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© 2022 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from ORF.
Attribution: Aspirations, Ambitions, and Approaches, January 2022, Observer Research Foundation.
Observer Research Foundation20 Rouse Avenue, Institutional Area New Delhi 110002 India [email protected] www.orfonline.org
ORF provides non-partisan, independent analyses and inputs on matters of security, strategy, economy, development, energy and global governance to diverse decision-makers (governments, business communities, academia, and civil society). ORF’s mandate is to conduct in-depth research, provide inclusive platforms, and invest in tomorrow’s thought leaders today.
India at 75
Aspirations, Ambitions, and
Approaches
4 5
INDIA @ 75
ETHIC, ECONOMY AND EXEMPLAR
SAMIR SARAN
If a weary international community—
reeling from unanticipated
challenges and unprecedented
disruptions in the early 21st
century—was looking forward to a
stabilising start to the 2020s, its hopes
were short-lived. COVID-19 continues
to weave its way through borders and
continents, felling victims and flummoxing
governments. Two years down the line,
it is increasingly clear that we have to
EDITOR’S NOTE
learn to live with the virus, as it shows
signs of transitioning to become endemic.
A “new normal” where COVID-19 does
not cripple communities, countries and
whole continents is the future, even as
vaccine inequity makes the possibility of
more lethal variants imminent.
But even before COVID-19 forced us to
radically rethink and redo the way we
live our very lives, a certain tiredness
had been evident. Generational and
geographical shifts in the balance of
power, rapid advances in technology-led
innovations, and existential global risks
like climate change have all strained
the capacity of prevailing international
norms and institutions. These had left
them looking wilted, if not withered. Now,
these norms and institutions have all but
shattered from the strain of the pandemic.
There is no percentage in stating the
obvious, yet it must be reiterated: The
international community needs new
ideas, anchors and torchbearers to
reinvigorate globalisation and strengthen
global co-operation.
Towards this end, only asinine
assessments of a future world order
as the century turns 20 would ignore
the crucial role of India in shaping this
decade, and determining the trajectory
of the decades to follow. Our endeavour
with this series of essays is to capture the
ideas and ethics driving contemporary
Indian diplomacy; examine the methods
and contours of India’s engagement with
the world; and, offer a prognosis of India’s
future as a leading power.
Under the rubric of ‘India@75:
Aspirations, Ambitions, and Approaches’,
ORF has curated 18 essays written
by some of the world’s finest minds,
representing former heads of state and
government, members of parliament,
heads of international institutions,
leaders from business, and experts from
academia and media. Between them, they
have studied India’s evolving relationship
with new geographies, its engagement
with new domains of global governance,
and the human imperative that must
define India’s rise.
6 7
Few predict the path ahead will be
easy for India, or that latent and legacy
challenges confronting this nation can
be ignored. Indeed, most assessments
in this volume suggest disquiet and
uncertainty. Amrita Narlikar begins
her essay with a cautionary note on
world affairs. “Multilateralism is facing
a crisis of unprecedented proportions,”
she writes, “It manifests itself in a
fundamental questioning of the very value
of multilateralism within countries and
deadlocks in negotiations in multilateral
organisations.” But this global crisis, she
argues, also begets opportunities for
India. C. Raja Mohan agrees and asserts
that this period of churn offers India the
opportunity to shed the temptation to act
alone and actively build new coalitions
and consensus with other powers. But
this will depend, he argues, on how quickly
India can restructure its traditional
worldview.
As Harsh V Pant writes in his essay, this
restructuring is already underway, as
“India’s past diffidence in making certain
foreign policy choices is rapidly giving
way to greater readiness to acknowledge
the need for a radical shift in thinking
about internal capability enhancement by
leveraging external partnerships.”
As the world’s centre of gravity shifts
from the Atlantic system, India’s
engagement with both emerging and
old geographies acquires new salience.
And this is where the new external
partnerships are actively taking shape.
Central among these is the dynamically
evolving Indo-Pacific construct which,
as Premesha Saha posits, will weave
communities, markets and states from
the East Pacific to East Africa into one
strategic geography. How India adapts
its “economic structure” to these realities
and implements its “commitment to
prevent hegemony in the oceans”, argues
Kwame Owino, will determine its ability to
lead these new regions.
But shaping new geographies will also
require India to manage certain old
relationships. The Indo-Pacific should
not be seen in isolation—its markets and
communities are also rapidly integrating
with the Eurasian supercontinent. Steven
Blockmans laments that the India-EU
relationship has underperformed given
its potential to anchor democratic and
rules-based governance in greater
Eurasia. Solomon Passy and Angel
Apostolov boldly make the case for
exploring the possibility of a dialogue
between NATO and India, indicating just
how drastically—and rapidly—the mental
maps of the world are morphing.
There is a common thread that binds
these analyses: A keen interest in
India’s evolving relationship with the
US and China. These three nations will,
after all, rank among the largest three
economies by the middle of this century.
The turbulent Twenties will see the
dynamics of this power triangle assume
centre stage. The US sees India as a
partner in its endeavour to neutralise an
increasingly aggressive and expansionist
China. Jane Holl Lute argues that India
“has understood China’s principal
strategic aim to replace the United States
as the most consequential security
power in Asia”. While India’s choices will
undoubtedly implicate the balance of
power between the US and China, India
will most likely chart its own course in
international affairs.
ORF Distinguished Fellow Rajeswari
Pillai Rajagopalan highlights India’s
behaviour in international negotiations
on outer space as a primary example.
In every significant process—from
the UN GGE to the EU CoC—India has
argued for greater multilateralism while
actively discouraging behaviour that is
“inherently destabilising”. I would add
India’s engagement on cyber governance,
particularly on emerging technologies, to
this list. Although technological systems
8 9
are rapidly unravelling, India has sought
to frame rules for its digital economy that
serve both its development interests and
preserve interdependence. As Trisha Ray
writes, “New Delhi must prepare to shape,
rather than be shaped, by these shifting
geopolitical winds.” Others remind us that
much work still needs to be done. Renato
Flores urges India to learn lessons from
its RCEP withdrawal, shed traditional
hesitations, and emerge as a leading
advocate for multilateral trade.
India’s most significant contribution to
the global commons will be providing
sustainable livelihoods to its own people,
and its battle against climate change.
Indeed, Oommen Kurian & Shoba Suri
begin their analysis with the proposition
that success or failure in implementing
the global SDG agenda is dependent
almost wholly on India achieving its own
targets. India already produces nearly
half of all global vaccines and is a leading
voice on IPR reform, as Khor Swee
Kheng & K. Srinath Reddy note, making it
essential for global health security.
India will also be tasked with achieving
livelihood goals for itself and the world
in a carbon-constrained world, which is
why Jayant Sinha argues that India can
no longer rely on the ‘farm to industry’
model of development. Instead, Nilanjan
Ghosh asserts that India’s own goal
of becoming a US$10 trillion economy,
which is both equitable and inclusive, is
only possible by following through on the
SDG agenda. All of this, according to Adil
Zainulbhai, will be powered by India’s
already immense digital infrastructure,
innovation capabilities and skilled
workforce as it leverages the Fourth
Industrial Revolution to its advantage.
“India’s green transformation,” asserts
Mihir Sharma, “will have to be led by the
decisions of its people and by the energy
of its private sector.”
It is these twin imperatives—achieving
sustainable development and the climate
change agenda—that make India a very
different type of ‘rising power’. Its path
to prominence will not be defined by
military dominance or coercive economic
capabilities. Instead, India’s rise will be
characterised by its ability to provide
solutions, technologies and finance to
emerging communities in urgent need
of new models of economic growth and
social mobility. It is this ‘new economic
diplomacy’, Navdeep Suri believes, that
will define India’s foreign policy priorities
in the decade ahead.
Underwriting India’s foreign policy will be
its civilisational identity as a democratic,
open and plural society. Arguably the
most abstract of all its foreign policy
tools, India’s own ability to retain social
cohesion while providing economic
growth and development will, as Prime
Minister Stephen Harper observes, help
“lead the world as a whole to greater
prosperity and peace”. Indeed, each essay
has this very sentiment at its core—the
importance of India’s rise for its own
people, its region, and indeed as a model
for the world in this century.
We hope these essays will provide an
intellectual stimulus to debates and
discussions that will undoubtedly
contribute to shaping our collective
future, examine our contemporary
challenges and allow us a moment to
learn from the journey so far. The world
in the 2020s demands more from us.
Indians must be ready to deliver.
Samir Saran
President of the Observer Research Foundation.
10 11
INDIA’S LEAP: EMBRACING IR 4.0 TO BUILDING FOR THE WORLD
INDIA’S LEAP: EMBRACING IR 4.0 TO BUILDING FOR THE WORLD
ADIL ZAINULBHAI
Envision this:
Saravanan nods with a smile when the
payment soundbox tells him the exact
transaction amount in Tamil. He sells
toys and chocolates outside a school in
Tiruchirapalli.
Dhabalesh Majhi raps out of a small
house in Kalahandi District in Odisha,
using his phone to reach out to lakhs of
his followers.
5 years from now:
Anurag who has just completed his
undergraduate degree intends to help
his father in the farms near Bhagalpur.
Using digital advisory applications
(for planning and pre-planting—IMD
forecasts, soil health), Internet of Things
(IoT) monitoring devices (in-season care)
and digital marketplaces, he helps raise
farm revenues—all this using an app via
open platform and data sharing.
Vikas requests, processes and gets
his MBA loan approval in less than 10
minutes on his phone.
Vidyasagar, a resident of Balkonda
Mandal, has been selling his produce
through commission agents at
Nizamabad market yard for 20 years.
He used to stay back in the market yard
till weighment completion and wait 20-
30 days for payment. Through e-NAM,
he sells through direct purchase orders
and saves on commission and hamali
charges. Furthermore, he gets the
payment within minutes online.
Bhanu, along with his classmates, and
social media student friends from Assam,
designed a rooftop rainwater harvesting
structure for his locality in Beed,
Maharashtra. He posted his success
story via a live video on the National Atal
Innovation Challenge and got selected
within a day. He now gets funding to scale
this idea and work with experts in Atal
Incubation Centres.
Reena wants to venture into robotics and
artificial intelligence. Through Swayam
and NPTEL offerings, she curated her
personalised course toolkit (rather than
a packaged course) to learn what was
interesting with live demo sessions. Along
with the certification, she managed to
interact with experts and meet peers in
her cohort with like-minded ideas. She is
now ready to tinker and build for India!
More than 70% of Ravi’s crops were
destroyed due to untimely rains in
Nalanda. He logs onto his mobile app and
applies for crop insurance. Through geo-
tagged data and satellite imaging, his
claims are processed within a day and
funds are transferred into his account.
12 13
India has more than 750 million
internet users today and
innumerable small success stories
that affect lives—from the kirana
store, which has now widened its audience
to outside its street, to textile weavers
who sell through social media platforms.
India is at the cusp of disruptive digital
change, one that is already creating the
next large businesses, democratising
ideas and driving inclusion at a scale
never seen before.
Today, India is powered by consumption
by a burgeoning middle class (70% of total
spending) supported by rising disposable
incomes and affordable internet
penetration (marked by Jio’s entry into the
telecom space in 2016) across rural and
urban areas. Post liberalisation, India has
moved from being the business process
outsourcing hub of the ’90s and 2000s—
with call centres and software testing—
to being at the frontier of innovation and
cutting-edge technologies at a population
scale.
During the 1990s, India saw a boom in
the services sectori—predominantly in
Information Technology (IT), IT Enabled
Services (ITeS), and financial services—
with the IT industry growing from US$150
million in 1991 to more than US$5.7 billion
in 2000, which, for the first time, created
a new set of Indian-made companies,
like Infosys, Wipro, and TCS, that have
become world beaters riding the 3rd
Industrial Revolution Wave. This marked
the start of a change in India’s perception
of “Electronification and Information
Technology".
Over the last decade, cyber-computing
improvements have steadily narrowed
the gap between the real and digital
worlds accelerating the onset of
Industrial Revolution 4.0ii as we know it.
India has been a major disruptor in this
space taking giant strides in implementing
unique, large-scale projects powered by
public digital infrastructure.
India’s Century - Digital Innovation being India’s driving force
• Unified Payments Interface (UPI):
India’s real-time mobile payments system,
which is universally interoperable, low-
cost (replaces PoS), and mobile-first
has seen incredible growth, clocking
more than 4.5 billion transactions worth
INR 8.26 lakh crores in just December
2021. In 18 months, we have seen more
transactions per month in UPI than we
have had in 40 years on credit and debit
cards!
• Aadhaar: The largest identity
programme in the world with 1.29
billion individuals, has moved from
being an identity marker to powering
India’s Digital Stack with 410 million
Jan Dhan Accounts (part of the JAM
trinity of Jan Dhan accounts, Aadhar,
and Mobile Number), INR 3.8 lakh
crore Direct Benefit Transfers (DBT)
annually to beneficiaries, and 9.3
billion e-KYC transactions.
• CoWIN: To tackle COVID-19, India’s
open source, modular real-time
vaccine monitoring platform has
clocked more than 1.5 billion vaccine
doses and, with open Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs),
is becoming a key Indian export
for global healthcare during the
pandemic.
• National Digital Health Mission
Stack: This aims to create a unified
network (remote, decentralised,
coherent) to match people with
resources across public and private
sector services. This will cut costs,
save time, and increase the ability
to monitor health compliance for
millions of Indians. With the right
security infrastructure in place, it
can help in timely interventions to
check the course of a pandemic or
in the long term for the nation at
large.
• Jan Dhan Yojana: With more than
44.3 crore beneficiaries banked,
the scheme has enabled banking
penetration, financial services
usage and, more importantly,
financial inclusion for a variety of
demographics. This has been a true
force multiplier when combined
with Aadhaar and DBT to increase
transparency, efficiency, and
productivity of government delivery.
• E-Shram: This is designed as a
National Database of Unorganised
Workers, which is the largest in
the world. It currently has over
21.5 crore unique registrations
in less than six months, seeded
with Aadhaar along with details of
occupation, skills and educational
qualifications, amongst others.
This unlocks huge opportunities for
the Government to extend suitably
tailored social security schemes,
targeted skilling initiatives to
increase employability and bring
the large informal workforce into
the digital fold. With a unique UAN
number, we will gain unprecedented
insight into movement of workers,
and the demand-supply market
marked against skills across varied
geographies of India.
• eNational Agriculture Market: With
more than 2.1 lakh traders, 1 lakh+
commission agents, 1000 mandis
and 17 million+ farmers, this pan
India electronic trading portal aims
to create a unified national market
for agricultural commodities. More
importantly, it aims to arm small
farmers with the power of “choice”
and “information”, increasing their
14 15
bargaining power across India.
With Jan Dhan (banking penetration,
payments), and a unified logistics
interface platform (transport), this
is in line to be a true game-changer
in the coming decade.
• Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT):
Focussing on maximum governance
through technology, DBT has
transformed the Government
delivery system over the past eight
years with over 311 schemes,
spanning 54 ministries, and
reaching more than 900 million
citizens.iii Along with the JAM trinity,
it has increased the productivity of
Government spending with leakages
coming down by more than 90%.
• API Setu: To facilitate an open API
policy, and build interoperable
digital platforms for seamless
government delivery, this platform
by the Ministry of Electronics and
Information Technology (MeitY)
currently helps provide information
from more than 300 central and
state government departments by
accessing 973 different data points
including Driver’s License, vehicle
registration, PAN, e-KYC, to name a
few.
What is worth noting here is that all
such large public digital solutions are
built with an open architecture, and
are modular with plug and play, which
essentially seek to democratise and
decentralise technology usage. India has
been building ‘open digital platforms’,
which are tremendous force multipliers
(Platformisation). This is critical and
unique in being affordable, interoperable,
API-driven (and hence scalable), mobile-
first in vernacular languages, and allows
India’s entrepreneurs to build on the rails
of these platforms to innovate and solve
problems at scale and for trust.
India’s start-up landscape has benefited
immensely with Aadhaar, UPI, and Jan
Dhan (financial inclusion) coming in. The
boom in the past 5-6 years has been
phenomenal. Venture Capital investment
surpassed all records in 2021, with more
than US $17 billion in funding and 840+
deals. India is home to 81 unicorns with a
total valuation of US $275 billion (as on 29
December 2021)iv, 44 of which were born
in 2021 itself.
India is home to India is home to 81 unicorns with a 81 unicorns with a total valuation of total valuation of US$275.5 billionUS$275.5 billion
““
According to MeitYv, India’s public and
private digital offerings are on their way
to unlocking more than US$1 trillion
in digital value by 2025. India today is
building cutting edge technology for the
world with offerings ranging from social
commerce, Software as a Service (SaaS),
payments, ed-tech and much more.
