THE STATE AND ETHNO-RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN

NIGERIA: A STUDY OF KADUNA STATE FROM (1999-

2012)

BY

IBRAHIM AHMED OLATUNJISMS/09/POL/00831

A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENTOF POLITICAL SCIENCE, FACULTY OF SOCIAL AN

MANAGEMENT SCIENCES (SMS), BAYERO UNIVERSITY,KANO,

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FORTHE AWARD OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCES (B.SC.HONS)

DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE.

MAY, 2014.

DECLARATION

I declared that this research project is an

independent research work carried out by me and all

the materials used with references to this work as

been duly acknowledged.

Ibrahim Ahmed

Olatunji

ii

APPROVAL PAGE

This project titled the State and Ethno-

religious violence in Nigeria, A study of Kaduna

State from (1999 – 2012) has been read and approved

as meeting the requirement of the faculty of social

and management sciences (SMS), Bayero University,

Kano for the award of B.Sc. in Political Science.

________________________ …………………….Mallama Hafsat. Y. YakasaiDateProject Supervisor

________________________ …………………….Dr.Aisha Abdul-Ismail DateHead of Department

_________________________ …………………….

iii

Mallama Hafsat. Y. YakasaiDateLevel Co-ordinator

_________________________ …………………….External Examiner Date

iv

DEDICATION

I dedicated this research work to Almighty

Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful.

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Alhamdulillah Robilalamin .It is imperative to

appreciate the conscious and sub-conscious efforts

of those who wittingly and unwittingly contributed

to the completion of this work.

My profound gratitude goes to Almighty God for

His mercies, life, opportunities, strength and

wisdom since birth and during the period of this

programmed and for the inspiration my Muslim faith

has blessed me with. May His infinite name be

exalted forever

I am highly indebted to my erudite, versatile

and picky supervisor, Mrs.Hafsat .Y.Yakasai for

her scholarly supervision and guidance. The quality

of this work is indeed attributable to her

constructive criticism and masterly advice. Suffice

vi

it to mention that in the course of my interaction

with her during this study, I was brought to the

real nitty-gritty of research study and also it was

those painstaking efforts of her that has made this

research work not be marred by too many mistakes.

May God bless and elevate her to a higher pedestal.

I also acknowledge our Head of Department in

person of Dr. Aishat Abdul Ismail for her

professional and motherly advice towards our

success for the past four years.

I appreciate and acknowledge the prodigious

influence of my parents in the pursuit of my

intellectual drive, an influence that has brought

and sustain me this far, their indefatigable

contributions to my academic sustain forever.

vii

My unalloyed gratitude also goes to the family

of my sponsor for their conscientious role in the

course of my programmed in person of Alhaji.Abdul-

Ganiyu Alate’s family and the rest of my family,

May God reward them more abundantly. Jazaakummulahu

Khairan

I also acknowledge the lecturers at the

department of political science, Bayero University,

Kano. For their instructions and teachings these

past four years.

Also to be acknowledge are my brothers,

sisters, siblings and nephew and the rest of my

family members for their moral and financial

supports, support that remain immeasurable in the

context of this work

viii

This acknowledgement would be incomplete

without expressing my sincere and profound

appreciation to all my friends both at home and in

school.

It is instructive, however, that I use this

medium to unequivocally thank the family of Hafeez

Adegoke, Oluwole Lasisi, Saheed. I.Adeyemi,Taibu

Monsuru and the long list which cannot contain

here. It will be an unpardonable oversight should I

fail to commend these family for their influence in

completion of this work. May God bless and reward

you all.

In submission and most importantly too, I hold

my fiancée, Khadijat Omobolanle Yusuph in high

esteem for giving me the emotional and

psychological boost, a boost that added color to

ix

the work. I am thankful and remain committed to

her.

Finally, a piece of work of this nature cannot

be completely free from errors. I therefore take

full responsibility for any in this research work.

IBRAHIM AHMED OLATUNJI

x

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page

i

Declaration

ii

Approval Page

iii

Dedication

iv

Acknowledgement v

Table of Contents

viii

Abstract

x

CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

xi

1.1 Background of the Study

1

1.2. Statement of Research Problem

6

1.3 Research Objectives

8

1.4 Significance of the Study

8

1.5 Scope and Limitation of the Research

9

1.6 Research Methodology

10

1.7 Definition of the key Concept

10

1.8 Outlines of Chapters

11

xii

xiii

CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE/

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Introduction

12

2.1 Theoretical Framework

12

2.2 Ethno-Religious Violence in Nigeria: A Review

19

CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

3.1 History of Kaduna State

37

3.2 Background to Sharia in Kaduna

45

3.3 The visible causes of Religious Violence in

Nigeria 49

CHAPTER FOUR

xiv

4.1 State Ineffectiveness in the Management

of Ethno-Religious Violence

69

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND

RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Summary 83

5.2 Conclusion

85

5.3 Recommendations

87

Bibliography 94

xv

ABSTRACT The literature on ethno-religious violence in Nigeria largely

implicates social-economic, political and governance deficits as themajor causes of such violence. The thrust of this paper therefore, is toundertaken an analytical inquiry into the immediate and visiblefactors that trigger religious conflicts in the country. It also evaluatesthe nature of state management of ethno-religious conflict and positsthat government haphazard approach to these conflicts as well asthe absence of long-term strategy for its management account fortheir persistent manifestation. Drawing from the findings made,recommendations on the appropriate approach to curbing ethno-religious violence in the country are proffered.

Keywords: State, Ethno-religious violence and Nigeria

xvi

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

Religion could serve and has indeed served as

an instrument of social harmony in many

civilizations. Paradoxically, however, it has also

served as a motivation for violence, hence its

indication in some literature as a “double edge

sword” (Maregere 2011: 17-23; Obasi 2009, cited in,

Sampson 2012:104) from the time immemorial,

religious bigots have attempted to legitimize

violence in the name of God. Contemporarily act of

extreme violence such as terrorist attacks are

often justified as “holy warfare”. In the past two

decades, religious has been at the centre of most

violent conflict around the world, thereby gaining

1

notoriety as one of the prime security challenges

confronting the world in the wake of the cold war

(Juergensmeyer, 2000:6; Abu-Nimer 2000, cited in,

Sampson 2012). Nigeria since independence has

remained a multi-ethnic nation state with over 400

ethnic groups (Chidi, 2005; Salawa; 2010),

belonging to several religious sects has been

trying to cope with the problem of ethnicity on the

one hand and the problem of ethno religious

conflict on the other. In Nigeria, it is

interesting to note that ethnicity and religious

bigotry has become a fulcrum of violence forms of

nationalism ranging from bitter war of words,

cultural autonomy and religious superiority to

demand for local political autonomy and self-

determination. All these sometimes leads to some

2

forms of contextual discrimination of members of

one ethnic or religious group against another on

the basis of differentiated systems of socio-

cultural symbols and religion. Therefore, in a

multi-ethnic and religiously diverse society like

Nigeria, with some - forms of contextual

discrimination, relationship between people may be

characterized by lack of cordiality and mutual

suspicion of fear. This mutual suspicion and lack

of cordiality among the various ethnic components

explain why ethno-religious conflicts have become

permanent feature of Nigeria as a nation as far

back as 1960’s to date. The Nigeria states have

been characterized by various upheavals and vices

from ethnic to religious violence, corruption and

injustice, accusation and allegations of neglect,

3

oppression, domination, exploitation,

victimization, discrimination, marginalization,

nepotism, bigotry and so on. All these also have

some historical antecedent. This is because many

governmental actions during the colonial rule and

after independence encourage to a large extents,

the sowing of seeds of ethno-religious violence

that are found to be rampant in the Nigerian nation

today. As noticed by Ikejiani Clark (2005), over

the years, many events in Nigeria have led to the

politicization of mistrust, intolerance, violence

and acrimonious relations between the mainly Muslim

North and the Christian South of Nigeria. To this

extent, Ikejiani Clark contended that there has

been an unfortunate insertion of ethno-religious

discrimination and incompatibility in the

4

structures of the Nigerian state since the colonial

period. In 1931 for instance, the colonial

administration under the leadership of Governor

Donald Cameroon did not encourage intermingling of

religions. The governor advised the Christian

mission to thread softly in Muslim core areas,

pushing them instead into the Sabon Gari (Strangers

quarters) so as to maintain the stability of

indirect rule. The political events of the June 15,

1966 coup and the July 1966 counter-coup further

entrenched ethno-religious configuration in

Nigeria.

This is because proper considerations were not

taken as colonial administration before merging

people of different ethnic and religious groups

into one entity. This was done because it made

5

control easier. Although some disagree on

qualifying Nigeria as a single entity but an

amalgam of two distinct and antagonistic entities

with different background, aspirations and

interest. The problems escalated during the call

for self-determination as the nationalist elites

rather than seeks to correct the ills created by

the colonial government, were more concerned about

attaining political office and consolidating

themselves in power. Therefore, the trends and

patterns laid out by the colonial administration

became the status quo for regulating the function

of the state. Religion and its volatile nature

which were the central focus of this research is

one of the recognized factors that can enhance or

destabilize the security of any nation at any given

6

period. It is generally believed that religious

value system play a very important role in

collective self-awareness and identity which brings

together individuals, families and regions and pull

them towards great self-consciousness needed to

build a nation from within (Williams, 1996).

Nigeria, a country with a population of over

150 million inhabitants is been considered one of

the most religious countries in the world. While it

is generally believed that ethnic identification is

presumed to be the almost salient and consistent

source of social identity in Nigeria. (Lewis,

2007).

This common assumption is challenged by a

researched by the pew-Religious forum which

revealed that religion, rather than ethnicity is

7

the most salient identity in the country. By virtue

of its complex web of politically salient

identities and history of chronic and seemingly

intractable conflicts and instability, Nigeria can

be rightly described as one of the most deeply

divided states in Africa (Osaghae and Suberu,

2005). The country is essentially heterogeneous

society within the two monotheistic religion,

Christianity and Islam enjoying the loyalty of most

Nigerians. It is this unique religious divide that

prompted Archbishop Onaiyekan to describe the

country as “the greatest Islam-Christian nation in

the world” by which he meant that Nigeria is the

largest country in the world with an evenly split

population of Muslims and Christians and “really

8

the test of the clash of civilization” (Paden,

2007.)

Religion has always been important in Nigeria

and in Nigerian politics (Enwerem, 1995; cited in,

Okpanachi 2010.) “The intensity of religious

identity in Nigeria is regarded as one of the

highest in the world” (Paden, 2008). This claim is

supported by the fact that Nigerians are more

likely to define themselves in terms of religion

than any other identity.

A study conducted in Spain has found that

societies that are divided along religious lines

are more prone to intense and prolonged conflict

than those divided by political, territorial and

ethnic differences (ReynalQuerol 2002). Perhaps,

this reality explains the prime position that

9

religious violence occupies on Nigeria’s security

pyramid. Although often marginalized traditional

religion has a fair of degree of followership and

is not by any means isolated from religious

violence for instance, in part of Kogi, Kwara and

Nassarawa State, Masquerade activities associated

with traditional religion have been a major sources

of conflicts (Osagha and Suberu 2005:11).

The attitude of ethno-religion violence has

deepened suspicion among the Nigerian populace,

thus, creating cracks in the effort of the

government towards sustainable development. Kaduna

state as a composite unit of Nigeria has almost

remained under the siege of ethno-religious crisis.

Just as in other parts of the country, the sheer

frequency of this conflict in the state is a cause

10

for concern, A concern which actually informed this

study.

1.2. STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM

Peace is an integral to national building and

sustainable development. Absence of peace in any

society breeds instability akin to “a state of

nature”. This necessitates effective management of

conflict by putting proper mechanisms in order to

forestall further deterioration of societal order.

Any keen observer of the Nigerian political scene

would clearly see that since the nascent democracy

in 1999, the Nigerian state has been characterized

by all sought of political crisis predominantly of

which is religious violence.

The phenomenal reoccurrence of ethno-religious

conflict in Kaduna State as evidenced in the recent

11

time has left more to be desired. Perennial loss of

lives and properties, dominance of social upheaval

in the state collapse of commercial and industrial

activities, etc. all combine to precipitate a

climate of fear uncertainty and underdevelopment in

the state. Kaduna state has two broad cultural and

religious blocs, the political system is expected

to cope with and control violence in whatever form

it may arise, and thus the state inability to

effectively curb and curtail ethno-religious

violence should not be overlooked or taken lightly.

It is against this backdrop that the study

addressed the following questions;

1. Why were ethno-religious conflict rampant in

Kaduna State in the

Period under study?

12

2. What is the socio-political economic and

governance factor that cause vio1ence?

3. What role, if any, did the non-governmental

organization play in the management of

aforementioned violence?

13

1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The focus of this study rest on the following

objectives;

i. To examine the underlying socio-political,

economic and governance factors that brings about

ethno religious violence.

ii. To examine the present lapses in the Nigerian

state that give rise to violence and how it can

improve and appropriate strategies for managing

religious violence.

iii. To suggest ways in which incidence of

ethno-religious violence can be reduced to

ensure peace and security in the state.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

What this research intends to do basically is

to highlight on the probable factors and causes of

14

ethno-religious violence in the country within

special focus on the forth republic, it would as

much as possible provide a deep insight on the

structures of the state that allows for the

mismanagement of its affairs. It would shed light

on the reasons for dissatisfaction among different

groups that has led to many crisis which the state

as witnessed since independence, also how relevant

other institutions unwillingly spark of religious

grievances and sentiment while carrying out their

activities. The paper would provide insights on how

certain inactions of the state has created the

platform for religious violence to occur. Finally,

it will proffer solutions that would be very useful

in managing religious differences and violence

15

which if carefully observed can ensure peaceful

coexistence among the different religious groups.

