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2014 Cohort
Capstone Projects
Dedicated to the children
of the State of Nevada
Overview
The Public Education Foundation understands that the highest-performing organizations, including our
public schools, need to recruit and retain top talent. In order to bring about real and lasting change to
public education, it is critical that principals and other top administrators have the vision, knowledge and
courage to develop innovative solutions that produce results. The Foundation’s Leadership Institute of
Nevada is building a network of leaders from Nevada’s public schools and businesses to drive statewide
school improvement.
Our Executive Leadership Academy is a 15-month, intensive executive leadership experience for a
select group of educational and business leaders. The program prepares participants for strategic
problem-solving and the effective use of talent, tools, time and money. Participants engage with world-
class leaders in the fields of education, business, finance and public policy to discuss and debate
strategic solutions to the problems we face in public education. These solutions balance the needs of
children, the state and our nation. Some of the nation’s top scholars and practitioners in education –
including those from the American Enterprise Institute, Harvard University, Georgetown University and
Rice University – comprise the Academy’s faculty. Participants complete their Academy experience with a
capstone project that includes an action plan to solve many of the state’s most challenging educational
issues. The Executive Leadership Academy provides participants with an opportunity to impact public
education today and in the future.
Another essential component of the Leadership Institute of Nevada is the Education Leadership
Summit. Two times per year – once in Southern Nevada and once in Northern Nevada – principals,
business leaders, elected officials and stakeholders from across the state are invited to attend each event
featuring the nation’s best practitioners, scholars and business leaders. Participants from Northern and
Southern Nevada are exposed to new ideas, entrepreneurial thinkers and best practices intended to
motivate, inspire and foster awareness of innovative problem-solving. To date, we have conducted five
Education Leadership Summits, engaging approximately 1000 principals, education administrators,
business executives and community leaders from across Nevada.
The final component of the Leadership Institute of Nevada is Leadership Development for
Policymakers. The Foundation facilitates leadership development for policymakers, including school
board members. For example, in conjunction with each Executive Leadership Academy course session,
the Foundation facilities a community roundtable discussion during which Academy faculty discuss issues
such as school finance and data-based decision making. Like the Executive Leadership Academy,
participants are challenged to identify innovative solutions to the challenges we face in Nevada public
schools.
For more information, please contact Dr. Brian Myli at (702) 799-1042 or mylibc@ccpef.org.
Table of Contents
Executive Summary – Are You Sick?
End of Career Excessive Sick Leave Use..………………….page 1
Full Report - Are You Sick? End of Career Excessive Sick Leave Use …..……….page 3
Executive Summary – Leadership Matters Most………………..……..……..……..page 25
Full Report – Leadership Matters Most..………………………………..….…….......page 27
Executive Summary – SIERRA Project…………..………………………………......page 49
Full Report – SIERRA Project……………………….…….……………………...…...page 51
Executive Summary – Incentivizing High Performing School Administrators
to be Placed in At Risk School..…………………………......page 71
Full Report – Incentivizing High Performing School Administrators
to be Placed in At Risk Schools..…………………………...…….......page 73
1
Executive Summary
End of Excessive Career Sick Leave Use
Children across the nation deserve to have the best instructional leader present in their
classrooms every day. Quality teachers in classrooms have the largest impact on increasing
student achievement; however, when teachers are absent, district budgets and instructional time
are reduced and there is a negative impact on student achievement. School districts with liberal
sick leave policies and limited incentives for accumulated leave enable teachers to use excessive
leave near retirement; inevitably, such policies encourage teachers to be absent from their
classrooms more toward career end. Many districts have policies driven by negotiated
agreements that inadvertently facilitate excessive sick leave use near retirement. This study
discovers school districts across the nation with fewer teacher absences, gleans best practices
from these districts, reviews many ideas to discourage absenteeism, and makes specific
recommendations to decrease the abuse of sick leave near retirement.
Are you Sick?
End of Career Excessive Sick Leave Use
Mr. J. M. Lamers
Mrs. Brenda Nielsen
Mrs. Pamela Goynes-Brown
Dr. Carrie A. Buck
The Public Education Foundation
Executive Leadership Academy
October 2014
SICK LEAVE USE
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Are You Sick?
End of Career Excessive Sick Leave Use
A major challenge facing public education in Nevada is the excessive use of sick leave as
employees approach retirement. In fact, current sick leave policies enable employees to accrue
and use substantial amounts of leave toward the end of their career. Although sick leave abuse
near retirement is a problem across all employee groups, the focus for this study will be on
teachers because they have the greatest impact on student achievement. It must be noted that
teachers within Nevada school districts accrue up to 15 days of sick leave per year, potentially
resulting in 450 days within a 30 year career (Clark County Education Association, 2012). This
equates to two and a half years of paid leave. Most teachers utilize a few sick days per year,
while accruing the majority of them. At retirement, the offered payout for unused sick leave
equates to pennies per day. As a result, the system encourages teachers to utilize more sick leave
near retirement as opposed to collecting a small check at the end of their career for unused sick
days.
The purpose of this study is to examine the systematic problem of sick leave abuse closer to
retirement, educate employee groups about sick leave practices, and make recommendations to
Nevada school districts to improve employee attendance. Suggested solutions could be
successfully implemented for other employee groups as well. The goals of this study are to
increase instructional time with consistent, certified classroom teachers; improve student
achievement; escalate employee morale and school climate; recognize unfunded liabilities;
stabilize expenses; reduce the impact on already strained budgets; as well as develop consistent
expectations by improving communication and accountability for use of sick leave. This paper
will reveal the problem of sick leave abuse at career end, investigate best practices across the
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country, and develop a strategic plan of recommendations to present to Nevada‘s school district
policy makers.
Problems with Teacher Absenteeism
The cascade of problems associated with sick leave abuse include disrupting the
consistency of the classroom environment, hiring random substitutes to fill vacant positions,
requiring other faculty to cover the absent employee‘s work duties, thereby impacting employee
morale and school culture, as well as straining limited budgets, costing state and local tax payers
millions of additional dollars. Most importantly, the research is evident that there is a significant
negative impact on student learning and achievement.
Implications on District Budgets
Teacher absenteeism costs school districts a tremendous amount of money annually. A
comprehensive cost figure is extremely difficult to calculate; however, estimates indicate teacher
absences place a substantial burden on school district budgets (Miller, 2012). In considering
there are more than 13,000 public school districts across the nation, the real monetary cost of
teacher absenteeism is incalculable and staggering. Out of the 40 districts analyzed by Joseph,
Wymack, and Zielaski (2014) , ―approximately $424 million was spent on substitutes in 2012-13
school year‖ (p. 2). This is roughly $1,800 per teacher to cover their absences (Joseph,
Waymack, & Zielaski, 2014). An absence costs $90 to $160 per day for a substitute teacher to
fill one vacancy at a school (Brill, 2011). Considering that schools spend more on salary and
benefits of teachers than any other category of expenditure, the financial implications of teacher
absences are disastrous. With 5.3 percent of teachers absent on any given day, stipends for
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substitute teachers and associated administrative costs amount to a minimum of four billion
dollars annually (Joseph, Waymack, & Zielaski, 2014).
Implications on Instructional Time/Student Achievement
When looking at the non-financial impact, a direct correlation exists between higher
teacher absenteeism and lower student achievement. With that said, teachers are the most
important factor in determining student academic success and excessive absences have a
tremendous negative impact on student learning (Fryer, 2012). Therefore, student learning and
achievement is the true ‗cost‘ of teacher absenteeism (Kronholz, 2013). According to several
academic studies, teacher absences negatively correlate with standardized assessment scores. In
some cases, a full day of being absent equals a 1.75 percentage-point drop in reading and math
proficiency rates (Kant, 2011). Furthermore, teacher absenteeism seriously disrupts the learning
environment of the classroom and lowers standardized test scores (Brown & Arnell, 2012).
Miller (2012) discusses the significant ―negative impact on student learning and achievement
when the regular teacher is not in the classroom‖ (p.5). Many times, absences suspended any
progress a class might be making and in some cases, classes actually regress when a teacher is
excessively absent (Brill, 2011). Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2007) found that a teacher
missing 10 days creates the educational equivalent of a student being taught for the year by a
novice, ineffective teacher, rather than an experienced, effective teacher. Joseph, Waymack, and
Zielaski (2014) realized that in terms of achievement, "every 10 absences lowers students‘
mathematics average equivalent to a half year of learning‖ When teachers were absent, the
learning environment is disrupted, negatively impacting student achievement. As a result of
frequent teacher absences, individual standardized test scores decrease, student rank in the grade
level drops, and overall school scores go down (Jacobs and Kritsonis, 2007).
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Teacher absences require schools to cover classrooms using a variety of means.
Ultimately, administration bares the responsibility of classroom coverage, by relying on other
school colleagues to cover, combining classrooms, or locating substitutes or guest teachers. In
fact, the majority of the time substitute teachers fill vacant positions. Studies show that students
learn less with a substitute teacher than when the regular classroom teacher is present (Miller,
2012). Although substitute teachers may typically follow a given lesson plan, they do not know
the students, the culture of the building, or normal procedures and routines that are common and
most familiar to students (Miller, 2012). Further compounding the problem, instructional time is
spent on menial classroom management and procedures as opposed to learning new content.
Students are more apt to behave differently when they have a guest teacher or feel their
environment is more relaxed with little or no expectations because their regular teacher is absent.
When a substitute is present, they do not know the learning needs of the children or the
curriculum as well as the regular teacher. ―Despite their best efforts it‘s often a diminished day
compared to having the regular teacher in the class‖ (Konz, 2014, p.1). Therefore, when students
are left with a substitute teacher, students miss out on quality instruction and are less focused on
learning core content (Miller, 2012).
Review of Literature
According to a myriad of data points in research surveys, articles, and studies, teacher
attendance is a substantial problem across the nation. Beginning in 2009, the Office for Civil
Rights and the U.S. Department of Education included a new item on its biennial survey: teacher
absences (Miller, 2012). The survey analyzed 56,837 schools and realized that in a typical school
year, nationally, 28% of teachers missed between 11 and 17 days, defined as ―frequently absent,‖
with eight percent absent more than 17 days and ―chronically absent‖ during the 2009-10 school
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year (Miller, 2012). A more recent study indicated that on average, teachers were in the
classroom 94% of the school year, which correlated to 11 missed days (Konz, 2014). In many
districts, a significant percentage of teachers exceeded that number. In 2014, the same percent
(28%) of teachers missed between 11 to 17 days, while 16% or roughly one in six missed 18
days or more. Nine districts surveyed had over half their teachers absent more than three weeks
annually (Konz, 2014) and new teachers were absent less than veteran teachers, indicating
possible abuse by more secure teachers (Kronholz, 2013). Research has shown two common
factors in teacher absences. Teachers were absent more frequently on Monday and Fridays
(Freyer, 2012) and the days they were absent were shorter than the three days requiring a
medical release or note from a doctor (Kronholz, 2013). Joseph, Waymack, & Zielaski (2014)
also indicated that schools in low socioeconomic neighborhoods have higher absenteeism rates
compared to schools in more affluent areas.
Further compounding the problem, contractual agreements and board policies across the
114 districts grant teachers an average of 12.7 days of general (sick or personal) leave each year
with accrual of days. This ranges from a low of 8 days in Dallas, to a high of 25 days for tenured
teachers in Hartford (Moored, 2010). In 73% of districts, teachers utilized less short-term leave
than what the district offered within negotiated agreements. However, in Nashville, Sacramento,
and Portland, OR teachers exceeded the annual allocation offered by districts. In fact, these
districts offered 15 to 17 days of general, short-term leave and their teachers exceeded this
amount by one or two more days (Joseph, Waymack, & Zielaski, 2014). Comparatively, other
districts with the lowest teacher absenteeism rates across the nation were: Indianapolis (6.1
days), District of Columbia (7.3 days), Louisville (8.1 days), and Tampa (8.6 days) (Konz,
2014). With some of the lowest teacher absence rates in the nation, Indianapolis teachers were
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absent on average 6.1 days and only 3.14% were considered chronically absent. The Indianapolis
policy included all teachers receiving only 10 days of leave their first year and seven days each
year after with an increase in the payout for accumulated days. At retirement, the teachers
received $35 for every 7 hours of unused sick time deposited into a retirement account (Joseph,
Waymack, & Zielaski, 2014). The other school districts offered incentives to keep teachers in
school by allowing teachers to accumulate unused sick and personal days or districts allowed
teachers to cash out a percentage of sick leave when they separated from the organization
(Kronholz, 2013). This additional incentive payout of accumulated, unused leave days were
cashed out close to retirement (Kronholz, 2013) or annual awards were designed to discourage
unnecessary absences (Moored, 2012). Other incentive options included days being held in an
account teachers could use in future years or teachers could turn days into cash when they retire
(Brill, 2011). In some districts, these payout costs came in the form of enhanced lifetime pension
benefits or payout dollars at retirement (Moored, 2012). Some districts put a ―use them or lose
them‖ model in place and capped the number of days teachers could accumulate per year, while
other districts set up some type of reward system to pay the teacher a yearly bonus for the days
they did not take off or give the school the money saved from less absences (Kronholz, 2013).
Other best practices in schools with lower teacher absenteeism rates were substantial buy back
policies at daily rates of pay, offering less than the median (12.5) of leave days to begin with,
providing an annual payment for a percentage of unused sick leave at the daily rate of pay,
and/or placing limits on sick leave accumulation (Konz, 2014). In a study done at Duke
University, researchers proposed that ―increasing teacher salaries by $400 a year and then
charging teachers $50 for each day they take off‖ would reduce absences by about one day per
teacher per year and largely pay for itself; however, the arguments raised against the proposal
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was that the policy would hit female teachers with children harder than it would hit men
(Kronholz, 2013, p. 5). Another best practice discovered that the top 10 districts include teacher
attendance as part of a broad evaluation measure describing the teacher's competency. The metric
is also considered in employee promotions (Moored, 2012).
When considering educational institutions across the nation with lower teacher absentee
rates, charter school teachers were absent less frequently than educators at public schools.
