Aspirations, Ambitions, and Approaches

Attribution: Aspirations, Ambitions, and Approaches, January 2022, Observer Research Foundation.

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India at 75

Aspirations, Ambitions, and

Approaches

INDIA @ 75

ETHIC, ECONOMY AND EXEMPLAR

SAMIR SARAN

If a weary international community—

reeling from unanticipated

challenges and unprecedented

disruptions in the early 21st

century—was looking forward to a

stabilising start to the 2020s, its hopes

were short-lived. COVID-19 continues

to weave its way through borders and

continents, felling victims and flummoxing

governments. Two years down the line,

it is increasingly clear that we have to

EDITOR’S NOTE

learn to live with the virus, as it shows

signs of transitioning to become endemic.

A “new normal” where COVID-19 does

not cripple communities, countries and

whole continents is the future, even as

vaccine inequity makes the possibility of

more lethal variants imminent.

But even before COVID-19 forced us to

radically rethink and redo the way we

live our very lives, a certain tiredness

had been evident. Generational and

geographical shifts in the balance of

power, rapid advances in technology-led

innovations, and existential global risks

like climate change have all strained

the capacity of prevailing international

norms and institutions. These had left

them looking wilted, if not withered. Now,

these norms and institutions have all but

shattered from the strain of the pandemic.

There is no percentage in stating the

obvious, yet it must be reiterated: The

international community needs new

ideas, anchors and torchbearers to

reinvigorate globalisation and strengthen

global co-operation.

Towards this end, only asinine

assessments of a future world order

as the century turns 20 would ignore

the crucial role of India in shaping this

decade, and determining the trajectory

of the decades to follow. Our endeavour

with this series of essays is to capture the

ideas and ethics driving contemporary

Indian diplomacy; examine the methods

and contours of India’s engagement with

the world; and, offer a prognosis of India’s

future as a leading power.

Under the rubric of ‘India@75:

Aspirations, Ambitions, and Approaches’,

ORF has curated 18 essays written

by some of the world’s finest minds,

representing former heads of state and

government, members of parliament,

heads of international institutions,

leaders from business, and experts from

academia and media. Between them, they

have studied India’s evolving relationship

with new geographies, its engagement

with new domains of global governance,

and the human imperative that must

define India’s rise.

Few predict the path ahead will be

easy for India, or that latent and legacy

challenges confronting this nation can

be ignored. Indeed, most assessments

in this volume suggest disquiet and

uncertainty. Amrita Narlikar begins

her essay with a cautionary note on

world affairs. “Multilateralism is facing

a crisis of unprecedented proportions,”

she writes, “It manifests itself in a

fundamental questioning of the very value

of multilateralism within countries and

deadlocks in negotiations in multilateral

organisations.” But this global crisis, she

argues, also begets opportunities for

India. C. Raja Mohan agrees and asserts

that this period of churn offers India the

opportunity to shed the temptation to act

alone and actively build new coalitions

and consensus with other powers. But

this will depend, he argues, on how quickly

India can restructure its traditional

worldview.

As Harsh V Pant writes in his essay, this

restructuring is already underway, as

“India’s past diffidence in making certain

foreign policy choices is rapidly giving

way to greater readiness to acknowledge

the need for a radical shift in thinking

about internal capability enhancement by

leveraging external partnerships.”

As the world’s centre of gravity shifts

from the Atlantic system, India’s

engagement with both emerging and

old geographies acquires new salience.

And this is where the new external

partnerships are actively taking shape.

Central among these is the dynamically

evolving Indo-Pacific construct which,

as Premesha Saha posits, will weave

communities, markets and states from

the East Pacific to East Africa into one

strategic geography. How India adapts

its “economic structure” to these realities

and implements its “commitment to

prevent hegemony in the oceans”, argues

Kwame Owino, will determine its ability to

lead these new regions.

But shaping new geographies will also

require India to manage certain old

relationships. The Indo-Pacific should

not be seen in isolation—its markets and

communities are also rapidly integrating

with the Eurasian supercontinent. Steven

Blockmans laments that the India-EU

relationship has underperformed given

its potential to anchor democratic and

rules-based governance in greater

Eurasia. Solomon Passy and Angel

Apostolov boldly make the case for

exploring the possibility of a dialogue

between NATO and India, indicating just

how drastically—and rapidly—the mental

maps of the world are morphing.

There is a common thread that binds

these analyses: A keen interest in

India’s evolving relationship with the

US and China. These three nations will,

after all, rank among the largest three

economies by the middle of this century.

The turbulent Twenties will see the

dynamics of this power triangle assume

centre stage. The US sees India as a

partner in its endeavour to neutralise an

increasingly aggressive and expansionist

China. Jane Holl Lute argues that India

“has understood China’s principal

strategic aim to replace the United States

as the most consequential security

power in Asia”. While India’s choices will

undoubtedly implicate the balance of

power between the US and China, India

will most likely chart its own course in

international affairs.

ORF Distinguished Fellow Rajeswari

Pillai Rajagopalan highlights India’s

behaviour in international negotiations

on outer space as a primary example.

In every significant process—from

the UN GGE to the EU CoC—India has

argued for greater multilateralism while

actively discouraging behaviour that is

“inherently destabilising”. I would add

India’s engagement on cyber governance,

particularly on emerging technologies, to

this list. Although technological systems

are rapidly unravelling, India has sought

to frame rules for its digital economy that

serve both its development interests and

preserve interdependence. As Trisha Ray

writes, “New Delhi must prepare to shape,

rather than be shaped, by these shifting

geopolitical winds.” Others remind us that

much work still needs to be done. Renato

Flores urges India to learn lessons from

its RCEP withdrawal, shed traditional

hesitations, and emerge as a leading

advocate for multilateral trade.

India’s most significant contribution to

the global commons will be providing

sustainable livelihoods to its own people,

and its battle against climate change.

Indeed, Oommen Kurian & Shoba Suri

begin their analysis with the proposition

that success or failure in implementing

the global SDG agenda is dependent

almost wholly on India achieving its own

targets. India already produces nearly

half of all global vaccines and is a leading

voice on IPR reform, as Khor Swee

Kheng & K. Srinath Reddy note, making it

essential for global health security.

India will also be tasked with achieving

livelihood goals for itself and the world

in a carbon-constrained world, which is

why Jayant Sinha argues that India can

no longer rely on the ‘farm to industry’

model of development. Instead, Nilanjan

Ghosh asserts that India’s own goal

of becoming a US$10 trillion economy,

which is both equitable and inclusive, is

only possible by following through on the

SDG agenda. All of this, according to Adil

Zainulbhai, will be powered by India’s

already immense digital infrastructure,

innovation capabilities and skilled

workforce as it leverages the Fourth

Industrial Revolution to its advantage.

“India’s green transformation,” asserts

Mihir Sharma, “will have to be led by the

decisions of its people and by the energy

of its private sector.”

It is these twin imperatives—achieving

sustainable development and the climate

change agenda—that make India a very

different type of ‘rising power’. Its path

to prominence will not be defined by

military dominance or coercive economic

capabilities. Instead, India’s rise will be

characterised by its ability to provide

solutions, technologies and finance to

emerging communities in urgent need

of new models of economic growth and

social mobility. It is this ‘new economic

diplomacy’, Navdeep Suri believes, that

will define India’s foreign policy priorities

in the decade ahead.

Underwriting India’s foreign policy will be

its civilisational identity as a democratic,

open and plural society. Arguably the

most abstract of all its foreign policy

tools, India’s own ability to retain social

cohesion while providing economic

growth and development will, as Prime

Minister Stephen Harper observes, help

“lead the world as a whole to greater

prosperity and peace”. Indeed, each essay

has this very sentiment at its core—the

importance of India’s rise for its own

people, its region, and indeed as a model

for the world in this century.

We hope these essays will provide an

intellectual stimulus to debates and

discussions that will undoubtedly

contribute to shaping our collective

future, examine our contemporary

challenges and allow us a moment to

learn from the journey so far. The world

in the 2020s demands more from us.

Indians must be ready to deliver.

Samir Saran

President of the Observer Research Foundation.

INDIA’S LEAP: EMBRACING IR 4.0 TO BUILDING FOR THE WORLD

ADIL ZAINULBHAI

Envision this:

Saravanan nods with a smile when the

payment soundbox tells him the exact

transaction amount in Tamil. He sells

toys and chocolates outside a school in

Tiruchirapalli.

Dhabalesh Majhi raps out of a small

house in Kalahandi District in Odisha,

using his phone to reach out to lakhs of

his followers.

5 years from now:

Anurag who has just completed his

undergraduate degree intends to help

his father in the farms near Bhagalpur.

Using digital advisory applications

(for planning and pre-planting—IMD

forecasts, soil health), Internet of Things

(IoT) monitoring devices (in-season care)

and digital marketplaces, he helps raise

farm revenues—all this using an app via

open platform and data sharing.

Vikas requests, processes and gets

his MBA loan approval in less than 10

minutes on his phone.

Vidyasagar, a resident of Balkonda

Mandal, has been selling his produce

through commission agents at

Nizamabad market yard for 20 years.

He used to stay back in the market yard

till weighment completion and wait 20-

30 days for payment. Through e-NAM,

he sells through direct purchase orders

and saves on commission and hamali

charges. Furthermore, he gets the

payment within minutes online.

Bhanu, along with his classmates, and

social media student friends from Assam,

designed a rooftop rainwater harvesting

structure for his locality in Beed,

Maharashtra. He posted his success

story via a live video on the National Atal

Innovation Challenge and got selected

within a day. He now gets funding to scale

this idea and work with experts in Atal

Incubation Centres.

Reena wants to venture into robotics and

artificial intelligence. Through Swayam

and NPTEL offerings, she curated her

personalised course toolkit (rather than

a packaged course) to learn what was

interesting with live demo sessions. Along

with the certification, she managed to

interact with experts and meet peers in

her cohort with like-minded ideas. She is

now ready to tinker and build for India!

More than 70% of Ravi’s crops were

destroyed due to untimely rains in

Nalanda. He logs onto his mobile app and

applies for crop insurance. Through geo-

tagged data and satellite imaging, his

claims are processed within a day and

funds are transferred into his account.

India has more than 750 million

internet users today and

innumerable small success stories

that affect lives—from the kirana

store, which has now widened its audience

to outside its street, to textile weavers

who sell through social media platforms.

India is at the cusp of disruptive digital

change, one that is already creating the

next large businesses, democratising

ideas and driving inclusion at a scale

never seen before.

Today, India is powered by consumption

by a burgeoning middle class (70% of total

spending) supported by rising disposable

incomes and affordable internet

penetration (marked by Jio’s entry into the

telecom space in 2016) across rural and

urban areas. Post liberalisation, India has

moved from being the business process

outsourcing hub of the ’90s and 2000s—

with call centres and software testing—

to being at the frontier of innovation and

cutting-edge technologies at a population

scale.

During the 1990s, India saw a boom in

the services sectori—predominantly in

Information Technology (IT), IT Enabled

Services (ITeS), and financial services—

with the IT industry growing from US$150

million in 1991 to more than US$5.7 billion

in 2000, which, for the first time, created

a new set of Indian-made companies,

like Infosys, Wipro, and TCS, that have

become world beaters riding the 3rd

Industrial Revolution Wave. This marked

the start of a change in India’s perception

of “Electronification and Information

Technology".

Over the last decade, cyber-computing

improvements have steadily narrowed

the gap between the real and digital

worlds accelerating the onset of

Industrial Revolution 4.0ii as we know it.

India has been a major disruptor in this

space taking giant strides in implementing

unique, large-scale projects powered by

public digital infrastructure.

India’s Century - Digital Innovation being India’s driving force

• Unified Payments Interface (UPI):

India’s real-time mobile payments system,

which is universally interoperable, low-

cost (replaces PoS), and mobile-first

has seen incredible growth, clocking

more than 4.5 billion transactions worth

INR 8.26 lakh crores in just December

2021. In 18 months, we have seen more

transactions per month in UPI than we

have had in 40 years on credit and debit

cards!

• Aadhaar: The largest identity

programme in the world with 1.29

billion individuals, has moved from

being an identity marker to powering

India’s Digital Stack with 410 million

Jan Dhan Accounts (part of the JAM

trinity of Jan Dhan accounts, Aadhar,

and Mobile Number), INR 3.8 lakh

crore Direct Benefit Transfers (DBT)

annually to beneficiaries, and 9.3

billion e-KYC transactions.

• CoWIN: To tackle COVID-19, India’s

open source, modular real-time

vaccine monitoring platform has

clocked more than 1.5 billion vaccine

doses and, with open Application

Programming Interfaces (APIs),

is becoming a key Indian export

for global healthcare during the

pandemic.

• National Digital Health Mission

Stack: This aims to create a unified

network (remote, decentralised,

coherent) to match people with

resources across public and private

sector services. This will cut costs,

save time, and increase the ability

to monitor health compliance for

millions of Indians. With the right

security infrastructure in place, it

can help in timely interventions to

check the course of a pandemic or

in the long term for the nation at

large.

• Jan Dhan Yojana: With more than

44.3 crore beneficiaries banked,

the scheme has enabled banking

penetration, financial services

usage and, more importantly,

financial inclusion for a variety of

demographics. This has been a true

force multiplier when combined

with Aadhaar and DBT to increase

transparency, efficiency, and

productivity of government delivery.

• E-Shram: This is designed as a

National Database of Unorganised

Workers, which is the largest in

the world. It currently has over

21.5 crore unique registrations

in less than six months, seeded

with Aadhaar along with details of

occupation, skills and educational

qualifications, amongst others.

This unlocks huge opportunities for

the Government to extend suitably

tailored social security schemes,

targeted skilling initiatives to

increase employability and bring

the large informal workforce into

the digital fold. With a unique UAN

number, we will gain unprecedented

insight into movement of workers,

and the demand-supply market

marked against skills across varied

geographies of India.

• eNational Agriculture Market: With

more than 2.1 lakh traders, 1 lakh+

commission agents, 1000 mandis

and 17 million+ farmers, this pan

India electronic trading portal aims

to create a unified national market

for agricultural commodities. More

importantly, it aims to arm small

farmers with the power of “choice”

and “information”, increasing their

bargaining power across India.

With Jan Dhan (banking penetration,

payments), and a unified logistics

interface platform (transport), this

is in line to be a true game-changer

in the coming decade.

• Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT):

Focussing on maximum governance

through technology, DBT has

transformed the Government

delivery system over the past eight

years with over 311 schemes,

spanning 54 ministries, and

reaching more than 900 million

citizens.iii Along with the JAM trinity,

it has increased the productivity of

Government spending with leakages

coming down by more than 90%.

• API Setu: To facilitate an open API

policy, and build interoperable

digital platforms for seamless

government delivery, this platform

by the Ministry of Electronics and

Information Technology (MeitY)

currently helps provide information

from more than 300 central and

state government departments by

accessing 973 different data points

including Driver’s License, vehicle

registration, PAN, e-KYC, to name a

What is worth noting here is that all

such large public digital solutions are

built with an open architecture, and

are modular with plug and play, which

essentially seek to democratise and

decentralise technology usage. India has

been building ‘open digital platforms’,

which are tremendous force multipliers

(Platformisation). This is critical and

unique in being affordable, interoperable,

API-driven (and hence scalable), mobile-

first in vernacular languages, and allows

India’s entrepreneurs to build on the rails

of these platforms to innovate and solve

problems at scale and for trust.

India’s start-up landscape has benefited

immensely with Aadhaar, UPI, and Jan

Dhan (financial inclusion) coming in. The

boom in the past 5-6 years has been

phenomenal. Venture Capital investment

surpassed all records in 2021, with more

than US $17 billion in funding and 840+

deals. India is home to 81 unicorns with a

total valuation of US $275 billion (as on 29

December 2021)iv, 44 of which were born

in 2021 itself.