Seizing the Digital Opportunity
India’s emerging digital ecosystems
supported by robust innovation in
start-ups and favourable demographic
dividendvi (with an increase in working
age population till 2041 and 3.6 million
STEM graduates annually) give us a
unique opportunity to lead in the decades
to come.
This wave of digital growth would help core
digital sectors and ones with immense
growth potential (newly digitising
logistics, educationvii, healthcare,
agriculture) to exponentially increase
potential by 2025—financial services
(170X) agriculture (70X), education (30X),
Government Emarketplace by 25X.
India is already on its way to be the
software development engine of the
world. This is evident in the fact that it is
the fastest growing country in terms of
developers contributing on open sourceviii,
with the number projected to grow to
10 million by 2023. Open-source software
development, at the core, solves large-
scale issues and democratises technology
usage. Indian start-ups have already
started exporting software extensively
as well (a change from only providing IT
services two decades ago); for example,
more than 17 million developers and
98% of fortune 500 companies use the
‘Postman API Platform’ today.
Future is Digital
Digital forces have started to re-define
how we connect and transactix with
each other and institutions, it has
enabled organisations to automate
routine tasks to enhance productivity,
and it has brought about data-driven
decision-making for organisations and
governments. Interaction of these forces
will carve out new digital ecosystems in
the times to come. India stands to gain
due to its cutting-edge tech stack.
India’s Tech Stack backed by a sound
foundation (UPI, Aadhaar, open-source
architecture with strong data security
measures), digital reach (> 1 billion
internet users, local language content),
can propel India to be the digital factory
of the world (software innovation, data
analytics).
Digital enablement will drive productivity
from MSMEsx to big companies, redefine
impact in schools and universities
(fortifying student skills, increasing
Return on Investment and learning
16 17
ADIL ZAINULBHAI
Chairman at Capacity Building Commission of India and Quality Council of India
outcomes); transform India’s agriculture
ecosystem (digital farm advisory, IoT-
enabled monitoring) to healthcare
(demand-supply mismatch – telemedicine,
improve quality and trust).
Sectors and industries will radically
be impacted and change with digital
adoption. For example, software and
applications layer would account for 60%
of the value of an autonomous vehicle in
the futurexi. (See Illustration above):
Leading this digital transformation, the
India of tomorrow will drive services and
make major strides in manufacturing in
the future.xii (SAMARTH UDYOG Bharat
4.0 aims to create technological solutions
at scale and increase the share of
manufacturing in GDP to 25% by 2025).
Digital India today, means different
things to different people—with most
being things we take for granted—from
ordering food at 2 AM, shopping online,
transferring a portion of the salary back
home in real-time to creating a reel in the
countryside, but what it does mean for
the world is that India with its technology
is here to lead!
Endnotes
i Nandan M. Nilekani, "India's software industry turned superstar after 1991," Rediff, https://www.rediff.com/money/2009/jan/29-indias-software-industry-turned-superstar-after-1991.htm.
ii T. P. Bhat, "India and Industry 4.0", Institute for Studies in Industrial Development, https://isid.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/WP218.pdf.
iii E TECH, "India to have 900 million active internet users by 2025, says report", The Economic Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/india-to-have-900-million-active-internet-users-by-2025-says-report/articleshow/83200683.cms.
iv Invest India, "The Indian Unicorn Landscape", Invest India, https://www.investindia.gov.in/indian-unicorn-landscape.
v Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, "India's Trillion Dollar Digital Opportunity", MeitY, https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/india_trillion-dollar_digital_opportunity.pdf.
vi McKinsey Global Institute, "Digital India: Technology to transform a connected nation", McKinsey Global Institute, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/digital-india-technology-to-transform-a-connected-nation.
vii Ministry of Education, Department of Higher Education, "All India Survey on Higher Education 2019-2020", Ministry of Education, https://www.education.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/statistics-new/aishe_eng.pdf
viii ET Bureau, " India emerges as the fastest growing country in the world by open source contribution," The Economic Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/information-tech/india-emerges-as-the-fastest-growing-country-in-the-world-by-open-source-contribution/articleshow/81708087.cms?from=mdr.
ix Nivruti Rai," Data-centric innovation and digitalisation will catalyse India’s growth", Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/data-centric-innovation-and-digitalisation-will-catalyse-indias-growth/
x Milind Kumar Sharma, Samir Mittal, "It's time for Industry 4.0," The Hindu, https://www.thehindu. com/opinion/op-ed/its-time-for-industry-40/article36103800.ece
xi Morgan Stanley Blue Papers, "Shared Mobility on the Road of the Future", Morgan Stanley, https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/car-of-future-is-autonomous-electric-shared-mobility
xii Mayank Agarwal et al.," Industry 4.0: Reimagining manufacturing operations after COVID-19," McKinsey Global Institute, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/industry-40-reimagining-manufacturing-operations-after-covid-19
18 19
THE FOUR Cs OF INDIA’S GREEN GROWTH
MIHIR SHARMA
India is in a unique position with
respect to climate change. It is
simultaneously the country with
the most citizens exposed to threats
caused by a warming world; the country
which will have to most dramatically alter
its development trajectory if the world
is to keep warming below two degrees
Celsius; and the member of the G-20 that
has gone furthest towards meeting its
climate targets.
India’s leadership on climate change is,
therefore, not just a matter of keeping its
promises; it is a signifier of the country’s
acceptance of global responsibility. Yet,
the fact is that, India has to increase
its ambition on carbon mitigation
alongside shouldering enormous
adaptation costs—all while ensuring a
comprehensive economic transformation
that meets the aspirations of its young
population.
Commitement, Commitement, co-benefits, cost co-benefits, cost and captial are and captial are the 4 Cs of India's the 4 Cs of India's renewable miraclerenewable miracle
““
Unlike developed economies, India’s
green transition is not a matter of
compensating those in sectors that have
to be decarbonised while retrofitting
other, profitable sectors. Nor is India,
unlike some upper-middle income
economies in East Asia, already so
industrialised that the natural movement
from manufacturing to services would be
sufficient to reduce the carbon intensity
of its output. Its commitment to reduce
the carbon intensity of its economy to 45
per cent by 2030 (over 2005 levels) is,
thus, a far deeper commitment than made
by those other economies, as it requires
completely eschewing carbon-intensive
growth while at a very different level of
development. Such green growth would
be unprecedented. It requires India to
discover a path to high-income status
that is completely different from all those
before it.
In some sectors, India has already
demonstrated its ability to absorb
and catalyse transformation at scale.
Renewable energy is one such sector.
About 45 per cent of India’s greenhouse
gas emissions come from the power
generation sector—unsurprising,
given that coal is abundant in India, and
reducing energy poverty and increasing
supply continues to be a priority for
the developmental state. Yet, by the
end of 2021, India had added over 100
gigawatts of renewable energy capacityi,
and, at COP26, the Prime Minister
20 21
committed to taking the non-fossil fuel
generation capacity in the country up to
500 gigawatts by 2030. India now has
the lowest installed cost for large-scale
solar power in the worldii—another
demonstration of its traditional skill at
supply-side process innovation.
The renewable energy revolution in
India was powered by the alignment of
several factors. First, there was clear
political commitment that translated into
favourable and consistent policy. Second,
there were clear co-benefits given that
potential demand outstrips actual supply.
Third, technological innovations and cost
reductions could quickly be adopted and
adapted. And, fourth, global and domestic
capital was incentivised to flow into the
sector. Commitment, co-benefits, cost,
and capital are the four Cs of India’s
renewable miracle. India’s success
in carving out a unique green growth
trajectory will depend on how effectively
the four Cs can be extended to cover
the greening of other sectors—from
mobility, to housing, to manufacturing, to
agriculture.
Three of the four factors can be
engineered domestically—co-benefits,
commitment, and cost. But capital will
require closer integration—financial,
industrial, and technological—with the
rest of the world. As Prime Minister
Modi made clear at COP26, India expects
climate finance worth US$1 trillion to
support its ambitions. This is not a gift. It
is not aid. It is investment in our shared,
global future—an investment that will
bring returns not just in terms of climate
action, but in cold, hard cash. Green
growth is still growth, and growth brings
opportunities for investors.
India’s ambition on renewables has
concealed the fact that similarly ambitious
targets have been set and are being met
in some other sectors as well. Consider
cooling, which is inextricably linked to the
housing sector as well as to agriculture
through the construction of cold-chain
networks. The India Cooling Action Plan,
launched in 2019iii by the Union Ministry
of Environment, Forests and Climate
Change, plans to reduce cooling demand
across sectors by at least 20 per cent by
2037-38 and to reduce overall energy
requirements for cooling by at least 25 per
cent by 2037-38. Given that this comes at
a time when the relevant residential and
commercial sectors will expand manifold
and temperatures will continue to rise,
this is exceptionally ambitious.
Here, however, one advantage of being
a latecomer to the development race
becomes visible. By some estimates,
almost three-fourths of the buildings that
will stand in the India as of 2030 are yet
to be built. Proper design of this build-out
can reduce cooling demand at the source.
Similar possibilities exist in the transport
sector, both in terms of public transport
and in terms of individual mobility.
Many Indians are yet to buy their first
car, and are not necessarily addicted
to the conveniences of the internal
combustion engine. If they are presented
with attractive alternatives in terms
of decarbonised and accessible public
transport, or cheap and efficient zero-
emissions personal vehicles, they may
never choose to buy a traditional car.
Thus, there is every chance that India’s
current rate of car ownership—of under
25 for every 1,000 people—will not
increase to levels seen in the West or
even China.
MIHIR SWARUP SHARMA
is the Director Centre for Economy and Growth Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Endnotes
i Press Release, "India achieves 100 GW Milestone of Installed Renewable Energy Capacity", Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1745254
ii Sudhir Singh, " India becomes lowest-cost producer of solar power," Economic Times, https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/renewable/india-becomes-lowest-cost-producer-of-solar-power/69565769
iii India Cooling Action Plan, "India Cooling Action Plan (ICAP)", International Energy Agency, https://www.iea.org/policies/7455-india-cooling-action-plan-icap.
In the end, the greening of India’s
development pathway will have to be the
product of millions—indeed billions—
of such choices. India’s commitment to
climate change will be marked not just in
the singular choices of its leaders, but in
the many choices made by its citizens—
for electrification, for energy efficiency,
and for responsible consumption. As has
been the case throughout its 75 years of
freedom and development, India’s green
transformation will have to be led by the
decisions of its people and by the energy
of its private sector.
22 23
GETTING TO THE GREEN FRONTIER
JAYANT SINHA
As the Indian economy
strides towards achieving
the US$ 5-trillion goal
in the next decade, the
country must navigate through a host of
multidimensional challenges. Foremost
amongst these is the climate change
crisis. India has a vast population, with the
majority dependent on the agricultural
sector, making it especially vulnerable
to the irreversible and catastrophic
consequences of climate change.
The battle against climate change will
play a pivotal role in shaping India’s
economic trajectory. Conventional
development models—driven primarily
by unbridled industrialisation and rapid
urbanisation—are no longer suitable
for the country’s economy. The standard
development model, in which an economy
progresses from farm to factory, has
become incompatible with India’s twin
goals of long-term sustainability and
competitiveness. To create a sustainable
and inclusive future for its population of
1.38 billion people, India must integrate
environmental protection into the
growth agenda. This entails embracing a
development model in which the economy
leapfrogs from “farm to Green Frontier”.
The onset of the Fourth Industrial
Revolution presents a tremendous
opportunity for India to couple its
economic and environmental goals,
which will transform the fundamental
contours of the economy. Green
technologies and business models are
set to unleash an unprecedented wave
of disruption, propelling the Indian
economy towards the Green Frontier.
In the last few years, there has been a
swift expansion of the green energy and
technology ecosystem in India—spread
across wind and solar power generation
firms, biofuel production, and electric
vehicle manufacturing. What was once
an aspiration has become a reality, as
countries around the world are beginning
to recognise India as an attractive
destination for renewable energy
investment and are making substantial
investments in India’s green energy
system. Indeed, the Indian renewable
energy industry has rapidly increased
its capacity, at an annual growth rate of
17.5 percent between 2014 and 2019,
and increased the share of renewables in
India’s total energy mix from six percent to
10 percent. This growth was accompanied
by a sharp increase in investment in the
sector, from both domestic and foreign
players. Since 2014, the sector has
received investments worth more than
US$42 billion, and around US$7 billion in
foreign direct investment (FDI) between
April 2000 and June 2018.i
To be sure, substantial potential remains
untapped in the green economy. Global
experience suggests that long-term
economic growth in the 21st century
can only be sustained if policymakers
24 25
effectively leverage the linkages between
technological innovation and green
growth. This can be accomplished by
focusing on two key policy levers: Market
creation and the mobilisation of green
finance. As shown by international
best practices, the green economic
transformation of any region must be
a market-driven process, for which
policymakers must unleash market
forces to incentivise investments for
building a low-carbon economy. It is also
imperative to dovetail the financial sector
with the national climate policy, to develop
sufficient financing capacity from private
as well as public sources. At the same
time, to catalyse any economy’s green
transformation, a conducive regulatory
environment for green innovation is a
necessary condition. Another crucial
policy lever is the creation of an effective
institutional architecture to support
green growth, the pillars of which would
include legislative bodies, independent
monitoring organisations, dedicated
funding agencies, academic institutions
with major climate change research
programmes, and intersectoral expert
groups.
The Indian government’s commitment
to pursuing low-carbon development is
evident in its ambitious targets and path-
breaking climate initiatives. The recently
concluded COP26 marks a momentous
moment for India, with Prime Minister
Narendra Modi declaring a Net Zero
target for 2070 and propelling the levers
of development towards more green
and sustainable pathways. The country
has declared to increase its non-fossil
energy capacity to 500 GW, bring its
economy’s carbon intensity down to 45
per cent, and reduce 1 billion tonnes
of carbon emissions from the total
projected emissions—all by 2030. The
capacity target for renewables has been
increased from 175 GW to 228 GW by
2022, further committing to fulfil 50 per
cent of its energy requirement through
renewable energy by 2030. By launching
the International Solar Alliance (ISA)
in 2015ii and the Coalition for Disaster
Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) in 2019iii
and, most recently, the Infrastructure
for Resilient Island States (IRIS) in 2021,iv
India has successfully positioned itself
as an emerging leader in the domain of
climate action. The Smart Cities Mission
The standard The standard development development models are no models are no longer compatible longer compatible with India's goal of with India's goal of sustainable Green sustainable Green Growth”Growth”
““
(2015), National Clean Air Programme
(2019) and Jal Jeevan Mission (2019) are
important examples of frameworks that
embed the principle of sustainability in the
domains of urban development, air quality
and water management, respectively.
Schemes such as the Ujjwala Yojana and
the Rural Electrification Programme, too,
are driving green technologies across
the country.
The next decade will be decisive in
establishing India’s development
pathway and with the right policies for
renewables, electric, mobility, carbon
trading systems and carbon taxes, better
outcomes can be achieved not only
across environmental but also economic
indicators. Massive green investments
will lead to fast economic growth, lower
energy imports, higher job creation, rise
in investment levels, and more lives saved
from air pollution. Careful planning must
be undertaken to ensure the transition is
just, fair and inclusive.
Climate change is a global challenge
that implicates everyone and requires
coordinated, multi-stakeholder action.
India’s low-carbon growth pathway can
provide a new and unique model for
the rest of the developing world. As the
third-largest greenhouse gas emitter,
the country’s climate action will play a
crucial role in bolstering global efforts
to combat the crisis. Thus, India’s green
transformation is critical not only to the
Indian growth story but also to global
sustainability.
JAYANT SINHA
is Member, Global Advisory Board, Observer Research Foundation. He is the Chairperson of the Parliamentary Standing Committee for Finance and a Member of Parliament from Hazaribagh, Jharkhand.
i Jayant Sinha, Tanushree Chandra, " Getting to the Green Frontier Faster: The Case for a Green Frontier SuperFund", Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-case-for-a-green-frontier-superfund/
ii International Solar Alliance, https://isolaralliance.org/
iii Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, https://www.cdri.world/
iv Press Release, "Launch of ‘Infrastructure for Resilient Island States’ (IRIS) at COP26", CDRI, https://www.cdri.world/press-releases/launch-infrastructure-resilient-island-states-iris-cop26
Endnotes
26 27
THOUGHTS ON A RISING INDIA
THE RT. HON. STEPHEN J. HARPER
Light illuminates; shadows define.
Amidst the gathering clouds of
global turbulence and disruption,
India’s rise as a self-defined
democratic power holds great promise
for the world order.
Even before the worldwide trauma
unleashed by the COVID-19 pandemic,
globalisation and rapid advances in
technology had already been reshaping
societies across the globe. There is
now more wealth and opportunity than
ever before, but there is also growing
agitation from globalisation’s uneven
affects. Disruptions to economic norms
and national identities have led to
politics becoming more fragmented and
polarised, while zero-sum behaviour by
authoritarian regimes has weakened the
rules-based order.