Furthermore, teachers were absent from traditional schools more than 10 times per year at a rate
more than 15% higher than charter school teachers (Freyer, 2012). The data points were clear
that charter school teachers were significantly less likely to utilize excessive sick days compared
to traditional public schools because of the way they offer teacher contracts (Kant, 2011). In fact,
teachers in one Connecticut charter school were ―absent an average of 1.8 days,‖ compared to
the public schools in the same region where ―teachers were absent 16.5 days, 10% of the school
year, or a full month of school‖ (Kant, 2011, p.3). In Harlem Success I, a charter school in New
York City, ―teachers were absent an average of 1.1 days‖ (Brill, 2011, p. 15). Oftentimes, charter
schools lengthen the teacher contract day and year, offer less leave with limited accrual than
traditional schools, provide more autonomy in classrooms, ensure nonrenewal policies, pay a
percentage for unused leave, and build professional development into teacher contracts (Freyer,
2012). Kronholz (2013) explained that some charter or private schools with low absence rates do
not hire substitutes, thereby, placing pressure on the individual teacher to pass on responsibility
to their colleagues. Due to this accountability, these teachers were absent less. Freyer‘s (2012)
study indicated that teacher absences had a direct correlation to the culture of the school. The
research was clear that school culture guides teacher behavior. Many times, excessive teacher
absences significantly above the national average were a symptom of a dysfunctional
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professional culture at the building level (Kronholz, 2013). As opposed to schools with a positive
culture and specific high expectations for teacher attendance, teachers were less likely to be
absent because they exhibited ownership in the values of the school and were more focused on
student achievement (Freyer, 2012). Accountability and high expectations in Kronholz‘s (2013)
study recognized that teachers who were required to call in to speak with the site administrator
were absent less than teachers who would call in to a computer-based system.
In the research, overall attendance incentives did not affect the attendance of chronically
absent (18 or more days) teachers; however, in districts that implemented policies to encourage
good attendance, frequently absent (11 to 17) teachers were out of school approximately two
fewer days than absent teachers in districts that did not implement such policies (Moored, 2012).
This could be interpreted as districts that place an emphasis on good attendance tend to develop a
culture that places greater value on teacher attendance. Therefore, the chronically absent are
policed by their peers to the extent that it reduces absences below the norm.
Teacher Absenteeism in Nevada
Focusing specifically on the problem in Nevada, a 2012 Center for American Progress
report on how teacher absences impact student achievement ranked Nevada 42nd
out of 50 states
because Nevada‘s teachers missed, on average, 10 or more days in a school year. Nevada
reported a 29.1% absence rate, trailing Utah with only 17.8% of teachers absent (Miller, 2012).
Nevada Revised Statue 288 (NRS 288; 2013) outlines the relationships between governments
and public employees in the state of Nevada. The provisions of this statue allow Nevada school
districts and employee organizations the right to collectively bargain for conditions of
employment, which include sick leave policies. The Nevada school districts that are discussed
below have negotiated agreements that shape current sick leave policies.
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Washoe County School District (WCSD) is the second largest school district in Nevada
serving approximately 64,740 students enrolled in 111 schools and employs 3,144 licensed
teachers. As defined in the collective bargaining agreement, each licensed employee is credited
with fifteen days of sick leave at the beginning of each school year with unlimited accumulation.
Licensed employees with at least 10 years of continuous service are entitled to payout dollars for
accumulated sick leave. The rate of pay is determined by 25% of the days of accumulated sick
leave for a maximum of 100 days, multiplied by the employees‘ daily rate of pay at the end of
the previous fiscal year. The first 15 days of sick leave are not earned until the employee has
completed the entire school year. If an employee leaves the system before all of their sick leave
is earned and the 15 days of leave have been used, a payroll deduction is made for the unearned
portion of the used sick leave (WEA, 2013).
Elko County, ranked as the third largest school district in Nevada, employs 602 licensed
employees. With 9,612 students enrolled in 32 schools in this rural Nevada County, the
negotiated agreement states that sick leave should be granted in the amount of 15 days per year,
given at the beginning of each contracted year. Upon retirement from the Elko County School
District, the employee is entitled to a sick leave payment at the rate of 50% of the substitute‘s
daily rate of pay. An employee who has accumulated 15 years but less than 20 years of service is
entitled to a payment to exceed no more than $5,000. Those who have served 20-25 years will
receive a payment of no more than $6,250. Employees who have 25 or more years of service will
receive no more than $7,500 as payment (ECCTA, 2012).
One of the smallest school districts in Nevada, Humboldt County, employs 221 licensed
employees. Educating 3,436 students in their 11 schools, Humboldt School District is located in
rural north-central Nevada. As agreed upon, 12 month employees are provided with fifteen sick
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days per year and 9 month employees receive 12 sick days with no limit on the number of
accrued days. Upon retirement, employees may select $40 per day for unused sick leave or have
it applied to health insurance costs (Jensen, 2014).
The largest district in Nevada is the Clark County School District (CCSD) where
approximately 317,000 students are currently enrolled. CCSD employs 17,979 licensed teachers.
Currently, negotiated agreements between CCSD and the teachers‘ union allows employees to
earn 1.5 days per month for a maximum of 10 months, not to exceed 15 days per year, with year-
to-year accumulation of leave without limit. Upon retirement or death, a licensed teacher who
has been employed by CCSD for 10 consecutive years is compensated for a maximum of 100
sick days. The District allocates $196,197.24 to the Clark County Education Association
(CCEA) to divide and pay retiring teachers‘ a portion for accumulated, unused days of sick
leave. This amount is divided by the total number of eligible unused sick days allowed for all
eligible employees to yield a daily unused sick leave rate. Each entitled employee is paid the
daily unused sick leave rate for each day of unused sick leave (CCEA, 2013).
In 2014, sick leave forms submitted to the CCSD Human Resources Division tracked
teacher absences. In consideration of the actual implications of teacher absences in the confines
of instructional time and dollars, the current costs of teacher absences tracked by substitute jobs
requested in the CCSD was $13,315,300 with a total of 133,153 missed instructional days. (See
Table 1). With 133,153 missed days, this was equivalent to 739.7 school years of missed
instructional time. The overall teacher absentee rate was 7.4 days. When compared to the 278
teachers within a year of retirement, the number of absences increased to 24.29 days as indicated
in Table 2 (Clarke, 2014). Table 2 also shows the cost of $675,450 for retiring teacher
absenteeism, with a total of 6,754.5 sick leave days the last year before retirement. Therefore, the
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teachers closer to retirement were three times more absent (24.29 days) than the overall rate (7.4
days) of teacher absenteeism (Clarke, 2014). For the 2013-2014 year of school, the total
substitute teacher cost was $13,315,300 and with compounded expenses of prep buyouts being
$1,164,405, the total was $14,479,705 as indicated in Table 1 (Clarke, 2014). Therefore, the 278
teachers retiring at the end of the year consumed $675,450 or approximately 5% of the entire
amount ($14,479,705) as shown in Table 2.
Research Design
This study will identify the problem of sick leave use near retirement in Nevada school
districts. Once the problem has been defined, research will entail a thorough analysis of best
practices from districts across the country. Districts with the least amount of sick leave used will
be investigated to glean strategies for reducing sick leave use during retirement. When reviewing
all the data, a strategic plan of action will be developed with recommendations for Nevada
school districts. The process of this study is to:
Research a variety of different sized districts across the nation with fewer absences per
employee group and determine best practices, policies, and procedures.
Research successful public entities, city governments, or businesses with fewer absences
and determine best practices, policies, and procedures that can be replicated to public
school districts.
Identify current data points on use of sick leave, programs, and resources for Nevada public
education employee groups.
Identify budgetary expenses as a result of the use of sick leave for Nevada public education
employee groups.
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Determine recommendations to consolidate services, gain efficiencies, and improve
effectiveness of sick leave policies.
Create a strategic action plan of recommendations established on research-based best
practices, policies, and procedures across the nation, with immediate, as well as secondary
recommendations that would require revision within negotiated agreements.
Utilize a year one plan of action reflection component to ensure implementation, initiate
and evaluate progress toward plan recommendations, further researching for strategy
development and future planning.
Recommendations
The Strategic Action Plan of recommendations consists of three-fold strategic plan to
remedy the problem of sick leave abuse near retirement. The first recommendation requires a
board policy communicating and developing accountability triggers to deter use of sick leave
carried out by a central office. Within recommendation two, a creative approach, the accrual of
sick leave is limited and financially incentivizes employees who do not use their leave.
Recommendation three, guarantees every employee access to long term disability policies. The
limitations to this study include research articles and best practices across the country discuss
general teacher absences and do not specifically reference teachers near retirement. In addition,
districts have systems to keep up with the number of days a teacher is absent but not necessarily
to track achievement as it is tied to teacher absence.
Recommendation I
Establish a School Board policy addressing employee sick leave use to ensure
consistency and hold employees accountable to the policy for proper use of sick leave.
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Communicate sick leave expectations and accountability to all stakeholders, as well as add
attendance to staff evaluation with the Nevada Evaluation Performance Framework (NEPF;
2014). Implement a district policy which includes a review of attendance to be considered for
promotion and/or lateral movement. Develop centralized enforcement of current contractual
policies written in negotiated agreements, transferring responsibility from site administrators to a
centralized subset of the Human Resource (HR) department called a Leave Management
Department (LMD). Develop trigger points for communication of expectations, notification of
policy requirements, submittal of doctors‘ notices, updates on sick leave days used, and/or
disciplinary actions.
The estimated cost of this recommendation is approximately $425,000. This would
include a Human Resource Leave Management Department (LMD) Administrator ($125,000),
four support staff members ($250,000), communications, materials, and printing ($20,000), as
well as technology and software applications ($30,000). CCSD would budget for the LMD and
consolidate efforts into a comprehensive program to reduce the misuse of sick leave in the
district. This recommendation would reduce absences by at least four percent. If the outcome
reduced teacher absences by four %, this new department would pay for itself. The goal would
be to reduce teacher absences by considerably more than 4%.
Recommendation II
Renegotiate to allow up to 11 days paid time off. Renegotiate for up to 100 days
maximum accrual. After accruing 80 days, if using less than three days that year, $50 per day
will be paid for a total of five days. After 20 years of service and an accrual of 80 sick days, if
three or less days are used that year, $100 per day will be paid for five total days. After 25 years
SICK LEAVE USE
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of service and an accrual of 80 sick days, if three or less days are used that year, $200 per day
will be paid for a total of five days.
The estimated cost of this recommendation is six million dollars. Therefore, if
approximately 8000 eligible teachers took advantage of the yearly buyout incentive, it would
cost an average of $750 per qualifying teacher. For example, in CCSD teachers take an average
of 7.4 days per year. This recommendation would allow eligible teachers with three days or
fewer to collect this benefit. Thus, the goal would be to reduce overall teacher absence by nearly
50%, which equates to $6,657,650 in CCSD alone. If the end goal is student achievement by
rewarding teachers who are present more often in the classrooms, this is well worth the
investment.
Recommendation III
Educate teachers on the importance of disability insurance and ensure all teachers have
access to guaranteed-issued long term disability plans. Work with a provider to get the most
reasonable group pricing for long-term disability insurance for each teacher. Negotiate this into
the benefit package for all teachers, as this will certify that all teachers are covered at a
percentage of their income in case they exceed their available sick leave.
A potential barrier during collective bargaining would be the reduction of days given and
the limited accrual of 100 sick days. Therefore, offering disability insurance would cover the best
interest of the teacher in case there was a severe illness or injury. The selling point with this
recommendation is that the disability insurance transfers the risk, expense, and accountability
associated with long term sick leave to the insurance company. The guaranteed-issued long term
disability plan benefit would be favorable for all teachers, no matter their years of service. It
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would be especially favorable to those teachers early in their careers who have limited amounts
of sick leave. Another advantage to this recommendation is that disability insurance would pay
the employee a benefit until the age of 65, in some cases lengthening the compensation period by
decades.
With an average group long-term disability plan costing $450 a year, this would cost about
$8,090,550 if the district were to purchase this plan. Another viable option could be working this
into negotiations as a part of the benefit package with an impact on future cost of living raises. If
the cost of disability insurance was optional and paid for by teachers, further savings would result.
For example, instead of getting a one percent cost of living raise, teachers would only get a three-
fourths increase with the other one quarter offsetting the cost of disability insurance. Work with a
provider to get the most reasonable group pricing for long-term disability insurance for each
employee. Negotiate this into the benefit package for all employees. This will certify that all
teachers would be covered at a percentage of their income in case they need to utilize multiple
days of sick leave.
Conclusion
Student achievement is the goal of education and student achievement happens with focused
instructional time from a quality teacher present in the classroom each day. Therefore, the
objective of school district policies must be to keep quality teachers in classrooms throughout the
school year as much as possible. Many school districts have negotiated and built systems that
enable teachers to use more leave near retirement -- moving farther from this goal — and
inevitably, negatively impacting student achievement. With the implementation of some or all of
this study‘s recommendations, the goal of increasing the time quality teachers are present with
children in classrooms will increase student achievement. We owe this time to our children.
