suitable as forensic evidence in the context of investigation of improper employee or contractor behavior.



20 How does Privileged Access Manager control access to recordedlogin sessions (privacy protection)?

Session monitoring can have serious implications on user privacy and so should be implemented withgreat care. The session monitoring infrastructure is subject to strict access control rules and workflowinfrastructure. For example, an auditor must first request the right to perform a given search through sessiondata. If approved, he can execute the search and may find sessions of interest. The auditor must thenrequest the right to playback selected sessions. Only if this second request is approved can the auditorretrieve session data. Of course, all such requests and searches this is indelibly logged.

Another measure used to protect user privacy in Hitachi ID Privileged Access Manager is a pattern-matchingcensorship process. Hitachi ID Systems customers are encouraged to define regular expression patterns,matching passwords, social security numbers, credit card numbers, bank account numbers, etc. A pro-cess on the Privileged Access Manager server post-processes keystroke and keyword data captured bythe session monitor, searching for matches for these patterns. Matches are deleted from the keystroke andkeyword database.

www.Hitachi-ID.com

500, 1401 - 1 Street SE, Calgary AB Canada T2G 2J3 Tel: 1.403.233.0740 Fax: 1.403.233.0725 E-Mail: [email protected]

File: / pub/ wp/ documents/ faq/ hipam/ hipam-faq-1.texDate: 2011-07-15


Technology

Privileged Access Manager Product Q&A