Japan’s Response to the Shifting Global Order PHASE 1: Domestic Reforms 1869 feudal domains...

1

Japan’s Response to the Shifting Global

Order

Professor Sally PaineStrategy & Policy

DepartmentU.S. Naval War College

This presentation represents the thoughtsand opinions of the author, not necessarilythose of the U.S. government, the U.S.Department of Defense, the U.S. NavyDepartment, or the U.S. Naval War College. Emperor Meiji

(1852-1912)

2Tōjō Hideki on the stand

International Military Tribunal of the Far East, ca. 1948

Japan’s Response to the Shifting Global Order

TH E IN D U S T R IA L RE V O LU T IO N

I. Modernization vs. Westernization

II. Incorrect and Missed Lessons

WO R LD WA R I A N D T H E GR E A T

DE P R E S S IO N

III. Implosion of the Regional and Global Order

IV. Incomplete Institution Building

3

Steam Power

Iron Industry

Textiles

Insurance/Banking

Railways/Telegraph

Steamships

Mass Markets/Trade

Armaments

Rapid rise in per capita income Manchester, England 1843

I. MODERNIZATION VS. WESTERNIZATIONThe Industrial Revolution

Steam power and textiles Industrial Revolution Economic growth Changed balance of power

The Industrial RevolutionThe Destruction of Traditional Societies

66

Commodore Matthew G. Perry’s Squadron, Japan, 1854

7

TO THE WAR CRIMES PROSECUTOR:

“ Tokugawa Japan believed inisolation…and had its doors lockedtightly. Then along came Perry…inhis black ships to open those doors;he aimed his big guns at Japan andwarned ‘If you don’t deal with us,look out for these; open your doors,and negotiate with other countriestoo.’…[Japan] for its owndefense…took your own country asits teacher and set about learninghow to be aggressive...Why don’tyou subpoena Perry from the otherworld and try him as a warcriminal?”

Lt Gen Ishiwara Kanji(1889-1949)

Architect of 1931 Manchuria invasion

8

Studying the Problem

Iwakura Mission, 1872

QuickTime™ and a decompressor

are needed to see this picture.

9

Japanese Grand Strategy

Goal: Transform Japan into a great power

Environment: Preempt Russia in Korea and China. • Failing Qing dynasty (power vacuum)• Accelerating Western imperialism • Russia on the march (Trans-Siberian Railway)

Two-phase grand strategy• stage 1: domestic reforms (make Japan strong)• stage 2: activist foreign policy (net an empire)

Avoid war in stage 1 so as not to derail reforms.

10

PHASE 1: Domestic Reforms1869 feudal domains disbanded 1872 compulsory elementary education 1873 universal military conscription1878 Army General Staff1882 Bank of Japan1882 new criminal code1885 Western Cabinet system under prime minister1886 Imperial Tokyo University1887 modern civil service examination1889 Constitution1890 Diet (Parliament)1890 reorganized court system1890 code of civil procedure

Russo-Japanese

War 1904-5

PHASE 2:Expansion

Sino-Japanese

War 1894-5

12

Second Sino-Japanese War (1931-45)

Japanese soldiers with gas masks in China, 1940

13

Fishing for KoreaFrench Cartoon, ca. 1890

Japan China

Russia

Korea

14

Tonghak Unrest

Battle

Tonghak Advance

Tonghak Plan

Tonghak Retreat

Korean Advance

Qing Advance

Japanese Advance

Tonghak RebellionOutbreak of

First Sino-Japanese War(1894-5)

15Sino-Japanese War (1894-5)

Japan

China

• Pyongyang• Port Arthur

• Seoul

Battle of Yalu

• Weihaiwei

Japanese Gains in the Sino-Japanese WarDemise of the Chinese Regional Order

DOMESTICValidated controversial westernization program•Increased prestige of military, especially the army•

REGIONAL Japan replaced China as dominant regional power•Beginnings of Japanese Empire (Taiwan, Pescadores)•

INTERNATIONAL Japan became a recognized great power (• 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance)Russo• -Japanese arms raceRussian foreign policy shift from Europe to Asia•