1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH

The research is limited to Kaduna State ethno-

religious crisis from 1999 – 2012 pointing out the

various incidents, locations and the causes.

However, an analysis of the frequency of these

conflicts must necessarily incorporate historical

antecedents. This is in agreement with the

postulation of (Ekong, 2002: 95). All our past

proclaims our future… if we of today would

understand where we are at present, we must begin

by examining the heritage of our past”.

The research took a historical tour of past

ethno-religious conflict in Kaduna from 1986 — 2012

in order to have insight of the nature of the

16

conflicts. Most importantly, it would make more

inquiry in the immediate and visible factors that

have triggered ethno religious violence in the

country. And also, the researcher will look into

the state ineffectiveness in the management of

ethno-religious violence as in Nigeria.

17

1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study is based on data derived from

secondary sources. The research work being

historical, descriptive and analytical in nature

requires such a methodology. In this regards, much

of the data were sourced from books, journals,

magazines, newspaper, published and unpublished

materials, seminar and conference papers presented

on different fora, Internet source was also used,

data were also obtained from library of Bayero

University, Kano. Which help to gain understanding

of the issues there in subjected to questioning?

1.7 DEFINITION OF THE KEY CONCEPT

State: State is characterized by political

apparatuses, distinct from both ruler and ruled

)with supreme jurisdiction over a democratic

territorial arena, backed by a claim to

18

monopoly of coercive power and enjoying or

minimum level of support or loyalty from their

citizen (Epelle, 20 10:7).

Ethno Religious Violence: Ethno-religious

violence means a situation which the

relationship between members of one ethnic or

religious group and another of such group in a

multiethnic and multi- religious society is

characterized by lack of cordiality, mutual

suspicion and fear, and a tendency towards

violence confrontation.

Nigeria: Nigeria, officially the Federal

Republic of Nigeria is a federal constitutional

republic comprising 36 states and its federal

capital territory, Abuja. The country is

located in West Africa and shares borders with

the Republic Of Benin in the west, Chad and

Cameroon in the East and Niger in the North.

19

Its coast in the South lies on the gulf of

Guinea on the Atlantic Ocean. There are over

500 ethnic groups in Nigeria of which the tree

largest ethnic groups are the Hausa, Igbo and

Yoruba.

1.8 OUTLINES OF CHAPTERS

The first chapter which gives the background of

the research, statement of the research problem,

research objectives, significance of the study,

scope and limitation of the research, research

methodology, definition of key concept and chapter

outline.

Chapter Two, focuses on literature review and

theoretical framework. Chapter three will be based

on proper analysis of the historical precedence of

the existing problem of ethno-religious violence,

the visible causes of the violence, pattern of

settlement along religious line and timeline of

20

some cases of religious violence. Chapter four will

look into state ineffectiveness in the management

of ethno-religious violence. Finally, the fifth

chapter will contain the summary, recommendation,

conclusion and bibliography.

21

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF LITERATURE/THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 INTRODUCTION

The study of this nature necessarily embodies

reviews of relevant literature, this section

therefore attempt to review some scholarly work on

ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria by different

authors, attempt was made to confine the analysis

of the work within the framework of pluralist

theory.

2.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The analysis in social science oriented. Thus,

in a chapter like this, it is pertinent to use a

theory whose framework analysis will be made. For

this purpose, The PLURALIST theoretical perception

is adopted to guide the analysis.

22

According to Haralambos and Heald (1980:144),

pluralism is all about the idea that in society,

“power is dispersed among a variety of groups”.

They further explained that as society grows,

diverse groups spring up expressing varied opinion

on social issues. This phenomenon does call for

interest aggregation and the fostering of it at

societal level bringing into focus representation

by organized groups. This representation is

enhanced through the elite who act on behalf of the

diverse groups. In order to ensure fair

representation, power is shared and diffused

amongst the elite who represent the group, which is

why Haralambos and Heald equate pluralism to elite

pluralism because the conduct of societal revolves

around the elite class.

23

In explaining the work of pluralism,

harallambos and Heald use the studies conducted by

Dahl and Rose who showed how political parties and

interest groups in the U.S.A. rely on the elite in

carrying out their activities, for instance through

political parties, the masses on the one hand

influence state policies and interest groups on the

other hand, exert great pressure on government

institutions.

The modern state functions in a pluralistic

way, thus, from a pluralist perspective, political

parties and interest groups are cornerstone of

democracy. They are the means by which

representative government is possible in large

complex tell societies. Through these

organizations, a multiple of interests are

24

articulated and mobilized to participate in the

running of society. Politics is a process of

competition and bargaining and government is a

process of mediation and compromise. Power is

dispersed among a variety of groups and as a

result, all major interest in society are able to

have some say in the conduct of affairs.

(Haralambos and heald, 1980).

Haralambos and Heald limited their analysis

around the elites and the downtrodden and

maintained silence on the religious and ethnic

diversity inherent in the society. Religion and

ethnic differentiation were however incorporated

into the discourse of pluralism by Dahl, Mouw and

Griffione, Ilesanmi etc. Robert Dahl (1971)

conceived pluralism in terms of a political system

25

in which the social restructuring can lead to the

evolution of different socio-political formation.

They characterizes these formations has hegemonies

that could either be inclusive or closed. These are

the conditions that guarantees competitive

political regime. Therefore, in such a regime,

according to him; systems of bargaining and

negotiation grew up within parallel to, or in

opposition to hierarchical arrangement; and these

systems help to foster a political subculture with

norms that legitimate negotiation, bargaining,

logrolling, give and take the gaining of consent as

against unilateral power or coercion (Dahl,

1971:77).

Dahl’s theoretical postulate, explains the

tenet of pluralism in that it presents the

26

existence of a political system in which diversity

prevails, a setting in which there is a plethora of

exclusive groups and ideas co-existing alongside

other.

This gives way to the formation of what he

terms as a sub-culture that becomes a social norm.

Dahl further maintained that every society is

characterized by the existence of multiple and

competing groups. All these groups exercise

different “cup of power” and that is critical areas

of decision making any of the group can ensure that

its political preferences and wishes are adopted if

they are sufficiently determined. The argument of

the pluralist tradition is not so much that power

is evenly distributed among groups in the society

but that power is unequally and widely distributed

27

in the society. Power is therefore fragmented and

diffused in the society. According to this

tradition also, as various groups compete amongst

themselves, the state is to serve as reference or a

neutral arbiter in the competition so as to

preserve the pluralist tradition of the society.

Dahl identified polyandry as sublet in the

pluralist discourse. He affirmed that polyandry is

a democratic order in which power disperses not

only between the government, individuals and group

on the one hand, but in which also, there is wide

but unevenly distributed power amongst the

different segments of the population.

He traced the following as fundamental

characteristics of polyandry;

28

1.There must be a freedom of thought which

include freedom of religion

2.Consensus and dissension: There must be broad

base consultation in the same vein, people are

free to dissent.

3.Free open and competitive participation in

politics.

4.There is peaceful management of conflict.

According to Mouw and Griffione (1993),

pluralism can be equated with diversity. The

implication is that in a pluralist society,

differentiations in terms of race, language and

religion define the state of affairs. Thus, issues

like power, resources and social amenities and so

on are shared in recognition to these differences

that exist in the said society. The guiding

principle in a pluralist society is the acceptance

29

by the variegated groups to live together in an

arrangement that ensures power sharing amongst

them. In short, according to Kariel (1968:164),

pluralism refers to specific institutional

arrangement for distributing and sharing government

power to the doctrinal defense of these

arrangements, and to an approach for gaining

understanding of political behavior. This implies

that institutionally, the diversities are

recognized. Hence an arrangement is made for power

sharing. Ilesanmi (in Khalid 2004) is of the

opinion that pluralism is used in three different

perspectives, namely; the sociological, political

and normative. The sociological usage implies the

way a society is constituted i.e. in terms of race,

religion, ethnics, and gender and class identities.

On the other hand, political pluralism is said to

30

be concerned with political power i.e. sharing

power amongst the sub-units that make up the

holistic political entity. Lastly, pluralism is

normatively used to imply the fact that no matter

the level of uniqueness that exists in society,

individuals and groups do differ in some respects.

Looking at the above theory, its suitability to

this discourse become apparent. This is because

taking the Nigerian state in general and Kaduna

state in particular, their composition depicted the

tenet of pluralist theory. A look at Kaduna state

will unveil divergence in terms of multiplicity of

ethnic groups, religions, languages and cultures.

The frequency of social upheaval in the state can

then be explained on the best of the fact that

Kaduna state is pluralistic in nature which in the

first place presents the problem of diversity and

31

competition and secondly, the incapacity of the

government to provide the means for power sharing

and ensuring equity amongst the constituent unit is

also a fact.

It is in the above context that the theory can

be used as guided and tool for analysis in this

research.

PLURALISM – CRITIQUE

A large body of evidence from studies such as

those of Dahl, in the US, and Hewitt and Grand and

Marsh in British, appears to support the classical

pluralist position. However, there are a number of

serious criticisms of pluralism. These criticisms

are concerned both with the methods pluralist used

to measure power and with empirical evidence which

seems t contradict their claim that powers is

dispersed in western democracies. Marxists and

32

other conflicts theories have suggested that

pluralists ignore some aspects of power. In

particular, it is argued that they concentrate

exclusively on the first face of power, decision

making.

John Urry (in Urry and Wakeford, 1973), for

example, believes that pluralist ignored the

possibility that some have the power to prevent

certain issues from reaching the point of decision.

As a result of this non-decision making, only safe

decisions may be taken-decisions which do not

fundamentally alter the basic structures of

capitalist societies.

From this point of view, it is in the interest

of the powerful to allow a variety of interest

groups to influence safe decisions. This faster the

33

illusion of real participation and helps to create

the myth that a society is democratic. It disguises

the real basis of power and so protects the

powerful.

Pluralists can also be criticized for ignoring

what Steven Lukes (1974, 2006) has identified as

the third face of power. They do not take account

of the possibility that thee preferences expressed

in opinion polls or by pressure groups might

themselves have been manipulated by those with real

power – for example, those who control institution

such as the media and the education system which

can play a part in shaping individual’s attitude

and opinions.

2.2 ETHNO-RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA: A REVIEW

34

Uka (2005) argued that all that characterized

the fall of the first republic gives credence to

the fact that the political behavior of Nigeria is

still greatly influenced by the hyperbolic

assumption that one’s political destined is

intrinsically and exclusively linked with one’s

ethnic linguistic, and to some extent religious

identity.

Similarly, Dlakwa cited in Uka (2005) posits

that it was as a result of mutual suspicion between

the North and South that the civil war (1967 –

1970) was precipitated in Nigeria. The breach of

peace caused by both ethnic and religious crisis

has been so great that political alignment and the

formation of political parties have been

characterized by the ganging-up of ethnic

35

champions. Uka’s view has a number of limitations,

when he laid credence to ethnic and religious

affinity as responsible for the fall of the first

republic and the crisis that brewed therefore. He

failed to acknowledge the seed of discord planted

by the British colonial masters who partitioned

Nigeria unevenly and the unholy marriage symbolized

in the 1914 amalgamation of the country which has

been Nigeria fundamental problem. Shawulu (in

Okpanachi 2010), attributes ethnic and religious

crisis in Nigeria to colonialism. According to him,

the advent of colonialism which saw to the varied

experiences of the different communities

contributed in nurturing a spirit of conflict in

them. He added further: “The nature of the

disengagement of Europeans from Nigeria itself

36

introduced new factors. All these have combined to

create conditions of the inevitability of

conflicts” (2002:3). He went on to enumerate

sources of conflicts in Nigeria to include

militarism, distortion of democracy, weakness of

civil society groups, security inadequacies and so

on. According to Okene (2005:824), several factors

can explain causes of ethnic-religious conflicts in

the Nigeria’s recent democracy experience. One of

such causes in the nature of the British colonial

rule in the Nigeria regions. The British played

either one ethnic or religious groups against the

other. However, in spite of the oversight, Uka;s

view on political-alignment and the formation of

political parities along ethnic cleavages was

strongly supported by Humphrey Nwosu, the then

37

chairman of the National Electrical Commission,

when he argued that the aborted third republic in

1993 was attributed to ethnic championship. As he

put it; our party system, from inception in the

late 1940s and early 1950, reflected the injection

of ethnicity into our political system. In due

course, the major political parties and minor

one’s become vehicle for the representation,

protection and aggregation of ethnic interest “Our

political leaders, by and large, exploited ethnic

ties and symbols to promote their selfish interest

and to consolidate themselves in power in their

regional enclaves”. Cited in Omojuwa, (2005:25).

Though, this was hitherto the case but at present,

one must acknowledge the trend of political

alignment and configuration which is no longer

38

recognition to ethnic or religious affiliation but

on the patter of personal interest. For instance,

the configuration of People Democratic Party (PDP)

cut across ethnic and the same applies to all

Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) and the rest others.

Ali (2002) discusses the twin issues of ethno-

religious conflict and democracy in Nigeria

touching on the most recent in the 1990s, which

included the Aguleri, Shagamu, Ife-Modakeke, Zango-

Kataf, Odi, Ode-Itesekiri, Itesekiri-Ilaje and so

on. He treats their effects on society particularly

following the institutionalization of democracy in

Nigeria in the late 90s. he further classifies

religious activities into four major groups

including centralist, community-oriented

syncretistic and fundamentalist activities. He

39

posits that Nigerian leaders have capitalized or

using religion as the basis for political action.

