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THE STATE AND ETHNO-RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN
NIGERIA: A STUDY OF KADUNA STATE FROM (1999-
2012)
BY
IBRAHIM AHMED OLATUNJISMS/09/POL/00831
A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENTOF POLITICAL SCIENCE, FACULTY OF SOCIAL AN
MANAGEMENT SCIENCES (SMS), BAYERO UNIVERSITY,KANO,
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FORTHE AWARD OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCES (B.SC.HONS)
DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE.
MAY, 2014.
DECLARATION
I declared that this research project is an
independent research work carried out by me and all
the materials used with references to this work as
been duly acknowledged.
Ibrahim Ahmed
Olatunji
ii
APPROVAL PAGE
This project titled the State and Ethno-
religious violence in Nigeria, A study of Kaduna
State from (1999 – 2012) has been read and approved
as meeting the requirement of the faculty of social
and management sciences (SMS), Bayero University,
Kano for the award of B.Sc. in Political Science.
________________________ …………………….Mallama Hafsat. Y. YakasaiDateProject Supervisor
________________________ …………………….Dr.Aisha Abdul-Ismail DateHead of Department
_________________________ …………………….
iii
Mallama Hafsat. Y. YakasaiDateLevel Co-ordinator
_________________________ …………………….External Examiner Date
iv
DEDICATION
I dedicated this research work to Almighty
Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful.
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Alhamdulillah Robilalamin .It is imperative to
appreciate the conscious and sub-conscious efforts
of those who wittingly and unwittingly contributed
to the completion of this work.
My profound gratitude goes to Almighty God for
His mercies, life, opportunities, strength and
wisdom since birth and during the period of this
programmed and for the inspiration my Muslim faith
has blessed me with. May His infinite name be
exalted forever
I am highly indebted to my erudite, versatile
and picky supervisor, Mrs.Hafsat .Y.Yakasai for
her scholarly supervision and guidance. The quality
of this work is indeed attributable to her
constructive criticism and masterly advice. Suffice
vi
it to mention that in the course of my interaction
with her during this study, I was brought to the
real nitty-gritty of research study and also it was
those painstaking efforts of her that has made this
research work not be marred by too many mistakes.
May God bless and elevate her to a higher pedestal.
I also acknowledge our Head of Department in
person of Dr. Aishat Abdul Ismail for her
professional and motherly advice towards our
success for the past four years.
I appreciate and acknowledge the prodigious
influence of my parents in the pursuit of my
intellectual drive, an influence that has brought
and sustain me this far, their indefatigable
contributions to my academic sustain forever.
vii
My unalloyed gratitude also goes to the family
of my sponsor for their conscientious role in the
course of my programmed in person of Alhaji.Abdul-
Ganiyu Alate’s family and the rest of my family,
May God reward them more abundantly. Jazaakummulahu
Khairan
I also acknowledge the lecturers at the
department of political science, Bayero University,
Kano. For their instructions and teachings these
past four years.
Also to be acknowledge are my brothers,
sisters, siblings and nephew and the rest of my
family members for their moral and financial
supports, support that remain immeasurable in the
context of this work
viii
This acknowledgement would be incomplete
without expressing my sincere and profound
appreciation to all my friends both at home and in
school.
It is instructive, however, that I use this
medium to unequivocally thank the family of Hafeez
Adegoke, Oluwole Lasisi, Saheed. I.Adeyemi,Taibu
Monsuru and the long list which cannot contain
here. It will be an unpardonable oversight should I
fail to commend these family for their influence in
completion of this work. May God bless and reward
you all.
In submission and most importantly too, I hold
my fiancée, Khadijat Omobolanle Yusuph in high
esteem for giving me the emotional and
psychological boost, a boost that added color to
ix
the work. I am thankful and remain committed to
her.
Finally, a piece of work of this nature cannot
be completely free from errors. I therefore take
full responsibility for any in this research work.
IBRAHIM AHMED OLATUNJI
x
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page
i
Declaration
ii
Approval Page
iii
Dedication
iv
Acknowledgement v
Table of Contents
viii
Abstract
x
CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION
xi
1.1 Background of the Study
1
1.2. Statement of Research Problem
6
1.3 Research Objectives
8
1.4 Significance of the Study
8
1.5 Scope and Limitation of the Research
9
1.6 Research Methodology
10
1.7 Definition of the key Concept
10
1.8 Outlines of Chapters
11
xii
CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE/
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.0 Introduction
12
2.1 Theoretical Framework
12
2.2 Ethno-Religious Violence in Nigeria: A Review
19
CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
3.1 History of Kaduna State
37
3.2 Background to Sharia in Kaduna
45
3.3 The visible causes of Religious Violence in
Nigeria 49
CHAPTER FOUR
xiv
4.1 State Ineffectiveness in the Management
of Ethno-Religious Violence
69
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATION
5.1 Summary 83
5.2 Conclusion
85
5.3 Recommendations
87
Bibliography 94
xv
ABSTRACT The literature on ethno-religious violence in Nigeria largely
implicates social-economic, political and governance deficits as themajor causes of such violence. The thrust of this paper therefore, is toundertaken an analytical inquiry into the immediate and visiblefactors that trigger religious conflicts in the country. It also evaluatesthe nature of state management of ethno-religious conflict and positsthat government haphazard approach to these conflicts as well asthe absence of long-term strategy for its management account fortheir persistent manifestation. Drawing from the findings made,recommendations on the appropriate approach to curbing ethno-religious violence in the country are proffered.
Keywords: State, Ethno-religious violence and Nigeria
xvi
CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
Religion could serve and has indeed served as
an instrument of social harmony in many
civilizations. Paradoxically, however, it has also
served as a motivation for violence, hence its
indication in some literature as a “double edge
sword” (Maregere 2011: 17-23; Obasi 2009, cited in,
Sampson 2012:104) from the time immemorial,
religious bigots have attempted to legitimize
violence in the name of God. Contemporarily act of
extreme violence such as terrorist attacks are
often justified as “holy warfare”. In the past two
decades, religious has been at the centre of most
violent conflict around the world, thereby gaining
1
notoriety as one of the prime security challenges
confronting the world in the wake of the cold war
(Juergensmeyer, 2000:6; Abu-Nimer 2000, cited in,
Sampson 2012). Nigeria since independence has
remained a multi-ethnic nation state with over 400
ethnic groups (Chidi, 2005; Salawa; 2010),
belonging to several religious sects has been
trying to cope with the problem of ethnicity on the
one hand and the problem of ethno religious
conflict on the other. In Nigeria, it is
interesting to note that ethnicity and religious
bigotry has become a fulcrum of violence forms of
nationalism ranging from bitter war of words,
cultural autonomy and religious superiority to
demand for local political autonomy and self-
determination. All these sometimes leads to some
2
forms of contextual discrimination of members of
one ethnic or religious group against another on
the basis of differentiated systems of socio-
cultural symbols and religion. Therefore, in a
multi-ethnic and religiously diverse society like
Nigeria, with some - forms of contextual
discrimination, relationship between people may be
characterized by lack of cordiality and mutual
suspicion of fear. This mutual suspicion and lack
of cordiality among the various ethnic components
explain why ethno-religious conflicts have become
permanent feature of Nigeria as a nation as far
back as 1960’s to date. The Nigeria states have
been characterized by various upheavals and vices
from ethnic to religious violence, corruption and
injustice, accusation and allegations of neglect,
3
oppression, domination, exploitation,
victimization, discrimination, marginalization,
nepotism, bigotry and so on. All these also have
some historical antecedent. This is because many
governmental actions during the colonial rule and
after independence encourage to a large extents,
the sowing of seeds of ethno-religious violence
that are found to be rampant in the Nigerian nation
today. As noticed by Ikejiani Clark (2005), over
the years, many events in Nigeria have led to the
politicization of mistrust, intolerance, violence
and acrimonious relations between the mainly Muslim
North and the Christian South of Nigeria. To this
extent, Ikejiani Clark contended that there has
been an unfortunate insertion of ethno-religious
discrimination and incompatibility in the
4
structures of the Nigerian state since the colonial
period. In 1931 for instance, the colonial
administration under the leadership of Governor
Donald Cameroon did not encourage intermingling of
religions. The governor advised the Christian
mission to thread softly in Muslim core areas,
pushing them instead into the Sabon Gari (Strangers
quarters) so as to maintain the stability of
indirect rule. The political events of the June 15,
1966 coup and the July 1966 counter-coup further
entrenched ethno-religious configuration in
Nigeria.
This is because proper considerations were not
taken as colonial administration before merging
people of different ethnic and religious groups
into one entity. This was done because it made
5
control easier. Although some disagree on
qualifying Nigeria as a single entity but an
amalgam of two distinct and antagonistic entities
with different background, aspirations and
interest. The problems escalated during the call
for self-determination as the nationalist elites
rather than seeks to correct the ills created by
the colonial government, were more concerned about
attaining political office and consolidating
themselves in power. Therefore, the trends and
patterns laid out by the colonial administration
became the status quo for regulating the function
of the state. Religion and its volatile nature
which were the central focus of this research is
one of the recognized factors that can enhance or
destabilize the security of any nation at any given
6
period. It is generally believed that religious
value system play a very important role in
collective self-awareness and identity which brings
together individuals, families and regions and pull
them towards great self-consciousness needed to
build a nation from within (Williams, 1996).
Nigeria, a country with a population of over
150 million inhabitants is been considered one of
the most religious countries in the world. While it
is generally believed that ethnic identification is
presumed to be the almost salient and consistent
source of social identity in Nigeria. (Lewis,
2007).
This common assumption is challenged by a
researched by the pew-Religious forum which
revealed that religion, rather than ethnicity is
7
the most salient identity in the country. By virtue
of its complex web of politically salient
identities and history of chronic and seemingly
intractable conflicts and instability, Nigeria can
be rightly described as one of the most deeply
divided states in Africa (Osaghae and Suberu,
2005). The country is essentially heterogeneous
society within the two monotheistic religion,
Christianity and Islam enjoying the loyalty of most
Nigerians. It is this unique religious divide that
prompted Archbishop Onaiyekan to describe the
country as “the greatest Islam-Christian nation in
the world” by which he meant that Nigeria is the
largest country in the world with an evenly split
population of Muslims and Christians and “really
8
the test of the clash of civilization” (Paden,
2007.)
Religion has always been important in Nigeria
and in Nigerian politics (Enwerem, 1995; cited in,
Okpanachi 2010.) “The intensity of religious
identity in Nigeria is regarded as one of the
highest in the world” (Paden, 2008). This claim is
supported by the fact that Nigerians are more
likely to define themselves in terms of religion
than any other identity.
A study conducted in Spain has found that
societies that are divided along religious lines
are more prone to intense and prolonged conflict
than those divided by political, territorial and
ethnic differences (ReynalQuerol 2002). Perhaps,
this reality explains the prime position that
9
religious violence occupies on Nigeria’s security
pyramid. Although often marginalized traditional
religion has a fair of degree of followership and
is not by any means isolated from religious
violence for instance, in part of Kogi, Kwara and
Nassarawa State, Masquerade activities associated
with traditional religion have been a major sources
of conflicts (Osagha and Suberu 2005:11).
The attitude of ethno-religion violence has
deepened suspicion among the Nigerian populace,
thus, creating cracks in the effort of the
government towards sustainable development. Kaduna
state as a composite unit of Nigeria has almost
remained under the siege of ethno-religious crisis.
Just as in other parts of the country, the sheer
frequency of this conflict in the state is a cause
10
for concern, A concern which actually informed this
study.
1.2. STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM
Peace is an integral to national building and
sustainable development. Absence of peace in any
society breeds instability akin to “a state of
nature”. This necessitates effective management of
conflict by putting proper mechanisms in order to
forestall further deterioration of societal order.
Any keen observer of the Nigerian political scene
would clearly see that since the nascent democracy
in 1999, the Nigerian state has been characterized
by all sought of political crisis predominantly of
which is religious violence.
The phenomenal reoccurrence of ethno-religious
conflict in Kaduna State as evidenced in the recent
11
time has left more to be desired. Perennial loss of
lives and properties, dominance of social upheaval
in the state collapse of commercial and industrial
activities, etc. all combine to precipitate a
climate of fear uncertainty and underdevelopment in
the state. Kaduna state has two broad cultural and
religious blocs, the political system is expected
to cope with and control violence in whatever form
it may arise, and thus the state inability to
effectively curb and curtail ethno-religious
violence should not be overlooked or taken lightly.
It is against this backdrop that the study
addressed the following questions;
1. Why were ethno-religious conflict rampant in
Kaduna State in the
Period under study?
12
2. What is the socio-political economic and
governance factor that cause vio1ence?
3. What role, if any, did the non-governmental
organization play in the management of
aforementioned violence?
13
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The focus of this study rest on the following
objectives;
i. To examine the underlying socio-political,
economic and governance factors that brings about
ethno religious violence.
ii. To examine the present lapses in the Nigerian
state that give rise to violence and how it can
improve and appropriate strategies for managing
religious violence.
iii. To suggest ways in which incidence of
ethno-religious violence can be reduced to
ensure peace and security in the state.
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
What this research intends to do basically is
to highlight on the probable factors and causes of
14
ethno-religious violence in the country within
special focus on the forth republic, it would as
much as possible provide a deep insight on the
structures of the state that allows for the
mismanagement of its affairs. It would shed light
on the reasons for dissatisfaction among different
groups that has led to many crisis which the state
as witnessed since independence, also how relevant
other institutions unwillingly spark of religious
grievances and sentiment while carrying out their
activities. The paper would provide insights on how
certain inactions of the state has created the
platform for religious violence to occur. Finally,
it will proffer solutions that would be very useful
in managing religious differences and violence
15
which if carefully observed can ensure peaceful
coexistence among the different religious groups.