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Table 1: 2014 CCSD TeachersSick Leave
Elementary Teachers Middle School Teachers High School Teachers
$6,972,700
Average of 8.87 days off for
elementary teachers
7,863 teachers
108,408 Total Sub Jobs
Elementary
55,630 51% personal illness
14,097 13% illness in
immediate family
3,684 days 1% bereavement
73,411 days
$2,737,900
Average of 9.2 days off for
middle school
2,976 teachers
42,113 Total Sub Jobs Middle
School
21,633 51% personal illness
5,746 13% illness in
immediate family
1,529 days 1% bereavement
28,908 days
$2,940,200
Average of 7.74 days off
3,798 teachers
45,497 Total Sub Jobs
High School
23,923 52% personal
illness
5,470 12% illness in
immediate family
1,441 days 1%
bereavement
30,834 days
Table 2: 2012-2014 Retiring Teachers’ Use of Sick Leave
2012 2013 2014
Total number of retirees:
343 Teachers
Total hours of sick leave:
71,008 hours
Sick leave days used:
8,876 days
Average per retiree: 25.87
days
Total $887,600
Total number of retirees:
370 Teachers
Total hours of sick leave:
77,044 hours
Sick leave days used:
9,630.5 days
Average per retiree: 26.02
days
Total $963,050
Total number of retirees:
278 Teachers
Total hours of sick leave:
54,036 hours
Sick leave days used:
6,754.5
Average per retiree: 24.29
days
Total $675,450
Total number of retirees:
56 Administrators
Total hours of sick leave:
7,832 hours
Sick leave days used: 979
days
Average per retiree: 17.48
days
Total number of retirees: 51
Administrators
Total hours of sick leave:
11,624 hours
Sick leave days used: 1457
days
Average per retiree: 28.5
days
Total number of retirees:
30 Administrators
Total hours of sick leave:
5,376 hours
Sick leave days used: 672
days
Average per retiree: 22.4
days
Total number of retirees:
372 Support Staff
Total hours of sick leave:
73790 hours
Sick leave days used:
9,223.75 days
Average per retiree: 24.79
days
Total number of retirees:
380 Support Staff
Total hours of sick leave:
65,816 hours
Sick leave days used: 8,227
days
Average per retiree: 21.65
days
Total number of retirees:
184 Support Staff
Total hours of sick leave:
29,269 hours
Sick leave days used:
3,658.63 days
Average per retiree: 19.88
days
SICK LEAVE USE
20
Table 3: Nevada School Districts Sick Leave Policies
School District Sick Days
Given in One
Year
Buy-Out Option Max
Accrual
COST PER
DAY:
Average Cost of
Substitute
Clark County
School District
15 days 100 days buys one
year at 29 years of
service
No Max $90.00-$110
Average $100
Washoe County
School District
15 days No Max $82.00-$97.00
Average $90
Humboldt County
School District
15 days $40 for each
unused day, or
have that applied
to insurance costs
No Max
$106-$116
Average $111
Elko County
School District
15 days No Max
Douglas County
School District
15 days 186 days $64.00-$88.00
Average $76
Table 4: National School Districts with Fewer Teacher Absenteeism Rates
School District Average
Sick Days Used
Indianapolis, IN 6.1
District of Columbia 7.3
Louisville, KY 8.1
Tampa, FL 8.6
Table 5: Human Resource Leave Management Department
Item Estimated Cost
Human Resources Leave Management Administrator $125,000
Four Support Staff Leave Management Staff Members $250,000
Communication Materials & Printing $20,000
Technology – Hardware, Software, & Computer Applications $30,000
SICK LEAVE USE
21
References
American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological
Association (6th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association..
Brill, S. (2011). Class welfare: Inside the fight to fix America’s schools. New York: Simon
& Schuster Paperbacks.
Brown, S., &Arnell, A. (2012). Measuring the effect of teacher absenteeism has on
student achievement: ―At an urban but not too urban Title I elementary school.‖
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 172.
Clark County Education Association. (2013). Negotiated Agreement Between the Clark
County School District and the Clark County Education Association, Article 18.
Retrieved from http://www.nctq.org/search.do
Clark County School District Fast Facts 2013-2014. (2013). Retrieved from
http://www.ccsd.net/district/news/general/2013/nov/1/check-out-the-2013-2014-fast-facts
Clarke, A., (2014, June). Data Performance and Project Management Coordinator. Clark
County School District Human Resources Unit.
Clotfelter, C., Ladd, H., & Vigdor, J. (2007). Are teacher absences worth
worrying about in the U.S.? National Bureau of Economics, 1-51.
Elko County Classroom Teachers Association and the Elko County School District Final
Agreement July1, 2012-June 30, 2013. (2012). Retrieved from
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:gIbcwS5laHkJ:www.elkocounty
teachers.com/uploads/8/8/3/4/8834970/2012-
2013_negotiated_agreement.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
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22
Fryer Jr., R.G. (2012, September). Learning from the successes and failures of charter schools, in
the Hamilton Project. Retrieved from
http://scholar.harvard.edu/fryer/publications/learning-successes-and-failures-charter-
schools
Jacobs, Karen D., & Kritsonis, William A. (2007). ―An Analysis of Teacher and Student
Absenteeism in Urban Schools: What the Research Says and Recommendations for
Educational Leaders.‖ The Lamar University Electronic Journal of Student Research.
Jensen, D. (2014, June). Superintendent of Humboldt County School District.
Joseph, N., Waymack, N., & Zielaski, D. (2014, June). Roll call: the importance of
teacher attendance. National Council on Teacher Quality, 1-14.
Kant, N. (2011). Interactive tool: Teacher absence rates by district & school. Connecticut Policy
Institute, 1-4.
Konz, A. (2014, June). JCPS teachers absent less than most nationwide, The Courier-
Journal. Retrieved from
http://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/education/education/2014/06/03/jcps-
teachers-absent-less-nationwide/9889687/
Konz, T. (2014, June 3). Big city school districts have teacher attendance problems. USA
Today. Retrieved from
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/06/03/teachers-attendance-
study/9889949/
Kronholz, J. (2013). No substitute for a teacher. Education Next, 13, 1-5.
Miller, R. (2012, November). Teacher absence as a leading indicator in student
achievement. Center for American Progress, 1-14.
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23
Moored, G. (2012, August). A closer look at teacher benefits: An apples to apples
comparison.National Council on Teacher Quality, 1-12.
Nevada Educator Performance Framework 2013-2014, 2014-2015. (2014). Retrieved from
http://rpdp.net/pdfs/RPDP%20NEPF%20Overview%209%2030%2013.pdf
Nevada Revised Statutes. 288. (2013). Retrieved from https://www.leg.state.nv.us/law1.cfm
Washoe County School District Website (http://washoeschools.net)
Washoe County Negotiated Agreement: Agreement between the Washoe County School District
and the Washoe Education Association, 2013-2015. (2013). Retrieved from
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:7O2RcSMTt1cJ:www.weatoday
.org/WEA_WCSD_Negotiated_Agreement_2013-
2015.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
25
Executive Summary
Leadership Matters Most
Students in Nevada are not achieving at an academic level necessary to attract and retain
leading businesses in order to develop a vibrant and knowledge based economy. Educational
bureaucracy and funding have been blamed for the decades of disappointing statistics touted by
the press. An effort to isolate variables leading to educational underperformance is like trying to
determine the reason that two people fall in love. In fact, academic success is impacted by a
variety of factors that have a compounding effect throughout a student’s academic career.
Examples of these factors include: the quality of the student’s teachers, administrators and other
school staff; socioeconomic indicators; language; transiency; family perceptions of educational
value; access to educational materials, and likely hundreds more. While lawmakers are well
intentioned in trying to isolate and “fix” these factors, changing one variable in an equation of a
multipronged analysis is unlikely to have the desired outcome of dramatically improved student
success. However, some factors can have a larger impact on student success than others. One
clear area of research is the effect that school leaders have on student success in persistently
underachieving schools.
Developing a system through which we can encourage excellent school leadership while
improving or eliminating ineffective leaders should be a top priority for lawmakers and
education advocates in Nevada. Currently, after two years of less than effective performance
ratings, principals can revert to probationary status. After a year on probation, should expected
outcomes not be improved, that principal is subject to termination or demotion. However, three
years of an ineffective administrator in a school can be incredibly damaging for student success.
26
In order to more effectively enhance academic instruction through effective
administrative performance, three primary recommendations are provided:
1) Address ineffective administrators in a timely manner;
2) Modify the current administrator evaluation system to avoid a disincentive for our
highest performing administrators; and
3) Provide meaningful incentives to encourage change at our lowest performing schools.
This change will not be easy. In response to the current political environment, including
legislative hesitancy to modify existing statute, the recommendations will present difficulties for
collective bargaining units that represent administrative personnel. This self-preservation will
likely become evident as administrative team members begin to evaluate the potential outcomes
under the proposed changes. Accomplishing this change will require a substantial team effort
with strategic team members. School board leadership, district superintendents, and business
leaders will need to partner with powerful and well-funded state teacher unions to demonstrate
the necessity to execute this change while holding districts accountable for successful
implementation.
Ultimately this change will not singularly improve student success. It is not a panacea.
Rather, based on the extensive research demonstrating the importance of school leadership on
academic success, it is obvious that a laser focus on ensuring every school has an effective leader
should be a primary focus of our society as we all stand to benefit from high achieving schools.
Leadership Matters Most
Lindsay Anderson
Dr. David Jensen
Mike Paul
The Public Education Foundation
Leadership Institute of Nevada
October 2014
LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST
28
Leadership Matters Most
More than thirty years ago, the National Commission on Education Excellence delivered
the report, A Nation at Risk (1983). This eye-opening report specifically recommended that
leadership should be developed for schools to succeed. The school principal is viewed as one of
the single most influential individuals on a school campus (Cohen, McCabe, Michelli, &
Pickeral, 2009; Edmonds, 1979; Kelley, Thornton, & Daugherty, 2005; Leech & Fulton, 2008).
According to Rooney (2009), “Schools are, in some ways, „long shadows‟ of their principals.
The school looks and feels like its leader” (p. 89). While the principal is viewed as critically
important in influencing the school environment as a whole, leadership is second only to the
classroom teacher in influencing student learning (Leithwood, Louis, Anderson, & Wahlstrom,
2004; Wallace Foundation Report, 2012). Whitaker (2003) explained that “great principals know
that if they have great teachers, they have a great school; without great teachers, they do not have
a great school” (p. 7). It is critical for school leaders to exert this influence in a manner that
allows great teachers to perform their duties free of unnecessary encumbrances while still
holding student achievement as the priority. Furthermore, “Principals are central figures in
schools whose actions directly shape their schools‟ climate” (Price, 2012, p. 40).
The Issue
A large body of research exists on the positive consequences of effective school
leadership in relation to student achievement and school climate (Hallinger & Heck, 1998).
Extensive research also exists on school climate and its effects on student achievement (Cohen,
Fege, & Pickeral, 2009; Cohen et al., 2009; Freiberg, 1999; Hoy & Woolfolk, 1993; Mitchell,
Bradshaw, & Leaf, 2010; Stewart, 2008). In persistently underachieving schools a highly skilled
and knowledgeable principal is of the upmost importance for such schools to begin to break the
LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST
29
cycle the underachievement. An underperforming principal can cause lasting damage to any
school. In today‟s system of heightened accountability, the great sense of urgency to improve
that exists for chronically underperforming schools is a continual topic of conversation in the
education and public setting. In order to begin to address this issue of chronic underachievement
the performance of the principal must be examined.
Principal Leadership
According to Kouzes and Posner (2012), the definition of leadership is the relationship
between those who desire to step into the forefront to lead and those who choose to step in line
and follow. “Leaders never get extraordinary things accomplished all by themselves. Leaders
mobilize others to want to struggle for shared aspirations, and this means that, fundamentally,
leadership is a relationship” (Kouzes & Posner, 2012, p. 30). Suber (2011) found that
characteristics that define successful school leadership include building strong staff relationships,
empowering teachers, and setting examples for all involved stakeholders. Leithwood et al.
(2004) define leadership, at its core, as providing direction and exercising influence.
With direction and influence, the link between leadership and student achievement is also
evident (Ovando & Cavazos, 2012; Robinson, Lloyd, & Rowe, 2008; Sergiovanni, 2001;
Tschannes-Moran & Gareis, 2004). “Quality schooling indeed leads to quality learning, and an
important key to quality schooling is the amount and kind of leadership that school principals
provide directly and promote among teachers and supporting staff” (Sergiovanni, 2001, p. 162).
Central to school effectiveness is the ability to build and maintain trusting, positive relationships
among school staff and leadership (Price, 2012). “When principals establish trusting school
spaces, serious school improvement and success can occur” (Price, 2012, p. 42). Meister (2010)
LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST
30
noted that it is frustrating for teachers when the principal disregards the knowledge of teachers,
takes only superficial input from staff, and/or exhibits a lack of cooperation.
There is an indirect relationship between school leaders‟ behaviors and student outcomes;
however, teachers make a more direct impact through their daily interactions with students. At
the same time, effective leaders support teachers with resources, provide professional learning
opportunities, and organize student groupings (Robinson et al., 2008; Soehner & Ryan, 2011).
Leaders establish a vision and shape a climate that is supportive of that vision. Simultaneously,
they must inspire their people by bringing out their individuality, talents, and energies toward a
well-intentioned future (Brown & Posner, 2001). DuFour and Eaker (1998) added that principals
who identify, promote, and protect shared vision and values, regard these behaviors as the most
important responsibilities to promote student success. Additionally, researchers suggest that
schools of all sizes and types that have leaders who effectively share leadership responsibilities,
create collaborative cultures, promote collective learning and application, and have shared values
and vision will have increased effectiveness (Brown, Finch, MacGregor, & Watson, 2012;
Fullan, 2003).
This effectiveness is particularly enhanced when a principal serves as an instructional
leader. As an instructional leader, the principal is expected to know quality instruction and
possess knowledge of the curriculum that is commensurate to the needs of all students
(Wahlstrom & Louis, 2008). It is presumed that the instructional leader is able to provide quality
constructive feedback, improve the practice of teaching, and/or construct a system for others to
provide this support (Wahlstrom & Louis, 2008).
The National Association of Elementary School Principals (NAESP, 2004) identified six
standards for effective instructional leaders. The first standard was to place student and adult
LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST
31
learning at the center of all decision making. The next standard focused on setting specific, high
expectations for students and adults. Along with this, the third standard was established
demanding content and instruction to promote student achievement. The final three standards
related to the creation of a culture of continuous learning, to the use of multiple sources of data,
and to actively engage the community (NAESP, 2004).
School Climate
As principal leadership continues to be a focus of studies, school climate also serves as a
focus of school research. Yet, a clear definition for school climate has not been determined
nationally or internationally despite more than 100 years of discussions on the topic (Cohen,
Fege, & Pickeral, 2009; Cohen et. al., 2009; Perry, 1908; Thapa, Cohen, Guffey, & Higgins-
D‟Lessandro, 2013). Throughout the body of research on school climate, many interpretations of
the definition of school climate exist. As early as 1908, Perry began a conversation regarding
school climate by describing it as:
A school “atmosphere,” school loyalty, school moral, esprit de corps, - all these, so
essential to securing the best results in the development of a school organization, cannot
be gained in a day. School spirit, pride in the school and thought for its name and honor
must become a matter of tradition, and once established, be handed down from one set of
pupils to another (p. 332).
In modern times and in simple terms, school climate is the personality of the school (Hoy
& Tarter, 1997; Hoy, Tarter, & Kottkamp, 1991) or its heart and soul (Freiberg, 1999). In more
complex language, school climate is “the set of internal characteristics that distinguishes one
school from another and influences the behavior of its members” (Hoy & Tarter, 1997, p. 6). It
has also been defined as the “quality of a school that helps each individual feel personal worth,
LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST
32
dignity and importance, while simultaneously helping create a sense of belonging to something
beyond ourselves” (Freiberg, 1999, p. 11).