The pandemic has only strengthened the
headwinds that the post-war international
India has achieved India has achieved a lot. Its 3000-year-a lot. Its 3000-year-old civilisation has old civilisation has had wide culutral had wide culutral impacts on all of impacts on all of humanity."humanity."
““
order was already struggling to manage.
That a transatlantic consensus would
provide replicable templates for
governance around the world is no
longer a popular assumption, not even in
its Western core. These challenges do not
undermine the fundamental strengths
of the democratic capitalist model,
which continues to provide prosperity,
security and resilience, wherever it is
fully embraced and thoughtfully applied.
However, they do suggest that the model
requires new champions.
Few are as capable of or appropriate for
occupying this mantle as India. For all its
monumental challenges as a nation—its
multiple divisions, its colonial past, its
socialist legacy—the Republic of India
stands as a tribute to the emancipatory
potential of freedom and democracy.
Indeed, the coming decades will be
shaped in no small part by the choices
India makes as it seeks to rise to its
“great-power” potential. This journey is
taking place amidst a shift in the centre
of gravity of economic power from the
Atlantic system to the Indo-Pacific region
and during immense technological and
political transformations.
India’s rise is also set against the
backdrop of a bi-polar contest for global
supremacy between China and the United
States (US), along with the increasing
decoupling of their economic models.
Most emerging economies have sought
28 29
to prioritise their own development in a
multi-polar environment and to protect
themselves from the fallout of this
strategic competition. However, the world
is increasingly being pushed towards a
real choice: Free markets governed by
the rule of law and democratic norms vs.
a state-directed, neo-mercantilist model
of trade, investment and debt. Countries
will invariably gravitate towards a rules-
based world of free nations or a hub-and-
spokes global order with Beijing at its
centre.
India did not need Chinese aggression in
Ladakh to demonstrate on which side of
these choices it should fall. The country
is, by its very nature, a deeply pluralistic
society that will naturally resist any
inclination to authoritarian governance.
It is also an inherently entrepreneurial
nation that has thrived when presented
with the opportunities that democratic
capitalism affords. Thus, as India emerges
from its non-aligned legacy and becomes
a real player in the international arena, its
success will rest on the democratic model
at home and appropriate partnerships
abroad. The bold policy directions of
Prime Minister Narendra Modi indicate
a clear understanding of India’s growing
importance in the world, its needs and its
potential.
One of those needs is greater opportunities
for the largest working-age population in
the world. External Affairs Minister, Dr. S.
Jaishankar, has rightly highlighted that by
2030, India’s human capital will be a key
feature of its diplomacy. Yet more than
half of India’s workforce is still employed
in the agricultural sector, which accounts
for a mere 15 percent of the country’s
gross domestic product. There is an
urgent requirement for long-term
structural realignment—a generational
transformation—to prepare this diverse
workforce for the new realities of the
Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Further, India will have to undertake
substantial economic reforms to realise
its income goals. Harnessing technology
to overcome its rigid bureaucracy,
robust federal engagement with state
governments, more emphasis on the
private sector, and better governance of
state institutions will be essential moving
forward. India’s recent policy innovations
towards economic formalisation, such as
the delivery of services through Aadhaar
and the introduction of the GST (Goods
and Services Tax), have been significant
steps in the right direction. Early
measures towards the privatisation of
key sectors are encouraging. Necessary
structural reform in agriculture is being
debated. Additionally, India must scale
what is already the world’s third-largest
start-up ecosystem.
Finally, at a time when nations are
reasserting the primacy of their own
economic interests, an Indian agenda of
economic dynamism and mutual benefit
will need to be pursued at the international
level. A well-articulated trade agenda
is essential, which will advance India’s
place in global supply chains and build
confidence in the country as a destination
for investment. It must avoid both the
pitfalls of export-oriented protectionism
and the re-colonisation of Indian sectors.
Doing this right will not only make India a
truly wealthy country, but also enhance
its global leadership and provide the
world with a stronger and more stable
trading order.
India has already achieved a lot. Its
3,000-year-old civilisation has had wide
cultural impacts on all of humanity.
Modern India has put a lie to the notion that
democratic governance and economic
THE RT. HON. STEPHEN J. HARPER
is Canada’s 22nd Prime Minister and Co-Chair of the Observer Research Foundation’s Global Advisory Board.
progress are incompatible with extreme
social diversity and high initial levels of
poverty. After Independence, India left
behind the famines of the past. Since the
1990s, it has undertaken an economic
transformation that is destined to achieve
great heights. Now, should India make the
right choices, it will discover the potential
of helping to lead the world to greater
prosperity and peace.
30 31
A NEW ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY WHERE INDIA MATTERS
NAVDEEP SURI
Economic diplomacy is broadly
defined as the aspect of
diplomacy that focuses
on international economic
relations. In the aftermath of World War
II, this has usually meant promoting
national trade, investment and technology
interests through aggressive bilateral
negotiations and pushing the same
interests in multilateral institutions,
such as the World Trade Organisation
and the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development. Foreign
assistance programmes were added as
an afterthought to the principal objective
of pursuing commercial goals.
However, India became something of
an outlier in September 1964, when the
Indian Union Cabinet decided to establish
the Indian Technical and Economic
Cooperation Programme (ITEC). India
was a newly independent and still
impoverished country announcing that
it would now provide support to its even
poorer friends in Africa and Asia, arguing
that, “it was necessary to establish
relations on mutual concern and inter-
dependence based not only on commonly
held ideals and aspirations but also on
solid economic foundations.”
It was this ambitious statement of intent,
carrying an unusual blend of altruism and
pragmatism, that set the foundations of
modern India’s economic diplomacy. And
it worked. I saw this first-hand during my
extensive travels across Africa, hearing
stories of prime ministers and ministers
who had learned maths and science from
Indian teachers; of industrial estates
and agriculture schools set up by Indian
experts; of national defence colleges
established by the National Defence
College (NDC); of the vast numbers of
civil servants and technical personnel,
doctors and nurses, engineers and
scientists who had been trained in India
under the ITEC. From Addis Ababa and
Gaborone to Accra and Windhoek, the
goodwill towards India was palpable. The
country was considered a helpful and
trustworthy friend.
It felt good, but that was about it. Barring
a handful of honourable exceptions,
India’s aid programmes did not translate
into any distinct economic benefits for the
country. This started to change sometime
around 2005. India rolled out its first lines
of credit (LoCs) to Africa, with a modest
sum of US$500 million. With soft interest
rates that included a grant element of
about 30 percent backed by a sovereign
guarantee, these LoCs became a catalyst
for some of India’s leading companies
to crack the difficult markets of a
32 33
India is a veritable India is a veritable lighthouse of lighthouse of knowledge and knowledge and ideas, which can ideas, which can and will make a and will make a difference”difference”
““
francophone Africa and to successfully
execute projects in countries across
Asia and Africa. These projects cover
key infrastructure sectors like transport
connectivity via railways, roads and
ports; power generation and distribution;
manufacturing industries; and even
agriculture and irrigation. As a result,
ambitious but often delayed connectivity
projects in India’s neighbourhood—
spanning road, rail and river transport
networks along with oil pipelines and
power transmission grids—finally
started to take shape under the direct
supervision of Prime Minister Modi.
On the services side, India was building
IT Centres for Excellence, leveraging its
satellite capabilities to offer education and
health services through the e-VidyaBharti
e-ArogyaBharti programmes. The original
ITEC programme was expanded to
provide 12,000 fully funded training slots
in courses ranging from cybersecurity
and climate change to entrepreneurship
and education. The government also
started to offer Buyer’s Credit to the tune
of US $1 billion to encourage countries to
purchase Indian products. Recognising
the importance of climate change, India
not only took the lead in establishing
the International Solar Alliance but also
agreed to provide an LoC of US$1.6
billion to fund solar energy projects in
developing countries.
The dramatic expansion of India’s aid
programmes under the Development
Partnership Administration within the
Ministry of External Affairs accompanied
an equally vigorous push to the more
‘conventional’ aspects of commercial and
multilateral economic diplomacy. India’s
diplomatic missions became actively
engaged in organising trade shows and
“Make in India” events, pursuing market
access and contesting non-tariff barriers;
wooing MNCs, private equity firms and
sovereign funds to invest in the country;
and pursuing oil concessions and energy
security arrangements. India’s high-
profile participation in Dubai Expo 2020
and the imaginative manner in which the
India Pavilion has been used to project a
New India is an example. At the same time,
by actively participating in multilateral
institutions, India is signalling its intent
to be involved in defining the new rules of
the game, instead of remaining a passive
spectator to rules framed by others.
34 35
Nevertheless, in the new decade, India
must confront fresh challenges in
the domain of economic diplomacy.
Protectionist trends are on the rise,
and there is a preference for bilateral
over multilateral trade arrangements.
A growing anti-immigration sentiment
in major Western countries poses new
hurdles to labour mobility. With artificial
intelligence, the Fourth Industrial
Revolution, and 5G as the emerging
backbone of economic growth, India
must retool some of its own economic
diplomacy. If data is the new oil, clear
and transparent domestic laws and
institutions must be developed to inspire
confidence in India as a safe destination
for data processing. If climate change
becomes an existential matter and
pandemics such as COVID-19 threaten
to send the entire global economy
into a tailspin, India must lead the
conversations on subjects ranging from
resilient infrastructure to global health.
It’s active participation in the Quad
alongside the US, Japan and Australia
will play a key role in addressing issues
of climate change and vaccine production
as also in the quest for critical minerals,
cybersecurity, supply chain resilience,
adoption of 5G and other technologies
from trustworthy sources, and a host of
other emerging challenges.
The positions taken by India on these and
other new areas of economic diplomacy
will be followed closely, not only by India’s
competitors but also by its allies in the
developing world who count on India’s
advocacy to protect their own vital
interests. The upcoming collaboration
between the Observer Research
Foundation and India’s Foreign Service
Institute to design and run a programme
on new economic diplomacy signals the
growing importance of this emerging
discipline. Over the years, it is expected
to build significant capacity amongst
young Indian and foreign diplomats to
engage effectively with these issues in the
context of both bilateral and multilateral
platforms.
In this new economic diplomacy, it is
important to look beyond government
actors alone. Some of the best talent
lies in the exceptional work being done
by India’s leading NGOs in areas such
as education, healthcare and financial
inclusion. Some of the brightest ideas in
these areas come from the numerous
social entrepreneurs and start-ups
that have taken upon themselves the
challenge of disrupting business-as-
usual. Many have developed education,
healthcare, financial inclusion, and other
models that can be scaled up and adapted
for other developing countries. Cases
in point include the growing demand in
several countries for the Pratham model
of primary school education, the Jaipur
foot, the Barefoot College of Women Solar
Energy Technicians, and for IndiaStack
to configure Aadhar-like solutions. There
are many more waiting in the winds, to
take their ideas and expertise beyond
India’s shores. Thus, India must now tell
its own stories—of the school children in
Bangladesh, the amputees in Malawi, the
solar grandmothers from Kenya, the IT
graduates from Ghana, the nurses from
Ethiopia and all the others whose lives
have been touched by its ideas and vision.
In this world of new economic diplomacy,
India matters. Instead of lamenting
about India’s inability to match Chinese
largesse, it is important to play to the
AMB. NAVDEEP SURI
is Distinguished Fellow at ORF
country’s formidable strengths and
resources. India is a veritable lighthouse
of knowledge and ideas, which can and
will make a difference.
36 37
TOWARDS A 10-TRILLION-DOLLAR INDIAN ECONOMY BASED ON THE SDG AGENDA
NILANJAN GHOSH
The Indian development story,
especially over the last three
decades since economic
liberalisation, has focussed
on economic growth only with scant
recognition of the costs of growth. While
growth entailed creation of new capital
through large capital expenditures, in
most cases, the costs imposed on the
society and natural ecosystem have
been so overwhelming that they have
raised questions on the efficacy of such
investments! Such capital expenditures
were witnessed in large-scale land-
use changes for linear infrastructure,
agriculture, industry, and urban
settlements; dam constructions impeding
over the natural hydrological flows, and
the like. These have also been associated
with social costs of rehabilitation or lack
of rehabilitation leading to conflicts. Yet,
there is no denying the critical role physical
capital plays in promoting economic
growth, while the empirical evidencei
of physical infrastructure enhancing
the overall business environment and
economic competitiveness at the macro-
scale is also ample.
However, the vision of growth as the
sole parameter of development has
been challenged globally for over
half a century, with the challenge
becoming more prominent recently
with development being viewed through
the Sustainable Development Goals’
(SDG) lens. To a large extent, SDGs find
a theoretical underpinning in Mohan
Munasinghe’s sustainomicsii, which
talks of a transdisciplinary knowledge
base combining economic, social
and environmental goals. This also
presents itself as reconciling between
the irreconcilable trinity of equity,
efficiency, and sustainability dimensions
of development. Much in contrary to
this global policy and academic thinking,
the Indian “growth-fetishism” has led
to a development paradigm that has
often witnessed a compromise with
the concerns of equity and distributive
justice, apart from environmental
sustainability. The sheer paucity of
social security to provide a cushion
during crisis was evidenced during
the economic lockdown of 2020 in the
wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, which
clearly revealed the anguishes of the
country’s migrant labour, the micro and
small enterprises, and the poor. It was
apparent that the social cushioning to
the poor and vulnerable has been, so far,
provided by the market forces, thereby,
highlighting the failure of policy-driven
India should India should present itself as present itself as a more equitable a more equitable green economy by green economy by reconciling between reconciling between equality, efficiency, equality, efficiency, & sustainability”& sustainability”
““
38 39
distribution and equity. The lockdown
was tantamount to locking down of the
organic market forces, thereby, leaving
the informal labour force in the lurch.
On the other hand, the SDG agenda rests
largely on the four forces of capital,
namely, human capital (SDGs 1 – 5),
physical capital (SDGs 8 and 9), natural
capital (SDGs 14 and 15) and social capital
(SDGs 10 and 16). UNEP’s publication on
Inclusive Wealth talks of the changes
in the social values of the three of these
capital assets, namely, natural capital,
human capital and produced or physical
capital over the period from 1990 to
2014. As per this report, between 1990
and 2014, physical capital and health- and
education-induced human capital grew
at 3.8% and 2.1% per annum respectively
globally—both at the cost of natural
capital that declined at 0.7% per annum.
The report infers that the decline of
forests in India is creating pressure on its
ability to develop sustainably. Though the
“inclusive wealth” of India increased at
barely 1.6% per annum during this period
driven by growth in human and physical
capital, there was a decline in per capita
inclusive wealth from US$368 in 1990 to
US$359 in 2014 (both at 2005 prices). If
inclusive wealth is taken as the factor or
fundamental basis for development, then
such a decline raises serious questions
on the sustainability of the development
process. Such a lop-sided development
trajectory cannot sustain India’s path
towards a US$10-trillion economy over
the next 10-15 years. It needs a holistic
approach.
On the other hand, following the
Malthusian creed of Club of Rome’s
doomsday prediction in their Limits to
Growth thesis, the Catalan economists
(e.g., Joan Martinez-Alier) have already
been propagating degrowth as the
way to look forward. Degrowth talks
of deceleration or a receding wave
of progression in human activities so
that the very fundamental basis of life
in the forms of natural capital can be
sustained. This process of contraction
in the economic activities in the global
North by viewing development from a
“beyond growth” (rather “anti-growth”)
perspective is posited to create the space
for a more self-defined pathway for social
organisation in the global South.iii
However, India’s development cannot
be in the direction of “degrowth”. As I
proposed earlieriv, degrowth is not merely
a statement emanating from a world that
has already grown, but from a world
that is more equal in economic terms
(income or wealth equality parameters),
more equitable from the perspective
of distributive justice, and where
social security has helped in evolving
with the welfare state. The situation in
India is quite the opposite! While equity
and distribution concerns still pose a
challenge in this 1.3-bn+ population, a
recent piecev argues how increasing
income and wealth inequalities can inhibit
the long-term growth prospects of India,
especially when consumption demand is
the prime driver of growth.
The US$10 trillion economy is not merely
an economy with a number—it is a dream
and a vision. Neither can such a dream
be achieved in a non-inclusive manner,
nor can this dream leave anybody behind.
Amartya Sen’s essayvi in the wake of the
pandemic-induced lockdown in India
reiterated the need for equity and the
distributive justice by citing how life
expectancy in the UK increased during
the war decades. Sen emphasised, “…
The positive lessons from pursuing
equity and paying greater attention to the
disadvantaged helped in the emergence
of what came to be known as the welfare
state”.
From the pandemic-induced economic
pandemonium, India has to rise like a
phoenix to realise the US$10-trillion
economy dream. This will have to rest on
two key elements: a> the simultaneous
growth in health- and education-induced
human capital and physical capital,
without compromising the sustainability
of the natural capital; and b> a more equal
India serving the cause of distributive
justice through reduced inequality that
is posed to come in the way of long-run
growth prospects. This US$10-trillion
India, therefore, should present itself as a
more equitable green economy based on
the SDG agenda, reconciling between the
irreconcilable trinity of equity, efficiency
and sustainability.