1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH
The research is limited to Kaduna State ethno-
religious crisis from 1999 – 2012 pointing out the
various incidents, locations and the causes.
However, an analysis of the frequency of these
conflicts must necessarily incorporate historical
antecedents. This is in agreement with the
postulation of (Ekong, 2002: 95). All our past
proclaims our future… if we of today would
understand where we are at present, we must begin
by examining the heritage of our past”.
The research took a historical tour of past
ethno-religious conflict in Kaduna from 1986 — 2012
in order to have insight of the nature of the
16
conflicts. Most importantly, it would make more
inquiry in the immediate and visible factors that
have triggered ethno religious violence in the
country. And also, the researcher will look into
the state ineffectiveness in the management of
ethno-religious violence as in Nigeria.
17
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The study is based on data derived from
secondary sources. The research work being
historical, descriptive and analytical in nature
requires such a methodology. In this regards, much
of the data were sourced from books, journals,
magazines, newspaper, published and unpublished
materials, seminar and conference papers presented
on different fora, Internet source was also used,
data were also obtained from library of Bayero
University, Kano. Which help to gain understanding
of the issues there in subjected to questioning?
1.7 DEFINITION OF THE KEY CONCEPT
State: State is characterized by political
apparatuses, distinct from both ruler and ruled
)with supreme jurisdiction over a democratic
territorial arena, backed by a claim to
18
monopoly of coercive power and enjoying or
minimum level of support or loyalty from their
citizen (Epelle, 20 10:7).
Ethno Religious Violence: Ethno-religious
violence means a situation which the
relationship between members of one ethnic or
religious group and another of such group in a
multiethnic and multi- religious society is
characterized by lack of cordiality, mutual
suspicion and fear, and a tendency towards
violence confrontation.
Nigeria: Nigeria, officially the Federal
Republic of Nigeria is a federal constitutional
republic comprising 36 states and its federal
capital territory, Abuja. The country is
located in West Africa and shares borders with
the Republic Of Benin in the west, Chad and
Cameroon in the East and Niger in the North.
19
Its coast in the South lies on the gulf of
Guinea on the Atlantic Ocean. There are over
500 ethnic groups in Nigeria of which the tree
largest ethnic groups are the Hausa, Igbo and
Yoruba.
1.8 OUTLINES OF CHAPTERS
The first chapter which gives the background of
the research, statement of the research problem,
research objectives, significance of the study,
scope and limitation of the research, research
methodology, definition of key concept and chapter
outline.
Chapter Two, focuses on literature review and
theoretical framework. Chapter three will be based
on proper analysis of the historical precedence of
the existing problem of ethno-religious violence,
the visible causes of the violence, pattern of
settlement along religious line and timeline of
20
some cases of religious violence. Chapter four will
look into state ineffectiveness in the management
of ethno-religious violence. Finally, the fifth
chapter will contain the summary, recommendation,
conclusion and bibliography.
21
CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE/THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.0 INTRODUCTION
The study of this nature necessarily embodies
reviews of relevant literature, this section
therefore attempt to review some scholarly work on
ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria by different
authors, attempt was made to confine the analysis
of the work within the framework of pluralist
theory.
2.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The analysis in social science oriented. Thus,
in a chapter like this, it is pertinent to use a
theory whose framework analysis will be made. For
this purpose, The PLURALIST theoretical perception
is adopted to guide the analysis.
22
According to Haralambos and Heald (1980:144),
pluralism is all about the idea that in society,
“power is dispersed among a variety of groups”.
They further explained that as society grows,
diverse groups spring up expressing varied opinion
on social issues. This phenomenon does call for
interest aggregation and the fostering of it at
societal level bringing into focus representation
by organized groups. This representation is
enhanced through the elite who act on behalf of the
diverse groups. In order to ensure fair
representation, power is shared and diffused
amongst the elite who represent the group, which is
why Haralambos and Heald equate pluralism to elite
pluralism because the conduct of societal revolves
around the elite class.
23
In explaining the work of pluralism,
harallambos and Heald use the studies conducted by
Dahl and Rose who showed how political parties and
interest groups in the U.S.A. rely on the elite in
carrying out their activities, for instance through
political parties, the masses on the one hand
influence state policies and interest groups on the
other hand, exert great pressure on government
institutions.
The modern state functions in a pluralistic
way, thus, from a pluralist perspective, political
parties and interest groups are cornerstone of
democracy. They are the means by which
representative government is possible in large
complex tell societies. Through these
organizations, a multiple of interests are
24
articulated and mobilized to participate in the
running of society. Politics is a process of
competition and bargaining and government is a
process of mediation and compromise. Power is
dispersed among a variety of groups and as a
result, all major interest in society are able to
have some say in the conduct of affairs.
(Haralambos and heald, 1980).
Haralambos and Heald limited their analysis
around the elites and the downtrodden and
maintained silence on the religious and ethnic
diversity inherent in the society. Religion and
ethnic differentiation were however incorporated
into the discourse of pluralism by Dahl, Mouw and
Griffione, Ilesanmi etc. Robert Dahl (1971)
conceived pluralism in terms of a political system
25
in which the social restructuring can lead to the
evolution of different socio-political formation.
They characterizes these formations has hegemonies
that could either be inclusive or closed. These are
the conditions that guarantees competitive
political regime. Therefore, in such a regime,
according to him; systems of bargaining and
negotiation grew up within parallel to, or in
opposition to hierarchical arrangement; and these
systems help to foster a political subculture with
norms that legitimate negotiation, bargaining,
logrolling, give and take the gaining of consent as
against unilateral power or coercion (Dahl,
1971:77).
Dahl’s theoretical postulate, explains the
tenet of pluralism in that it presents the
26
existence of a political system in which diversity
prevails, a setting in which there is a plethora of
exclusive groups and ideas co-existing alongside
other.
This gives way to the formation of what he
terms as a sub-culture that becomes a social norm.
Dahl further maintained that every society is
characterized by the existence of multiple and
competing groups. All these groups exercise
different “cup of power” and that is critical areas
of decision making any of the group can ensure that
its political preferences and wishes are adopted if
they are sufficiently determined. The argument of
the pluralist tradition is not so much that power
is evenly distributed among groups in the society
but that power is unequally and widely distributed
27
in the society. Power is therefore fragmented and
diffused in the society. According to this
tradition also, as various groups compete amongst
themselves, the state is to serve as reference or a
neutral arbiter in the competition so as to
preserve the pluralist tradition of the society.
Dahl identified polyandry as sublet in the
pluralist discourse. He affirmed that polyandry is
a democratic order in which power disperses not
only between the government, individuals and group
on the one hand, but in which also, there is wide
but unevenly distributed power amongst the
different segments of the population.
He traced the following as fundamental
characteristics of polyandry;
28
1.There must be a freedom of thought which
include freedom of religion
2.Consensus and dissension: There must be broad
base consultation in the same vein, people are
free to dissent.
3.Free open and competitive participation in
politics.
4.There is peaceful management of conflict.
According to Mouw and Griffione (1993),
pluralism can be equated with diversity. The
implication is that in a pluralist society,
differentiations in terms of race, language and
religion define the state of affairs. Thus, issues
like power, resources and social amenities and so
on are shared in recognition to these differences
that exist in the said society. The guiding
principle in a pluralist society is the acceptance
29
by the variegated groups to live together in an
arrangement that ensures power sharing amongst
them. In short, according to Kariel (1968:164),
pluralism refers to specific institutional
arrangement for distributing and sharing government
power to the doctrinal defense of these
arrangements, and to an approach for gaining
understanding of political behavior. This implies
that institutionally, the diversities are
recognized. Hence an arrangement is made for power
sharing. Ilesanmi (in Khalid 2004) is of the
opinion that pluralism is used in three different
perspectives, namely; the sociological, political
and normative. The sociological usage implies the
way a society is constituted i.e. in terms of race,
religion, ethnics, and gender and class identities.
On the other hand, political pluralism is said to
30
be concerned with political power i.e. sharing
power amongst the sub-units that make up the
holistic political entity. Lastly, pluralism is
normatively used to imply the fact that no matter
the level of uniqueness that exists in society,
individuals and groups do differ in some respects.
Looking at the above theory, its suitability to
this discourse become apparent. This is because
taking the Nigerian state in general and Kaduna
state in particular, their composition depicted the
tenet of pluralist theory. A look at Kaduna state
will unveil divergence in terms of multiplicity of
ethnic groups, religions, languages and cultures.
The frequency of social upheaval in the state can
then be explained on the best of the fact that
Kaduna state is pluralistic in nature which in the
first place presents the problem of diversity and
31
competition and secondly, the incapacity of the
government to provide the means for power sharing
and ensuring equity amongst the constituent unit is
also a fact.
It is in the above context that the theory can
be used as guided and tool for analysis in this
research.
PLURALISM – CRITIQUE
A large body of evidence from studies such as
those of Dahl, in the US, and Hewitt and Grand and
Marsh in British, appears to support the classical
pluralist position. However, there are a number of
serious criticisms of pluralism. These criticisms
are concerned both with the methods pluralist used
to measure power and with empirical evidence which
seems t contradict their claim that powers is
dispersed in western democracies. Marxists and
32
other conflicts theories have suggested that
pluralists ignore some aspects of power. In
particular, it is argued that they concentrate
exclusively on the first face of power, decision
making.
John Urry (in Urry and Wakeford, 1973), for
example, believes that pluralist ignored the
possibility that some have the power to prevent
certain issues from reaching the point of decision.
As a result of this non-decision making, only safe
decisions may be taken-decisions which do not
fundamentally alter the basic structures of
capitalist societies.
From this point of view, it is in the interest
of the powerful to allow a variety of interest
groups to influence safe decisions. This faster the
33
illusion of real participation and helps to create
the myth that a society is democratic. It disguises
the real basis of power and so protects the
powerful.
Pluralists can also be criticized for ignoring
what Steven Lukes (1974, 2006) has identified as
the third face of power. They do not take account
of the possibility that thee preferences expressed
in opinion polls or by pressure groups might
themselves have been manipulated by those with real
power – for example, those who control institution
such as the media and the education system which
can play a part in shaping individual’s attitude
and opinions.
2.2 ETHNO-RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA: A REVIEW
34
Uka (2005) argued that all that characterized
the fall of the first republic gives credence to
the fact that the political behavior of Nigeria is
still greatly influenced by the hyperbolic
assumption that one’s political destined is
intrinsically and exclusively linked with one’s
ethnic linguistic, and to some extent religious
identity.
Similarly, Dlakwa cited in Uka (2005) posits
that it was as a result of mutual suspicion between
the North and South that the civil war (1967 –
1970) was precipitated in Nigeria. The breach of
peace caused by both ethnic and religious crisis
has been so great that political alignment and the
formation of political parties have been
characterized by the ganging-up of ethnic
35
champions. Uka’s view has a number of limitations,
when he laid credence to ethnic and religious
affinity as responsible for the fall of the first
republic and the crisis that brewed therefore. He
failed to acknowledge the seed of discord planted
by the British colonial masters who partitioned
Nigeria unevenly and the unholy marriage symbolized
in the 1914 amalgamation of the country which has
been Nigeria fundamental problem. Shawulu (in
Okpanachi 2010), attributes ethnic and religious
crisis in Nigeria to colonialism. According to him,
the advent of colonialism which saw to the varied
experiences of the different communities
contributed in nurturing a spirit of conflict in
them. He added further: “The nature of the
disengagement of Europeans from Nigeria itself
36
introduced new factors. All these have combined to
create conditions of the inevitability of
conflicts” (2002:3). He went on to enumerate
sources of conflicts in Nigeria to include
militarism, distortion of democracy, weakness of
civil society groups, security inadequacies and so
on. According to Okene (2005:824), several factors
can explain causes of ethnic-religious conflicts in
the Nigeria’s recent democracy experience. One of
such causes in the nature of the British colonial
rule in the Nigeria regions. The British played
either one ethnic or religious groups against the
other. However, in spite of the oversight, Uka;s
view on political-alignment and the formation of
political parities along ethnic cleavages was
strongly supported by Humphrey Nwosu, the then
37
chairman of the National Electrical Commission,
when he argued that the aborted third republic in
1993 was attributed to ethnic championship. As he
put it; our party system, from inception in the
late 1940s and early 1950, reflected the injection
of ethnicity into our political system. In due
course, the major political parties and minor
one’s become vehicle for the representation,
protection and aggregation of ethnic interest “Our
political leaders, by and large, exploited ethnic
ties and symbols to promote their selfish interest
and to consolidate themselves in power in their
regional enclaves”. Cited in Omojuwa, (2005:25).
Though, this was hitherto the case but at present,
one must acknowledge the trend of political
alignment and configuration which is no longer
38
recognition to ethnic or religious affiliation but
on the patter of personal interest. For instance,
the configuration of People Democratic Party (PDP)
cut across ethnic and the same applies to all
Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) and the rest others.