That most religious crisis in Nigeria has taken on

this element. His conclusion is that Nigeria is

undoubtedly ethnically, religiously and culturally

cosmopolitans, that the only way to entrench

progress and democratic values in the country is

for the various groups to understand, tolerate and

accommodate one another as he put it “we cannot shy

away from the reality of ethnicity in any

heterogeneous society like Nigeria. We must be

ready to operate it, understand ourselves on that

basis and relate for a better community” (Ibid:74).

Abdul (2002) takes a look at the dimension of

the February 2000 Kaduna ethno-religious crisis by

presenting concise date to explain how the crisis

40

unfolded itself. In a similar vein as Shawulu

(2000) who hinges the causes of ethno-religious

crisis to colonialism, he attributes the cause of

the mayhem to historical attachment. That is to say

that the enmity between the Christian minority and

the Muslim Majority in Kaduna state is a historical

rivalry dating back to the pre-colonial political

structure of the then Hausa Land and its politics.

According to him, the minority groups in Kaduna

state have ever been apprehensive of domination by

their Hausa-Fulani counterparts. Thus, in order to

assert their own identity, confrontations and hence

conflicts have often than not, found expression in

ethno-religious crisis which are frequent in the

state.

41

He documents the losses incurred as a result of

the 2000 Kaduna crisis to include the following;

1. A total of 19 deaths were recorded. Corpses

were picked from obscure places in various

crisis spots.

2. A total of 746 vehicles of various descriptions

were burnt.

3. About 123 churches and 55 mosques were burnt in

various locations like Kawo, Barnawa, Sabo

Tasha, Sabon Gari, Kakuri, Tudun Wada, Kurmin,

Mashi, Rijar and Zaria etc.

4. Police out-post of Maraban Jos was burnt

5. Over 100 persons sustained various injuries and

received treated in hospital (Ibid: 127).

In a different but similar work to the above,

Abdul (2002) generalizes the issues of religion

42

vis-à-vis democratization and national integration

in Nigeria. He considers the polarization of

Nigeria along religious lines as detrimental to

democracy and national cohesion. To him, the trend

in which religion is used to shroud political

interest by individual as well as group in Nigeria

has only amplified the national question and has

put a bigger question on the practice of federalism

in Nigeria. He concludes that national unity can

only be enhanced by designing a national project

that will accommodate the diverse socio-cultural

groups as found in the country. He also advocates

for more autonomy of the component unit that make

up the federation. One autonomy, he said: “This

can best be done by diversifying the revenue base

of the country as concentrating “on the oil sector

43

is not being enough for genuine federalization”

(Ibid: 176).

Tanko (2002) considers ethnic and religious

pluralism as a universal phenomenon. So, the

Nigerian case calls for no exasperation because to

him, it is the use of which a society makes of such

pluralism that matters. Ethnic and religious

pluralism pretend good and bad for a socio-

depending on the usage. The democracy can only be

safe in Nigeria if only Nigerians emphasize the

aspects that bind them than those that set them

apart. He conclusively proposed the way forward

thus:

44

Ethnicity and religion in Nigeria arepowerful forces that can be usedpositively or negatively. It will allintensify our efforts along merepositive lines, emphasized oursimilarities, we will be building adurable democracy in Nigeria. It isdifferent and impossible to erectbarriers that will completely keep thedifferent ethnic groups in Nigeriaapart. The same can be said of religionsince in some families, you haveChristian and Muslims. If we are able towork towards the elimination of ethnicand religious domination in all theirforms and shades. Democracy may have afuture in Nigeria (Ibid:220)

Jega’s (2000) approach to ethno-religious

conflict in Nigeria especially beginning from May

29, 1999 when democracy found its roots once again

in the country is through the identification of the

causative factors responsible for the nagging

socio-political stigma. He further considers the

degree of these conflicts while highlighting their

consequences on national integrity and economic

45

development. Finally, he suggests solutions, which,

if implemented, would put an end to or at least

limit ethnic and religious confrontation in

Nigeria. In advancing reasons for ethno-religious

conflicts in Nigeria since the rebirth of democracy

in 1999, Jega explicates such factors as poverty,

the character of the post-colonial Nigerian state;

ineptitude on the path of the elite and so on as

been responsible for the ugly development. He

particularly hinges the spate of ethno-religious

conflict on the nature of our leaders in the past

colonial era. This becomes apparent, according to

him;

…In the context of the overbearingcharacter of the post colonial Nigerianstates, greed, selfishness,parochialism, pettiness andirresponsible conduct by those who aresupposed to be leaders have been majorcausal, or at least catalytic, factors

46

of ethno-religious tension and conflict(Ibid: 36-37).

Alemika attempting a sociological analysis of

ethnic and religious conflict in the middle belt of

Nigeria argued that is a difficult task to

differentiate between or dichotomizing the sources

of conflicts from one another. He opined that;

It must be appreciated, however, that itis in practice difficult to isolatewhich conflicts are primarily engenderedby economic, ethic, religion andpolitical competition. The factors areintertwined especially within the middlebelt, to such an extent that it is quiteeasy to miss-identify the sources ofconflicts and therefore misclassify them(2002:5)

The position was consolidated by the world of

caution sounded by Jega (2002) when he said: there

are many causes of ethno-religious tension and

conflicts in Nigeria and quite a number of them are

actually interrelated.

47

It is a fact that in the recent past, conflicts

are often misclassified on the basis of perceived

source or causes. Even when these factors or causes

are intrinsically linked, caution must be exercised

to identify which of these factors are more

dominant and fundamental in the feuds. There are

two fundamental factors which are responsible for

conflicts. The first and most important factor is

scarcity of resources (economic) and the struggle

to control their appropriation (politics) when this

feud amongst the elite are not being resolve in the

first face, they take it to another level thereby

whipping up prejudice associated with ethnic

religious, cultural, gender and racial differences.

This point here is clear, that even though the

factor responsible for conflict are “interrelated

48

as noted by Alemika (2002) and Jega (2002), two of

these factors are fundamental and dominant, they

are the economic and the political.

Alemika in his quest to analyze the religious

conflict in the middle belt unilaterally expand the

geographical scope of the middle belt. He has this

to say;

Religious conflicts are explosive. TheMiddle-Belt people have witnessedseveral conflicts, which are in part ofreligious origin and expression. Theseincludes the conflict between Christiansand Muslims in Zaria (1982), Ilorin(1986), Kafanchan, Kaduna, Zaria andSeveral other towns in Kaduna State(1987) over the attack on Bako, aChristian preacher by some Muslims overalleged improper reference to Islam;Kaduna (1988).

Tafawa Balewa (1991); the Jos North Local

Council Chairmanship crisis of 1996, (Alamika,

2002:9). Though, the concept of middle belt is

rebellious but conceptually, it has demarcation,

49

therefore the inclusion of Zaria emirate being part

of middle belt by Alemika (2002), that the Hausa-

Fulani and some major ethnic minorities, who are

Muslims (Nupe, Kanuri etc.) do see themselves more

of “Lugard North” than belong to the belt.

The colonial administration created an

impression of the state as something that must be

assaulted and if possible privatized. After

independent, there emerged out of continual

conflict with the colonial authority, political

leaders whose interest were not serve but to use

the instrument of the state to enrich themselves, a

goal that was difficult to prosecute under colonial

rule. This attitude of the elites according to

Dudley (1973), was not accidental nor was it self

generative, but was due to the heterogeneous

50

direction provided by the colonial predators who

for their own convenience divided the country into

three administrative areas grouped around the major

ethnic and religious groups. This, according to

him, later created political antagonism among the

elites that led to the numerous conflicts and

violence that have been witnessed in the past

decades. The above situation was summarized by Ake

(2001) when he posited that: “The nationalist

movement was essentially a coalition of disparate

groups united by their common grievances amongst

colonial oppression.

It was typically a network of nationalities,

ethnic groups and professional groups. But even

though they operated against colonial regime, their

relationship was never free from tension, and

51

conflict. As the prospect for political

independence improved, the solidarity of the

movement grew weaker and competitive between its

component units became more “intense”. It is

against all these matrices of historical

deformities of both the colonial and post-colonial

states that the nature and character of the various

groups in the polity whether they be religious or

political can be understood.

Nigeria has been described as one of the most

deeply divided states in Africa due to its complex

web of politically salient identities and a history

of seemingly in-traceable conflict and instability,

from its inception as a colonial state, Nigeria has

faced a personal crisis of territorial or state

legitimacy, which has often challenged its effort

52

at national cohesion, democratization, stability

and economic transformation (Post and Vicker,

1973). The issue of diversity has been a major

focus in the discussion of religious conflict and

violence and it has been suggested by some segments

of society as a contributor to religious uprising.

But, contrary to what some overly simplistic

analyses of the implication of diversity in Nigeria

and other countries suggest, diversity is a

necessary but not sufficient condition for

conflict. In other words, the very fact a country

has different religious group does not make

division and conflict inevitable.

Thus, James Fearon and David Laitin (2003:75,

82) have claimed that “a greater degree of

religious diversity … by itself is not “a major and

53

direct cause of violent civil conflict. Rather,

they see violent civil conflict as associated with

“conditions that favor insurgency”. Including

“poverty which marks financially and

bureaucratically weak states (Fearon and Laitan,

2003:75) other factors that have been identified

and intervene between diversity and conflict

include the role of formal and informal institution

for conflict regulation, the different sizes of

groups relative to the national arena and the

extent to which different identities (ethnic,

regional, religious, class etc.) overlap with or

crosscut, each other (see Fearon and Laitin, 1996).

Religious identity is one of the factors that is

often mobilized and politicized to the level of

overt conflict (Osaghae and Suberu, 2004). To

54

arrive at a better understanding of the cause of

religious violence and the role of the state in

Nigeria, a look at the contemporary descriptive

typology of the Nigerian government would be of

useful importance.

Scholars like Jega (2004) argue that the

increasing pauperization of Nigerians under the

regimes of poor economic management has worsened

the situation of the poor. Some have even expressed

the situation either the government become

irrelevant or failed. In Jega’s worlds;

Mass poverty and unemployment served tocondition the mind and attitude ofNigeria and made them susceptible toelite manipulation and mobilization ofnegative identities. As the state becomeunable to satisfy basic needs of thepeople, they in turn withdrew from thesphere of the state into ethno religiousand communal of the state into ethnoreligious and communal cocoons, withheightened sensitivity to the roles ofthe “others” in their marginalization

55

and immoderations (cited in Lawan,2000:54).

Authors like Lawan (2000) argued that poverty,

illiteracy and unemployment are antithetical to the

survival of democracy. Therefore, democracy is

unsafe with the persistence of these factors in

Nigeria. This is because a poverty stricken and

illiterate person can easily be mobilized in the

event of religious conflicts. Thus, poverty and

illiteracy contribute to perpetuating and fueling

of religious violence in Nigeria.

Omorogbe and Omohan (2005) strongly believed

that societies around the world experience various

forms of civil unrest irrespective of their level

of development. However, the frequent occurrence of

religious conflict and violence in Nigeria is great

concern to all stakeholders because of the

56

devastating effects of such conflict. They went

further to explain that giving the position of

Nigeria as the sixth oil producing nation in world,

one would naturally expect that the resources

occurring to the country will be more than

sufficient to cope with the needs of her citizens.

Sad to say, that has not been the case. No year

passes without the eruption or threat conflicts and

violence between religious groups in Nigeria, this

is probably as a result of the state nonchalant

attitude toward ensuring peace and co-existence

among various religious groups.

They therefore conclude that among other

factors, mass poverty experienced by Nigerians over

the years is one of the factors responsible for the

generally high level of instability in the country.

57

Invariable, this has found expression in ethnic and

religious outburst. To further give credence to the

claim that poverty is the major cause of frequent

ethno-religious crisis in recent times in Nigeria.

Huntington remarked that of a large extent,

violence and instability are the products of rapid

social change and rapid mobilization of new groups

into politics coupled with the slow development of

political institutions. His argument therefore,

seems to be concerned basically with institutional

capacity, which explains the failure of

institutions or the system to keep up with social

demands.

The period since the 1980’s has been

spectacular for many African societies as the harsh

economic conditions of the people has resulted into

an upsurge of internal crisis. The period proved

58

there is a symbiotic relationship between poverty

and internal conflicts in these societies. The

Nigerian experience to a huge extent and that of

Northern Nigeria in particular, fits into these

characterization the country has witnessed ethnic

regional, religious class, political and communal

conflicts that have taken a major toll on national

department (Kwanashie, 2005). It is therefore

purposed that poverty and unemployment are major

causes of frequent occurrence of religious and

political conflict in Northern Nigeria. This in

line with Makarfi (2005) position that “as economic

crisis dwindle people fortunes; they tend to

perceive their enemies as those who belong to the

other-ethno-religious groups (2005:8). The

situation is further worsened by the conspicuous

consumption of political officeholders whose

59

economic backgrounds, according to Elaigwu (2005)

were well known before they assumed public offices.

Therefore, people abject poverty in the midst of

plenty not only alienates but could generate

violence.