NILANJAN GHOSH
is Director, Centre for New Economic Diplomacy, Observer Research Foundation, and ORF’s Kolkata Centre.
i Tatyana Palei, "Assessing The Impact of Infrastructure on Economic Growth and Global Competitiveness," Elsevier, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/82772001.pdf
ii Mohan Munasinghe, "Climate Change and Sustainable Development: Analysing the linkages with Sustainomics", OECD, https://www.oecd.org/env/cc/1933843.pdf.
iii Degrowth, "What is Degrowth?", Degrowth.info, https://degrowth.info/degrowth.
iv Nilanjan Ghosh, " Deciphering the colours of India’s economic growth," Observer Research Foundation, orfonline.org/expert-speak/deciphering-colours-india-economic-growth/
v Nilanjan Ghosh, " Is increasing wealth inequality coming in the way of economic growth in India?", Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/is-increasing-wealth-inequality-coming-in-the-way-of-economic-growth-in-india/
vi Amartya Sen, "A better society can emerge from the lockdowns," Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/5b41ffc2-7e5e-11ea-b0fb-13524ae1056b
Endnotes
40 41
RETHINKING HEALTH: INDIA AND THE WORLD
OOMMEN C. KURIAN AND SHOBA SURI
Some estimates suggest that
India already has the world’s
highest population, with 31
percent living in urban areas
as of 2011.i Despite being the sixth-
largest and fastest-growing economy
in the world,ii with a GDP of US$3.25
trillion, India ranks low in the human
development index.iii Some analysts
have argued that if India fails to meet its
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
the global SDGs will fail.iv On the other
hand, India’s success will ensure the
success of the global community, making
an “India Model” the blueprint for large
parts of the world to emulate. This rings
true the most in the healthcare sector in
India, where globally recognised factors
that limit quality healthcare access to
the population have been scaled to the
extreme and brought to focus during the
ongoing pandemic. Starting from a very
low baseline, the way India scaled up its
testing and vaccination infrastructure
very quickly to overcome the daunting
challenges brought about by COVID-19
has been remarkable. By making the
COWIN software open-source, which
coordinated the country’s vaccine
deployment effort, India has announced
that along with the vaccines, it is also
willing to actively share its experience
in quickly distributing the vaccines with
other nations.
Indeed, COVID-19 has cast doubt on
whether the world can achieve the SDGs
in time. The pandemic has overwhelmed
the health systems globally, impacting
both lives and livelihoods. The progress
on the SDGs has been hindered severely
by the outbreak, which is causing massive
devastation in low- and lower-middle-
income countries. Many have called it
the worst human and economic crisis in
human history. The COVID-19 pandemic
has led to a disruption of essential health
and nutritional services across the
country, particularly the urban areas,
putting the vulnerable population at a
higher risk of malnutrition, food insecurity
and disease exposure.
India’s urbanisation is driven by
migration across regions as well as the
gradual transformation of rural areas
India's success at India's success at meeting the SDGs meeting the SDGs will ensure the will ensure the success of the global success of the global community ”community ”
““
42 43
into urban over time. It is estimated
that by 2047, close to 65 percent of all
Indians will be living in urban areas,
emphasising the need to provide an
urban way of life for at least 800 million
Indians in the near- to mid-term.v Given
the chronic underfunding of the Indian
health system, this poses additional
challenges for decision-makers, e.g.,
reaching out to the marginalised and
vulnerable communities in urban and
rural areas and ensuring equitable health
outcomes. There is a need to ramp up the
urban health system. Further, it must be
ensured that channelling resources to
urban areas does not result in the limited
resources meant for rural areas being
spread too thin across the country.
Health is a state subject under India’s
federal system, and historically, centrally-
driven efforts towards regulation have not
fared well. The High-Level Group on Health
constituted under the Fifteenth Finance
Commission recently recommended
shifting healthcare under “Concurrent
Subjects.”vi Ayushman Bharat Pradhan
Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (AB-PMJAY)
has already empanelled more than
10,000 private hospitals and is trying to
use the new “poor patient market” as an
incentive for these hospitals to regulate
better.
In many states in India, considerable
proportions of the population across the
socio-economic spectrum are unhealthy,
according to the Latest National Family
Health Survey.vii Anaemia in reproductive
age women has worsened, with even
relatively prosperous states like Punjab
and Gujarat showing a higher prevalence.
States with better nutrition are the worst
affected by lifestyle diseases, which
poses a great challenge and forces the
health systems to spread their scarce
resources even thinner. This issue has
come to the fore during the COVID-19
pandemic. According to the World Heart
Federation, non-communicable diseases
(NCDs), particularly chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, heart disease,
hypertension and diabetes are major risk
factors for developing severe symptoms
of COVID-19.viii
Inadequate infrastructure and human
resources are significant challenges
faced by Indian healthcare, as made
evident during the pandemic. A 2017
study estimates the need for 2.07
million doctors by 2030 for equitable
healthcare.ix The Indian government is
aggressively trying to expand medical
college seats, both in the public and
private sectors, aiming to overcome
personnel bottlenecks. The number of
undergraduate medical seats has seen
a jump of 48 percent, from 54,348 in
2014–15 to 80,312 in 2019–20.x There
has also been a 47 percent rise in public-
sector medical colleges during 2014–19,
compared to a 33 percent increase in the
total number of medical colleges in the
past five years, from 404 in 2014–15 to
539 in 2019.xi Currently, India is deploying
telehealth to tide over the disruption
caused by the pandemic.
However, the infrastructure gaps
are proving to be insurmountable at
current levels of spending. According
to the latest data presented in the Rural
Health Statistics 2019-20, the shortfall
of Primary Health Centres in Jharkhand
and West Bengal stand at 73 percent and
58 percent, respectively. The shortfall of
CHCs (community health centres) in Bihar
is as much as 94 percent.xii The severe
shortfall of primary and secondary
infrastructure in rural areas causes
strain on the tertiary hospitals in urban
areas and overwhelm the facilities.
Infrastructure and urban planning are
linked to rural infrastructure, since
the supply bottleneck in rural areas
forces excess demand to spill over to
urban areas and render any planning
meaningless. Projecting a requirement
of INR 5.38 lakh crore over the next five
years for providing primary healthcare
to the Fifteenth Finance Commission, the
Ministry of Health hopes to manage the
44 45
iv Samir Saran, “India as a leading power: Shaping the development narrative at home and abroad,” Commentaries, Observer Research Foundation, 7 April 2017, https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-as-a-leading-power-shaping-the-development-narrative-at-home-and-abroad/.
v Swaminathan Ramanathan, “India’s urban moment: The pressing need for a new thought architecture,” Occasional Paper 196, Observer Research Foundation, 6 June 2019, https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-urban-moment-pressing-need-new-thought-architecture-51710/.
vi “Fifteenth Finance Commission: List of Studies Commissioned,” https://fincomindia.nic.in/ShowContentOne.aspx?id=27&Section=1.
vii National Family Health Survey -5, International Institute for Population Sciences, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) et al , New Delhi, 2021, http://rchiips.org/nfhs/factsheet_NFHS-5.shtml
viii “Preventing COVID-19 spread in poor areas,” 5 March 2020, World Heart Federation, https://www.world-heart-federation.org/news/preventing-covid-19-spread-in-poor-areas/.
xi Basant Potnuru, “Aggregate availability of doctors in India: 2014–2030,” Indian Journal of Public Health 61, no. 3 (15 September 2017): 182–187, http://www.ijph.in/article.asp?issn=0019-557X;year=2017;volume=61;issue=3;spage=182;epage=187;aulast=Potnuru.
x Rhythma Kaul, “Number of govt medical colleges surpasses private ones: Data,” Hindustan Times, 15 January 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/number-of-govt-medical-colleges-surpasses-private-ones-data/story-yy3shBkdgVcFDM7gplblGL.html.
xi Ibid.
xii Government of India, “Rural Health Statistics 2019-20”, https://hmis.nhp.gov.in/downloadfile?filepath=publications/Rural-Health-Statistics/RHS%202019-20.pdf.
xiii Oommen C. Kurian, “Health as a poll issue: We need better reporting and evidence-informed narratives,” Commentaries, Observer Research Foundation, 15 April 2019, https://www.orfonline.org/research/health-as-a-poll-issue-we-need-better-reporting-and-evidence-informed-narratives-49911/.
Endnotes
OOMMEN C. KURIAN
is a Senior Fellow & Head of Health Initiative at Observer Research Foundation. He works on public health.
SHOBA SURI
is a Senior Fellow with ORF’s Health Initiative. She is a nutritionist, with experience in community and clinical research
spiralling demand for tertiary care by
dealing with health problems early on
and by strengthening the comprehensive
primary healthcare access and outreach.
The current formation in power (NDA),
over the last seven years, has been
able to consolidate the gains from the
previous coalition in power (UPA) within
the health sector and has built on and
broad-based them, as in the cases of
the AB-PMJAY, Ayushman Bharat Digital
Mission (ABDM), Ayushman Bharat Health
and Wellness Centres, and Pradhan
Mantri Bhartiya Janaushadhi Pariyojana
(PMBJP).xiii Moreover, the NDA has been
silently working on converting the Social
Determinants of Health (SDH) framework
into practice, with flagship interventions
in key areas such as nutrition (National
Nutrition Mission), drinking water (Water
Mission), indoor air pollution (Ujjwala
Yojna), sanitation (Swachh Bharat), road
access (Gram Sadak Yojana), and gender
(Bet Bachao Beti Padhao). These initiatives
have contributed greatly to India’s
multisector response to the pandemic
and will certainly provide templates for
other health systems to accept, adapt and
build on.
i Yi Fuxian, “How Chinese officials inflated the nation’s birth rate and population size for 2019,” South China Morning Post, 28 January 2020, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3047798/how-chinese-officials-inflated-nations-birth-rate-and-population.
ii “GDP, Current Prices,” https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD.
iii “Latest Human Development Index Ranking,” http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/latest-human-development-index-ranking.
46 47
EMERGING AND CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES: NEW FRONTIERS FOR AN ASPIRATIONAL INDIA
RAJESWARI PILLAI RAJAGOPALANTRISHA RAY
The future of geopolitics,
economies, livelihoods and
governance will be written in
chrome. It will be undergirded
by emerging technologies like Artificial
Intelligence (AI), robotics, and quantum
computing, and will play out across
several domains, ranging from
cyberspace to outer space.
As India enters its 76th year, it is an
increasingly consequential power in a
range of multilateral technology coalitions
and multistakeholder forums. All eyes
are, therefore, on the world’s largest
democracy and how it engages with
emerging and critical technologies, not
just at international fora framing the rules
of the road but through its own domestic
policies as well. This piece identifies two
keystone technology arenas for India’s
engagement in the coming decade: Space
and quantum technologies.
Crowded Outer Space
It is a widely accepted truism in the
space policy community that outer space
is becoming increasingly crowded,
congested and contested. The emerging
space security scenario points to
serious consequences. A deliberate act
or accident in space is consequential.
The current situation calls for laying out
some rules of the road for outer-space
activities, to ensure that space remains
safe, secure and sustainable. Given the
number of new and emerging security
challenges in outer space, India can—
and should—play a substantial role in
shaping an international outer-space
regime.
India is an established space power and
has important stakes in maintaining an
open and secure outer-space regime. Its
interests in drafting the rules are driven
by the fact that it is one of the earliest
spacefaring powers and would like to
play an active role in shaping the rules
for outer space activities. India is one of
the three biggest space players in Asia,
along with China and Japan, and any
future regime will be ineffective without
the participation of the key players. Also,
rules and regulations can bring about
a restraining effect on certain space
activities that are inherently destabilising.
The development of sophisticated military
space programmes and counter-space
capabilities in its neighbourhood is of
enormous concern to India, and having
legally binding mechanisms can be a
way of curtailing certain destabilising
capabilities. Anti-satellite weapons
(ASAT) are a prominent example. China’s
48 49
demonstration of ASAT in January 2007
was a stark reminder of the kind of
challenges that India should be prepared
for. Also, India’s interests in formulating
rules for space is linked to its economic
growth story, which is closely associated
with its space programme. India has
assets worth around US$37 billion,
if one were to calculate the ground
infrastructure and the value-added
services associated with its outer space
programme. Thus, the economic stakes
of India’s space programme are rather
high, making it crucial for the country to
protect its space assets. Moreover, space
assets have significant utility in the daily
lives of Indian citizens, which is likely to
grow manifold in the coming years.
Finally, the Indian interest in writing
an outer-space regime is linked to the
increasingly contested geopolitics in the
Indo-Pacific region, since New Delhi does
not want outer space to become another
realm of cut-throat competition. The
influence of geopolitics in today’s space
governance is evident, but India does not
want such security politics to go too far,
with states adopting deterrence policies,
which would end badly for everyone.
While this may sound hollow against the
backdrop of India conducting an ASAT
test of its own in March 2019, India
was only responding to a capacity that
already existed in its neighbourhood. It
was a strategically considered decision,
not a knee-jerk reaction to China’s ASAT
tests. However, the hope remains that
going forward, all countries can avoid
going down the path of threatening each
other’s satellites. Indeed, ignoring the
security implications of military-space
programmes would be perilous.
India can contribute to the global writing
of the rules in various ways.
It has remained an active partner in all the
recent initiatives, including the European
Union-initiated Code of Conduct for Outer
Space Activities as well as the 2018–19 UN
Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on
PAROS (Prevention of Arms Race in Outer
Space). The EU Code of Conduct ran into
problems, mostly due to process issues.
For example, many within the Indian civil
and military bureaucracies opposed the
way the Code was written, saying that the
EU cannot determine what is good for the
rest of the world. But many Asian space
players, including India, had reservations
on the content of the Code as well. While
many non-Asian nations perceive these
objections frivolous, there is significant
political and geopolitical value to
engaging with these issues instead of
dismissing them. Being part of such an
exercise will provide these countries
with a sense of ownership over the Code
or any final outcome, which can, in turn,
ensure better longevity and compliance.
That the EU Code did not provide for
any legal framework or verification
mechanism only exacerbated the
concerns of the Asian space powers. The
GGE specifically sought “to consider and
make recommendations on substantial
elements of an international legally
binding instrument on the prevention of an
arms race in outer space, including, inter
alia, on the prevention of the placement of
weapons in outer space.” But the GGE on
PAROS that followed in 2018–19 had met
with a similar inconclusive fate. Due to the
divisive and contested nature of global
politics, there was no consensus amongst
the 25 member states. Consequently,
there was no formal report from the GGE.
The UK’s recent space security
proposali, “Reducing Space Threats
through Norms, Rules and Principles of
Responsible Behaviours,” offers India an
opportunity to shape the space security
governance debates. Given the bottom-
up and behaviour-based approach of the
proposal, it is important for India and like-
minded partners to engage with it and
identify existing and potential threats and
risks to space, as well as ideate possible
pathways laying stress on trust-building
as a key driver.
Given the contentious nature of great
power relations, and the resultant
standstill in multilateral negotiations,
India understands that one may need
to start with a normative process
50 51
and gradually develop legally binding
measures. It is unlikely that the global
governance debates will see much
progress in the near future.
Quantum Technologies
Just a couple of years ago, a viable
commercial quantum computer was, by
most estimates, between 10 and 30 years
away. Launched by IBM and the University
of Tokyo, the world’s first commercial
quantum computer began operating in
Japan in 2021.
Quantum technologies come with a
plethora of applications that could
accelerate our progress in solving some
of the most challenging problems of our
time: Quantum encryption can secure
communications; quantum simulation
can help us discover new materials,
including for green technologies; and
quantum sensing could help us map the
impact of climate change. To capitalise
on the quantum revolution, India’s 2020-
21 Union Budget proposedii to spend
INR 8,000 crore (USD 1.2 billion) on the
newly launched National Mission on
Quantum Technologies and Applications
(NMQTA). India joins a growing group of
countries that have announced dedicated
strategies and budgets for quantum,
which includes Canada’s National
Quantum Strategyiii, with a budget
commitment of CAD 360 million (US$287
million); France’s National Strategy for
Quantum Technologies, which commitsiv
1.8 billion euro (US$1.8 billion) over five
years; and South Korea’s announcementv
of an investment of KRW 44.5 billion
(US$38 million) over five years.
At the same time, quantum applications
can undermine the stability of nascent
digital infrastructure, including key
public infrastructure upon which India’s
financial infrastructure is built. In the
absence of clear rules of the road, and
of bright red lines on unethical uses of
quantum technologies, the quantum
revolution could become a double-edged
sword.
