Labor Digest

Arts. 82-961. Arizala v. CA, 189 SCRA 5842. PNOC-EDC v. Leogardo, 175 SCRA 263. NWSA v. NWSA Consolidated Unions, 11 SCRA 7664. San Miguel v. Democratic Labor Union, 8 SCRA 6135. Apex Mining v. NLRC, 196 SCRA 2516. Tan v. Lagrama, 387 SCRA 3937. Rada v. NLRC, 205 SCRA 698. PAL v. NLRC, 302 SCRA 5829. Natl Devt. Corp v. CIR, 6 SCRA 76310. Isaac Peral Bowling Alley v. United Employees Welfare Assoc, 102 Phil 21911. Arica v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 77612. National Shipyards Steel Corp. v. CIR, 3 SCRA 89013. Caltex Regular Employees v. Caltex, 247 SCRA 39814. PNB v. PNB Employees Assoc., 115 SCRA 50715. Engineering Equipment Inc., v. Minister of Labor, 138 SCRA 61616. DOLE DO No. 02, Series of 2004.17. Mercury Drug v. Dayao, 117 SCRA 9918. Inerphil Union FFW v. Interphil Lab Inc., 372 SCRA 65819. Remerco Garments v. Minister of Labor, 135 SCRA 16720. Producers Bank v. NLRC, 355 SCRA 48921. Asian Transmission Corp v. CA, G.R. No. 144664, 15 March 2004.22. JRC v. NLRC, 156 SCRA 2723. JPL Marketing v. CA, 463 SCRA 13624. Auto Bus v. Bautista, 458 SCRA 57825. Fernandez v. NLRC, 285 SCRA 14926. Republic Planters Bank v. NLRC, 266 SCRA 14227. Ace Navigation v. CA, 338 SCRA 701. PABLO ARIZALA, SERGIO MARIBAO, LEONARDO JOVEN, and FELINO BULANDUS, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Under the Industrial Peace Act,government-owned or controlled corporations had the duty to bargain collectively and were otherwise subject to the obligations and duties of employers in the private sector.The Act also prohibited supervisors to become, or continue to be, members of labor organizations composed of rank-and-file employees,and prescribed criminal sanctions for breach of the prohibition.

It was under the regime of said Industrial Peace Act that the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS, for short) became bound by a collective bargaining agreement executed between it and the labor organization representing the majority of its employees, the GSIS Employees Association. The agreement contained a "maintenance-of-membership" clause,i.e., that all employees who, at the time of the execution of said agreement, were members of the union or became members thereafter, were obliged to maintain their union membership in good standing for the duration of the agreement as a condition for their continued employment in the GSIS.There appears to be no dispute that at that time, the petitioners occupied supervisory positions in the GSIS. Pablo Arizala and Sergio Maribao were, respectively, the Chief of the Accounting Division, and the Chief of the Billing Section of said Division, in the Central Visayas Regional Office of the GSIS. Leonardo Joven and Felino Bulandus were, respectively, the Assistant Chief of the Accounting Division (sometimes Acting Chief in the absence of the Chief) and the Assistant Chief of the Field Service and Non-Life Insurance Division (and Acting Division Chief in the absence of the Chief), of the same Central Visayas Regional Office of the GSIS. Demands were made on all four of them to resign from the GSIS Employees Association, in view of their supervisory positions. They refused to do so. Consequently, two (2) criminal cases for violation of the Industrial Peace Act were lodged against them in the City Court of Cebu: one involving Arizala and Maribaoand the other, Joven and Bulandus.Both criminal actions resulted in the conviction of the accused in separate decisions..

The appeals were consolidated on motion of the appellants, and eventuated in a judgment promulgated on January 29, 1976 affirming the convictions of all four appellants. The appellants moved for reconsideration. They argued that when the so called "1973 Constitution" took effect on January 17, 1973 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1104, the case of Arizala and Maribao was still pending in the Court of Appeals and that of Joven and Bulandus, pending decision in the City Court of Cebu; that since the provisions of that constitution and of the Labor Code subsequently promulgated (effective on November 1, 1974), repealing the Industrial Peace Act-placed employees of all categories in government-owned or controlled corporations without distinction within the Civil Service, and provided that the terms and conditions of their employment were to be "governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations" and hence, no longer subject of collective bargaining, the appellants ceased to fall within the coverage of the Industrial Peace Act and should thus no longer continue to be prosecuted and exposed to punishment for a violation thereof. They pointed out further that the criminal sanction in the Industrial Peace Act no longer appeared in the Labor Code.

The Appellate Court denied their plea for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review oncertiorari.ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners' criminal liability for a violation of the Industrial Peace Act may be deemed to have been obliterated in virtue of subsequent legislation and the provisions of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

HELD: YES. The petitioners contend that the right of self-organization and collective bargaining had been withdrawn by the Labor Code from government employees including those in government-owned and controlled corporations- chiefly for the reason that the terms and conditions of government employment, all embraced in civil service, may not be modified by collective bargaining because set by law. It is therefore immaterial, they say, whether supervisors are members of rank-and-file unions or not; after all, the possibility of the employer's control of the members of the union thru supervisors thus rendering collective bargaining illusory, which is the main reason for the prohibition, is no longer of any consequence.

This was true, for a time. As already discussed, both under the Labor Code and PD 807, government employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, were indeed precluded from bargaining as regards terms and conditions of employment because these were set by law and hence could not possibly be altered by negotiation.

But EO 111 restored the right to organize and to negotiate and bargain of employees of "government corporations established under the Corporation Code." And EO 180, and apparently RA 6715, too, granted to all government employees the right of collective bargaining or negotiation except as regards those terms of their employment which were fixed by law; and as to said terms fixed by law, they were prohibited to strike to obtain changes thereof.

The decisive consideration is that at present, supervisors who were already members of a rank-and-file labor organization at the time of the effectivity of Implementing Rules of RA 6715, are authorized to "remain therein." It seems plain, in other words, that the maintenance by supervisors of membership in a rank-and-file labor organization even after the enactment of a statute imposing a prohibition on such membership, is not only not a crime, but is explicitly allowed, under present law.

2. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, v. HON. VICENTE T. LEOGARDO, DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR AND VICENTE D. ELLELINA FACTS: Petitioner PNOC-EDC is a subsidiary of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). On 20 January 1978, it filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City (MOLE), a clearance application to dismiss/terminate the services of private respondent, Vicente D. Ellelina, a contractual employee.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The application for clearance was premised on Ellelinas alleged commission of a crime (Alarm or Public Scandal) during a Christmas party on 19 December 1977 at petitioners camp in Uling, Cebu, when, because of the refusal of the raffle committee to give him the prize corresponding to his lost winning ticket, he tried to grab the armalite rifle of the PC Officer outside the building despite the warning shots fired by the latter.

Clearance to dismiss was initially granted by MOLE but was subsequently revoked and petitioner was ordered to reinstate Ellelina to his former position, without loss of seniority rights, and with backwages from 1 February 1978 up to his actual reinstatement.

Petitioner appealed to the Minister of Labor who, acting through public respondent, affirmed, on 14 August 1981, the appealed Order. Hence, this PetitionISSUES: 1.Whether or not the public respondent has no jurisdiction over petitioner because it is a government-owned or controlled corporation

2. whether or not Ellelinas dismissal was justified.

HELD: 1. NO. In NASECO v. NLRC (G.R. No. 69870, November 29, 1988), we had occasion to apply the present Constitution in deciding whether or not the employees of NASECO (a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is in turn a subsidiary wholly-owned by the PNB, a government-owned corporation) are covered by the Civil Service Law or the Labor Code notwithstanding that the case arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution was still in effect. We held that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO "on the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in place at the time of decision;" and that being a corporation without an original charter, the employees of NASECO are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code.

2. No. The application for clearance was premised on Ellelinas alleged commission of a crime (Alarm or Public Scandal) during a Christmas party on 19 December 1977 at petitioners camp in Uling, Cebu, when, because of the refusal of the raffle committee to give him the prize corresponding to his lost winning ticket, he tried to grab the armalite rifle of the PC Officer outside the building despite the warning shots fired by the latter. In so far as Ellelina is concerned, we hold that the reinstatement ordered by public respondent, without loss of seniority rights, is proper. However, consistent with the rulings of the Court, backwages should be limited to three years from 1 February 1978. The dismissal ordered by petitioner was a bit too harsh considering the nature of the act which he had committed and that it was his first offense.

3. NWSA CONSOLIDATED UNIONS v. NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY, JESUS CENTENO, ET AL.,

FACTS: Petitioner National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Republic Act No. 1383, while respondent NWSA Consolidated Unions are various labor organizations composed of laborers and employees of the NAWASA. The other respondents are intervenors Jesus Centeno, Et Al., hereinafter referred to as intervenors.

Acting on a certification of the President of the Philippines, the Court of Industrial Relations conducted a hearing on December 5, 1957 on the controversy then existing between petitioner and respondent unions which the latter embodied in a "Manifesto" dated December 5, 1957, namely: implementation of the 40-Hour Week Law (Republic Act No. 1880); alleged violations of the collective bargaining agreement dated December 28, 1956 concerning "distress pay" ; minimum wage of P5.25; promotional appointments and filling of vacancies of newly created positions; additional compensation for night work; wage increases to some laborers and employees; and strike duration pay. In addition, respondent unions raised the issue of whether the 25% additional compensation for Sunday work should be included in computing the daily wage and whether, in determining the daily wage of a monthly salaried employee, the salary should be divided by 30 days.

Later, however, respondent intervenors amended their petition by including a new demand for overtime pay in favor of Jesus Centeno, Cesar Cabrera, Feliciano Duiguan, Cecilio Remotigue, and other employees receiving P4,200.00 per annum or more.chanrobles

On February 5, 1958, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the claim for overtime pay alleging that respondent Court of Industrial Relations was without jurisdiction to pass upon the same because, as mere intervenors, the latter cannot raise new issues not litigated in the principal case, the same not being the lis mota therein involved. To this motion the intervenors filed an opposition. Thereafter, respondent court issued on order allowing the issue to be litigated. Petitioners motion to reconsider having been denied, it filed its answer to the petition for intervention. Finally, on January 16, 1961, respondent court rendered its decisionIts motion for reconsideration having been denied, NAWASA filed the present petition for review.

ISSUES: 1. Whether NAWASA is performing governmental functions and, therefore, essentially a service agency of the government;

2. Whether NAWASA is a public utility and therefore, exempted from paying additional compensation for work on Sundays and legal holidays;

3. Whether the intervenors are "managerial employees" within the meaning of Republic Act 2377 and, therefore, not entitled to the benefits of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended;

4. Whether respondent Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to adjudicate overtime pay considering that this issue was not among the demands of respondent union in the principal case but was merely dragged into the case by the intervenors;

5. Whether those attached to the General Auditing Office and the Bureau of Public Works come within the purview of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended;

6. In determining whether one has worked in excess of eight hours, whether the undertime for that day should be set-off;

7. In computing the daily wage, whether the additional compensation for Sunday work should be included;

8. What is the correct method to determine the equivalent daily wage of a monthly-salaried employee, especially in a firm which is a public utility?;

9. Considering that the payment of night compensation is not by virtue of any statutory provision but emanates only from an award of respondent Court of Industrial Relations, whether the same can be made retroactive and cover a period prior to the promulgation of the award;

10. Whether the minimum wage fixed and awarded by respondent Court of Industrial Relations in another case (MWD Workers Union v. MWD, CIR Case No. 359-V) applies to those employed long after the promulgation thereof, whether hired as temporary, emergency and casual workers for a definite period and for a specific project;

11. How should the collective bargaining agreement of December 28, 1956 and Resolution No. 29, series of 1957 of the Grievance Committee be interpreted and construed insofar as the stipulations therein contained relative to "distress pay" is concerned?; and

12. Whether, under the first indorsement of the President of the Philippines dated August 12, 1957, which authorizes herein petitioner to stagger the working days of its employees and laborers, those whose services are indispensably continuous throughout the year may be staggered in the same manner as the pump, valve, filter and chlorine operators, guards, watchman, medical services, and those attached to the recreational facilities.HELD: 1. NO. The National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority is a government corporation performing not governmental but proprietary functions, and as such comes within the coverage of Commonwealth Act No. 444. The National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority was not created for purposes of local government. It is not a municipal corporation. It was created "for the purpose of consolidating and centralizing all waterworks, sewerage and drainage systems in the Philippines under one control and direction and general supervision. "The NAWASA, therefore, though a public corporation, is not a municipal corporation, because it is not an agency of the State to regulate or administer the local affairs of the town, city, or district which is incorporated.

