Verifying non-diversion of

nuclear material from

naval fuel cycles under

the Nonproliferati

on Treaty(general)

1. Security risks (nuclear terrorism and proliferation)associated with the use of HEU for naval reactor fuel by

the US/UK, Russia, India and perhaps other countries in the future

2. The potential obstacle to nuclear disarmamentthat large reserves of HEU for naval reactor fuel could

pose for deep cuts and ultimately nuclear disarmament.

3. Verifying non-diversion of nuclear material from naval fuel cycles under the Nonproliferation Treaty

and a future Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

MY PRESENTATION FOCUS

The Issues(according Prof von Hippel

presentation)

Sumarine Fuel: LEU x HEU• Certain design tradeoffs exist between

the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) versus the use of low enriched uranium (LEU) as a nuclear submarine reactor fuel with regard to such factors as:

core lifecore size

total powerreactor safetyLANNING, D.D.; IPPOLITO,T. Some Technical Aspects of the Use of Low-Enriched vs. High-Enriched

Uranium Fuel in Submarine Reactors, in Conference on the Implications of Acquisition of Nuclear Powered Submarines by Non-Nuclear Weapons States Proceedings, MIT, Cambridge, USA, 1989.

Submarine Fuel: LEU x HEU• The fuel for the first nuclear submarine Nautilus

and her prototype STR was metallic alloyed HEU – in principle a low U density fuel (early 50´s)

• Which drivers did push Rickover to this decision? Considering the state-of-art at these times, the trade-offs were not the same Availability of HEU Technological process to obtain U metal already developed Less U content in the alloy, less radiation damage to the fuel –

a problem for early graphite-gas reactors U metal fuelled Early development of a suitable metal to be alloyed –

Zirconium Time constraint of the project Non proliferation did not still enter in the dictionaries

Submarine Fuel: LEU x HEU• Why USA did not change its option, considering the

evolution of the state-of -the-art of nuclear fuel, with new solutions more dense in atomic U, as UO2 and many others?

Good results for this option in terms of the current trade-off: High core life, low core size, high total power, no safety

problems

R&D effort in the original option, still better results Industrial effect: an infrastructure was established Availability of HEU Non proliferation entered in the dictionaries but not in

the US Navy´s ones

Submarine Fuel: LEU x HEU• Why did France choose HEU in early 60

´s?

Few HEU available: total priority for weapons

Brand new “Force de Frappe”, low enrichment capacity

HEU for 1st criticality of PAT (land prototype) supplied by USA

But nothing more after, neither ToT (transfer of technology)

I guess …

First SSBN class using HEU

form and source of supply unknown

Submarine Fuel: LEU x HEU• Why did France change to LEU in early

70´s?

Higher density UO2 rod fuel already developed for PWRs

Rod fuel weakness for submarine use: new UO2 solution

UO2 “caramel” plate fuel developed for first SSN class

Not so good results terms of the current trade-off:

But the use of an integral design rather than a loop-type design could compensate for the larger core size.

Submarine Fuel: LEU x HEU• Why France did not keep HEU?

HEU availability remains limited, large LEU availability George Besse I in operation: final enrichment at Pierrelatte No success in centrifuge development

R&D effort in the LEU option, still better results Mainly in terms of integral PWR design compensating core

size Core life not as important as in USA (French Navy is not “7

oceans”) No safety problems for this option

Industrial effect: an infrastructure was established Non proliferation entered in the dictionaries but not in

the Marine Nationale´s ones

Submarine Fuel: LEU x HEU• Why did Brazil choose LEU in early 80´s?

Prudent to start with a proven technology (UO2 fuel rods) with a lot of information and experimental data in open sources for the land prototype (nowadays called LABGENE) No expertise in dealing with metallic uranium and practically no

information and experimental data available in open sources

Non proliferation entered in all Brazilian dictionaries: dealing with metal HEU was not a good political approach nor a sound technical one

But UO2 rods is not a good technical solution for submarines (but it was adopted successfully for Otto Hahn German merchant ship)

Submarine Fuel: LEU x HEU• Why did Brazil choose LEU in early 80´s?

So, a better fuel for the real nuclear submarine reactor core must be developed.

Which options keeping UO2 and LEU? “Caramel” plate fuel, at these times already a proven solution Dispersion fuels CERMET and CERCER, the first one looking better

R&D programs launched to explore both alternatives Good results for both, including irradiation of mini-plates in

Brazilian research reactor IEA-R1 for “caramel”

Decision will be make in the future on first submarine core Rods? Caramel Plates? Dispersion CERMET plates? It depends on real time schedule

Submarine Fuel: LEU x HEU• Will Brazil change to HEU in late 2020

´s?

