ISA 562 Information Systems Theory and Practice

1

ISA 562Information Systems Theory and Practice

ISA 562Information Systems Theory and Practice

10. Digital Certificates10. Digital Certificates

2

PUBLIC-KEY CERTIFICATES-1

• What is a certificate?: – A statement claiming some binding of attribute values

• Why do we need them?– Identifying entities outside of domain– Distributed access control

• What do they do?– Propagates claims:

• Certifier makes a claim that can be checked for authenticity and accepted if the recipient believe the claimant to be truthful

– Manages trust – distributed trust management

3

X.509v1 CERTIFICATE

VERSION

SERIAL NUMBER

SIGNATURE ALGORIT

ISSUER

VALIDITY

SUBJECT

SUBJECT PUB KEY INFO

SIGNATURE

1

1234567891011121314

RSA+MD5, 512

C=US, S=VA, O=GMU, OU=ISE

9/9/99-1/1/1C=US, S=VA, O=GMU, OU=ISE, CN=Alice

RSA, 1024, xxxxxx

SIGNATURE

4

PUBLIC-KEY CERTIFICATES

• For public-key based encryption

– sender needs public key of receiver

• For public-key digital signatures

– receiver needs public key of sender

• To establish an agreement

– both need each other’s public keys

5

CERTIFICATE TRUST

• Acquisition of public key of the issuer to verify the signature– Go to through a certificate chain

• Whether or not to trust certificates signed by the issuer for this subject

6

PEM CERTIFICATION GRAPHInternet Policy Registration Authority

Policy Certification Authorities (PCAs)

HIGHASSURANCE

MID-LEVELASSURANCE

RESIDENTIAL PERSONA

CertificationAuthorities

(CAs)

Abrams

Grover

SubjectsGrover

LEO

IPRA

MITRE GMU

CS

Virginia

Fairfax

Anonymous

7

PUBLIC-KEY CERTIFICATES• What is a certificate?:

– A statement claiming some binding of attribute values

• Why do we need them?– Identifying entities outside of domain

– Distributed access control

• What do they do?– Propagate claims:

• Certifier makes a claim that can be checked for authenticity and accepted if the recipient believe the claimant to be truthful

– Manages trust – distributed trust management

8

SECURE ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS (SET) CA HIERARCHY

Root

Brand BrandBrand

Geo-Political

Bank Acquirer

Customer Merchant

9

Certificate Revocation

• Sometimes, the issuer need to recant certificate– The subject’s attributes have changed– The subject misused the certificate– There are forged certificates

• Published in a certificate revocation list

10

CRL FORMAT

SIGNATURE ALGORITHM

ISSUER

LAST UPDATE

NEXT UPDATE

REVOKED CERTIFICATES

SIGNATURE

SERIAL NUMBER

REVOCATION DATE

11

X.509 CERTIFICATES

• X.509v1– basic

• X.509v2– adds unique identifiers to prevent against reuse of

X.500 names

• X.509v3– adds many extensions– can be further extended

12

X.509v3 CERTIFICATE INNOVATIONS

• distinguish various certificates– signature, encryption, key-agreement

• identification info in addition to X.500 name– internet names: email addresses, host names, URLs

• issuer can state policy and usage– good enough for casual email but not for signing checks

• limits on use of signature keys for further certification• extensible

– proprietary extensions can be defined and registered

• attribute certificates– ongoing work

13

X.509v2 CRL INNOVATIONS

• CRL distribution points• indirect CRLs• delta CRLs• revocation reason• push CRLs

