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a TNO initiative
Developing Capability Portfolios: 10 Trends An Idiosyncratic and Iconoclastic View
Stephan De SpiegeleireSenior Scientist
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
NATO International Conference on Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis
ParisMay 12-14, 2009
2
Capability Portfolios – New Kid on the Block
3
‘Portfolio’-Thinking under Fire
4
The essence of portfolio theory
5www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009
Trend 1 – Broadening Definition of ‘Capability'
DOTMLPF
6www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, CoP DP
Planning for National Security –The New Dutch Whole-of-Government Approach
1. Government-wide analysis
A. Strategic foresight
B. Horizon-scanning
B. Thematic in-depth foresight
Report strategic foresight
Process
Product
Decision-making
Report
Threat-pictureReport
themes and scenarios
Cabinet decides onthemes for thematicin-depth
analyses
C. National risk-
assessment
NationalRisk
Picture
3. Follow-up
Legislation
Risk prioritization Measures
Policy
Planning assumpt
ions
programmetasks and capabilities
2. Strategic planning
Required capabilies
Current capabiliities
Capabilities gap
Capability-
requirement
Werk-
Cabinet selects
priorities on basis of
national risk picture
Cabinet decides on
capabilities to be
strengthened through normal budget system
7www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009
Government-Wide (Meta-)Foresight
8www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, CoP DP
Government-Wide National Risk Assessment Methodology
9www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009
Government-Wide National Risk Assessment – Assessing likelihood
Hazards
Class Quantitative (%) Qualitative description of danger
A < 0,05 Highly improbable
B 0.05 – 0.5 Improbable
C 0.5 – 5 Possible
D 5 – 50 Probable
E 50 – 100 Highly probable
Dangers
Class Qualitative description of danger
ANo concrete indication, and event is thought to be inconceivable
B No concrete indication, but event is conceivable
C No concrete indication, but event is conceivable
D Event is thought to be quite probable
E Concrete indication event will occur
10www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009
Government-Wide National Risk Assessment – Assessing Impact
15www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009
Government-Wide National Risk Assessment – 2008 Risk diagram
16www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, CoP DP
Government-Wide National Security Planning – Planning for National Security (CBP)
National security planning method
Foresight(Scenarios,…)
Values
Interests ForAffairs
Interior
Defence
Who?
...
With what?Capabilities
What?Tasks
Analysis
Prevention
Response
Evaluation
What?Task fieldsRisks
17www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009
Trend 2 – Back on the Security ChainFrom response to prevention (but not much further)
18www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009
Trend 3 – Shifts in Planning HorizonsAway from Presentism?
60s 70s 80s 90s 00s 10s
Low
Medium
HighPersonal and notional estimates !!!
Defence Planning-Horizons:• current• medium-term• long-term
YEAR
19www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009
Trend 4 – National Security ModelTowards resilience?
20www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009
Trend 5 – Scientific baseBroadening scientific capability base
SAS-066 Joint Operations 2030 – Long Term Scientific Study
What is it?
A study that will offer insights into the impact that advancing technologies could have on a range of the capabilities that could be required in future NATO led Joint Operations.
What are the objectives?
• Consider the impact of future global security environments on joint ops across a range of representative scenarios • Determine types of capabilities and projected capability gaps that may exist in these future environments• Consider how applied technologies will impact future capabilities• Identify system concepts to close capability gaps or significantly enhance capabilities
Who is the Lead Nation?
Canada.
Who are the participants?
To date they include:
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Slovak Republic, Turkey, USA, ACT, NAAG, NIAG, NATO DCS, NURC
The 5 Phases of the JO 2030 Study:
PHASE 1
Define the strategic environment, scenarios, & CONOPs
PHASE 2
Explore future capability needs through a Thematic Analytical approach
PHASE 3Identify capabilities needed in 2030 that derive
from the Thematic Analysis and ACT’s Long Term Requirements Study
PHASE 4Out reach and search for solutions
PHASE 5Hold Multinational Workshop and write the
final report
Timelines:
Phase 1 began in the fall 2006, the study is currently nearing the end of Phase IV and has a projected completion date of Dec 2009.