The broader structural implications
of quantum technologies also remain
underexplored. Will the shift from linear to
quantum causality require a fundamental
rejig in how we think about power, ethics
and decision-making? How would we code
accountability into a technology where
cause and effect may be indeterminate,
where the act of observation may change
the outcome, and where explainability
and reconstruction of how a decision was
made may be impossible?
Finally, emerging technologies in all
spheres are increasingly embroiled in
geopolitics, particularly the strategic
competition between the United States
and China. Consequently, international
norms around quantum could follow a
trajectory similar to that of AI or space,
RAJESWARI PILLAI RAJAGOPALAN
is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the ORF, New Delhi.
TRISHA RAY
is an Associate Fellow at ORF’s Centre for Security Strategy and Technology.
remaining in limbo or scattered across
disparate sets of principles. New Delhi
must prepare to shape, rather than be
shaped, by these shifting geopolitical
winds.
Conclusion: India’s Place in the World
India must use this as an opportunity
to take the lead in developing a coalition
of like-minded countries that can fund
technology-aided solutions, which
might gradually find favour among
the Great Powers as well. There is a
particular advantage to India leading
such an exercise. For instance, many
developing countries in Asia, Africa and
other parts of the world consider New
Delhi’s technological advancements as
impressive achievements for a fellow
developing nation. Indeed, India is also
seen as a bridging power that can narrow
the divide between the developed and
developing countries. It will serve India
well if it manages to take the opportune
moment to make important gains in the
governance of these technologies.
i United Nations General Assembly, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space: prevention of an arms race in outer space," UNGA, https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.1/75/L.45/Rev.1.
ii Press Release, "Budget 2020 announces Rs 8000 cr National Mission on Quantum Technologies & Applications," Ministry of Science and Technology, https://dst.gov.in/budget-2020-announces-rs-8000-cr-national-mission-quantum-technologies-applications.
iii Government of Canada, "National Quantum Strategy," Government of Canada, https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/154.nsf/eng/home
iv Anne-Françoise Pelé, "French President Details €1.8b Quantum Plan," EE Times Europe, https://www.eetimes.eu/french-president-details-e1-8b-quantum-plan/
v Heewon Shim, "Korea Starts Five-year Development Program for Quantum Computing Technology," Korea-EU Research Centre, https://k-erc.eu/korea-starts-five-year-development-program-for-quantum-computing-technology/
Endnotes
52 53
INDIA’S ERA OF PARTNERSHIPS: FROM NON-ALIGNMENT TO CRAFTING A ‘NEW BALANCE’
HARSH V PANT
Even as a new order is being
shaped in the Indo-Pacific
with India at the heart of this
emerging strategic geography,
developments in Afghanistan managed
to underscore for New Delhi the evolving
political map of South Asia itself. In a
matter of hours, the old order folded
like nine pins in Afghanistan in 2021 and
all that was left were the ruins of the
last two decades. The new order is yet
to emerge fully, but the contours of that
order can be discerned based on the past
experience of the Afghan nation and the
region. The West was, in any case, cutting
and running but the speed of Taliban
advance meant that once again the United
States (US) had to live through the Saigon
moment with diplomats being evicted by
helicopters and sensitive documents
being destroyed.
Even as Afghanistan was crumbling,
Biden was pushing back against
suggestions that the Taliban could swiftly
conquer Afghanistan by arguing that, “the
likelihood there’s going to be the Taliban
overrunning everything and owning the
whole country is highly unlikely.” And
in less than a month, western nations
were left scrambling to evacuate their
citizens and diplomatic staff even while
acknowledging that there will be a new
government in Afghanistan. After talking
of freedom, democracy and human rights
for the last two decades, the West moved
quickly towards accommodating the
Taliban regime in some form.
The western governments have now been
telling their people that some form of
accommodation with the Taliban, whether
evolved or not, is important for the larger
good of the Afghan people as this would
mean Afghans taking ownership of their
own future. While the humanitarian
catastrophe unfolding in Afghanistan
will be brushed aside, the strategic
consequences of Taliban’s re-emergence
will have to be reckoned with by the West
for a long time. If, as is being suggested
in some quarters, one of the reasons
for the US withdrawing troops from
Afghanistan is to focus attention squarely
on the competition with China, then the
credibility of western assurances as
a security guarantor after the Afghan
debacle have been put under a scanner.
The coalition of partners that the West
Non-alignment Non-alignment is giving way to is giving way to a 'new balance' a 'new balance' in crafting in crafting partnerships that partnerships that serve vital Indian serve vital Indian interests”interests”
““
54 55
is trying to construct to manage China’s
rise is likely to face greater fissures as
western allies look at the Afghanistan car
crash with a degree of foreboding.
The limits of American power today are
all too palpable and the embarrassment
of Afghanistan is likely to constrain
western strategic thinking for decades
now. The US, perhaps, couldn’t have built
a nation in Afghanistan but the manner
in which the withdrawal unfolded casts
a long shadow on Washington’s ability
to manage the emerging, highly volatile
global order.
For India, this is an important moment
in regional political evolution. In its 75th
year after independence, its centrality
in the wider Indo-Pacific is today well-
established. New Delhi wants to play a
“leading role” in the international system
so that it can shape global outcomes,
rather than merely being a recipient of
the frameworks set by others. In the
Indo-Pacific, a large part of its foreign
policy today is to find opportunities in a
challenging environment to shape global
outcomes. One of the ways in which India,
along with others, have responded to this
is to push the envelope on building issue-
based coalitions amongst like-minded
nations. The plethora of minilaterals in
the Indo-Pacific today underscore the
stark void in this vast geography when it
comes to institutionalisation. And in the
absence of major power consensus, the
ideas of middle powers like India have
found greater receptivity.
The Indo-Pacific Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue or the Quad, involving the US,
Japan, India and Australia, has the been
most talked about platform in this regard.
Its dramatic resurrection since 2017 and
a growing profile has conveyed a new
sense of purpose to the wider region,
reassuring some and creating anxieties
for China. With two summit level meetings
in 2021, one virtual and one in person,
within a matter of six months, the agenda
of this nascent platform has been widening
to include some of the most critical issues
of our times such as vaccines, emerging
strategic technologies, infrastructure
connectivity and maritime security. But
it is the commitment of India, Japan and
Australia that ultimately convinced the US
to invest in this initiative.
Yet, even as India is setting up new terms
of engagement in the wider Indo-Pacific,
the evolving South Asian landscape
has meant maintaining stable relations
with old partners like Russia. New Delhi
understands the critical role Russia plays
in the regional and global balance of
power. India hosted the regional dialogue
on Afghanistan in November 2021,
which saw Russian participation with
Iran and the Central Asian Republics.
The convergence on Afghanistan and
the threats emanating from there is
remarkable given that Moscow was quite
supportive of the Taliban in the initial days.
There is quite a distance from wanting to
see the Americans out to managing the
negative externalities emanating from the
Taliban takeover. And not surprisingly,
Russia has moved closer to Indian
assessment of the regional security.
As the global structural realities undergo
a fundamental transformation with the
rise of China and its assertive pursuit of
its ambitions, both Moscow and New Delhi
are trying to figure out their responses.
Despite the Cold War historical legacy,
Russia has moved quickly to cement ties
with China. India, too, has witnessed
the withering away of the ‘hesitations of
history’ when it comes to the US and the
wider West. Unlike in the past, India’s
growing weight in the global order
ensures that its ability to navigate great
power politics is much stronger now.
As it balances China’s rise and builds
a strategic partnership with the US,
India remains keen to invest in a stable
relationship with Russia. The India-
Russia engagement of today is responding
to today’s geopolitical imperatives,
not of the past. Devoid of yesteryear’s
sentimentalism, this is a relationship
that is grounded in pragmatism, which
ensures that while New Delhi can do little
about Moscow’s gravitation to Beijing, it
can insulate its own burgeoning ties with
the US from the overweening presence of
Russia.
India’s past diffidence in making certain
foreign policy choices is rapidly giving
way to greater readiness to acknowledge
the need for a radical shift in thinking
about internal capability enhancement by
leveraging external partnerships. Non-
alignment is finally giving way to a ‘new
balance’ in crafting partnerships that can
serve vital Indian interests.
HARSH V PANT
is Director, Studies and Head of the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.
56 57
HARNESSING NEW OPPORTUNITIES IN A WORLD OF DECLINING MULTILATERALISM: WHAT INDIA CAN DO FOR ITSELF AND OTHERS
AMRITA NARLIKAR
The post-World War II
multilateral order may have
been shaped largely by the
western allies, but this did
not deter India from taking on an active
role across different negotiations for
the setting up of new international
organisations. For instance, even before
the country won independence in 1947,
its negotiators worked systematically
to ensure that any international trade
organisation that emerged would take into
account its interests (and the concerns of
several other developing countries). India
was a founding member of the United
Nations (UN), and an original signatory
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). Even when the rules of the
game did not turn out to its advantage—it
was neither a permanent member of the
UN Security Council, nor was it a member
of the informal decision-making “Quad”
group in the GATT—its enthusiasm for
multilateralism seldom waned.
Over the next 70 years, sometimes in
coalitions and sometimes alone, the
world’s largest democracy sought to
reform the multilateral system from the
inside. This earned it a reputation of being
a “difficult” negotiator, especially when
dealing with western counterparts. Its
persistent activism, however, contributed
to at least some updating of the system
(e.g., the World Trade Organisation, from
the mid-2000s onwards, began to include
Brazil and India in the Quad)i. And the
multilateral system, in turn, served India
well: India’s dramatic rise since the turn
of the millennium, while in good measure
a function of its domestic economic and
social reforms, has also been facilitated
by the many growth and development
opportunities afforded to it by free
markets and the absence of major wars.
Today, multilateralism faces a crisis of
unprecedented proportions. The crisis
has several sourcesii. It manifests itself
in a fundamental questioning of the
very value of multilateralism within
countries and deadlocks in negotiations
in multilateral organisations. Add to
this the phenomenon of “Weaponised
Interdependence”iii—the ability of some
powerful states to exploit the control that
they exercise over hubs of production
networks in a world of closely integrated
global value chains—and it is clear that
multilateral institutions are ill-suited
to meet the challenges of the present
dayiv The long-standing vulnerabilities
Multilateralism Multilateralism faces a crisis of faces a crisis of unprecedented unprecedented proportions and proportions and this crisis has this crisis has multiple sources”multiple sources”
““
58 59
of the multilateral system have been laid
bare by the pandemic: The World Health
Organisation has come under much
critique for its mishandling of COVID-19;v
even now the World Trade Organisation
stands by helplessly as members
continue to bicker over the TRIPS waiver,
and potential capacity for vaccine and
medicine production in the Global South
cannot be put to its much-needed use.
The system is in dire crisis, at a time when
the world needs it most; collapse of the
system would hurt all parties, including
India. Yet, amidst all the handwringing,
it is often forgotten that the crisis
of multilateralism could offer new
opportunities that India should harness.
Never let a good crisis go to waste
The opportunities emerging directly
from the crisis are fourfold. First, while
India itself had, for decades, pushed for
reforms in the multilateral order (e.g.,
for greater inclusiveness in international
organisations), the crisis of the system
seems to have finally created a more
widespread recognition for the necessity
of reform. Second, key players in the
west—especially in Europe—have begun
to recognise that they need new allies and
friends. This is especially so given that
the US seems to be turning away from
the very system that it had led in creating,
and then served as a guarantor for. Third,
a significant cause for the malaise of
multilateralism lies in the disillusionment
of the many—within both the global
north and the global south—who believe
that they have missed out on the gains
of globalisation. This disillusionment, in
turn, is a product not only of inequalities
that have indeed increased across many
societies, but also of the absence of a
convincing narrative about globalisation
and the multilateral rules that facilitate
it. In some key policy circles in developed
countries, this has prompted considerable
soul-searching, as exemplified by Munich
Security Conference 2020 and its focus on
“westlessness”. And fourth, a recognition
seems to be finally growing that
sometimes helter-skelter globalisation—
in a world where production chains can
be weaponised—is no longer acceptable.
Alternative and more sustainable forms
of globalisation need to be developed,
which meet goals of both prosperity and
security. The moment is ripe for sharing
new ideas. And while India has always
had much to offer the world, the world
may now be ready to appreciate itvi.
Strategies
To make the most of these opportunities,
India would be well-served to adopt the
following strategies.
First, India, even it were to come up with
the most innovative ideas for reform of
the system, will not be effective if it works
alone. Coalitions with like-minded actors
because multilateralism is little more than
an instrument per se; it cannot be seen
as a goal in itself. Rather, one must ask:
Multilateralism, for what end? To argue
for a multilateral rules-based system
will never suffice on its own; one must
always address the issue of the values
that underpin the rules. This attention
to values could turn out to be especially
important in the context of China’s rise.
Finally, none of the above strategies
will work if India fails to get its act
together domestically. Here, the most
important sector is the economy. Its
own people will not support its growing
role internationally, if the government
fails to deliver with jobs and better
living standards. The pandemic is a very
tough test for governments everywhere.
There is a danger that as a reaction to
the pandemic—and the costs of over-
dependence on potential rivals that it
revealed—India swings in the opposite
direction with its Atmanirbhar Bharat
Abhiyan (literally “self-reliant India
campaign”). If “self-reliance” turns out to
be similar to “self-sufficiency” of earlier
decades, India risks undoing its hard-
won gains of the last 30 years. Choosing
the right economic strategies will be
even more important amidst the global
economic downturn that the coronavirus
pandemic is already causing. These
strategies will need to strike the right
balance between shortening supply
chains on the one hand (which the current
will be key. Here, India could work closely
with the Alliance for Multilateralism—
an initiative launched by Germany and
France—to shape both the alliance itself
and the overall reform agenda. Working
together with a group of both developed
and developing countries could further
amplify India’s voice.
Second, while keeping an eye on the global
picture, India needs to pay attention to its
own immediate region. Connecting the
regional with the global is China’s Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI). India risks finding
itself in a precarious geo-economic
position, surrounded by the so-called
“string of pearls” and potentially weak in
a world where interdependence can be
weaponised. Especially with key actors—
such as the United States, European
Union, and Japan—diversifying away
from China, India too has a potential route
to escape an emerging Chinese sphere of
influence. By hedging and balancing, and
working in coalitions with other countries
also facing such dilemmas—including
in Europe—India could carve out an
important niche for itself as a shaper
of the multilateralism that upholds the
liberal order.vii
Third, while India today seems to be
laying emphasis on pragmatism rather
than ideology, it would do well to tap into
some of the core values that it stands
for: Democracy, pluralism, rule of law,
and freedom of speech. Values matter
60 61
PROFESSOR AMRITA NARLIKAR
is President of the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Honorary Fellow of Darwin College (University of Cambridge), and Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Observer Researcher Foundation.
drive aims for), while still preserving
and deepening economic integration
with reliable allies. Between aggressive
globalisation and market closure, India
will have to find its “uvarna madhyam”
(golden mean) that will be based on
strategic economic diversification within
a small group of like-minded countries.
Internationally, too, an India rising
on sustainable economic growth—in
cooperation with others who share
its values of democracy, pluralism,
liberalism and more—will have more
bargaining clout and persuasive power
than an inward-looking India caught up in
domestic political upheavals and slowing
growth rates. After all, a strengthened
and reformed multilateralism will need to
have strong roots in the domestic politics
of the countries that seek to uphold it.
Endnotes
i Amrita Narlikar, " Poverty Narratives and Power Paradoxes in International Trade Negotiations and Beyond," Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/international-relations-and-international-organisations/poverty-narratives-and-power-paradoxes-international-trade-negotiations-and-beyond?format=PB.@GIGA_Institute
ii Amrita Narlikar, " The malaise of multilateralism and how to manage it," Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-malaise-of-multilateralism-and-how-to-manage-it/
iii Henry Farrell, Abraham L. Newman; "Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion. International Security 2019; 44 (1): 42–79." doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351
iv Amrita Narlikar, "A Grand Bargain to Revive the WTO", CIGI, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/grand-bargain-revive-wto/.
v Samir Saran, "#Covid19: Dr WHO gets prescription wrong", Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/covid19-dr-who-gets-prescription-wrong-63708/.
vi Narlikar, A. India’s foreign economic policy under Modi: negotiations and narratives in the WTO and beyond. Int Polit (2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00275-z
vii Amrita Narlikar, "Reflections on the EU-India Summit: Some small steps towards breaking a pattern of unrequited love?", Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/some-small-steps-towards-breaking-a-pattern-of-unrequited-love/
62 63
INDIA AND THE POST-PANDEMIC GEOPOLITICS
C. RAJA MOHAN
The rise of China and its
expansionism, the reassertion
of Russia, the reordering of
US global priorities, and the
breakdown of the post-Cold War global
political and economic order have
opened up unprecedented challenges
and opportunities for India. If Delhi’s
deepening conflict with Beijing underlines
the new challenges, the growing
intensity of India’s strategic cooperation
symbolises the new opportunities.