Despite the varying definitions, school climate is larger than any single person‟s
experience; it is a group phenomenon that describes the quality of school life (Cohen et al.,
2009). More specifically, Cohen et al. (2009) described school climate as “the character of the
school, refers to spheres of school life (e.g., safety, relationships, teaching and learning, the
environment) and larger organizational patterns (e.g., from fragmented to cohesive or „shared‟
vision, healthy or unhealthy, conscious or unrecognized)” (p. 182). According to Hoy and Miskel
(2005), “School climate is a relatively enduring quality of the school environment that is
experienced by participants, affects their behavior, and is based on their collective perceptions of
behavior in schools” (p. 185). Principals‟ and teachers‟ attitudes create an atmosphere for
learning referred to as a school climate that has a great influence on school success (Price, 2012).
Price (2012) noted that this school climate is guided in a positive direction when an atmosphere
of trust, shared vision, and openness is created. Similarly, Mitchell et al. (2010) emphasized that
shared beliefs, values, and attitudes shape interactions and define school climate. Thapa et al.
(2013) added that school climate is a reflection of social, emotional, civil, ethical, and academic
experiences of students, educators, and parents that comprise the school community.
This unique reflection of many individuals and experiences demonstrates that the
“relationship between school climate and trust is extensive and consistent” (Hoy & Tarter, 1997,
p. 11). They explain that in a school where trust is prevalent, a generally productive and happy
climate prevails. At the same time, in a school with a positive climate students view school not
as a place they have to attend, but somewhere they want to be. Additionally, teachers share in the
long term commitment of school endeavors and are willing to put in the extra effort that is
LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST
33
needed to accomplish organizational goals (Hoy & Tarter, 1997). The open and healthy school
leader allows and encourages teachers to take risks for the sake of improving the school (Hoy &
Tarter, 1997). Tschannen-Moran (2001) stated that “expert principals know how to construct
processes in which important decisions are made through collaboration” (p. 309). However,
Tschannen-Moran (2001) cautioned that teachers could become disillusioned with involvement if
an administrator does not genuinely seek teacher input. Essentially, the open and healthy school
principal must also be willing to accept teachers who may ignore advice that conflicts with
professional decisions and high levels of autonomy (Hoy & Tarter, 1997).
It has been found that principals in open and healthy school climates indirectly foster
school success and teacher outcomes by impacting the school climate (Hallinger & Heck, 1998;
Hoy & Tarter, 1997; Price, 2012). Leithwood et al. (2004) agreed, “Mostly leaders contribute to
student learning indirectly, through their influence on other people or features of their
organizations” (p. 13). Meister (2010) contributed in that, over time, administration has a small
impact in the daily endeavors within in a teacher‟s classroom. The commitment and trust of the
faculty as a whole is key in school effectiveness (Hoy & Tarter, 1997). At the same time, “The
relationships of principals, as the school leader, strongly and directly affect teachers‟ attitudes,
which define the schooling climate” (Price, 2012, p. 40).
In order for these relationships to have successful outcomes, a shared definition of
expectations between the principal and teachers is critical (Price, 2012). According to Mitchell et
al. (2010) teachers indicated that a higher student-teacher ratio and larger class sizes contribute
to decreased levels of job satisfactions and overall decreases in school climate more so than
instability in leadership. MacNeil, Prater, and Bush (2009) added that “Ultimately, the
relationships that shape the culture and climate of the school are strongly influenced by the
LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST
34
school principal” (p. 76). Kelly, Thornton, and Daugherty (2005) highlighted that effective
leadership is critical, especially because the behaviors of building level principals are uniquely
linked to school climate.
The aforementioned NAESP (2004) report suggested that an exceptional school cannot
exist without an exceptional principal. The report acknowledged that leadership is a balancing
act with staff support. Specifically, NAESP (2004) affirmed that principals cannot perform the
many tasks of a school on their own; rather, distributed leadership must occur, and people must
know the values behind the many tasks.
While all people must know the values behind tasks, Esquith (2014) stated that the
climate and morale of a school starts at the top when the leader respects and believes in the
teachers. “Most staff members are more than willing to do some of the more unpleasant parts of
their jobs because they work for a principal who rolls up his sleeves and works alongside them”
(Esquith, 2014, p. 21). Cohen et al. (2009b) agreed that positive school climates start with strong
collaborative communities.
Thapa et al. (2013) found that, according to teachers, several factors contribute to a
positive school climate, which include the work environment, peer relationships, and feelings of
respect and inclusion. Thapa et al. (2013) continued, “School leaders and teachers should strive
to clearly define the sets of norms, goals, and values that shape the learning and teaching
environment” (p. 366). These researchers explained that cooperative learning, group cohesion,
respect, and mutual trust are byproducts of a positive school climate. Also, higher rates of
teacher retention can be linked to a positive school climate (Cohen et al., 2009b; Fulton, Yoon, &
Lee, 2005; Miller, Brownell, & Smith, 1999; Thapa et al., 2013).
LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST
35
Proposed Solutions
As previously indicated, the impact of effective administration is clear. The quality of
principals and teachers has been demonstrated as accounting for nearly 60% of a school‟s impact
on student achievement, with principals accounting for 25% of this impact (Marzano, Waters, &
McNulty, 2005). The principal is critical to this factor based on the required actions taken to
develop the conditions necessary to support academic learning, which include: effective hiring
practices, meaningful and relevant professional development, effective evaluation, as well as
efforts to support retention and dismissal.
Though there is a growing body of research that supports the premise that effective
instructional practice is directly correlated to the effectiveness of the site administrator, little has
been addressed in terms of removing ineffective administrators. Recent changes to the Nevada
Revised Statutes (NRS, 2013) provides the flexibility to deem a post-probationary administrator
(or teacher) as probationary following two years of unsatisfactory/less than effective
performance, while extending the time required to establish post-probationary status to three
years for probationary administrators. Despite this enhanced flexibility, there remain incidents in
which two years is too long to remove an ineffective administrator.
In order to more effectively enhance academic instruction through effective
administrative performance, three primary recommendations are provided:
1) Address ineffective administrators in a timely manner;
2) Modify the current NEPF to avoid a disincentive for our highest performing
administrators;
3) Provide meaningful incentives to encourage change at our lowest performing schools.
LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST
36
The impact of an effective administrator is clear. However, an ineffective administrator
can have an equally aversive impact. Currently, Statute allows for the removal of ineffective
administrators through a disciplinary process (NRS 391.31297(1)(a)). However, the process is
mired in legal expectations and requirements which could negate efforts to make the necessary
changes (NRS 391.313). In such circumstances, both staff and students are negatively impacted
by a continuation of ineffective leadership.
Recommendation: Allow for a reversion to probationary status for principals identified as
“ineffective” following the first evaluation in which such a classification is identified, based
upon modified expectations in the Nevada Educator Performance Framework (NEPF;
2014).
In addition, the current NEPF (2014) provides a disincentive to attracting and retaining
highly effective administrators at our lowest performing schools. School Turnaround models
incorporate the replacement of the site level administrator as the first and most important step in
transitioning the educational practices of a school (Kutash, Nico, Gorin, Rahmatullah, & Tallant,
2010). Despite the importance of facilitating and implementing a change in leadership, research
on change theory also confirms that the implementation of the change process does not occur
over night. Rather, researchers frequently site the need for three to five years of sustained efforts
to facility lasting change (Roy, 2013).
With the understanding that change is a process and often requires several years of
sustained focus, current requirements that 50% of an administrators evaluation be tied to
academic performance provides a disincentive for high performing administrators to assume the
leadership role at underperforming schools. The currently defined evaluative process would
likely identify a Turnaround principal as “ineffective” prior to the ability to implement
LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST
37
meaningful change. This impact is evident when it is understood that the data used in the
evaluative process is based on the prior academic year and fails to account for the necessary time
required for an effective change process to be implemented.
Understanding that student academic performance is a key indicator of leadership impact,
such measures must inherently be part of the evaluation system. However, the currently
identified 50% student academic expectation in the evaluative model is unrealistic and requires
modification.
Recommendation: Student academic achievement for evaluative purposes not exceed 25%
of the total evaluation. In addition, for new administrators at a school, academic measures
not be factored into the evaluation (although notation of growth be included) during the
first two years of placement.
Given the intent to draw our most highly skilled administrators into our lowest
performing schools, measures to provide meaningful incentives will be necessary. This need is
particularly noted in smaller districts where opportunities for movement are limited. As a result,
previously effective administrators place themselves in jeopardy if they are unable to facilitate
the anticipated improvements. Rather, the ability to implement an incentive-based system to
enhance the motivation of our highest performing administrators to take on the lowest
performing schools is deemed appropriate.
Understanding that fiscal resources are limited, legislative funds could be targeted
through an application process to enhance the performance of schools currently identified as
FOCUS and/or 1-star schools, with the understanding an expectation for funding includes a
change in site leadership. Selected administrators willing to take on the change process could be
LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST
38
incentivized through additional compensation or purchased years of service through the PERS
system.
Recommendation: Provide legislatively driven fiscal or purchased years of service for a
new administrator willing to take on a low performing school through a “Turnaround”
type model.
Why This Solution
Evidence has clearly identified that ineffective administrators are damaging towards
effective instructional practices. In addition, ineffective administrators have been found to lead to
higher rates of staff turnover, while decreasing an academically based culture within the school
setting. This enhanced teacher turnover rate has been directly correlated to decreases in student
academic achievement (Meyer, 2013).
Though recent legislation has provided additional means and supports towards removing
ineffective staff, including administration, the process remains cumbersome and time consuming.
In a best case scenario, outside of addressing a termination through the disciplinary process,
Statute requires three years before removal can be implemented: two years of unsatisfactory/less
than effective ratings, plus one of probationary status. During this time, the culture and academic
performance of individual school sites are impacted negatively. As a result, it is imperative that
methods be implemented to facilitate an expedited process for the removal of administrators that
have been deemed to be “ineffective.”
At the same time as we work to remove ineffective administrators, it is essential that a
mechanism be in place to attract and retain highly effective administrators within our lowest
performing schools. The current evaluative methodology proves to be a disincentive towards
taking on the change process required at our lowest performing schools. Until such time that
LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST
39
effective mechanisms are in place to both incentivize and reward administration to take on
schools requiring a high level of support, the likelihood of a “revolving door” administrative
pattern will become the norm.
Barriers
In presenting recommendations to address the issue at hand, it is essential to recognize
barriers to change. Two primary areas of concern to the proposed recommendations are
identified: political perception and individual protectionism.
With the introduction of Senate Bill 407 (2013) sponsored by Senators Smith and
Woodhouse, with Joint Sponsorship by Assemblywoman Dondero Loop, bipartisan support was
implemented with the intent of enhancing the evaluative process of Nevada‟s teachers and
administrators. A component of this bill requires designation of teachers and administrators as
“highly effective,” “effective,” “minimally effective” or “ineffective.” In addition, the bill
implemented pupil achievement as a component of the evaluation process, and required that such
account for “at least 50 percent” of the evaluation (NRS 391.465).
The adopted legislative action was consistent with a broad movement to enhance
accountability for academic practices in schools throughout the nation. When accountability is
considered, student academic performance was deemed as the clearest measure of teacher and
administrative performance. In reviewing other states practices, Nevada mirrored the national
trend, including recommendations by educational leaders (Marzano, 2010) to include student
outcomes at a minimum 50% threshold in the evaluative process.
This determination solidified the commitment felt by state legislators to ensure that all
students receive a meaningful educational program. As a result of this unified commitment, a
LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST
40
reversion on the 50% threshold may be seen as weakening of the commitment made by law
makers and educational partners.
In addition to legislative hesitancy to change statute, the state recommendations will
present difficulties for collective bargaining units that represent administrative personnel. This
self-preservation will likely become evident as administrative team members begin to evaluate
the potential outcomes under the proposed changes. As a result, state legislators will likely be
faced with a “quid pro quo” dilemma, outside of overt changes to collective bargaining law, to
incentivize administrative personnel to willingly agree place themselves at risk.
Advocacy Plan
While these barriers are substantial, with an appropriate political approach and a modest
awareness campaign, ultimate approval and passage of this proposal is achievable. In the past,
the emphasis on accountability and evaluations has been squarely focused on rank and file
teachers. With robust research that documents the tremendous impact classroom teachers have
on student success combined with the sheer number of teachers, that laser focus was probably
appropriate. However, as has been documented in our earlier research, the school leader also has
a profound impact and arguably even good classroom teachers can be negatively impacted by an
underperforming school administrator.
Teachers feel targeted and even persecuted. Many of the complaints teachers have about
the new evaluation system is the underfunded training effort of administrators who are charged
with completing the evaluations. By approaching teachers to partner in the advocacy efforts to
change the evaluation system for administrators, a credible and well-funded effort can be
launched. While teachers are often criticized for appearing to skirt accountability, this could be
seen as a method to increase accountability in education. Simultaneously, it would give teachers
LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST
41
an avenue to address the legitimate concerns about using un-validated and unidentified student
achievement data as half of their evaluation.
A coalition between the Nevada Association of Superintendents (NASS) and the Nevada
State Education Association (NSEA) would be necessary to execute a policy change at this level.
The collective voice of the 17 superintendents in the state is an untapped resource in Nevada
politics. The sheer size and financial ability of the NSEA could put political pressure on elected
officials in a way almost no other political organization can. NSEA spends roughly half a
million dollars during an election cycle to support candidates, parties and coalitions that help
them achieve their legislative priorities. If this proposal to enhance flexibility to ensure strong
school leadership is a top priority of the NSEA, it would increase the likelihood of success in a
Democrat-controlled legislature.
While many high profile issues like evaluations require some level of public (constituent)
awareness and support, achieving public understanding of this complex issue could be very time
intensive and thus expensive. On the contrary, the key decision makers in the process are the 63
legislators who get a vote and the Governor. While term limits have increased the number of
freshman legislators, the leadership of each party has remained relatively consistent and they
were essential in the evaluation reform of the 2011 and 2013 legislative sessions. The amount of
information sharing and educating of the legislative leadership will have to be targeted and clear,
yet shouldn‟t require a significant amount of resources. Convincing legislative leaders of the
importance of school leaders on our educational is believed to be attainable. Convincing those
same leaders about all the risks and inadequacies of the data available to connect teachers to
student outcomes will be a much more rigorous process, and rightfully so. In fact, districts and
superintendents largely supported and pushed for teacher evaluation reform in both 2011 and
LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST
42
2013. After four years of pilots and validation studies, Nevada (along with the nation) is no
closer to a reliable way to connect teachers to student success. This work has been riddled with
unpredictable variables including changes to standards and curriculum, assessment systems,
changing student information systems and the big question about untested grades and subjects.