Moreover, the NAWASA, by its charter, has personality and power separate and distinct from the government. It is an independent agency of the government although it is placed, for administrative purposes, under the Department of Public Works and Communications. It has continuous succession under its corporate name and may sue and be sued in court. It has corporate powers to be exercised by its board of directors; it has its own assets and liabilities; and it may charge rates for its services.

2. YES. The NAWASA is a public utility because its primary function is to construct, maintain and operate water reservoirs and waterworks for the purpose of supplying water to the inhabitants, as well as to consolidate and centralize all water supplies and drainage systems in the Philippines. The NAWASA is a public utility. Although pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 444, it is not obliged to pay an additional sum of 25% to its laborers for work done on Sundays and legal holidays, yet it must pay said additional compensation by virtue of the contractual obligation it assumed under the collective bargaining agreement. In other words, the employees and laborers of NAWASA can be made to work on Sundays and legal holidays without being required to pay them an additional compensation of 25%. It may, therefore, be said that while under Commonwealth Act No. 444 a public utility is not required to pay additional compensation to its employees and workers for work done on Sundays and legal holidays, there is, however, no prohibition for it to pay such additional compensation if it voluntarily agrees to do so. The NAWASA committed itself to pay this additional compensation. It must pay not because of compulsion of law but because of contractual obligation.

3. NO. As a matter of fact, they are required to observe working hours and record their time work and are not free to come and go to their offices, nor move about at their own discretion. They do not, therefore, come within the category of "managerial employees" within the meaning of the law.Employees who have little freedom of action and whose main function is merely to carry out the companys orders, plans and policies, are not managerial employees and hence are covered by Commonwealth Act No. 444.

4. YES. The Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to adjudicate overtime pay where there was employer- employee relationship existing between the parties at the time the dispute arose. The fact that the question of overtime payment is not included in the principal case in the sense that it is not one of the items of dispute certified to by the President is of no moment, for it comes within the sound discretion of the Court of Industrial Relations. Moreover, in labor disputes technicalities of procedure should as much as possible be avoided not only in the interest of labor but to avoid multiplicity of action. This claim has no merit.

5. The GAO employees assigned to work in the NAWASA even if they were paid out of the latters funds cannot be regarded as employees of the NAWASA on matters relating to compensation. They are employees of the national government and are not covered by the Eight- Hour Labor Law. The same may be said of the Bureau of Public Works assigned to work in the NAWASA.

6. NO. The method used by the NAWASA in offsetting the overtime with the undertime and at the same time charging said undertime to the accrued leave is unfair, for under such method the employee is made to pay twice for his undertime because his leave is reduced to that extent while he was made to pay for it with work beyond the regular working hours. The proper method should be to deduct the undertime from the accrued leave but pay the employee the overtime to which he is entitled. This method also obviates the irregular schedule that would result if the overtime should be set off against the undertime for that would place the schedule for working hours dependent on the employee.

7. YES. The differential pay for Sundays is a part of the legal wage. Hence, it was correctly included in computing the weekly wages of those employees and laborers who worked seven days a week and were regularly receiving the 25% salary differential for a period of three months prior to the implementation of Republic Act 1880. This is so even if petitioner is a public utility in view of the contractual obligation it has assumed on the matter.

8. In the computation of daily wages of employees paid by the month distinction should be made between government employees like the General Auditing Office (GAO) employees and those who are not. The computation for government employees is governed by Section 254 of the Revised Administrative Code while for others the correct computation is the monthly salary divided by the actual number of working hours in the month or the regular monthly compensation divided by the number of working days in the month.

9. YES. It is of common occurrence that a working man who has already rendered night time service takes him a long time before he can muster enough courage to confront his employer with the demand for payment for it for fear of possible reprisal. It happens that many months or years are allowed to pass by before he could be made to present such claim against his employer, and so it is neither fair nor just that he be deprived of what is due him simply because of his silence for fear of losing the means of his livelihood. Hence, it is not erroneous for the Court of Industrial Relations to make the payment of such night compensation retroactive to the date when the work was actually performed.

The power of the Court of Industrial Relations to order the payment of compensation for overtime service prior to the date of the filing of the claim has been recognized by this Court (Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Department Union, Et Al., L-9265, April 29, 1957). The same reasons given therein for the retroactivity of overtime compensation may also be given for the retroactivity of payment of night compensation, as such reasoning runs along the line already abovestated.

10. YES.The rates of minimum pay fixed in a CIR case are applicable not only to those who were already in the service as of the date of the decision but also to those who were employed subsequent to said date. We find no valid reason to disagree with the foregoing finding of the Court of Industrial Relations considering that the award continued to be valid and effective in spite of the notice of termination given by the employer. No good reason is seen why such award should not apply to those who may be employed after its approval by the court there being nothing therein that may prevent its extension to them. Moreover, the industrial court can at any time during the effectiveness of an award alter and modify in whole or in part said award or reopen any question involved therein under Section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, and such is what said court has done when it made the award extensive to the new employees, more so when they are similarly situated. To do otherwise would be to foster discrimination.