17

Trans-Siberian Railway

Manchurian Route1. Save on construction costs2. Contain Japan3. Stake claim to Manchuria

Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901)

19

POPULATIONRussia

126,367,000 (1897)

Japan 45,000,000 (1903)

ARMY IN EURASIA Russia

1,135,000 (Jan. 1904)

Japan150,745 (Jan. 1904)

Russo-Japanese War

(1904-5)

Mukden

Tsushima

Port Arthur ··

Japanese Gains in the Russo-Japanese WarConfirmation of the First Sino-Japanese War

IMMEDIATE WAR OBJECTIVE• Russian troop withdrawal from Manchuria• Japanese sphere of influence in Korea• Validated Westernization program

EXPANSION OF EMPIRE• So. Manchuria sphere of influence (Russian railways)• Southern half of Sakhalin Island (Russian territory)• Japan the dominant regional power in East Asia

21

Russian sphere of influence

Japanese sphere of influence

Spheres of Influence̶̶ 1907 treaty̶̶ 1912 treaty

Northern Islands

Battle of Shahe (Sha-ho) 1904

II. FLAWED MILITARY LESSONS Combined with an Incorrect Self-Assessment

23

Russian troops posing with Japanese dead

ASSAULTS ON PORT ARTHURStorm Date CasualtiesNo. 1904 Japan Russia1st 8/19-24 16,000 3,0002nd 9/19-23 7,500 1,5003rd 10/26-30 6,000+ ? 4th 11/26-12/4 14,500 6,9001/2/05 Fall of Port Arthur

False Operational Lessons: Will Power Trumps Material Superiority

PO S T-W A R JA P A NOverlooks weapons systems•Exaggerates own personnel •Minimizes logistical problems•Discounts enemy will•

24

False Strategic Lessons:

The Army Won the Wars While theDiplomats Lost

the Peace

LiaodongPeninsula

First Sino-Japanese War 1894-5

MISSEDDiplomacy•Alliances•Mediation•War loans•Intelligence•Public diplomacy•International law•

25

Missed Strategic LessonsCooperative Adversaries and Sins of Omission

Neither Adversary Leveraged Its StrengthsStrategic depth•Overwhelming manpower superiority•Resource superiority•

Neither Adversary Targeted Japanese WeaknessesEssential sea lines of communication•Manpower shortage•Logistical difficulties fighting inland•Failed to contest river crossings or transit through passes •Failed to draw the Japanese deep inland to fight •

26

Army-Navy Debate over Self-AssessmentNavy Argument: Japan the Maritime Power

ADM Yamamoto Gombei (1852-1933)

POSITIONSAdmiral 1904Navy Minister 1898-1906Prime Minister, 1913-14, 1923-4

FAILED PLANS•Navy dominant service•Empire not essential for defense•Jettison empire in time of war

ARMY-NAVY SOLUTION•Separate chiefs of staff•Decline of joint operationsOUTCOME: Navy becomes interested in maritime empire

27

The MoatJapan the Sea Power

POSITIONSKey naval theoristVice Admiral 1915President Naval War College

“Among the Powers in theworld, there are only threecountries that can defendthemselves primarily withnavies. They are the UK and theUS and Japan.”

History of Imperial Defense,1908

Vice Admiral Satō Tetsutarō (1866-1942)

28

Marshal Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922)

Army-Navy Debate over Self-AssessmentArmy Counter-Argument: Japan the Continental Power

POSITIONSChief of General Staff

1878-82, 1884-5, 1904-5Field Marshal

1898Prime Minister

1889-91, 1898-1900President of Privy Council

1893-4, 1905-22

BELIEFS•Empire essential for defense•Manchuria = Japan’s “life line”

29

POSITIONSMinister of War 1902-11Governor-General Korea 1910-16Prime Minister 1916-18Marshal 1916

BELIEFS“Eventually all of Asia should beunder the control of our Emperor.”

Japan the Continental PowerAsian Monroe Doctrine

General Terauchi Masatake (1852-1919)

30

POSITIONSWar Minister 1918-21, 1923-4Prime Minister 1927-9Foreign Minister 1927-9Colonization Minister 1927-9

Japan should “free itself fromprevious conditions of being anisland and develop its nationalfuture as a continental power.”