Further, India’s emergence as a power
of some consequence has improved New
Delhi’s ability to take advantage of new
possibilities and limit some of the negative
fallout. India’s success now depends
on how quickly it can restructure its
traditional worldview.
As the COVID-19 pandemic persists two
years after it enveloped the world, the pre-
existing strategic trends in international
politics have accelerated. The pandemic
has not only increased the awareness
of the dangers of overdependence on
China for manufactured goods, including
pharmaceutical drugs and medical
equipment, but also triggered political
calls for greater resilience in the supply
chains. Moreover, China’s growing
influence in multilateral institutions
such as the World Health Organisation
has been brought into clear focus. The
US trade disputes with China have led
to a new recognition in Washington
that America needs to strengthen its
domestic industrial and technological
capabilities.
The US pushback against China in the
security domain, which began well
before the pandemic, has now acquired a
sharper edge. The Biden Administration in
Washington has fully embraced the Trump
Administration’s initiatives in the Indo-
Pacific and reinforced the Quadrilateral
Forum (that brings together Australia,
India, Japan and the United States).
Biden took a step forward in unveiling
the AUKUS–a new military partnership
between Australia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. It involves the
transfer of nuclear-powered submarines
to Canberra by Washington and London
as well as trilateral cooperation on
emerging strategic technologies like
cyber and artificial intelligence.
Meanwhile, there has been no resolution
of the military crisis between India and
China triggered by Beijing’s aggression in
the Ladakh region in the spring of 2020.
The military friction between India and
64 65
China in the high Himalayas boiled over
into a deadly clash between the troops of
the nations in June 2020—the first in many
decades. Despite continuous engagement
at the military, diplomatic and political
levels, Delhi has been unable to persuade
Beijing to vacate the aggression and
restore the territorial status quo ante in
Ladakh. As it comes to terms with Chinese
hostility and unwillingness to abide
by the terms of bilateral engagement
negotiated earlier, Delhi had no option but
to reassess its China policy and adapt to
the new geopolitical dynamic triggered by
Beijing’s rise.
In the immediate post-colonial period, India
tended to reject the notion of geopolitics
and its emphasis on the enduring primacy
of power and its distribution in shaping
international relations. India’s unique
brand in world affairs was defined by
universalist notions such as “One World,”
and calls for co-existence amongst rival
blocs in the Cold War, peaceful resolution
of disputes, opposition to alliances,
anti-imperialist solidarity with the post-
colonial world, and campaigns against
apartheid and for nuclear abolition.
However, it was never easy to sustain this
ambitious framework amidst the pulls
and pressures of the real world. Within
the neighbourhood, New Delhi sought
to preserve the subcontinental sphere
India's success India's success now depends now depends on how fast it on how fast it can restructure can restructure its traditional its traditional worldview”worldview”
““
Overarching this tension was something
far more consequential: India’s relative
economic decline and, with it, the strategic
salience, as it turned inward and limited its
commercial engagement with the world.
Finally, the change of domestic economic
orientation in the 1990s reversed India’s
relative decline. As high growth rates
since the turn of the 21st century put India
on the path to becoming the third-largest
economy, New Delhi began to rethink the
nature of the post-Cold War world and its
own place in it.
India’s self-perception as a champion of
abstract norms and universal principles
began to change in favour of a more
realistic appreciation of power and its
role in shaping the global order. To cope
with the unipolar moment in the 1990s,
India joined Russia and China to promote a
multipolar world, even as it opened up to a
rapprochement with the US. Eventually, as
China’s rise began to seriously constrain
India’s regional and global advance in the
21st century, New Delhi moved closer
to Washington. The persistent border
crisis on the China frontier helped Delhi
overcome the enduring hesitations on a
strategic embrace with Washington.
As it intensifies its security partnership
with Washington, Delhi is also
complementing the US partnership by
of influence inherited from the Raj. The
1962 war with China shook the idealism
of the 1950s, and Jawaharlal Nehru
turned to the US for military assistance.
As shifting great power relations shaped
India’s regional security environment,
Nehru’s successor, Indira Gandhi,
turned to Soviet Russia to balance the
Sino–US entente. For India, it remained
a persistent struggle to reconcile its
declared idealism and the foreign policy
practice that demanded compromise and
realpolitik.
66 67
C RAJA MOHAN
is Director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.
trying to build a coalition of middle powers
that could limit the turbulence generated
by the rivalry amongst the US, China and
Russia. This is particularly important
in light of the uncertain trajectory of
domestic politics in the US and the
potential surprises in China. India has
begun to devote greater energies to the
development of strategic partnerships
with middle powers such as France in
Europe and Japan in Asia.
The collaboration amongst the middle
powers of special importance comes at
a time when the US is rethinking the role
of its alliances in Europe, the Middle East
and Asia. While President Donald Trump
castigated US allies for being “free riders”,
Joe Biden has underlined the importance
of alliances in restoring US leadership
in the world. But Biden is also looking
beyond alliances to like-minded partners
to take on greater responsibilities for
regional security. Biden is also shifting
focus from the prolonged interventions in
the Middle East to coping with the China
challenge in the Indo-Pacific. In the east,
America wants its allies to contribute
more to regional security.
While many of the US treaty allies are
dismayed by a potential American resizing
of its post-war global commitments,
India is in a position to approach this in
a positive framework. The readjustment
of the US security role in Europe and
Asia provides an opportunity for India to
take on more responsibility in terms of
security in its neighbourhood and beyond.
This would require that India transcends
its traditional temptations to act alone
and find ways to work with other powers
on regional and international security,
through bilateral, plurilateral and
multilateral mechanisms.
As a major beneficiary of economic
globalisation, India must actively
prevent a breakdown of the international
economic order, now strained by the
tensions between the world’s two largest
economies—the US and China—as
well the disruptions triggered by new
technologies and the impact of climate
change. Instead of responding to the
new global economic challenges within
the old North–South perspective, New
Delhi must contribute to the construction
and maintenance of a new consensus
amongst the major economic actors
for sustainable global growth and fair
distribution of benefits and costs. The
post-pandemic world has seen India’s
political engagement with emerging ideas
on cooperation amongst democratic
states, on building resilient supply chains,
and strengthening ad-hoc security
coalitions such as the Quad (involving
India, US, Australia, and Japan).
As India responds to new global
opportunities, the constraints on the
country are more internal than external.
Without a more rapid and higher-quality
growth, India’s international performance
will remain underwhelming. Equally
important is the need to maintain internal
coherence. The vast diversity at home has
long complicated India’s nation-building
challenge. In this regard, internal political
divisions will not only reduce New Delhi’s
ability to benefit from global possibilities,
but also invite external meddling in its
domestic politics.
68 69
CHARTING A FUTURE FOR INDIA–US RELATIONS IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER
JANE HOLL LUTE
How should one view India’s
emerging role in the
international system and its
growing contributions to the
vitality and stability of the global world
order? What issues and challenges
confront India’s growing international
profile, and what opportunities might
it exploit as it continues to evolve as a
significant global player? The strategic
state of relations between India and the
United States (US) provides a useful lens
for considering these questions.
The Contours of the India–US Relationship
Despite India’s undeniable regional and
global importance to American interests,
for decades, the US was unwilling to
consider key areas for deepening bilateral
and regional cooperation, largely due to
India has long India has long understood China's understood China's principal strategic principal strategic aim to replace the aim to replace the US as the most US as the most consequential consequential security power in security power in Asia”Asia”
““
India’s possession of nuclear weapons.
In the early 2000s, however, Washington
began to view an active and constructive
relationship with India as essential to
making progress in a range of issues.
The US’ global war on terror, for example,
aligned with India’s efforts to combat its
own organised terrorism threats; it gave
both countries a practical platform for
increased cooperation in intelligence, law
enforcement and military relations. In
recent years, cybersecurity cooperation
has steadily increased between the two
nations. Moreover, the US has realised
that enhanced cooperation with India is
essential to counter a rising China, which
is already well-underway in exercising its
considerable economic and political clout
regionally and beyond.
For its part, India has long understood
China’s principal strategic aim to replace
the US as the most consequential security
power in Asia and, more importantly, to
challenge the prevailing international
global order underwritten by the US. At
the same time, India understands the
continuing and strong regional and global
position of the US as crucial to curbing
Beijing’s strategic aspirations. As Robert
D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis have
written in the October 2019 edition of
Foreign Affairs:
70 71
“Where China was concerned,
U.S. and Indian national interests
intersected. Washington sought to
maintain stability in Asia through
an order based not on Chinese
supremacy but on security and
autonomy for all states in the region.
India, driven by its own fears of
Chinese domination, supported
Washington’s vision over Beijing’s.”
Over the past two decades, the India–
US relationship has expanded in almost
every conceivable dimension—political,
diplomatic, economic and military—albeit
not as allies but as fellow travellers on
parallel journeys. One might fairly say
the India–US relationship in the 21st
century has been characterised by a
pragmatic realism that recognises the
major points of divergence and, at times,
open friction that remain ever-present.
However, in 2020, two major factors have
accounted for the current heightened
cooperation between India and the US:
i) the global COVID-19 pandemic, and ii)
China’s moves, both its domestic actions
on the COVID-19 pandemic and in Hong
Kong and what appears to be increasingly
provocative regional behaviour.
India’s Role in the International System
Observers of India have long anticipated
the country’s growing importance on
the world stage. The country is rightly
touted as the world’s largest democracy:
Massively populous, immensely resource-
rich, fiercely proud, and unquestionably
successful in continuing to advance the
circumstances of its more than 1.3 billion
citizens. Its tradition of independence
on global issues has served it well over
the decades since the Cold War. India
occupies a prominent place in the vital
issues facing the world community
today: Climate change; sustainable
development; closing inequality gaps;
and the challenges to a robust global
economy to support, educate, employ, and
elevate the growing global population.
Internationally, India has served as a
perennial force in the United Nations and
in other international fora. It has skilfully
navigated the often-fraught waters of
the US–Russia relationship, negotiated
countless developing world challenges,
and emerged as a major voice wrestling
with the paradoxical promise and peril
of the cyber age. All this, even as it
continues to deal with its preoccupations
with Pakistan and China on issues closer
to home.
Internally, India’s challenges remain
not only immense but also, at times,
obstructive to its designs to assert a
more powerful international profile.
Its democratic processes have been
bedevilled by significant sectarian
animosities, and its institutions of
governance remain chronically weak in
the face of their heavy political, economic
and social responsibilities. Moreover,
India has to contend with persistent rural
poverty and an increasingly educated
and mobile urban population churning
out over a million new workers looking
for work into the economy every month.
These challenges, along with countless
others, hinder India’s ability to assert
confidence in the kind of role it wants and
deserves to play internationally.
In many respects, India’s challenges
mirror those that all strong players
eventually face: Whether to accept fully
the responsibilities that vast power and
potential entail. These responsibilities
demand making hard choices at home
as well as abroad. Indeed, every
government today is facing the challenge
to take into account accelerating social
expectations, fuelled by widespread
access to information and connectivity
that empowers people everywhere.
Nowhere is this reality truer than in India.
To move forward, India must confront
its approach to international leadership,
which has traditionally been more
passive than assertive, more reactive
than active. Here, India’s greatest
resource is its people. In today’s world
where, statistically, people are healthier,
wealthier, more educated, more mobile,
and more politically active than at any
point in human history, India stands on
an equal footing with any country that
aspires to leadership.
The US’ position as world leader
notwithstanding, it is unmistakable that
the challenges facing today’s world are
such that no country can do all that needs
doing, and all that needs doing cannot be
done alone. The unprecedented global
contagion that is the COVID-19 pandemic
serves as Exhibit A. Wither the India–US
relationship? The US has always valued a
capable partner. It is time for India to step
up, with purpose and pride, to take up its
share of the leader’s mantel.
JANE HOLL LUTE
is the President and CEO of SICPA North America.
72 73
THE INDIA–NATO COUNCIL AND A TRI-POLAR WORLD
DR. SOLOMON PASSY AND DR. ANGEL APOSTOLOV
A COVID-19 Postscript
This paper outlines the strategic need
for a qualitatively new type of large-
scale cooperation between India and the
West. It was drafted and submitted for
publication well before the onslaught of
COVID-19. However, the report and its
findings have only become more relevant
in light of the pandemic and related
developments. In the meantime, the EU–
India Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap
to 2025 stipulated that the European
Union (EU) and India will cooperate in the
EU–India Joint Working Group to facilitate
trade and the removal of obstacles related
to sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
measures and technical barriers to trade
(TBT); continue the regulatory dialogue
on pharmaceuticals and medical devices,
notably via the established EU–India Joint
Working Group on pharmaceuticals,
biotechnology and medical devices;
and work together on health security
India–West India–West cohesion is vital for cohesion is vital for global democracy global democracy with the NATO–with the NATO–India Council filling India Council filling a strategic gap”a strategic gap”
““
and pandemic-crisis preparedness
and response, linked specifically to the
COVID-19 outbreak. This is further proof
that India–West cohesion is vital for
global democracy with the NATO–India
Council filling a strategic gap.
Following the fall of the Berlin Wall
30 years ago, it was expected
that the world would shift from
being bi-polar to becoming
unipolar. However, current geopolitical
realities suggest that, for the most part,
the world remains divided into two poles,
albeit with relatively less rigidity: The
Western pole anchored in Washington-
Brussels and around the NATO/EU; and
the Eastern pole around Moscow–Beijing,
which is increasingly being structured
via the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China
and South Africa) and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
In this context, the question is: Quo Vadis,
India?1 Bearing in mind both India’s
heritage as a founder of the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) and its ambitions to join
the P5—the Permanent UNSC members—
India needs innovative solutions. The
Modi government, in its second term,
1 Literally, “Where are you marching, India?”
74 75
seems to have the imagination, capacity
and the opportunity to do so. India is a
founding member of the BRICS as well as
a member of the SCO since 2017, which
goes beyond its non-aligned tradition. The
continuing development of India’s space
and nuclear programmes is testimony to
the country’s progress towards becoming
a great power in a sensitive part of the
world. Moreover, India is now officially
recognised as a “nuclear power.”
Being the world’s largest democracy,
India can aim to become a player
proportional to its size by positioning
itself as the “Third Geo-Pole”. To that end,
India must engage in regular and visible
dialogue with the NATO, the second
biggest democratic entity in the world.
An important first step towards this
would be to formalise the India–NATO
Council (INC) as a discussion forum, to
brainstorm for a bilateral agenda and a
better future for humanity. The INC must
be grounded on logic and reason, not just
opportunities for both sides. India and
all NATO members together account for
one-third of the world’s total population.
The two share common values and the
interest to protect them. At the same
time, they have shared concerns vis-à-vis
security and economic challenges, as well
as competitors and threats. Other areas
of cooperation include the environment
(including the North and South Poles),
energy (including nuclear), space, cyber
space and 5G.
When the Atlantic Club first launched the
idea of creating the INC 10 years ago,
it was a non-starter. However, recent
developments in New Delhi, Brussels and
Washington suggest that this has changed
in both India and the West, signalling a
window of opportunity. Joining together
will mean the democratic world will
have utilised the united potential of more
than two billion people and a significant
portion of the world’s landmass including
industrial capabilities and resources.
Establishing the INC will help improve
India’s ties with the three NATO members
of the P5. With the other two—Russia and
China—India already has ties through
the BRICS. Thus, India could play a unique
role by instituting separate security
arrangements with each P5 member. This
will de facto transform India into the Third
Geo-Pole, which will strengthen its case
for permanent membership to the UN
Security Council. NATO, for its part, will
gain new credibility and political strength
amongst the formidable group of India
supporters in the UN and the former NAM.
The establishment of AUKUS in 2021 is yet
another compelling proof of the need for
cooperation between global democracies
in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Indian
membership in the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue (QUAD) may serve as a foothold
for Delhi to eventually join AUKUS.
Where does the EU feature in this
equation? Currently, the US reportedly
has more military exercises with India
than with many of its NATO allies. In
February 2020, US President Donald
Trump announced US$3 billion worth
of sales of US military equipment to
India. Thus, India–US security ties are
progressing well outside of the context of
NATO. Consequently, the ones that really
need NATO for security engagements with
India are the European Allies and the EU.
Therefore, the successful establishment
of the INC requires the commitment of the
EU leadership vis-à-vis NATO.
Indeed, the INC should be launched in a
holistic way, with no confrontation with
Pakistan or China or any other party
with whom the West needs a different
communication line. Neither India nor
the West could have a stronger and more
reliable partner than each other. A world
with three poles, two of which are like-
minded democracies, will be a substantial
improvement on the current bi-polar one.
DR. SOLOMON PASSY
is Bulgarian Foreign Minister (2001–05) and founding president of the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria.
DR. ANGEL APOSTOLOV
has a PhD in modern history and specializes in NATO-Russia relations and Europe-Asia geopolitics.
