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Maritime Force Protection Operations Analysis Methodology Development
Analysis Techniques for Defeating Threats to Naval Assets
International Maritime Protection Symposium
12-14 December 2005
Presented by Dr Darren J. Sutton
Navy Scientific Adviser
Defence Science and Technology Organisation – Australia
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Presentation Outline
Maritime Force Protection Scope the Problem
• Multiple views• Risk Analysis• Attribute Analysis• Threat Analysis• Functional Decomposition
Quantify The Problem• Modelling• Solution Options Evaluation• Requirements Determination• Examples
• Solution Options - Weapons Performance • Requirement for defence against suicide light aircraft
Conclusion
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TTCP MAR AG-5
• Small Boat Swarm Attack
• Suicide Attack on Berthed or Anchored ShipSurface Craft
Truck Bomb
• Swimmer or SDV Attack on Berthed or Anchored Ship• Attack by Asymmetric Air Threats on Berthed or Anchored Ship
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IntroductionMaritime Force Protection
{closely related to security of commercial ships, ports and harbour installations}
• Maritime Force Protection
To conserve the fighting potential of the force by countering the wider threat to all its elements from adversary, natural and human hazards, and fratricide.
• Harbour Protection To protect critical waterfront and floating assets by providing area security (defence) of
the harbour or port.
• In-Harbour Force ProtectionTo secure ships and naval assets while anchored or alongside in a port or harbour by
offboard or onboard means.
• Ship-Based Force ProtectionTo protect naval vessels berthed, anchored or underway, close-to-shore, at home or
away with onboard means.
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RISK ANALYSISComparative Risk
0.000001
0.00001
0.0001
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000
Consequence of Failure [f (Lives lost, Cost in $M)]
An
nu
al P
rob
ab
iliy
of
Sig
nif
ica
nt
Da
ma
ge
or
De
str
uc
tio
n
[R
ISK
]
Commercial Aviation
Unacceptable RegionMerchant
Shipping
Acceptable Region
Marginal Region
Drilling Rigs
Space Travel?
Dams
[after Bhattracharya et al][after Bhattracharya et al]
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• Effects based approach• Seek publicity as effects-multiplier
(political damage)• Flexibility and Improvising ability• Opportunistic (initiative seizing /
offensive) • Cellular Local or Tactical Organisation
(Network or Hierarchy Command Structure)• Dispersed operations• Low cost relative to Military Force• Civilian - Non-compliant with UN, Laws of
Armed Conflict, national or local legislation
• Hardening (deterrence/survivability)• Intelligence /surveillance/reconnaissance• Preparedness (alertness/response
capability)• Flexibility (defences need to be as
flexible and adaptable as the threat!)• Flatter Command and Control (more
autonomous smaller forces)• Affordability (Realistic cost)• Freer legal operational environment
(maintain minimal collateral damage and avoid fratricide)
Anti-terrorist Requirements Terrorist Attributes
Attribute Analysis View
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Threat Analysis View Maritime Terrorist Threats
Threats may be characterised by • mission or intent
• harassment or attention-seeking non-lethal attacks• lethal weapon attacks• suicidal explosive attacks
• effector delivery method• Surface, sub-surface, air; Manned, unmanned
• physical features of the threat platform • form, material, dimensions• speed, agility• stability • signatures.
• cross platform features • manning strategy (recruitment, training, practicing, command and control) • interoperability and tactical skill
• strategy • radical unpredictability• opportunistic• employ quantity versus quality of forces
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Force Protection Functional Chain
Detect DefeatDeterClassify Mitigate
Next Map Functions to Capability Components and then Enablers Next Map Functions to Capability Components and then Enablers
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Detect
Intelligence
CBRN sensor packages* (air, sea, undersea)
EO/IR/acoustic*Sniper/Mortar Detection*Swimmer Detection (passive acoustic and non-acoustic)*
*Potential Technology
- Find Terrorists before they strike- Recognize terrorist targeting- Hold defensive posture
Sensors
Data fusion*Pattern/Anomaly recognition*Early warningInformation dissemination*Intelligent agents/Data Mining*
Detect potential threats approaching or entering protected areas or in areas of interest to the warfighter such as straits, anchorages, ports,
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Classify
Classification (provoke intent)
Remote Explosive Detection*Standoff imaging*Firearm Detection*Biometrics*Sensor Integration
*Potential Technology
Determine:•Friend / Enemy / Neutral?•Mission?•Authorized / Unauthorized?•Armed or Unarmed?•With What?