11. All the laborers, whether assigned to the sewerage division or not who are actually working inside or outside the sewerage chambers, are entitled to distress pay. As thus interpreted, we find that those who are entitled to the distress pay are those employees and laborers who work in the sewerage chambers whether they belong to the sewerage division or not, and by sewerage chambers should be understood to mean as the surroundings where the work is actually done, not necessarily "inside the sewerage chambers." This is clearly inferred from the conference held in the Department of Labor on November 25, 1957 where it was agreed that the compensation should be paid to those who work "in and outside" the sewerage chambers in accordance with the terms of Resolution No. 9 of the Grievance Committee. It should be noted that, according to said resolution, sewerage chambers include "pits, trenches, and other excavations that are necessary to tap the sewer lines." And the reason given for this extra compensation is the "unusual distress" that is caused to the laborers by working in the sewerage chambers in the form and extent abovementioned.

It is clear then that all the laborers whether of the sewerage division or not assigned to work in and outside the sewerage chambers and suffering unusual distress because of the nature of their work are entitled to the extra compensation. And this conclusion is further bolstered by the findings of the industrial court regarding the main activities of the sewerage division.

12. YES. Staggering of working hours is not required where the evidence shows that the work is not continuous. The industrial court justified the staggering of the work days of those holding positions as pump operators, valve operators, filter operators, chlorine operators, watchmen and guards, and those in the medical service for the reason that the same was made pursuant to the authority granted by the President who in the valid exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Republic Act No. 1880 could prescribe the working days of employees and laborers in government-owned and controlled corporations depending upon the exigencies of the service. The court, however, stated that the staggering should not apply to the personnel in the construction, sewerage, maintenance, machineries and shops because they work below 365 days a year and their services are not continuous to require staggering. From this portion of the decision, the petitioner appeals.

Considering that respondent court found that the workers in question work less than 365 days a year and their service are not continuous to require staggering, we see no reason to disturb this finding. This is contrary to the very essence of the request that the staggering should be made only with regard to those phases of the operation of the NAWASA that have to be attended to continuously for twenty-four hours without interruption which certainly cannot apply to the workers mentioned in the last part of the decision of the respondent court on the matter.

4. SAN MIGUEL BREWERY INC., ETC. v. DEMOCRATIC LABOR ORGANIZATION, ET AL.,

FACTS: On January 27, 1953, the Democratic Labor Association filed a complaint against the San Miguel Brewery, Inc., embodying 12 demands for the betterment of the conditions of employment of its members. The company filed its answer to the complaint specifically denying its material averments and answering the demands point by point. The company asked for the dismissal of the complaint. At the hearing held sometime in September, 1955, the union manifested its desire to confine its claim to its demands for overtime, night-shift differential pay, and attorneys fees, although it was allowed to present evidence on service rendered during Sundays and holidays, or on its claim for additional separation pay and sick and vacation leave compensation. After the case had been submitted for decision, Presiding Judge Jose S. Bautista, who was commissioned to receive the evidence, rendered decision expressing his disposition with regard to the points embodied in the complaint on which evidence was presented. The demands for the application of the Minimum Wage Law to workers paid on "pakiao" basis, payment of accumulated vacation and sick leave and attorneys fees, as well as the award of additional separation pay, were either dismissed, denied, or set aside. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the industrial court en banc, which affirmed the decision of the court a quo with few exceptions, the San Miguel Brewery, Inc. interposed the present petition for review.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT EIGHT-HOUR LABOR LAW APPLIES TO OUTSIDE OR FIELD SALES PERSONNEL.

HELD: NO. Where after the morning roll call the outside or field sales personnel leave the plant of the company to go on their respective sales routes and they do not have a daily time record but the sales routes are so planned that they can be completed within 8 hours at most, and they receive monthly salaries and sales commissions in variable amounts, so that they are made to work beyond the required eight hours similar to piece work, "pakiao", or commission basis regardless of the time employed, and the employees participation depends on their industry, it is held that the Eight-Hour Labor Law has no application to said outside or field sales personnel and that they are not entitled to overtime compensation. The philosophy behind this exemption is that his earnings are in the form of commission based on the gross receipts of the day. His participation depends upon his industry so that the more hours he employs in the work the greater are his gross returns and the higher his commission.

5. APEX MINING COMPANY, INC., v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SINCLITICA CANDIDO

FACTS: Private respondent Sinclitica Candido was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc. on May 18, 1973 to perform laundry services at its staff house located at Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte. In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis. However, on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly basis at P250.00 a month which was ultimately increased to P575.00 a month. On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported the accident to her immediate supervisor Mila de la Rosa and to the personnel officer, Florendo D. Asirit. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with her work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication. De la Rosa offered her the amount of P2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work. Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988. On March 11, 1988, private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and Employment. After the parties submitted their position papers as required by the labor arbiter assigned to the case on August 24, 1988 the latter rendered a decision, Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent, Apex Mining Company, Inc., Masara, Davao del Norte, to pay the complainant. petitioner appealed to the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), wherein in due course a decision was rendered by the Fifth Division thereof on July 20, 1989 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the appealed decision. A motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a resolution of the NLRC dated June 29, 1990.

Hence, the herein petition for review bycertiorari

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT private respondent should be treated as a mere househelper or domestic servant and not as a regular employee of petitioner.

HELD: NO. Private Respondent is a regular employee. Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms "househelper" or "domestic servant" are defined as follows: The term `househelper as used herein is synonymous to the term `domestic servant and shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employers home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employers family. The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is employed in the employers home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employers family. Such definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and other similar househelps. The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywoman working in staffhouses of a company, like petitioner who attends to the needs of the companys guests and other persons availing of said facilities. By the same token, it cannot be considered to extend to the driver, houseboy, or gardener exclusively working in the company, the staffhouses and its premises. They may not be considered as within the meaning of a "househelper" or "domestic servant" as above-defined by law. The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.

The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guests or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended. Because of an accident which took place while private respondent was performing her laundry services, she was not able to work and was ultimately separated from the service. She is, therefore entitled to appropriate relief as a regular employee of petitioner. Inasmuch as private respondent appears not to be interested in returning to her work for valid reasons, the payment of separation pay to her is in order.