Politicians who spent a substantial amount of political capital supporting these changes in years
past are frustrated that the educational institutions who philosophically supported these changes
in the past are now back in front of lawmakers asking for continued implementation delays or
studies. Political lifecycles are much shorter than the time necessary to plan, develop and
execute monumental shifts in evaluations for the education profession. It will take time, patience
and persistence to help our lawmakers realize that developing a legally defensible system that
doesn‟t create any perverse incentives to teach at high need schools is worth the wait. A unified
effort between the superintendents and the teachers is a powerful combination that will take on
this task.
Ultimately, policy change at this level is not accomplished on information alone.
Educational administrators will have valid concerns and expect some protection from any
potential system design flaws. Superintendents and teachers will have to be prepared to make
some compromise and make the proposal more enticing. There is agreement that Nevada wants
a system that encourages its strongest leaders and teachers in the schools that serve the most
challenged students. Incentivizing that has been a challenge. Financial incentive packages have
met with “luke warm” success. Offering non-financial incentives like autonomy have had some
success, but haven‟t been implemented systematically on a statewide level. This proposed policy
change may be a good opportunity to attempt to create a positive incentive for our most effective
administrators to take positions at our most impacted schools.
LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST
43
Working at a school with a large percentage of students struggling with poverty, mobility
and language is incredibly exhausting and difficult work. While it can be equally rewarding, the
“burn out” rate of administrators at these schools is alarmingly high. Thus, there is evidence to
show that many of those effective administrators can‟t stay in the schools that need them the
most because of the emotional, professional and physical burdens of that work environment. Our
proposal would be to acknowledge those challenges and much like public safety officials getting
“hazard pay”, we offer retirement benefits to our most effective administrators at our highest
need schools. This proposal would have to be negotiated depending on the political realities of a
legislative session, but could include options like purchasing years of service towards an early
retirement benefit, or increased contribution rates for qualified administrators. We recognize that
this side the proposal has a fiscal impact that may be a non-starter for some legislators, but like
any meaningful change, there are rarely examples of change that could have this level of impact
on schools without a price tag associated with it. We will work with each group to overcome as
many of the obstacles as possible while focusing on improving schools and student achievement
as the ultimate goal.
LEADERSHIP MATTERS MOST
44
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49
Executive Summary
SIERRA Project
S(Strategic), I(Improvement), E(Empowering), R(Reform), R(Raising), A(Achievement)
STRATEGIC PLAN OVERVIEW
Improving a persistently underachieving school is an enormous challenge. A State law must be
designed to impact district policy regarding leadership at the lowest performing schools. It is our
belief that to improve persistently underachieving schools the process must begin with an
effective, experienced, well-trained leader. Nevada must craft a law that will ensure that
principals who are identified to lead the lowest performing schools will have prerequisite skills,
training, and experiences as well as school empowerment latitude and the opportunity to
participate in on-going training and support in order to be successful.
GOALS
Create law/policy that mandates the follow at identified low performing schools:
SIERRA Master Principal Certification Endorsement
Empowerment autonomies
Incentives for all staff
OBJECTIVES:
Identify core competencies that selected school leaders will possess in order to participate
in the Leadership Academy.
Create an intensive Master Principal Certification Endorsement program to develop high
quality leaders to lead persistently underachieving schools.
Allow for empowerment autonomy at identified schools.
Implement incentive plans for school leaders who will participate in the Master Principal
Certification Endorsement and be recruited to lead persistently low achieving schools.
Implement incentive plans for school staffs to better attract strong, effective teachers.
IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE (12/18 MONTH)
6 month - Application process that will identify candidates to participate in the
Leadership Academy. Develop curriculum and essential experiences for Leadership
Academy.
12 month - SIERRA Leadership Academy for school leaders.
TRANSITION PLAN/ TIMELINE FOR EXISITING TURNAROUND PRINCIPALS
Previously appointed Turnaround principals will be granted the option to participate in
the SIERRA Leadership Academy or request an alternate placement.
Principals who have demonstrated two consecutive years of increased student
achievement will be provided the opportunity to apply for a waiver to the SIERRA
program.
BUDGET CONSIDERATIONS
SIERRA Leadership training
Incentives for Principal
Empowerment
Incentives for Teachers
SIERRA Project:
S(Strategic), I(Improvement), E(Empowering), R (Reform), R (Raising), A (Achievement)
Belinda Jones, Cortez Elementary School
Greg Mingo, Derfelt Elementary School
Tim Adams, Martinez Elementary School
The Public Education Foundation
Executive Leadership Academy
October 2014
SIERRA PROJECT
52
SIERRA Project:
S(Strategic), I(Improvement), E(Empowering), R(Reform), R(Raising), A(Achievement)
THE PEOPLE AND THE STATE OF NEVADA, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND
ASSEMBLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
Section 1. Chapter 386 of the Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS, 2013) is hereby amended by
adding thereto the provisions set forth as sections 2 to 5, inclusive, of this act.
Section 2. As used in sections 2 to 5, inclusive, of this act, unless the content otherwise
requires," SIERRA Project" (Strategic Improvement Empowering Reform Raising Achievement)
refers to a model program of education for use by school districts to train and develop highly
qualified administrators to lead consistently underachieving schools.
Section 3. 1. There is hereby established that the State Board shall develop a model program of
education for use by school districts to train principals who have been identified, by a rigorous
selection process, to lead consistently underachieving schools.
2. The board of trustees of a school district which participates in the SIERRA Project
must create a task force for the school district. The members of this task force must consist of
the following persons appointed by the board of trustees or a designee:
(a) One representative of the board of trustees;
(b) The superintendent of the school district, or his designee;
(c) Educational personnel employed by the school district, including, without limitation,
school principals who have demonstrated consecutive years of increased student achievement;
(d) Representatives of organizations that represent administrators;
(e) Representative from the Public Education Foundation; (f) Such other members as
the board of trustees determines are necessary.
SIERRA PROJECT
53
3. The design team created for the SIERRA Project shall:
(a) Recommend policies, procedures and courses relating to the SIERRA Project to the
board of trustees, superintendent of the school district and the state department;
(b) Work with educational institutions in this state as well as the State Board to offer
courses of study and training for the education of principals accepted into the SIERRA Project.
(c) Develop a screening and application process that allows equal opportunity for
licensed principals seeking SIERRA Master Principal Certification an opportunity to apply for
said endorsement.
(C.1) Administrators who are already serving as principals at a school that is
deemed a new "underachieving school" will have two (2) years from the date of classification to
complete the SIERRA. Endorsement in order to remain at their current position;
(C.2) Administrators who are serving as principals at a school that is deemed a
new “underachieving school" will have the option of completing the SIERRA Master Principal
Certification endorsement or requesting to be moved to another school;
(C.3) Principals who can demonstrate two (2) consecutive years of increased
student achievement at a former underachieving school will be given the option to apply for a
waiver to automatically be granted admission into the Master Principal Certification program;
(C.4.) Principals who have successfully completed the Public Education
Foundation Executive Leadership Program shall automatically be granted the Master Principal
Certification;
(d) The design team along with the board of trustees shall review and evaluate a course of
study and training offered by an educational institution which is designed to provide the
education required for the endorsement in the field of SIERRA Master Principal Certification;
SIERRA PROJECT
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(e) The SIERRA Program will be a twelve (12) month program;
(E.1.) Certification will require twelve (12) credit hours covering topics
determined in conjunction with board of trustees, superintendent of the school district, the Public
Education Foundation, the state department and educational institutions; such as:
(E.1.1.) Effective Leadership Practices
(E.1.2.) Instructional Talent Development
(E.1.3.) Resource Management
(E.1.4.) Law and Ethics
(E.1.5.) Local / Regional Service Project
(f) Determine renewal requirements, if any, for principals with SIERRA Master Principal
Certification;
(g) The board of trustees of a school district may accept gifts, grants, and donations from
any source for the support of the SIERRA Project which may include but not limited to, tuition
reimbursement, salary advancement for master principals when placed in an underachieving
school and staff incentives to attract and retain teachers at an underachieving school and/or
bonus when pre-established goals are met.
Section 4. The board of trustees of a school district that participates in the SIERRA Master
Principal Certification program will upon principal completion of program and placement in a
determined underachieving school, may establish policies and procedures for that school
principal within the school district, which may provide for:
1. Autonomy for the principal to decide issues relating to the operation of the school,
including, but not limited to, the school schedule, governance, staffing, budgeting and provision
of instruction;
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(a) Prescribe the manner by which all licensed educational personnel will be selected and
hired for the school, which must be determined and negotiated pursuant to chapter 288 of NRS;
(b) Prescribe the manner by which all other staff for the school is selected and hired,
which must be determined and negotiated pursuant to chapter 288 of NRS;
(c) Prescribe the manner by which all staff, licensed or support, can opt out of working at
an underachieving SIERRA school based on a fundamental disagreement with the school’s plan
and beliefs;
(d) A peer review model will be developed and have the option of removing and
replacing a teacher who is not compatible with the SIERRA model;
(e) Any teacher removed by peer review will fall into the involuntary transfer provisions
of Article 35 of the Negotiated Agreement;
(f) If the time frame does not allow for participation in the surplus meeting, the teacher or
staff member will be administratively reassigned by the Human Resource Division into a vacant
position for which they are qualified;
(g) Teachers who choose not to remain at a SIERRA school may apply and transfer to
another CCSD school during the annual transfer season;
(h) If a position is not secured during voluntary transfer, this employee will fall within the
involuntary transfer provisions of Article 35;
(i) The principal has the final say in all staffing matters;
(j) Allow for incentive/bonus pay for staff.
(k) Have autonomy over implementing research based quality instruction and/or
programs adopted;
SIERRA PROJECT
56
(l) Have the authority to opt out of any pilot testing or programs that will cause
summative assessments to be skewed or irregular; this includes but not limited to research, new
curriculum or any procedures that affect data or interruption of student instructional time;
(2) A procedure to obtain a waiver from certain requirements and regulations of the board
of trustees of the school district. The board of trustees may not waive:
(a) The requirements of a state or federal law or regulation;
(b) A policy or requirement relating to safety of school personnel, the students or the
safety of the school;
(c) State summative assessments.
Section 5. Upon successful completion of the SIERRA Master Certification training and
assignment to a classified underachieving school, the principal will be placed on the salary
schedule two (2) ranges above the district's current adopted Administrative Personnel Salary
Schedule;
(a) Principals will follow the Administrative Personnel Salary Schedule as outlined until
they have completed SIERRA Master Certification training and have been placed at a classified
underachieving school;
(b) Once placed at an underachieving school, principals will stay at the advanced salary
schedule (two steps above) for the expected duration of a minimum of three (3) years to improve
proficiency and set in place procedures to allow the improvement to be sustainable at an
underachieving school;
(c) Once the school is no longer considered underachieving the SIERRA principal will
have the option of staying at that school and returning to the regular Administrative Personnel
SIERRA PROJECT
57
Salary Schedule or requesting to be transferred to another underachieving location as to remain
at the higher pay rate;
(d) If there is not an available underachieving school, the principal may opt to stay at the
current assignment for the duration of up to three (3) additional years, at the increased pay rate,
until a suitable position at another underachieving school becomes available.
SIERRA PROJECT
58
SIERRA Project
S(Strategic), I(Improvement), E(Empowering), R(Reform), R(Raising), A(Achievement)
A 2013 report from the National Association of Secondary School Principals and the National
Association of Elementary School Principals states, “Principal development remains a low priority in
most education policy agendas” (p. 1). As school reform movements continue across both the country and
the state of Nevada, very few initiatives have proven to be successful. This lack of success is continually
evident in the state of Nevada as for many years we have found ourselves at the bottom of almost every
education poll published in the mainstream media. The "Kids Count" report recently released by the
Annie E. Casey Foundation (2014) placed Nevada last in education and 48th overall in the United States.
Education reform in the state of Nevada has been a scatter plot of design and very few if any initiatives
have been proven to be successful or shown longevity. The SIERRA project is a new way of tackling
educational reform. Research has shown that an effective building principal has the biggest impact on
school improvement. “Given the impact school leadership can have on student outcomes, providing every
school with an effective principal should clearly be among the top priorities” (Sun, 2011, p. 4). Current
practice in the state of Nevada has never put a focus on the development of effective school leaders. Until
recently even the biggest university in southern Nevada no longer offered an Educational Leadership
program to develop these leaders. The talent pipeline for school administrators has in a sense dried up in
Nevada, and not only are school districts scrambling to find teachers, the struggle to find effective
administrators has become very problematic as well. This lack of talent to fill these ever-important
positions is exponentially more difficult to fill the needs of the persistently underachieving, high needs
schools. As of recent, in the Clark County School District, several administrator positions at these schools
took weeks or months to fill as the applicant lists were not filled, and the desire to work at a high needs
school was not very appealing. In many cases, if not all theses schools, were staffed with brand new and
very inexperienced school administrators to run the most difficult schools in the district. This continual
process of selection and appointment to schools that persistently underachieving has contributed to the
fact that Nevada remains at the bottom.
SIERRA PROJECT
59
In a system where it is understood that talent equates to positive results, the state of Nevada must
ensure that the top talent is in the schools that have the most needs. The state of Nevada must develop a
law to force districts to fill these schools with its most effective administrators that have been trained to
lead this type of school. As previously pointed out the talent pool has all but dried up, and there must be
added incentive for teachers and administrators to accept and lead these schools. The SIERRA project is
deigned to address both the lack of highly effective administrators in the state and designed to ensure the
most effective administrators are in the highest of need school, as well as being compensated for taking
on this additional challenge.
Application/Screening Process
Unlike traditional postgraduate degree programs offered by several universities, the SIERRA
project comes at no cost to the participants. It is fully funded by the local school districts under the
premise that effective leaders will make the most impact on persistently underachieving schools. This
investment will in turn be more effective and more sustainable then any other reform initiative being
purchased at this time.