India is home to India is home to 81 unicorns with a 81 unicorns with a total valuation of total valuation of US$275.5 billionUS$275.5 billion

““

According to MeitYv, India’s public and

private digital offerings are on their way

to unlocking more than US$1 trillion

in digital value by 2025. India today is

building cutting edge technology for the

world with offerings ranging from social

commerce, Software as a Service (SaaS),

payments, ed-tech and much more.

Seizing the Digital Opportunity

India’s emerging digital ecosystems

supported by robust innovation in

start-ups and favourable demographic

dividendvi (with an increase in working

age population till 2041 and 3.6 million

STEM graduates annually) give us a

unique opportunity to lead in the decades

to come.

This wave of digital growth would help core

digital sectors and ones with immense

growth potential (newly digitising

logistics, educationvii, healthcare,

agriculture) to exponentially increase

potential by 2025—financial services

(170X) agriculture (70X), education (30X),

Government Emarketplace by 25X.

India is already on its way to be the

software development engine of the

world. This is evident in the fact that it is

the fastest growing country in terms of

developers contributing on open sourceviii,

with the number projected to grow to

10 million by 2023. Open-source software

development, at the core, solves large-

scale issues and democratises technology

usage. Indian start-ups have already

started exporting software extensively

as well (a change from only providing IT

services two decades ago); for example,

more than 17 million developers and

98% of fortune 500 companies use the

‘Postman API Platform’ today.

Future is Digital

Digital forces have started to re-define

how we connect and transactix with

each other and institutions, it has

enabled organisations to automate

routine tasks to enhance productivity,

and it has brought about data-driven

decision-making for organisations and

governments. Interaction of these forces

will carve out new digital ecosystems in

the times to come. India stands to gain

due to its cutting-edge tech stack.

India’s Tech Stack backed by a sound

foundation (UPI, Aadhaar, open-source

architecture with strong data security

measures), digital reach (> 1 billion

internet users, local language content),

can propel India to be the digital factory

of the world (software innovation, data

analytics).

Digital enablement will drive productivity

from MSMEsx to big companies, redefine

impact in schools and universities

(fortifying student skills, increasing

Return on Investment and learning

ADIL ZAINULBHAI

Chairman at Capacity Building Commission of India and Quality Council of India

outcomes); transform India’s agriculture

ecosystem (digital farm advisory, IoT-

enabled monitoring) to healthcare

(demand-supply mismatch – telemedicine,

improve quality and trust).

Sectors and industries will radically

be impacted and change with digital

adoption. For example, software and

applications layer would account for 60%

of the value of an autonomous vehicle in

the futurexi. (See Illustration above):

Leading this digital transformation, the

India of tomorrow will drive services and

make major strides in manufacturing in

the future.xii (SAMARTH UDYOG Bharat

4.0 aims to create technological solutions

at scale and increase the share of

manufacturing in GDP to 25% by 2025).

Digital India today, means different

things to different people—with most

being things we take for granted—from

ordering food at 2 AM, shopping online,

transferring a portion of the salary back

home in real-time to creating a reel in the

countryside, but what it does mean for

the world is that India with its technology

is here to lead!

Endnotes

i Nandan M. Nilekani, "India's software industry turned superstar after 1991," Rediff, https://www.rediff.com/money/2009/jan/29-indias-software-industry-turned-superstar-after-1991.htm.

ii T. P. Bhat, "India and Industry 4.0", Institute for Studies in Industrial Development, https://isid.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/WP218.pdf.

iii E TECH, "India to have 900 million active internet users by 2025, says report", The Economic Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/india-to-have-900-million-active-internet-users-by-2025-says-report/articleshow/83200683.cms.

iv Invest India, "The Indian Unicorn Landscape", Invest India, https://www.investindia.gov.in/indian-unicorn-landscape.

v Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, "India's Trillion Dollar Digital Opportunity", MeitY, https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/india_trillion-dollar_digital_opportunity.pdf.

vi McKinsey Global Institute, "Digital India: Technology to transform a connected nation", McKinsey Global Institute, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/digital-india-technology-to-transform-a-connected-nation.

vii Ministry of Education, Department of Higher Education, "All India Survey on Higher Education 2019-2020", Ministry of Education, https://www.education.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/statistics-new/aishe_eng.pdf

viii ET Bureau, " India emerges as the fastest growing country in the world by open source contribution," The Economic Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/information-tech/india-emerges-as-the-fastest-growing-country-in-the-world-by-open-source-contribution/articleshow/81708087.cms?from=mdr.

ix Nivruti Rai," Data-centric innovation and digitalisation will catalyse India’s growth", Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/data-centric-innovation-and-digitalisation-will-catalyse-indias-growth/

x Milind Kumar Sharma, Samir Mittal, "It's time for Industry 4.0," The Hindu, https://www.thehindu. com/opinion/op-ed/its-time-for-industry-40/article36103800.ece

xi Morgan Stanley Blue Papers, "Shared Mobility on the Road of the Future", Morgan Stanley, https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/car-of-future-is-autonomous-electric-shared-mobility

xii Mayank Agarwal et al.," Industry 4.0: Reimagining manufacturing operations after COVID-19," McKinsey Global Institute, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/industry-40-reimagining-manufacturing-operations-after-covid-19

THE FOUR Cs OF INDIA’S GREEN GROWTH

MIHIR SHARMA

India is in a unique position with

respect to climate change. It is

simultaneously the country with

the most citizens exposed to threats

caused by a warming world; the country

which will have to most dramatically alter

its development trajectory if the world

is to keep warming below two degrees

Celsius; and the member of the G-20 that

has gone furthest towards meeting its

climate targets.

India’s leadership on climate change is,

therefore, not just a matter of keeping its

promises; it is a signifier of the country’s

acceptance of global responsibility. Yet,

the fact is that, India has to increase

its ambition on carbon mitigation

alongside shouldering enormous

adaptation costs—all while ensuring a

comprehensive economic transformation

that meets the aspirations of its young

population.

Commitement, Commitement, co-benefits, cost co-benefits, cost and captial are and captial are the 4 Cs of India's the 4 Cs of India's renewable miraclerenewable miracle

““

Unlike developed economies, India’s

green transition is not a matter of

compensating those in sectors that have

to be decarbonised while retrofitting

other, profitable sectors. Nor is India,

unlike some upper-middle income

economies in East Asia, already so

industrialised that the natural movement

from manufacturing to services would be

sufficient to reduce the carbon intensity

of its output. Its commitment to reduce

the carbon intensity of its economy to 45

per cent by 2030 (over 2005 levels) is,

thus, a far deeper commitment than made

by those other economies, as it requires

completely eschewing carbon-intensive

growth while at a very different level of

development. Such green growth would

be unprecedented. It requires India to

discover a path to high-income status

that is completely different from all those

before it.

In some sectors, India has already

demonstrated its ability to absorb

and catalyse transformation at scale.

Renewable energy is one such sector.

About 45 per cent of India’s greenhouse

gas emissions come from the power

generation sector—unsurprising,

given that coal is abundant in India, and

reducing energy poverty and increasing

supply continues to be a priority for

the developmental state. Yet, by the

end of 2021, India had added over 100

gigawatts of renewable energy capacityi,

and, at COP26, the Prime Minister

committed to taking the non-fossil fuel

generation capacity in the country up to

500 gigawatts by 2030. India now has

the lowest installed cost for large-scale

solar power in the worldii—another

demonstration of its traditional skill at

supply-side process innovation.

The renewable energy revolution in

India was powered by the alignment of

several factors. First, there was clear

political commitment that translated into

favourable and consistent policy. Second,

there were clear co-benefits given that

potential demand outstrips actual supply.

Third, technological innovations and cost

reductions could quickly be adopted and

adapted. And, fourth, global and domestic

capital was incentivised to flow into the

sector. Commitment, co-benefits, cost,

and capital are the four Cs of India’s

renewable miracle. India’s success

in carving out a unique green growth

trajectory will depend on how effectively

the four Cs can be extended to cover

the greening of other sectors—from

mobility, to housing, to manufacturing, to

agriculture.

Three of the four factors can be

engineered domestically—co-benefits,

commitment, and cost. But capital will

require closer integration—financial,

industrial, and technological—with the

rest of the world. As Prime Minister

Modi made clear at COP26, India expects

climate finance worth US$1 trillion to

support its ambitions. This is not a gift. It

is not aid. It is investment in our shared,

global future—an investment that will

bring returns not just in terms of climate

action, but in cold, hard cash. Green

growth is still growth, and growth brings

opportunities for investors.

India’s ambition on renewables has

concealed the fact that similarly ambitious

targets have been set and are being met

in some other sectors as well. Consider

cooling, which is inextricably linked to the

housing sector as well as to agriculture

through the construction of cold-chain

networks. The India Cooling Action Plan,

launched in 2019iii by the Union Ministry

of Environment, Forests and Climate

Change, plans to reduce cooling demand

across sectors by at least 20 per cent by

2037-38 and to reduce overall energy

requirements for cooling by at least 25 per

cent by 2037-38. Given that this comes at

a time when the relevant residential and

commercial sectors will expand manifold

and temperatures will continue to rise,

this is exceptionally ambitious.

Here, however, one advantage of being

a latecomer to the development race

becomes visible. By some estimates,

almost three-fourths of the buildings that

will stand in the India as of 2030 are yet

to be built. Proper design of this build-out

can reduce cooling demand at the source.

Similar possibilities exist in the transport

sector, both in terms of public transport

and in terms of individual mobility.

Many Indians are yet to buy their first

car, and are not necessarily addicted

to the conveniences of the internal

combustion engine. If they are presented

with attractive alternatives in terms

of decarbonised and accessible public

transport, or cheap and efficient zero-

emissions personal vehicles, they may

never choose to buy a traditional car.

Thus, there is every chance that India’s

current rate of car ownership—of under

25 for every 1,000 people—will not

increase to levels seen in the West or

even China.

MIHIR SWARUP SHARMA

is the Director Centre for Economy and Growth Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Endnotes

i Press Release, "India achieves 100 GW Milestone of Installed Renewable Energy Capacity", Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1745254

ii Sudhir Singh, " India becomes lowest-cost producer of solar power," Economic Times, https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/renewable/india-becomes-lowest-cost-producer-of-solar-power/69565769

iii India Cooling Action Plan, "India Cooling Action Plan (ICAP)", International Energy Agency, https://www.iea.org/policies/7455-india-cooling-action-plan-icap.

In the end, the greening of India’s

development pathway will have to be the

product of millions—indeed billions—

of such choices. India’s commitment to

climate change will be marked not just in

the singular choices of its leaders, but in

the many choices made by its citizens—

for electrification, for energy efficiency,

and for responsible consumption. As has

been the case throughout its 75 years of

freedom and development, India’s green

transformation will have to be led by the

decisions of its people and by the energy

of its private sector.

GETTING TO THE GREEN FRONTIER

JAYANT SINHA

As the Indian economy

strides towards achieving

the US$ 5-trillion goal

in the next decade, the

country must navigate through a host of

multidimensional challenges. Foremost

amongst these is the climate change

crisis. India has a vast population, with the

majority dependent on the agricultural

sector, making it especially vulnerable

to the irreversible and catastrophic

consequences of climate change.

The battle against climate change will

play a pivotal role in shaping India’s

economic trajectory. Conventional

development models—driven primarily

by unbridled industrialisation and rapid

urbanisation—are no longer suitable

for the country’s economy. The standard

development model, in which an economy

progresses from farm to factory, has

become incompatible with India’s twin

goals of long-term sustainability and

competitiveness. To create a sustainable

and inclusive future for its population of

1.38 billion people, India must integrate

environmental protection into the

growth agenda. This entails embracing a

development model in which the economy

leapfrogs from “farm to Green Frontier”.

The onset of the Fourth Industrial

Revolution presents a tremendous

opportunity for India to couple its

economic and environmental goals,

which will transform the fundamental

contours of the economy. Green

technologies and business models are

set to unleash an unprecedented wave

of disruption, propelling the Indian

economy towards the Green Frontier.

In the last few years, there has been a

swift expansion of the green energy and

technology ecosystem in India—spread

across wind and solar power generation

firms, biofuel production, and electric

vehicle manufacturing. What was once

an aspiration has become a reality, as

countries around the world are beginning

to recognise India as an attractive

destination for renewable energy

investment and are making substantial

investments in India’s green energy

system. Indeed, the Indian renewable

energy industry has rapidly increased

its capacity, at an annual growth rate of

17.5 percent between 2014 and 2019,

and increased the share of renewables in

India’s total energy mix from six percent to

10 percent. This growth was accompanied

by a sharp increase in investment in the

sector, from both domestic and foreign

players. Since 2014, the sector has

received investments worth more than

US$42 billion, and around US$7 billion in

foreign direct investment (FDI) between

April 2000 and June 2018.i

To be sure, substantial potential remains

untapped in the green economy. Global

experience suggests that long-term

economic growth in the 21st century

can only be sustained if policymakers

effectively leverage the linkages between

technological innovation and green

growth. This can be accomplished by

focusing on two key policy levers: Market

creation and the mobilisation of green

finance. As shown by international

best practices, the green economic

transformation of any region must be

a market-driven process, for which

policymakers must unleash market

forces to incentivise investments for

building a low-carbon economy. It is also

imperative to dovetail the financial sector

with the national climate policy, to develop

sufficient financing capacity from private

as well as public sources. At the same

time, to catalyse any economy’s green

transformation, a conducive regulatory

environment for green innovation is a

necessary condition. Another crucial

policy lever is the creation of an effective

institutional architecture to support

green growth, the pillars of which would

include legislative bodies, independent

monitoring organisations, dedicated

funding agencies, academic institutions

with major climate change research

programmes, and intersectoral expert

groups.

The Indian government’s commitment

to pursuing low-carbon development is

evident in its ambitious targets and path-

breaking climate initiatives. The recently

concluded COP26 marks a momentous

moment for India, with Prime Minister

Narendra Modi declaring a Net Zero

target for 2070 and propelling the levers

of development towards more green

and sustainable pathways. The country

has declared to increase its non-fossil

energy capacity to 500 GW, bring its

economy’s carbon intensity down to 45

per cent, and reduce 1 billion tonnes

of carbon emissions from the total

projected emissions—all by 2030. The

capacity target for renewables has been

increased from 175 GW to 228 GW by

2022, further committing to fulfil 50 per

cent of its energy requirement through

renewable energy by 2030. By launching

the International Solar Alliance (ISA)

in 2015ii and the Coalition for Disaster

Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) in 2019iii

and, most recently, the Infrastructure

for Resilient Island States (IRIS) in 2021,iv

India has successfully positioned itself

as an emerging leader in the domain of

climate action. The Smart Cities Mission

The standard The standard development development models are no models are no longer compatible longer compatible with India's goal of with India's goal of sustainable Green sustainable Green Growth”Growth”

““

(2015), National Clean Air Programme

(2019) and Jal Jeevan Mission (2019) are

important examples of frameworks that

embed the principle of sustainability in the

domains of urban development, air quality

and water management, respectively.

Schemes such as the Ujjwala Yojana and

the Rural Electrification Programme, too,

are driving green technologies across

the country.

The next decade will be decisive in

establishing India’s development

pathway and with the right policies for

renewables, electric, mobility, carbon

trading systems and carbon taxes, better

outcomes can be achieved not only

across environmental but also economic

indicators. Massive green investments

will lead to fast economic growth, lower

energy imports, higher job creation, rise

in investment levels, and more lives saved

from air pollution. Careful planning must

be undertaken to ensure the transition is

just, fair and inclusive.

Climate change is a global challenge

that implicates everyone and requires

coordinated, multi-stakeholder action.