6. ROLANDO Y. TAN v. LEOVIGILDO LAGRAMA and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALSFACTS: Petitioner Rolando Tan is the president of Supreme Theater Corporation and the general manager of Crown and Empire Theaters in Butuan City. Private respondent Leovigildo Lagrama is a painter, making ad billboards and murals for the motion pictures shown at the Empress, Supreme, and Crown Theaters for more than 10 years, from September 1, 1988 to October 17, 1998. On October 17, 1998, private respondent Lagrama was summoned by Tan and upbraided: "Nangihi na naman ka sulod sa imong drawinganan." ("You again urinated inside your work area.") When Lagrama asked what Tan was saying, Tan told him, "Ayaw daghang estorya. Dili ko gusto nga mo-drawing ka pa. Guikan karon, wala nay drawing. Gawas." ("Dont say anything further. I dont want you to draw anymore. From now on, no more drawing. Get out.") Lagrama denied the charge against him. He claimed that he was not the only one who entered the drawing area and that, even if the charge was true, it was a minor infraction to warrant his dismissal. However, everytime he spoke, Tan shouted "Gawas" ("Get out"), leaving him with no other choice but to leave the premises. Lagrama filed a complaint with the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. X of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Butuan City. He alleged that he had been illegally dismissed and sought reinvestigation and payment of 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, salary differential, and damages. Petitioner Tan denied that Lagrama was his employee. He asserted that Lagrama was an independent contractor who did his work according to his methods, while he (petitioner) was only interested in the result thereof. He cited the admission of Lagrama during the conferences before the Labor Arbiter that he was paid on a fixed piece-work basis, i.e., that he was paid for every painting turned out as ad billboard or mural for the pictures shown in the three theaters, on the basis of a "no mural/billboard drawn, no pay" policy. He submitted the affidavits of other cinema owners, an amusement park owner, and those supervising the construction of a church to prove that the services of Lagrama were contracted by them. He denied having dismissed Lagrama and alleged that it was the latter who refused to paint for him after he was scolded for his habits. As no amicable settlement had been reached, Labor Arbiter Rogelio P. Legaspi directed the parties to file their position papers. On June 17, 1999, he rendered a decision in favor of Lagrama. Petitioner Rolando Tan appealed to the NLRC Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City, which, on June 30, 2000, rendered a decision 4 finding Lagrama to be an independent contractor, and for this reason reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Respondent Lagrama filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied for lack of merit by the NLRC in a resolution of September 29, 2000. He then filed a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner exercised control over Lagramas work by dictating the time when Lagrama should submit his billboards and murals and setting rules on the use of the work area and rest room. Although it found that Lagrama did work for other cinema owners, the appeals court held it to be a mere sideline insufficient to prove that he was not an employee of Tan. The appeals court also found no evidence of any intention on the part of Lagrama to leave his job or sever his employment relationship with Tan. Accordingly, on May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of Lagrama. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals found no reason to reverse its decision and so denied his motion for lack of merit. 5 Hence, this petition for review oncertiorari.ISSUES: 1. Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and private respondent

2. whether or not petitioner is guilty of illegally dismissing private Respondent.

HELD: 1. YES. In determining whether there is an employer-employee relationship, we have applied a "four-fold test," to wit: (1) whether the alleged employer has the power of selection and engagement of employees; (2) whether he has control of the employee with respect to the means and methods by which work is to be accomplished; (3) whether he has the power to dismiss; and (4) whether the employee was paid wages. These elements of the employer-employee relationship are present in this case.

First. The existence in this case of the first element is undisputed. It was petitioner who engaged the services of Lagrama without the intervention of a third party.

Second. It is the existence of the second element, the power of control, that requires discussion here. In the case at bar, albeit petitioner Tan claims that private respondent Lagrama was an independent contractor and never his employee, the evidence shows that the latter performed his work as painter under the supervision and control of petitioner. Lagrama worked in a designated work area inside the Crown Theater of petitioner, for the use of which petitioner prescribed rules. The rules included the observance of cleanliness and hygiene and a prohibition against urinating in the work area and any place other than the toilet or the rest rooms. Petitioners control over Lagramas work extended not only to the use of the work area, but also to the result of Lagramas work, and the manner and means by which the work was to be accomplished.

Moreover, it would appear that petitioner not only provided the workplace, but supplied as well the materials used for the paintings, because he admitted that he paid Lagrama only for the latters services. Private respondent Lagrama claimed that he worked daily, from 8 oclock in the morning to 5 oclock in the afternoon. Petitioner disputed this allegation and maintained that he paid Lagrama P1,475.00 per week for the murals for the three theaters which the latter usually finished in 3 to 4 days in one week. Even assuming this to be true, the fact that Lagrama worked for at least 3 to 4 days a week proves regularity in his employment by petitioner.

Third. That petitioner had the right to hire and fire was admitted by him in his position paper submitted to the NLRC. By stating that he had the right to fire Lagrama, petitioner in effect acknowledged Lagrama to be his employee. For the right to hire and fire is another important element of the employer-employee relationship. 13 Indeed, the fact that, as petitioner himself said, he waited for Lagrama to report for work but the latter simply stopped reporting for work reinforces the conviction that Lagrama was indeed an employee of petitioner. For only an employee can nurture such an expectancy, the frustration of which, unless satisfactorily explained, can bring about some disciplinary action on the part of the employer.

Fourth. Payment of wages is one of the four factors to be considered in determining the existence of employer-employee relation. Wages are defined as "remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered." 14 That Lagrama worked for Tan on a fixed piece-work basis is of no moment. Payment by result is a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the relation." 15 It is a method of computing compensation, not a basis for determining the existence or absence of employer-employee relationship. One may be paid on the basis of results or time expended on the work, and may or may not acquire an employment status, depending on whether the elements of an employer-employee relationship are present or not.