Candidates will be recommended to the SIERRA program by current and former supervisors, and
selected through a written application and in-person interview process. In all cases, the principal shall
have two years of successful experience as a building principal as evidenced by relevant data, including
data supporting student growth in three of the principal's previous five years, and formal evaluations or
letters of recommendation from current or former supervisors.
Each candidate must meet the following minimum requirements:
A valid and current K-12 Nevada Administrator License
Submission of a portfolio that presents evidence of a candidate’s achievements during his
or her administrative experience in each of the following categories:
o Support of all students in the classroom to achieve high standards of learning;
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60
o Accomplished site based leadership, which shall include data providing evidence
of two years of student growth and learning within the last five years;
o Significant leadership roles at the district level;
Strong oral and written communication skills;
Analytic abilities needed to collect and analyze data for student improvement;
Demonstrated respect for family and community partnerships;
Strong interpersonal skills; and
Extensive knowledge of curriculum and instructional practices
Candidates successfully completing the SIERRA program shall obtain a principal endorsement on
their State of Nevada Educator License and will be eligible to work as a principal, in a state identified
persistently underachieving school, or state labeled turnaround school.
As each cohort group will only consist of 25 applicants, a board of designated district officials and
community leaders will screen and interview all applicants and determine the top 25 applicants to proceed
into the SIERRA project. All applicants who attend the SIERRA project will do so with the
understanding and drive that once completed will qualify them for the SIERRA plan endorsements and
allow them to apply for and work in schools that are persistently underachieving and with high needs. It is
also understood that these graduates once selected for these positions would be granted both the increased
salary as well as empowerment capabilities.
Timeline
As the need for school reform increases and the number of persistently low achieving schools
increases, local school districts within the state will be given 18 months to graduate their first set of 25
administrators into the SIERRA project applicant pool. Each subsequent year, local districts will continue
to train school based administrators using the SIERRA curriculum, thus increasing the applicant pool
each year and building a strong talent pool that will effect more schools each year. During the first year
local districts will be given 6 months to develop the SIERRA curriculum and screen for applicants to
SIERRA PROJECT
61
participate in the first SIERRA cohort. The first graduating class of the SIERRA academy must be
completed within two years of the laws inception and SIERRA endorsed administrators will be able to
apply for vacant positions under the SIERRA classification at that time.
SIERRA Endorsement Course Descriptions Requirements
The SIERRA Project will encompass a 12-month intensive professional development program to
help successful school leaders become great school leaders. This 12-month program shall offer a
curriculum that addresses student learning and school growth and improvement and will address the
following:
A Pre K- 12 continuum.
The role of instruction (with an emphasis on literacy and math), curriculum, assessment
and needs of the schools that are persistently underachieving.
The Nevada Educator Performance Framework (NEPF; 2014).
Providing researched based instruction to all children (EL, SPED, Poverty).
How to cultivate and maintain collaborative relationships with all members of the school
community.
How to establish effective school cultures.
The importance of human capital.
School Based Finance - How to Rethink it.
Union Contracts/ Laws.
How to use data and ensuring it is the right data.
Concurrently with the last 6 months of the professional development program, a school-based
internship of 60 hours will take place within identified mentor based schools.
The internship portion of the program shall be conducted at one or more public or nonpublic schools
so as to enable the candidate to be exposed to and to participate in a variety of school leadership situations
SIERRA PROJECT
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in settings that represent diverse economic and cultural conditions and involve interaction with various
members of the school community (e.g., parents, school board members, local school councils or other
governing councils, community partners).
Curriculum programs will be developed collaboratively with input from a multifaceted task force
including stakeholders from the local school districts, school boards, and community partners.
Budget Narrative
Because talent attracts talent, because talented people want to join winning, talented
teams, designing and running a leadership academy to prepare leaders to meet the challenges of
guiding the lowest performing schools should be a budget priority for school districts and State
Departments of Education. Each organization should be dedicated to talent development. It’s
hard work to get there and the process never ends.
The path through the Executive Leadership Academy brought to life a set of priorities for
creating a great school. Priority #1 is securing the right person to lead the school; nothing matters
as much as leadership. Leadership is the most critical factor in determining the student learning,
the climate, and the professional collaboration that occurs across a school. Effective leaders are
a key factor in developing effective teachers. Quality school leadership is critical for consistent
student achievement across classrooms and grade levels. Therefore, incentives to change the
culture of persistently underperforming school must begin with an incentive for the principal.
Teachers and Teacher Leaders are also significant factors for impacting student achievement.
Leadership provided by identified Lead Teachers within the building will receive incentives.
Assistant Principals in SIERRA schools will be participating in essential experiences and
training that will earn them credit for certification and the opportunity to lead a SIERRA school
themselves.
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A. Personnel – List each position that pertains to the proposal. The cost calculation should show
the employee’s annual salary rate and the percentage of time devoted to the project.
1. Principal: $8,943-$9,394/year. SIERRA Principals will move up two steps on the
Administrative Personnel Salary Schedule (Clark County School District, 2014). The
majority of elementary and middle school principal positions are classified as a Range 42
or a Range 43. The following is a breakdown of the annual incentive for a principal that
was SIERRA endorsed and chosen to lead a SIERRA school.
If the principal were on Range 42, Step F ($7,917/mo.) and they were moved up to Range
44, Step F ($8,713/mo.) they would realize an incentive of $813 per month. This
individual’s annual salary incentive would total $8,943. ($813 x 11 months = $8,943)
If the principal were on Range 42, Step G ($8,312/mo.) and they were moved up to
Range 44, Step G ($9,166/mo.) they would realize an incentive of $854 per month. This
individual’s annual salary incentive would total $9,394. ($854 x 11 months = $9,394)
If the principal were on Range 43, Step F ($8,312/mo.) and they were moved up to Range
45, Step F ($9,166/mo.) they would realize an incentive of $854 per month. This
individual’s annual salary incentive would total $9,394. ($854 x 11 months = $9,394)
If the principal were on Range 43, Step G ($8,730/mo.) and they were moved up to
Range 45, Step G ($9,617/mo.) they would realize an incentive of $887 per month. This
individual’s annual salary incentive would total $9,757. ($887 x 11 months = $9,757)
The total yearly principal cost for 10 SIERRA Schools would be in the range of $89,430
to $97,570 based upon the principal position Range for the individual schools before
SIERRA designation.
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2. Licensed Staff: All licensed staff will receive an annual incentive of $5,000. The
incentive will be received each year that a staff member remains at a SIERRA school.
The average staff size for an elementary school is 40 licensed staff members. The total
yearly staff incentive cost for the average size elementary would be $200,000 per school.
A total of 8 SIERRA elementary schools would cost $1,600,000.
The average staff size of a middle school is 65 licensed staff members. The total yearly
staff incentive would be $325,000 per middle school. Two SIERRA middle schools
would cost $650,000.
3. Licensed Staff – Lead Teacher: Licensed staff identified as a Lead Teacher (7 lead
positions per SIERRA school) will receive an additional $1,500 annual incentive. The
creation of these positions and incentives emphasizes the importance of teacher
leadership, collaboration, and input on the school improvement process. Lead teachers
should have positions on the School Improvement Team and the Governance/Budget
Team. Teacher Leaders should play a vital role in all decision making that impact
students or families.
The total yearly Lead Teacher incentive cost would be $10,500 ($1,500 x 7 Lead
Teachers) per SIERRA school. The total annual cost of Lead Teacher incentive pay for
10 SIERRA schools would be $105,000.
The total annual licensed staff incentive cost for 10 SIERRA schools, 8 elementary
schools and 2 middle schools would be $2,355,000.
The grand total for all performance incentives, administration and licensed teachers,
would be $2,452,000. The figure seems large on the surface, but when considered in the
scope of federal funding for at risk schools, it would be manageable. Specifically,
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Title I-A Basic funding for Clark County during fiscal year 2013-2014 totaled more than
104 million dollars. A 2.5 million dollar allocation to improve the 10 lowest performing
schools would account for less than 3% of the funds received. Schools in Clark County
regularly receive a reduced amount of funding so that the district may allocate additional
dollars to specific improvement initiatives such as PASS.
Table 1: Listing of SIERRA Incentives
Principal Monthly Salary 2 Ranges Higher Incentive Per Mo. Annual
Incentive
Range 42 - Step F $7,917 $8,713 $813 $8,943
Range 42 - Step G $8,312 $9,166 $854 $9,394
Range 43 - Step F $8,312 $9,166 $854 $9,394
Range 43 - Step G $8,730 $9,617 $887 $9,757
Licensed Staff Annual Incentive Avg. # of Staff Ind. School Total School Level Total
Elementary (8) $5,000 40 $200,000 $1,600,000
Middle School (2) $5,000 65 $325,000 $650,000
$2,250,000
Licensed - Lead Teacher
Additional Incentive
# of Lead Teachers Ind. School Total School Level Total
Elementary (8) $1,500 7 $10,500 $84,000
Middle School (2) $1,500 7 $10,500 $21,000
$105,000
Grand Total: (Dependent upon Pay Range Classification of future SIERRA Schools) $2,444,430 to
$2,452,570
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B. Internship for future SIERRA Principals – The internship for SIERRA Endorsement
would be possible through two paths locally: (1)a partnership with a beneficiary such as the
Public Education Foundation or the Lincy Foundation to compensate the presenters and program
organizers’ or (2) the program could be developed by the Clark County School District
Administrative Leadership Development Program (ALDP) which is responsible for designing
and implementing professional development for and experienced administrators.
1. District expenditure per participant for CCPEF Partnership: $5,000. 15 participants per
cohort would cost CCSD a total of $75,000 per cohort.
2. There would be no additional cost to make Sierra Endorsement a component of the
CCSD ALDP.
C. SIERRA Project Assistant Principal Internship – There would be no cost associated with
providing opportunities for assistant principals to participate in an internship working with
principals to earn partial credit toward a SIERRA Endorsement. Placements would be made by
the Superintendent, the Chief Academic Officer, and the Assistant Chief Achievement Officer in
charge of the Turnaround Schools. Assistant Principals who have completed the Public
Education Foundation’s Executive Leadership Academy will automatically be granted SIERRA
Endorsement until the SIERRA endorsement program officially begins.
Evaluation
Increased funding, for any reason or incentive, comes with increased accountability.
Evaluation of initiatives is an essential component of accountability that ensures that progress is
realized and there is a return on investment. Evaluation measures for the SIERRA Project would
come on multiple levels: school performance rating, talent pool size, talent pipeline
infrastructure, and school climate/satisfaction survey results from students, parents, and staff.
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School Performance Framework and Measuring Progress
SIERRA schools growth on the Nevada School Performance Framework (NSPF; Nevada
Department of Education, 2014 school rankings. The state ranking system classifies schools on a
1-5 star system using multiple measures of student achievement and other data. SIERRA schools
would be identified from the lowest performing schools, 1-star or 2-star schools as identified by
the NSPF (Nevada Department of Education, 2014).
Talent Pool & Pipeline
The human capital goal of the SIERRA Project is meant to put in place the architecture
that allows Nevada school districts to build and maintain a talent-rich pipeline and to become a
talent magnet. The evaluation and development process for building based administrators
(Principals and APs) is designed to promote effective leadership by providing regular and
comprehensive feedback at all stages of the SIERRA endorsement process, feedback that both
encourages growth and carries professional consequences. Evaluation of the initiative’s progress
and sustainability would take into account the overall number of qualified administrators,
principals and assistant principals who are in the process of earning a SIERRA Endorsement.
Annual increases in the number of SIERRA endorsed administrators would indicate success in
meeting the goal.
School Climate Surveys
SIERRA schools will implement an annual School Climate Survey with specific focus
given to the change process and instructional improvements. This survey will collect feedback
from students, teachers, and parents about their individual schools. Survey results will be used
as a significant factor in monitoring progress of the schools. Each school’s annual review of its
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own school improvement plan will take into account how well that schools used their survey
results to make improvements.
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References
Annie Casey Foundation. (2014). Kids Count. Retrieved from
http://www.aecf.org/work/kids-count/
Clark County School District. (2014). Administrative Personnel Salary Schedule. Retrieved from
http://ccsd.net/employees/current/employment/salary
National Association of Secondary School Principals and National Association of
Elementary School Principals. (2013). Leadership Matters. Retrieved from
http://www.nassp.org/Content/158/leadership_matters_screen.pdf
Nevada Department of Education. (2014). Nevada School Performance Framework.. Retrieved
October 1, 2014, from http://nspf.doe.nv.gov/
Nevada Educator Performance Framework 2013-2014, 2014-2015. (2014). Retrieved from
http://rpdp.net/pdfs/RPDP%20NEPF%20Overview%209%2030%2013.pdf
Nevada Revised Statutes. 386. (2013). Retrieved from https://www.leg.state.nv.us/law1.cfm
Sun, C. (2011). School leadership: Improving state systems for leader development (NASBE
discussion guide). Retrieved from
http:// nasbe.org/wp-content/uploads/DG_School_Leadership _August_2011.pdf
71
Executive Summary
Incentivizing High Performing School Administrators
to be Placed in At-Risk Schools
Strategic Plan Overview
Transform existing pay structures in CCSD into opportunities to incentivize high
performing leaders to assume positions in the schools where they are needed most.
Goals
Develop a pay structure that compensates principals based on the complexity of
their assignment and the quality of their performance.
Provide leaders with salaries that are commensurate with the amount and level of
challenges they will face.
Objectives
Redesign the compensation model to more accurately reflect the current CCSD
enrollment.
Readjust the “points” system and determine appropriate “add-ons” within each
compensation package. (e.g. special education, year round/multi track, FRL, high
school activities, athletics, ELL, transportation, magnet, etc)
Implement the new model: base pay + performance incentives = total
compensation
Implementation Timeline
This new compensation proposal will take time to be accepted and fully integrated into
CCSD. Data collection will be a significant process in the development of this model and
current salaries are locked through the collective bargaining agreement through 2015. A
specific activation timeline has not yet been determined.
Challenges
With this new compensation model there does propose the opportunity where principals
could earn more than their non-school based principals. This could likely lead to some
resistance. This will raise policy considerations as to whether building-level administrators
should earn more than non-school based administrators and suggests that adjusting
principal compensation should trigger consideration of adjusting area manager
compensation as well. Data collection is another barrier as the new base pay model will
require additional achievement data be captured and used for compensation purposes.
