10 Trends in Capability Planning for Defence and Security

a TNO initiative

Developing Capability Portfolios: 10 Trends An Idiosyncratic and Iconoclastic View

Stephan De SpiegeleireSenior Scientist

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

NATO International Conference on Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis

ParisMay 12-14, 2009

2

Capability Portfolios – New Kid on the Block

3

‘Portfolio’-Thinking under Fire

4

The essence of portfolio theory

5www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009

Trend 1 – Broadening Definition of ‘Capability'

DOTMLPF

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Planning for National Security –The New Dutch Whole-of-Government Approach

1. Government-wide analysis

A. Strategic foresight

B. Horizon-scanning

B. Thematic in-depth foresight

Report strategic foresight

Process

Product

Decision-making

Report

Threat-pictureReport

themes and scenarios

Cabinet decides onthemes for thematicin-depth

analyses

C. National risk-

assessment

NationalRisk

Picture

3. Follow-up

Legislation

Risk prioritization Measures

Policy

Planning assumpt

ions

programmetasks and capabilities

2. Strategic planning

Required capabilies

Current capabiliities

Capabilities gap

Capability-

requirement

Werk-

Cabinet selects

priorities on basis of

national risk picture

Cabinet decides on

capabilities to be

strengthened through normal budget system

7www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009

Government-Wide (Meta-)Foresight

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Government-Wide National Risk Assessment Methodology

9www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009

Government-Wide National Risk Assessment – Assessing likelihood

Hazards

Class Quantitative (%) Qualitative description of danger

A < 0,05 Highly improbable

B 0.05 – 0.5 Improbable

C 0.5 – 5 Possible

D 5 – 50 Probable

E 50 – 100 Highly probable

Dangers

Class Qualitative description of danger

ANo concrete indication, and event is thought to be inconceivable

B No concrete indication, but event is conceivable

C No concrete indication, but event is conceivable

D Event is thought to be quite probable

E Concrete indication event will occur

10www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009

Government-Wide National Risk Assessment – Assessing Impact

15www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009

Government-Wide National Risk Assessment – 2008 Risk diagram

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Government-Wide National Security Planning – Planning for National Security (CBP)

National security planning method

Foresight(Scenarios,…)

Values

Interests ForAffairs

Interior

Defence

Who?

...

With what?Capabilities

What?Tasks

Analysis

Prevention

Response

Evaluation

What?Task fieldsRisks

17www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009

Trend 2 – Back on the Security ChainFrom response to prevention (but not much further)

18www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009

Trend 3 – Shifts in Planning HorizonsAway from Presentism?

60s 70s 80s 90s 00s 10s

Low

Medium

HighPersonal and notional estimates !!!

Defence Planning-Horizons:• current• medium-term• long-term

YEAR

19www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009

Trend 4 – National Security ModelTowards resilience?

20www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009

Trend 5 – Scientific baseBroadening scientific capability base

SAS-066 Joint Operations 2030 – Long Term Scientific Study

What is it?

A study that will offer insights into the impact that advancing technologies could have on a range of the capabilities that could be required in future NATO led Joint Operations.

What are the objectives?

• Consider the impact of future global security environments on joint ops across a range of representative scenarios • Determine types of capabilities and projected capability gaps that may exist in these future environments• Consider how applied technologies will impact future capabilities• Identify system concepts to close capability gaps or significantly enhance capabilities

Who is the Lead Nation?

Canada.

Who are the participants?

To date they include:

Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Slovak Republic, Turkey, USA, ACT, NAAG, NIAG, NATO DCS, NURC

The 5 Phases of the JO 2030 Study:

PHASE 1

Define the strategic environment, scenarios, & CONOPs

PHASE 2

Explore future capability needs through a Thematic Analytical approach

PHASE 3Identify capabilities needed in 2030 that derive

from the Thematic Analysis and ACT’s Long Term Requirements Study

PHASE 4Out reach and search for solutions

PHASE 5Hold Multinational Workshop and write the

final report

Timelines:

Phase 1 began in the fall 2006, the study is currently nearing the end of Phase IV and has a projected completion date of Dec 2009.

