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Recommendations and Reports / Vol. 61 / No. 3 July 6, 2012 Updated CDC Recommendations for the Management of Hepatitis B Virus–Infected Health-Care Providers and Students U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report

Updated cdc recommendations for the management of hepatitis b virus–infected health care providers and students

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  • 1. Please note: An erratum has been published for this issue. To view the erratum, please click here. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly ReportRecommendations and Reports / Vol. 61 / No. 3July 6, 2012 Updated CDC Recommendations for the Management of Hepatitis BVirusInfected Health-Care Providers and StudentsU.S. Department of Health and Human ServicesCenters for Disease Control and Prevention

2. Recommendations and ReportsCONTENTSCONTENTS (Continued)Introduction ............................................................................................................1Recommendations for Chronically HBV-Infected Health-CareMethods ....................................................................................................................2Providers and Students .....................................................................................9Major Trends in Regard to Providers with HBV Infection ........................2 Practice Scope .....................................................................................................9 Health-Care Provider-to-Patient Transmission of HBV .........................2Hepatitis B Vaccination and Screening ......................................................9 National Trends in Acute Hepatitis B Incidence and Prevalence ......4Expert Panel Oversight Not Needed ....................................................... 10 Treatments for Chronic Hepatitis B Infection ..........................................4Expert Panel Oversight Recommended ................................................. 10 Consistency with Other Guidelines .............................................................4Institutional Policies and Procedures ...................................................... 10Prevention Strategies ...........................................................................................5 Standard Precautions .......................................................................................5 Work Practice and Engineering Controls ..................................................6 Testing and Vaccination of Health-Care Providers .................................6Actions Taken Against HBV-Infected Health-Care Providers and Students ..............................................................................................................6Technical and Ethical Issues in Developing Recommendations ..........6 Monitoring HBV DNA Level and Hepatitis B e Antigen (HBeAg) ......6 Assessing a Safe Level of HBV DNA .............................................................7 Disclosure of Relationship Fluctuating HBV DNA Levels ..........................................................................7 CDC, our planners, and our content experts wish to disclosethat they have no financial interests or other relationships Specifying Exposure-Prone Procedures ....................................................7 with the manufacturers of commercial products, suppliers of Notification of Patients of HBV-Infected Health-Care Providers .......8commercial services, or commercial supporters. Presentations Ethical Considerations .....................................................................................8will not include any discussion of the unlabeled use of a productor a product under investigational use. CDC does not accept Guidance for Expert Review Panels at Institutions ................................9commercial support.The MMWR series of publications is published by the Office of Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Laboratory Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Atlanta, GA 30333.Suggested Citation: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. [Title]. MMWR 2012;61(No. RR-3):[inclusive page numbers]. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Thomas R. Frieden, MD, MPH, Director Harold W. Jaffe, MD, MA, Associate Director for Science James W. Stephens, PhD, Director, Office of Science Quality Stephen B. Thacker, MD, MSc, Deputy Director for Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Laboratory ServicesStephanie Zaza, MD, MPH, Director, Epidemiology and Analysis Program OfficeMMWR Editorial and Production StaffRonald L. Moolenaar, MD, MPH, Editor, MMWR SeriesMartha F. Boyd, Lead Visual Information Specialist Christine G. Casey, MD, Deputy Editor, MMWR SeriesMaureen A. Leahy, Julia C. Martinroe,Teresa F. Rutledge, Managing Editor, MMWR SeriesStephen R. Spriggs, Terraye M. StarrDavid C. Johnson, Lead Technical Writer-Editor Visual Information Specialists Jeffrey D. Sokolow, MA, Project Editor Quang M. Doan, MBA, Phyllis H. King Information Technology SpecialistsMMWR Editorial BoardWilliam L. Roper, MD, MPH, Chapel Hill, NC, ChairmanMatthew L. Boulton, MD, MPH, Ann Arbor, MI Dennis G. Maki, MD, Madison, WIVirginia A. Caine, MD, Indianapolis, IN Patricia Quinlisk, MD, MPH, Des Moines, IAJonathan E. Fielding, MD, MPH, MBA, Los Angeles, CAPatrick L. Remington, MD, MPH, Madison, WIDavid W. Fleming, MD, Seattle, WA John V. Rullan, MD, MPH, San Juan, PRWilliam E. Halperin, MD, DrPH, MPH, Newark, NJWilliam Schaffner, MD, Nashville, TNKing K. Holmes, MD, PhD, Seattle, WA Dixie E. Snider, MD, MPH, Atlanta, GA Deborah