Mr Paul Massel – DRDC-CORA CORT Team LeaderMr Paul Massel – DRDC-CORA CORT Team Leader
JO 2030 Study Leader [email protected] 2030 Study Leader [email protected]
22www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, CoP DP
A Strategic Planning Approach…
23www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, CoP DP
JO2030 approach…
Long Term Capability
Requirements
Long Term Capability
Requirements
Long Term
Requirements Study
Long Term
Requirements Study
JO2030 Thematic Approach
JO2030 Capabilities
JO2030 Issues
CapabilityRequirement
s
CapabilityRequirement
s
Solution Concepts
Solution Concepts
25www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, CoP DP
Small TeamOperations
Standing Arrangements
PoliticalTransformation
Blurring ofPeace &Conflict
Cost Escalation
Different C2Paradigms
StayingPower
Moral, Mental & Physical
Domain
PlanningUnder DeepUncertainty
Dual-useTechnology
Space is Opening Up
Regeneration
Non-Military,Non violent
threats
CoalitionOperations
ChangingMan-Machine
Interaction
StructureStructure
Technology Technology
EconomicsEconomics
Focus andCoherenceFocus andCoherence
Information & Media
Strategic Compression
Super Empowered
Individuals
EnvironmentEnvironment
Long TermCommitments
Long TermCommitments
PoliticalLevel
PoliticalLevel
The Themes
26www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, CoP DP
Theme
Theme
Issue
Issue
Issue
Issue
Issue
CapabilityCapabilityCapabilityCapability
CapabilityCapability
CapabilityCapabilityCapability
Capability
CapabilityCapability
JO2030 Outputs Structure
TT
IICC
TiCV: 3 - 4 - 4 - 141008 Theme: Planning Under Deep Uncertainty
In the past, where conditions were relatively certain, Alliance defence and operational planning processes were deliberate and reflected ‘strategy as design’. The fluidity and pace of change within the emerging globalised environment will increasingly demand that planning for Alliance operations will be done under conditions of deep uncertainty. Deep uncertainty is present when decision makers do not know or cannot agree on: the current system model of how things fit together, prior probabilities, timing and cost. This will require a new suite of methods and analytical tools to support decision makers in a ‘strategy as process’ manner to develop capabilities that are flexible, adaptable and robust.
JO 2030 Theme-Issue-Capabilities sheet
Issue: Future structures
The need for agile, flexible and adaptive answers to (intrinsically unpredictable) changes in the security environment warrants a radical rethink of how armed forces are structured and maintained. Models from the business world may be examined for applicability. Outsourcing of services and reliance on market adaptation mechanisms must be considered
Capability:
List : A
28www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, CoP DP
31www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, CoP DP
Data mined T I Cs
http://wordle.net
32www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009
Trend 6 – Foresight and PlanningMore Insight and ‘Frank’ness
Hind-sight
Side-sight
from “plan and pray” to “sense and respond”
33www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009
Paul Davis' Uncertainty-sensitive planning
34www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009
Trend 7 – Confronting Uncertainty Head-On
Rumsfeldian uncertainty matrix – ideal typical (left) vs. reality? (right)
Traditional ways of dealing with uncertainty
35www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, CoP DP
The ‘Butterfly’-Model
outside-in
futureenvironments =>
capabilities
inside-out
what are / dowe want to be
good at?
High-levelpolicy
guidance
future me’s
integration
36www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, CoP DP
The ‘Butterfly’-Model
outside-in inside-out
what are / dowe want to be
good at?
vision
future me’s
integration
Purposive strategic planning
Front-to-Back
Adaptive strategic planning
back-to-front
42www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009
Trend 8 – From Marginal to Systemic Defence Planning (Risk Assessment, Balance of Investment)
43www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009
Trend 9 – Towards performance management
44www.hcss.nl 8 Apr 2023Stephan De Spiegeleire, Defense Capability Portfolio Analysis, Paris, May 2009
Trend 10 – Towards Strategic Defence Management
High-Level Policy Parameters
StrategicDefence
Management
Strategic intent
Capability-based Planning
PerformanceManagement