India’s low-carbon growth pathway can

provide a new and unique model for

the rest of the developing world. As the

third-largest greenhouse gas emitter,

the country’s climate action will play a

crucial role in bolstering global efforts

to combat the crisis. Thus, India’s green

transformation is critical not only to the

Indian growth story but also to global

sustainability.

JAYANT SINHA

is Member, Global Advisory Board, Observer Research Foundation. He is the Chairperson of the Parliamentary Standing Committee for Finance and a Member of Parliament from Hazaribagh, Jharkhand.

i Jayant Sinha, Tanushree Chandra, " Getting to the Green Frontier Faster: The Case for a Green Frontier SuperFund", Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-case-for-a-green-frontier-superfund/

ii International Solar Alliance, https://isolaralliance.org/

iii Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, https://www.cdri.world/

iv Press Release, "Launch of ‘Infrastructure for Resilient Island States’ (IRIS) at COP26", CDRI, https://www.cdri.world/press-releases/launch-infrastructure-resilient-island-states-iris-cop26

Endnotes

THOUGHTS ON A RISING INDIA

THE RT. HON. STEPHEN J. HARPER

Light illuminates; shadows define.

Amidst the gathering clouds of

global turbulence and disruption,

India’s rise as a self-defined

democratic power holds great promise

for the world order.

Even before the worldwide trauma

unleashed by the COVID-19 pandemic,

globalisation and rapid advances in

technology had already been reshaping

societies across the globe. There is

now more wealth and opportunity than

ever before, but there is also growing

agitation from globalisation’s uneven

affects. Disruptions to economic norms

and national identities have led to

politics becoming more fragmented and

polarised, while zero-sum behaviour by

authoritarian regimes has weakened the

rules-based order.

The pandemic has only strengthened the

headwinds that the post-war international

India has achieved India has achieved a lot. Its 3000-year-a lot. Its 3000-year-old civilisation has old civilisation has had wide culutral had wide culutral impacts on all of impacts on all of humanity."humanity."

““

order was already struggling to manage.

That a transatlantic consensus would

provide replicable templates for

governance around the world is no

longer a popular assumption, not even in

its Western core. These challenges do not

undermine the fundamental strengths

of the democratic capitalist model,

which continues to provide prosperity,

security and resilience, wherever it is

fully embraced and thoughtfully applied.

However, they do suggest that the model

requires new champions.

Few are as capable of or appropriate for

occupying this mantle as India. For all its

monumental challenges as a nation—its

multiple divisions, its colonial past, its

socialist legacy—the Republic of India

stands as a tribute to the emancipatory

potential of freedom and democracy.

Indeed, the coming decades will be

shaped in no small part by the choices

India makes as it seeks to rise to its

“great-power” potential. This journey is

taking place amidst a shift in the centre

of gravity of economic power from the

Atlantic system to the Indo-Pacific region

and during immense technological and

political transformations.

India’s rise is also set against the

backdrop of a bi-polar contest for global

supremacy between China and the United

States (US), along with the increasing

decoupling of their economic models.

Most emerging economies have sought

to prioritise their own development in a

multi-polar environment and to protect

themselves from the fallout of this

strategic competition. However, the world

is increasingly being pushed towards a

real choice: Free markets governed by

the rule of law and democratic norms vs.

a state-directed, neo-mercantilist model

of trade, investment and debt. Countries

will invariably gravitate towards a rules-

based world of free nations or a hub-and-

spokes global order with Beijing at its

centre.

India did not need Chinese aggression in

Ladakh to demonstrate on which side of

these choices it should fall. The country

is, by its very nature, a deeply pluralistic

society that will naturally resist any

inclination to authoritarian governance.

It is also an inherently entrepreneurial

nation that has thrived when presented

with the opportunities that democratic

capitalism affords. Thus, as India emerges

from its non-aligned legacy and becomes

a real player in the international arena, its

success will rest on the democratic model

at home and appropriate partnerships

abroad. The bold policy directions of

Prime Minister Narendra Modi indicate

a clear understanding of India’s growing

importance in the world, its needs and its

potential.

One of those needs is greater opportunities

for the largest working-age population in

the world. External Affairs Minister, Dr. S.

Jaishankar, has rightly highlighted that by

2030, India’s human capital will be a key

feature of its diplomacy. Yet more than

half of India’s workforce is still employed

in the agricultural sector, which accounts

for a mere 15 percent of the country’s

gross domestic product. There is an

urgent requirement for long-term

structural realignment—a generational

transformation—to prepare this diverse

workforce for the new realities of the

Fourth Industrial Revolution.

Further, India will have to undertake

substantial economic reforms to realise

its income goals. Harnessing technology

to overcome its rigid bureaucracy,

robust federal engagement with state

governments, more emphasis on the

private sector, and better governance of

state institutions will be essential moving

forward. India’s recent policy innovations

towards economic formalisation, such as

the delivery of services through Aadhaar

and the introduction of the GST (Goods

and Services Tax), have been significant

steps in the right direction. Early

measures towards the privatisation of

key sectors are encouraging. Necessary

structural reform in agriculture is being

debated. Additionally, India must scale

what is already the world’s third-largest

start-up ecosystem.

Finally, at a time when nations are

reasserting the primacy of their own

economic interests, an Indian agenda of

economic dynamism and mutual benefit

will need to be pursued at the international

level. A well-articulated trade agenda

is essential, which will advance India’s

place in global supply chains and build

confidence in the country as a destination

for investment. It must avoid both the

pitfalls of export-oriented protectionism

and the re-colonisation of Indian sectors.

Doing this right will not only make India a

truly wealthy country, but also enhance

its global leadership and provide the

world with a stronger and more stable

trading order.

India has already achieved a lot. Its

3,000-year-old civilisation has had wide

cultural impacts on all of humanity.

Modern India has put a lie to the notion that

democratic governance and economic

THE RT. HON. STEPHEN J. HARPER

is Canada’s 22nd Prime Minister and Co-Chair of the Observer Research Foundation’s Global Advisory Board.

progress are incompatible with extreme

social diversity and high initial levels of

poverty. After Independence, India left

behind the famines of the past. Since the

1990s, it has undertaken an economic

transformation that is destined to achieve

great heights. Now, should India make the

right choices, it will discover the potential

of helping to lead the world to greater

prosperity and peace.

A NEW ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY WHERE INDIA MATTERS

NAVDEEP SURI

Economic diplomacy is broadly

defined as the aspect of

diplomacy that focuses

on international economic

relations. In the aftermath of World War

II, this has usually meant promoting

national trade, investment and technology

interests through aggressive bilateral

negotiations and pushing the same

interests in multilateral institutions,

such as the World Trade Organisation

and the United Nations Conference

on Trade and Development. Foreign

assistance programmes were added as

an afterthought to the principal objective

of pursuing commercial goals.

However, India became something of

an outlier in September 1964, when the

Indian Union Cabinet decided to establish

the Indian Technical and Economic

Cooperation Programme (ITEC). India

was a newly independent and still

impoverished country announcing that

it would now provide support to its even

poorer friends in Africa and Asia, arguing

that, “it was necessary to establish

relations on mutual concern and inter-

dependence based not only on commonly

held ideals and aspirations but also on

solid economic foundations.”

It was this ambitious statement of intent,

carrying an unusual blend of altruism and

pragmatism, that set the foundations of

modern India’s economic diplomacy. And

it worked. I saw this first-hand during my

extensive travels across Africa, hearing

stories of prime ministers and ministers

who had learned maths and science from

Indian teachers; of industrial estates

and agriculture schools set up by Indian

experts; of national defence colleges

established by the National Defence

College (NDC); of the vast numbers of

civil servants and technical personnel,

doctors and nurses, engineers and

scientists who had been trained in India

under the ITEC. From Addis Ababa and

Gaborone to Accra and Windhoek, the

goodwill towards India was palpable. The

country was considered a helpful and

trustworthy friend.

It felt good, but that was about it. Barring

a handful of honourable exceptions,

India’s aid programmes did not translate

into any distinct economic benefits for the

country. This started to change sometime

around 2005. India rolled out its first lines

of credit (LoCs) to Africa, with a modest

sum of US$500 million. With soft interest

rates that included a grant element of

about 30 percent backed by a sovereign

guarantee, these LoCs became a catalyst

for some of India’s leading companies

to crack the difficult markets of a

India is a veritable India is a veritable lighthouse of lighthouse of knowledge and knowledge and ideas, which can ideas, which can and will make a and will make a difference”difference”

““

francophone Africa and to successfully

execute projects in countries across

Asia and Africa. These projects cover

key infrastructure sectors like transport

connectivity via railways, roads and

ports; power generation and distribution;

manufacturing industries; and even

agriculture and irrigation. As a result,

ambitious but often delayed connectivity

projects in India’s neighbourhood—

spanning road, rail and river transport

networks along with oil pipelines and

power transmission grids—finally

started to take shape under the direct

supervision of Prime Minister Modi.

On the services side, India was building

IT Centres for Excellence, leveraging its

satellite capabilities to offer education and

health services through the e-VidyaBharti

e-ArogyaBharti programmes. The original

ITEC programme was expanded to

provide 12,000 fully funded training slots

in courses ranging from cybersecurity

and climate change to entrepreneurship

and education. The government also

started to offer Buyer’s Credit to the tune

of US $1 billion to encourage countries to

purchase Indian products. Recognising

the importance of climate change, India

not only took the lead in establishing

the International Solar Alliance but also

agreed to provide an LoC of US$1.6

billion to fund solar energy projects in

developing countries.

The dramatic expansion of India’s aid

programmes under the Development

Partnership Administration within the

Ministry of External Affairs accompanied

an equally vigorous push to the more

‘conventional’ aspects of commercial and

multilateral economic diplomacy. India’s

diplomatic missions became actively

engaged in organising trade shows and

“Make in India” events, pursuing market

access and contesting non-tariff barriers;

wooing MNCs, private equity firms and

sovereign funds to invest in the country;

and pursuing oil concessions and energy

security arrangements. India’s high-

profile participation in Dubai Expo 2020

and the imaginative manner in which the

India Pavilion has been used to project a

New India is an example. At the same time,

by actively participating in multilateral

institutions, India is signalling its intent

to be involved in defining the new rules of

the game, instead of remaining a passive

spectator to rules framed by others.

Nevertheless, in the new decade, India

must confront fresh challenges in

the domain of economic diplomacy.

Protectionist trends are on the rise,

and there is a preference for bilateral

over multilateral trade arrangements.

A growing anti-immigration sentiment

in major Western countries poses new

hurdles to labour mobility. With artificial

intelligence, the Fourth Industrial

Revolution, and 5G as the emerging

backbone of economic growth, India

must retool some of its own economic

diplomacy. If data is the new oil, clear

and transparent domestic laws and

institutions must be developed to inspire

confidence in India as a safe destination

for data processing. If climate change

becomes an existential matter and

pandemics such as COVID-19 threaten

to send the entire global economy

into a tailspin, India must lead the

conversations on subjects ranging from

resilient infrastructure to global health.

It’s active participation in the Quad

alongside the US, Japan and Australia

will play a key role in addressing issues

of climate change and vaccine production

as also in the quest for critical minerals,

cybersecurity, supply chain resilience,

adoption of 5G and other technologies

from trustworthy sources, and a host of

other emerging challenges.

The positions taken by India on these and

other new areas of economic diplomacy

will be followed closely, not only by India’s

competitors but also by its allies in the

developing world who count on India’s

advocacy to protect their own vital

interests. The upcoming collaboration

between the Observer Research

Foundation and India’s Foreign Service

Institute to design and run a programme

on new economic diplomacy signals the

growing importance of this emerging

discipline. Over the years, it is expected

to build significant capacity amongst

young Indian and foreign diplomats to

engage effectively with these issues in the

context of both bilateral and multilateral

platforms.

In this new economic diplomacy, it is

important to look beyond government

actors alone. Some of the best talent

lies in the exceptional work being done

by India’s leading NGOs in areas such

as education, healthcare and financial

inclusion. Some of the brightest ideas in

these areas come from the numerous

social entrepreneurs and start-ups

that have taken upon themselves the

challenge of disrupting business-as-

usual. Many have developed education,

healthcare, financial inclusion, and other

models that can be scaled up and adapted

for other developing countries. Cases

in point include the growing demand in

several countries for the Pratham model

of primary school education, the Jaipur

foot, the Barefoot College of Women Solar

Energy Technicians, and for IndiaStack

to configure Aadhar-like solutions. There

are many more waiting in the winds, to

take their ideas and expertise beyond

India’s shores. Thus, India must now tell

its own stories—of the school children in

Bangladesh, the amputees in Malawi, the

solar grandmothers from Kenya, the IT

graduates from Ghana, the nurses from

Ethiopia and all the others whose lives

have been touched by its ideas and vision.

In this world of new economic diplomacy,

India matters. Instead of lamenting

about India’s inability to match Chinese

largesse, it is important to play to the

AMB. NAVDEEP SURI

is Distinguished Fellow at ORF

country’s formidable strengths and

resources. India is a veritable lighthouse

of knowledge and ideas, which can and

will make a difference.

TOWARDS A 10-TRILLION-DOLLAR INDIAN ECONOMY BASED ON THE SDG AGENDA

NILANJAN GHOSH

The Indian development story,

especially over the last three

decades since economic

liberalisation, has focussed

on economic growth only with scant

recognition of the costs of growth. While

growth entailed creation of new capital

through large capital expenditures, in

most cases, the costs imposed on the

society and natural ecosystem have

been so overwhelming that they have

raised questions on the efficacy of such

investments! Such capital expenditures

were witnessed in large-scale land-

use changes for linear infrastructure,

agriculture, industry, and urban

settlements; dam constructions impeding

over the natural hydrological flows, and

the like. These have also been associated

with social costs of rehabilitation or lack

of rehabilitation leading to conflicts. Yet,

there is no denying the critical role physical

capital plays in promoting economic

growth, while the empirical evidencei

of physical infrastructure enhancing

the overall business environment and

economic competitiveness at the macro-

scale is also ample.

However, the vision of growth as the

sole parameter of development has

been challenged globally for over

half a century, with the challenge

becoming more prominent recently

with development being viewed through

the Sustainable Development Goals’

(SDG) lens. To a large extent, SDGs find

a theoretical underpinning in Mohan

Munasinghe’s sustainomicsii, which

talks of a transdisciplinary knowledge

base combining economic, social

and environmental goals. This also

presents itself as reconciling between

the irreconcilable trinity of equity,

efficiency, and sustainability dimensions

of development. Much in contrary to

this global policy and academic thinking,

the Indian “growth-fetishism” has led

to a development paradigm that has

often witnessed a compromise with

the concerns of equity and distributive

justice, apart from environmental

sustainability. The sheer paucity of

social security to provide a cushion

during crisis was evidenced during

the economic lockdown of 2020 in the

wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, which

clearly revealed the anguishes of the

country’s migrant labour, the micro and

small enterprises, and the poor. It was

apparent that the social cushioning to

the poor and vulnerable has been, so far,

provided by the market forces, thereby,

highlighting the failure of policy-driven

India should India should present itself as present itself as a more equitable a more equitable green economy by green economy by reconciling between reconciling between equality, efficiency, equality, efficiency, & sustainability”& sustainability”

““

distribution and equity. The lockdown

was tantamount to locking down of the

organic market forces, thereby, leaving

the informal labour force in the lurch.

On the other hand, the SDG agenda rests

largely on the four forces of capital,

namely, human capital (SDGs 1 – 5),

physical capital (SDGs 8 and 9), natural

capital (SDGs 14 and 15) and social capital

(SDGs 10 and 16). UNEP’s publication on

Inclusive Wealth talks of the changes

in the social values of the three of these

capital assets, namely, natural capital,

human capital and produced or physical

capital over the period from 1990 to

2014. As per this report, between 1990

and 2014, physical capital and health- and

education-induced human capital grew

at 3.8% and 2.1% per annum respectively

globally—both at the cost of natural

capital that declined at 0.7% per annum.