Holtzman, PhD, Atlanta, GAJohn W. Ward, MD, Atlanta, GA Timothy F. Jones, MD, Nashville, TN 3. Recommendations and Reports Updated CDC Recommendations for the Management of Hepatitis BVirusInfected Health-Care Providers and StudentsPrepared by Scott D. Holmberg, MDAnil Suryaprasad, MD John W. Ward, MD Division of Viral Hepatitis, National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention SummaryThis report updates the 1991 CDC recommendations for the management of hepatitis B virus (HBV)infected health-care providers and students to reduce risk for transmitting HBV to patients during the conduct of exposure-prone invasive procedures (CDC. Recommendations for preventing transmission of human immunodeficiency virus and hepatitis B virus to patients during exposure-prone invasive procedures. MMWR 1991;40[No. RR-8]). This update reflects changes in the epidemiology of HBV infection in the United States and advances in the medical management of chronic HBV infection and policy directives issued by health authorities since 1991.The primary goal of this report is to promote patient safety while providing risk management and practice guidance to HBV- infected health-care providers and students, particularly those performing exposure-prone procedures such as certain types of surgery. Because percutaneous injuries sustained by health-care personnel during certain surgical, obstetrical, and dental procedures provide a potential route of HBV transmission to patients as well as providers, this report emphasizes prevention of operator injuries and blood exposures during exposure-prone surgical, obstetrical, and dental procedures.These updated recommendations reaffirm the 1991 CDC recommendation that HBV infection alone should not disqualify infected persons from the practice or study of surgery, dentistry, medicine, or allied health fields. The previous recommendations have been updated to include the following changes: no prenotification of patients of a health-care providers or students HBV status; use of HBV DNA serum levels rather than hepatitis B e-antigen status to monitor infectivity; and, for those health-care professionals requiring oversight, specific suggestions for composition of expert review panels and threshold value of serum HBV DNA considered safe for practice (17 million IU/ml) (9) transmitted HBV to betweento quantify the strength-of-evidence or enable the grading of a two and eight patients during August 2008May 2009 (10).recommendation (5). An international review of HBV health-care provider-to-Nonetheless, CDC and state authorities have been able topatient transmissions in other countries in which the HBVdetect instances of patient-to-patient transfer of HBV (and DNA levels (viral load) of the providers were measured hasHCV) from unsafe injection and dialysis practices, sharing of determined that 4 x 104 genome equivalents per ml (GE/ml)blood-glucose monitoring equipment, and other unsanitary(roughly comparable to 8,000 international units (IU)/ml)practices and techniques (6). One report from an oral surgery was the lowest level of HBV DNA in any of several surgeonspractice documented patient-to-patient HBV transmission,implicated in transmission of HBV to patients between 1992although a retrospective assessment did not identifyand 2008 (915; Table 1). This lowest measurement wasinappropriate procedures (7). However, despite detectingtaken >3 months after the suspected transmission event, sopatient-to-patient transmission, there is only one publishedthe relevance of the HBV DNA viral load to transmissibilityTABLE 1. Cases of surgeon-to-patient transmission of hepatitis B virus (HBV) in which the surgeons HBV DNA was quantified HBV DNA HBV Time sample takenLocation of reported case (yr) Profession(GE/ml)* e-antigen Quantification technique after transmissionUnited States (1992)Thoracic surgery resident1.0 X 109PositiveSemi-quantitative PCR dot-blot4 mos hybridization, with comparison serum containing 108 chimpanzee- infectious particlesUnited Kingdom Cardiothoracic surgeon 109PositiveSemi-quantification by end-point6 mos (19901997)General surgeon108Positivedilution>8 wks General surgeon109PositiveUnknown General surgeon107PositiveUnknown Cardiothoracic surgeon 105PositiveUnknownUnited Kingdom General surgeon1.0 X 107NegativeLiquid hybridization and enzyme-12 wks (1988, 19931995)Gynecologist 4.4 X 106Negativelinked oligonucleotide assayUnknown Gynecologist 5.5 X 106NegativeUnknown General surgeon2.5 X 105Negative12 wksUnited Kingdom (1999)**Surgeon1.03 X 106 NegativeLightcycler PCR UnknownNetherlands (19981999)Surgeon5.0 X 109PositiveLimited dilution PCR1 yrUnited Kingdom Surgeon1.12 X 108 NegativeChiron Quantiplex Branched DNAAt least 3 (19881997) Surgeon2.55 X 105 assay and Roche Amplicor HBVmos after Surgeon6.72 X 105 DNA monitor assay transmission in Surgeon6.35 X 104 all surgeons Surgeon4.20 X 108 Surgeon9.47 X 108United States (2008)***Orthopedic surgeon 1.79 X 107 PositiveVersant 3.0 third generation14 wks branched DNA assay *GE/ml, genome equivalents/ml; generally, approximately five times comparable measurement of international units (IU)/ml. Source: Harpaz R, von Seidlin L, Averhoff AM, et al. Transmission of hepatitis B virus to multiple patients from a surgeon without evidence of inadequate infection control. N Engl J Med 1996;334:54954. Source: Ngui SL, Watkins RPF, Heptonstall J, Teo CG. Selective transmission of hepatitis B after percutaneous exposure. J Infect Dis 2000;181:83843.Source: The Incident Investigation Teams and Others. Transmission of hepatitis to patients from four infected surgeons without hepatitis B e antigen. N Engl J Med 1997;336:17884. **Source: Molyneaux P, Reid