Ali (2002) discusses the twin issues of ethno-
religious conflict and democracy in Nigeria
touching on the most recent in the 1990s, which
included the Aguleri, Shagamu, Ife-Modakeke, Zango-
Kataf, Odi, Ode-Itesekiri, Itesekiri-Ilaje and so
on. He treats their effects on society particularly
following the institutionalization of democracy in
Nigeria in the late 90s. he further classifies
religious activities into four major groups
including centralist, community-oriented
syncretistic and fundamentalist activities. He
39
posits that Nigerian leaders have capitalized or
using religion as the basis for political action.
That most religious crisis in Nigeria has taken on
this element. His conclusion is that Nigeria is
undoubtedly ethnically, religiously and culturally
cosmopolitans, that the only way to entrench
progress and democratic values in the country is
for the various groups to understand, tolerate and
accommodate one another as he put it “we cannot shy
away from the reality of ethnicity in any
heterogeneous society like Nigeria. We must be
ready to operate it, understand ourselves on that
basis and relate for a better community” (Ibid:74).
Abdul (2002) takes a look at the dimension of
the February 2000 Kaduna ethno-religious crisis by
presenting concise date to explain how the crisis
40
unfolded itself. In a similar vein as Shawulu
(2000) who hinges the causes of ethno-religious
crisis to colonialism, he attributes the cause of
the mayhem to historical attachment. That is to say
that the enmity between the Christian minority and
the Muslim Majority in Kaduna state is a historical
rivalry dating back to the pre-colonial political
structure of the then Hausa Land and its politics.
According to him, the minority groups in Kaduna
state have ever been apprehensive of domination by
their Hausa-Fulani counterparts. Thus, in order to
assert their own identity, confrontations and hence
conflicts have often than not, found expression in
ethno-religious crisis which are frequent in the
state.
41
He documents the losses incurred as a result of
the 2000 Kaduna crisis to include the following;
1. A total of 19 deaths were recorded. Corpses
were picked from obscure places in various
crisis spots.
2. A total of 746 vehicles of various descriptions
were burnt.
3. About 123 churches and 55 mosques were burnt in
various locations like Kawo, Barnawa, Sabo
Tasha, Sabon Gari, Kakuri, Tudun Wada, Kurmin,
Mashi, Rijar and Zaria etc.
4. Police out-post of Maraban Jos was burnt
5. Over 100 persons sustained various injuries and
received treated in hospital (Ibid: 127).
In a different but similar work to the above,
Abdul (2002) generalizes the issues of religion
42
vis-à-vis democratization and national integration
in Nigeria. He considers the polarization of
Nigeria along religious lines as detrimental to
democracy and national cohesion. To him, the trend
in which religion is used to shroud political
interest by individual as well as group in Nigeria
has only amplified the national question and has
put a bigger question on the practice of federalism
in Nigeria. He concludes that national unity can
only be enhanced by designing a national project
that will accommodate the diverse socio-cultural
groups as found in the country. He also advocates
for more autonomy of the component unit that make
up the federation. One autonomy, he said: “This
can best be done by diversifying the revenue base
of the country as concentrating “on the oil sector
43
is not being enough for genuine federalization”
(Ibid: 176).
Tanko (2002) considers ethnic and religious
pluralism as a universal phenomenon. So, the
Nigerian case calls for no exasperation because to
him, it is the use of which a society makes of such
pluralism that matters. Ethnic and religious
pluralism pretend good and bad for a socio-
depending on the usage. The democracy can only be
safe in Nigeria if only Nigerians emphasize the
aspects that bind them than those that set them
apart. He conclusively proposed the way forward
thus:
44
Ethnicity and religion in Nigeria arepowerful forces that can be usedpositively or negatively. It will allintensify our efforts along merepositive lines, emphasized oursimilarities, we will be building adurable democracy in Nigeria. It isdifferent and impossible to erectbarriers that will completely keep thedifferent ethnic groups in Nigeriaapart. The same can be said of religionsince in some families, you haveChristian and Muslims. If we are able towork towards the elimination of ethnicand religious domination in all theirforms and shades. Democracy may have afuture in Nigeria (Ibid:220)
Jega’s (2000) approach to ethno-religious
conflict in Nigeria especially beginning from May
29, 1999 when democracy found its roots once again
in the country is through the identification of the
causative factors responsible for the nagging
socio-political stigma. He further considers the
degree of these conflicts while highlighting their
consequences on national integrity and economic
45
development. Finally, he suggests solutions, which,
if implemented, would put an end to or at least
limit ethnic and religious confrontation in
Nigeria. In advancing reasons for ethno-religious
conflicts in Nigeria since the rebirth of democracy
in 1999, Jega explicates such factors as poverty,
the character of the post-colonial Nigerian state;
ineptitude on the path of the elite and so on as
been responsible for the ugly development. He
particularly hinges the spate of ethno-religious
conflict on the nature of our leaders in the past
colonial era. This becomes apparent, according to
him;
…In the context of the overbearingcharacter of the post colonial Nigerianstates, greed, selfishness,parochialism, pettiness andirresponsible conduct by those who aresupposed to be leaders have been majorcausal, or at least catalytic, factors
46
of ethno-religious tension and conflict(Ibid: 36-37).
Alemika attempting a sociological analysis of
ethnic and religious conflict in the middle belt of
Nigeria argued that is a difficult task to
differentiate between or dichotomizing the sources
of conflicts from one another. He opined that;
It must be appreciated, however, that itis in practice difficult to isolatewhich conflicts are primarily engenderedby economic, ethic, religion andpolitical competition. The factors areintertwined especially within the middlebelt, to such an extent that it is quiteeasy to miss-identify the sources ofconflicts and therefore misclassify them(2002:5)
The position was consolidated by the world of
caution sounded by Jega (2002) when he said: there
are many causes of ethno-religious tension and
conflicts in Nigeria and quite a number of them are
actually interrelated.
47
It is a fact that in the recent past, conflicts
are often misclassified on the basis of perceived
source or causes. Even when these factors or causes
are intrinsically linked, caution must be exercised
to identify which of these factors are more
dominant and fundamental in the feuds. There are
two fundamental factors which are responsible for
conflicts. The first and most important factor is
scarcity of resources (economic) and the struggle
to control their appropriation (politics) when this
feud amongst the elite are not being resolve in the
first face, they take it to another level thereby
whipping up prejudice associated with ethnic
religious, cultural, gender and racial differences.
This point here is clear, that even though the
factor responsible for conflict are “interrelated
48
as noted by Alemika (2002) and Jega (2002), two of
these factors are fundamental and dominant, they
are the economic and the political.
Alemika in his quest to analyze the religious
conflict in the middle belt unilaterally expand the
geographical scope of the middle belt. He has this
to say;
Religious conflicts are explosive. TheMiddle-Belt people have witnessedseveral conflicts, which are in part ofreligious origin and expression. Theseincludes the conflict between Christiansand Muslims in Zaria (1982), Ilorin(1986), Kafanchan, Kaduna, Zaria andSeveral other towns in Kaduna State(1987) over the attack on Bako, aChristian preacher by some Muslims overalleged improper reference to Islam;Kaduna (1988).
Tafawa Balewa (1991); the Jos North Local
Council Chairmanship crisis of 1996, (Alamika,
2002:9). Though, the concept of middle belt is
rebellious but conceptually, it has demarcation,
49
therefore the inclusion of Zaria emirate being part
of middle belt by Alemika (2002), that the Hausa-
Fulani and some major ethnic minorities, who are
Muslims (Nupe, Kanuri etc.) do see themselves more
of “Lugard North” than belong to the belt.
The colonial administration created an
impression of the state as something that must be
assaulted and if possible privatized. After
independent, there emerged out of continual
conflict with the colonial authority, political
leaders whose interest were not serve but to use
the instrument of the state to enrich themselves, a
goal that was difficult to prosecute under colonial
rule. This attitude of the elites according to
Dudley (1973), was not accidental nor was it self
generative, but was due to the heterogeneous
50
direction provided by the colonial predators who
for their own convenience divided the country into
three administrative areas grouped around the major
ethnic and religious groups. This, according to
him, later created political antagonism among the
elites that led to the numerous conflicts and
violence that have been witnessed in the past
decades. The above situation was summarized by Ake
(2001) when he posited that: “The nationalist
movement was essentially a coalition of disparate
groups united by their common grievances amongst
colonial oppression.
It was typically a network of nationalities,
ethnic groups and professional groups. But even
though they operated against colonial regime, their
relationship was never free from tension, and
51
conflict. As the prospect for political
independence improved, the solidarity of the
movement grew weaker and competitive between its
component units became more “intense”. It is
against all these matrices of historical
deformities of both the colonial and post-colonial
states that the nature and character of the various
groups in the polity whether they be religious or
political can be understood.
Nigeria has been described as one of the most
deeply divided states in Africa due to its complex
web of politically salient identities and a history
of seemingly in-traceable conflict and instability,
from its inception as a colonial state, Nigeria has
faced a personal crisis of territorial or state
legitimacy, which has often challenged its effort
52
at national cohesion, democratization, stability
and economic transformation (Post and Vicker,
1973). The issue of diversity has been a major
focus in the discussion of religious conflict and
violence and it has been suggested by some segments
of society as a contributor to religious uprising.
But, contrary to what some overly simplistic
analyses of the implication of diversity in Nigeria
and other countries suggest, diversity is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for
conflict. In other words, the very fact a country
has different religious group does not make
division and conflict inevitable.
Thus, James Fearon and David Laitin (2003:75,
82) have claimed that “a greater degree of
religious diversity … by itself is not “a major and
53
direct cause of violent civil conflict. Rather,
they see violent civil conflict as associated with
“conditions that favor insurgency”. Including
“poverty which marks financially and
bureaucratically weak states (Fearon and Laitan,
2003:75) other factors that have been identified
and intervene between diversity and conflict
include the role of formal and informal institution
for conflict regulation, the different sizes of
groups relative to the national arena and the
extent to which different identities (ethnic,
regional, religious, class etc.) overlap with or
crosscut, each other (see Fearon and Laitin, 1996).
Religious identity is one of the factors that is
often mobilized and politicized to the level of
overt conflict (Osaghae and Suberu, 2004). To
54
arrive at a better understanding of the cause of
religious violence and the role of the state in
Nigeria, a look at the contemporary descriptive
typology of the Nigerian government would be of
useful importance.
Scholars like Jega (2004) argue that the
increasing pauperization of Nigerians under the
regimes of poor economic management has worsened
the situation of the poor. Some have even expressed
the situation either the government become
irrelevant or failed. In Jega’s worlds;
Mass poverty and unemployment served tocondition the mind and attitude ofNigeria and made them susceptible toelite manipulation and mobilization ofnegative identities. As the state becomeunable to satisfy basic needs of thepeople, they in turn withdrew from thesphere of the state into ethno religiousand communal of the state into ethnoreligious and communal cocoons, withheightened sensitivity to the roles ofthe “others” in their marginalization
55
and immoderations (cited in Lawan,2000:54).
Authors like Lawan (2000) argued that poverty,
illiteracy and unemployment are antithetical to the
survival of democracy. Therefore, democracy is
unsafe with the persistence of these factors in
Nigeria. This is because a poverty stricken and
illiterate person can easily be mobilized in the
event of religious conflicts. Thus, poverty and
illiteracy contribute to perpetuating and fueling
of religious violence in Nigeria.
Omorogbe and Omohan (2005) strongly believed
that societies around the world experience various
forms of civil unrest irrespective of their level
of development. However, the frequent occurrence of
religious conflict and violence in Nigeria is great
concern to all stakeholders because of the
56
devastating effects of such conflict. They went
further to explain that giving the position of
Nigeria as the sixth oil producing nation in world,
one would naturally expect that the resources
occurring to the country will be more than
sufficient to cope with the needs of her citizens.
Sad to say, that has not been the case. No year
passes without the eruption or threat conflicts and
violence between religious groups in Nigeria, this
is probably as a result of the state nonchalant
attitude toward ensuring peace and co-existence
among various religious groups.
They therefore conclude that among other
factors, mass poverty experienced by Nigerians over
the years is one of the factors responsible for the
generally high level of instability in the country.
57
Invariable, this has found expression in ethnic and
religious outburst. To further give credence to the
claim that poverty is the major cause of frequent
ethno-religious crisis in recent times in Nigeria.
Huntington remarked that of a large extent,
violence and instability are the products of rapid
social change and rapid mobilization of new groups
into politics coupled with the slow development of
political institutions. His argument therefore,
seems to be concerned basically with institutional
capacity, which explains the failure of
institutions or the system to keep up with social
demands.
The period since the 1980’s has been
spectacular for many African societies as the harsh
economic conditions of the people has resulted into
an upsurge of internal crisis. The period proved
58
there is a symbiotic relationship between poverty
and internal conflicts in these societies. The
Nigerian experience to a huge extent and that of
Northern Nigeria in particular, fits into these
characterization the country has witnessed ethnic
regional, religious class, political and communal
conflicts that have taken a major toll on national
department (Kwanashie, 2005). It is therefore
purposed that poverty and unemployment are major
causes of frequent occurrence of religious and
political conflict in Northern Nigeria. This in
line with Makarfi (2005) position that “as economic
crisis dwindle people fortunes; they tend to
perceive their enemies as those who belong to the
other-ethno-religious groups (2005:8). The
situation is further worsened by the conspicuous
consumption of political officeholders whose
59
economic backgrounds, according to Elaigwu (2005)
were well known before they assumed public offices.
Therefore, people abject poverty in the midst of
plenty not only alienates but could generate
violence.