The report infers that the decline of

forests in India is creating pressure on its

ability to develop sustainably. Though the

“inclusive wealth” of India increased at

barely 1.6% per annum during this period

driven by growth in human and physical

capital, there was a decline in per capita

inclusive wealth from US$368 in 1990 to

US$359 in 2014 (both at 2005 prices). If

inclusive wealth is taken as the factor or

fundamental basis for development, then

such a decline raises serious questions

on the sustainability of the development

process. Such a lop-sided development

trajectory cannot sustain India’s path

towards a US$10-trillion economy over

the next 10-15 years. It needs a holistic

approach.

On the other hand, following the

Malthusian creed of Club of Rome’s

doomsday prediction in their Limits to

Growth thesis, the Catalan economists

(e.g., Joan Martinez-Alier) have already

been propagating degrowth as the

way to look forward. Degrowth talks

of deceleration or a receding wave

of progression in human activities so

that the very fundamental basis of life

in the forms of natural capital can be

sustained. This process of contraction

in the economic activities in the global

North by viewing development from a

“beyond growth” (rather “anti-growth”)

perspective is posited to create the space

for a more self-defined pathway for social

organisation in the global South.iii

However, India’s development cannot

be in the direction of “degrowth”. As I

proposed earlieriv, degrowth is not merely

a statement emanating from a world that

has already grown, but from a world

that is more equal in economic terms

(income or wealth equality parameters),

more equitable from the perspective

of distributive justice, and where

social security has helped in evolving

with the welfare state. The situation in

India is quite the opposite! While equity

and distribution concerns still pose a

challenge in this 1.3-bn+ population, a

recent piecev argues how increasing

income and wealth inequalities can inhibit

the long-term growth prospects of India,

especially when consumption demand is

the prime driver of growth.

The US$10 trillion economy is not merely

an economy with a number—it is a dream

and a vision. Neither can such a dream

be achieved in a non-inclusive manner,

nor can this dream leave anybody behind.

Amartya Sen’s essayvi in the wake of the

pandemic-induced lockdown in India

reiterated the need for equity and the

distributive justice by citing how life

expectancy in the UK increased during

the war decades. Sen emphasised, “…

The positive lessons from pursuing

equity and paying greater attention to the

disadvantaged helped in the emergence

of what came to be known as the welfare

state”.

From the pandemic-induced economic

pandemonium, India has to rise like a

phoenix to realise the US$10-trillion

economy dream. This will have to rest on

two key elements: a> the simultaneous

growth in health- and education-induced

human capital and physical capital,

without compromising the sustainability

of the natural capital; and b> a more equal

India serving the cause of distributive

justice through reduced inequality that

is posed to come in the way of long-run

growth prospects. This US$10-trillion

India, therefore, should present itself as a

more equitable green economy based on

the SDG agenda, reconciling between the

irreconcilable trinity of equity, efficiency

and sustainability.

NILANJAN GHOSH

is Director, Centre for New Economic Diplomacy, Observer Research Foundation, and ORF’s Kolkata Centre.

i Tatyana Palei, "Assessing The Impact of Infrastructure on Economic Growth and Global Competitiveness," Elsevier, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/82772001.pdf

ii Mohan Munasinghe, "Climate Change and Sustainable Development: Analysing the linkages with Sustainomics", OECD, https://www.oecd.org/env/cc/1933843.pdf.

iii Degrowth, "What is Degrowth?", Degrowth.info, https://degrowth.info/degrowth.

iv Nilanjan Ghosh, " Deciphering the colours of India’s economic growth," Observer Research Foundation, orfonline.org/expert-speak/deciphering-colours-india-economic-growth/

v Nilanjan Ghosh, " Is increasing wealth inequality coming in the way of economic growth in India?", Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/is-increasing-wealth-inequality-coming-in-the-way-of-economic-growth-in-india/

vi Amartya Sen, "A better society can emerge from the lockdowns," Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/5b41ffc2-7e5e-11ea-b0fb-13524ae1056b

Endnotes

RETHINKING HEALTH: INDIA AND THE WORLD

OOMMEN C. KURIAN AND SHOBA SURI

Some estimates suggest that

India already has the world’s

highest population, with 31

percent living in urban areas

as of 2011.i Despite being the sixth-

largest and fastest-growing economy

in the world,ii with a GDP of US$3.25

trillion, India ranks low in the human

development index.iii Some analysts

have argued that if India fails to meet its

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

the global SDGs will fail.iv On the other

hand, India’s success will ensure the

success of the global community, making

an “India Model” the blueprint for large

parts of the world to emulate. This rings

true the most in the healthcare sector in

India, where globally recognised factors

that limit quality healthcare access to

the population have been scaled to the

extreme and brought to focus during the

ongoing pandemic. Starting from a very

low baseline, the way India scaled up its

testing and vaccination infrastructure

very quickly to overcome the daunting

challenges brought about by COVID-19

has been remarkable. By making the

COWIN software open-source, which

coordinated the country’s vaccine

deployment effort, India has announced

that along with the vaccines, it is also

willing to actively share its experience

in quickly distributing the vaccines with

other nations.

Indeed, COVID-19 has cast doubt on

whether the world can achieve the SDGs

in time. The pandemic has overwhelmed

the health systems globally, impacting

both lives and livelihoods. The progress

on the SDGs has been hindered severely

by the outbreak, which is causing massive

devastation in low- and lower-middle-

income countries. Many have called it

the worst human and economic crisis in

human history. The COVID-19 pandemic

has led to a disruption of essential health

and nutritional services across the

country, particularly the urban areas,

putting the vulnerable population at a

higher risk of malnutrition, food insecurity

and disease exposure.

India’s urbanisation is driven by

migration across regions as well as the

gradual transformation of rural areas

India's success at India's success at meeting the SDGs meeting the SDGs will ensure the will ensure the success of the global success of the global community ”community ”

““

into urban over time. It is estimated

that by 2047, close to 65 percent of all

Indians will be living in urban areas,

emphasising the need to provide an

urban way of life for at least 800 million

Indians in the near- to mid-term.v Given

the chronic underfunding of the Indian

health system, this poses additional

challenges for decision-makers, e.g.,

reaching out to the marginalised and

vulnerable communities in urban and

rural areas and ensuring equitable health

outcomes. There is a need to ramp up the

urban health system. Further, it must be

ensured that channelling resources to

urban areas does not result in the limited

resources meant for rural areas being

spread too thin across the country.

Health is a state subject under India’s

federal system, and historically, centrally-

driven efforts towards regulation have not

fared well. The High-Level Group on Health

constituted under the Fifteenth Finance

Commission recently recommended

shifting healthcare under “Concurrent

Subjects.”vi Ayushman Bharat Pradhan

Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (AB-PMJAY)

has already empanelled more than

10,000 private hospitals and is trying to

use the new “poor patient market” as an

incentive for these hospitals to regulate

better.

In many states in India, considerable

proportions of the population across the

socio-economic spectrum are unhealthy,

according to the Latest National Family

Health Survey.vii Anaemia in reproductive

age women has worsened, with even

relatively prosperous states like Punjab

and Gujarat showing a higher prevalence.

States with better nutrition are the worst

affected by lifestyle diseases, which

poses a great challenge and forces the

health systems to spread their scarce

resources even thinner. This issue has

come to the fore during the COVID-19

pandemic. According to the World Heart

Federation, non-communicable diseases

(NCDs), particularly chronic obstructive

pulmonary disease, heart disease,

hypertension and diabetes are major risk

factors for developing severe symptoms

of COVID-19.viii

Inadequate infrastructure and human

resources are significant challenges

faced by Indian healthcare, as made

evident during the pandemic. A 2017

study estimates the need for 2.07

million doctors by 2030 for equitable

healthcare.ix The Indian government is

aggressively trying to expand medical

college seats, both in the public and

private sectors, aiming to overcome

personnel bottlenecks. The number of

undergraduate medical seats has seen

a jump of 48 percent, from 54,348 in

2014–15 to 80,312 in 2019–20.x There

has also been a 47 percent rise in public-

sector medical colleges during 2014–19,

compared to a 33 percent increase in the

total number of medical colleges in the

past five years, from 404 in 2014–15 to

539 in 2019.xi Currently, India is deploying

telehealth to tide over the disruption

caused by the pandemic.

However, the infrastructure gaps

are proving to be insurmountable at

current levels of spending. According

to the latest data presented in the Rural

Health Statistics 2019-20, the shortfall

of Primary Health Centres in Jharkhand

and West Bengal stand at 73 percent and

58 percent, respectively. The shortfall of

CHCs (community health centres) in Bihar

is as much as 94 percent.xii The severe

shortfall of primary and secondary

infrastructure in rural areas causes

strain on the tertiary hospitals in urban

areas and overwhelm the facilities.

Infrastructure and urban planning are

linked to rural infrastructure, since

the supply bottleneck in rural areas

forces excess demand to spill over to

urban areas and render any planning

meaningless. Projecting a requirement

of INR 5.38 lakh crore over the next five

years for providing primary healthcare

to the Fifteenth Finance Commission, the

Ministry of Health hopes to manage the

iv Samir Saran, “India as a leading power: Shaping the development narrative at home and abroad,” Commentaries, Observer Research Foundation, 7 April 2017, https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-as-a-leading-power-shaping-the-development-narrative-at-home-and-abroad/.

v Swaminathan Ramanathan, “India’s urban moment: The pressing need for a new thought architecture,” Occasional Paper 196, Observer Research Foundation, 6 June 2019, https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-urban-moment-pressing-need-new-thought-architecture-51710/.

vi “Fifteenth Finance Commission: List of Studies Commissioned,” https://fincomindia.nic.in/ShowContentOne.aspx?id=27&Section=1.

vii National Family Health Survey -5, International Institute for Population Sciences, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) et al , New Delhi, 2021, http://rchiips.org/nfhs/factsheet_NFHS-5.shtml

viii “Preventing COVID-19 spread in poor areas,” 5 March 2020, World Heart Federation, https://www.world-heart-federation.org/news/preventing-covid-19-spread-in-poor-areas/.

xi Basant Potnuru, “Aggregate availability of doctors in India: 2014–2030,” Indian Journal of Public Health 61, no. 3 (15 September 2017): 182–187, http://www.ijph.in/article.asp?issn=0019-557X;year=2017;volume=61;issue=3;spage=182;epage=187;aulast=Potnuru.

x Rhythma Kaul, “Number of govt medical colleges surpasses private ones: Data,” Hindustan Times, 15 January 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/number-of-govt-medical-colleges-surpasses-private-ones-data/story-yy3shBkdgVcFDM7gplblGL.html.

xi Ibid.

xii Government of India, “Rural Health Statistics 2019-20”, https://hmis.nhp.gov.in/downloadfile?filepath=publications/Rural-Health-Statistics/RHS%202019-20.pdf.

xiii Oommen C. Kurian, “Health as a poll issue: We need better reporting and evidence-informed narratives,” Commentaries, Observer Research Foundation, 15 April 2019, https://www.orfonline.org/research/health-as-a-poll-issue-we-need-better-reporting-and-evidence-informed-narratives-49911/.

Endnotes

OOMMEN C. KURIAN

is a Senior Fellow & Head of Health Initiative at Observer Research Foundation. He works on public health.

SHOBA SURI

is a Senior Fellow with ORF’s Health Initiative. She is a nutritionist, with experience in community and clinical research

spiralling demand for tertiary care by

dealing with health problems early on

and by strengthening the comprehensive

primary healthcare access and outreach.

The current formation in power (NDA),

over the last seven years, has been

able to consolidate the gains from the

previous coalition in power (UPA) within

the health sector and has built on and

broad-based them, as in the cases of

the AB-PMJAY, Ayushman Bharat Digital

Mission (ABDM), Ayushman Bharat Health

and Wellness Centres, and Pradhan

Mantri Bhartiya Janaushadhi Pariyojana

(PMBJP).xiii Moreover, the NDA has been

silently working on converting the Social

Determinants of Health (SDH) framework

into practice, with flagship interventions

in key areas such as nutrition (National

Nutrition Mission), drinking water (Water

Mission), indoor air pollution (Ujjwala

Yojna), sanitation (Swachh Bharat), road

access (Gram Sadak Yojana), and gender

(Bet Bachao Beti Padhao). These initiatives

have contributed greatly to India’s

multisector response to the pandemic

and will certainly provide templates for

other health systems to accept, adapt and

build on.

i Yi Fuxian, “How Chinese officials inflated the nation’s birth rate and population size for 2019,” South China Morning Post, 28 January 2020, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3047798/how-chinese-officials-inflated-nations-birth-rate-and-population.

ii “GDP, Current Prices,” https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD.

iii “Latest Human Development Index Ranking,” http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/latest-human-development-index-ranking.

EMERGING AND CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES: NEW FRONTIERS FOR AN ASPIRATIONAL INDIA

RAJESWARI PILLAI RAJAGOPALANTRISHA RAY

The future of geopolitics,

economies, livelihoods and

governance will be written in

chrome. It will be undergirded

by emerging technologies like Artificial

Intelligence (AI), robotics, and quantum

computing, and will play out across

several domains, ranging from

cyberspace to outer space.

As India enters its 76th year, it is an

increasingly consequential power in a

range of multilateral technology coalitions

and multistakeholder forums. All eyes

are, therefore, on the world’s largest

democracy and how it engages with

emerging and critical technologies, not

just at international fora framing the rules

of the road but through its own domestic

policies as well. This piece identifies two

keystone technology arenas for India’s

engagement in the coming decade: Space

and quantum technologies.

Crowded Outer Space

It is a widely accepted truism in the

space policy community that outer space

is becoming increasingly crowded,

congested and contested. The emerging

space security scenario points to

serious consequences. A deliberate act

or accident in space is consequential.

The current situation calls for laying out

some rules of the road for outer-space

activities, to ensure that space remains

safe, secure and sustainable. Given the

number of new and emerging security

challenges in outer space, India can—

and should—play a substantial role in

shaping an international outer-space

regime.

India is an established space power and

has important stakes in maintaining an

open and secure outer-space regime. Its

interests in drafting the rules are driven

by the fact that it is one of the earliest

spacefaring powers and would like to

play an active role in shaping the rules

for outer space activities. India is one of

the three biggest space players in Asia,

along with China and Japan, and any

future regime will be ineffective without

the participation of the key players. Also,

rules and regulations can bring about

a restraining effect on certain space

activities that are inherently destabilising.

The development of sophisticated military

space programmes and counter-space

capabilities in its neighbourhood is of

enormous concern to India, and having

legally binding mechanisms can be a

way of curtailing certain destabilising

capabilities. Anti-satellite weapons

(ASAT) are a prominent example. China’s

demonstration of ASAT in January 2007

was a stark reminder of the kind of

challenges that India should be prepared

for. Also, India’s interests in formulating

rules for space is linked to its economic

growth story, which is closely associated

with its space programme. India has

assets worth around US$37 billion,

if one were to calculate the ground

infrastructure and the value-added

services associated with its outer space

programme. Thus, the economic stakes

of India’s space programme are rather

high, making it crucial for the country to

protect its space assets. Moreover, space

assets have significant utility in the daily

lives of Indian citizens, which is likely to

grow manifold in the coming years.

Finally, the Indian interest in writing

an outer-space regime is linked to the

increasingly contested geopolitics in the

Indo-Pacific region, since New Delhi does

not want outer space to become another

realm of cut-throat competition. The

influence of geopolitics in today’s space

governance is evident, but India does not

want such security politics to go too far,

with states adopting deterrence policies,

which would end badly for everyone.

While this may sound hollow against the

backdrop of India conducting an ASAT

test of its own in March 2019, India

was only responding to a capacity that

already existed in its neighbourhood. It

was a strategically considered decision,

not a knee-jerk reaction to China’s ASAT

tests. However, the hope remains that

going forward, all countries can avoid

going down the path of threatening each

other’s satellites. Indeed, ignoring the

security implications of military-space

programmes would be perilous.