According to Jega, in discussing the causes of

violence and conflict in Nigeria, it is important

to mention that religious factors are present in

the majority of social conflicts the Nigerian

people have witnessed. Religious identity as it

present in Nigeria has therefore become a critical

factor in religious conflict. At different levels

and times people experience religious

discrimination, people demand for religious rights

in their state, and more importantly, the state

uses religious in political discourse or nation.

What Jega attempts to point out is that religious

conflict is a multi-causal variables. For effective

60

discussion of the causes of religious conflict in

Nigeria, Jega explained that there is a need to put

this into consideration factors such as the

accusations and allegations of neglect. Oppression,

domination, exploitation, victimization,

discrimination, marginalization, bigotry etc. In

every nation (Nigeria inclusive), there tend to be

some disagreement on how wealth, power and status

are to be shared among individuals and groups,

there are also disagreements on how to effect

necessary change and reforms.

This is because different groups and

individuals have diverse interests in which case,

some groups will have their aims met, while others

will not. What this means is that conflict usually

occurs when deprived groups and individuals

attempts to increase their share of power and

61

wealth or to modify the dominant values, norms,

behalf or ideology. It is interesting to note that

the overall consequences of this is the escalation

of various religious conflict and uprisings that

are witnessed all over the country today which are

supportably meant to correct any perceived form of

marginalization, oppression or domination. It is

important to note here too that the failure of the

Nigerian leaders to establish good systems of

governance, forge national international and

promote what can be called real economic progress,

through deliberate and articulate policies, has led

to mass poverty and unemployment. This has resulted

into communal, ethnic, religious and class

conflicts that have now characterized the Nigerian

nation. Poverty and unemployment have therefore

62

served as nursery beds for many religious conflict

in Nigeria because the country now has a reservoir

of poor people who are willing to be used as

mercenary fighters. What this means theoretically

is that poverty and unemployment increase the

number of people who are prepared to kill or be

killed for a given course at token benefit. This

explains why all ethno-religious crisis that ever

occurred in Nigeria have a large turnout of people

(including the under-aged) as fighter, Jega (2002).

According to Ikelegbe (2001), a very important

cause of ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria is the

breakdown of such vehicles of social control that

characterized the international African societies

such as the family, education, law, religion and

political system that cared for the well-being of

63

all citizens. Indeed, the malfunctioning of all

these important institutions has actually increased

ethnic and communal conflicts in Nigeria. For

instance, the inability of many homes to make the

ends meet with the family income tends to increase

immorality, broken fatherless/motherless homes,

divorces and drunkenness, leading against a large

reserve of youths who could be employed for

execution of ethno-religious conflicts. It is also

important to note that the school system in Nigeria

today is in shambles and cannot impact even sound

knowledge, let alone instill discipline and desired

type of morality. The religious institution is also

not playing its expected roles, while low

enforcement agents indulge in crimes, demand bribes

and collect illegal levies from motorist openly

64

and, shamelessly. All the above constitute a wrong

signal to the social and encourage social vices in

the societies there by laying the foundation for

conflicts in general.

65

CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

3.1 HISTORY OF KADUNA STATE

Kaduna State occupies part of the central

position of the Northern part of Nigeria and shares

common borders with Zamfara, Katsina, Niger, Kano,

Bauchi and Plateau States. To the South-West, the

state shares a border with the Federal Capital

Territory, Abuja.

What is presently known as Kaduna State

encompasses the area of the old Zaria (Zazzau)

emirate-cum-province. According to M. G Smith,

there are two broad cultural segments in this

emirate province. The first of these segments is

what Smith referred to as the Muhammadan Hausa-

Fulani group. The group constitutes about 60 per

cent of the emirate population, occupies mainly the

66

northern part of the province and dominates the

structure of traditional governance as expressed in

the emirate system (Smith, 1960 cited in Suberu

1996). The second ethno cultural bloc of the Zazzau

kingdom comprises a ‘pagan population’ of some

thirty tribes. These are located in the southern

and western half of the territory. However,

throughout this pagan-dominated half of the

territory are to be found the Hausa ‘in enclaves,

walled towns or open villages which are the foci of

economic, political and administrative life in

their respective areas’ (Smith, 1960).

More importantly, however, complex forms of

clientage and vassalage have developed between the

dominant Hausa-Fulani bloc and the pagan population

of Zazzau. The pagan tribes were traditionally the

target for slave-raiding, the exaction of tribute

67

and other forms of domination by the Hausa-Fulani.

The political and military vulnerability of the

pagan groups to Hausa-Fulani hegemony arose from

their relatively inferior technology, smaller

settlements and decentralized modes of political

organization, all of which rendered them relatively

defenseless in the face of Hausa-Fulani

expansionism and imperialism (Kazah-Toure, 1991;

cited in, Suberu 1996). A major consequence was

that the diverse peoples of this region were driven

into the mountains of this region and this

reinforced both their spirit of independence and

their military organization (Blench, et.al. 2006).

While the three southern Zaria districts of

Kagoro, Jaba and Moroa have enjoyed some degree of

independence from the emirate system as a result of

68

their successful resistance of conquest and

incorporation by the Fulani power-group, the other

incorporated pagan populations have been more

vulnerable to cultural, economic and political

domination by the Hausa-Fulani power group. While

the independent pagan populations are ruled by

their own chiefs, the incorporated pagan

communities are administered by emirate-appointed

district heads. This unequal historical political

relationship between the Hausa-Fulani group and the

pagan community has been compounded by religious

differences. Islam is the religion of an

overwhelming majority of the Hausa-Fulani. The

religion also provides the doctrinal or ideological

foundation for the emirate system. On the other

hand, different forms of animistic worship have

69

traditionally predominated amongst the pagan

populations. Moreover, looked down upon as infidels

by the emirate population, and often arbitrarily

and oppressively subjected to the Muslim judicial

and legal system, these pagan populations have

become particularly receptive to Christian

conversion and education (Smith, 1960;cited in,

Suberu 1996).

Given the foregoing, there have been long

historical animosities, a high degree of unease and

mutual suspicion between Christian ethnic groups of

southern origin and Hausa-Fulani Muslims. This

pattern of relationship has been reinforced by the

political and economic imbalances between the two

communities dating back to the colonial period.

70

According to Ibrahim’s Studies in the History, Politics

and Cultures of Southern Kaduna Peoples Group (1997) the

colonial administration initially simply

subordinated these southern Kaduna peoples groups

under emirate rule. From the point of view of the

colonial authorities it was administratively simple

to treat the Southern Kaduna peoples as falling

under the Zaria Native Authority (NA), despite

their resistance and the striking cultural

differences between them and Islamic Emirate. The

sustained resistance of the southern Kaduna peoples

to Emirate rule in the 1910s and 1920s continued

and in the 1930s Governor Cameron questioned the

legitimacy of Fulani rule and embarked upon

administrative reforms. However, the British

Resident argued against the reform proposals on the

71

grounds that they would undermine the authority of

the Emir of Zaria. The Emir rejected the proposals,

arguing that southern Kaduna peoples groups were so

‘primitive’ they would fight against each other

over rotational presidency of a council of chiefs.

As a compromise, the Secretary, Northern Province

ordered that local elements be appointed district

heads.

Ibrahim (1997; cited in Okpanachi 2010.) also

narrates how these chiefdoms were revived, created,

downgraded, and upgraded throughout this period. In

the colonial period, it was not uncommon for a

traditional chiefdom to be abolished on economic

reasons of the inability of the institution to fend

for itself. Tax assessment and collection were the

criteria for establishment or recognition of

72

chiefdoms. Equally important was the supply of

forced labor to carry out development activities.

This situation was far from satisfactory and has

been responsible for friction in the region, partly

played out in situ and partly in Kaduna, where

opposing forces confront one and other on a daily

basis.

These socio-cultural and political differences

sometimes escalated into violent crises since the

colonial period. As Kazar Toure documents, “right

from 1907, when the first set of Muslim Hausa-

Fulani rulers were posted into the zone as District

Heads and other NA officials, there were continuous

outbreaks of peasant revolts in such places as

Kachia and these took ethnic forms” (Kazah-Toure,

1995). In 1942, the Kaje ethnic group of Zangon

73

Kataf district protested over perceived domination

and discrimination by the Native Authority

administration. Between 1946 - 1966, there were

violent demonstrations by the “Katafs and other

related groups in Southern Zaria province over

certain oppressive features of the emirate system,

particularly the headship of the Fulani ruling

families over predominantly non-Fulani districts”

(Suberu, 1996). Throughout these periods the crises

always had a mix of ethnic and political dimensions

but lacked any discernible religious under- or

overtones.

In the 1980s, these tensions in Kaduna state

begin to mobilize distinct religious overtones and

the additional dimension of a Muslim versus

Christian dichotomy (Kazah-Toure, 1999). The

74

escalation of political violence was witnessed in

Kasuwar Magani (1980), ZangonKataf (1984),

Kafanchan (1987) and Zangon Kataf again (1992).

While these conflicts mobilized religious sentiment

in Kaduna State, besides the spillover of the

Zangon Kataf conflict in 1992, the city of Kaduna

remained relatively insulated from violent ethno-

religious crises.

Kaduna city, the capital of Kaduna state, had

been an administrative capital since the pre-

independent colonial era as the administrative

capital of the old Northern Protectorate in 1931

and later the Northern Region even after

independence. It later became the administrative

capital of North Central State, and the Old Kaduna

State before the present dispensation. The city is

75

located on the Kaduna River. Apart from being the

administrative nerve centre of Northern Nigeria, it

is an important trade area and a major

transportation hub for the surrounding agricultural

areas with its rail and road junctions (Millennium

Cities Initiative, 2009). Kaduna town is also one

of Northern Nigeria’s industrial centers. Many of

the industries especially the textile and garment

industries have been in existence in the city since

the colonial and early independence era. Among

other industries in the city are paint and other

chemical plants, refinery and petrochemical plants,

vehicle assembly, fertilizer processing, breweries,

and defense industries and units among others.

To date Kaduna city has had the attribute of a

land almost totally made up of immigrants. The

76

original inhabitants known as the Gwaris (Gbagyi)

who are essentially agrarian have been forced to

move out of the main city into the outskirts of the

town by the influx of visitors since the colonial

era. At present the city’s inhabitants consist

mostly of the offspring of Civil Servants from the

old northern region who worked and settled in the

city since the colonial era when it was the

administrative headquarters of the old Northern

Region. Nigerians from all over the country have

made the city their place of residence having moved

there as a result of government or commercial work

including military attachment or training. Many

retired civil and military officers currently live

there. The population figures for the city

according to the 2006 national census, ranked it

77

fourth among the cities of Nigeria after Lagos

Ibadan and Kano with a population of 1,563,300

persons made up of 766,409 females and 796,891

males.

While Kaduna is known to be a volatile state,

Kaduna metropolis did not have or deserve a

reputation for frequent susceptibility to violent

ethno-religious crises until February and May 2000

(Abdu and Umar, 2002). Unlike most cities of

Northern Nigeria, Kaduna is quite complex. It

ethnic, religious and cultural diversity with

Christian and Islamic values sometimes inter-mixing

with traditional values, provides a veritable

ground for differences that, if not properly

mediated, could easily lead to violence. However,

Kaduna town differs from most old cities of

Northern Nigeria, such as Zaria, Sokoto, and Kano

78

where “indigenous” communities are separated from

“settlers”, in that although some areas are

dominated by particular ethnic groups, these

different groups have also lived side by side in

the same areas for many years (Ibid.). This is

partly driven by the fact that Kaduna’s colonial

legacy left settlement patterns relatively open to

migration shifts. Kaduna received a large number of

immigrants relative to the indigenous population

after the federal reorganization in 1976. Kaduna’s

unique status is also spurred by its urbanization

in the late 1970’s. A significant number of

immigrants from other northern and middle-belt

states moved to Kaduna as part of labor migration.

This process of urbanization included young

laborers temporarily moving from rural villages and

towns during the dry season and eventually

79

permanently settling in Kaduna after finding work

in the heavy manufacturing industry. Over time,

this large migration led to nearly

indistinguishable lines between ‘settlers’ and ‘the

smaller indigenous’ communities. Also, considerable

inter-marriage between the two communities fostered

new kinship ties across ethnic and religious lines

3.2 BACKGROUND TO SHARIA IN KADUNA

The Kaduna Sharia journey was tortuous and it

started on December 14, 1999, when the Kaduna state

of Assembly constituted an 11- person all-Muslim

member committee to collate views of the people on

the need to introduce the Sharia legal system in

the state. This singular action polarized the House

of Assembly across religious lines. The Christian

members of the House of Assembly argued that the

motion was not properly passed, and accused the

80

Muslim members of having a hidden agenda. The

Muslims, in turn, argued that Sharia is purely a

Muslim affair that had nothing to do with

Christians. They also maintained that there was

nothing wrong with the way the motion was passed,

pointing out that two Christian members nominated

to participate in the committee declined their

nominations (Abdu and Umar, 2002).

As Abdu and Umar (ibid.) documents, the

Committee began work shortly after it was

constituted. It demanded memoranda from the public

and began its public hearing in January 2000. The

Christian community refused to appear before the

committee. They argued that it was biased and the

process of its constitution was illegal. Muslims

from various local governments in Kaduna State

trooped to the House of Assembly to present their

81

memoranda and express solidarity with the House of

Assembly. Both Muslims and Christians organized

rallies and lectures to educate adherents of the

religious groups on their differing points of view.