TM, Collacott I, Mcintyre PG, Dillon JF, Laing RB. Acute hepatitis B in two patients transmitted from an e antigen negative cardiothoracic surgeon. Commun Dis Publ Health 2000;3:2502. Source: Spijkerman IJ, van Doorn LJ, Janssen MH, et al. Transmission of hepatitis B virus from a surgeon to his patients during high risk and low risk surgical procedures during 4 years. Infect Contr Hosp Epidemiol 2002;23:30612. Source: Corden S, Ballard AJ, Ijaz S, et al. HBV DNA levels and transmission of hepatitis B by health care workers. J Clin Virol 2003;27:528. Lowest value in any transmitting surgeon; average of testing at two laboratories using the same (Roche) assay. **Source: Enfield KB, Sharapov U, Hall K, et al. Transmission of hepatitis B virus to patients from an orthopedic surgeon [Abstract no. 420]. Presented at the 5th* Decennial International Conference on Healthcare-Associated Infections, Atlanta, Georgia; March 1820, 2010. Available at http://shea.confex.com/shea/2010/ webprogram/Paper2428.html.MMWR/July 6, 2012/Vol. 61/No. 3 3 6. Please note: An erratum has been published for this issue. To view the erratum, please click here. Recommendations and Reportsis unclear. In general, those surgeons who transmitted HBV toalpha and pegylated interferon) and five nucleoside or nucleotidepatients appear to have had HBV DNA viral loads well above analogs (lamuvidine, telbivudine, abacavir, entecavir, and tenofovir).105 GE/ml (or above 20,000 IU/ml) at the earliest time thatAmong the approved analogs, both entecavir and tenofovir haveviral load was tested after transmission (Table 1). However, the potent antiviral activity as well as very low rates of drug resistance.few studies conducted in nonhuman primates have reported Treatment with these agents reduces HBV DNA levels to undetectabledifferent results regarding the correlation between HBV DNAor nearly undetectable levels in most treated persons (2527).levels in blood and infectivity. One study found a correlation Virtually all treated patients, even those few still receiving older agents(16), but another did not (17).(e.g., lamuvidine), can expect to achieve a reduction of HBV DNA In addition to the rarity of surgery-related transmission ofviral loads to very low levels within weeks or months of initiatingHBV since 1994 (one reported instance), the most recenttherapy (25). The newer medications are effective in suppressingcase of HBV transmission from a U.S. dental health-careviral replication, and it is expected that they will be used for a newlyprovider to patients was reported in 1987 (18,19). Since thisidentified HBV-infected health-care provider who is performingevent, certain infection control measures are thought to haveexposure-prone procedures and who has HBV virus levels above thecontributed to the absence of detected transmissions; such threshold suggested in this report (1,000 IU/ml [i.e., about 5,000measures include widespread vaccination of dental health-caregenome equivalents (GE)/ml]) or as adopted by his or her institutionsprofessionals, universal glove use, and adherence to the tenetsexpert review panel. However, clinicians caring for infected health-of the 1991 Occupational Safety and Health Administrationcare providers or students who are not performing exposure-prone(OSHA) Bloodborne Pathogens Standard (20). Since 1991, noprocedures and who are not subject to expert panel review shouldtransmission of HBV has been reported in the United States consider both the benefits and risks associated with life-long antiviralor other developed countries from primary care providers,therapy for chronic HBV started at young ages (25).clinicians, medical or dental students, residents, nurses, otherhealth-care providers, or any others who would not normally Consistency with Other Guidelinesperform exposure-prone procedures (21).Recommendations for the management of HBV-infected health-care providers and students have evolved in the United National Trends in Acute Hepatitis BStates and other developed countries (Table 2). In 2010, theIncidence and Prevalence Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA) Symptomatic acute HBV infections in the United States,issued updated guidelines that recommended a processas reported through health departments to CDC, havefor ensuring safe clinical practice by HBV-infected health-declined approximately 85% from the early 1990s to 2009care providers and students (28). These separate guidelines(22), following the adoption of universal infant vaccination classify many invasive procedures and list those associatedand catch-up vaccinations for children and adolescents (23). with potentially increased risk for provider-to-patient bloodIf declining trends continue, an ever-increasing proportionexposures (Category III procedures, in the SHEA guidelines).of patients receiving health care and their providers will beSHEA recommends restricting a providers practice on theprotected by receipt of hepatitis B vaccination. basis of the providers HBV DNA blood levels and the conduct Patient-to-health-care provider transmission of HBV also hasof certain invasive procedures considered exposure prone.declined markedly. Reflecting this finding, the reported numberThe SHEA guidelines also address the current therapeuticof acute HBV infections among providers in the United States,interventions that reduce the viral loads and the infectiousnessnot all of which reflect occupational exposure, decreased from of HBV-infected personnel. For providers practicing certainapproximately 10,000 in 1983 to approximately 400 in 2002exposure-prone procedures, SHEA recommends that they(24) and to approximately 100 by 2009 (22).maintain HBV blood levels