76 77
INDIA, THE EU AND THE FUTURE OF MULTILATERALISM
STEVEN BLOCKMANS
Amongst the major poles
of today’s unravelling
international order, there
is one relationship that is
underperforming: That between India and
Europe. Stronger India–Europe bonds
will not only serve mutual interests, but
also allow Delhi and Brussels to combine
efforts in tackling global challenges,
such as climate change, digitalisation,
and the malfunctioning of international
organisations.
There are various reasons for the
previously lethargic state of bilateral
relations. Since 1945, Europe has been
preoccupied with itself. By widening
and deepening the integration process,
Stronger India–Stronger India–Europe bonds Europe bonds will not only serve will not only serve mutual interests, mutual interests, but also allow but also allow Delhi and Brussels Delhi and Brussels to combine efforts to combine efforts in tackling global in tackling global challenges”challenges”
““
the European Union (EU) has stabilised
the continent. Tethered to the United
States (US), the transatlantic relationship
has grown into the most tightly woven
socioeconomic fabric between any two
continents. With foreign affairs and
security policy defined along national
lines, Europe looks at the rest of the
world mostly through the prism of this
strategic alliance. The EU has exported
its own diplomatic model of rules-based
multilateralism to both member states
and other nations, mostly in the field
of trade. However, it has found it more
difficult to develop such relations with
states that are fiercely sovereigntist.
A subcontinent unto itself, India, too, has
historically been consumed by domestic
matters. Its traditional approach to
Europe has been through its relations
with individual countries rather than
through the EU. However, India is now
changing this posture, having realised
that the European collective is its
largest trade and investment partner,
a key technological associate, and an
increasingly important balancing actor
in the Indian Ocean and the wider Middle
East.
As a result of the forces of global
reordering, there has been some
improvement in the environment for more
forthright and institutionalised security
conversations (particularly in the
maritime realm) and renewed bilateral
78 79
trade negotiations that go beyond
slashing sectoral tariffs. It is in these
fields that India and the EU delivered on
the expectation to breathe new life into
their partnership at their virtual summit
on 15 July 2020.
While Europe does entertain concerns
about the hard Hindu-nationalist line of
the second Modi government, the human
rights dialogue that the parties agreed
to reconvene will likely be drowned
out in the increasingly pragmatic
stance the EU has adopted to navigate
the changing geopolitical landscape.
Ironically, increased nationalism and
realism may help renew multilateralism,
since it is easier to negotiate between
actors with clearly identified positions.
A smaller EU must go beyond fraying
alliances and forge new coalitions,
seeking convergences with countries
that have different historical trajectories.
As an emerging power in a multipolar
world, India too requires more—not
less—multilateralism to secure a stable
environment and sustain growth.
Exacerbating the situation are two
factors: That the United Nations is far
less credible now than it has ever been
in the 75 plus years since its conception,
and that major powers have turned their
backs on the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) and other international
organisations. The proliferation of
exceptionalism is hollowing out the rules-
based international order. While some of
the challenges that the world is facing
are new or more acute than before,
the fundamentals of human behaviour
remain the same: Greed, fear and the
lust for power. If states let go of the
multilateral system instead of upgrading
it, they risk creating a world in which
the weak will suffer at the hands of the
strong. Multilateralism as a tool must be
reformed, and there is work to be done by
India and the EU.
The EU is on the front foot in designing
global rules in new fields. It has initiated a
global debate on rules to protect personal
data; is aiming to set a global precedent
for ethical, human-centric standards for
the use of artificial intelligence; and is very
active in the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development to renew
its take on taxation in a digital world.
Along with the US and Japan, the EU has
agreed to new standards on industrial
subsidies, in the hope of renewal within
the WTO and binding China. Together with
India, the world’s largest democracy,
Europe can explore similar plurilateral
arrangements to generate global
opportunities in connectivity and new
technologies.
Many of the problems that the world
currently faces remain the same: From
counterterrorism to maritime security;
from state fragility to migration; from
environmental degradation to public
health. India and the EU must explore new
avenues for greater political and security
cooperation to protect the world’s public
goods. In an era dominated by heightening
Sino–US rivalry, there is a greater need
for global burden-sharing between like-
minded middle powers. India’s seat in
the UN Security Council in 2021–22 and
its Presidency of the G20 in 2022-2023
provide opportunities to move a joint
vision into common action.
PROF. STEVEN BLOCKMANS
is Director of CEPS (Brussels)
80 81
INDIA’S ROLE IN THE EMERGING DYNAMICS OF THE INDO-PACIFIC
PREMESHA SAHA
The growing importance of the
Indian and Pacific oceans have
given new momentum to the
“Indo-Pacific” as a geostrategic
construct. The Indo-Pacific region will
shape the trajectory of global politics
for most of the 21st century. This is the
region where Great Power competition
(primarily between the United States (US)
and China) is playing out. The region is
also home to some of the world’s largest
economies. Given China’s questionable
policies and expansionist tendencies that
are impeding the interests of nearly all in
the Indo-Pacific region, and with all major
powers like the US, Australia, Japan,
United Kingdom (UK), and the European
Union (EU) making the Indo-Pacific the
pivot of their foreign, defence and security
policies, the growing significance of
this region is clear. The Indo-Pacific will
very much be the fulcrum around which
countries will re-orient and re-align their
policies.
The India–Pacific The India–Pacific region will shape region will shape the trajectory of the trajectory of global politics for global politics for most of the 21st most of the 21st century”century”
““
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
unveiled the Free and Open Indo-Pacific
(FOIP) concept in mid-2016 in Nairobi.
Similarly, the US has picked up on the
FOIP terminology and even renamed the
US Pacific Command as the Indo-Pacific
Command. Other countries in the region,
including Australia, India, Indonesia
and even the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), UK, Germany,
Netherlands and now the EU have also
adopted some variations of the Indo-
Pacific terminology in their foreign policy
postures.
India has been active in championing
a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The US,
Australia and the members of the ASEAN
have all expressed a common view
that India should play a greater role in
the region. For its part, India regards
the Indo-Pacific as a geographic and
strategic expanse, with the 10 ASEAN
countries connecting the two great
oceans. “Inclusiveness, openness, and
ASEAN centrality and unity” lie at the heart
of India’s conception of the Indo-Pacific.
For India, the geography of the Indo-
Pacific stretches from the eastern coast
of Africa to Oceania (from the shores of
Africa to those of the Americas), which
also includes the Pacific Island countries.
India has been an active participant in
mechanisms such as the Indian Ocean Rim
Association (IORA), the East Asia Summit,
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus,
ASEAN Regional Forum, the Bay of Bengal
82 83
Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical
and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC),
and Mekong Ganga Economic Corridor,
in addition to convening the Indian Ocean
Naval Symposium. Through the Forum for
India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC),
India is moving towards engaging with
the Pacific Island countries.
India’s trade in this region is growing
rapidly, with overseas investments
being directed towards the East, e.g., the
Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreements with Japan, South Korea,
and Singapore, and the Free Trade
Agreements with ASEAN and Thailand.
India’s approach to the region is
exemplified by its evolving “Act East Policy,”
comprising economic engagement with
Southeast Asia and strategic cooperation
beyond that to East Asia (Japan, Republic
of Korea), Australia, New Zealand, as well
as the Pacific Island countries.
India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region
as a strategy or as a club of limited
members. Security in the region must be
maintained through dialogue, a common
rules-based order, freedom of navigation,
unimpeded commerce, and settlement of
disputes in accordance with international
law. India’s view is to work with other
like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific
region to cooperatively manage a rules-
based multipolar regional order and
prevent any single power from dominating
the region or its waterways. For instance,
while India has always emphasised the
need to ensure freedom of navigation and
overflight in the South China Sea (SCS),
a more vocal stand is now being taken,
whereby the SCS has been declared
as “the global commons,” wherein, all
disputes should be settled in accordance
with international law and “the interests
of no third party should be impinged”.
These are subtle messages directed at
Beijing. India supports a rules-based,
balanced and stable trade environment
in the Indo-Pacific region. Sustainable
connectivity initiatives promoting mutual
benefit should be continually fostered. In
this regard, India has been an important
stakeholder in the New Development Bank
and the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank. It envisions a central role for
multilateral organisations, such as the
ASEAN, in managing regional affairs in
the Indo-Pacific.
Engaging with its partners in the Indo-
Pacific region has become a necessity
for India, given the current difficult phase
in the Sino-India relationship, especially
after the 2020 Galwan Valley clash. India
now believes in issue-based partnerships;
this explains India’s embracing of the
several minilateral platforms like India-
Australia-Japan, India-US-Japan, India-
Australia-Indonesia, amongst others,
which have mushroomed in the Indo-
Pacific. Faced with an increasingly
84 85
powerful and aggressive China, countries
such as Australia, Japan, and the US, as
well as the ASEAN, are rethinking and
remapping their China policies. India,
along with its Quad partners, is upping
its game in the Indo-Pacific. After the
September 2019 Foreign Ministers
meeting, the Quad has taken off in a
significant way. It is no longer merely
a talking shop or just another popular
plurilateral platform. In July 2020, the
Indian Navy conducted joint naval drills
with the US Navy in the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands, sending out a clear
message to China. India and Australia
have signed the Mutual Logistics Sharing
Agreement in June 2020. With Japan, too,
India signed the Mutual Logistics Sharing
Agreement in September 2020. India
and the US finalised the long-pending
Basic Exchange Cooperation Agreement
(BECA) in October 2020. India, Australia
and Japan have unveiled a supply chain
resilience initiative in April 2021, with the
aim of countering China’s dominance and
with a view to eventually attaining a strong,
sustainable, balanced and inclusive
growth in the Indo-Pacific. Further,
Australia participated in the November
2020 Malabar exercises alongside India,
Japan and the US. India finally came on
board with this proposition largely to
showcase its commitment to work with
like-minded partner countries in the
Indo-Pacific, and to also demonstrate
that India will not shy away from taking
tougher decisions and a harder stance
DR. PREMESHA SAHA
is an Associate Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation’s (ORF) Strategic Studies Programme.
if the need arises. This added a military
quotient to the Quad, marking the first
time since 2007 that all four countries
participated in a joint military drill. As
the Quad starts to leverage its hard
power, and as India’s relations with China
deteriorate, New Delhi is likely to reshape
its Indo-Pacific strategy alongside its
partners. Moreover, given the challenges
that the world is grappling with due to
the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, it is
only logical for India to work with the
countries of the Indo-Pacific to build
alternate supply chains to reduce its
economic dependence on China, to boost
its own health infrastructure and R&D,
and to draw lessons from their response.
The Indo-Pacific division in the Ministry
of External Affairs (MEA) was set up as a
natural corollary to this vision. Since the
term “Indo-Pacific” has gained currency
and major regional actors such as the
US, Japan and Australia are articulating
their regional visions (in addition to
including this term in their official policy
statements), it has become imperative for
India to operationalise its Indo-Pacific
policy. This MEA wing provides a strategic
coherence to the Prime Minister’s Indo-
Pacific vision by integrating the IORA,
the ASEAN region, and the Quad with the
Indo-Pacific dynamic.
It is important that the new MEA division
moves beyond security and political issues
to articulate a more comprehensive
policy towards the region. Commerce and
connectivity must be prioritised if India is
to take advantage of a new opening for
its regional engagement. While India has
consistently emphasised “inclusiveness”
in the Indo-Pacific framework, it will be
challenging to strike a balance between
the interests of all stakeholders. While the
primary proponents of the Indo-Pacific
agree on the values that should be upheld
in this region, the approach and policies
(Indo-Pacific visions or strategies) vary.
For instance, India’s vision is starkly
different from the US’. In recent years,
India seems to have shed its past caution
of standing up to China. However, as
geopolitical tensions rise between China
and the US, India needs to carefully
design its Indo-Pacific architecture
while keeping its long-term strategic and
economic interests in mind.
86 87
INDIA, KENYA AND THE AFRO-ASIAN CENTURY
KWAME OWINO
Scholars of international
relations attempt to craft
future scenarios in global
affairs; for instance, making
projections about which countries and
regions might gain dominance in the
medium and long term. Now that the
world appears to have come full circle,
and some parts of the developing world
are catching up with higher-income
countries, analysts are looking to Asia
and Africa as the regions on which future
global growth will be hinged. The idea
behind the so-called “Afro-Asian Century”
is that Africa’s economic performance
in the recent years, coupled with Asia’s
success in making its mark on the world,
will be amongst the most significant
political and economic changes in the 21st
century.
Indeed, there is a great opportunity for
economic growth for certain countries in
the African continent. Together with the
force of large economies in Asia, the two
regions combined will hold considerable
The promise of The promise of the "Afro–Asian the "Afro–Asian century" is real”century" is real”““
economic clout. At the same time,
however, the population growth rate in
most South Asian and African countries
are well above replacement levels, while
in Europe, it will stagnate and possibly
decline in many countries with higher
incomes. This is where India and Kenya
enter the frame.
Two Sources of Uncertainty
While the promise of the “Afro-Asian
century” is real, it will be tempered by
two factors. The first is economic growth.
Only select countries in Africa will be
able to maintain moderate to high levels
of economic growth for at least one
generation, which is key to becoming a
significant player in the global economy
in addition to achieving mass prosperity.
A substantial number, however, may not.
If this happens, the outcome will not be
an “Afro-Asian century” for the countries
that do not have sufficient economic or
political weight. This risk is very real.
It has become increasingly clear that the
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic will be
widespread and has disrupted growth in
many African countries for the last two
years. In its assessment, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) considers the year
2020 to be distinguished for the fact that
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
experienced economic contraction for the
first time in 30 years.i In addition to the
challenge of sustaining growth rates and
shrinking poverty is that of ensuring quick
88 89
recovery from the enduring effects of
lower growth rates. The poorest citizens
of many countries in SSA will experience
a regression in the gains from poverty
reduction, and the welfare of many more
will be adversely affected in the long run.
The combined effect of this is that many
countries will suffer structural damage
to the economy, which will be difficult to
reverse.
The second factor is population
growth. The challenge comes from a
complicated but convenient claim that
African population growth rates will
carry forward for at least a generation
and, thereby, lead to a convergence in
population sizes between Africa and Asia.
This assumption involves an extrapolation
of the comparatively high fertility rates
in some countries within Africa. These
analyses posit that since most SSA
countries will be far more populous in
the coming years, by extension, African
populations and workers will dominate
world numbers. However, this argument
is flawed. While many SSA countries have
yet to undergo a demographic transition,
the rising literacy rates and modest but
real economic growth render the fear of
an “overbreeding” continent unfounded.
Fertility rates in Africa are likely to fall
more sharply going forward, much faster
than the straight-line extrapolations
suggest.
Meanwhile, the large sizes of Asia’s major
economies ensure that the region will
have an expanded role in the 21st century.
The drivers will include the economic size
of Japan, its challenges notwithstanding;
and the economic and demographic sizes
of India and China. Thus, Africa is faced
with the challenge of making itself count
in the 21st century. In all likelihood, it will
be a mixed picture, with a few superstars;
many middle-level countries; and a small
number of countries trapped in conflict,
poor governance and an inability to
initiate and maintain necessary economic
reform.
Kenya and India
Kenya and India have longstanding ties
through the monsoon trade across the
India Ocean. This relationship precedes
the former’s colonisation by several
centuries. Further, the construction of
the railway across the Kenyan territory
creates a more visible cultural presence
of South Asians in the country. Linked to
this is the fact that the British construction
of the railway used South Asian labour,
and after they became independent,
Kenya and India acquired memberships
into the British Commonwealth. Thus, the
opportunities for diplomatic leverage and
the inheritance of a common bureaucratic
ethos provide a solid historical platform
for the two nations to work together in the
new century.
By virtue of its massive population and
growing economy, it is evident that India
will be a major geopolitical player in
the 21st century. What must be keenly
examined is whether its economic
structure will change substantially to
make it a significant competitor against
China, a country that has a huge export
and infrastructure footprint in Kenya as
well as the rest of the African continent.
According to the Observatory of Economic
Complexity, Kenya and India are ranked
103 and 16 of 222 countries, respectively,
in terms of export earnings in 2018. This
alone demonstrates that India’s place in
global trade participation, measured in
export value, is impressive, while Kenya
is constrained by the size of its economy
and incomplete reform.
Kenya has ambitions to serve as a
bellwether of growth in the East African
Region and in the southwest of the Indian
Ocean Region (IOR). There is a clear
convergence of interests and opportunity
for developing maritime commerce by
ensuring the safety of trade routes, the
readiness of ports, and a commitment
to rules-based international commerce.
Through the Lamu Port, Ethiopia, South
Sudan Transport Corridor (LAPPSET)
project, Kenya leads Ethiopia and
South Sudan in building the largest
infrastructure project in the Eastern
African seaboard, linking a port,
highways, railway line, pipeline, new
cities and airports. These countries
estimate correctly that the significance of
the Indian Ocean as an avenue for global
commerce will rise in the future, and this
location will become invaluable. Further,
East African nations should welcome
India’s commitment to preventing any
nation from establishing hegemonic
control over the IOR.