14

HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE

Z

X

Q

A

Y

R S T

C E G I K M O

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p

15

HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE WITH ADDED LINKS

Z

X

Q

A

Y

R S T

C E G I K M O

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p

16

TOP-DOWN HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE

Z

X

Q

A

Y

R S T

C E G I K M O

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p

17

FORREST OF HIERARCHIES

18

MULTIPLE ROOT CA’s + INTERMEDIATE CA’s MODEL

X

Q

A

R

S T

C E G I K M O

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p

19

THE CERTIFICATE TRIANGLE

user

attribute public-key

X.509identity

certificate

X.509attribute

certificate

SPKIcertificate

20

2-WAY SSL HANDSHAKE WITH RSA

Client Server ClientHello --------> ServerHello Certificate CertificateRequest <-------- ServerHelloDone Certificate ClientKeyExchange CertificateVerify [ChangeCipherSpec] Finished --------> [ChangeCipherSpec] <-------- Finished Application Data <-------> Application Data

RecordProtocol

HandshakeProtocol

21

SINGLE ROOT CA MODEL

RootCA

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p

RootCA

User

22

SINGLE ROOT CAMULTIPLE RA’s MODEL

RootCA

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p

RootCA

User RA

User RA

User RA

23

MULTIPLE ROOT CA’s MODEL

RootCA

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p

RootCAUser

RootCA

RootCA

RootCAUser

RootCAUser

24

ROOT CA + INTERMEDIATE CA’s MODEL

Z

X

Q

A

Y

R S T

C E G I K M O

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p

25

MULTIPLE ROOT CA’s PLUS INTERMEDIATE CA’s MODEL

X

Q

A

R

S T

C E G I K M O

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p

26

MULTIPLE ROOT CA’s PLUS INTERMEDIATE CA’s MODEL

X

Q

A

R

S T

C E G I K M O

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p

27

MULTIPLE ROOT CA’s PLUS INTERMEDIATE CA’s MODEL

X

Q

A

R

S T

C E G I K M O

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p

28

MULTIPLE ROOT CA’s + INTERMEDIATE CA’s MODEL

• Essentially the model on the web today

• Deployed in server-side SSL mode

• Client-side SSL mode yet to happen

29

SERVER-SIDE MASQUERADING

BobWeb browser

www.host.comWeb serverServer-side SSL

UltratrustSecurityServices

www.host.com

30

SERVER-SIDE MASQUERADING

BobWeb browser

www.host.comWeb server

Server-side SSL UltratrustSecurityServices

www.host.comMallory’sWeb server

BIMMCorporation

www.host.com

Server-side SSL

31

SERVER-SIDE MASQUERADING

BobWeb browser

www.host.comWeb server

Server-side SSL UltratrustSecurityServices

www.host.comMallory’sWeb server

Server-side SSL

BIMMCorporation

UltratrustSecurityServices

www.host.com

32

MAN IN THE MIDDLEMASQUERADING PREVENTED

BobWeb browser

www.host.comWeb server

Client-side SSL

UltratrustSecurityServices

www.host.com

Mallory’sWeb server

BIMMCorporation

Client-side SSL

UltratrustSecurityServices

www.host.com

Client Side SSLend-to-endUltratrust

SecurityServices

Bob

BIMMCorporation

UltratrustSecurityServices

Bob

33

ATTRIBUTE-BASED CLIENT SIDE MASQUERADING

Joe@anywhereWeb browser

BIMM.comWeb serverClient-side SSL

UltratrustSecurityServices

BIMM.com

UltratrustSecurityServices

Joe@anywhere

34

ATTRIBUTE-BASED CLIENT SIDE MASQUERADING

Alice@SRPCWeb browser

BIMM.comWeb serverClient-side SSL

UltratrustSecurityServices

BIMM.com

SRPC

Alice@SRPC

35

ATTRIBUTE-BASED CLIENT SIDE MASQUERADING

Bob@PPCWeb browser

BIMM.comWeb serverClient-side SSL

UltratrustSecurityServices

BIMM.com

PPC

Bob@PPC

36

ATTRIBUTE-BASED CLIENT SIDE MASQUERADING

Alice@SRPCWeb browser

BIMM.comWeb serverClient-side SSL

UltratrustSecurityServices

BIMM.com

SRPC

PPC

Bob@PPC