On 29 January 2000, The Christian Association of

Nigerian (CAN) held a Seminar at HEKAN Church,

Katsina Road, Kaduna to “enlighten Christians on

the implications of adopting Shariah on Christians

and Christianity.” Different eminent personalities

were invited to present papers including the former

leader of the secessionist Biafra, Chief

Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, who condemned Sharia as an

infringement of Christians’ rights and advised Igbo

migrants to stand by the indigenous Christians in

the north. The National body of Jama’atul Nasir Islam

(JNI) also organized a program on Sharia at Arewa

82

House around this period to which some Christians

were invited as speakers. Both Muslims and

Christians used their worship centre to pass

commentaries on Sharia. While this was going on,

the Kaduna State government constituted two inter-

religious committees consisting of equal numbers of

Muslim and Christian leaders, all in an attempt to

calm the political temperature (Abdu and Umar,

2002).

The Sharia Violence in Kaduna

After the public hearing of the Committee of

the State House of Assembly, and the series of

seminars by the various religious groups, CAN

Kaduna Branch, organized a public protest on

February 21 2000 against what they called the

“planned introduction of Sharia in the state.”

83

During the protest, Christians expressed their

fears concerning what they perceived as an attempt

to “Islamize Kaduna State” and the possibility of

such action generating crisis in Kaduna (ibid.).

The peaceful protest later turned violent: Muslim

youths clashed with the Christian protesters, and

fighting between Christians and Muslims spiraled

out of control, with massive violence and

destruction on both sides.

The Sharia violence in Kaduna took place in two

main waves—sometimes referred to as “Sharia 1” and

“Sharia 2” (Paden, 2005). The first wave took place

in Kaduna city, as stated above, from February 21

to 25, with further killings in March, followed by

a second wave from May 22 to 23. On Wednesday 23

March 2000, the crisis spilled over to outlying

84

LGAs, particularly Kachia and BirninGwari. In

Kachia LGA, Muslims were attacked. Their

residential houses, shops, clinics, courts, filling

stations and the market were destroyed. It later

spread to neighbouring villages like Sakainu,

Katul, Adadgai, Slowai, and Gumel (Abdu and Umar,

2002; cited in, Okpanachi 2010).

The May “Sharia 2” violence occurred while the

Judicial Commission of Inquiry set up to probe

February's clashes, was yet to complete its work.

The clash started at Narayi and Banarwa areas and

later spread to other parts of the city. While the

immediate cause of the crisis could not be fully

ascertained, Police say the clashes broke out after

residents of a mainly Christian neighborhood blamed

Muslims for the killing of a local man18. Others

85

however saw it as the continuation of the February

Sharia violence. It took a combined team of fully

armed soldiers and policemen to restore peace to

the city. An accurate, total death toll has never been

ascertained. The Judicial Commission of Inquiry set up by

the Kaduna state government reported that at least 1,295

people had been killed, while an unspecified additional

number were buried unidentified, and others were declared

missing as result of the February riots alone. In all, it is

believed that the two Kaduna riots left at least 3000

persons dead and led to the displacement of over 63,000

people within Kaduna and its surroundings (International

Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2007). The scale of the

killing and human displacement and destruction was so huge

that President Obasanjo, described it the worst he had seen

since the 1967-70 Nigerian civil war.

3.3 THE VISIBLE CAUSES OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN

NIGERIA

86

Several causes of religious violence in Nigeria

have been identified in the literature (Agwu 2009;

Gofwen 2004; Salawu 2010; Iwara 2006; Kwaja 2009;

Omotosho 2003; Sanusi 2009; Sani no date cited

in,Sampson 2012). Whereas most of these causes

conflate, emphasis in the literature is on the

underlying socio-political, economic and governance

factors that gestate not only religious conflicts,

but violent conflicts in Nigeria generally. In this

research however, the focus is on the immediate and

visible factors that generate religious violence

rather than the remote precipitating and other

social factors that animate it.

A cursory perusal of extant literature on the

remote socio-political, economic and governance

factors that drive religious violence in Nigeria

87

does show, however, that government neglect,

oppression, domination, exploitation,

victimization, discrimination, marginalization,

nepotism and bigotry are some of the predisposing

factors (Salawu 2010:348). In his treatise, Kwaja

(2009:107) also identifies fragility of the

institutions of the state in terms of their ability

and capacity to manage diversity, corruption,

rising inequality between the rich and poor, gross

violation of human rights, environmental

degradation, contestations over land, among others,

as the underlying causes of violent conflicts in

Nigeria since the enthronement of democratic rule

in 1999. In his view, Danjibo (:3 cited in, Sampson

2012) believes the failure of governance is

responsible for the recurring sectarian violence in

88

Nigeria; while Omotosho (2003) recognize

disparaging literature/publications by both

Christian and Muslim elites as the major causes of

religious violence in the country. Contributing to

the debate, Achunike(2008: 287) opined that the

wrong perception of other people’s religion or

faith, wrong religious orientation, the low

literacy level of religious adherents, selfishness

on the part of religious personalities, pervasive

poverty, government involvement in religious

matters, among others, are responsible for

interreligious conflicts in Nigeria.

Sani (no date; cited in Sampson 2012.) has made

a comprehensive but unelaborated list of 7 causes

of religious conflicts in Nigeria. While

identifying both the remote sociopolitical and

89

economic drivers as well as the immediate factors

that generate religious violence in Nigeria, he has

failed to critically analyze how these factors

generate religious disturbances. Nonetheless, it

suffices to state that he identified poverty,

corruption, non-implementation of previous probe

panel reports, impunity of past perpetrators of the

violence, proliferation of preachers and worship

centers, provocative and inciting utterances,

sensational journalism, political manipulation of

religion, incitement in the social media and mobile

telephony, among others, as key causes of religious

violence in Nigeria. These causes are quite

comprehensive and indeed cover most of the factors

discussed in this research. However, I shall take a

step further to demonstrate how some of these

90

issues generate religious violence and further

suggest an approach to state management.

1. Religious intolerance, fundamentalism and

extremism

Religious intolerance, fundamentalism and

extremism are deliberately chosen to kick-start

discussions on the drivers of religious violence in

Nigeria because they form the base (sub-structure)

upon which other sources of religious violence

(super-structure) rest. Religious intolerance has

been defined as ‘hostility towards other religions,

as well as the inability of religious adherents to

harmonize between the theories and the practical

aspect of religion’ (Balogun1988:166). It

encompasses bigotry, which is the obstinate and

intolerant devotion to one’s opinions and

91

prejudices, especially the exhibition of

intolerance and animosity toward persons of

differing beliefs (Baird and Rosenbaum 1999)

Religious intolerance has been identified as

the major source of religious conflict/violence in

all societies existing as long as the history of

mankind, and permeating all forms of human

civilizations, with attendant destructive

tendencies (Gofwen 2004:50; cited in, Sampson

2012).Religious fundamentalism and extremism are

similar to, and indeed, manifestations of religious

intolerance. Komonchak, Collins and Lane(1996:411)

view religious fundamentalism from three

perspectives: from a cognitive understanding where

the word is associated with a closed personality

type that expresses exclusivity, particularity,

92

literality and moral rigor; from a cultural

theological viewpoint, where the word expresses

opposition to religious and cultural liberalism in

defense of orthodoxy and religious traditions; and

from a social movement perspective, where it

denotes organizational and ideological uniqueness

from other types of religious movements. Ultimately

therefore, religious fundamentalism is a religious

movement that promotes the literal interpretation

of, and strict adherence to religious doctrine,

especially as a return to orthodox scriptural

prescriptions and doctrinal originality. It seeks

strict adherence to the orthodox principles of

particular faiths – in the case of Nigeria,

Christianity and Islam – and abhors modernism with

93

its propensity to adulterating or diminishing

original doctrinal principles.

Religious fundamentalists, therefore, place

great emphasis ‘on right doctrine and then

necessity of organized warfare against the forces

of modernism’ (Komonchak,Collins and Lane 1996:411;

cited in, Sampson 2012). Religious intolerance and

fundamentalism may not necessarily entail violence;

however, it is the extreme manifestation of

intolerance and fundamentalist ideals that embraces

violence. Religious extremist are therefore

religious fundamentalists, who take religious

conservatism and intolerance to an unreasonable

extent, by manifesting violence against those who

hold contrary religious views. Religious extremists

take the position that if others do not follow

94

their ways, they will be damned (Religious

extremism). They abhor the preaching of other

faiths and resort to violence to stop it. They

insist that their religious doctrines must be

universally entrenched by brute force, while the

political, social and economic systems must conform

to their religious tenets. Religious extremism does

not admit of any compromise with social change,

particularly that which contradicts religious

orthodoxy. In terms of hierarchy, therefore,

religious extremism is the farthest and most lethal

form of religious intolerance.

2. Obstructive and disruptive modes of worship

One other trigger of religious violence in

Nigeria is the obstructive, disruptive and annoying

modes of worship employed by the two dominant

95

religions. There is a notorious Christian tradition

of organizing mass crusades and revivals on public

high ways or properties adjoining the high ways.

Most of these crusades and revivals have the

disrepute of obstructing vehicular and human

movement for long periods of time (Daily Champion

2006; Ehigiator and Akinbaani 2002; cited in

Sampson 2012). in absolute disregard to torturous

and criminal liabilities. Many road users of other

faiths – and even those of the same faith – see

this practice as an affront to their legal rights

to the use of public roads as well as a

demonstration of religious arrogance and

insensitivity. In the same vein, it has become an

unwritten law for all public roads in Muslim-

dominated areas to be blocked during Juma’at (Friday)

96

prayers. Accordingly, all intending road users

needing access through these roads on Fridays have

often had the misfortune of abating their movements

and waiting for the completion of Juma’at prayers.

This tradition has triggered religious

disturbances, particularly in places with evenly

distributed numbers of Christians and Muslims. The

2001 Jos religious violence was caused by a mêlée

that erupted after a Christian woman insisted on

having her right of way through a public highway

which was barricaded by Muslim worshippers on a

Friday.

In addition to the above, both Churches and

Mosques have a tradition of erecting large and

extremely noisy loud-speakers within and outside

their worship places. This sound-magnifying

97

equipment generates serious noise pollution to the

annoyance of neighbors. In most cases, the

worshippers engage the use of these instruments

throughout the nights, in religious rituals

commonly known as ‘night vigils’ in the Christendom

and Tafsir among Muslims during the period of

Ramadan. Muslim worshippers also engage the use of

these instruments every neighbors. With the

indiscriminate location of Churches and Mosques in

residential areas, the annoyance inherent in this

tradition has triggered religious conflicts in the

country, and would indeed remain a potential

trigger of religious violence in the future. The

erection of worship places in public offices has

also served the purpose of politicizing religion in

98

work places, as both religious groups often compete

for public spaces for worship purposes.

99

3. Disparaging preaching and stereotyping

Disparaging or critical preaching is one of the

most common causes of religious violence in

Nigeria. First, both religions claim monopoly of

religious truths as well as the absolute

prerogative to eternity in heaven. This religious

cliché is contemptuously imbued in the public

preaching of both religious groups, as religious

sermons are often laden with messages signifying

the monopoly of salvation and truth. In extreme

cases, the messages transcend the traditional

monopolization of essence, thereby delving into the

arena of judgmental and scornful delegitimization

of opposing religions and their prophetic symbols.

The March 1987 religious violence in Kafanchan,

Kaduna state was allegedly caused by a Christian

100

preacher, who allegedly used verses from the Qur’an

to delegitimize Islam, while justifying the

exclusive existence of salvation within the

ambience of Christianity (Gofwen, 2004:101) Muslims

in Kaduna had also alleged that one Revd. Abubakar

Bako, publicly sought to interpret the Qur’an in a

manner that disparaged Islam, in addition to making

some uncomplimentary comments about Prophet

Mohammad (Omotosho 2003). The proliferation of

Churches and Mosques in the country and the

pervasive electronic media coverage of religious

preaching have helped in reinforcing these

disparaging sermons. With little or no censorship

of the critical content of these sermons, some

religious fundamentalists have used these media

opportunities to cause serious religious disharmony

101

and subsequent violence. The use of audio and video

preaching in public places is not less provocative.

The two religious groups often use audio-taped

preaching even in conflict-prone areas like Jos

city, in defiance of the standing security embargo

placed on them. These acts have helped to intensify

the recrimination from both sides, Christian and

Muslim, and sustain the cycle of violence.

A dangerous dimension to inter-faith ridiculing

and provocation in Nigeria is manifested in the

publication of critical literature by religious

intellectuals. In his treatise, Omotosho (2003)

chronicled the following hate-influenced

publications by both Christian and Muslim

intellectuals: Odetayo1993; Mohammad 1990:20;

Moshay 1994:46; Sanni and Amoo 1987:3; and

102

Suleiman1997:1, among others. These publications

have all made disparaging remarks against opposing

religions and their prophetic essences. The mockery

of opposing faiths is also compounded by the

pervasive stereotyping of religious adherents. For

instance, Muslims, especially those from the

northern part of Nigeria, are in the habit of

referring to all non-Muslims as Arna or Kafir; Arabic

words for ‘heathen’ or unbelievers; while it is

fashionable for Christians to refer to all Muslims

as terrorists and violence-mongers. This attitude

of religious stigmatization has generated religious

violence in the past and has the potential to do

more.

4. Proselytizing

103

One of the major causes of religious violence

in Nigeria is the methods of proselytizing used by

the two dominant religions. Although Islam and

Christianity deprecate the use of threat and

coercion as a means of proselytizing (Omotosho

2003), their approaches to preaching have remained

mentally and sometimes physically coercive.