According to Jega, in discussing the causes of
violence and conflict in Nigeria, it is important
to mention that religious factors are present in
the majority of social conflicts the Nigerian
people have witnessed. Religious identity as it
present in Nigeria has therefore become a critical
factor in religious conflict. At different levels
and times people experience religious
discrimination, people demand for religious rights
in their state, and more importantly, the state
uses religious in political discourse or nation.
What Jega attempts to point out is that religious
conflict is a multi-causal variables. For effective
60
discussion of the causes of religious conflict in
Nigeria, Jega explained that there is a need to put
this into consideration factors such as the
accusations and allegations of neglect. Oppression,
domination, exploitation, victimization,
discrimination, marginalization, bigotry etc. In
every nation (Nigeria inclusive), there tend to be
some disagreement on how wealth, power and status
are to be shared among individuals and groups,
there are also disagreements on how to effect
necessary change and reforms.
This is because different groups and
individuals have diverse interests in which case,
some groups will have their aims met, while others
will not. What this means is that conflict usually
occurs when deprived groups and individuals
attempts to increase their share of power and
61
wealth or to modify the dominant values, norms,
behalf or ideology. It is interesting to note that
the overall consequences of this is the escalation
of various religious conflict and uprisings that
are witnessed all over the country today which are
supportably meant to correct any perceived form of
marginalization, oppression or domination. It is
important to note here too that the failure of the
Nigerian leaders to establish good systems of
governance, forge national international and
promote what can be called real economic progress,
through deliberate and articulate policies, has led
to mass poverty and unemployment. This has resulted
into communal, ethnic, religious and class
conflicts that have now characterized the Nigerian
nation. Poverty and unemployment have therefore
62
served as nursery beds for many religious conflict
in Nigeria because the country now has a reservoir
of poor people who are willing to be used as
mercenary fighters. What this means theoretically
is that poverty and unemployment increase the
number of people who are prepared to kill or be
killed for a given course at token benefit. This
explains why all ethno-religious crisis that ever
occurred in Nigeria have a large turnout of people
(including the under-aged) as fighter, Jega (2002).
According to Ikelegbe (2001), a very important
cause of ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria is the
breakdown of such vehicles of social control that
characterized the international African societies
such as the family, education, law, religion and
political system that cared for the well-being of
63
all citizens. Indeed, the malfunctioning of all
these important institutions has actually increased
ethnic and communal conflicts in Nigeria. For
instance, the inability of many homes to make the
ends meet with the family income tends to increase
immorality, broken fatherless/motherless homes,
divorces and drunkenness, leading against a large
reserve of youths who could be employed for
execution of ethno-religious conflicts. It is also
important to note that the school system in Nigeria
today is in shambles and cannot impact even sound
knowledge, let alone instill discipline and desired
type of morality. The religious institution is also
not playing its expected roles, while low
enforcement agents indulge in crimes, demand bribes
and collect illegal levies from motorist openly
64
and, shamelessly. All the above constitute a wrong
signal to the social and encourage social vices in
the societies there by laying the foundation for
conflicts in general.
65
CHAPTER THREE
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
3.1 HISTORY OF KADUNA STATE
Kaduna State occupies part of the central
position of the Northern part of Nigeria and shares
common borders with Zamfara, Katsina, Niger, Kano,
Bauchi and Plateau States. To the South-West, the
state shares a border with the Federal Capital
Territory, Abuja.
What is presently known as Kaduna State
encompasses the area of the old Zaria (Zazzau)
emirate-cum-province. According to M. G Smith,
there are two broad cultural segments in this
emirate province. The first of these segments is
what Smith referred to as the Muhammadan Hausa-
Fulani group. The group constitutes about 60 per
cent of the emirate population, occupies mainly the
66
northern part of the province and dominates the
structure of traditional governance as expressed in
the emirate system (Smith, 1960 cited in Suberu
1996). The second ethno cultural bloc of the Zazzau
kingdom comprises a ‘pagan population’ of some
thirty tribes. These are located in the southern
and western half of the territory. However,
throughout this pagan-dominated half of the
territory are to be found the Hausa ‘in enclaves,
walled towns or open villages which are the foci of
economic, political and administrative life in
their respective areas’ (Smith, 1960).
More importantly, however, complex forms of
clientage and vassalage have developed between the
dominant Hausa-Fulani bloc and the pagan population
of Zazzau. The pagan tribes were traditionally the
target for slave-raiding, the exaction of tribute
67
and other forms of domination by the Hausa-Fulani.
The political and military vulnerability of the
pagan groups to Hausa-Fulani hegemony arose from
their relatively inferior technology, smaller
settlements and decentralized modes of political
organization, all of which rendered them relatively
defenseless in the face of Hausa-Fulani
expansionism and imperialism (Kazah-Toure, 1991;
cited in, Suberu 1996). A major consequence was
that the diverse peoples of this region were driven
into the mountains of this region and this
reinforced both their spirit of independence and
their military organization (Blench, et.al. 2006).
While the three southern Zaria districts of
Kagoro, Jaba and Moroa have enjoyed some degree of
independence from the emirate system as a result of
68
their successful resistance of conquest and
incorporation by the Fulani power-group, the other
incorporated pagan populations have been more
vulnerable to cultural, economic and political
domination by the Hausa-Fulani power group. While
the independent pagan populations are ruled by
their own chiefs, the incorporated pagan
communities are administered by emirate-appointed
district heads. This unequal historical political
relationship between the Hausa-Fulani group and the
pagan community has been compounded by religious
differences. Islam is the religion of an
overwhelming majority of the Hausa-Fulani. The
religion also provides the doctrinal or ideological
foundation for the emirate system. On the other
hand, different forms of animistic worship have
69
traditionally predominated amongst the pagan
populations. Moreover, looked down upon as infidels
by the emirate population, and often arbitrarily
and oppressively subjected to the Muslim judicial
and legal system, these pagan populations have
become particularly receptive to Christian
conversion and education (Smith, 1960;cited in,
Suberu 1996).
Given the foregoing, there have been long
historical animosities, a high degree of unease and
mutual suspicion between Christian ethnic groups of
southern origin and Hausa-Fulani Muslims. This
pattern of relationship has been reinforced by the
political and economic imbalances between the two
communities dating back to the colonial period.
70
According to Ibrahim’s Studies in the History, Politics
and Cultures of Southern Kaduna Peoples Group (1997) the
colonial administration initially simply
subordinated these southern Kaduna peoples groups
under emirate rule. From the point of view of the
colonial authorities it was administratively simple
to treat the Southern Kaduna peoples as falling
under the Zaria Native Authority (NA), despite
their resistance and the striking cultural
differences between them and Islamic Emirate. The
sustained resistance of the southern Kaduna peoples
to Emirate rule in the 1910s and 1920s continued
and in the 1930s Governor Cameron questioned the
legitimacy of Fulani rule and embarked upon
administrative reforms. However, the British
Resident argued against the reform proposals on the
71
grounds that they would undermine the authority of
the Emir of Zaria. The Emir rejected the proposals,
arguing that southern Kaduna peoples groups were so
‘primitive’ they would fight against each other
over rotational presidency of a council of chiefs.
As a compromise, the Secretary, Northern Province
ordered that local elements be appointed district
heads.
Ibrahim (1997; cited in Okpanachi 2010.) also
narrates how these chiefdoms were revived, created,
downgraded, and upgraded throughout this period. In
the colonial period, it was not uncommon for a
traditional chiefdom to be abolished on economic
reasons of the inability of the institution to fend
for itself. Tax assessment and collection were the
criteria for establishment or recognition of
72
chiefdoms. Equally important was the supply of
forced labor to carry out development activities.
This situation was far from satisfactory and has
been responsible for friction in the region, partly
played out in situ and partly in Kaduna, where
opposing forces confront one and other on a daily
basis.
These socio-cultural and political differences
sometimes escalated into violent crises since the
colonial period. As Kazar Toure documents, “right
from 1907, when the first set of Muslim Hausa-
Fulani rulers were posted into the zone as District
Heads and other NA officials, there were continuous
outbreaks of peasant revolts in such places as
Kachia and these took ethnic forms” (Kazah-Toure,
1995). In 1942, the Kaje ethnic group of Zangon
73
Kataf district protested over perceived domination
and discrimination by the Native Authority
administration. Between 1946 - 1966, there were
violent demonstrations by the “Katafs and other
related groups in Southern Zaria province over
certain oppressive features of the emirate system,
particularly the headship of the Fulani ruling
families over predominantly non-Fulani districts”
(Suberu, 1996). Throughout these periods the crises
always had a mix of ethnic and political dimensions
but lacked any discernible religious under- or
overtones.
In the 1980s, these tensions in Kaduna state
begin to mobilize distinct religious overtones and
the additional dimension of a Muslim versus
Christian dichotomy (Kazah-Toure, 1999). The
74
escalation of political violence was witnessed in
Kasuwar Magani (1980), ZangonKataf (1984),
Kafanchan (1987) and Zangon Kataf again (1992).
While these conflicts mobilized religious sentiment
in Kaduna State, besides the spillover of the
Zangon Kataf conflict in 1992, the city of Kaduna
remained relatively insulated from violent ethno-
religious crises.
Kaduna city, the capital of Kaduna state, had
been an administrative capital since the pre-
independent colonial era as the administrative
capital of the old Northern Protectorate in 1931
and later the Northern Region even after
independence. It later became the administrative
capital of North Central State, and the Old Kaduna
State before the present dispensation. The city is
75
located on the Kaduna River. Apart from being the
administrative nerve centre of Northern Nigeria, it
is an important trade area and a major
transportation hub for the surrounding agricultural
areas with its rail and road junctions (Millennium
Cities Initiative, 2009). Kaduna town is also one
of Northern Nigeria’s industrial centers. Many of
the industries especially the textile and garment
industries have been in existence in the city since
the colonial and early independence era. Among
other industries in the city are paint and other
chemical plants, refinery and petrochemical plants,
vehicle assembly, fertilizer processing, breweries,
and defense industries and units among others.
To date Kaduna city has had the attribute of a
land almost totally made up of immigrants. The
76
original inhabitants known as the Gwaris (Gbagyi)
who are essentially agrarian have been forced to
move out of the main city into the outskirts of the
town by the influx of visitors since the colonial
era. At present the city’s inhabitants consist
mostly of the offspring of Civil Servants from the
old northern region who worked and settled in the
city since the colonial era when it was the
administrative headquarters of the old Northern
Region. Nigerians from all over the country have
made the city their place of residence having moved
there as a result of government or commercial work
including military attachment or training. Many
retired civil and military officers currently live
there. The population figures for the city
according to the 2006 national census, ranked it
77
fourth among the cities of Nigeria after Lagos
Ibadan and Kano with a population of 1,563,300
persons made up of 766,409 females and 796,891
males.
While Kaduna is known to be a volatile state,
Kaduna metropolis did not have or deserve a
reputation for frequent susceptibility to violent
ethno-religious crises until February and May 2000
(Abdu and Umar, 2002). Unlike most cities of
Northern Nigeria, Kaduna is quite complex. It
ethnic, religious and cultural diversity with
Christian and Islamic values sometimes inter-mixing
with traditional values, provides a veritable
ground for differences that, if not properly
mediated, could easily lead to violence. However,
Kaduna town differs from most old cities of
Northern Nigeria, such as Zaria, Sokoto, and Kano
78
where “indigenous” communities are separated from
“settlers”, in that although some areas are
dominated by particular ethnic groups, these
different groups have also lived side by side in
the same areas for many years (Ibid.). This is
partly driven by the fact that Kaduna’s colonial
legacy left settlement patterns relatively open to
migration shifts. Kaduna received a large number of
immigrants relative to the indigenous population
after the federal reorganization in 1976. Kaduna’s
unique status is also spurred by its urbanization
in the late 1970’s. A significant number of
immigrants from other northern and middle-belt
states moved to Kaduna as part of labor migration.
This process of urbanization included young
laborers temporarily moving from rural villages and
towns during the dry season and eventually
79
permanently settling in Kaduna after finding work
in the heavy manufacturing industry. Over time,
this large migration led to nearly
indistinguishable lines between ‘settlers’ and ‘the
smaller indigenous’ communities. Also, considerable
inter-marriage between the two communities fostered
new kinship ties across ethnic and religious lines
3.2 BACKGROUND TO SHARIA IN KADUNA
The Kaduna Sharia journey was tortuous and it
started on December 14, 1999, when the Kaduna state
of Assembly constituted an 11- person all-Muslim
member committee to collate views of the people on
the need to introduce the Sharia legal system in
the state. This singular action polarized the House
of Assembly across religious lines. The Christian
members of the House of Assembly argued that the
motion was not properly passed, and accused the
80
Muslim members of having a hidden agenda. The
Muslims, in turn, argued that Sharia is purely a
Muslim affair that had nothing to do with
Christians. They also maintained that there was
nothing wrong with the way the motion was passed,
pointing out that two Christian members nominated
to participate in the committee declined their
nominations (Abdu and Umar, 2002).
As Abdu and Umar (ibid.) documents, the
Committee began work shortly after it was
constituted. It demanded memoranda from the public
and began its public hearing in January 2000. The
Christian community refused to appear before the
committee. They argued that it was biased and the
process of its constitution was illegal. Muslims
from various local governments in Kaduna State
trooped to the House of Assembly to present their
81
memoranda and express solidarity with the House of
Assembly. Both Muslims and Christians organized
rallies and lectures to educate adherents of the
religious groups on their differing points of view.