India can contribute to the global writing

of the rules in various ways.

It has remained an active partner in all the

recent initiatives, including the European

Union-initiated Code of Conduct for Outer

Space Activities as well as the 2018–19 UN

Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on

PAROS (Prevention of Arms Race in Outer

Space). The EU Code of Conduct ran into

problems, mostly due to process issues.

For example, many within the Indian civil

and military bureaucracies opposed the

way the Code was written, saying that the

EU cannot determine what is good for the

rest of the world. But many Asian space

players, including India, had reservations

on the content of the Code as well. While

many non-Asian nations perceive these

objections frivolous, there is significant

political and geopolitical value to

engaging with these issues instead of

dismissing them. Being part of such an

exercise will provide these countries

with a sense of ownership over the Code

or any final outcome, which can, in turn,

ensure better longevity and compliance.

That the EU Code did not provide for

any legal framework or verification

mechanism only exacerbated the

concerns of the Asian space powers. The

GGE specifically sought “to consider and

make recommendations on substantial

elements of an international legally

binding instrument on the prevention of an

arms race in outer space, including, inter

alia, on the prevention of the placement of

weapons in outer space.” But the GGE on

PAROS that followed in 2018–19 had met

with a similar inconclusive fate. Due to the

divisive and contested nature of global

politics, there was no consensus amongst

the 25 member states. Consequently,

there was no formal report from the GGE.

The UK’s recent space security

proposali, “Reducing Space Threats

through Norms, Rules and Principles of

Responsible Behaviours,” offers India an

opportunity to shape the space security

governance debates. Given the bottom-

up and behaviour-based approach of the

proposal, it is important for India and like-

minded partners to engage with it and

identify existing and potential threats and

risks to space, as well as ideate possible

pathways laying stress on trust-building

as a key driver.

Given the contentious nature of great

power relations, and the resultant

standstill in multilateral negotiations,

India understands that one may need

to start with a normative process

and gradually develop legally binding

measures. It is unlikely that the global

governance debates will see much

progress in the near future.

Quantum Technologies

Just a couple of years ago, a viable

commercial quantum computer was, by

most estimates, between 10 and 30 years

away. Launched by IBM and the University

of Tokyo, the world’s first commercial

quantum computer began operating in

Japan in 2021.

Quantum technologies come with a

plethora of applications that could

accelerate our progress in solving some

of the most challenging problems of our

time: Quantum encryption can secure

communications; quantum simulation

can help us discover new materials,

including for green technologies; and

quantum sensing could help us map the

impact of climate change. To capitalise

on the quantum revolution, India’s 2020-

21 Union Budget proposedii to spend

INR 8,000 crore (USD 1.2 billion) on the

newly launched National Mission on

Quantum Technologies and Applications

(NMQTA). India joins a growing group of

countries that have announced dedicated

strategies and budgets for quantum,

which includes Canada’s National

Quantum Strategyiii, with a budget

commitment of CAD 360 million (US$287

million); France’s National Strategy for

Quantum Technologies, which commitsiv

1.8 billion euro (US$1.8 billion) over five

years; and South Korea’s announcementv

of an investment of KRW 44.5 billion

(US$38 million) over five years.

At the same time, quantum applications

can undermine the stability of nascent

digital infrastructure, including key

public infrastructure upon which India’s

financial infrastructure is built. In the

absence of clear rules of the road, and

of bright red lines on unethical uses of

quantum technologies, the quantum

revolution could become a double-edged

sword.

The broader structural implications

of quantum technologies also remain

underexplored. Will the shift from linear to

quantum causality require a fundamental

rejig in how we think about power, ethics

and decision-making? How would we code

accountability into a technology where

cause and effect may be indeterminate,

where the act of observation may change

the outcome, and where explainability

and reconstruction of how a decision was

made may be impossible?

Finally, emerging technologies in all

spheres are increasingly embroiled in

geopolitics, particularly the strategic

competition between the United States

and China. Consequently, international

norms around quantum could follow a

trajectory similar to that of AI or space,

RAJESWARI PILLAI RAJAGOPALAN

is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the ORF, New Delhi.

TRISHA RAY

is an Associate Fellow at ORF’s Centre for Security Strategy and Technology.

remaining in limbo or scattered across

disparate sets of principles. New Delhi

must prepare to shape, rather than be

shaped, by these shifting geopolitical

winds.

Conclusion: India’s Place in the World

India must use this as an opportunity

to take the lead in developing a coalition

of like-minded countries that can fund

technology-aided solutions, which

might gradually find favour among

the Great Powers as well. There is a

particular advantage to India leading

such an exercise. For instance, many

developing countries in Asia, Africa and

other parts of the world consider New

Delhi’s technological advancements as

impressive achievements for a fellow

developing nation. Indeed, India is also

seen as a bridging power that can narrow

the divide between the developed and

developing countries. It will serve India

well if it manages to take the opportune

moment to make important gains in the

governance of these technologies.

i United Nations General Assembly, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space: prevention of an arms race in outer space," UNGA, https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.1/75/L.45/Rev.1.

ii Press Release, "Budget 2020 announces Rs 8000 cr National Mission on Quantum Technologies & Applications," Ministry of Science and Technology, https://dst.gov.in/budget-2020-announces-rs-8000-cr-national-mission-quantum-technologies-applications.

iii Government of Canada, "National Quantum Strategy," Government of Canada, https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/154.nsf/eng/home

iv Anne-Françoise Pelé, "French President Details €1.8b Quantum Plan," EE Times Europe, https://www.eetimes.eu/french-president-details-e1-8b-quantum-plan/

v Heewon Shim, "Korea Starts Five-year Development Program for Quantum Computing Technology," Korea-EU Research Centre, https://k-erc.eu/korea-starts-five-year-development-program-for-quantum-computing-technology/

Endnotes

INDIA’S ERA OF PARTNERSHIPS: FROM NON-ALIGNMENT TO CRAFTING A ‘NEW BALANCE’

HARSH V PANT

Even as a new order is being

shaped in the Indo-Pacific

with India at the heart of this

emerging strategic geography,

developments in Afghanistan managed

to underscore for New Delhi the evolving

political map of South Asia itself. In a

matter of hours, the old order folded

like nine pins in Afghanistan in 2021 and

all that was left were the ruins of the

last two decades. The new order is yet

to emerge fully, but the contours of that

order can be discerned based on the past

experience of the Afghan nation and the

region. The West was, in any case, cutting

and running but the speed of Taliban

advance meant that once again the United

States (US) had to live through the Saigon

moment with diplomats being evicted by

helicopters and sensitive documents

being destroyed.

Even as Afghanistan was crumbling,

Biden was pushing back against

suggestions that the Taliban could swiftly

conquer Afghanistan by arguing that, “the

likelihood there’s going to be the Taliban

overrunning everything and owning the

whole country is highly unlikely.” And

in less than a month, western nations

were left scrambling to evacuate their

citizens and diplomatic staff even while

acknowledging that there will be a new

government in Afghanistan. After talking

of freedom, democracy and human rights

for the last two decades, the West moved

quickly towards accommodating the

Taliban regime in some form.

The western governments have now been

telling their people that some form of

accommodation with the Taliban, whether

evolved or not, is important for the larger

good of the Afghan people as this would

mean Afghans taking ownership of their

own future. While the humanitarian

catastrophe unfolding in Afghanistan

will be brushed aside, the strategic

consequences of Taliban’s re-emergence

will have to be reckoned with by the West

for a long time. If, as is being suggested

in some quarters, one of the reasons

for the US withdrawing troops from

Afghanistan is to focus attention squarely

on the competition with China, then the

credibility of western assurances as

a security guarantor after the Afghan

debacle have been put under a scanner.

The coalition of partners that the West

Non-alignment Non-alignment is giving way to is giving way to a 'new balance' a 'new balance' in crafting in crafting partnerships that partnerships that serve vital Indian serve vital Indian interests”interests”

““

is trying to construct to manage China’s

rise is likely to face greater fissures as

western allies look at the Afghanistan car

crash with a degree of foreboding.

The limits of American power today are

all too palpable and the embarrassment

of Afghanistan is likely to constrain

western strategic thinking for decades

now. The US, perhaps, couldn’t have built

a nation in Afghanistan but the manner

in which the withdrawal unfolded casts

a long shadow on Washington’s ability

to manage the emerging, highly volatile

global order.

For India, this is an important moment

in regional political evolution. In its 75th

year after independence, its centrality

in the wider Indo-Pacific is today well-

established. New Delhi wants to play a

“leading role” in the international system

so that it can shape global outcomes,

rather than merely being a recipient of

the frameworks set by others. In the

Indo-Pacific, a large part of its foreign

policy today is to find opportunities in a

challenging environment to shape global

outcomes. One of the ways in which India,

along with others, have responded to this

is to push the envelope on building issue-

based coalitions amongst like-minded

nations. The plethora of minilaterals in

the Indo-Pacific today underscore the

stark void in this vast geography when it

comes to institutionalisation. And in the

absence of major power consensus, the

ideas of middle powers like India have

found greater receptivity.

The Indo-Pacific Quadrilateral Security

Dialogue or the Quad, involving the US,

Japan, India and Australia, has the been

most talked about platform in this regard.

Its dramatic resurrection since 2017 and

a growing profile has conveyed a new

sense of purpose to the wider region,

reassuring some and creating anxieties

for China. With two summit level meetings

in 2021, one virtual and one in person,

within a matter of six months, the agenda

of this nascent platform has been widening

to include some of the most critical issues

of our times such as vaccines, emerging

strategic technologies, infrastructure

connectivity and maritime security. But

it is the commitment of India, Japan and

Australia that ultimately convinced the US

to invest in this initiative.

Yet, even as India is setting up new terms

of engagement in the wider Indo-Pacific,

the evolving South Asian landscape

has meant maintaining stable relations

with old partners like Russia. New Delhi

understands the critical role Russia plays

in the regional and global balance of

power. India hosted the regional dialogue

on Afghanistan in November 2021,

which saw Russian participation with

Iran and the Central Asian Republics.

The convergence on Afghanistan and

the threats emanating from there is

remarkable given that Moscow was quite

supportive of the Taliban in the initial days.

There is quite a distance from wanting to

see the Americans out to managing the

negative externalities emanating from the

Taliban takeover. And not surprisingly,

Russia has moved closer to Indian

assessment of the regional security.

As the global structural realities undergo

a fundamental transformation with the

rise of China and its assertive pursuit of

its ambitions, both Moscow and New Delhi

are trying to figure out their responses.

Despite the Cold War historical legacy,

Russia has moved quickly to cement ties

with China. India, too, has witnessed

the withering away of the ‘hesitations of

history’ when it comes to the US and the

wider West. Unlike in the past, India’s

growing weight in the global order

ensures that its ability to navigate great

power politics is much stronger now.

As it balances China’s rise and builds

a strategic partnership with the US,

India remains keen to invest in a stable

relationship with Russia. The India-

Russia engagement of today is responding

to today’s geopolitical imperatives,

not of the past. Devoid of yesteryear’s

sentimentalism, this is a relationship

that is grounded in pragmatism, which

ensures that while New Delhi can do little

about Moscow’s gravitation to Beijing, it

can insulate its own burgeoning ties with

the US from the overweening presence of

Russia.

India’s past diffidence in making certain

foreign policy choices is rapidly giving

way to greater readiness to acknowledge

the need for a radical shift in thinking

about internal capability enhancement by

leveraging external partnerships. Non-

alignment is finally giving way to a ‘new

balance’ in crafting partnerships that can

serve vital Indian interests.

HARSH V PANT

is Director, Studies and Head of the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

HARNESSING NEW OPPORTUNITIES IN A WORLD OF DECLINING MULTILATERALISM: WHAT INDIA CAN DO FOR ITSELF AND OTHERS

AMRITA NARLIKAR

The post-World War II

multilateral order may have

been shaped largely by the

western allies, but this did

not deter India from taking on an active

role across different negotiations for

the setting up of new international

organisations. For instance, even before

the country won independence in 1947,

its negotiators worked systematically

to ensure that any international trade

organisation that emerged would take into

account its interests (and the concerns of

several other developing countries). India

was a founding member of the United

Nations (UN), and an original signatory

to the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade (GATT). Even when the rules of the

game did not turn out to its advantage—it

was neither a permanent member of the

UN Security Council, nor was it a member

of the informal decision-making “Quad”

group in the GATT—its enthusiasm for

multilateralism seldom waned.

Over the next 70 years, sometimes in

coalitions and sometimes alone, the

world’s largest democracy sought to

reform the multilateral system from the

inside. This earned it a reputation of being

a “difficult” negotiator, especially when

dealing with western counterparts. Its

persistent activism, however, contributed

to at least some updating of the system

(e.g., the World Trade Organisation, from

the mid-2000s onwards, began to include

Brazil and India in the Quad)i. And the

multilateral system, in turn, served India

well: India’s dramatic rise since the turn

of the millennium, while in good measure

a function of its domestic economic and

social reforms, has also been facilitated

by the many growth and development

opportunities afforded to it by free

markets and the absence of major wars.

Today, multilateralism faces a crisis of

unprecedented proportions. The crisis

has several sourcesii. It manifests itself

in a fundamental questioning of the

very value of multilateralism within

countries and deadlocks in negotiations

in multilateral organisations. Add to

this the phenomenon of “Weaponised

Interdependence”iii—the ability of some

powerful states to exploit the control that

they exercise over hubs of production

networks in a world of closely integrated

global value chains—and it is clear that

multilateral institutions are ill-suited

to meet the challenges of the present

dayiv The long-standing vulnerabilities

Multilateralism Multilateralism faces a crisis of faces a crisis of unprecedented unprecedented proportions and proportions and this crisis has this crisis has multiple sources”multiple sources”

““

of the multilateral system have been laid

bare by the pandemic: The World Health

Organisation has come under much

critique for its mishandling of COVID-19;v

even now the World Trade Organisation

stands by helplessly as members

continue to bicker over the TRIPS waiver,

and potential capacity for vaccine and

medicine production in the Global South

cannot be put to its much-needed use.

The system is in dire crisis, at a time when

the world needs it most; collapse of the

system would hurt all parties, including

India. Yet, amidst all the handwringing,

it is often forgotten that the crisis

of multilateralism could offer new

opportunities that India should harness.

Never let a good crisis go to waste

The opportunities emerging directly

from the crisis are fourfold. First, while

India itself had, for decades, pushed for

reforms in the multilateral order (e.g.,

for greater inclusiveness in international

organisations), the crisis of the system

seems to have finally created a more

widespread recognition for the necessity

of reform. Second, key players in the

west—especially in Europe—have begun

to recognise that they need new allies and

friends. This is especially so given that

the US seems to be turning away from

the very system that it had led in creating,

and then served as a guarantor for. Third,

a significant cause for the malaise of

multilateralism lies in the disillusionment

of the many—within both the global

north and the global south—who believe

that they have missed out on the gains

of globalisation. This disillusionment, in

turn, is a product not only of inequalities

that have indeed increased across many

societies, but also of the absence of a

convincing narrative about globalisation

and the multilateral rules that facilitate

it. In some key policy circles in developed

countries, this has prompted considerable

soul-searching, as exemplified by Munich

Security Conference 2020 and its focus on

“westlessness”. And fourth, a recognition

seems to be finally growing that

sometimes helter-skelter globalisation—

in a world where production chains can

be weaponised—is no longer acceptable.

Alternative and more sustainable forms

of globalisation need to be developed,

which meet goals of both prosperity and

security. The moment is ripe for sharing

new ideas. And while India has always

had much to offer the world, the world

may now be ready to appreciate itvi.