Hard to find a rationale for thatThe reasons for France not keeping HEU are all

applicable to Brazil not changing to HEU

with one more strong motivation:

Non proliferation is an integral part ofBrazilian Navy dictionary

Verifying non-diversion of

nuclear material from naval fuel

cycles under the Nonproliferation

Treaty

(Brazil and Argentina)

Assuring non-diversion of LEU produced for

brazilian naval propulsion reactors(adapted from Prof von Hippel presentation)

Boxes outlined in red could be dealt with by standard IAEA approaches forland-based reactors. Others Brazilian Navy will cooperate to establish a sounder approach

Monitored LEU stockpile inunclassified form

Fabricated fuelLEU mass balanceContainer sealed

Spent fuel storage insealed container

Mass balance for LEU?

Proliferation risks

Diversion of UF6 or UO2 in powder production facility

Countermeasure: dealt with by standard IAEA approaches for land-based reactors (last LEU mass balance)

Diversion of UO2 in fuel rod/plate fabrication facility

Countermeasure: standard approaches do not apply

Special procedures (INFCIRC/435) must give reasonable assurance UO2 go out of the facility only in the form of a sealed container with a number of fuel elements

No new mass balance (protecting final fuel form)

Diversion of fuel elements from fresh fuel container

Only a risk if exists an undeclared dedicated facility to “reprocess” fresh fuel: very very low risk

Countermeasure: fresh fuel container goes direct to a monitored interim storage near refueling facilities, keeping the balance of mass in terms of number of containers in and out this facility.

Proliferation risks

Diversion of fuel elements during refueling Only a risk if exists a dedicated facility to “reprocess”

fresh fuel: very low risk

Countermeasure: standard approaches do not apply

Special procedures (INFCIRC/435) must give reasonable assurance there is no route to divert a fresh fuel element

Mass balance in terms of sealed container in, unsealed container (empty) out

After completing works, refueling hatch sealed in a checkable way

Proliferation risks

Diversion of fuel elements during reactor operation

Only a risk if exists undeclared dedicated facilities for defueling and further reprocessing irradiated fuel: very very low risk

Countermeasure: Special procedures (INFCIRC/435) must give reasonable assurance there is no diversion checking refueling hatch seals after a operational cycle to be defined

Proliferation risks

Diversion of fuel elements during reactor defueling

Operation done in declared facilities

Only a risk if exists undeclared dedicated facilities for reprocessing irradiated fuel : very very low risk

unloaded irradiated fuel elements go to a cooling pool without inspection (protecting final fuel form)

Countermeasure: Special procedures (INFCIRC/435) must give reasonable assurance there is no route to divert an irradiated fuel element from cooling pool

Proliferation risks

Diversion of fuel elements off cooling pool This operation will be done in very long term (around 10

years after defueling) and, consequently, in a very different context

But it will be done to an interim or final disposal facility, as there is no plans in Brazil to build a reprocessing facility

Countermeasure: dealt with by standard IAEA approaches for land-based reactors as at this time, the current fuel design will be very different from the older ones

The same if Brazil would develop a reprocessing facility in the long term

Proliferation risks

Over and above this paradox, Brazil is making an irreprehensible “homework” in non proliferation issues

Vert

ical

Vert

ical

HorizontalHorizontal

"We must abandon the unworkable

notion that it is morally reprehensible for

some countries to pursue weapons of

mass destruction, yet morally

acceptable for others to rely on them for

security - and indeed to continue to

refine their capacities and postulate

plans for their use."

(Mohamed ElBaradei)

NON PROLIFERATION IN NON PROLIFERATION IN BRAZILBRAZIL

UNIQUE SUCCESS EXPERIENCE UNIQUE SUCCESS EXPERIENCE

NON PROLIFERATION IN NON PROLIFERATION IN BRAZILBRAZIL

UNIQUE SUCCESS EXPERIENCE UNIQUE SUCCESS EXPERIENCE• Brazilian Constitution Brazilian Constitution proscribe all non-pacific uses proscribe all non-pacific uses of nuclear energyof nuclear energy– Member of NPTMember of NPT

– Member of Tlatelolco TreatyMember of Tlatelolco Treaty

} A remarkableA remarkablerecord of more record of more than 25 than 25 years without years without

technical technical deviations or deviations or

suspicious suspicious eventsevents

• All nuclear installations fully safeguarded– Multilateral agreements (1990 +

1994) (Brazil – Argentina – ABACC) + IAEA

• ABACC – bilateral regional agency

– IAEA full escope (NPT - 1997)

As Japan, Germany and Netherlands, has 2+1 enrichment plants fully safeguarded

Brazilian centrifuge program was never suspected being “proliferant” neither part of any international “black-marketing”

Has produced 20% batches for research reactor fuel under full scope safeguardsLEI

USIDE

RESENDEEnrichmentfacility

NON PROLIFERATION IN NON PROLIFERATION IN BRAZILBRAZIL

UNIQUE SUCCESS EXPERIENCE UNIQUE SUCCESS EXPERIENCE