On 29 January 2000, The Christian Association of
Nigerian (CAN) held a Seminar at HEKAN Church,
Katsina Road, Kaduna to “enlighten Christians on
the implications of adopting Shariah on Christians
and Christianity.” Different eminent personalities
were invited to present papers including the former
leader of the secessionist Biafra, Chief
Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, who condemned Sharia as an
infringement of Christians’ rights and advised Igbo
migrants to stand by the indigenous Christians in
the north. The National body of Jama’atul Nasir Islam
(JNI) also organized a program on Sharia at Arewa
82
House around this period to which some Christians
were invited as speakers. Both Muslims and
Christians used their worship centre to pass
commentaries on Sharia. While this was going on,
the Kaduna State government constituted two inter-
religious committees consisting of equal numbers of
Muslim and Christian leaders, all in an attempt to
calm the political temperature (Abdu and Umar,
2002).
The Sharia Violence in Kaduna
After the public hearing of the Committee of
the State House of Assembly, and the series of
seminars by the various religious groups, CAN
Kaduna Branch, organized a public protest on
February 21 2000 against what they called the
“planned introduction of Sharia in the state.”
83
During the protest, Christians expressed their
fears concerning what they perceived as an attempt
to “Islamize Kaduna State” and the possibility of
such action generating crisis in Kaduna (ibid.).
The peaceful protest later turned violent: Muslim
youths clashed with the Christian protesters, and
fighting between Christians and Muslims spiraled
out of control, with massive violence and
destruction on both sides.
The Sharia violence in Kaduna took place in two
main waves—sometimes referred to as “Sharia 1” and
“Sharia 2” (Paden, 2005). The first wave took place
in Kaduna city, as stated above, from February 21
to 25, with further killings in March, followed by
a second wave from May 22 to 23. On Wednesday 23
March 2000, the crisis spilled over to outlying
84
LGAs, particularly Kachia and BirninGwari. In
Kachia LGA, Muslims were attacked. Their
residential houses, shops, clinics, courts, filling
stations and the market were destroyed. It later
spread to neighbouring villages like Sakainu,
Katul, Adadgai, Slowai, and Gumel (Abdu and Umar,
2002; cited in, Okpanachi 2010).
The May “Sharia 2” violence occurred while the
Judicial Commission of Inquiry set up to probe
February's clashes, was yet to complete its work.
The clash started at Narayi and Banarwa areas and
later spread to other parts of the city. While the
immediate cause of the crisis could not be fully
ascertained, Police say the clashes broke out after
residents of a mainly Christian neighborhood blamed
Muslims for the killing of a local man18. Others
85
however saw it as the continuation of the February
Sharia violence. It took a combined team of fully
armed soldiers and policemen to restore peace to
the city. An accurate, total death toll has never been
ascertained. The Judicial Commission of Inquiry set up by
the Kaduna state government reported that at least 1,295
people had been killed, while an unspecified additional
number were buried unidentified, and others were declared
missing as result of the February riots alone. In all, it is
believed that the two Kaduna riots left at least 3000
persons dead and led to the displacement of over 63,000
people within Kaduna and its surroundings (International
Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2007). The scale of the
killing and human displacement and destruction was so huge
that President Obasanjo, described it the worst he had seen
since the 1967-70 Nigerian civil war.
3.3 THE VISIBLE CAUSES OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN
NIGERIA
86
Several causes of religious violence in Nigeria
have been identified in the literature (Agwu 2009;
Gofwen 2004; Salawu 2010; Iwara 2006; Kwaja 2009;
Omotosho 2003; Sanusi 2009; Sani no date cited
in,Sampson 2012). Whereas most of these causes
conflate, emphasis in the literature is on the
underlying socio-political, economic and governance
factors that gestate not only religious conflicts,
but violent conflicts in Nigeria generally. In this
research however, the focus is on the immediate and
visible factors that generate religious violence
rather than the remote precipitating and other
social factors that animate it.
A cursory perusal of extant literature on the
remote socio-political, economic and governance
factors that drive religious violence in Nigeria
87
does show, however, that government neglect,
oppression, domination, exploitation,
victimization, discrimination, marginalization,
nepotism and bigotry are some of the predisposing
factors (Salawu 2010:348). In his treatise, Kwaja
(2009:107) also identifies fragility of the
institutions of the state in terms of their ability
and capacity to manage diversity, corruption,
rising inequality between the rich and poor, gross
violation of human rights, environmental
degradation, contestations over land, among others,
as the underlying causes of violent conflicts in
Nigeria since the enthronement of democratic rule
in 1999. In his view, Danjibo (:3 cited in, Sampson
2012) believes the failure of governance is
responsible for the recurring sectarian violence in
88
Nigeria; while Omotosho (2003) recognize
disparaging literature/publications by both
Christian and Muslim elites as the major causes of
religious violence in the country. Contributing to
the debate, Achunike(2008: 287) opined that the
wrong perception of other people’s religion or
faith, wrong religious orientation, the low
literacy level of religious adherents, selfishness
on the part of religious personalities, pervasive
poverty, government involvement in religious
matters, among others, are responsible for
interreligious conflicts in Nigeria.
Sani (no date; cited in Sampson 2012.) has made
a comprehensive but unelaborated list of 7 causes
of religious conflicts in Nigeria. While
identifying both the remote sociopolitical and
89
economic drivers as well as the immediate factors
that generate religious violence in Nigeria, he has
failed to critically analyze how these factors
generate religious disturbances. Nonetheless, it
suffices to state that he identified poverty,
corruption, non-implementation of previous probe
panel reports, impunity of past perpetrators of the
violence, proliferation of preachers and worship
centers, provocative and inciting utterances,
sensational journalism, political manipulation of
religion, incitement in the social media and mobile
telephony, among others, as key causes of religious
violence in Nigeria. These causes are quite
comprehensive and indeed cover most of the factors
discussed in this research. However, I shall take a
step further to demonstrate how some of these
90
issues generate religious violence and further
suggest an approach to state management.
1. Religious intolerance, fundamentalism and
extremism
Religious intolerance, fundamentalism and
extremism are deliberately chosen to kick-start
discussions on the drivers of religious violence in
Nigeria because they form the base (sub-structure)
upon which other sources of religious violence
(super-structure) rest. Religious intolerance has
been defined as ‘hostility towards other religions,
as well as the inability of religious adherents to
harmonize between the theories and the practical
aspect of religion’ (Balogun1988:166). It
encompasses bigotry, which is the obstinate and
intolerant devotion to one’s opinions and
91
prejudices, especially the exhibition of
intolerance and animosity toward persons of
differing beliefs (Baird and Rosenbaum 1999)
Religious intolerance has been identified as
the major source of religious conflict/violence in
all societies existing as long as the history of
mankind, and permeating all forms of human
civilizations, with attendant destructive
tendencies (Gofwen 2004:50; cited in, Sampson
2012).Religious fundamentalism and extremism are
similar to, and indeed, manifestations of religious
intolerance. Komonchak, Collins and Lane(1996:411)
view religious fundamentalism from three
perspectives: from a cognitive understanding where
the word is associated with a closed personality
type that expresses exclusivity, particularity,
92
literality and moral rigor; from a cultural
theological viewpoint, where the word expresses
opposition to religious and cultural liberalism in
defense of orthodoxy and religious traditions; and
from a social movement perspective, where it
denotes organizational and ideological uniqueness
from other types of religious movements. Ultimately
therefore, religious fundamentalism is a religious
movement that promotes the literal interpretation
of, and strict adherence to religious doctrine,
especially as a return to orthodox scriptural
prescriptions and doctrinal originality. It seeks
strict adherence to the orthodox principles of
particular faiths – in the case of Nigeria,
Christianity and Islam – and abhors modernism with
93
its propensity to adulterating or diminishing
original doctrinal principles.
Religious fundamentalists, therefore, place
great emphasis ‘on right doctrine and then
necessity of organized warfare against the forces
of modernism’ (Komonchak,Collins and Lane 1996:411;
cited in, Sampson 2012). Religious intolerance and
fundamentalism may not necessarily entail violence;
however, it is the extreme manifestation of
intolerance and fundamentalist ideals that embraces
violence. Religious extremist are therefore
religious fundamentalists, who take religious
conservatism and intolerance to an unreasonable
extent, by manifesting violence against those who
hold contrary religious views. Religious extremists
take the position that if others do not follow
94
their ways, they will be damned (Religious
extremism). They abhor the preaching of other
faiths and resort to violence to stop it. They
insist that their religious doctrines must be
universally entrenched by brute force, while the
political, social and economic systems must conform
to their religious tenets. Religious extremism does
not admit of any compromise with social change,
particularly that which contradicts religious
orthodoxy. In terms of hierarchy, therefore,
religious extremism is the farthest and most lethal
form of religious intolerance.
2. Obstructive and disruptive modes of worship
One other trigger of religious violence in
Nigeria is the obstructive, disruptive and annoying
modes of worship employed by the two dominant
95
religions. There is a notorious Christian tradition
of organizing mass crusades and revivals on public
high ways or properties adjoining the high ways.
Most of these crusades and revivals have the
disrepute of obstructing vehicular and human
movement for long periods of time (Daily Champion
2006; Ehigiator and Akinbaani 2002; cited in
Sampson 2012). in absolute disregard to torturous
and criminal liabilities. Many road users of other
faiths – and even those of the same faith – see
this practice as an affront to their legal rights
to the use of public roads as well as a
demonstration of religious arrogance and
insensitivity. In the same vein, it has become an
unwritten law for all public roads in Muslim-
dominated areas to be blocked during Juma’at (Friday)
96
prayers. Accordingly, all intending road users
needing access through these roads on Fridays have
often had the misfortune of abating their movements
and waiting for the completion of Juma’at prayers.
This tradition has triggered religious
disturbances, particularly in places with evenly
distributed numbers of Christians and Muslims. The
2001 Jos religious violence was caused by a mêlée
that erupted after a Christian woman insisted on
having her right of way through a public highway
which was barricaded by Muslim worshippers on a
Friday.
In addition to the above, both Churches and
Mosques have a tradition of erecting large and
extremely noisy loud-speakers within and outside
their worship places. This sound-magnifying
97
equipment generates serious noise pollution to the
annoyance of neighbors. In most cases, the
worshippers engage the use of these instruments
throughout the nights, in religious rituals
commonly known as ‘night vigils’ in the Christendom
and Tafsir among Muslims during the period of
Ramadan. Muslim worshippers also engage the use of
these instruments every neighbors. With the
indiscriminate location of Churches and Mosques in
residential areas, the annoyance inherent in this
tradition has triggered religious conflicts in the
country, and would indeed remain a potential
trigger of religious violence in the future. The
erection of worship places in public offices has
also served the purpose of politicizing religion in
98
3. Disparaging preaching and stereotyping
Disparaging or critical preaching is one of the
most common causes of religious violence in
Nigeria. First, both religions claim monopoly of
religious truths as well as the absolute
prerogative to eternity in heaven. This religious
cliché is contemptuously imbued in the public
preaching of both religious groups, as religious
sermons are often laden with messages signifying
the monopoly of salvation and truth. In extreme
cases, the messages transcend the traditional
monopolization of essence, thereby delving into the
arena of judgmental and scornful delegitimization
of opposing religions and their prophetic symbols.
The March 1987 religious violence in Kafanchan,
Kaduna state was allegedly caused by a Christian
100
preacher, who allegedly used verses from the Qur’an
to delegitimize Islam, while justifying the
exclusive existence of salvation within the
ambience of Christianity (Gofwen, 2004:101) Muslims
in Kaduna had also alleged that one Revd. Abubakar
Bako, publicly sought to interpret the Qur’an in a
manner that disparaged Islam, in addition to making
some uncomplimentary comments about Prophet
Mohammad (Omotosho 2003). The proliferation of
Churches and Mosques in the country and the
pervasive electronic media coverage of religious
preaching have helped in reinforcing these
disparaging sermons. With little or no censorship
of the critical content of these sermons, some
religious fundamentalists have used these media
opportunities to cause serious religious disharmony
101
and subsequent violence. The use of audio and video
preaching in public places is not less provocative.
The two religious groups often use audio-taped
preaching even in conflict-prone areas like Jos
city, in defiance of the standing security embargo
placed on them. These acts have helped to intensify
the recrimination from both sides, Christian and
Muslim, and sustain the cycle of violence.
A dangerous dimension to inter-faith ridiculing
and provocation in Nigeria is manifested in the
publication of critical literature by religious
intellectuals. In his treatise, Omotosho (2003)
chronicled the following hate-influenced
publications by both Christian and Muslim
intellectuals: Odetayo1993; Mohammad 1990:20;
Moshay 1994:46; Sanni and Amoo 1987:3; and
102
Suleiman1997:1, among others. These publications
have all made disparaging remarks against opposing
religions and their prophetic essences. The mockery
of opposing faiths is also compounded by the
pervasive stereotyping of religious adherents. For
instance, Muslims, especially those from the
northern part of Nigeria, are in the habit of
referring to all non-Muslims as Arna or Kafir; Arabic
words for ‘heathen’ or unbelievers; while it is
fashionable for Christians to refer to all Muslims
as terrorists and violence-mongers. This attitude
of religious stigmatization has generated religious
violence in the past and has the potential to do
more.
4. Proselytizing
103
One of the major causes of religious violence
in Nigeria is the methods of proselytizing used by
the two dominant religions. Although Islam and
Christianity deprecate the use of threat and
coercion as a means of proselytizing (Omotosho
2003), their approaches to preaching have remained
mentally and sometimes physically coercive.