Unfortunately, the most visible approach to Islamic

conversion campaigns, particularly in northern

Nigeria, is that of Jihad. This is epitomized by

the Boko Haram declaration that Western culture, as

represented by Christianity, is polluting and

worthy of spiritual purging. Muslim fundamentalists

view adherents of other faiths, and sometimes

moderate Muslims, as corrupted stock worthy of

Islamic conversion or regeneration as the case may

104

be. Thus the extremist disposition to enlisting

conformity by brute force has created serious

religious tensions in Nigeria.

Furthermore, the ubiquitous cassette and video

culture that now pervades the landscape of

Nigeria’s religious preaching has done a lot in

exacerbating religious violence (Larkin 1997).

These emergent forms of ‘small media’ are perhaps

even more instrumental in circulating religious

propaganda than the independent media institutions

(Hackett no date). The uninhibited playing of these

cassettes in public places, particularly the

transmission of disparaging messages or accounts of

conversion by new converts, have often attracted

the outrage of opposing religious groups.

Similarly, the Christians’ approach of ‘evangelism’

105

– a conversion campaign that favor house to house

preaching as well as preaching in public places

such as hospitals, prisons, public transport

avenues – has often outraged non-Christians, who

find the common message of ‘I am the way, the truth

and the light; no one goes to the Father except

through me’ as provocative and denigrating their

own faiths. On the campuses of many institutions of

learning in Nigeria, this tendency has resulted in

low intensity conflicts between adherents of the

two religions, as the evangelizers often invade the

privacies, and therefore, sensibilities of rival

religious adherents. The deliberate targeting of

non-Christian homes for such evangelization

campaigns has been responsible for religious

106

conflicts in the past and remains a potent trigger

to religious violence.

5. Government patronage, religious preferentialism

and marginalization

In spite of the constitutional prohibition of

disqualifications or disabilities inflicted on

persons on account of their religious leanings,

religious patronage has been entrenched in the

public realm, depending on the predominance of

particular religious adherents in positions of

authority. Thus at the federal and state government

levels, public officials manifestly patronize

particular religions at the expense of others. In

many states of northern Nigeria, public funds are

used in the purchase and distribution of food items

and other valuables for Muslim faithful during the

107

Ramadan fast; however, government does not extend

the same gesture to Christians during Christmas or

traditional religious worshippers during their

traditional ceremonies. This attitude is reversed

in some Christian dominated states. Furthermore,

whereas the federal government has established both

Christian and Muslim Pilgrims Commissions with

state funding, some states, especially in the

north, have single pilgrims’ commissions for

particular religions at the exclusion of others.

Depending on which religious group has the superior

numerical strength in a state, the clergy is given

prominent roles and privileges at state functions,

while marginalizing the others. In most states, the

dominant religion denies the other religious groups

access to certain privileges like land for locating

108

worship houses or air time for transmitting

religious messages. This attitude translates into

political and economic preferentialism towards the

favored religious group(s), while marginalizing the

others. Registering his complaint over this

discriminatory practice, Yusuf (1995:84; in Sampson

2012) argued that:

Christians have been denied access toelectronic media in 16 Northern states,while Islam monopolizes 24 hours for itsbroadcast in the same area. … Every hourthe Muslims broadcast provocativestatements about Christianity. It meansnothing, they proclaim, that peopleattend church on Sunday only to danceand to listen to songs. Authoritiesmerely wink…

It is, therefore, not out of place to hear

religious groups complain of marginalization in

respect of political and economic privileges,

public employment and political benefits. These

attitudes do not only cause inter-religious

109

upheavals, they precipitate religious sentiments in

political and economic policy making. The present

debacle over the institutionalization of Islamic

banking in the country is based on this

apprehension that the religious affiliation of the

product could be used as an instrument for the

exclusion of Christians.

6. Sensationalism in media reportage

The media’s penchant for exaggerating details

of religious violence and thereby fuelling their

intensity is well known and documented (Kukah 1993;

Kukah 1996; cited in, Okpanachi 2010). This media

character constituted the gravamen in the 1987

Kafancha religious disturbances. News reports

monitored on Radio Kaduna, immediately after the

commencement of the violence, alleged that

Christians were killing Muslims indiscriminately,

110

burning their Mosques and copies of the Holy

Qur’an, and banishing them from the town. The

broadcast further alleged that an itinerant

preacher had misquoted the Qur’an and blasphemed

the name of Prophet Mohammed, urging Christians to

kill Muslims and burn their Mosques (News watch

1987:10). These reports ignited reprisal attacks by

Muslims allover Kaduna state, causing an invaluable

loss of lives and property (Gofwen2004:91–93). Most

religious leaders in the country have therefore,

accused the media of fanning the embers of

religious violence by their provocative and emotive

reports (Kukah 1993; Spero 2010; Etaghene 2010).

News headlines such as ‘Islamic Assailants Kill

Hundreds of Christians near Jos’, ‘Muslims

slaughter Christians in central Nigeria’, ‘Muslims

slaughter 400–500 Christians in latest Jos crisis’

111

(Creeping Sharia 2010, cited in, Sampson 2012) are

very common during religious disturbances. Such

alarming headlines, coupled with gory images of

victims often trigger reprisal attacks.

The proliferation of media technology has made

it easy for some of these emotive reports and

images of slain persons to be transported far and

wide, generating intense hatred between

belligerents and reprisal attacks in a cycle of

violence. The ethno-religious violence that has

engulfed Jos, central Nigeria, in recent years has

generated an unimaginable level of hatred between

the locals and the alleged settlers (who are

generally divided along religious lines) as a

result of the dissemination of gory images of

victims on the internet. This has helped to sustain

112

recrimination and reprisal attacks from both

groups.

7. The use of religious symbols

The use of religious symbols is increasingly

becoming a source of religious conflict and

violence in Nigeria. Most Muslim women insist on

the use of the Hijab, and in extreme cases, Niqab and

Burka, even where the regulatory regime prohibit

their use. In 2005, following the prohibition of

the use of head scarves by female law students in

the faculty of law, Ahmadu Bello University

(ABU),Zaria; a Christian lecturer, Dr Andrew Akume,

turned back a female student who wore the Hijab

from attending his lecture. This action drew the

ire of the Muslim Students Society (MSS), who

mobilized their collectives and issued a fatwa

(Islamic death sentence) on the said lecturer,

113

thereby forcing him into hiding (Madugba 2005:4).

This act did not only cause serious religious

tension on the campus, but ignited a diplomatic

strain between the governments of Kaduna and Benue

states (the state in which the university is

located and the lecturer’s home state,

respectively) over Akume’s safety. The inscription

of Arabic symbols on Nigerian currency

denominations has also been vehemently opposed by

Nigerian Christians, who associate it with Islam

and an overarching Islamization agenda by northern

Muslims. On the other hand, Muslims have

continuously opposed the use of the ‘cross’ as a

symbol on public hospitals’ bill/ sign boards and

other hospital accessories. These situations remain

potential triggers of religious violence.

Pattern of Settlement in Kaduna

114

Complex interconnectedness between ethno-

regional, ethno-religious and ethnicity presents a

new phenomenon in the springing of settlement

pattern in almost all the northern states. Combine

as exacerbating factor, preponderant violent ethno-

religious fracas had ushered in new phenomenon in

neighborhood/settlement arrangement in most

northern towns and cities. Empirical survey

revealed settlement pattern along religious lines

and ethnic formations in Kaduna. The non-Muslims

and non-indigenes settle outside the traditional

city walls of Kaduna (Zaria). The insurgence

religious crises compelled the non-Muslims and the

non-indigenes to settle outside the city walls for

perceive safety.

Settlement Pattern in Kaduna State along Religion

Lines

115

Christian MuslimBarnawa High Cost KawoBarnawa complex Tudun WadaSabon Unguwan DosaUnguwanPama Unguwan RimiUnguwan Sunday MandoSource: Field Survey,2013; cited in, Salawu 2010

The pattern of settlement also in the north

informs people choice of where to live and whether

not live. This has compelled some people to swap

lands and in some cases residential apartments to

areas of dominant religion. The Table shows

criteria for judging safe areas, what people

consider before deciding where to live and/or not

live. Empirical survey revealed that violent

outbreaks affect settlement arrangement as such

perceive safety compelled people to settle along

religious and ethnic divides as commonly found in

116

most northern cities. This has great consequences

on land uses and administration thereby causing

floating of property values as the case may be in

safely advantageous neighborhoods.

117

TIMELINE OF SOME CASES OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA 1999 – 2012

No Date State(s) Nature Remarks

11 Jul.

1999Ogun

Violent clashes between Yoruba traditional worshippers and Hausa groups in Sagamu, Ogun state.

The crisis originated from the killing of a Hausa woman by the Oro Masqueraders for violating traditional rites.

222

July 1999

Kano Reprisal to the Sagamu crisis above,

The casualty figure was not reported.

320

Dec. 1999

Kwara

Muslim fundamentalists attacked and destroyed over 14 churches in Ilorin.

Properties with several millions of naira were destroyed and an unspecified casualty reported.

421—22 Feb 2000

Kaduna Riots over the introduction of Sharia

An estimated 3 000 people died

528

Feb. 2000

Abia

Religious riots iii Aba, and minor disturbances in Umuahia.

Over 450 persons killed in Aba, Abia state, as reprisal for the Kaduna crisis.

68

Sept. 2000

Gombe The Kaltungo religious crisis,

The crisis erupted over the implementation of Sharia in the state.

712

Oct. 2001

Kano Religious riot in Kano.

In protest to US invasion of Afghanistan over Osama bin Laden. Over 150 persons were killed.

8 7—17 Sept. 2001

Jos A religious riot between Muslims and Christians in Jos. Mosques, churches and several properties were damaged or torched. The clashes started on September 7 and lasted

The riot broke out when the Islamic Brigade attacked a Christian woman who attempted to cross a public high-way barricaded by Muslim worshippers on Friday.

118

nearly two weeks, ending onSeptember 17.

Over 300 people were killed.

916

Nov. 2002

KadunaThe Miss World crisis in which Muslims attacked Christians and churches.

The crisis was triggeredby an article authored by Isioma Daniel in This Day newspaper, alleging that Prophet Mohammed would have loved to havethe girls. Over 250 people were killed and several churches destroyed.

108 Jun.

2004Adamawa

Religious conflict between Christians and Muslims in Numan town.

Caused by the location of the town’s Central Mosque close to Bachama paramount ruler’s palace. Over 17 persons killed.

119

1118

Feb. 2006

BornoReligious conflict between Christians and Muslims in Maiduguri.

The riot was caused by the Danish cartoon on Prophet Mohammed, in Jyllarids-Posreonewspaper. Over 50 persons killed and 30 churches destroyed; over 200 shops, 50 houses and 100vehicles vandalized.

1222

Mar. 2007

GombeMuslim pupils killed their Christian teacher, Mrs Oluwatoyin Olusesan.

The pupils claimed that their teacher desecratedthe Qur’an while attempting to stop a student from cheating inan examination hail.

1328

Nov. 2008

PlateauReligious violence between Muslims and Christians in the city of Jos.

The crisis which was triggered by the controversial results ofa local election later turned religious. Over 700 people killed and thousands internally displaced.

1421

Feb. 2009

Bauchi Ethno-religious conflict atthe Makama New Extension.

Over 11 people were killed, more than 400 houses burnt, and over 1600 families displaced.

1526—30 Jul 2009

l3auchi,Borno Kano Yobe

Religious violence unleashed by the radical Boko Haram sect on Christians,

Over 700 persons killed 3 500 persons internallydisplaced 264 children orphaned, over 392 womenwidowed, and several properties destroyed.

1629

Dec. 2009

BauchiReligious violence unleashed by the Kala- Karo sect on Christians.

Over 38 persons killed; about 20 suspected members of the sect arrested; and over 1000 people internally displaced.

120

1717 20 Tin. 2009

Plateau Resurgence of religious crisis in Jos

Police announced at least 320 killed but aidworkers and local leaders place death tollat over 55o over 40,000 person displaced.

187 Mar.

201(1P1atam

Attacks by Fulani Moslems on Christian— dominated villages of Dogo Nahewa, Shen and Fan in Jos.

Over 500 people — mainlywomen and children — were killed.

1917

Mar. 20(0

PlateauSuspected Fulani militia men attacked residents of Biye and Batem in Jos

13 person killed

2011

Apr. 2010

Plateau

Attach on a Christian village of Berom Stock, some 30 kilometres south ofJos, by suspected Fulani herdsmen.

The attackers targeted the homes of some officials in Kura Jenta,in reprisal of the killing of about 150 Fulani Muslims, who wereallegedly killed ad dumped in wells on 19 January 2010. No life was lost but 3 houses and 6 vehicles were torched. This violence was ethno-religious.

2222 May

2010Plateau

Attack on some Christians, who were returning from their place of worship along Bauchi road in Jos.

Reprisal attack by Muslims over the killingof 3 Fulani Muslims. At least I person died while many were injured.

2317

Jul. 2010

Plateau

Muslim Fulani herdsmen launched an overnight attack on a Christian village, Mazah, north of the city of Jos.

About eight people were reportedly killed, including the wife, two children and a grandson of a Pastor. Seven houses and a church werealso burned during the attack.

24 29 Plateau Clashes between Muslims and No less than 20 persons

121

Aug. 2011

Christians at Rukuba road and Farm Gada in Jos duringthe Ramadan prayers.

were killed, 50 injured,over 50 motor vehicles and 100 motor cycles were torched.