MISSES• Moat provides sanctuary• Survival depends on trade,

not resources per se General Tanaka Giichi (1864-1929)

Japan the Continental PowerJapan First Policy

31

Naval Arms Limitations ConferencesDebate within the Navy

DEATH OF NAVAL ARMS CONTROL

1922 Washington Naval TreatyUK, US, Japan navies 5:5:3 tonnage ratioRight of “supreme command” = military veto

1930 London Naval ConferenceUK, US, Japan navies 10:10:7 tonnage ratio

1935 London Naval ConferenceJapan walked out

1936 Arms limitations expired

32

Grand StrategyThe Nexus between Economic and Military Power

“National defense is not a monopolythat belongs to militarymen.…Simply put, no war can befought without money.”

“Even if we would match the US interms of military power…wherewould we get the money? The US isthe only country from which Japancan borrow money. If the US is theenemy, this is impossible and wewould have to make money for our-selves. Unless we are prepared to doso, we can never fight…Thus, warwith the US is simply impossible.”

Admiral Katō Tomosaburō(1861-1923)

Navy Minister 1915-23Prime Minister 1922-3

33

Grand StrategyThe Constraints

Memo: The New Defense Plan,fall 1941

Japan Could Not:Invade• the United StatesOccupy• the U.S. capitalBlockade• the U.S. coastline

But the U.S.:Could• do all of the above toJapan

Therefore:War• vs. the U.S. = Unwinnable Admiral Inoue Shigeyoshi

(1889-1975)

34

Strategic AssassinationsMisunderstanding Japan’s Geography and Economy

Assassinations of Prime Ministers1931 Hamaguchi Osachi1932 Inukai Tsuyoshi

Replaced by ADM Saitō MakotoEnd of Party governments

1936 ADM Saitō Makoto

Assassinations of Finance Ministers1932 Inoue Junnosuke1936 Takahashi Korekiyo

35

Continental vs. Maritime PowersContinental Powers

• Border on main enemies• Focus on territorial control• Preemption by garrisoning surrounding buffer zones• Therefore large standing army is key• BUT Army has great political influence at home• Economic policies favor army, state planning

Maritime Powers• Moat provides comparative security• No need for large, expensive standing army• Focus on trade, wealth accumulation, economic growth • Navy key for homeland defense and trade protection• Reliance on trade, wealth, and navy grand strategy

36

Positive-Sum vs. Negative-Sum World OrdersMaritime vs. Continental World Orders

Maritime Global Order = Positive Sum (Win-Win)Focus on wealth creation•

1. Freedom of navigation2. Free trade3. International laws and institutions facilitating trade

Together produce economic growth (a win for all)•

Continental Global Order = Negative Sum (Win-Lose Big)Focus on territorial confiscation•

1. Spheres of influence2. Negative-sum territorial disputes3. Security through the destabilization of neighbors

Together impede growth (a win for one, a lose for the rest)•

37

Foreign policy reduced to a single instrument: the militaryFalse belief that operational success = strategic success

Follow on Effects of Mis-self-identificationDeath of Grand Strategy

Marshal Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922)

General Tanaka Giichi (1864-1929)

38

III. Implosion of the Regional and Global Order:

World War I and the Great Depression

39

Collapsing Regional OrderChina the Failed State

China’s Revolutions• 1911-12 Fall of the Qing Dynasty• 1913 Failed revolt of South China• 1916 Failed imposition of new dynasty

Main Warlord Wars of 1920s (North China)• Anhui-Zhili War (1920)• First Zhili-Fengtian War (1922)• Second Zhili-Fengtian War (1924)• Fentian-Zhejiang War (1925)• Fengtian-Feng Yuxiang War (1925-6)

Nominal Reunification of China• Northern Expedition under Nationalists (1926-8)

40

Collapsing Regional OrderChina the Failed State, continued

Coup Attempts within the Nationalist Coalition• 1929 Four North/South China coup attempts• 1930 War of Central Plains• 1931 South China coup attempt• 1933 North China coup attempt• 1936 South China coup attempt

Nationalist Encirclement Campaigns vs. Communists• 1930 1st Encirclement Campaign• 1931 2nd Encirclement Campaign• 1931 3rd Encirclement Campaign• 1932-3 4th Encirclement Campaign• 1933-4 5th Encirclement Campaign

The Treacherous Regional EnvironmentPost-World War I Economic Depression in Japan

Rice Riots 1918

Tokyo Earthquake

1923

500,000 homeless100,000 dead

43

Collapsing European OrderEmpires Overthrown or Weakened

1914 1919

44

Great DepressionThe Rise of Communism and Fascism

Vladimir I. Lenin (1870-1924)

“Comrade Lenin cleansthe world of scum.”