There could also be challenges surrounding the process of determining points and weights
because of varying viewpoints.
INCENTIVIZING HIGH PERFORMING
SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS TO BE
PLACED IN AT-RISK SCHOOLS
Ronnie Guerzon
Principal, Canyon Springs High School
Sami Randolph
Assistant General Counsel, Clark County School District
Victor Wakefield
Executive Director, Teach For America – Las Vegas Valley
The Public Education Foundation
Executive Leadership Academy
October 2014
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74
Incentivizing High Performing School Administrators to Be Placed In At-Risk Schools
There are several significant challenges in human capital for educational leaders, one of
which is incentivizing high performing administrators to be placed in at-risk schools. In many
school districts, administrators‟ compensation is based primarily on years of service, post-
secondary degrees and credits, school grade levels and school size. This is also true in the Clark
County School District in Las Vegas, Nevada. The purpose of this research study is to identify
opportunities for school districts to thoughtfully consider changes to administrators‟ job
descriptions and compensation packages, so that administrative positions in at-risk schools are
more attractive to high quality leaders. Current compensation packages and job characteristics
for leadership positions in at-risk schools do not necessarily attract high quality candidates. The
changes proposed here will transform existing pay structures into opportunities to incentivize
high performing leaders to assume positions in the schools where they are needed the most.
Critical to this discussion is an agreed upon definition as to what constitutes a “high
performing school administrator.” In addition, to fully respond to the question posed requires a
working definition of an at-risk school. This paper proposes solutions that contemplate prior
agreement as to the definition of these terms. To some extent the Nevada State Legislature is
currently seeking to establish guidelines that delineate effective and highly effective school
administrators. For our purposes those forthcoming definitions can be used to identify the pool
of administrators that we seek to incentivize.
Scope of the Problem
The Clark County School District (CCSD) is the fifth largest school district in the United
States. CCSD has a student enrollment in excess of 300,000. Enrollment data reflects that
student population of CCSD is majority minority. It employs over thirty thousand employees.
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For the 2013-2014 school year, CCSD employed 1,291 administrators. These administrative
employees included principals, assistant principals, deans and central office employees. (Clark
County School District Fast Facts 2013-2014, 2013). The administrators are represented by the
Clark County Association of School Administrators and Professional-Technical Employees
(CCASPE). Similar to other districts, the Clark County School District, employs an
administrators‟ salary schedule and a school-based site management plan that only reward
longevity, educational credits, and post-secondary degrees. A salary schedule that is based
primarily on step increases associated with years of service does not reward new or veteran
administrators who produce extraordinary results in student achievement. Furthermore, a salary
schedule such as this one does not reward or incentivize administrators to assume leadership
positions in at-risk schools. In a study commissioned by The Wallace Foundation, Mitgang
(2003), suggests that the “policies and practices aimed solely at adding more certified candidates
to the pipeline miss the core challenges underlying the difficulty many districts are having in
attracting and retaining high quality leaders. These challenges include inadequate incentives to
draw high quality leaders to the neediest schools with the most difficult working conditions…”
(p.2 ).
A review of the current distribution of CCSD administrator compensation, depicted in
Figure 1 , highlights the fact that the existing method for determining administrator
compensation results in a grossly skewed range distribution. Range is determined by the
presence of certain district-set criteria that will be more fully addressed in subsequent sections.
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Figure 1: Current Distribution of CCSD Administrator Compensation
Elementary Schools
Middle Schools
High Schools
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Alternative Schools
Special Schools
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The salary ranges depicted in Figure 2 determine administrator placement on the salary
schedule.
Figure 2: Salary Schedule for CCSD Administrators
A review of the Figures 1 and 2 invites numerous questions regarding the job being performed
by administrators. Is each principal within a given range performing the same job? Are the principals
within a given range performing at the same level?
In general, an employee earns a step increase on the salary scale by moving one column
to the right of the current column after each year of service. An employee‟s current column is
determined by their cumulative years of experience.
Returning to the issue of range, the range determination is based on a point system.
CCSD and CCASAPE are party to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Article 20 of the
CBA addresses professional compensation. Relevant here is article 20-11-5 which states, “On
or shortly after state-count day, or when enrollment is finalized for funding purposes, the Human
Resources Division will review the results of the point system applied to each school, taking into
consideration all information available” (Clark County School District and Clark County
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Association of School Administrators and Professional-Technical Employees Negotiated
Agreement 2013-2015, 2013, p.34). The discussion of administrator compensation is
particularly relevant at this time because section 20-12 of the CBA states “Nevada Revised
Statutes requires the implementation of a performance and enhanced compensation for school-
based administrators commencing with the 2015-2016 school year,” (p.35).
The yearly review to determine range is based on a point system. Table 1 displays the
School-Based Site Management Plan (SBSMP) for CCSD (Clark County School District, 2003).
Relevant data include the school‟s grade levels, number of students, number of students who
qualify for free or reduced lunch, number of English Language Learners and the number of
students who qualify for special education services. Each aforementioned factor is assigned a
specific weight. The combined weight for all factors and the school‟s staff size determines the
salary range.
Table 1: Clark County School District School-Based Site Management Plan
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To determine the pay range for a principal in the Clark County School District, we must
consider the total staff size and the factors delineated in (SBSMP). The total staff size refers to
the total number of teachers and support staff assigned to the specific building or school. The
total staff size and the total number of points earned, as displayed in Table 1, can be applied to
the information in Table 2 in order to determine the salary range for the principal of any
particular school.
Table 2: Clark County School District School-Based Site Management Plan (cont’d)
There are several things that appear to be outdated with the Clark County School District‟s
process for determining a principal‟s salary range. The point system was last modified in 2003,at
which time the demographics of CCSD looked considerably different. In addition, points are
generally awarded in a lump sum. For example, if one school has 9 special education programs
and a second school has 18 special education programs, both schools would earn an equal
amount of factor points, which in this case is 8 points.
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Little consideration is given to the barriers that adversely impact student
achievement. Only 11% of the total possible points are dedicated to at-risk factors. Currently,
the only measure for at-risk points is the number of students who qualify for free or reduced-
price lunch. Factors such as the students‟ present scholastic ability levels are not taken into
consideration.
The award of points for ELL (English Language Learner) is 4 points if 25% or more of
the student population receives ELL instruction. This method of awarding ELL points fails to
consider the curriculum challenges that differ among schools with a 25% ELL enrollment versus
a school with a 75% or more ELL population.
At present, points are awarded for activities, athletics and transportation. Though
important, the weight assigned to each of these factors does not coincide with currently
articulated district priorities. Neither the principal‟s role in fostering academic growth nor
enhancing proficiency are acknowledged or rewarded. The current compensation system does
not directly align to the district‟s Pledge of Achievement (Clark County School District, 2014).
Tables 1 and 2 show that the total number of possible factor points is 53. However, as
shown, the threshold number of points is 17 points. In other words, a school with 17 factor
points could yield the same principal‟s salary as a school with 53 factor points. Clearly, the
system currently for compensation purposes treats the administrators at dissimilar schools the
same. More importantly, the current system creates a disincentive for high performing
administrators to lead at-risk schools. The evidence provided here supports a consideration
raised by researchers, in that perceived “shortages are largely a problem of distribution rather
than of absolute numbers” (Darling-Hammond, 2000, p.136). If school districts do not employ
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a more differentiated pay structure for principals, what will incent high performing leaders to
take on more challenging, at-risk schools?
Solutions
Similar to other large districts, the Clark County School District is well positioned to
develop a compensation program that “compensates principals based on the complexity of their
assignment and the quality of their performance” (Providence Public School Department, 2013,
p.1). In order to attract high performing leaders to at risk schools, school districts must consider
offering higher levels of autonomy, special staffing considerations and a differentiated pay
structure. Simply put, school districts must provide leaders with salaries that are commensurate
with the amount and level of challenges they will undoubtedly face. “A complete performance
incentive program for a school or a school district will include means for considering and
rewarding the contribution of the school principal” (Schuermann, Guthrie, Prince, & Witham
2009, p.1).
Miami-Dade County Public Schools in Florida is the fourth largest school district in the
United States with an enrollment of 345,000 students (Miami-Dade Public Schools, 2014). The
district is the second largest majority-minority district in the country. Miami-Dade employs in
excess of 40,000 employees. A Differentiated Compensation Model (PDCM) is used to
determine principal compensation (Miami-Dade Public Schools, 2013). This model starts with a
base pay that is the same for all principals. The base pay is not tied to the school being an
elementary, middle or high school. Add-ons to base pay are awarded based on categories
identified as membership, economic disadvantage, reading levels, school configuration,
exceptional student education and fragile school. This compensation model considers factors not
currently used by CCSD. One significant difference is the number of categories in the Miami-
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Dade system that is tied to student performance. Reading levels, exceptional student education
and fragile schools are categories that emphasize student performance. The Miami-Dade model
recognizes and provides compensation associated with the administrative challenges that come
with seeking to raise low reading scores, provide a rigorous curriculum for exceptional students
as well as the challenges inherent in seeking to reform a fragile school. To this end, the Miami-
Dade model provides some guidance regarding student achievement factors that can help
restructure the existing CCSD system.
The system for determining administrator compensation used by the Houston
Independent School District (HISD) provides additional considerations for CCSD. With an
enrollment of over 210,000 students, HISD is the seventh largest school district in the United
States (HISD, 2014) . Administrator salary in HISD is based on a combination of three
variables. Principal experience and school type, size of school and site complexity are used to
determine administrator compensation. (Houston Independent School District Compensation
Manual 2014-2015, 2014). Campus variables from the prior year are used to calculate
components and principal salaries.
The experience component is tied to the administrators credited years of experience. The size of
school component is based on size of enrollment and whether the school is an elementary, middle or high
school. The site complexity component is based on the percentage of students that are economically
disadvantaged as well as the number of students that are considered gifted and talented. However, unlike
CCSD, HISD provides monetary add-ons based on the percentage of students that are economically
disadvantaged and/or gifted and talented. Another area in which CCSD and HISD differ is that awards
are not lump sum awards. HISD provides graduated salary add-ons based on a linear system of
percentages. For example, as displayed in Table 3, salary add-ons for economically disadvantaged
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students are staggered based on the percentage of enrollment. HISD also provides additional salary
add-ons for gifted and talented students.
Table 3: Salary Add-Ons for Administrators at HISD
Percentage of Economically Disadvantaged Students
% of student 0-35% 36-50% 51-75% 76-
90%
91% +
$ add-on 0 $2,700 $4,000 $5,000 $6,000
Percentage of Gifted and Talented Students
% of students 0-11% 12-40% 41- 80% 81% +
$ add-on 0 $2,000 $3,000 $4,000
The monetary awards for size of school and site complexity are added to the years of
experience component resulting in a total compensation package. Similar to Miami-Dade the
model used by HISD provides increased add-ons for higher populations of economically
disadvantaged and exceptional students. However, the system used by HISD does not provide
salary add-ons related to student achievement criteria such as reading levels as was seen in the
model used by Miami-Dade.
The compensation model used by Providence Schools, the public school district serving
students in, Providence, Rhode Island provides a third example that can be used to shape a
compensation system for CCSD. With an enrollment of 23,561 students, this district is
significantly smaller that the districts previously referenced (Providence Schools, 2014).
However, Providence Schools is a majority minority district, with a minority enrollment of 87%.
In addition, Providence Schools has a significant ELL population associated with 63% of
students of Hispanic origin. Providence Schools created a principal compensation program that
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85
reflects the difficulty of the principal‟s specific assignment and the quality of the principal‟s
performance in that role during the preceding year (Providence Schools, 2013-). Within this
model annual compensation is the result of (1) base salary based on the specific school
assignment, (2) individual performance compensation based on evaluation and service to the
district, and (3) length of contract based on evaluation during contract year. The compensation
framework recognizes three levels of principals. The levels are basic, proficient and
distinguished. The district adopted the Vanderbilt Assessment for Leadership in Education
(VAL-ED) to determine movement across levels (Providence Schools, 2014). It is clear that the
task of reforming administrator compensation in this district was deliberate and purposeful.
Available documents reveal the developers of the model reviewed models from other districts
and created a system tailored to the needs of their district.
Each of the three districts discussed here are meaningful for different reasons. The sheer
size of Miami-Dade and Houston are important for CCSD because of inherent difficulty in
reforming a large urban system. The demographics populations of Miami-Dade and Houston
and the resulting instructional considerations associated therewith provide points of
consideration for CCSD. The model created by Providence is extremely helpful because of the
deliberate, purposeful and systematic process by which changes were made. Before seeking to
reform their system, the developers of the Providence model clearly identified their goal. With
this guidance in mind, the authors of this paper have created a model for CCSD that includes the
formula: base pay + performance incentives = total compensation.
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Part 1: Base Pay
A closer look at the Clark County School District‟s process for determining salary ranges
for principals yielded promising opportunities for change within the structures that already exist.
For example, more emphasis could be placed on at-risk factors and students in special programs
such as special education and English Language Learners. One might consider a more linear
approach to assigning points for quantitative factors like the number of buses needed to transport
students, the number of special education programs offered by the school and the number of ELL
students enrolled. Table 4 displays the School-Based Site Management Plan (Clark County
School District, 2003) that was presented as part of the Leadership Institute on August 8, 2014.
The proposed plan is a hybrid of the Clark County School District‟s existing plan. The new plan
places greater emphasis and weight on at-risk factors and presents a more linear approach to
awarding points in the areas of special education, at-risk, ELL and transportation.