Unfortunately, the most visible approach to Islamic
conversion campaigns, particularly in northern
Nigeria, is that of Jihad. This is epitomized by
the Boko Haram declaration that Western culture, as
represented by Christianity, is polluting and
worthy of spiritual purging. Muslim fundamentalists
view adherents of other faiths, and sometimes
moderate Muslims, as corrupted stock worthy of
Islamic conversion or regeneration as the case may
104
be. Thus the extremist disposition to enlisting
conformity by brute force has created serious
religious tensions in Nigeria.
Furthermore, the ubiquitous cassette and video
culture that now pervades the landscape of
Nigeria’s religious preaching has done a lot in
exacerbating religious violence (Larkin 1997).
These emergent forms of ‘small media’ are perhaps
even more instrumental in circulating religious
propaganda than the independent media institutions
(Hackett no date). The uninhibited playing of these
cassettes in public places, particularly the
transmission of disparaging messages or accounts of
conversion by new converts, have often attracted
the outrage of opposing religious groups.
Similarly, the Christians’ approach of ‘evangelism’
105
– a conversion campaign that favor house to house
preaching as well as preaching in public places
such as hospitals, prisons, public transport
avenues – has often outraged non-Christians, who
find the common message of ‘I am the way, the truth
and the light; no one goes to the Father except
through me’ as provocative and denigrating their
own faiths. On the campuses of many institutions of
learning in Nigeria, this tendency has resulted in
low intensity conflicts between adherents of the
two religions, as the evangelizers often invade the
privacies, and therefore, sensibilities of rival
religious adherents. The deliberate targeting of
non-Christian homes for such evangelization
campaigns has been responsible for religious
106
conflicts in the past and remains a potent trigger
to religious violence.
5. Government patronage, religious preferentialism
and marginalization
In spite of the constitutional prohibition of
disqualifications or disabilities inflicted on
persons on account of their religious leanings,
religious patronage has been entrenched in the
public realm, depending on the predominance of
particular religious adherents in positions of
authority. Thus at the federal and state government
levels, public officials manifestly patronize
particular religions at the expense of others. In
many states of northern Nigeria, public funds are
used in the purchase and distribution of food items
and other valuables for Muslim faithful during the
107
Ramadan fast; however, government does not extend
the same gesture to Christians during Christmas or
traditional religious worshippers during their
traditional ceremonies. This attitude is reversed
in some Christian dominated states. Furthermore,
whereas the federal government has established both
Christian and Muslim Pilgrims Commissions with
state funding, some states, especially in the
north, have single pilgrims’ commissions for
particular religions at the exclusion of others.
Depending on which religious group has the superior
numerical strength in a state, the clergy is given
prominent roles and privileges at state functions,
while marginalizing the others. In most states, the
dominant religion denies the other religious groups
access to certain privileges like land for locating
108
worship houses or air time for transmitting
religious messages. This attitude translates into
political and economic preferentialism towards the
favored religious group(s), while marginalizing the
others. Registering his complaint over this
discriminatory practice, Yusuf (1995:84; in Sampson
2012) argued that:
Christians have been denied access toelectronic media in 16 Northern states,while Islam monopolizes 24 hours for itsbroadcast in the same area. … Every hourthe Muslims broadcast provocativestatements about Christianity. It meansnothing, they proclaim, that peopleattend church on Sunday only to danceand to listen to songs. Authoritiesmerely wink…
It is, therefore, not out of place to hear
religious groups complain of marginalization in
respect of political and economic privileges,
public employment and political benefits. These
attitudes do not only cause inter-religious
109
upheavals, they precipitate religious sentiments in
political and economic policy making. The present
debacle over the institutionalization of Islamic
banking in the country is based on this
apprehension that the religious affiliation of the
product could be used as an instrument for the
exclusion of Christians.
6. Sensationalism in media reportage
The media’s penchant for exaggerating details
of religious violence and thereby fuelling their
intensity is well known and documented (Kukah 1993;
Kukah 1996; cited in, Okpanachi 2010). This media
character constituted the gravamen in the 1987
Kafancha religious disturbances. News reports
monitored on Radio Kaduna, immediately after the
commencement of the violence, alleged that
Christians were killing Muslims indiscriminately,
110
burning their Mosques and copies of the Holy
Qur’an, and banishing them from the town. The
broadcast further alleged that an itinerant
preacher had misquoted the Qur’an and blasphemed
the name of Prophet Mohammed, urging Christians to
kill Muslims and burn their Mosques (News watch
1987:10). These reports ignited reprisal attacks by
Muslims allover Kaduna state, causing an invaluable
loss of lives and property (Gofwen2004:91–93). Most
religious leaders in the country have therefore,
accused the media of fanning the embers of
religious violence by their provocative and emotive
reports (Kukah 1993; Spero 2010; Etaghene 2010).
News headlines such as ‘Islamic Assailants Kill
Hundreds of Christians near Jos’, ‘Muslims
slaughter Christians in central Nigeria’, ‘Muslims
slaughter 400–500 Christians in latest Jos crisis’
111
(Creeping Sharia 2010, cited in, Sampson 2012) are
very common during religious disturbances. Such
alarming headlines, coupled with gory images of
victims often trigger reprisal attacks.
The proliferation of media technology has made
it easy for some of these emotive reports and
images of slain persons to be transported far and
wide, generating intense hatred between
belligerents and reprisal attacks in a cycle of
violence. The ethno-religious violence that has
engulfed Jos, central Nigeria, in recent years has
generated an unimaginable level of hatred between
the locals and the alleged settlers (who are
generally divided along religious lines) as a
result of the dissemination of gory images of
victims on the internet. This has helped to sustain
112
recrimination and reprisal attacks from both
groups.
7. The use of religious symbols
The use of religious symbols is increasingly
becoming a source of religious conflict and
violence in Nigeria. Most Muslim women insist on
the use of the Hijab, and in extreme cases, Niqab and
Burka, even where the regulatory regime prohibit
their use. In 2005, following the prohibition of
the use of head scarves by female law students in
the faculty of law, Ahmadu Bello University
(ABU),Zaria; a Christian lecturer, Dr Andrew Akume,
turned back a female student who wore the Hijab
from attending his lecture. This action drew the
ire of the Muslim Students Society (MSS), who
mobilized their collectives and issued a fatwa
(Islamic death sentence) on the said lecturer,
113
thereby forcing him into hiding (Madugba 2005:4).
This act did not only cause serious religious
tension on the campus, but ignited a diplomatic
strain between the governments of Kaduna and Benue
states (the state in which the university is
located and the lecturer’s home state,
respectively) over Akume’s safety. The inscription
of Arabic symbols on Nigerian currency
denominations has also been vehemently opposed by
Nigerian Christians, who associate it with Islam
and an overarching Islamization agenda by northern
Muslims. On the other hand, Muslims have
continuously opposed the use of the ‘cross’ as a
symbol on public hospitals’ bill/ sign boards and
other hospital accessories. These situations remain
potential triggers of religious violence.
Pattern of Settlement in Kaduna
114
Complex interconnectedness between ethno-
regional, ethno-religious and ethnicity presents a
new phenomenon in the springing of settlement
pattern in almost all the northern states. Combine
as exacerbating factor, preponderant violent ethno-
religious fracas had ushered in new phenomenon in
neighborhood/settlement arrangement in most
northern towns and cities. Empirical survey
revealed settlement pattern along religious lines
and ethnic formations in Kaduna. The non-Muslims
and non-indigenes settle outside the traditional
city walls of Kaduna (Zaria). The insurgence
religious crises compelled the non-Muslims and the
non-indigenes to settle outside the city walls for
perceive safety.
Settlement Pattern in Kaduna State along Religion
Lines
115
Christian MuslimBarnawa High Cost KawoBarnawa complex Tudun WadaSabon Unguwan DosaUnguwanPama Unguwan RimiUnguwan Sunday MandoSource: Field Survey,2013; cited in, Salawu 2010
The pattern of settlement also in the north
informs people choice of where to live and whether
not live. This has compelled some people to swap
lands and in some cases residential apartments to
areas of dominant religion. The Table shows
criteria for judging safe areas, what people
consider before deciding where to live and/or not
live. Empirical survey revealed that violent
outbreaks affect settlement arrangement as such
perceive safety compelled people to settle along
religious and ethnic divides as commonly found in
116
most northern cities. This has great consequences
on land uses and administration thereby causing
floating of property values as the case may be in
safely advantageous neighborhoods.
117
TIMELINE OF SOME CASES OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA 1999 – 2012
No Date State(s) Nature Remarks
11 Jul.
1999Ogun
Violent clashes between Yoruba traditional worshippers and Hausa groups in Sagamu, Ogun state.
The crisis originated from the killing of a Hausa woman by the Oro Masqueraders for violating traditional rites.
222
July 1999
Kano Reprisal to the Sagamu crisis above,
The casualty figure was not reported.
320
Dec. 1999
Kwara
Muslim fundamentalists attacked and destroyed over 14 churches in Ilorin.
Properties with several millions of naira were destroyed and an unspecified casualty reported.
421—22 Feb 2000
Kaduna Riots over the introduction of Sharia
An estimated 3 000 people died
528
Feb. 2000
Abia
Religious riots iii Aba, and minor disturbances in Umuahia.
Over 450 persons killed in Aba, Abia state, as reprisal for the Kaduna crisis.
68
Sept. 2000
Gombe The Kaltungo religious crisis,
The crisis erupted over the implementation of Sharia in the state.
712
Oct. 2001
Kano Religious riot in Kano.
In protest to US invasion of Afghanistan over Osama bin Laden. Over 150 persons were killed.
8 7—17 Sept. 2001
Jos A religious riot between Muslims and Christians in Jos. Mosques, churches and several properties were damaged or torched. The clashes started on September 7 and lasted
The riot broke out when the Islamic Brigade attacked a Christian woman who attempted to cross a public high-way barricaded by Muslim worshippers on Friday.
118
nearly two weeks, ending onSeptember 17.
Over 300 people were killed.
916
Nov. 2002
KadunaThe Miss World crisis in which Muslims attacked Christians and churches.
The crisis was triggeredby an article authored by Isioma Daniel in This Day newspaper, alleging that Prophet Mohammed would have loved to havethe girls. Over 250 people were killed and several churches destroyed.
108 Jun.
2004Adamawa
Religious conflict between Christians and Muslims in Numan town.
Caused by the location of the town’s Central Mosque close to Bachama paramount ruler’s palace. Over 17 persons killed.
119
1118
Feb. 2006
BornoReligious conflict between Christians and Muslims in Maiduguri.
The riot was caused by the Danish cartoon on Prophet Mohammed, in Jyllarids-Posreonewspaper. Over 50 persons killed and 30 churches destroyed; over 200 shops, 50 houses and 100vehicles vandalized.
1222
Mar. 2007
GombeMuslim pupils killed their Christian teacher, Mrs Oluwatoyin Olusesan.
The pupils claimed that their teacher desecratedthe Qur’an while attempting to stop a student from cheating inan examination hail.
1328
Nov. 2008
PlateauReligious violence between Muslims and Christians in the city of Jos.
The crisis which was triggered by the controversial results ofa local election later turned religious. Over 700 people killed and thousands internally displaced.
1421
Feb. 2009
Bauchi Ethno-religious conflict atthe Makama New Extension.
Over 11 people were killed, more than 400 houses burnt, and over 1600 families displaced.
1526—30 Jul 2009
l3auchi,Borno Kano Yobe
Religious violence unleashed by the radical Boko Haram sect on Christians,
Over 700 persons killed 3 500 persons internallydisplaced 264 children orphaned, over 392 womenwidowed, and several properties destroyed.
1629
Dec. 2009
BauchiReligious violence unleashed by the Kala- Karo sect on Christians.
Over 38 persons killed; about 20 suspected members of the sect arrested; and over 1000 people internally displaced.
120
1717 20 Tin. 2009
Plateau Resurgence of religious crisis in Jos
Police announced at least 320 killed but aidworkers and local leaders place death tollat over 55o over 40,000 person displaced.
187 Mar.
201(1P1atam
Attacks by Fulani Moslems on Christian— dominated villages of Dogo Nahewa, Shen and Fan in Jos.
Over 500 people — mainlywomen and children — were killed.
1917
Mar. 20(0
PlateauSuspected Fulani militia men attacked residents of Biye and Batem in Jos
13 person killed
2011
Apr. 2010
Plateau
Attach on a Christian village of Berom Stock, some 30 kilometres south ofJos, by suspected Fulani herdsmen.
The attackers targeted the homes of some officials in Kura Jenta,in reprisal of the killing of about 150 Fulani Muslims, who wereallegedly killed ad dumped in wells on 19 January 2010. No life was lost but 3 houses and 6 vehicles were torched. This violence was ethno-religious.
2222 May
2010Plateau
Attack on some Christians, who were returning from their place of worship along Bauchi road in Jos.
Reprisal attack by Muslims over the killingof 3 Fulani Muslims. At least I person died while many were injured.
2317
Jul. 2010
Plateau
Muslim Fulani herdsmen launched an overnight attack on a Christian village, Mazah, north of the city of Jos.
About eight people were reportedly killed, including the wife, two children and a grandson of a Pastor. Seven houses and a church werealso burned during the attack.
24 29 Plateau Clashes between Muslims and No less than 20 persons
121
Aug. 2011
Christians at Rukuba road and Farm Gada in Jos duringthe Ramadan prayers.
were killed, 50 injured,over 50 motor vehicles and 100 motor cycles were torched.