Mr Paul Massel – DRDC-CORA CORT Team LeaderMr Paul Massel – DRDC-CORA CORT Team Leader

JO 2030 Study Leader paul.massel@drdc-rddc.gc.caJO 2030 Study Leader paul.massel@drdc-rddc.gc.ca

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A Strategic Planning Approach…

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JO2030 approach…

Long Term Capability

Requirements

Long Term Capability

Requirements

Long Term

Requirements Study

Long Term

Requirements Study

JO2030 Thematic Approach

JO2030 Capabilities

JO2030 Issues

CapabilityRequirement

s

CapabilityRequirement

s

Solution Concepts

Solution Concepts

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Small TeamOperations

Standing Arrangements

PoliticalTransformation

Blurring ofPeace &Conflict

Cost Escalation

Different C2Paradigms

StayingPower

Moral, Mental & Physical

Domain

PlanningUnder DeepUncertainty

Dual-useTechnology

Space is Opening Up

Regeneration

Non-Military,Non violent

threats

CoalitionOperations

ChangingMan-Machine

Interaction

StructureStructure

Technology Technology

EconomicsEconomics

Focus andCoherenceFocus andCoherence

Information & Media

Strategic Compression

Super Empowered

Individuals

EnvironmentEnvironment

Long TermCommitments

Long TermCommitments

PoliticalLevel

PoliticalLevel

The Themes

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Theme

Theme

Issue

Issue

Issue

Issue

Issue

CapabilityCapabilityCapabilityCapability

CapabilityCapability

CapabilityCapabilityCapability

Capability

CapabilityCapability

JO2030 Outputs Structure

TT

IICC

TiCV: 3 - 4 - 4 - 141008 Theme: Planning Under Deep Uncertainty

In the past, where conditions were relatively certain, Alliance defence and operational planning processes were deliberate and reflected ‘strategy as design’. The fluidity and pace of change within the emerging globalised environment will increasingly demand that planning for Alliance operations will be done under conditions of deep uncertainty. Deep uncertainty is present when decision makers do not know or cannot agree on: the current system model of how things fit together, prior probabilities, timing and cost. This will require a new suite of methods and analytical tools to support decision makers in a ‘strategy as process’ manner to develop capabilities that are flexible, adaptable and robust.

JO 2030 Theme-Issue-Capabilities sheet

Issue: Future structures

The need for agile, flexible and adaptive answers to (intrinsically unpredictable) changes in the security environment warrants a radical rethink of how armed forces are structured and maintained. Models from the business world may be examined for applicability. Outsourcing of services and reliance on market adaptation mechanisms must be considered

Capability:

List : A

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Data mined T I Cs

http://wordle.net

32www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009

Trend 6 – Foresight and PlanningMore Insight and ‘Frank’ness

Hind-sight

Side-sight

from “plan and pray” to “sense and respond”

33www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009

Paul Davis' Uncertainty-sensitive planning

34www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009

Trend 7 – Confronting Uncertainty Head-On

Rumsfeldian uncertainty matrix – ideal typical (left) vs. reality? (right)

Traditional ways of dealing with uncertainty

35www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, CoP DP

The ‘Butterfly’-Model

outside-in

futureenvironments =>

capabilities

inside-out

what are / dowe want to be

good at?

High-levelpolicy

guidance

future me’s

integration

36www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, CoP DP

The ‘Butterfly’-Model

outside-in inside-out

what are / dowe want to be

good at?

vision

future me’s

integration

Purposive strategic planning

Front-to-Back

Adaptive strategic planning

back-to-front

42www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009

Trend 8 – From Marginal to Systemic Defence Planning (Risk Assessment, Balance of Investment)

43www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009

Trend 9 – Towards performance management

44www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009

Trend 10 – Towards Strategic Defence Management

High-Level Policy Parameters

StrategicDefence

Management

Strategic intent

Capability-based Planning

PerformanceManagement