Table 4: Comparison of Current CCSD Plan vs. Proposed Plan
Current Plan Proposed Plan
Weight Factor (points earned) Weight Factor (points earned)
Weight Special Education
8-12 (8) 3-4 units
(10) 5-8 units
(12) 9+ units
Weight Special Education
0-16 (1) per unit, up to 16 units
Weight Year Round, Multi Track
8
Weight Year Round, Multi Track
8
Weight At-Risk
6 (6) Based on 50% or more students receiving FRL
Weight FRL
0-18 (1) 11-20% FRL
(2) 21-30% FRL
(3) 31-40% FRL
(6) 41-50% FRL
(9) 51-60% FRL
(12) 61-70% FRL
(15) 71-80% FRL
(18) 81% or more
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Weight At-Risk
6 (6) Based on 50% or more students receiving FRL
Weight Below Grade Level - Reading
0-15 (3) 11-15% students below
(6) 16-20% (9) 21-25% (12) 26-30%
(15) 31% or more
Weight High School Activities
6 Extra-curricular functions
Weight High school Activities
6 Extra-curricular functions
Weight Athletics
6 Athletics program
Weight Athletics
6 Athletics program
Weight ELL
4 25% of students ELL
Weight ELL
0-12 (3) 1-9% of students ELL
(6) 10-29%
(9) 30-49%
(12) 50% or more
Weight Transportation
3 # of buses = 10 or more
Weight Transportation
0-9 (1) 4-9 buses
(3) 10-15 buses
(6) 16-20 buses
(9) 21+
Weight Magnet 2 Separate Academic Program
Weight Magnet 2 Separate Academic Program
Weight Middle/Elementary School 2 Activities
Weight Middle/Elementary School 2 Extra-curricular functions
Weight Sole Administrator 2 Single administrator
Weight Sole Administrator 2 Single administrator
Weight Rural Site
2 Weight Rural Site
2
Weight Multiple Sites
2 Principal supervises 2+ sites
Weight Multiple Sites
2 Principal supervises 2+ sites
Weight – Total Possible
53
Weight – Total Possible
100
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The proposed plan presents opportunities for a more differentiated salary structure when
compared to the current CCSD plan. As shown in Table 5, the proposed plan includes 16
possible salary ranges compared to only 8 in the current CCSD plan. The proposed plan has
multiple thresholds that take into consideration all of the 100 possible factor points that can be
earned. The staff size calculation for the proposed plan is the same as the current plan.
Table 5: Range Determination of Proposed Plan
Factor Pts. →
Staff Size
0-25 26-50 51-75 76-100
0-50
Range 41 Range 42 Range 43 Range 44
51-100
Range 42 Range 43 Range 44 Range 45
101-150
Range 43 Range 44 Range 45 Range 46
151+
Range 44 Range 45 Range 46 Range 47
Thus far the discussion has focused on school factors. That focus is only half of the
equation. Administrator performance is the second half of the equation. Individual
administrator performance must factor into total compensation. If performance is left out, the
resulting system still misses the objective of attracting and rewarding high performing
administrators.
Part 2: Performance Incentives
As referenced earlier, this is an important time in Nevada to thoughtfully develop new
models of compensation that reward principals for achieving positive student achievement
outcomes and incentivize the actions of hiring, developing, and retaining teachers. This is
especially important at this moment in time given the growing understanding of the principal‟s
role in driving student success, a variety of initiatives that move additional decision making
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rights to the school level (e.g. more budgetary autonomy), and state law that mandates a
performance pay system for principals in the upcoming years.
It is not our intention to suggest a specific model of performance pay in the context of
this section. Instead, we hope to articulate a contextual back drop of the issue and share some of
the benefits of a sophisticated and balanced system. In addition, we hope to highlight the
limitations and risks of a pay for performance system. Finally, we will share three general areas
of measurement that seem most aligned to Nevada‟s unique context that we would suggest be
considered in the principal review process.
The case for a pay for performance system for principals.
When considering the positive impact that an effective principal can have on student
achievement (upwards of 25% of student success in their building), there are surprisingly few
examples of school systems that have implemented a pay for performance system for principals
(New Leaders, 2014). In addition, from a research and practice perspective it is surprising how
limited the general body of work has been in studying the impact of incentivizing placement or
retention of our most effective school leaders in the schools that need them the most.
Part of the challenge may stem from the fact that our current systems typically work
counter to the goal of placing and retaining our highest achieving principals in our highest-need
schools for two distinct reasons. First, principals, like teachers, seek employment in pleasant
workplace settings and the additional demands of the work in our low income schools as well as
the instability of leadership or staff may make low income schools less „pleasant‟ places of
employment (Goldhaber, 2007). Secondly, some of the factors that are easier to measure and
logically expected to lead towards desired results do not. For instance, some studies have found
an inverse relationship between higher degree attainment of school leaders and impact on student
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achievement (Goldhaber 2007). In all, today‟s system of compensation is antiquated and
incongruent to the goal of incentivizing the most effective leaders to move to and stay in our
highest-need schools. When considering the current status quo, it becomes more and more
apparent that it is time to reform compensation practices as one lever to drive change.
Some of the same challenges exist that make fair and accurate teacher compensation
challenging. For instance, it is difficult to measure the precise impact of a principal given our
bureaucratic structures and antiquated policies and data systems that do not isolate school based
factors of spending, performance, or contextual challenges adequately. All of this said, there is
potential to significantly mitigate the barriers that impede teacher evaluation models in
measuring school performance. First, the current systems of school monitoring are considerably
more aligned to accurate measurement for the state of performance for an entire school compared
to individual classrooms. In Nevada, the Nevada School Performance Framework (NSPF)
considers absolute achievement levels, student learning growth, and other factors (Nevada
Department of Education, 2014). In addition, measuring a school‟s achievement involves the
composite of multiple samples of student test scores and the multiple snapshots of data. This
limits the concern over a test irregularity. Finally, the smaller number of school leaders
(compared to teachers, for instance) makes the work of rolling out a new system and investing
and training people to use it much more reasonable.
Limitations and challenges of a pay for performance system for principals.
While less contentious, the multi-dimensional nature of the work of a principal still gives
us concern over the limitations of an evaluation system – both from a multiple data point
perspective, but also from a locus of control perspective. First, relating to the idea of multiple
data points, no matter how many data points can be included in the school‟s performance review
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there will likely continue to be the concern that the state of student learning and teacher practice
cannot be boiled down to a single test or evaluation (or even multiple standardized assessments
or multiple administrations of an evaluation). In addition, the design of our school system will
lead to concern over „locus of influence.‟ There is and will continue to be questions as to how
much influence the school leader has over the results of that campus. For instance, if the
principal is dependent on the Human Resources function of the school district for staffing and
there is a staffing shortage across the entire district, the principal will likely question their locus
of influence over that function and the subsequent achievement results. In addition, the
contextual setting of the school (e.g. the level of poverty, or if students are learning English as a
second language) will further create challenges in ensuring the review is normative and considers
all factors that influence student achievement. Arguably, our current school district‟s structure,
data limitations, and external factors make it a non-experimental environment.
Systems to learn from that have considered or implemented pay for performance.
In addition to the three case study districts referred to earlier in this paper – Houston,
Miami-Dade, and Providence – we would like to reference the other district and charter school
operators that have informed our work. These entities are displayed in Table 6.
Table 6: Additional Educational Entities that have Considered or Use Pay for Performance
Name Description of approach Resource Link
Charlotte-
Mecklenburg
Schools,
North
Carolina
Strategic placement of strongest
principal talent in highest need
schools with increased
compensation and bonuses
http://annenberginstitute.org/profiles-
transformation-charlotte-mecklenburg-
north-carolina-public-schools-strategic-
staffing-initi
Washington
DC Public
Schools
Uses student achievement goals
and leadership framework
standards to annually review
performance and pays bonus
based on results
http://dcps.dc.gov/DCPS/Files/downloads/A
BOUT%20DCPS/Human%20Resources/20
12-
13%20DCPS%20School%20Leader%20IM
PACT%20Guidebook%20(Principal).pdf
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KIPP Houston Has moved to a stipend model-
mostly paying for principals
who have a “successful” year-
the goals vary based on the
principals, multiple versions
http://kipphouston.org/
Uncommon
Schools
Give strong school leaders the
opportunity to take on more
leadership (write books, run the
RELAY graduate program)
http://www.uncommonschools.org/
http://www.relay.edu/
KIPP
San Jose
Give a big bump in year three to
principals
http://www.kippbayarea.org/schools/sjcolle
giate
General Recommendations for successful implementation of a review process for principals
that could be tied to pay for performance.
We recommend considering multiple snapshots of data that represent the broad
aspirations that we have for student outcomes and ensuring the data are reliable and
normative over a long period of time.
We recommend mirroring the principal evaluation system for the supervisor who
oversees the schools. For instance, we suggest making the area manager‟s review based
on the composite of the results of all of the schools they oversee. (In our model, this
would mean the aggregate evaluation scores of all teachers at the schools they oversee.)
Consider the approach of compensating for additional responsibilities as a means of
compensating for the ability to contribute rather than awarding a one-time bonus on
narrowly defined results (e.g. additional budgetary discretion for school leader who has
shown consistent results; or for principals who can inform district-level strategy or coach
incoming school leaders).
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It is imperative that there is adequate training around any new system – especially one
tied to compensation. We recommend rolling out the system and training around it before
using it and also suggest field testing in advance of wide-scale roll out.
Model system for a principal performance review tied to compensation decisions.
Our model system for a principal performance review to tie to compensation decisions
would be based upon the following factors:
Student level data
The NSPF (Nevada Department of Education, 2014) is a good starting point. The NSPF
has measurements that capture the student achievement and student growth as well as
some additional factors like attendance. We would recommend that the NSPF is used as a
set of guide posts for principal review and that the district, and potentially zone, further
contextualizes the NSPF to be more specific for the context of the school type and school
community.
Teacher-level data
We recommend using the teacher ratings from the Nevada Educator Performance
Framework (NEPF) to review the impact of the principal (Nevada Educator Performance
Framework, 2014). The growth of teacher ratings from minimally effective to effective,
or effective to highly effective, etc. would be a proxy for the level of teacher
development occurring at the school site and would incentivize a focus on teacher
development. Similar to student achievement data, it is critical to have a combination of
absolute ratings data as well as growth data. In this case we suggest growth data is given
a larger weight so that the system incentivizes developing the talent at a school site. It
will be imperative that these ratings are normative. One example to draw from is
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Washington, D.C. in terms of ensuring a normative system. Part of the review process for
principals in Washington, D.C. is how closely aligned their educator ratings are to the
central office staff who also administer teacher ratings across the district. This would
ensure that the system controls for inflated ratings. It may be worth giving the degree of
alignment between the principal and central office the largest weight in the evaluation
system to ensure normative ratings.
Human resources data
Third, we would recommend using some Human Resources (HR) proxies in the principal
review. We would have to work closely with HR to develop the right metrics but the
spirit of this recommendation is to incentivize principles to retain their effective staff
members and to ensure their buildings are staffed by the first day of school. This is
especially important considering Nevada's unique context and limited teacher pipeline.
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Figure 3 captures the spirit of our recommended review framework.
Table 7 displays our draft of a pay for performance compensation system, and an example of an
end-of-year bonus model.
Table 7: Draft of Pay for Performace Compensation System and Example of End-Of-Year
Bonus Model
Factors Example of target Bonus
School level data Improvement in SPF
composite score
1 year = +1
3 years consecutive = +2
Teacher level data Evaluation Scores within
__% normative scores
from central office review
Positive trend in % of
effective staff members
Evaluation scores within 5%
margin of error = +2
Score within 10% margin of
effort = +1
Higher percent of effective staff
year over year = +1
HR data Fully staffed by first day
of school
Fully staffed on First day of
school = +1
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End of year stipend
bonus system
+0 = no bonus
+1 or +2 = 5% bonus
+3 = 10% bonus
+4 or +5 or +6 = 15% bonus
As displayed in Table 8, we recommended a system that uses the evaluation score as a
gateway to giving the principal greater responsibility and compensating for that additional
responsibility.
Table 8: Provisions for Using Principal Evaluation Scores to Determine Principal
Responsibilities and Compensation
Alternative system:
Principal will qualify
for additional
responsibilities and
will receive additional
compensation for
those additional
responsibilities
+0 = no additional responsibility options
+1 or +2 = option to serve on principal onboarding group to
help train new principals for 5% pay increase
+3 = option to serve on principal onboarding group for 5% pay
increase and option to take on greater budgetary
responsibilities for school for 10% pay increase
+4 or +5 or +6 = option to take on greater budgetary
responsibilities for school and option to serve on
superintendent‟s advisory committee or take on full
mentor role to new principals for 15% responsibility pay
increase
Challenges
Shifting to a base pay + performance incentive = total compensation model of administrator
compensation will be met will considerable resistance. As proposed here the base pay plan does
not result in any school based administrator being paid less. The most significant change is the
shifting of district priorities whereby school based principals could earn more than their non-
school based supervisors. This raises policy considerations as to whether building- level
administrators should earn more than non-school-based administrators and suggests that
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adjusting principal compensation should trigger consideration of adjusting area manager
compensation as well.
If the district preferred to implement changes in a cost-neutral way, the proposed point
system could be modified to redistribute points rather than add additional points. Such
modifications, however, would result in some school-based administrators earning less than they
currently earn, which would likely receive resistance. It addition, it may not be possible to take
this action in the short-term given the hold harmless language currently contained in the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA; Clark County School District and Clark County Association
of School Administrators and Professional-Technical Employees Negotiated Agreement 2013-2015). At
present, a principal‟s higher salary is protected for several years even if the points awarded to the
school correlate to a lesser salary. However, this further illustrates the need for reform because
administrators are being paid more even when data suggests the job is not as difficult when
compared to other school based administrators.
Data collection is another barrier to implementation of both the base pay and
performance incentives components. The new base pay model will require additional
achievement data be captured and used for compensation purposes. Specifically reading data is
needed and that data has to be uniformly collected. Points of collection will also be an issue
given the varying standardized tests that are administered at various grade levels. The process of
determining points and weights will be an uncomfortable exercise because of varying
viewpoints. Specifically, reform will require prioritizing which administrator functions are most
important and deserving of more weight. Some of the areas of consideration may have a limited
research basis. CCSD will also have to grapple with categorizing student factors and evaluating
which factors make a principal‟s job more difficult.
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Careful consideration must be paid so that principals are not rewarded for poor
performance. Safe guards must be put in place so that principals at poorly performing schools
are not paid more because students continue to struggle. In addition, the financial incentive
associated with performance pay can create a climate in which professional integrity becomes
questionable. As such, any new system of compensation must balance these considerations.
Neither the point redistribution here nor the performance incentives are cost-neutral.
Administrator compensation cannot be addressed in a vacuum that ignores teacher compensation.
Any administrator incentive program should be coupled with a process whereby performance
incentives for teachers are also provided. In addition, it will likely take compensation reform for
the administrators who supervise principals as well.
Even when considering all of the challenges, there is a major opportunity here. By taking
cues from other districts CCSD has the opportunity to create an administrator compensation
framework that aligns with district priorities and incentivizes high performing administrators to
be placed at at-risk schools.
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Recommended