2516 Jun
2011
Police Head- quarters, Abuja
Suicide bomb attack at the Police Headquarters, Abuja by suspected Boko Haram Islamist whose ideology is framed around religion (Wahabism)
Authorities said 6 persons were killed and 73 vehicles destroyed.
2626
Aug. 2011
UN House, Abuja
Suicide bombing at the UN House, Abuja bysuspected Boko HararnIslamists.
23 persons (11 UN personnel and 12 non-UN personnel) were killed.
275 Nov.
2011
Potiskum, Damaturuand Maiduguri
Coordinated attacks on churches and police stations by suspected Boko Hararn Islarnists.
More than 90 persons were reportedly killed, several churches and police stations torched.
2825 Dec
2011
Madala Niger state near theFCT
The bombs were alleged to have been planted at the Church s parking lot
At the last count 45 persons were killed Somedied instantly others from injuries sustained from the explosion Over 80 others were receivingtreatment for various degrees of injuries
295—6 Jan. 2012
Gombe, Gombe state
Gunmen stormed a Deeper life church in Gombe, shooting indiscriminately at worshippers. The Boko Haram Islamic sect claimedresponsibility for the shooting.
6 persons were reportedly killed while many others were injured.
30 5—6 Jan. 2012
Mubi, Adamawa state
Suspected Boko Haram militants stormed a gathering of Igbo Christians and shot sporadically, killing over
22 persons were reportedly killed; a dozen others were injured.
122
a dozen and injuring othersin apparent execution of anultimatum given by the BokoHararn Islamist sect to Southern Christians living in the North to leave.
Source: Adapted from Onuoha 2010; cited in, Sampson 2012.
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CHAPTER FOUR
4.1 STATE INEFFECTIVENESS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF
ETHNO-RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE
While the roots of ethnic and religious
conflicts have been linked to colonialization,
scholars like (Machava, 2008), argues that
religious conflicts are rooted in bad governance,
politicization of religious identities, the
competition and conflict for political power by the
ethnic groups and religious communities
respectively (Anarfi, 2004; Conversi, 1999; cited
in Sampson 2012)
Takaya (1992:112) identified centrifugal
factors that give rise to the politicization of
religious identities in Nigeria, it is important to
note that the politicization of religion is an
offshoot of the ills of colonialism which includes
124
the existence of two or more religious groups with
numerical strengths that can significantly affect
the outcome and direction of a democratic political
process, the instrumentalism of religion as
legitimizing tools of hegemony in instances when
the interest of the political class are under
threat, when there is an ascendant radical thinking
within a politically significant ethnic or
religious group capable of upstaging hegemony; when
the society is characterized by political, social
and economic hardships that can cause alliances
along religious fault-lines. Institutional
fragility of the state in terms of their ability
and capacity to manage diversity, corruption rising
inequality between the rich and poor, gross
violation of human rights, environmental
125
degradation, contestations over land, have been
some of the underlining causes of violent conflicts
in Nigeria since the enthronement of democracy rule
in 1999. Others argue that religion is a cover for
or a surface aspect of deeper antagonism and that
the factor causing and driving the conflicts
transcend it to include a complex mix of history,
political, economic, ethnic and other factors, it
is a common refrain in discussing conflict in the
region that apparently religious tension are in
fact political, whether due to the restriction of
political freedoms under military rule or the
scheming of politicians since 1999. People feel
that politicians are responsible for violence,
either by using gangs of young men for political
126
thug or by stirring up trouble in other to seek a
pay-off from federal authorities.
The following is a typical view; “These elite
only raise their voices when they lose out in the
game of sharing power and resources among
themselves. During President Obasanjo’s regime, if
a northerner was sent packing from government, he
quickly rushed home to hoodwink and manipulate
youths to stage an armed conflict so that he could
negotiate for yet another position in government”.
An interlocutor argued that his state governor
was creating trouble in other to shift public
resources into a “security fund” so he did not have
to account for their use. Tensions and conflicts
stirred up by politicians often take on religious
or associated ethnic dimension simply because these
127
are society most visible lines of division.
Politics and religion have always been inextricably
linked in the north and recent political
development has affected religious coexistence. The
expansion of the country political structure from
three regions in 1960 to 36 states in 1996
undermined regionalism and reconfigured state-level
conditions. The smaller, predominantly Christian
ethnic groups began emerging as more significant
political actors within their states. Threatened by
this development, the ruling classes in the region
began to explore new strategies for retaining their
influence and control. In the far north, they well
back increasingly on religion “as a tool to forge a
new hegemonic coalition” and it become a major
128
instrument for mobilizing constituencies, sometimes
violently.
Growing disillusionment, especially among
Muslim youth, with the “deception” and
“insincerity” that have characterized
implementation of Sharia is also feeding into
conflicts. Sharia was meant to herald a corruption-
free and more compassionate state, but many in the
region now believe that the political establishment
has become even more corrupt and uncaring than it
was during the earlier era. Many youth conclude
that the promises of Sharia will never be truly
realized until it is implemented by religious
rather than political authorities in other words,
after the installation of an Islamic State. This
frequently leads to them into conflict with
129
established authorities. All these are further
compounded largely due to the failure of the
Nigeria state to live up to its primary
responsibility of providing security and welfare
for its citizens. Thus, as a consequence of all
these, the state is consumed by internal violence;
its credibility and legitimacy are being questioned
by the citizens (Rotberg, 2004). The reality of the
situation is that since the citizen have lost
confidence in the capacity of the state to manage
religious diversity on one hand, and provide
protection for them on another hand; they have
resort to alternative sources of security. The lack
of cohesiveness in the nation’s polity has also
manifested itself in the present democratic
dispensation. This has been demonstrated by the
130
incessant cases of violence and uprisings in the
last couple of years.
Since the enthronement of democratic rule in
1999, in his view, Kwaja (2009) believes the
failure of governance is responsible for the
recurring sectarian violence in Nigeria. Another
reason responsible for ethno-religious crisis in
Nigeria is the wrong interpretation of the
scripture by those who claim authority to the
interpretation of the holy books. If not so, one
wonders why people act contrary to the teaching of
the scriptures of matters pertaining to peaceful
co-existence, unity and sanctity of life, and
property. As it is a serious disease for an
ignorance to claim authority to knowledge, many of
the so called ‘religious leaders use their shallow
131
knowledge to interpret the scripture to suit their
selfish and banking on the ignorance of their
followers. Lamenting on the wide gap between the
teaching and practice of religion among its
adherents, Adebayo (2003) identified some factor
responsible for using religion as instrument of
polarization, among which is leadership tussle,
which also culminate in the proliferation of may
dominations in the country. Also, sectarian
jingoism as well as well as excessive patriotism to
one’s religious sect, which consequently
transformed to fanaticism, is another major factor
contributing to this social menace.
It is an un-derivable fact that a nation that
witnesses ethno-religious crisis almost on an
annual basis could not be said to be stable
132
politically. The problem of ethnicity, which
dichotomized the country’s armed forces, was said
to have been responsible for the outbreak of the
1967 civil war, which lasted for thirty months
leaving thousands of lives dead including “soldiers
and civilian that would have done the country proud
(Ajimotokin, 2003). It is also observed by Adebayo,
(2003) that religion has no place where ethnicity
is dominating. He attributed the annulment of the
June 12, 1993 election which was believed to have
been the most peaceful, free and fair election in
the political history of the country, to ethnicity
where both the acclaimed winner of the election and
the then military president that annulled the
election were Muslims but from different ethnic
background. In essence, ethno-religious crisis
133
breed unstable government, which is very crucial to
sustainable development.
Education is very vital in only sustainable
developmental program. The nation is striving to
put in place amenities for the purpose of elevating
the education standard of the country. This is,
however hampered by incessant closure of schools
and institutions in places where ethno-religious
crisis are holding. Apart from the schools are not
spared in the destructive tendencies of those
participating in crisis of any nature. Many schools
had been burnt down while many were forced to close
down for months. The education of innocent youths
was equally disrupted under tumultuous situations
created by ethno religious crisis, as many were
forced to migrate from the crisis area. Imam
134
(2004:38) identified two parties of emigration in
such a situation, namely temporary and permanent
emigration. He observed that;
Those who emigrated on temporary basiscame back after several weeks or monthsin exile to come back and contend withrely of their abandoned residence andproperties. However, those who opted forpermanent emigration were mostly non-indigenes who suffered losses and felttheir continued stay in the crisis areasis like casting one’s life intoperdition (Cited in Sampson, 2012).
Whichever the case, the crisis destabilized
everything, including the education of students
whose parents were forced to relocate consequent of
the crisis. Such people became refugees elsewhere
and would take time for them to settle down in
their new settlements to practice their profession
and for children to adjust to their new
environment.
135
Cases of ethno-religious crisis have serious
implication for stability of education programs in
the tertiary institutions where they are lunched.
Ethnic crisis, which took place at Ahmadu Bello
University (ABU) Zaria, no doubt, led to brain
drain. The Hausa community in the institution,
motivated by spirit of ethnicity, complained about
inequality of posts of responsibilities among the
staff of the University. The staff, mostly Hausa-
Fulani, constituted they into an organization
called Northern Elements coalition (NECO), accused
the Yoruba and Tiv staff of marginalizing them.
Losing sight of the fact that positions in tertiary
institutions are filled on merit and qualifications
and not on the basis of ethnicity, they accused the
then vice-chancellor, Prof. Daniel Saror (A Tiv
136
man) of collaborating with the university senate
and council, which were composed essentially of
professors of Yoruba extraction to “destroy” the
university. The rancor consequently led to the
brutal murder of Prof. Bamidele Bandipo, who hailed
from offa, a Yoruba town in Kwara State (Adeyemi,
2005). This state of insecurity made many lecturers
of the institution, especially the Yoruba and Tiv
to look outside the institution for other
universities where their lives and properties would
be protected.
A major cause of what we now see as ethno
religious conflict in Nigeria has to do with the
accusations and allegation of neglect, oppression
domination, exploitation, victimization,
discrimination, marginalization, nepotism and
137
bigotry. In every nation (Nigeria inclusive), there
is no complete agreement on how wealth, power and
states are to be shared among individuals and
groups. There is also no agreement on how to effect
necessary changes and reforms. This is because,
different groups and individuals have diverse
interest in which case, some groups will have their
aims met, while others will not. What this means is
that conflict (ethno religious ones inclusive)
usually occur when deprived group and individuals
attempt to increase their share of power and wealth
or to modify the dominant values, norms, beliefs or
ideology. Thus, in Nigeria and going by the various
examples of ethno-religious conflict cited earlier,
there seems to be a divisive interplay of politics,
ethicist and religious, which has consequently led
138
to the rising nationalism and militancy of various
ethnic and religious movement. It is interesting to
note that the overall consequence of this is the
escalation of various ethno-religious conflicts
that are witnessed all over the country today which
are meant to correct any perceived form of
marginalization, oppression or domination.
It is important to note here too that the
failure of the Nigerian leader to establish good
governments, forge national integration and promote
what can be called real economic progress, through
deliberate and articulated policies, has led to
mass poverty and unemployment. This has resulted
into communal, ethnic, religious and class conflict
that have now characterized the Nigerian nation.
139
Another glaring factor that sparks up ethno
religious violence conflict is indigene/settler
divides. In many parts of Nigeria, the issue of
indignity has seemed to create new kind of
parochialism where none has existed before. The
settler question in urban areas in Nigeria has
produced violent conflict in varying capacities as
witnessed in kasuwa Magani (1980), ZangoKataf, Gure
Kahagu (1984), Kafanchan Kaduna, Lere (1987),
Ilorin, Jere (1987), Tafawa Balewa Bauch (1991),
Zango Kataf (1992), Tiv and Idoma (1993), (See
Ibrahim, 1993; Dung, 1994). Dung (1994) asserts
that those conflicts often start as local conflict
but later spread to other areas. He further states
that religious factors have also played a crucial
role in the generation and expansion of the
140
conflict, especially in situations where the
religious and political boundaries overlap. The
issue of indigene/settler divides began to take an
increase importance not long after Nigeria’s
independence according to HEW (2006) “With regional
policies that discriminated against the indigene of
other region in areas as diverse as employment and
the acquisition of land (Brennan, 2005). The
following excerpt speaks volume of indigene/settler
dichotomy as indicated by Albert and Godfrey
(1965:55) where Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, Premier of
Nigeria’s Northern Region 1956 in a house of
chief’s debate opined that
We do not want to go to (lake) chad andmeet strangers catching our fish in thewater, and taking them away to leave uswith nothing. We don’t want to go toSokoto and find a carpenter who is astranger nailing our houses. I do notwant to go to the Sabon-Gari in kano and
141
find strangers making the body of alorry, or to go to the market and seebutcher who are not northerners (citedin Salawu, 2010:73)
The maintenance of peace and security is
critical to the responsibility of the state. Thus,
section 14 (1) of the Nigerian constitution state
that; “the security and welfare of the people shall be a primary
purpose of government”. The emerging consensus on the
study of ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria
emphasizes the role of the state as the both the
regulator of competition among the diverse ethnic
group as well as the guarantor of security
(Osaghae, 2007:171; cited in, Okpanachi 2010).