2516 Jun

2011

Police Head- quarters, Abuja

Suicide bomb attack at the Police Headquarters, Abuja by suspected Boko Haram Islamist whose ideology is framed around religion (Wahabism)

Authorities said 6 persons were killed and 73 vehicles destroyed.

2626

Aug. 2011

UN House, Abuja

Suicide bombing at the UN House, Abuja bysuspected Boko HararnIslamists.

23 persons (11 UN personnel and 12 non-UN personnel) were killed.

275 Nov.

2011

Potiskum, Damaturuand Maiduguri

Coordinated attacks on churches and police stations by suspected Boko Hararn Islarnists.

More than 90 persons were reportedly killed, several churches and police stations torched.

2825 Dec

2011

Madala Niger state near theFCT

The bombs were alleged to have been planted at the Church s parking lot

At the last count 45 persons were killed Somedied instantly others from injuries sustained from the explosion Over 80 others were receivingtreatment for various degrees of injuries

295—6 Jan. 2012

Gombe, Gombe state

Gunmen stormed a Deeper life church in Gombe, shooting indiscriminately at worshippers. The Boko Haram Islamic sect claimedresponsibility for the shooting.

6 persons were reportedly killed while many others were injured.

30 5—6 Jan. 2012

Mubi, Adamawa state

Suspected Boko Haram militants stormed a gathering of Igbo Christians and shot sporadically, killing over

22 persons were reportedly killed; a dozen others were injured.

122

a dozen and injuring othersin apparent execution of anultimatum given by the BokoHararn Islamist sect to Southern Christians living in the North to leave.

Source: Adapted from Onuoha 2010; cited in, Sampson 2012.

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CHAPTER FOUR

4.1 STATE INEFFECTIVENESS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE

While the roots of ethnic and religious

conflicts have been linked to colonialization,

scholars like (Machava, 2008), argues that

religious conflicts are rooted in bad governance,

politicization of religious identities, the

competition and conflict for political power by the

ethnic groups and religious communities

respectively (Anarfi, 2004; Conversi, 1999; cited

in Sampson 2012)

Takaya (1992:112) identified centrifugal

factors that give rise to the politicization of

religious identities in Nigeria, it is important to

note that the politicization of religion is an

offshoot of the ills of colonialism which includes

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the existence of two or more religious groups with

numerical strengths that can significantly affect

the outcome and direction of a democratic political

process, the instrumentalism of religion as

legitimizing tools of hegemony in instances when

the interest of the political class are under

threat, when there is an ascendant radical thinking

within a politically significant ethnic or

religious group capable of upstaging hegemony; when

the society is characterized by political, social

and economic hardships that can cause alliances

along religious fault-lines. Institutional

fragility of the state in terms of their ability

and capacity to manage diversity, corruption rising

inequality between the rich and poor, gross

violation of human rights, environmental

125

degradation, contestations over land, have been

some of the underlining causes of violent conflicts

in Nigeria since the enthronement of democracy rule

in 1999. Others argue that religion is a cover for

or a surface aspect of deeper antagonism and that

the factor causing and driving the conflicts

transcend it to include a complex mix of history,

political, economic, ethnic and other factors, it

is a common refrain in discussing conflict in the

region that apparently religious tension are in

fact political, whether due to the restriction of

political freedoms under military rule or the

scheming of politicians since 1999. People feel

that politicians are responsible for violence,

either by using gangs of young men for political

126

thug or by stirring up trouble in other to seek a

pay-off from federal authorities.

The following is a typical view; “These elite

only raise their voices when they lose out in the

game of sharing power and resources among

themselves. During President Obasanjo’s regime, if

a northerner was sent packing from government, he

quickly rushed home to hoodwink and manipulate

youths to stage an armed conflict so that he could

negotiate for yet another position in government”.

An interlocutor argued that his state governor

was creating trouble in other to shift public

resources into a “security fund” so he did not have

to account for their use. Tensions and conflicts

stirred up by politicians often take on religious

or associated ethnic dimension simply because these

127

are society most visible lines of division.

Politics and religion have always been inextricably

linked in the north and recent political

development has affected religious coexistence. The

expansion of the country political structure from

three regions in 1960 to 36 states in 1996

undermined regionalism and reconfigured state-level

conditions. The smaller, predominantly Christian

ethnic groups began emerging as more significant

political actors within their states. Threatened by

this development, the ruling classes in the region

began to explore new strategies for retaining their

influence and control. In the far north, they well

back increasingly on religion “as a tool to forge a

new hegemonic coalition” and it become a major

128

instrument for mobilizing constituencies, sometimes

violently.

Growing disillusionment, especially among

Muslim youth, with the “deception” and

“insincerity” that have characterized

implementation of Sharia is also feeding into

conflicts. Sharia was meant to herald a corruption-

free and more compassionate state, but many in the

region now believe that the political establishment

has become even more corrupt and uncaring than it

was during the earlier era. Many youth conclude

that the promises of Sharia will never be truly

realized until it is implemented by religious

rather than political authorities in other words,

after the installation of an Islamic State. This

frequently leads to them into conflict with

129

established authorities. All these are further

compounded largely due to the failure of the

Nigeria state to live up to its primary

responsibility of providing security and welfare

for its citizens. Thus, as a consequence of all

these, the state is consumed by internal violence;

its credibility and legitimacy are being questioned

by the citizens (Rotberg, 2004). The reality of the

situation is that since the citizen have lost

confidence in the capacity of the state to manage

religious diversity on one hand, and provide

protection for them on another hand; they have

resort to alternative sources of security. The lack

of cohesiveness in the nation’s polity has also

manifested itself in the present democratic

dispensation. This has been demonstrated by the

130

incessant cases of violence and uprisings in the

last couple of years.

Since the enthronement of democratic rule in

1999, in his view, Kwaja (2009) believes the

failure of governance is responsible for the

recurring sectarian violence in Nigeria. Another

reason responsible for ethno-religious crisis in

Nigeria is the wrong interpretation of the

scripture by those who claim authority to the

interpretation of the holy books. If not so, one

wonders why people act contrary to the teaching of

the scriptures of matters pertaining to peaceful

co-existence, unity and sanctity of life, and

property. As it is a serious disease for an

ignorance to claim authority to knowledge, many of

the so called ‘religious leaders use their shallow

131

knowledge to interpret the scripture to suit their

selfish and banking on the ignorance of their

followers. Lamenting on the wide gap between the

teaching and practice of religion among its

adherents, Adebayo (2003) identified some factor

responsible for using religion as instrument of

polarization, among which is leadership tussle,

which also culminate in the proliferation of may

dominations in the country. Also, sectarian

jingoism as well as well as excessive patriotism to

one’s religious sect, which consequently

transformed to fanaticism, is another major factor

contributing to this social menace.

It is an un-derivable fact that a nation that

witnesses ethno-religious crisis almost on an

annual basis could not be said to be stable

132

politically. The problem of ethnicity, which

dichotomized the country’s armed forces, was said

to have been responsible for the outbreak of the

1967 civil war, which lasted for thirty months

leaving thousands of lives dead including “soldiers

and civilian that would have done the country proud

(Ajimotokin, 2003). It is also observed by Adebayo,

(2003) that religion has no place where ethnicity

is dominating. He attributed the annulment of the

June 12, 1993 election which was believed to have

been the most peaceful, free and fair election in

the political history of the country, to ethnicity

where both the acclaimed winner of the election and

the then military president that annulled the

election were Muslims but from different ethnic

background. In essence, ethno-religious crisis

133

breed unstable government, which is very crucial to

sustainable development.

Education is very vital in only sustainable

developmental program. The nation is striving to

put in place amenities for the purpose of elevating

the education standard of the country. This is,

however hampered by incessant closure of schools

and institutions in places where ethno-religious

crisis are holding. Apart from the schools are not

spared in the destructive tendencies of those

participating in crisis of any nature. Many schools

had been burnt down while many were forced to close

down for months. The education of innocent youths

was equally disrupted under tumultuous situations

created by ethno religious crisis, as many were

forced to migrate from the crisis area. Imam

134

(2004:38) identified two parties of emigration in

such a situation, namely temporary and permanent

emigration. He observed that;

Those who emigrated on temporary basiscame back after several weeks or monthsin exile to come back and contend withrely of their abandoned residence andproperties. However, those who opted forpermanent emigration were mostly non-indigenes who suffered losses and felttheir continued stay in the crisis areasis like casting one’s life intoperdition (Cited in Sampson, 2012).

Whichever the case, the crisis destabilized

everything, including the education of students

whose parents were forced to relocate consequent of

the crisis. Such people became refugees elsewhere

and would take time for them to settle down in

their new settlements to practice their profession

and for children to adjust to their new

environment.

135

Cases of ethno-religious crisis have serious

implication for stability of education programs in

the tertiary institutions where they are lunched.

Ethnic crisis, which took place at Ahmadu Bello

University (ABU) Zaria, no doubt, led to brain

drain. The Hausa community in the institution,

motivated by spirit of ethnicity, complained about

inequality of posts of responsibilities among the

staff of the University. The staff, mostly Hausa-

Fulani, constituted they into an organization

called Northern Elements coalition (NECO), accused

the Yoruba and Tiv staff of marginalizing them.

Losing sight of the fact that positions in tertiary

institutions are filled on merit and qualifications

and not on the basis of ethnicity, they accused the

then vice-chancellor, Prof. Daniel Saror (A Tiv

136

man) of collaborating with the university senate

and council, which were composed essentially of

professors of Yoruba extraction to “destroy” the

university. The rancor consequently led to the

brutal murder of Prof. Bamidele Bandipo, who hailed

from offa, a Yoruba town in Kwara State (Adeyemi,

2005). This state of insecurity made many lecturers

of the institution, especially the Yoruba and Tiv

to look outside the institution for other

universities where their lives and properties would

be protected.

A major cause of what we now see as ethno

religious conflict in Nigeria has to do with the

accusations and allegation of neglect, oppression

domination, exploitation, victimization,

discrimination, marginalization, nepotism and

137

bigotry. In every nation (Nigeria inclusive), there

is no complete agreement on how wealth, power and

states are to be shared among individuals and

groups. There is also no agreement on how to effect

necessary changes and reforms. This is because,

different groups and individuals have diverse

interest in which case, some groups will have their

aims met, while others will not. What this means is

that conflict (ethno religious ones inclusive)

usually occur when deprived group and individuals

attempt to increase their share of power and wealth

or to modify the dominant values, norms, beliefs or

ideology. Thus, in Nigeria and going by the various

examples of ethno-religious conflict cited earlier,

there seems to be a divisive interplay of politics,

ethicist and religious, which has consequently led

138

to the rising nationalism and militancy of various

ethnic and religious movement. It is interesting to

note that the overall consequence of this is the

escalation of various ethno-religious conflicts

that are witnessed all over the country today which

are meant to correct any perceived form of

marginalization, oppression or domination.

It is important to note here too that the

failure of the Nigerian leader to establish good

governments, forge national integration and promote

what can be called real economic progress, through

deliberate and articulated policies, has led to

mass poverty and unemployment. This has resulted

into communal, ethnic, religious and class conflict

that have now characterized the Nigerian nation.

139

Another glaring factor that sparks up ethno

religious violence conflict is indigene/settler

divides. In many parts of Nigeria, the issue of

indignity has seemed to create new kind of

parochialism where none has existed before. The

settler question in urban areas in Nigeria has

produced violent conflict in varying capacities as

witnessed in kasuwa Magani (1980), ZangoKataf, Gure

Kahagu (1984), Kafanchan Kaduna, Lere (1987),

Ilorin, Jere (1987), Tafawa Balewa Bauch (1991),

Zango Kataf (1992), Tiv and Idoma (1993), (See

Ibrahim, 1993; Dung, 1994). Dung (1994) asserts

that those conflicts often start as local conflict

but later spread to other areas. He further states

that religious factors have also played a crucial

role in the generation and expansion of the

140

conflict, especially in situations where the

religious and political boundaries overlap. The

issue of indigene/settler divides began to take an

increase importance not long after Nigeria’s

independence according to HEW (2006) “With regional

policies that discriminated against the indigene of

other region in areas as diverse as employment and

the acquisition of land (Brennan, 2005). The

following excerpt speaks volume of indigene/settler

dichotomy as indicated by Albert and Godfrey

(1965:55) where Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, Premier of

Nigeria’s Northern Region 1956 in a house of

chief’s debate opined that

We do not want to go to (lake) chad andmeet strangers catching our fish in thewater, and taking them away to leave uswith nothing. We don’t want to go toSokoto and find a carpenter who is astranger nailing our houses. I do notwant to go to the Sabon-Gari in kano and

141

find strangers making the body of alorry, or to go to the market and seebutcher who are not northerners (citedin Salawu, 2010:73)

The maintenance of peace and security is

critical to the responsibility of the state. Thus,

section 14 (1) of the Nigerian constitution state

that; “the security and welfare of the people shall be a primary

purpose of government”. The emerging consensus on the

study of ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria

emphasizes the role of the state as the both the

regulator of competition among the diverse ethnic

group as well as the guarantor of security

(Osaghae, 2007:171; cited in, Okpanachi 2010).

