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Encrypted PostgreSQL

PGCon 2009Ottawa, Canada

Magnus HaganderRedpill Linpro AB

Decide what your threat is● Everything comes at a cost

– Performance or maintainability

● Encryption for the sake of encryption?

● Compliance/regulations?

Encryption at different layers

Application

Database

Storage Full harddrive/filesystem encryption

Pgcrypto encryption functions

Application data encryption

Encryption at different layers

Application

Database

Storage Full harddrive/filesystem encryption

Pgcrypto encryption functions

Application data encryption

SSL or VPN

Application data encryption● Independent of the database● Implemented in the application

layer– No, we won't talk about the myriad of

options here

Harddrive/filesystem encryption● Independent of the database● Filesystem och block device level● Needs to keep fsync behaviour!● Keeps all database functionality● Where to store the key?

Pgcrypto● Encryption as database functions● Client independent● Don't forget to encrypt the

connection!

Pgcrypto - challenges● Encryption is easy

– Relatively speaking– As long as you don't invent your own!

● Key management is not

Pgcrypto – overview● Raw encryption● PGP compatible encryption● Hashing

pgcrypto: raw encryptionSELECT encrypt(data, key, type)

SELECT decrypt(data, key, type)

SELECT encrypt_iv(data, key, iv, type)

● Type: bf-cbc, aes-cbc, ... (ecb supported, but..)

● Operates on bytea, returns bytea

● gen_random_bytes() can be used to create key

pgcrypto: PGP encryptionpgp_sym_encrypt(data, password[, opt])

pgp_sym_decrypt(data, password[, opt])

● Operates on text in plaintext, bytea in ciphertext

– armor(), dearmor()● Takes gpg style options like ciper-algo=aes256

pgcrypto: PGP encryptionpgp_sym_encrypt(data, password[, opt])

pgp_sym_decrypt(data, password[, opt])

● Public key encryption also supported, but no key generation

● Will detect wrong key/corrupt data

pgcrypto: Hashing● SELECT digest(txt, type)

– Returns bytea, use encode() to get hex– Md5, sha1, sha<more>

● SELECT encode( digest('lolcats!', 'sha256'), 'base64')

pgcrypto: Hashing● SELECT crypt('secret', gen_salt('bf'))

– Stores salt as part of hash– Autodetects algorithm– md5, bf, etc

● SELECT hash=crypt('secret', hash)

Key management● Where to store the key● How to protect the key● How to access the key● How to do key recovery

Searching encrypted data● Sorry, can't really be done by index● Match encrypted data for raw

encrypted without padding– But this decreases security– And does «is equal» matching only

● Index on expression– But why did you encrypt in the first place?

SSL secured connections● Encryption● Man-in-the-middle protection● Authentication

SSL secured connections● Enabled on the server (ssl=yes)● Optionally required through

pg_hba● Optionally required in libpq

SSL secured connections● Need to protect data in both

directions● For example username/password● Must know before connection is

started– Unknown equals unprotected

SSL encryption● SSL always requires a server

certificate● Can be self-signed● Does not need to be known by

client

Certificate chains

Issuer

Issuer Root certificate

Intermediate certificate

Server certificate

Certificate chains

Issuer

Issuer Root certificate

Intermediate certificate

Server certificate

Self-signedcertificate

SSL secured connections

Client Server

Threats handled by SSL: Eavesdropping

Client Server

SELECT * FROM secret_stuff

Eavesdropping● Prevented by encrypting all data● Key negotiation is automatic● Server certificate used but not

verified

Threats handled by SSL:Man in the middle

Client Server

Fake server

Valid SSL session Valid SSL session

SSL server verification● On top of encryption● Validate that the server is who it

claims to be● CA issues certificate, can be self-

signed● CA certificate known by client

Threats handled by SSL:Man in the middle

Client Server

Fake server

Valid SSL session

SSL client authentication● On top of encryption● Normally on top of server

verificateion, but not necessary● CA issued certificate on client● Match CN on certificate to user id● Protect client certificate!

SSL in libpq● Controlled by sslmode parameter● Or environment PGSSLMODE● For security, must be set on client

– Remember, unknown = unsecure

Summary of libpq SSL modes

Protect against Compatible with server set to... Performance

Client Mode

Eavesdrop MITM SSL required SSL disabled overhead

disable no no FAIL works no

allow no no works works If necessary

prefer no no works works If possible

require yes no works FAIL yes

verify-ca yes yes works FAIL yes

verify-full yes yes works FAIL yes

Client Mode

Summary● Only encrypt what you really need● Only encrypted where you really

need● Key management is hard● Many use-cases are very narrow

Encrypted PostgreSQL

Questions?

magnus@hagander.nethttp://blog.hagander.net

Encrypted PostgreSQL - PGCon · Consulting Development IT Operations Training Support Products...

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