Regrettably, the post colonial Nigeria state
has become so entangled in ethnic and religious
issues to the extent that its neutrality and
legitimacy has also become suspect. In the light of
142
the foregoing, certain probing questions become
germane; whose interest does the state seek to
protect in terms of access and opportunities? Which
of the ethnic or religious interests does the state
seek to protect or obstruct? Does the state possess
the capacity to manage ethnic and religious
conflict? How can such capacity be transformed with
the aim of guaranteeing durable peace, security and
stability? The question of how to reconcile the
contradictory role of the diverse ethnic and
religious group is central to our analysis of the
capacity of the state to manage ethnic and
religious conflicts. The inability of the state to
effectively perform its core functions of providing
or guaranteeing security for the people as well as
act as regulator has led to a weakening of the
143
bargaining strength and capacity in relation to the
ethnic and religious groups in society, which poses
a serious challenge for national security.
In this light, loyalty to ethnic or religious
cleavage is being placed for and above the state.
In view of the fact that some people especially
citizens in rural areas, who constitute the bulk of
the marginalized group prefer to be seen and
described based on the ethnic or religious groups
they belong rather than their status as citizens of
Nigeria. The failure of the state has led to the
emergence of ethnic militias in several parts of
the country that have been agitating for reversing
back to the old regional autonomy of the different
groups for the purpose of determining the pace of
144
their development and control of their respective
resources.
The Oduduwa People’s Congress (OPC) was put in
place by the Yoruba in the South West part of the
country to fight for the protection and defense of
Yoruba in Nigeria. In the eastern part was the
movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign
State of Biafra (MASSOB) fighting for cessation of
the Igbo ethnic tribe from the Nigeria. This might
probably be the feeling of Elaigwu (2005; cited in,
Adebayo 2010.) when he writes.
… the violent protests in the Niger-Delta over perceived injustice inresources distribution; the Itsekiri-Ijaw violence in the Delta; theresumption of the menace of Odu’aPeople’s Congress (APC) and the IgboPeople’s Congress (IPC); the MASSOBfeeble attempt to resuscitate Biafra;the Sharia crises and the demand for afederation; the south-south demand forthe control of its resources; and allthe recent inter-ethnic/religious
145
conflicts such as Boko haram in variousstates across the country are all partof the bubbles of the Nigeriafederation. They are based on thehistorical structures of mutual fearsand suspicions among Nigerians group ina competitive process. They reflectdissatisfaction of Nigeria group withthe state of the federation (P. 12).
Federalism, as an approach to national unity,
has resulted to anarchy in the country, lamenting
on this, a former military head of state and later
a civilian president of Nigeria, Chief Olusegun
Obasanjo, was said to have highlighted some of the
shortcoming of the type of approach when he says;
Fear suspicion, intolerance and greedhave been constant in every crisis andconfrontation in Nigeria… it is thepsychological fear of discrimination anddomination. It is fear of deprivation ornot getting one’s fair share… it isvariously described, at the politicallevels as constitutional imbalance; ateconomic level as inequality ofopportunity (Daily Times, 1984)
146
Apart from the ethnic rivalry threatening the
sustainable development of Nigeria, another serious
problem facing the country is religious pluralism
which has culminated in many crisis and has shaken
the country to its root and state has proven
incapacitated as a result of ethnic pressure and
demand which severe implication in term of the
ability to manage ethno-religious contradictions in
the political system. These also expose its lack of
autonomy and ability to stand above society as a
neutral agency.
147
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
5.1 SUMMARY
The research work examined the problem of
ethno- religious conflicts in Nigeria with emphasis
on it causes. Starting from a stand point that
religious conflicts which are widespread in Nigeria
have a long history and are characterized by
violent confrontations among the causes of these
religious conflicts are multi-dimensional. Some of
the causes mentioned and discussed in this paper
are accusations and allegations of neglect,
oppression, domination, victimization,
discrimination, marginalization and the inability
of the Nigerian leaders to establish a good system
of governments, breakdown of traditional vehicles
148
of social control; the long history of military
intervention in politics, which legitimizes the use
of force and violenceas instruments of social
change and attainment of set goals and demand, and
historical antecedent. In spite of the widespread
of religious conflicts in Nigeria and their long
history, the paper has shown that the Nigerian
governments (past and present) have failed to
tackle this problem through articulate and well
organized policy actions.
In the quest of disseminate credible
information, the media should be careful not to
exaggerate the detail of religious violence in
order not to fuel and intensify grievances, which
would lead to further killing and destruction of
property. This is not to suggest that the media
149
should withhold valuable information about violent
occurrence but rather that it should be done in
manner which clearly explains the conditions that
may have sparked off the violence, in other words,
it should not be recriminating to just one
religious group.
The patronage of one religious group or
another has also been a disturbing factor which
also has the tendency of fuel grievances, what this
means is that both of the state and federal level,
public officials apparently slow preference for
members of their religion. Also, at the mention of
any religious group in any political or economic
policy, there is always a tendency that religious
has been contend, as one of the factors that leads
to religious violence. The wrong perception of
150
different religious stems from the fact that there
is lack in the methods through which adherents
educate and carryout orientations. This has brought
about extremism and fundamentalism which are
indicators of religious intolerance as early
mentioned.
A critical lesson to learn from this analysis
is that religion has become in the contemporary
world to use the words of Ball and Dagger, “a
political force pushing in different directions
(Thomas and Richard, 1995). This implies that
nations and indeed Nigeria must wake up to this
reality and be more concerned with harnessing the
peace making opponents and values of its various
religious groups. There is no denying the fact that
each religion teaches peace and discourages war and
151
conflicts. Therefore, religious leaders from
different faith can be mobilized to facilitate
peace. This is no doubt requires religious leaders
from both faiths to teach and practice common
virtues such as justice, compassion, kindness and
respect for the others.
It is important from this point to note that
despite the measures taken to achieve some level of
social integration and unity in Nigeria, ethno-
religious violence have continued to linger thereby
threatening the very existence of the country and
constituting a threat to the nascent democracy .
5.2 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have examined the problem of
ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria in general and
Kaduna state in particular with emphasis on its
152
causes and management. Starting from a theoretical
standpoint that ethno-religious conflicts which are
widespread in Nigeria have a long history and are
characterized by violent confrontations among the
various ethnic and religious groups that make up
the Nigeria nation. The research argues that the
causes of these ethno-religious conflict are multi-
dimensional. Some of the causes mentioned and
discussed in this paper are accusations and
allegations of neglect, oppression, domination,
victimization, discrimination, marginalization,
nepotism and bigotry; the inability of the Nigerian
leaders to establish good government; breakdown of
traditional vehicle of social control; the long
history of military intervention in politics, which
legitimizes the use of force and violence as
153
instruments of social change and attainment of set
goals and demand; and historical antecedent.
In spite of the widespread of ethno-religious
conflicts in Nigeria and their long history, the
paper has shown that the Nigerian governments (past
and present) have failed to tackle this problem
through articulated and well organized policy
actions. The country record in conflict management
has been poor as the government continues to rely
on coercive method and always resorts to the use of
white paper emanating from them are often not
implemented. Since ethno-religious conflict are
inevitable in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious
society like Nigeria, the paper has suggested the
following mechanisms of conflict management:
government should move from conflict resolution to
154
the stage of conflict prevention; provision of
adequate and effective security in each state that
will respond promptly to any ethno-religious
insurgence; establishment of functional and
effective platform for ethno-religious leaders
where grievances can be discussed before they
escalate into ethno- religious crisis; involvement
of the civil society which will intervene in some
critical area of ethno-religious conflict;
strengthening of some conflict resolution
institutions through appropriate legislations;
government should resolve to be pluralistic,
representative and just in dealing with ethno-
religious issues; and above all the government
should strive to reduce poverty among the Nigerian
citizens.
155
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
We have discus above the frequency of ethno-
religious crisis in the state. We identify the
causes of the February 21 2000 crisis in the state
and its implications. We also acknowledge the
inevitability of conflict in social relations.
Having clearly understood the issues involved, the
following are masterpiece for interveners.
1. Firstly, the issue of street culture must be
addressed. Most of the riots in Kaduna would
not have been as fatal as they were if there
had not been the problem of street culture in
the city. By street culture we mean the
abnormal situation in which an individual who
has no home or work place spend a
156
disproportionately large part of his or her
time on the street and consequently become
liable to involvement in anti-social
activities. For instance, the “Almajirai, Yandaba
etc. the engendered the street culture where
instrumental to the pedestal dimension in which
the February 2000 crisis assumed. Therefore,
one of the way by which inter-religious and
inter-ethnic harmony can be promoted in Kaduna
is by dealing with the problem of street
culture. As a matter of urgency, the government
should deal with the Almajirai system by formally
absorbing the Qur’anic schooling which these
children attend into a formal educational
system in the country. Alternatively, Islamic
scholars should be given government grants for
157
the re-organization of their schools according
to modern standards. The pupils from these
schools should be stopped from begging on the
street. If the Almajiral could be permanently kept
off the street of Kaduna, those who seek to
cause religious or ethnic violence would not
find enough people on the street to support
their mob action.
2. As a step towards solving the problem of ethno-
religious conflict, the government at all
levels should jointly move from conflict
resolution to the stage of conflict prevention.
To effectively succeed in this new process, the
government should be more committed to the
provision of adequate and effective security in
each state. That should be able to respond
158
promptly to any insurgence of ethno-religious
crisis anywhere at any time. It is important to
point out here though that the security outfit
that will serve this purpose effectively should
be the type that will have adequate and modem
security facilities and training that will
enhance their quick response to ethno religious
conflicts.
3. Another step towards managing ethno-religious
conflicts in Nigeria is that government at all
levels must encourage, in their domains,
effective and functional platforms for ethno-
religious leaders so that through them it would
be possible to establish a network for conflict
prevention and management. This proposal is
necessary because in Nigeria, the various
159
political, religious, traditional and ethnic
leaders in most areas of conflict hardly sit
together to discuss the causes of ethno-
religious violence and how to prevent future
conflicts. What this means is that in Nigeria,
with a bad history of ethno-religious
conflicts, leaders hardly met to build bridges
of understanding that could lead to the
establishment of mutual confidence that could
sustain a multi-ethnic society. Thus, rather
than being part or initiators of the solution,
they (leaders) often become part of the
conflicts, which they suppose to resolve. The
recent government resolution to establish a
National Council of Traditional Rulers is a
move in the right direction, which will go a
160
long way in building bridges among religious
and ethnic divides. It is however suggested
here that such body should be expanded to
include ethnic leaders, opinion leaders and
religious leaders, while the government should
strengthen the Nigeria Inter Religious Council
(N1REC), which is already in existence.
4. The civil society also has important roles to
play in the management of ethno-religious
conflicts in Nigeria. The civil society can
effectively intervene by focusing attention on
the social organization and structural patterns
of interaction, the modes of violence employed
the values of the parties in conflict, the
genesis of conflict, and the degree of
incompatibility of goals among others.
161
5. Just like the civil society, the Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO) also has
special roles to play in conflict management in
Nigeria. Therefore, governmental organizations
or institutions at all levels should encourage
the NGOs to embark on research and program of,
environment, civic, religious, and peace
education for neighborhood communities. In
particular, the NGOs should be organized in
such a way that they will serve as facilitators
of dialogues between, conflicting groups.
6. The government in Nigeria should strengthen the
Institution of Public Complaint Bureau which
already exists in each state of the Federation
through appropriate legislations. With this
establishment, the parties in dispute will be
162
able to lay - bare their grievances for on-ward
transmission to appropriate government agencies
for necessary action. There should also be a
deliberate program of political and social
reorientation of the entire citizenry. Such
political and social orientation will go a long
way in changing the negative stereotypes and
negative, values that have characterized the
Nigerian peoples, In particular, the National
Orientation Agency (NOA), the National Youth
Service Corps (NYSC), the National Institute
for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPS),
Political Parties and National Associations
(like National Youth Council, Nigeria Council
of Women Society (NCWS) should be strengthened
in the various assignments as bridge builders
163
that will discourage the spirit of division
among Nigerians and foster oneness which is
necessary for building one nation with one
destiny as contained in the Nigerian
constitution.
7. There must be respect for the BELIEF of each
group. It was in one of the numerous meetings
of our fore leaders in the first Republic to
mediate peace and co-existence that Dr. Nnamdi
Azikiwe maintained thus, “we should forget
about our differences and live together as one”
but in swift reaction, Sir Ahmadu Bello
disapprove the submission of Nnamdi Azikiwe
when he argued “No, we cannot forget our
differences but to appreciate and accommodate
our differences if we must live together as
164
one” in this light therefore, Christian in the
state must consciously learn how to appreciate
the aversion of the followers of Islam and
cease from such. For instance, for the
Christian to openly preach that “The only way
to kingdom of God is through Christ, any other
way leads to hell” in a place like Muslim area
is to provoke the sensibilities of the Muslims
and must be avoided because it is considered
objectionable to them. In the same vein, the
Muslims in the state should desist from the
stereotype labeling of Christian as Kafiri
(Infidel), that is, someone who has no
religion. Closely related to this is the
worrisome issue of inflammatory sentiments
against religions by some political and
165
religious leaders. Imprudent religious comments
sharpen religious sensitivities and inflame
passions. If the leaders avoid foul languages,
it will encourage other members of their
religion to follow suit. This will in turn
promote good neighborliness and peaceful co-
existence in the state. The leaders of the two
religion are thus, challenged in the
accomplishment of this supposition.
Above all, in order to solve the problem of
ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria, the
government should be pluralistic, representative,
and just in their treatment of the Nigerian
citizens. It should discourage all forms of
discrimination, neglect and marginalization in
dealing with development and religious issues. The
166
government should also target to reduce poverty
among Nigerians so that the reservoir of recruits
for ethno-religious conflicts will be punctured.
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