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Deter
Show of forcePerimeter Security
Area denial (water, USW, air, shore)Quick passage for “authorized good guys”Barriers – Physical and Virtual*, ChemicalUnambiguous warning devices/systemVehicle and vessel stoppers* (at range)Vehicle and personnel matching systems*Integration/Automation of surveillance systems*
Light/AudioPsychological Effects*DeceptionObscurants*Automated active response*UCAV, UCGV, UUCV
*Potential Technology
- Deny access to protected areas- Facilitate access for authorized persons and platforms- Improve capabilities while also reducing manpower
- Hide weaknesses- Show strength - Improve response time of both personnel and “actions”
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Deny Defeat
Non-Lethal
Directed Energy Weapons*Stand-off vehicle/ vessel disablement*Anti-Swimmer disablement*Automated active response*UCAV, UCGV, UUCV
Lethal
Remote explosive detonation*Automated counter fire weapon*
*Potential Technology
Interdict or influence potential threats when ROE or uncertainty precludes lethal force
Rapidly and accurately neutralize threats at rangeMinimize collateral effects
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Mitigate
Reduce damage and casualties during threat strikeRecover rapidly to full operations / capability
Hardening/Blast MitigationRecovery Systems - rapid decontamination* - rapid temporary perimeters* - self forming networks*
Active armor / countermeasures*
*Potential Technology
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Quantify the Problem
• Variables• Constraints• Inclusions• Exclusions• Measures of Performance • Derive mathematical relationship between Variables
• Temporal• Spacial• Spectral
• Develop Model • Exploratory (parametric)• Deterministic
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Heirarchy of Mathematical Models
Tactical
Operational
Platform
Sub-system/ technical
System
Scenarios
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Probabilityof success
Ranges(detect, open fire,
intercept)
WeaponProbabilityof Hit & Kill
Time Delays
Threat NumberSpeed, Separation
Engagement Scheduling
Firing rate, Burst, Magazine
Size
Platform-Level Modelling
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Weapon Performance Study
• Aim – to compare general classes of gun based weapons against surface threats• Options
• 30mm stabilised• 25 mm stabilised • 20mm Close in Weapon System• 50 cal (stabilised or unstabilised)• 7.26 mm gun• 5.56mm
• Deconstruction• Single Gun vs single target• Platform vs multiple targets• Swarm Annihilation
• Tools • Gun Operational Analysis Model (GOAT), • Ship weapons scheduling model, • Target kill rate model.
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Weapon Study
0
5
10
15
20
25
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Firing Range (m)
Kill
s P
er M
aga
zine
30 mm stab
25mm stab
CIWS (20mm)
50 cal stab (12.7mm)
LMG (5.56mm)
GPMG (7.62mm)
Mini-Gun (7.62mm)
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Classif ication Range (m)
Mea
n K
ills
30 mm stab25mm stabCIWS (20mm)50 cal stab (12.7mm)LMG (5.56mm)GPMG (7.62mm)Mini-Gun (7.62mm)
Keep Out Range = 350 m
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0 5 10 15 20
Mean Kills
Pro
ba
bili
ty o
f S
wa
rm A
nn
ihila
tio
n
1
2
3
4
5
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7
8
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Ship physical,targeting data
Threat data
1 on 1effectiveness
System issues.e.g. how many, timing,
no fire zones.
System modelOverall
effectiveness.
1 on 1effectiveness
Gun data
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Terrorist Aircraft Attack Keep-Out-Range Requirement Study
• Scenario: Vessel attacked by low slow aircraft • Problem: Survive the Attack
• Engage the target• Avoid debris damage
Questions:• What is Close-in Weapons System effectiveness ? • What distance must the aircraft be defeated so
heavy debris does not hit the ship ?• What are the effects of wind on collateral damage ?
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Example: Given Aircraft speed of 300 m/s at altitude of 200 ft.
Results:• Debris spread is between 300-1000 m• High R-value falls between 300 and 600 m, depending on the initial angle of the aircraft• A keep-out-range of 600 m would be chosen to avoid being hit by the most damaging material• A keep-out-range of up to 1000 m would be chosen to avoid being hit by all material down to an
R-value of 2.
Debris Pattern
Flight Direction
Wind Direction
HeavyLow drag
LightHigh drag
Flight DirectionFlight Direction
Wind Direction
Wind Direction
HeavyLow drag
LightHigh drag
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Suicide Aircraft AttackIn Port or at Anchor
• Weapon Solution Options • Guns, Missiles
• Variables• Effective Range• Lethality• Magazine capacity
• Measure of Performance• Probability of hit• Conditional Probability of kill / hit• Salvo probability of kill
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Conclusion Summarising Methodology
Define Top level Requirements
Propose S&T development
Functions required
Propose non-tech changeStrategic/Legal/Operational/Tactical
Maritime Operational Analysis Studies
Contribution
Determine Capability Gaps
Assess S&T Component of Solution Set
Identify Potential Solutions – compare options
Map function required to capability
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Finally
Continuing Research Operations Analysis Methodology Development • Analysis Techniques for Maritime Force Protection• Applications to the Royal Australian Navy capability analysis for development and
acquisition of ship and harbour force protection improvements.
Eileen Moran
eileen.moran@dsto.defence.gov.au
Defence Science and Technology Organisation
Maritime Operations Division
Wharf 17, Pirrama Road
Pyrmont NSW 2009
Australia.
Eileen Moran
eileen.moran@dsto.defence.gov.au
Defence Science and Technology Organisation
Maritime Operations Division
Wharf 17, Pirrama Road
Pyrmont NSW 2009
Australia.
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Functions - Deter, Deny, DefeatGraded Responses
• Avoidance/deterrence• Persistent Situational Awareness• Interrogations (IFF)• Warnings (illuminators, acoustic, pyrotechnics)• Non-lethal effectors (floodlights, water hose, flash-bang,
acoustic blast)• Lethal Weapons (guns, missiles, torpedos )• Mitigation - Survivability, Recovery
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Non - lethal Options
• Acoustic (LRAD)• Electrical (Stun Gun)• Mechanical/Kinetic (Water cannon, nets)• Electromagnetic (Active Denial system)• Optical (Laser dazzle, spotlights)• Bio/Chemical (Foam, Smoke)
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Measures of Performance for the Defender
• Prob uncovering plans to attack• Prob detection outside restricted zone• Prob determining hostile intent outside restricted zone• Prob warning-off/dissuading outside a keep-out-zone• Prob destroying/disabling by keep-out-zone• Or• Prob halting attack at outer layer boundary• Prob halting attack at inner layer boundary
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