2. YES. The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code 29 provide that no worker shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after due process. This provision has two aspects: (1) the legality of the act of dismissal, that is, dismissal under the grounds provided for under Article 282 of the Labor Code and (2) the legality in the manner of dismissal. The illegality of the act of dismissal constitutes discharge without just cause, while illegality in the manner of dismissal is dismissal without due process. In this case, by his refusal to give Lagrama work to do and ordering Lagrama to get out of his sight as the latter tried to explain his side, petitioner made it plain that Lagrama was dismissed. Urinating in a work place other than the one designated for the purpose by the employer constitutes violation of reasonable regulations intended to promote a healthy environment under Art. 282(1) of the Labor Code for purposes of terminating employment, but the same must be shown by evidence. Here there is no evidence that Lagrama did urinate in a place other than a rest room in the premises of his work. Instead of ordering his reinstatement as provided in Art. 279 of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter found that the relationship between the employer and the employee has been so strained that the latters reinstatement would no longer serve any purpose. The parties do not dispute this finding. Hence, the grant of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is appropriate. This is of course in addition to the payment of backwages which, in accordance with the ruling in Bustamante v. NLRC should be computed from the time of Lagramas dismissal up to the time of the finality of this decision, without any deduction or qualification.

7. HILARIO RADA v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILNOR CONSULTANTS AND PLANNERS, INC

FACTS: "Petitioners initial employment with this Respondent was under a Contract of Employment for a Definite Period dated July 7, 1977, copy of which is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex A whereby Petitioner was hired as Driver for the construction supervision phase of the Manila North Expressway Extension, Second Stage (hereinafter referred to as MNEE Stage 2) for a term of about 24 months effective July 1, 1977.

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"Highlighting the nature of Petitioners employment, Annex A specifically provides as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

It is hereby understood that the Employer does not have a continuing need for the services of the Employee beyond the termination date of this contract and that the Employees services shall automatically, and without notice, terminate upon the completion of the above specified phase of the project; and that it is further understood that the engagement of his/her services is coterminous with the same and not with the whole project or other phases thereof wherein other employees of similar position as he/she have been hired. (Par. 7,Emphasis supplied). "Petitioners first contract of employment expired on June 30, 1979. Meanwhile, the main project, MNEE Stage 2, was not finished on account of various constraints, not the least of which was inadequate funding, and the same was extended and remained in progress beyond the original period of 2.3 years. Fortunately for the Petitioner, at the time the first contract of employment expired, Respondent was in need of Driver for the extended project. Since Petitioner had the necessary experience and his performance under the first contract of employment was found satisfactory, the position of Driver was offered to Petitioner, which he accepted. Hence a second Contract of Employment for a Definite Period of 10 months, that is, from July 1, 1979 to April 30, 1980 was executed between Petitioner and Respondent on July 7, 1979. . . "In March 1980 some of the areas or phases of the project were completed, but the bulk of the project was yet to be finished. By that time some of those project employees whose contracts of employment expired or were about to expire because of the completion of portions of the project were offered another employment in the remaining portion of the project. Petitioner was among those whose contract was about to expire, and since his service performance was satisfactory, respondent renewed his contract of employment in April 1980, after Petitioner agreed to the offer. Accordingly, a third contract of employment for a definite period was executed by and between the Petitioner and the Respondent whereby the Petitioner was again employed as Driver for 19 months, from May 1, 1980 to November 30, 1981, . . .

"This third contract of employment was subsequently extended for a number of times, the last extension being for a period of 3 months, that is, from October 1, 1985 to December 31, 1985, . . . "The last extension, from October 1, 1985 to December 31, 1985 (Annex E) covered by an Amendment to the Contract of Employment with a Definite Period, was not extended any further because Petitioner had no more work to do in the project. This last extension was confirmed by a notice on November 28, 1985 duly acknowledged by the Petitioner the very next day, . . . "Sometime in the 2nd week of December 1985, Petitioner applied for Personnel Clearance with Respondent dated December 9, 1985 and acknowledged having received the amount of P3,796.20 representing conversion to cash of unused leave credits and financial assistance. Petitioner also released Respondent from all obligations and or claims, etc. in a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim . . ." Culled from the records, it appears that on May 20, 1987, petitioner filed before the NLRC, National Capital Region, Department of Labor and Employment, a Complaint for nonpayment of separation pay and overtime pay. Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint alleging that he was illegally dismissed and that he was not paid overtime pay although he was made to render three hours overtime work from Monday to Saturday for a period of three years. Labor Arbiter Dominador M. Cruz rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Hence this petition.

ISSUES: 1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.

2. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO OVERTIME PAY

HELD: 1. NO. From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner is a project employee considering that he does not belong to a "work pool" from which the company would draw workers for assignment to other projects at its discretion. It is likewise apparent from the facts obtaining herein that petitioner was utilized only for one particular project, the MNEE Stage 2 Project of respondent company. Hence, the termination of herein petitioner is valid by reason of the completion of the project and the expiration of his employment contract.

2. YES. Anent the claim for overtime compensation, we hold that petitioner is entitled to the same. The fact that he picks up employees of Philnor at certain specified points along EDSA in going to the project site and drops them off at the same points on his way back from the field office going home to Marikina, Metro Manila is not merely incidental to petitioners job as a driver. On the contrary, said transportation arrangement had been adopted, not so much for the convenience of the employees, but primarily for the benefit of the employer, herein privateRespondent. Since the assigned task of fetching and delivering employees is indispensable and consequently mandatory, then the time required of and used by petitioner in going from his residence to the field office and back, that is, from 5:30 A.M. to 7:00 A.M. and from 4:00 P.M. to around 6:00 P.M., which the labor arbiter rounded off as averaging three hours each working day, should be paid as overtime work. Quintessentially, petitioner should be given overtime pay for the three excess hours of work performed during working days from January, 1983 to December, 1985.