Collapsing World OrderCommunism in Russia

46

1920 Iran, India, Turkey1921 China, Outer Mongolia1922 Japan1925 Korea1930 Vietnam, Siam, Laos, Malaya, Philippines

Soviet Funding of Chinese FactionsNationalist Party Chiang Kai-shekChinese Communist Party Mao ZedongManchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin Inner Mongolian warlord Feng YuxiangXinjiang warlord Sheng Shicai

Communist ExpansionFounding of Communist Parties

47

Collapsing Regional OrderHostile Neighborhood

Anti-Japanese NeighborsNationalism• in ChinaNationalism• in KoreaCommunism• in Russia

Focus of Japanese Overseas InvestmentsKorea•China• (Manchuria)

Western Protectionist Response to the Great DepressionSmoot• -Hawley Tariff 1930Other• Western powers follow suit

48

Japan’s Rejection of the Global OrderThe Manchurian Incident

= Manchurian Incident, 18 Sept. 1931

Close up of the damage

49Japanese troops enter Mukden, 18 September 1931

Manchurian IncidentRegional War

Chinese Boycotts

50

Opening Campaigns of Second Sino-Japanese War (1931-45)• 1931 Invasion of Manchuria• 1932 Assault on Shanghai• 1933 Invasion of Rehe (Jehol), Hebei• 1933 Great Wall Campaign• 1937 Invasion of coastal + central China

51

Japan AloneWithdrawal from League of Nations

Japan’s Defense• Chinese had blown up the railway track (False)• Manchuria was not an integral part of China (False)• Only Japan could stop Bolshevik spread to China (½ true)

ManchukuoJapanese Puppet State Building

Hsinking, Manchukuo

Takahashi Korekiyo (1854-1936)

Finance Minister (1931-6)•off gold standard

•devaluation of yen (↑ exports)

•↑ money supply (↑ consumption)

•↑govt spending (↑ deficit)

•↑ public works investments

•civil control over military spending

•cooperation with West

•anti dismemberment of China

•pro Chinese economic development

The Road Not TakenJapan’s Keynes

54

Dangers of a Political Army

The army does not stop at planning tosend troops abroad for militaryreasons, but interferes in diplomaticand economic decision making aswell, so that our country does nothave a unified policy…. Because thearmy’s general staff interferes withother state organs we should abolishit and unify the army’s administration[under the war ministry]. The navy’sgeneral staff happily does not havethe same invidious effects as thearmy’s, but it is an unnecessaryorgan. We should abolish bothgeneral staffs at the same time.

Takahashi Korekiyo (1854-1936)

Our country is poor in natural re-sources and I doubt that we cancompete in an autarkic economicenvironment. We must think about ourposition in the world and form abudget in keeping with our people’swealth. Financial trust is an intangible.Maintaining that trust is our mosturgent duty. If we focus only ondefense, we will cause bad inflationand that trust will collapse. Thus, ournational defense will not be secure.The military should think about this.

1935Takahashi Korekiyo

(1854-1936)

Dangers of Autarky

On Ethiopian Invasion by Italy:If a country increases its empire and putsmoney into it, how big a profit is it goingto have? Until the profits come in, thehome country has to carry [the colony].