Strategies

To make the most of these opportunities,

India would be well-served to adopt the

following strategies.

First, India, even it were to come up with

the most innovative ideas for reform of

the system, will not be effective if it works

alone. Coalitions with like-minded actors

because multilateralism is little more than

an instrument per se; it cannot be seen

as a goal in itself. Rather, one must ask:

Multilateralism, for what end? To argue

for a multilateral rules-based system

will never suffice on its own; one must

always address the issue of the values

that underpin the rules. This attention

to values could turn out to be especially

important in the context of China’s rise.

Finally, none of the above strategies

will work if India fails to get its act

together domestically. Here, the most

important sector is the economy. Its

own people will not support its growing

role internationally, if the government

fails to deliver with jobs and better

living standards. The pandemic is a very

tough test for governments everywhere.

There is a danger that as a reaction to

the pandemic—and the costs of over-

dependence on potential rivals that it

revealed—India swings in the opposite

direction with its Atmanirbhar Bharat

Abhiyan (literally “self-reliant India

campaign”). If “self-reliance” turns out to

be similar to “self-sufficiency” of earlier

decades, India risks undoing its hard-

won gains of the last 30 years. Choosing

the right economic strategies will be

even more important amidst the global

economic downturn that the coronavirus

pandemic is already causing. These

strategies will need to strike the right

balance between shortening supply

chains on the one hand (which the current

will be key. Here, India could work closely

with the Alliance for Multilateralism—

an initiative launched by Germany and

France—to shape both the alliance itself

and the overall reform agenda. Working

together with a group of both developed

and developing countries could further

amplify India’s voice.

Second, while keeping an eye on the global

picture, India needs to pay attention to its

own immediate region. Connecting the

regional with the global is China’s Belt and

Road Initiative (BRI). India risks finding

itself in a precarious geo-economic

position, surrounded by the so-called

“string of pearls” and potentially weak in

a world where interdependence can be

weaponised. Especially with key actors—

such as the United States, European

Union, and Japan—diversifying away

from China, India too has a potential route

to escape an emerging Chinese sphere of

influence. By hedging and balancing, and

working in coalitions with other countries

also facing such dilemmas—including

in Europe—India could carve out an

important niche for itself as a shaper

of the multilateralism that upholds the

liberal order.vii

Third, while India today seems to be

laying emphasis on pragmatism rather

than ideology, it would do well to tap into

some of the core values that it stands

for: Democracy, pluralism, rule of law,

and freedom of speech. Values matter

PROFESSOR AMRITA NARLIKAR

is President of the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Honorary Fellow of Darwin College (University of Cambridge), and Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Observer Researcher Foundation.

drive aims for), while still preserving

and deepening economic integration

with reliable allies. Between aggressive

globalisation and market closure, India

will have to find its “uvarna madhyam”

(golden mean) that will be based on

strategic economic diversification within

a small group of like-minded countries.

Internationally, too, an India rising

on sustainable economic growth—in

cooperation with others who share

its values of democracy, pluralism,

liberalism and more—will have more

bargaining clout and persuasive power

than an inward-looking India caught up in

domestic political upheavals and slowing

growth rates. After all, a strengthened

and reformed multilateralism will need to

have strong roots in the domestic politics

of the countries that seek to uphold it.

Endnotes

i Amrita Narlikar, " Poverty Narratives and Power Paradoxes in International Trade Negotiations and Beyond," Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/international-relations-and-international-organisations/poverty-narratives-and-power-paradoxes-international-trade-negotiations-and-beyond?format=PB.@GIGA_Institute

ii Amrita Narlikar, " The malaise of multilateralism and how to manage it," Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-malaise-of-multilateralism-and-how-to-manage-it/

iii Henry Farrell, Abraham L. Newman; "Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion. International Security 2019; 44 (1): 42–79." doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351

iv Amrita Narlikar, "A Grand Bargain to Revive the WTO", CIGI, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/grand-bargain-revive-wto/.

v Samir Saran, "#Covid19: Dr WHO gets prescription wrong", Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/covid19-dr-who-gets-prescription-wrong-63708/.

vi Narlikar, A. India’s foreign economic policy under Modi: negotiations and narratives in the WTO and beyond. Int Polit (2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00275-z

vii Amrita Narlikar, "Reflections on the EU-India Summit: Some small steps towards breaking a pattern of unrequited love?", Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/some-small-steps-towards-breaking-a-pattern-of-unrequited-love/

INDIA AND THE POST-PANDEMIC GEOPOLITICS

C. RAJA MOHAN

The rise of China and its

expansionism, the reassertion

of Russia, the reordering of

US global priorities, and the

breakdown of the post-Cold War global

political and economic order have

opened up unprecedented challenges

and opportunities for India. If Delhi’s

deepening conflict with Beijing underlines

the new challenges, the growing

intensity of India’s strategic cooperation

symbolises the new opportunities.

Further, India’s emergence as a power

of some consequence has improved New

Delhi’s ability to take advantage of new

possibilities and limit some of the negative

fallout. India’s success now depends

on how quickly it can restructure its

traditional worldview.

As the COVID-19 pandemic persists two

years after it enveloped the world, the pre-

existing strategic trends in international

politics have accelerated. The pandemic

has not only increased the awareness

of the dangers of overdependence on

China for manufactured goods, including

pharmaceutical drugs and medical

equipment, but also triggered political

calls for greater resilience in the supply

chains. Moreover, China’s growing

influence in multilateral institutions

such as the World Health Organisation

has been brought into clear focus. The

US trade disputes with China have led

to a new recognition in Washington

that America needs to strengthen its

domestic industrial and technological

capabilities.

The US pushback against China in the

security domain, which began well

before the pandemic, has now acquired a

sharper edge. The Biden Administration in

Washington has fully embraced the Trump

Administration’s initiatives in the Indo-

Pacific and reinforced the Quadrilateral

Forum (that brings together Australia,

India, Japan and the United States).

Biden took a step forward in unveiling

the AUKUS–a new military partnership

between Australia, the United Kingdom,

and the United States. It involves the

transfer of nuclear-powered submarines

to Canberra by Washington and London

as well as trilateral cooperation on

emerging strategic technologies like

cyber and artificial intelligence.

Meanwhile, there has been no resolution

of the military crisis between India and

China triggered by Beijing’s aggression in

the Ladakh region in the spring of 2020.

The military friction between India and

China in the high Himalayas boiled over

into a deadly clash between the troops of

the nations in June 2020—the first in many

decades. Despite continuous engagement

at the military, diplomatic and political

levels, Delhi has been unable to persuade

Beijing to vacate the aggression and

restore the territorial status quo ante in

Ladakh. As it comes to terms with Chinese

hostility and unwillingness to abide

by the terms of bilateral engagement

negotiated earlier, Delhi had no option but

to reassess its China policy and adapt to

the new geopolitical dynamic triggered by

Beijing’s rise.

In the immediate post-colonial period, India

tended to reject the notion of geopolitics

and its emphasis on the enduring primacy

of power and its distribution in shaping

international relations. India’s unique

brand in world affairs was defined by

universalist notions such as “One World,”

and calls for co-existence amongst rival

blocs in the Cold War, peaceful resolution

of disputes, opposition to alliances,

anti-imperialist solidarity with the post-

colonial world, and campaigns against

apartheid and for nuclear abolition.

However, it was never easy to sustain this

ambitious framework amidst the pulls

and pressures of the real world. Within

the neighbourhood, New Delhi sought

to preserve the subcontinental sphere

India's success India's success now depends now depends on how fast it on how fast it can restructure can restructure its traditional its traditional worldview”worldview”

““

Overarching this tension was something

far more consequential: India’s relative

economic decline and, with it, the strategic

salience, as it turned inward and limited its

commercial engagement with the world.

Finally, the change of domestic economic

orientation in the 1990s reversed India’s

relative decline. As high growth rates

since the turn of the 21st century put India

on the path to becoming the third-largest

economy, New Delhi began to rethink the

nature of the post-Cold War world and its

own place in it.

India’s self-perception as a champion of

abstract norms and universal principles

began to change in favour of a more

realistic appreciation of power and its

role in shaping the global order. To cope

with the unipolar moment in the 1990s,

India joined Russia and China to promote a

multipolar world, even as it opened up to a

rapprochement with the US. Eventually, as

China’s rise began to seriously constrain

India’s regional and global advance in the

21st century, New Delhi moved closer

to Washington. The persistent border

crisis on the China frontier helped Delhi

overcome the enduring hesitations on a

strategic embrace with Washington.

As it intensifies its security partnership

with Washington, Delhi is also

complementing the US partnership by

of influence inherited from the Raj. The

1962 war with China shook the idealism

of the 1950s, and Jawaharlal Nehru

turned to the US for military assistance.

As shifting great power relations shaped

India’s regional security environment,

Nehru’s successor, Indira Gandhi,

turned to Soviet Russia to balance the

Sino–US entente. For India, it remained

a persistent struggle to reconcile its

declared idealism and the foreign policy

practice that demanded compromise and

realpolitik.

C RAJA MOHAN

is Director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.

trying to build a coalition of middle powers

that could limit the turbulence generated

by the rivalry amongst the US, China and

Russia. This is particularly important

in light of the uncertain trajectory of

domestic politics in the US and the

potential surprises in China. India has

begun to devote greater energies to the

development of strategic partnerships

with middle powers such as France in

Europe and Japan in Asia.

The collaboration amongst the middle

powers of special importance comes at

a time when the US is rethinking the role

of its alliances in Europe, the Middle East

and Asia. While President Donald Trump

castigated US allies for being “free riders”,

Joe Biden has underlined the importance

of alliances in restoring US leadership

in the world. But Biden is also looking

beyond alliances to like-minded partners

to take on greater responsibilities for

regional security. Biden is also shifting

focus from the prolonged interventions in

the Middle East to coping with the China

challenge in the Indo-Pacific. In the east,

America wants its allies to contribute

more to regional security.

While many of the US treaty allies are

dismayed by a potential American resizing

of its post-war global commitments,

India is in a position to approach this in

a positive framework. The readjustment

of the US security role in Europe and

Asia provides an opportunity for India to

take on more responsibility in terms of

security in its neighbourhood and beyond.

This would require that India transcends

its traditional temptations to act alone

and find ways to work with other powers

on regional and international security,

through bilateral, plurilateral and

multilateral mechanisms.

As a major beneficiary of economic

globalisation, India must actively

prevent a breakdown of the international

economic order, now strained by the

tensions between the world’s two largest

economies—the US and China—as

well the disruptions triggered by new

technologies and the impact of climate

change. Instead of responding to the

new global economic challenges within

the old North–South perspective, New

Delhi must contribute to the construction

and maintenance of a new consensus

amongst the major economic actors

for sustainable global growth and fair

distribution of benefits and costs. The

post-pandemic world has seen India’s

political engagement with emerging ideas

on cooperation amongst democratic

states, on building resilient supply chains,

and strengthening ad-hoc security

coalitions such as the Quad (involving

India, US, Australia, and Japan).

As India responds to new global

opportunities, the constraints on the

country are more internal than external.

Without a more rapid and higher-quality

growth, India’s international performance

will remain underwhelming. Equally

important is the need to maintain internal

coherence. The vast diversity at home has

long complicated India’s nation-building

challenge. In this regard, internal political

divisions will not only reduce New Delhi’s

ability to benefit from global possibilities,

but also invite external meddling in its

domestic politics.

CHARTING A FUTURE FOR INDIA–US RELATIONS IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

JANE HOLL LUTE

How should one view India’s

emerging role in the

international system and its

growing contributions to the

vitality and stability of the global world

order? What issues and challenges

confront India’s growing international

profile, and what opportunities might

it exploit as it continues to evolve as a

significant global player? The strategic

state of relations between India and the

United States (US) provides a useful lens

for considering these questions.

The Contours of the India–US Relationship

Despite India’s undeniable regional and

global importance to American interests,

for decades, the US was unwilling to

consider key areas for deepening bilateral

and regional cooperation, largely due to

India has long India has long understood China's understood China's principal strategic principal strategic aim to replace the aim to replace the US as the most US as the most consequential consequential security power in security power in Asia”Asia”

““

India’s possession of nuclear weapons.

In the early 2000s, however, Washington

began to view an active and constructive

relationship with India as essential to

making progress in a range of issues.

The US’ global war on terror, for example,

aligned with India’s efforts to combat its

own organised terrorism threats; it gave

both countries a practical platform for

increased cooperation in intelligence, law

enforcement and military relations. In

recent years, cybersecurity cooperation

has steadily increased between the two

nations. Moreover, the US has realised

that enhanced cooperation with India is

essential to counter a rising China, which

is already well-underway in exercising its

considerable economic and political clout

regionally and beyond.

For its part, India has long understood

China’s principal strategic aim to replace

the US as the most consequential security

power in Asia and, more importantly, to

challenge the prevailing international

global order underwritten by the US. At

the same time, India understands the

continuing and strong regional and global

position of the US as crucial to curbing

Beijing’s strategic aspirations. As Robert

D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis have

written in the October 2019 edition of

Foreign Affairs:

“Where China was concerned,

U.S. and Indian national interests

intersected. Washington sought to

maintain stability in Asia through

an order based not on Chinese

supremacy but on security and

autonomy for all states in the region.

India, driven by its own fears of

Chinese domination, supported

Washington’s vision over Beijing’s.”

Over the past two decades, the India–

US relationship has expanded in almost

every conceivable dimension—political,

diplomatic, economic and military—albeit

not as allies but as fellow travellers on

parallel journeys. One might fairly say

the India–US relationship in the 21st

century has been characterised by a

pragmatic realism that recognises the

major points of divergence and, at times,

open friction that remain ever-present.

However, in 2020, two major factors have

accounted for the current heightened

cooperation between India and the US:

i) the global COVID-19 pandemic, and ii)

China’s moves, both its domestic actions

on the COVID-19 pandemic and in Hong

Kong and what appears to be increasingly

provocative regional behaviour.

India’s Role in the International System

Observers of India have long anticipated

the country’s growing importance on

the world stage. The country is rightly

touted as the world’s largest democracy:

Massively populous, immensely resource-

rich, fiercely proud, and unquestionably

successful in continuing to advance the

circumstances of its more than 1.3 billion

citizens. Its tradition of independence

on global issues has served it well over

the decades since the Cold War. India

occupies a prominent place in the vital

issues facing the world community

today: Climate change; sustainable

development; closing inequality gaps;

and the challenges to a robust global

economy to support, educate, employ, and

elevate the growing global population.

Internationally, India has served as a

perennial force in the United Nations and

in other international fora. It has skilfully

navigated the often-fraught waters of

the US–Russia relationship, negotiated

countless developing world challenges,

and emerged as a major voice wrestling

with the paradoxical promise and peril

of the cyber age. All this, even as it

continues to deal with its preoccupations

with Pakistan and China on issues closer

to home.

Internally, India’s challenges remain

not only immense but also, at times,

obstructive to its designs to assert a

more powerful international profile.

Its democratic processes have been

bedevilled by significant sectarian

animosities, and its institutions of

governance remain chronically weak in

the face of their heavy political, economic

and social responsibilities. Moreover,

India has to contend with persistent rural

poverty and an increasingly educated

and mobile urban population churning

out over a million new workers looking

for work into the economy every month.

These challenges, along with countless

others, hinder India’s ability to assert

confidence in the kind of role it wants and

deserves to play internationally.

In many respects, India’s challenges

mirror those that all strong players

eventually face: Whether to accept fully

the responsibilities that vast power and

potential entail. These responsibilities

demand making hard choices at home

as well as abroad. Indeed, every

government today is facing the challenge

to take into account accelerating social

expectations, fuelled by widespread

access to information and connectivity

that empowers people everywhere.

Nowhere is this reality truer than in India.