Finally, there are commercial links for
airlines based in East Africa and the
Middle Eastern region that link cities in
Kenya and India. At the same time, Kenya
is enthusiastic about inter-African trade
at regional and continental levels with the
East African Community and the African
Continental Free Trade Area. Already,
China has shown interest in the African
Union, which is leading the quest for
continental convergence. Perhaps, it is
time for India to show similar interest.
KWAME OWINO
is Chief Executive Officer of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA-Kenya), a think tank on economic policy and public affairs based in Nairobi, Kenya
i IMF Communications Department, “Sub-Saharan Africa: A Cautious Reopening,” 29 June 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/06/27/pr20249-sub-saharan-africa-a-cautious-reopening.
Endnotes
90 91
RISING INDIA 2021: A NOTE FROM A TROPICAL BRICS MEMBER
RENATO G. FLÔRES JR.
Indian civilisation and culture may be
the only ones in Asia—and likely in
the whole world—that can balance
the equally ancient and powerful
Chinese traditions. With its massive size
in many socio-economic dimensions,
India is essential to the world geopolitical
scenario. Equally important is its identity
as a diverse and pluralistic, functioning
democracy—qualities that place it at the
forefront of game-changing nations.
The visibility that a rising India is
experiencing—owning partly to the annual
growth of at least five percent for nearly
40 years—brings new domestic demands
and tough challenges to the country’s
human capital. There is much to be done in
building basic infrastructure, improving
social indicators and bridging inequality,
especially for India’s increasingly young
population. If the country succeeds in
achieving economic prosperity while
In the post-In the post-COVID-19 world, COVID-19 world, relevant middle relevant middle powers with fine powers with fine neogiating skills neogiating skills and a co-operative and a co-operative attitude will stand attitude will stand out”out”
““
maintaining its historically tolerant and
multiple nature, the world—developing
countries in particular—will certainly
have an inspiring model to emulate.
Many opportunities lie ahead. India
is well-suited for fully embracing the
digital economy, leapfrogging classical
stages in the manufacturing and
even services sectors. The country’s
conciliatory approach to disputes and its
strategic autonomy policies are crucial
in an increasingly fragmented world
of non-global governance. India can
aim to become an efficient and reliable
international trouble-shooter, credible
across continents.
Such an encompassing attitude is key
in situations like those at the World
Trade Organisation (WTO), for instance,
where stubborn positions taken by key
powers have left the institution in a
serious stalemate. India’s outstanding
track record in Geneva vis-à-vis its
savvy diplomats—similar to those of
another BRICS member, Brazil—will be
instrumental in finding a solution that,
in principle, must also be supported by
China. Without India’s involvement, in a
global alliance or key common purpose
groups to restructure the WTO, failure
is to be expected. The same applies to
the recently contested World Health
Organisation.
92 93
At the same time, India must rethink its
health and trade policies. The fragile
structure of its rural population, with
complex relations with the agricultural
sector and certain industrial practices,
already makes both endeavours a difficult
task. The geographical imbalances and
the contrasting and competing Chinese
exporting machine further exacerbate
the problems.
India’s immersion in the trade network
of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) along with Japan and
South Korea demands a shift in policy,
something evident in its refusal to
participate in the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP), involving
ASEAN itself, Japan, South Korea, China,
Australia and New Zealand. While India’s
motives are understandable, it must
shed its protectionist views and adopt a
wiser trade strategy. This goes beyond
the “non-reciprocal trade liberalisation
policy” towards a few small neighbours
or attempts to profit from the present
economic tensions between the US and
China.
A great India must also find stable
solutions to the challenges brought about
by its relationships with neighbours
such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. This
“neighbourhood deficit,” adding clay feet
to the subcontinent giant, must cease;
more diplomatic skills and stronger
political will, combined with large doses
of patience are required for sure.
If India acts as it can and deserves in
the international scene, its projection in
Iberian America, along with the clever
inroads it has been making in Africa
and Eurasia, will match the normal
care dispensed to the US and European
partners. Iberian America may seem
strategically meaningless, since it lies
outside of India’s sphere of influence, but
the people of the region yearn for strong
foreign partners besides those in the
traditional Atlantic rule-making axis and
the Chinese alternative.
In the post-COVID-19 world, relevant
middle powers with fine negotiating skills
and a co-operative attitude will stand out.
The numerous roles that India is able to
play in this scenario will aggravate latent
dangers, stretching to perilous limits the
number and capabilities of its human
capital, as well as exposing prevailing
domestic shortcomings.
Finally, no great power can subsist
without joy: The joy of being what it is,
of believing in its worldview. Think of
the flourishing mid-1950s to mid-1960s
United States, with Hollywood musicals
framing with colour, song and dance the
glory of the consolidated superpower.
India, despite its manifold problems, is
a land of colourful festivals and joyous
celebrations. If Bollywood is a factory of
illusions, it also shows the strength and
creativity of a nation that may lead without
causing fear or sadness, always aware of
a lighter and many times brighter side of
life—naïve at the surface, perhaps, but
deeply engaging and constructive.
RENATO G. FLÔRES JR.
is Director, FGV IIU—International Intelligence Unit, Professor FGV EPGE—Graduate School of Economics, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
94 95
INDIA, COVID-19 AND THE GLOBAL HEALTH AGENDA
KHOR SWEE KHENG AND K. SRINATH REDDY
In the third year of the COVID-19
pandemic, India must assume a
greater leadership role in the global
health agenda. This will befit India’s
status as the world’s seventh-largest
economyi and projections that India
will overtake China as the world’s most
populous nation as early as 2027.ii
Any future Indian leadership role must
build on the past, as India has been
underwriting global health security for
several decades even before COVID-19.
We share four examples. Firstly, India
produces considerable human capital
for health, such as 78,000 new doctors
annuallyiii. While most of them stay to
practice in India, a considerable number
leave to work abroad. Indeed, Indians
are the second most common nationality
in the United Kingdom National Health
Serviceiv, and the American Association
of Physicians of Indian Originv counts
80,000 members of Indian origin working
importantly, India supplies half of the
global demand for vaccines, which are
public health’s “best buy”viii. The Indian
manufacturing machine is playing an
important role in producing COVID-19
vaccine doses for hundreds of millions
of people, notably through the Serum
Institute of India and Bharat Biotech. It is
likely that Pfizer and Merck’s agreements
with the Medicines Patent Pool for
COVID-19 anti-viral pills (signed in
November 2021) will include many Indian
manufacturers as well.ix
Thirdly, health diplomacy is an emerging
Indian foreign policy tool. Before
COVID-19, India committed at least
US$100 million to bilateral health
projects in South Asia, Southeast Asia
and Africa. Such projects, especially
amongst Indian neighbours such as
Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Nepal,
serves both humanitarian and nation-
in the United States. Many of them are
in the frontlines of the battle against
COVID-19.
Secondly, India exports US$22 billion
worth of medicines annuallyvi, ensuring
affordable healthcare for millions of
people across the world. Indian products
account for 30 percent of the volume and
10 percent of the value of the US$100-
billion generics market in the United
States—the world’s largest.vii More
India has been India has been underwriting underwriting global health global health security for several security for several decades even before decades even before COVID-19”COVID-19”
““
96 97
building purposes.x During COVID-19,
India relied on health diplomacy to
strengthen their presence and soft
power in Africa, through donations or
technical assistance.xi During a prolonged
pandemic, such health diplomacy also
serves to protect the health security of
India and the world.
And finally, India provides healthcare for
1.3 billion people at home, safeguarding the
human security of an entire subcontinent.
Improvements in population health,
air pollution, gender empowerment
and primary care are crucial to allow
health to become a determinant—and
not just a consequence—of India’s
economic growth. Moreover, the world’s
success in achieving the UN Sustainable
Development Goals amidst a pandemic
depends heavily on India’s ability to
scale its policies and programmes for
its billion-plus citizens. These examples
demonstrate the crucial role that India
plays in global health today.
Expanding India’s Leadership Role in
Global Health
To take on a greater role in the global
health arena, however, India must
address its own issues, primary among
which is the chronic under-investment
in health. Currently, the country spends
a mere 3.3% of its GDP on healthcarexii,
significantly lower than the global
average of 10 percent.xiii, xiv Annually, 108
million Indians are pushed into poverty
due to out-of-pocket health expenditure,
which is three times higher than the world
average.xv This is possibly worsened by
the economic, social and health impact
of COVID-19, although data is still being
collected.
All this is entirely preventable. Healthcare
is a political subject, and providing
universal health coverage not only
protects all citizens against diseases, but
also increases the population’s resilience
against COVID-19 and other possible
pandemics. Therefore, India must spend
more on health by mobilising additional
resources from health-financing reform,
which includes a reasonable mix of general
taxation and social health insurance. This
will improve population health, ensure
societal equity and solidarity, accelerate
India’s growth (partially through new job
creation), and increase state legitimacy
through competent public services.
Second, India must strengthen primary
care delivery, instead of investing in
expensive hospital-based secondary or
tertiary care. Since the country is still
largely rural, an appropriately sized
network of rural primary care clinics must
be built, staffed, financed and maintained.
India’s highly qualified health service and
the vibrant tech/IT industry must find
synergies to re-imagine how primary
care can be delivered to all Indians. Such
re-imagination must consider the use
of digital health, screening, testing and
monitoring during home isolation in the
age of COVID-19, all led by primary care.
The result will be better health for one-
fifth of humanity as well as the opportunity
for India to export best practices, such as
primary care integration with hospitals
or electronic health records. In the same
way Cuba exports doctors for diplomacy,
dollars and soft power, India can export
healthcare management and digital
health, potentially to markets such as the
African continent or in populous Brazil or
Indonesia.xvi
Third, India’s pharmaceutical
manufacturing machine must move
higher up the value chain, alongside the
“Make in India” ethos. This can fit the
tectonic changes caused by COVID-19,
not necessarily only through the patented
original research route. Manufacturing
capacity must be increased to create
economies of scale and further reduce
prices. Additionally, factories must be
flexible enough to quickly re-tool, to
provide surge manufacturing capacity
for crisis situations, e.g., to manufacture
vaccines for new variants or seasonal
variations. That India is crucial to the
world is evident in the fact that the US FDA
has an India Office, and in 2019, India’s
pharmaceutical companies received
fewer quality warnings than American
ones.xvii, xviii This commitment to quality is
crucial for any expansion of India’s role
in global health, especially when moving
into the biosimilar market (higher-end
generics projected to be US$27 billion in
2024), transferring technology to other
emerging markets, or helping Big Pharma
through contract manufacturing.xix, xx
However, caution must be exercised:
A global systemically important role
for India’s pharmaceuticals means
operational fail-safes, diversified supply
chains, and geographically dispersed
factories become important.
Finally, India’s leadership in global
health can also be measured through
its contributions to reforms in the
international patent system. While
intellectual property rights (IPRs) and
competition are desirable public goods,
they can lead to destructive zero-sum
games, affecting lives, eroding public
health, and channelling capital away from
poor to rich countries in a neo-colonial
fashion.xxi COVID-19 presents a unique
opportunity for such new rules to be
anchored by Indian political, diplomatic
and technical leadership. India must take
a leadership role in rewriting some of
the rules of the global IPR regime, given
its experience, expertise and economic
exposure. Innovation, competition and
hard work should always be rewarded,
98 99
DR KHOR SWEE KHENG
is Associate Fellow in Chatham House and Senior Visiting Fellow in the United Nations University International Institute for Global Health.
PROF. DR K. SRINATH REDDY
is the President of the Public Health Foundation of India.
but in ways that are fair and sustainable
for the rest of the world. Strengthening
the global IPR regime will help global
public health and individual human
beings, while also laying the foundation
for science in other slower-moving
species-level global health threats, such
as climate change or anti-microbial
resistance. India, along with South Africa,
has sponsored a proposal for waiver of
patent rights for COVID-related vaccines,
drugs and technologies, to the World
Trade Organisation (WTO). While the
proposal is still being debated at WTO,
this demonstrates India’s commitment to
the promotion of global health equity.
India has global ambitions, and these
come with global health duties both
amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and in its
aftermath. India must match its duties to
its ambitions as a global superpower, and
the world is relying on India to rise to the
occasion.
Endnotes
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ii Hannah Ritchie, “India will soon overtake China to become the most populous country in the world,” Our World in Data, 16 April 2019, https://ourworldindata.org/india-will-soon-overtake-china-to-become-the-most-populous-country-in-the-world, accessed 20 Nov 2021.
iii “List of Colleges Teaching MBBS,” https://www.mciindia.org/CMS/information-desk/for-students-to-study-in-india/list-of-college-teaching-mbbs, accessed 20 Nov 2021.
iv Carl Baker, “NHS staff from overseas: statistics,” House of Commons Library, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7783/, accessed 21 Nov 2021..
v American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin, https://www.aapiusa.org/, accessed 21 Nov 2021.
vi C.R. Sukumar, “Indian pharma exports to touch $22 billion this fiscal, Q1 exports stand at $5 billion,” The Economic Times, 13 September 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/healthcare/biotech/pharmaceuticals/indian-pharma-exports-may-touch-22-billion-in-fy-20-pharmexcil/articleshow/71111944.cms?from=mdr, accessed 21 Nov 2021.
vii Indian Pharmaceuticals Industry Report, June 2020, https://www.ibef.org/industry/pharmaceutical-india.aspx, accessed 21 Nov 2021
viii “New data confirms immunisation as a best buy in public health,” Gavi: The Vaccine Alliance, 9 February 2016, https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/new-data-confirms-immunisation-best-buy-public-health, accessed 21 Nov 2021..
xi Medicines Patent Pool, https://medicinespatentpool.org/news-publications-post/pfizer-and-the-medicines-patent-pool-mpp-sign-licensing-agreement-for-covid-19-oral-antiviral-treatment-candidate-to-expand-access-in-low-and-middle-income-countries/, accessed 20 Nov 2021
x “Shifting Paradigm: How the BRICS are Reshaping Global Health and Development,” Global Health Strategies initiatives, http://nhsrcindia.org/sites/default/files/How%20BRICS%20are%20Reshaping%20Global%20Health%20%20Development%20-%20Report.pdf, accessed 21 Nov 2021.
xi Mol R, Singh B, Chattu VK, Kaur J, Singh B. India’s Health Diplomacy as a Soft Power Tool towards Africa: Humanitarian and Geopolitical Analysis. Journal of Asian and African Studies. September 2021. doi:10.1177/00219096211039539
xii K Srinath Reddy & Sarit Kumar Rout. National Health Accounts 2017-18: Faster movement towards a distant goal. https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/national-health-accounts-2017-18-faster-movement-towards-a-distant-goal/2379452/, accessed 13 Jan 2022.
xiii “States and Union Territories,” Know India, https://knowindia.gov.in/states-uts/, accessed 21 Nov 2021
xiv “Out-of-pocket expenditure,” The World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.OOPC.CH.ZS, accessed 21 Nov 2021.
xv Kaushalendra Kumar, Ashish Singh, Santosh Kumar, Faujdar Ram, Abhishek Singh, Usha Ram, Joel Negin and Paul R. Kowal, “Socio-Economic Differentials in Impoverishment Effects of Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure in China and India: Evidence from WHO SAGE,” PLOS One 10, no. 9 (13 August 2015)
xvi Bill Frist, “Cuba's Most Valuable Export: Its Healthcare Expertise,” Forbes, 8 June 2015, https://www.forbes.com/sites/billfrist/2015/06/08/cubas-most-valuable-export-its-healthcare-expertise/#77121699195e, accessed 21 Nov 2021.
xvii “India Office,” US Food and Drug Administration, 3 August 2020, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/office-global-operations/india-office, accessed 21 Nov 2021
xviii Rupali Mukherjee, “US pharma companies get more FDA ‘warnings’ than Indian firm,” Hindustan Times, 20 January 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/us-pharma-cos-get-more-fda-warnings-than-indian-firms/articleshow/73397856.cms, accessed 21 Nov 2021.
xix Ying Chen, Jennifer Dikan, Jennifer Heller and Jorge Santos da Silva, “Five things to know about biosimilars right now,” 17 July 2018, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/five-things-to-know-about-biosimilars-right-now, accessed 21 Nov 2021.
xx Prescient & Strategic Intelligence, “Biosimilars Market Size to Reach $26.7 Billion by 2024: P&S Intelligence,” 15 April 2019, https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/04/15/1803693/0/en/Biosimilars-Market-Size-to-Reach-26-7-Billion-by-2024-P-S-Intelligence.html, accessed 21 Nov 2021.
xxi Keith Aoki, “Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-so-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 6, no. 1 (Fall 1998).