8. PAL v. NLRC, 302 SCRA 582

FACTS: Private respondent was employed as flight surgeon at petitioner company.He was assigned at the PAL Medical Clinic at Nichols and was on duty from 4:00 in the afternoon until 12:00 midnight. On February 17, 1994, at around 7:00 in the evening, private respondent left the clinic to have his dinner at his residence, which was about five-minute drive away.A few minutes later, the clinic received an emergency call from the PAL Cargo Services.One of its employees, Mr. Manuel Acosta, had suffered a heart attack.The nurse on duty, Mr. Merlino Eusebio, called private respondent at home to inform him of the emergency.The patient arrived at the clinic at 7:50 in the evening and Mr. Eusebio immediately rushed him to the hospital.When private respondent reached the clinic at around 7:51 in the evening, Mr. Eusebio had already left with the patient.Mr. Acosta died the following day. Upon learning about the incident, PAL Medical Director Dr. Godofredo B. Banzon ordered the Chief Flight Surgeon to conduct an investigation.The Chief Flight Surgeon, in turn, required private respondent to explain why no disciplinary sanction should be taken against him. In his explanation, private respondent asserted that he was entitled to a thirty-minute meal break; that he immediately left his residence upon being informed by Mr. Eusebio about the emergency and he arrived at the clinic a few minutes later;that Mr. Eusebio panicked and brought the patient to the hospital without waiting for him. Finding private respondents explanation unacceptable, the management charged private respondent with abandonment of post while on duty.He was given ten days to submit a written answer to the administrative charge. In his answer, private respondent reiterated the assertions in his previous explanation.He further denied that he abandoned his post on February 17, 1994.He said that he only left the clinic to have his dinner at home.In fact, he returned to the clinic at 7:51 in the evening upon being informed of the emergency. After evaluating the charge as well as the answer of private respondent, petitioner company decided to suspend private respondent for three months effective December 16, 1994.

Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension against petitioner. Labor Arbiter Romulus A. Protasio rendered a decisiondeclaring the suspension of private respondent illegal. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC.The NLRC, however, dismissed the appeal after finding that the decision of the Labor Arbiter is supported by the facts on record and the law on the matter. The NLRC likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner argues that being a full-time employee, private respondent is obliged to stay in the company premises for not less than eight (8) hours. Hence, he may not leave the company premises during such time, even to take his meals.ISSUES: 1. WON the suspension of Dr. Fabros for 3 months is valid.

2. WON private respondent is not allowed to leave the company premises during meal time.

HELD: 1. No. There was an illegal suspension on the part of PAL. The facts do notsupport petitioners allegation that private respondent abandoned his post on the evening ofFebruary 17, 1994.Private respondent left the clinic that night only to have his dinner at his house, which was only a few minutes drive away from the clinic.His whereabouts were known to the nurse on duty so that he could be easily reached in case of emergency. Upon being informed of Mr. Acostas condition, private respondent immediately left his home and returned to the clinic.These facts belie petitioners claim of abandonment. 2. NO. Articles 83 and 85 of the Labor Code read:

Art. 83.Normal hours of work.The normal hours of work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a day.

Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a population of at least one million (1,000,000) or in hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least one hundred (100) shall hold regular office hours for eight (8) hours a day, for five (5) days a week,exclusive of time for meals, except where the exigencies of the service require that such personnel work for six (6) days or forty-eight (48) hours, in which case they shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty per cent (30%) of their regular wage for work on the sixth day.For purposes of this Article, health personnel shall include: resident physicians, nurses, nutritionists, dieticians, pharmacists, social workers, laboratory technicians, paramedical technicians, psychologists, midwives, attendants and all other hospital or clinic personnel.(emphasis supplied)

Art. 85.Meal periods.Subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe, it shall be the duty of every employer to give his employees not less than sixty (60) minutes time-off for their regular meals.

Section 7, Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code further states:

Sec. 7.Meal and Rest Periods.Every employer shall give his employees, regardless of sex, not less than one (1) hour time-off for regular meals, except in the following cases when a meal period of not less than twenty (20) minutes may be given by the employer provided that such shorter meal period is credited as compensable hours worked of the employee;

(a)Where the work is non-manual work in nature or does not involve strenuous physical exertion;

(b)Where the establishment regularly operates not less than sixteen hours a day;

(c)In cases of actual or impending emergencies or there is urgent work to be performed on machineries, equipment or installations to avoid serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer;and

(d)Where the work is necessary to prevent serious loss of perishable goods.

Rest periods or coffee breaks running from five (5) to twenty (20) minutes shall be considered as compensable working time.

Thus, the eight-hour work period does not include the meal break.Nowhere in the law may it be inferred that employees must take their meals within the company premises.Employees are not prohibited from going out of the premises as long as they return to their posts on time.Private respondents act, therefore, of going home to take his dinner does not constitute abandonment.

9. Natl Devt. Corp v. CIR, 6 SCRA 763 G.R. No. L-15422. November 30, 1962.

4. ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF WHAT IS COMPENSABLE WORK ONE OF FACT. The question of what constitutes compensable work is one of fact the determination of which depends upon the particular circumstances, to be determined by the courts in controverted cases. (31 Am. Jur., Sec. 626, pp. 877-878.)FACTS: At the National Development Co., a government-owned and controlled corporation, there were four shifts of work. One shift was from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., while the three other shifts were from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.; then from 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. and, finally, from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. In each shift, there was a one-hour mealtime period, to wit: from (1) 11 a.m. to 12 noon for those working between 6 a.m. and 2 p.m. and from (2) 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. for those working between 2 p.m. and 10 p.m.

The records disclose that although there was a one-hour mealtime, petitioner nevertheless credited the workers with eight hours of work for each shift and paid them for the same number of hours. However, since 1953, whenever workers in one shift were required to continue working until the next shift,Petitioner, instead of crediting them with eight hours of overtime work, has been paying them for six hours only, petitioner claiming that the two hours corresponding to the mealtime periods should not be included in computing compensation. On the other hand, respondent National Textile Workers Union whose members are employed at the NDC, maintained the opposite view and asked the Court of Industrial Relations to order the payment of additional overtime pay corresponding to the mealtime periods.After hearing, Judge Arsenio I. Martinez of the CIR issued an order holding that mealtime should be counted in the determination of overtime work and accordingly ordered petitioner to pay P101,407.96 by way of overtime compensation. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was dismissed by the CIR en banc on the ground that petitioner failed to furnish the union a copy of its motion.Petitioner appealed to this Court.

ISSUE: WON the mealtime breaks should be considered working timeHELD: NO. The idle time that an employee may spend for resting and during which he may leave the spot or place of work though not the premises of his employer, is not counted as working time only where the work is broken or is not continuous. Indeed, it has been said that no general rule can be laid down as to what constitutes compensable work, but rather the question is one of fact depending upon the particular circumstances, to be determined by the courts in controverted cases. (31 Am. Jur. Sec. 626 pp. 877-878.)In this case, the CIRs finding that work in the petitioner company was continuous and did not permit employees and laborers to rest completely is not without basis in evidence and following our earlier rulings, We shall not disturbed the same.