To move forward, India must confront

its approach to international leadership,

which has traditionally been more

passive than assertive, more reactive

than active. Here, India’s greatest

resource is its people. In today’s world

where, statistically, people are healthier,

wealthier, more educated, more mobile,

and more politically active than at any

point in human history, India stands on

an equal footing with any country that

aspires to leadership.

The US’ position as world leader

notwithstanding, it is unmistakable that

the challenges facing today’s world are

such that no country can do all that needs

doing, and all that needs doing cannot be

done alone. The unprecedented global

contagion that is the COVID-19 pandemic

serves as Exhibit A. Wither the India–US

relationship? The US has always valued a

capable partner. It is time for India to step

up, with purpose and pride, to take up its

share of the leader’s mantel.

JANE HOLL LUTE

is the President and CEO of SICPA North America.

THE INDIA–NATO COUNCIL AND A TRI-POLAR WORLD

DR. SOLOMON PASSY AND DR. ANGEL APOSTOLOV

A COVID-19 Postscript

This paper outlines the strategic need

for a qualitatively new type of large-

scale cooperation between India and the

West. It was drafted and submitted for

publication well before the onslaught of

COVID-19. However, the report and its

findings have only become more relevant

in light of the pandemic and related

developments. In the meantime, the EU–

India Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap

to 2025 stipulated that the European

Union (EU) and India will cooperate in the

EU–India Joint Working Group to facilitate

trade and the removal of obstacles related

to sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)

measures and technical barriers to trade

(TBT); continue the regulatory dialogue

on pharmaceuticals and medical devices,

notably via the established EU–India Joint

Working Group on pharmaceuticals,

biotechnology and medical devices;

and work together on health security

India–West India–West cohesion is vital for cohesion is vital for global democracy global democracy with the NATO–with the NATO–India Council filling India Council filling a strategic gap”a strategic gap”

““

and pandemic-crisis preparedness

and response, linked specifically to the

COVID-19 outbreak. This is further proof

that India–West cohesion is vital for

global democracy with the NATO–India

Council filling a strategic gap.

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall

30 years ago, it was expected

that the world would shift from

being bi-polar to becoming

unipolar. However, current geopolitical

realities suggest that, for the most part,

the world remains divided into two poles,

albeit with relatively less rigidity: The

Western pole anchored in Washington-

Brussels and around the NATO/EU; and

the Eastern pole around Moscow–Beijing,

which is increasingly being structured

via the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China

and South Africa) and the Shanghai

Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

In this context, the question is: Quo Vadis,

India?1 Bearing in mind both India’s

heritage as a founder of the Non-Aligned

Movement (NAM) and its ambitions to join

the P5—the Permanent UNSC members—

India needs innovative solutions. The

Modi government, in its second term,

1 Literally, “Where are you marching, India?”

seems to have the imagination, capacity

and the opportunity to do so. India is a

founding member of the BRICS as well as

a member of the SCO since 2017, which

goes beyond its non-aligned tradition. The

continuing development of India’s space

and nuclear programmes is testimony to

the country’s progress towards becoming

a great power in a sensitive part of the

world. Moreover, India is now officially

recognised as a “nuclear power.”

Being the world’s largest democracy,

India can aim to become a player

proportional to its size by positioning

itself as the “Third Geo-Pole”. To that end,

India must engage in regular and visible

dialogue with the NATO, the second

biggest democratic entity in the world.

An important first step towards this

would be to formalise the India–NATO

Council (INC) as a discussion forum, to

brainstorm for a bilateral agenda and a

better future for humanity. The INC must

be grounded on logic and reason, not just

opportunities for both sides. India and

all NATO members together account for

one-third of the world’s total population.

The two share common values and the

interest to protect them. At the same

time, they have shared concerns vis-à-vis

security and economic challenges, as well

as competitors and threats. Other areas

of cooperation include the environment

(including the North and South Poles),

energy (including nuclear), space, cyber

space and 5G.

When the Atlantic Club first launched the

idea of creating the INC 10 years ago,

it was a non-starter. However, recent

developments in New Delhi, Brussels and

Washington suggest that this has changed

in both India and the West, signalling a

window of opportunity. Joining together

will mean the democratic world will

have utilised the united potential of more

than two billion people and a significant

portion of the world’s landmass including

industrial capabilities and resources.

Establishing the INC will help improve

India’s ties with the three NATO members

of the P5. With the other two—Russia and

China—India already has ties through

the BRICS. Thus, India could play a unique

role by instituting separate security

arrangements with each P5 member. This

will de facto transform India into the Third

Geo-Pole, which will strengthen its case

for permanent membership to the UN

Security Council. NATO, for its part, will

gain new credibility and political strength

amongst the formidable group of India

supporters in the UN and the former NAM.

The establishment of AUKUS in 2021 is yet

another compelling proof of the need for

cooperation between global democracies

in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Indian

membership in the Quadrilateral Security

Dialogue (QUAD) may serve as a foothold

for Delhi to eventually join AUKUS.

Where does the EU feature in this

equation? Currently, the US reportedly

has more military exercises with India

than with many of its NATO allies. In

February 2020, US President Donald

Trump announced US$3 billion worth

of sales of US military equipment to

India. Thus, India–US security ties are

progressing well outside of the context of

NATO. Consequently, the ones that really

need NATO for security engagements with

India are the European Allies and the EU.

Therefore, the successful establishment

of the INC requires the commitment of the

EU leadership vis-à-vis NATO.

Indeed, the INC should be launched in a

holistic way, with no confrontation with

Pakistan or China or any other party

with whom the West needs a different

communication line. Neither India nor

the West could have a stronger and more

reliable partner than each other. A world

with three poles, two of which are like-

minded democracies, will be a substantial

improvement on the current bi-polar one.

DR. SOLOMON PASSY

is Bulgarian Foreign Minister (2001–05) and founding president of the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria.

DR. ANGEL APOSTOLOV

has a PhD in modern history and specializes in NATO-Russia relations and Europe-Asia geopolitics.

INDIA, THE EU AND THE FUTURE OF MULTILATERALISM

STEVEN BLOCKMANS

Amongst the major poles

of today’s unravelling

international order, there

is one relationship that is

underperforming: That between India and

Europe. Stronger India–Europe bonds

will not only serve mutual interests, but

also allow Delhi and Brussels to combine

efforts in tackling global challenges,

such as climate change, digitalisation,

and the malfunctioning of international

organisations.

There are various reasons for the

previously lethargic state of bilateral

relations. Since 1945, Europe has been

preoccupied with itself. By widening

and deepening the integration process,

Stronger India–Stronger India–Europe bonds Europe bonds will not only serve will not only serve mutual interests, mutual interests, but also allow but also allow Delhi and Brussels Delhi and Brussels to combine efforts to combine efforts in tackling global in tackling global challenges”challenges”

““

the European Union (EU) has stabilised

the continent. Tethered to the United

States (US), the transatlantic relationship

has grown into the most tightly woven

socioeconomic fabric between any two

continents. With foreign affairs and

security policy defined along national

lines, Europe looks at the rest of the

world mostly through the prism of this

strategic alliance. The EU has exported

its own diplomatic model of rules-based

multilateralism to both member states

and other nations, mostly in the field

of trade. However, it has found it more

difficult to develop such relations with

states that are fiercely sovereigntist.

A subcontinent unto itself, India, too, has

historically been consumed by domestic

matters. Its traditional approach to

Europe has been through its relations

with individual countries rather than

through the EU. However, India is now

changing this posture, having realised

that the European collective is its

largest trade and investment partner,

a key technological associate, and an

increasingly important balancing actor

in the Indian Ocean and the wider Middle

As a result of the forces of global

reordering, there has been some

improvement in the environment for more

forthright and institutionalised security

conversations (particularly in the

maritime realm) and renewed bilateral

trade negotiations that go beyond

slashing sectoral tariffs. It is in these

fields that India and the EU delivered on

the expectation to breathe new life into

their partnership at their virtual summit

on 15 July 2020.

While Europe does entertain concerns

about the hard Hindu-nationalist line of

the second Modi government, the human

rights dialogue that the parties agreed

to reconvene will likely be drowned

out in the increasingly pragmatic

stance the EU has adopted to navigate

the changing geopolitical landscape.

Ironically, increased nationalism and

realism may help renew multilateralism,

since it is easier to negotiate between

actors with clearly identified positions.

A smaller EU must go beyond fraying

alliances and forge new coalitions,

seeking convergences with countries

that have different historical trajectories.

As an emerging power in a multipolar

world, India too requires more—not

less—multilateralism to secure a stable

environment and sustain growth.

Exacerbating the situation are two

factors: That the United Nations is far

less credible now than it has ever been

in the 75 plus years since its conception,

and that major powers have turned their

backs on the World Trade Organisation

(WTO) and other international

organisations. The proliferation of

exceptionalism is hollowing out the rules-

based international order. While some of

the challenges that the world is facing

are new or more acute than before,

the fundamentals of human behaviour

remain the same: Greed, fear and the

lust for power. If states let go of the

multilateral system instead of upgrading

it, they risk creating a world in which

the weak will suffer at the hands of the

strong. Multilateralism as a tool must be

reformed, and there is work to be done by

India and the EU.

The EU is on the front foot in designing

global rules in new fields. It has initiated a

global debate on rules to protect personal

data; is aiming to set a global precedent

for ethical, human-centric standards for

the use of artificial intelligence; and is very

active in the Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and Development to renew

its take on taxation in a digital world.

Along with the US and Japan, the EU has

agreed to new standards on industrial

subsidies, in the hope of renewal within

the WTO and binding China. Together with

India, the world’s largest democracy,

Europe can explore similar plurilateral

arrangements to generate global

opportunities in connectivity and new

technologies.

Many of the problems that the world

currently faces remain the same: From

counterterrorism to maritime security;

from state fragility to migration; from

environmental degradation to public

health. India and the EU must explore new

avenues for greater political and security

cooperation to protect the world’s public

goods. In an era dominated by heightening

Sino–US rivalry, there is a greater need

for global burden-sharing between like-

minded middle powers. India’s seat in

the UN Security Council in 2021–22 and

its Presidency of the G20 in 2022-2023

provide opportunities to move a joint

vision into common action.

PROF. STEVEN BLOCKMANS

is Director of CEPS (Brussels)

INDIA’S ROLE IN THE EMERGING DYNAMICS OF THE INDO-PACIFIC

PREMESHA SAHA

The growing importance of the

Indian and Pacific oceans have

given new momentum to the

“Indo-Pacific” as a geostrategic

construct. The Indo-Pacific region will

shape the trajectory of global politics

for most of the 21st century. This is the

region where Great Power competition

(primarily between the United States (US)

and China) is playing out. The region is

also home to some of the world’s largest

economies. Given China’s questionable

policies and expansionist tendencies that

are impeding the interests of nearly all in

the Indo-Pacific region, and with all major

powers like the US, Australia, Japan,

United Kingdom (UK), and the European

Union (EU) making the Indo-Pacific the

pivot of their foreign, defence and security

policies, the growing significance of

this region is clear. The Indo-Pacific will

very much be the fulcrum around which

countries will re-orient and re-align their

policies.

The India–Pacific The India–Pacific region will shape region will shape the trajectory of the trajectory of global politics for global politics for most of the 21st most of the 21st century”century”

““

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

unveiled the Free and Open Indo-Pacific

(FOIP) concept in mid-2016 in Nairobi.

Similarly, the US has picked up on the

FOIP terminology and even renamed the

US Pacific Command as the Indo-Pacific

Command. Other countries in the region,

including Australia, India, Indonesia

and even the Association of Southeast

Asian Nations (ASEAN), UK, Germany,

Netherlands and now the EU have also

adopted some variations of the Indo-

Pacific terminology in their foreign policy

postures.

India has been active in championing

a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The US,

Australia and the members of the ASEAN

have all expressed a common view

that India should play a greater role in

the region. For its part, India regards

the Indo-Pacific as a geographic and

strategic expanse, with the 10 ASEAN

countries connecting the two great

oceans. “Inclusiveness, openness, and

ASEAN centrality and unity” lie at the heart

of India’s conception of the Indo-Pacific.

For India, the geography of the Indo-

Pacific stretches from the eastern coast

of Africa to Oceania (from the shores of

Africa to those of the Americas), which

also includes the Pacific Island countries.

India has been an active participant in

mechanisms such as the Indian Ocean Rim

Association (IORA), the East Asia Summit,

ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus,

ASEAN Regional Forum, the Bay of Bengal

Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical

and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC),

and Mekong Ganga Economic Corridor,

in addition to convening the Indian Ocean

Naval Symposium. Through the Forum for

India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC),

India is moving towards engaging with

the Pacific Island countries.

India’s trade in this region is growing

rapidly, with overseas investments

being directed towards the East, e.g., the

Comprehensive Economic Partnership

Agreements with Japan, South Korea,

and Singapore, and the Free Trade

Agreements with ASEAN and Thailand.

India’s approach to the region is

exemplified by its evolving “Act East Policy,”

comprising economic engagement with

Southeast Asia and strategic cooperation

beyond that to East Asia (Japan, Republic

of Korea), Australia, New Zealand, as well

as the Pacific Island countries.

India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region

as a strategy or as a club of limited

members. Security in the region must be

maintained through dialogue, a common

rules-based order, freedom of navigation,

unimpeded commerce, and settlement of

disputes in accordance with international

law. India’s view is to work with other

like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific

region to cooperatively manage a rules-

based multipolar regional order and

prevent any single power from dominating

the region or its waterways. For instance,

while India has always emphasised the

need to ensure freedom of navigation and

overflight in the South China Sea (SCS),

a more vocal stand is now being taken,

whereby the SCS has been declared

as “the global commons,” wherein, all

disputes should be settled in accordance

with international law and “the interests

of no third party should be impinged”.

These are subtle messages directed at

Beijing. India supports a rules-based,

balanced and stable trade environment

in the Indo-Pacific region. Sustainable

connectivity initiatives promoting mutual

benefit should be continually fostered. In

this regard, India has been an important

stakeholder in the New Development Bank

and the Asian Infrastructure Investment

Bank. It envisions a central role for

multilateral organisations, such as the

ASEAN, in managing regional affairs in

the Indo-Pacific.

Engaging with its partners in the Indo-

Pacific region has become a necessity

for India, given the current difficult phase

in the Sino-India relationship, especially

after the 2020 Galwan Valley clash. India

now believes in issue-based partnerships;

this explains India’s embracing of the

several minilateral platforms like India-

Australia-Japan, India-US-Japan, India-

Australia-Indonesia, amongst others,

which have mushroomed in the Indo-

Pacific. Faced with an increasingly

powerful and aggressive China, countries

such as Australia, Japan, and the US, as

well as the ASEAN, are rethinking and

remapping their China policies. India,

along with its Quad partners, is upping

its game in the Indo-Pacific. After the

September 2019 Foreign Ministers

meeting, the Quad has taken off in a

significant way. It is no longer merely

a talking shop or just another popular

plurilateral platform. In July 2020, the

Indian Navy conducted joint naval drills

with the US Navy in the Andaman and

Nicobar Islands, sending out a clear

message to China. India and Australia

have signed the Mutual Logistics Sharing

Agreement in June 2020. With Japan, too,

India signed the Mutual Logistics Sharing

Agreement in September 2020. India

and the US finalised the long-pending

Basic Exchange Cooperation Agreement

(BECA) in October 2020. India, Australia

and Japan have unveiled a supply chain

resilience initiative in April 2021, with the

aim of countering China’s dominance and

with a view to eventually attaining a strong,

sustainable, balanced and inclusive

growth in the Indo-Pacific. Further,

Australia participated in the November

2020 Malabar exercises alongside India,

Japan and the US. India finally came on

board with this proposition largely to

showcase its commitment to work with

like-minded partner countries in the

Indo-Pacific, and to also demonstrate

that India will not shy away from taking

tougher decisions and a harder stance

DR. PREMESHA SAHA

is an Associate Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation’s (ORF) Strategic Studies Programme.

if the need arises. This added a military

quotient to the Quad, marking the first

time since 2007 that all four countries

participated in a joint military drill. As

the Quad starts to leverage its hard

power, and as India’s relations with China

deteriorate, New Delhi is likely to reshape

its Indo-Pacific strategy alongside its

partners. Moreover, given the challenges

that the world is grappling with due to

the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, it is

only logical for India to work with the

countries of the Indo-Pacific to build

alternate supply chains to reduce its

economic dependence on China, to boost

its own health infrastructure and R&D,

and to draw lessons from their response.