Regrettably, the post colonial Nigeria state

has become so entangled in ethnic and religious

issues to the extent that its neutrality and

legitimacy has also become suspect. In the light of

142

the foregoing, certain probing questions become

germane; whose interest does the state seek to

protect in terms of access and opportunities? Which

of the ethnic or religious interests does the state

seek to protect or obstruct? Does the state possess

the capacity to manage ethnic and religious

conflict? How can such capacity be transformed with

the aim of guaranteeing durable peace, security and

stability? The question of how to reconcile the

contradictory role of the diverse ethnic and

religious group is central to our analysis of the

capacity of the state to manage ethnic and

religious conflicts. The inability of the state to

effectively perform its core functions of providing

or guaranteeing security for the people as well as

act as regulator has led to a weakening of the

143

bargaining strength and capacity in relation to the

ethnic and religious groups in society, which poses

a serious challenge for national security.

In this light, loyalty to ethnic or religious

cleavage is being placed for and above the state.

In view of the fact that some people especially

citizens in rural areas, who constitute the bulk of

the marginalized group prefer to be seen and

described based on the ethnic or religious groups

they belong rather than their status as citizens of

Nigeria. The failure of the state has led to the

emergence of ethnic militias in several parts of

the country that have been agitating for reversing

back to the old regional autonomy of the different

groups for the purpose of determining the pace of

144

their development and control of their respective

resources.

The Oduduwa People’s Congress (OPC) was put in

place by the Yoruba in the South West part of the

country to fight for the protection and defense of

Yoruba in Nigeria. In the eastern part was the

movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign

State of Biafra (MASSOB) fighting for cessation of

the Igbo ethnic tribe from the Nigeria. This might

probably be the feeling of Elaigwu (2005; cited in,

Adebayo 2010.) when he writes.

… the violent protests in the Niger-Delta over perceived injustice inresources distribution; the Itsekiri-Ijaw violence in the Delta; theresumption of the menace of Odu’aPeople’s Congress (APC) and the IgboPeople’s Congress (IPC); the MASSOBfeeble attempt to resuscitate Biafra;the Sharia crises and the demand for afederation; the south-south demand forthe control of its resources; and allthe recent inter-ethnic/religious

145

conflicts such as Boko haram in variousstates across the country are all partof the bubbles of the Nigeriafederation. They are based on thehistorical structures of mutual fearsand suspicions among Nigerians group ina competitive process. They reflectdissatisfaction of Nigeria group withthe state of the federation (P. 12).

Federalism, as an approach to national unity,

has resulted to anarchy in the country, lamenting

on this, a former military head of state and later

a civilian president of Nigeria, Chief Olusegun

Obasanjo, was said to have highlighted some of the

shortcoming of the type of approach when he says;

Fear suspicion, intolerance and greedhave been constant in every crisis andconfrontation in Nigeria… it is thepsychological fear of discrimination anddomination. It is fear of deprivation ornot getting one’s fair share… it isvariously described, at the politicallevels as constitutional imbalance; ateconomic level as inequality ofopportunity (Daily Times, 1984)

146

Apart from the ethnic rivalry threatening the

sustainable development of Nigeria, another serious

problem facing the country is religious pluralism

which has culminated in many crisis and has shaken

the country to its root and state has proven

incapacitated as a result of ethnic pressure and

demand which severe implication in term of the

ability to manage ethno-religious contradictions in

the political system. These also expose its lack of

autonomy and ability to stand above society as a

neutral agency.

147

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 SUMMARY

The research work examined the problem of

ethno- religious conflicts in Nigeria with emphasis

on it causes. Starting from a stand point that

religious conflicts which are widespread in Nigeria

have a long history and are characterized by

violent confrontations among the causes of these

religious conflicts are multi-dimensional. Some of

the causes mentioned and discussed in this paper

are accusations and allegations of neglect,

oppression, domination, victimization,

discrimination, marginalization and the inability

of the Nigerian leaders to establish a good system

of governments, breakdown of traditional vehicles

148

of social control; the long history of military

intervention in politics, which legitimizes the use

of force and violenceas instruments of social

change and attainment of set goals and demand, and

historical antecedent. In spite of the widespread

of religious conflicts in Nigeria and their long

history, the paper has shown that the Nigerian

governments (past and present) have failed to

tackle this problem through articulate and well

organized policy actions.

In the quest of disseminate credible

information, the media should be careful not to

exaggerate the detail of religious violence in

order not to fuel and intensify grievances, which

would lead to further killing and destruction of

property. This is not to suggest that the media

149

should withhold valuable information about violent

occurrence but rather that it should be done in

manner which clearly explains the conditions that

may have sparked off the violence, in other words,

it should not be recriminating to just one

religious group.

The patronage of one religious group or

another has also been a disturbing factor which

also has the tendency of fuel grievances, what this

means is that both of the state and federal level,

public officials apparently slow preference for

members of their religion. Also, at the mention of

any religious group in any political or economic

policy, there is always a tendency that religious

has been contend, as one of the factors that leads

to religious violence. The wrong perception of

150

different religious stems from the fact that there

is lack in the methods through which adherents

educate and carryout orientations. This has brought

about extremism and fundamentalism which are

indicators of religious intolerance as early

mentioned.

A critical lesson to learn from this analysis

is that religion has become in the contemporary

world to use the words of Ball and Dagger, “a

political force pushing in different directions

(Thomas and Richard, 1995). This implies that

nations and indeed Nigeria must wake up to this

reality and be more concerned with harnessing the

peace making opponents and values of its various

religious groups. There is no denying the fact that

each religion teaches peace and discourages war and

151

conflicts. Therefore, religious leaders from

different faith can be mobilized to facilitate

peace. This is no doubt requires religious leaders

from both faiths to teach and practice common

virtues such as justice, compassion, kindness and

respect for the others.

It is important from this point to note that

despite the measures taken to achieve some level of

social integration and unity in Nigeria, ethno-

religious violence have continued to linger thereby

threatening the very existence of the country and

constituting a threat to the nascent democracy .

5.2 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have examined the problem of

ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria in general and

Kaduna state in particular with emphasis on its

152

causes and management. Starting from a theoretical

standpoint that ethno-religious conflicts which are

widespread in Nigeria have a long history and are

characterized by violent confrontations among the

various ethnic and religious groups that make up

the Nigeria nation. The research argues that the

causes of these ethno-religious conflict are multi-

dimensional. Some of the causes mentioned and

discussed in this paper are accusations and

allegations of neglect, oppression, domination,

victimization, discrimination, marginalization,

nepotism and bigotry; the inability of the Nigerian

leaders to establish good government; breakdown of

traditional vehicle of social control; the long

history of military intervention in politics, which

legitimizes the use of force and violence as

153

instruments of social change and attainment of set

goals and demand; and historical antecedent.

In spite of the widespread of ethno-religious

conflicts in Nigeria and their long history, the

paper has shown that the Nigerian governments (past

and present) have failed to tackle this problem

through articulated and well organized policy

actions. The country record in conflict management

has been poor as the government continues to rely

on coercive method and always resorts to the use of

white paper emanating from them are often not

implemented. Since ethno-religious conflict are

inevitable in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious

society like Nigeria, the paper has suggested the

following mechanisms of conflict management:

government should move from conflict resolution to

154

the stage of conflict prevention; provision of

adequate and effective security in each state that

will respond promptly to any ethno-religious

insurgence; establishment of functional and

effective platform for ethno-religious leaders

where grievances can be discussed before they

escalate into ethno- religious crisis; involvement

of the civil society which will intervene in some

critical area of ethno-religious conflict;

strengthening of some conflict resolution

institutions through appropriate legislations;

government should resolve to be pluralistic,

representative and just in dealing with ethno-

religious issues; and above all the government

should strive to reduce poverty among the Nigerian

citizens.

155

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

We have discus above the frequency of ethno-

religious crisis in the state. We identify the

causes of the February 21 2000 crisis in the state

and its implications. We also acknowledge the

inevitability of conflict in social relations.

Having clearly understood the issues involved, the

following are masterpiece for interveners.

1. Firstly, the issue of street culture must be

addressed. Most of the riots in Kaduna would

not have been as fatal as they were if there

had not been the problem of street culture in

the city. By street culture we mean the

abnormal situation in which an individual who

has no home or work place spend a

156

disproportionately large part of his or her

time on the street and consequently become

liable to involvement in anti-social

activities. For instance, the “Almajirai, Yandaba

etc. the engendered the street culture where

instrumental to the pedestal dimension in which

the February 2000 crisis assumed. Therefore,

one of the way by which inter-religious and

inter-ethnic harmony can be promoted in Kaduna

is by dealing with the problem of street

culture. As a matter of urgency, the government

should deal with the Almajirai system by formally

absorbing the Qur’anic schooling which these

children attend into a formal educational

system in the country. Alternatively, Islamic

scholars should be given government grants for

157

the re-organization of their schools according

to modern standards. The pupils from these

schools should be stopped from begging on the

street. If the Almajiral could be permanently kept

off the street of Kaduna, those who seek to

cause religious or ethnic violence would not

find enough people on the street to support

their mob action.

2. As a step towards solving the problem of ethno-

religious conflict, the government at all

levels should jointly move from conflict

resolution to the stage of conflict prevention.

To effectively succeed in this new process, the

government should be more committed to the

provision of adequate and effective security in

each state. That should be able to respond

158

promptly to any insurgence of ethno-religious

crisis anywhere at any time. It is important to

point out here though that the security outfit

that will serve this purpose effectively should

be the type that will have adequate and modem

security facilities and training that will

enhance their quick response to ethno religious

conflicts.

3. Another step towards managing ethno-religious

conflicts in Nigeria is that government at all

levels must encourage, in their domains,

effective and functional platforms for ethno-

religious leaders so that through them it would

be possible to establish a network for conflict

prevention and management. This proposal is

necessary because in Nigeria, the various

159

political, religious, traditional and ethnic

leaders in most areas of conflict hardly sit

together to discuss the causes of ethno-

religious violence and how to prevent future

conflicts. What this means is that in Nigeria,

with a bad history of ethno-religious

conflicts, leaders hardly met to build bridges

of understanding that could lead to the

establishment of mutual confidence that could

sustain a multi-ethnic society. Thus, rather

than being part or initiators of the solution,

they (leaders) often become part of the

conflicts, which they suppose to resolve. The

recent government resolution to establish a

National Council of Traditional Rulers is a

move in the right direction, which will go a

160

long way in building bridges among religious

and ethnic divides. It is however suggested

here that such body should be expanded to

include ethnic leaders, opinion leaders and

religious leaders, while the government should

strengthen the Nigeria Inter Religious Council

(N1REC), which is already in existence.

4. The civil society also has important roles to

play in the management of ethno-religious

conflicts in Nigeria. The civil society can

effectively intervene by focusing attention on

the social organization and structural patterns

of interaction, the modes of violence employed

the values of the parties in conflict, the

genesis of conflict, and the degree of

incompatibility of goals among others.

161

5. Just like the civil society, the Non-

Governmental Organizations (NGO) also has

special roles to play in conflict management in

Nigeria. Therefore, governmental organizations

or institutions at all levels should encourage

the NGOs to embark on research and program of,

environment, civic, religious, and peace

education for neighborhood communities. In

particular, the NGOs should be organized in

such a way that they will serve as facilitators

of dialogues between, conflicting groups.

6. The government in Nigeria should strengthen the

Institution of Public Complaint Bureau which

already exists in each state of the Federation

through appropriate legislations. With this

establishment, the parties in dispute will be

162

able to lay - bare their grievances for on-ward

transmission to appropriate government agencies

for necessary action. There should also be a

deliberate program of political and social

reorientation of the entire citizenry. Such

political and social orientation will go a long

way in changing the negative stereotypes and

negative, values that have characterized the

Nigerian peoples, In particular, the National

Orientation Agency (NOA), the National Youth

Service Corps (NYSC), the National Institute

for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPS),

Political Parties and National Associations

(like National Youth Council, Nigeria Council

of Women Society (NCWS) should be strengthened

in the various assignments as bridge builders

163

that will discourage the spirit of division

among Nigerians and foster oneness which is

necessary for building one nation with one

destiny as contained in the Nigerian

constitution.

7. There must be respect for the BELIEF of each

group. It was in one of the numerous meetings

of our fore leaders in the first Republic to

mediate peace and co-existence that Dr. Nnamdi

Azikiwe maintained thus, “we should forget

about our differences and live together as one”

but in swift reaction, Sir Ahmadu Bello

disapprove the submission of Nnamdi Azikiwe

when he argued “No, we cannot forget our

differences but to appreciate and accommodate

our differences if we must live together as

164

one” in this light therefore, Christian in the

state must consciously learn how to appreciate

the aversion of the followers of Islam and

cease from such. For instance, for the

Christian to openly preach that “The only way

to kingdom of God is through Christ, any other

way leads to hell” in a place like Muslim area

is to provoke the sensibilities of the Muslims

and must be avoided because it is considered

objectionable to them. In the same vein, the

Muslims in the state should desist from the

stereotype labeling of Christian as Kafiri

(Infidel), that is, someone who has no

religion. Closely related to this is the

worrisome issue of inflammatory sentiments

against religions by some political and

165

religious leaders. Imprudent religious comments

sharpen religious sensitivities and inflame

passions. If the leaders avoid foul languages,

it will encourage other members of their

religion to follow suit. This will in turn

promote good neighborliness and peaceful co-

existence in the state. The leaders of the two

religion are thus, challenged in the

accomplishment of this supposition.

Above all, in order to solve the problem of

ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria, the

government should be pluralistic, representative,

and just in their treatment of the Nigerian

citizens. It should discourage all forms of

discrimination, neglect and marginalization in

dealing with development and religious issues. The

166

government should also target to reduce poverty

among Nigerians so that the reservoir of recruits

for ethno-religious conflicts will be punctured.

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