1936

Military % of GNP 1933-5 7%

Military % of Budget1931 27% 1936 46%

Heavenly PunishmentYoung Officer’s Revolt

Takahashi Korekiyo (1854-1936)

Young Officers’ RevoltFebruary 26 Incident (1936)

DeadInspector General of Military EducationLord Keeper of Privy SealFinance Minister

Severely WoundedGrand Chamberlain

Mutineers: 1,027 recruits

Consequences• Army in control• No more truth to power• Inflexible foreign policy• Unlimited objective in China

RussiaDangerous Neighbors

Adolf Hitler Joseph Stalin Hirota Kōki (1889-1945) (1878-1953) (1878-1948)

Enemies on Two FrontsAnti-Comintern Pact, 24 Nov. 1936

59

Ambassador Foreign Minister Kintomo Mushakoji Joachim von Ribbentrop

(1882-1962) (1893-1946)

60

Marco Polo Bridge Incident7 July 1937

Marco Polo Bridge

AREAS OCCUPIED BY JAPAN

UP TO 1937AFTER 1937

61

Russian Script for ChinaChinese, Not Russians to Die Fighting Japan

62

IV. INCOMPLETE INSTITUTION BUILDINGThe Founding Fathers (Genrō)

Diet

Difficult International Environment▪ Uncooperative adversaries ▪ Economic depression▪ Angry neighbors ▪ Brilliant leaders dead▪ Preoccupied fascist friends

63

Emperor

Electorate

Peers

Imperial HouseholdMinistry

Inner Minister

Privy Council

Genrō

Reps. Cabinet Genl StaffsDiet

LocalAssemblies

Army/Navy M.Other Min.Justice M.Home Min.

Prefectures Cops Judiciary Army/Navy

Direct Control----- Implied Controls

Incomplete Institution BuildingThe Constitution

64

Meiji ConstitutionImperial Prerogatives

Emperor Meiji (b. 1852, r. 1867-1912)

65

Incomplete Institution BuildingChange in the Civil-Military Balance

Prince Itō Hirobumi Marshal Yamagata Aritomo (1841-1909) (1838-1922)

Civilian control over military Military rule through EmperorParty prime ministers Non-party cabinetsCooperation with UK + USA Cooperation with AxisConstitutional monarchy National mobilization Rule thru House of Representatives Rule through War Ministry

66

Yamagata’s War Ministry

Military ministers and chiefs of staff had direct access to emperor1900 active-duty army + navy ministers = veto over Cabinet1907 military issuance of Imperial Orders = bypass prime minister

67

Incomplete Institution BuildingThe Confusion of Ends and Means

Japanese advance, Henan, China, 1941

68

Inner CabinetMissing Institutional Mechanisms

Prime Minister reading imperial rescript at Diet opening, 1936

69

Incomplete Institution BuildingEnd of Joint Operations

Joint Operations at Weihaiwei, 1895

70

Incomplete Institution BuildingProcess Stovepipe

General Tōjō Hideki (1884-1948)Prime Minister 1941-44 Foreign Minister 1942Army Minister 1940-44 Education Minister 1943Home Minister 1941-42 Industry Minister 1943

71

Province/City Refugees % Population Anhui 2,688,242 12.23Beijing (Hebei) 400,000 15.45Chahar 225,673 11.08Fujian 1,065,469 9.25Guangdong 4,280,266 13.76Guangxi 2,562,400 20.37Hubei 7,690,000 30.13Hebei 6,774,000 23.99Henan 14,533,200 43.49Hunan 13,073,209 42.73Jiangsu 12,502,633 34.83Jiangxi 1,360,045 9.55Manchuria 4,297,100 12.12Nanjing (Jiangsu) 335,634 32.90Shandong 11,760,644 30.71Shanghai (Jiangsu) 531,431 13.80Shanxi 4,753,842 41.06Suiyuan 695,715 38.20Tianjin (Hebei) 200,000 10.00Wuhan (Hubei) 534,040 43.56Zhejiang 5,185,210 23.90TOTAL 95,448,753 26.17

Refugees andHomeless during

the Second Sino-Japanese War

Shanghai 1937

Lary & MacKinnon, Scars of War, 122

72

Japan’s Response to the Shifting Global

Order

Professor Sally PaineStrategy & Policy

DepartmentU.S. Naval War College

This presentation represents the thoughtsand opinions of the author, not necessarilythose of the U.S. government, the U.S.Department of Defense, the U.S. NavyDepartment, or the U.S. Naval War College. Emperor Meiji

(1852-1912)