The Indo-Pacific division in the Ministry

of External Affairs (MEA) was set up as a

natural corollary to this vision. Since the

term “Indo-Pacific” has gained currency

and major regional actors such as the

US, Japan and Australia are articulating

their regional visions (in addition to

including this term in their official policy

statements), it has become imperative for

India to operationalise its Indo-Pacific

policy. This MEA wing provides a strategic

coherence to the Prime Minister’s Indo-

Pacific vision by integrating the IORA,

the ASEAN region, and the Quad with the

Indo-Pacific dynamic.

It is important that the new MEA division

moves beyond security and political issues

to articulate a more comprehensive

policy towards the region. Commerce and

connectivity must be prioritised if India is

to take advantage of a new opening for

its regional engagement. While India has

consistently emphasised “inclusiveness”

in the Indo-Pacific framework, it will be

challenging to strike a balance between

the interests of all stakeholders. While the

primary proponents of the Indo-Pacific

agree on the values that should be upheld

in this region, the approach and policies

(Indo-Pacific visions or strategies) vary.

For instance, India’s vision is starkly

different from the US’. In recent years,

India seems to have shed its past caution

of standing up to China. However, as

geopolitical tensions rise between China

and the US, India needs to carefully

design its Indo-Pacific architecture

while keeping its long-term strategic and

economic interests in mind.

INDIA, KENYA AND THE AFRO-ASIAN CENTURY

KWAME OWINO

Scholars of international

relations attempt to craft

future scenarios in global

affairs; for instance, making

projections about which countries and

regions might gain dominance in the

medium and long term. Now that the

world appears to have come full circle,

and some parts of the developing world

are catching up with higher-income

countries, analysts are looking to Asia

and Africa as the regions on which future

global growth will be hinged. The idea

behind the so-called “Afro-Asian Century”

is that Africa’s economic performance

in the recent years, coupled with Asia’s

success in making its mark on the world,

will be amongst the most significant

political and economic changes in the 21st

century.

Indeed, there is a great opportunity for

economic growth for certain countries in

the African continent. Together with the

force of large economies in Asia, the two

regions combined will hold considerable

The promise of The promise of the "Afro–Asian the "Afro–Asian century" is real”century" is real”““

economic clout. At the same time,

however, the population growth rate in

most South Asian and African countries

are well above replacement levels, while

in Europe, it will stagnate and possibly

decline in many countries with higher

incomes. This is where India and Kenya

enter the frame.

Two Sources of Uncertainty

While the promise of the “Afro-Asian

century” is real, it will be tempered by

two factors. The first is economic growth.

Only select countries in Africa will be

able to maintain moderate to high levels

of economic growth for at least one

generation, which is key to becoming a

significant player in the global economy

in addition to achieving mass prosperity.

A substantial number, however, may not.

If this happens, the outcome will not be

an “Afro-Asian century” for the countries

that do not have sufficient economic or

political weight. This risk is very real.

It has become increasingly clear that the

effects of the COVID-19 pandemic will be

widespread and has disrupted growth in

many African countries for the last two

years. In its assessment, the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) considers the year

2020 to be distinguished for the fact that

countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)

experienced economic contraction for the

first time in 30 years.i In addition to the

challenge of sustaining growth rates and

shrinking poverty is that of ensuring quick

recovery from the enduring effects of

lower growth rates. The poorest citizens

of many countries in SSA will experience

a regression in the gains from poverty

reduction, and the welfare of many more

will be adversely affected in the long run.

The combined effect of this is that many

countries will suffer structural damage

to the economy, which will be difficult to

reverse.

The second factor is population

growth. The challenge comes from a

complicated but convenient claim that

African population growth rates will

carry forward for at least a generation

and, thereby, lead to a convergence in

population sizes between Africa and Asia.

This assumption involves an extrapolation

of the comparatively high fertility rates

in some countries within Africa. These

analyses posit that since most SSA

countries will be far more populous in

the coming years, by extension, African

populations and workers will dominate

world numbers. However, this argument

is flawed. While many SSA countries have

yet to undergo a demographic transition,

the rising literacy rates and modest but

real economic growth render the fear of

an “overbreeding” continent unfounded.

Fertility rates in Africa are likely to fall

more sharply going forward, much faster

than the straight-line extrapolations

suggest.

Meanwhile, the large sizes of Asia’s major

economies ensure that the region will

have an expanded role in the 21st century.

The drivers will include the economic size

of Japan, its challenges notwithstanding;

and the economic and demographic sizes

of India and China. Thus, Africa is faced

with the challenge of making itself count

in the 21st century. In all likelihood, it will

be a mixed picture, with a few superstars;

many middle-level countries; and a small

number of countries trapped in conflict,

poor governance and an inability to

initiate and maintain necessary economic

reform.

Kenya and India

Kenya and India have longstanding ties

through the monsoon trade across the

India Ocean. This relationship precedes

the former’s colonisation by several

centuries. Further, the construction of

the railway across the Kenyan territory

creates a more visible cultural presence

of South Asians in the country. Linked to

this is the fact that the British construction

of the railway used South Asian labour,

and after they became independent,

Kenya and India acquired memberships

into the British Commonwealth. Thus, the

opportunities for diplomatic leverage and

the inheritance of a common bureaucratic

ethos provide a solid historical platform

for the two nations to work together in the

new century.

By virtue of its massive population and

growing economy, it is evident that India

will be a major geopolitical player in

the 21st century. What must be keenly

examined is whether its economic

structure will change substantially to

make it a significant competitor against

China, a country that has a huge export

and infrastructure footprint in Kenya as

well as the rest of the African continent.

According to the Observatory of Economic

Complexity, Kenya and India are ranked

103 and 16 of 222 countries, respectively,

in terms of export earnings in 2018. This

alone demonstrates that India’s place in

global trade participation, measured in

export value, is impressive, while Kenya

is constrained by the size of its economy

and incomplete reform.

Kenya has ambitions to serve as a

bellwether of growth in the East African

Region and in the southwest of the Indian

Ocean Region (IOR). There is a clear

convergence of interests and opportunity

for developing maritime commerce by

ensuring the safety of trade routes, the

readiness of ports, and a commitment

to rules-based international commerce.

Through the Lamu Port, Ethiopia, South

Sudan Transport Corridor (LAPPSET)

project, Kenya leads Ethiopia and

South Sudan in building the largest

infrastructure project in the Eastern

African seaboard, linking a port,

highways, railway line, pipeline, new

cities and airports. These countries

estimate correctly that the significance of

the Indian Ocean as an avenue for global

commerce will rise in the future, and this

location will become invaluable. Further,

East African nations should welcome

India’s commitment to preventing any

nation from establishing hegemonic

control over the IOR.

Finally, there are commercial links for

airlines based in East Africa and the

Middle Eastern region that link cities in

Kenya and India. At the same time, Kenya

is enthusiastic about inter-African trade

at regional and continental levels with the

East African Community and the African

Continental Free Trade Area. Already,

China has shown interest in the African

Union, which is leading the quest for

continental convergence. Perhaps, it is

time for India to show similar interest.

KWAME OWINO

is Chief Executive Officer of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA-Kenya), a think tank on economic policy and public affairs based in Nairobi, Kenya

i IMF Communications Department, “Sub-Saharan Africa: A Cautious Reopening,” 29 June 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/06/27/pr20249-sub-saharan-africa-a-cautious-reopening.

Endnotes

RISING INDIA 2021: A NOTE FROM A TROPICAL BRICS MEMBER

RENATO G. FLÔRES JR.

Indian civilisation and culture may be

the only ones in Asia—and likely in

the whole world—that can balance

the equally ancient and powerful

Chinese traditions. With its massive size

in many socio-economic dimensions,

India is essential to the world geopolitical

scenario. Equally important is its identity

as a diverse and pluralistic, functioning

democracy—qualities that place it at the

forefront of game-changing nations.

The visibility that a rising India is

experiencing—owning partly to the annual

growth of at least five percent for nearly

40 years—brings new domestic demands

and tough challenges to the country’s

human capital. There is much to be done in

building basic infrastructure, improving

social indicators and bridging inequality,

especially for India’s increasingly young

population. If the country succeeds in

achieving economic prosperity while

In the post-In the post-COVID-19 world, COVID-19 world, relevant middle relevant middle powers with fine powers with fine neogiating skills neogiating skills and a co-operative and a co-operative attitude will stand attitude will stand out”out”

““

maintaining its historically tolerant and

multiple nature, the world—developing

countries in particular—will certainly

have an inspiring model to emulate.

Many opportunities lie ahead. India

is well-suited for fully embracing the

digital economy, leapfrogging classical

stages in the manufacturing and

even services sectors. The country’s

conciliatory approach to disputes and its

strategic autonomy policies are crucial

in an increasingly fragmented world

of non-global governance. India can

aim to become an efficient and reliable

international trouble-shooter, credible

across continents.

Such an encompassing attitude is key

in situations like those at the World

Trade Organisation (WTO), for instance,

where stubborn positions taken by key

powers have left the institution in a

serious stalemate. India’s outstanding

track record in Geneva vis-à-vis its

savvy diplomats—similar to those of

another BRICS member, Brazil—will be

instrumental in finding a solution that,

in principle, must also be supported by

China. Without India’s involvement, in a

global alliance or key common purpose

groups to restructure the WTO, failure

is to be expected. The same applies to

the recently contested World Health

Organisation.

At the same time, India must rethink its

health and trade policies. The fragile

structure of its rural population, with

complex relations with the agricultural

sector and certain industrial practices,

already makes both endeavours a difficult

task. The geographical imbalances and

the contrasting and competing Chinese

exporting machine further exacerbate

the problems.

India’s immersion in the trade network

of the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) along with Japan and

South Korea demands a shift in policy,

something evident in its refusal to

participate in the Regional Comprehensive

Economic Partnership (RCEP), involving

ASEAN itself, Japan, South Korea, China,

Australia and New Zealand. While India’s

motives are understandable, it must

shed its protectionist views and adopt a

wiser trade strategy. This goes beyond

the “non-reciprocal trade liberalisation

policy” towards a few small neighbours

or attempts to profit from the present

economic tensions between the US and

China.

A great India must also find stable

solutions to the challenges brought about

by its relationships with neighbours

such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. This

“neighbourhood deficit,” adding clay feet

to the subcontinent giant, must cease;

more diplomatic skills and stronger

political will, combined with large doses

of patience are required for sure.

If India acts as it can and deserves in

the international scene, its projection in

Iberian America, along with the clever

inroads it has been making in Africa

and Eurasia, will match the normal

care dispensed to the US and European

partners. Iberian America may seem

strategically meaningless, since it lies

outside of India’s sphere of influence, but

the people of the region yearn for strong

foreign partners besides those in the

traditional Atlantic rule-making axis and

the Chinese alternative.

In the post-COVID-19 world, relevant

middle powers with fine negotiating skills

and a co-operative attitude will stand out.

The numerous roles that India is able to

play in this scenario will aggravate latent

dangers, stretching to perilous limits the

number and capabilities of its human

capital, as well as exposing prevailing

domestic shortcomings.

Finally, no great power can subsist

without joy: The joy of being what it is,

of believing in its worldview. Think of

the flourishing mid-1950s to mid-1960s

United States, with Hollywood musicals

framing with colour, song and dance the

glory of the consolidated superpower.

India, despite its manifold problems, is

a land of colourful festivals and joyous

celebrations. If Bollywood is a factory of

illusions, it also shows the strength and

creativity of a nation that may lead without

causing fear or sadness, always aware of

a lighter and many times brighter side of

life—naïve at the surface, perhaps, but

deeply engaging and constructive.

RENATO G. FLÔRES JR.

is Director, FGV IIU—International Intelligence Unit, Professor FGV EPGE—Graduate School of Economics, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

INDIA, COVID-19 AND THE GLOBAL HEALTH AGENDA

KHOR SWEE KHENG AND K. SRINATH REDDY

In the third year of the COVID-19

pandemic, India must assume a

greater leadership role in the global

health agenda. This will befit India’s

status as the world’s seventh-largest

economyi and projections that India

will overtake China as the world’s most

populous nation as early as 2027.ii

Any future Indian leadership role must

build on the past, as India has been

underwriting global health security for

several decades even before COVID-19.

We share four examples. Firstly, India

produces considerable human capital

for health, such as 78,000 new doctors

annuallyiii. While most of them stay to

practice in India, a considerable number

leave to work abroad. Indeed, Indians

are the second most common nationality

in the United Kingdom National Health

Serviceiv, and the American Association

of Physicians of Indian Originv counts

80,000 members of Indian origin working

importantly, India supplies half of the

global demand for vaccines, which are

public health’s “best buy”viii. The Indian

manufacturing machine is playing an

important role in producing COVID-19

vaccine doses for hundreds of millions

of people, notably through the Serum

Institute of India and Bharat Biotech. It is

likely that Pfizer and Merck’s agreements

with the Medicines Patent Pool for

COVID-19 anti-viral pills (signed in

November 2021) will include many Indian

manufacturers as well.ix

Thirdly, health diplomacy is an emerging

Indian foreign policy tool. Before

COVID-19, India committed at least

US$100 million to bilateral health

projects in South Asia, Southeast Asia

and Africa. Such projects, especially

amongst Indian neighbours such as

Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Nepal,

serves both humanitarian and nation-

in the United States. Many of them are

in the frontlines of the battle against

COVID-19.

Secondly, India exports US$22 billion

worth of medicines annuallyvi, ensuring

affordable healthcare for millions of

people across the world. Indian products

account for 30 percent of the volume and

10 percent of the value of the US$100-

billion generics market in the United

States—the world’s largest.vii More

India has been India has been underwriting underwriting global health global health security for several security for several decades even before decades even before COVID-19”COVID-19”

““

building purposes.x During COVID-19,

India relied on health diplomacy to

strengthen their presence and soft

power in Africa, through donations or

technical assistance.xi During a prolonged

pandemic, such health diplomacy also

serves to protect the health security of

India and the world.

And finally, India provides healthcare for

1.3 billion people at home, safeguarding the

human security of an entire subcontinent.

Improvements in population health,

air pollution, gender empowerment

and primary care are crucial to allow

health to become a determinant—and

not just a consequence—of India’s

economic growth. Moreover, the world’s

success in achieving the UN Sustainable

Development Goals amidst a pandemic

depends heavily on India’s ability to

scale its policies and programmes for

its billion-plus citizens. These examples

demonstrate the crucial role that India

plays in global health today.

Expanding India’s Leadership Role in

Global Health

To take on a greater role in the global

health arena, however, India must

address its own issues, primary among

which is the chronic under-investment

in health. Currently, the country spends

a mere 3.3% of its GDP on healthcarexii,

significantly lower than the global

average of 10 percent.xiii, xiv Annually, 108

million Indians are pushed into poverty

due to out-of-pocket health expenditure,

which is three times higher than the world

average.xv This is possibly worsened by

the economic, social and health impact

of COVID-19, although data is still being

collected.

All this is entirely preventable. Healthcare

is a political subject, and providing

universal health coverage not only

protects all citizens against diseases, but

also increases the population’s resilience

against COVID-19 and other possible

pandemics. Therefore, India must spend

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