10. Isaac Peral Bowling Alley v. United Employees Welfare Assoc, 102 Phil 219 G.R. No. L-9831. October 30, 1957PINBOYS EMPLOYMENT PERMANENT; CASE AT BAR. As warranted by the evidence presented and the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar which lend to the employment of the 36 pinboys the character of permanency, as no other pinboys were employed (except in their absence) during the period involved in this case, the finding of the lower court that said workers of the company are regular employees thereof should be sustained.FACTS: On October 6, 1952, the United Employees Welfare Association, a legitimate labor union, presented a petition before the Department of Labor on behalf of the 36 pinboys of the Isaac Peral Bowling Alley, allegedly affiliated with said union. The petition (Case No. 754 of the Department of Labor) made specific demands from the company among which were the conversion of their (pinboys) wages from hourly to daily basis; vacation and sick leaves; medical and hospital bills; payment of their wages during a strike if such strike had to be declared due to the refusal of the company to consider their demands; and that the United Employees Welfare Association be recognized as the sole bargaining agency.This petition was certified by the Department of Labor to the Court of Industrial Relations. On the same day, however, the 36 pinboys concerned therein staged a strike, whereupon the Court intervened and a commissioner of the same called the parties to a conference. It was agreed that the striking pinboys would return and be admitted to their work under the same working conditions and arrangements prevailing before the declaration of the strike, pending the final disposition of the case, and the management on the other hand was precluded from accepting pinboys other than those appearing in its payrolls before the strike unless the Court expressly authorize the admission of new ones.The company filed its answer denying the material averments of the petition and contended that in view of the nature of the business of the company, the payment of the wages of its pinboys can not be converted from the hourly to daily basis; that said pinboys were receiving wages in accordance with law and were being paid additional compensation for any work rendered on Sundays; that the company was actually shouldering medical and hospital bills of those injured or who become ill in line of duty; that the pinboys were just casual workers and not permanently employed by the company; that the Union cannot be recognized as the sole bargaining agency because aside from the fact that the pinboys were not the only ones working in that establishment, the company had no confidence in said union. It was, therefore prayed that the petition be dismissed with costs against therein petitioner.The Court rendered decision finding the petitioning pinboys as permanent and regular employees and not merely casual workers of the company; that from the start of its business on March 1, 1951, to July 31 of the same year, the company paid its pinboys wages at the rate of P80 a month and that from August 1, 1951, to date, the pinboys received wages at the rate of P0.50 per hour of actual work; that the pinboys in said company were working on 2 shifts, the morning shift working or staying, at the instance of the management, in their respective alleys from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., or for 9 hours on ordinary days and legal holidays, whereas the second shift began their work from 5:00 p.m. until 12:00 midnight or 1:00 a.m. on regular days and legal holidays and from 4:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. on Sundays. The Court thus ordered the company to pay the pinboys in the day shift 25 per cent additional compensation over their basic wages for 1 hour overtime on ordinary days and legal holidays to pay those in the night shift 25 per cent additional compensation for 1 hour overtime on Sundays, which should be computed from the date they had been rendered; and another 25 per cent additional compensation over their basic pay for those working from 6:00 p.m. until 12:00 or 1:00 a.m. as the case may be, to be computed from the time the petition was filed in court. The Court also held that the pinboys were entitled yearly to 8 days vacation leave and 7 days sick leave with pay, and the United Employees Welfare Association was recognized as the sole bargaining agency for its members (pinboys). The other demands were denied.

A motion for the reconsideration of said decision, filed by the company, was subsequently denied by the Court en banc. Isaac Peral Bowling Alley thus filed a petition forcertiorariwith this Court.

ISSUES: 1.WON the pinboys involved in this case are permanent workers of the company and that they rendered service for more than 8 hours.

2. WON those working in the night shift are entitled to 25 per cent additional compensation3. WON the Court was right in awarding vacation and sick leave to the said 36 pinboys.HELD: 1. YES. We must not forget that the company pays its pinboys wages at the rate of P0.50 per hour of actual work which, as a matter of fact was a wage allowed by the Wage Service considering the nature of the business of the company (Exhibit 30), and that the finding of the lower Court on this point was made before the promulgation of Our doctrine in the case of Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., v. Luzon Marine Department Union, 1 G. R. No. L-9265, April 29, 1957, wherein We pronounced that "to constitute non- working hours for the purpose of the Minimum Wage Law, the laborer or worker need not leave the premises of the factory, shop or boat (or establishment) in order that his period of rest shall not be counted, it being enough that he cease to work, may rest completely and leave or may leave at his will the spot where he actually stays while working to go somewhere else, whether within or outside the premises of said factory, shop or boat (establishment). If these requisites are complied with, such period shall not be counted." In view of what appears in the payrolls and vouchers signed by the pinboys, We are inclined to believe that such requisites had been satisfied, there being no evidence to the contrary. Such being the case, the conclusion arrived at by the lower Court to the effect that for the period above- mentioned the pinboys worked for 9 hours a day just because they remained in the premises of the Bowling Alley, finds no support to stand on and, consequently, said conclusion should be adjusted to what the evidence really show.

In view of the evidence presented and the circumstances obtaining in this case which lend to the employment of the 36 pinboys the charter of permanency, as no other pinboys were employed (except in their absence) during the period involved in this case, the finding of the lower Court that said workers of the company are regular employees thereof should be sustained.2. YES. The grant of additional compensation to those working at night has been recognized by this Court as a valid exercise of the general powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and may be allowed for "hygienic, medical, moral, cultural and sociological reasons" (Shell Co. of the Phil. Islands, Ltd. v. National Labor Union, 2 G. R. No L-1309, July 26, 1948), and We find no reason why the lower Court cannot apply the same measure to the workers involved herein considering that irrespective of the nature of their jobs, those working at night suffer a continued general loss of energies and are deprived of the same comfort. The ruling of the court a quo on this matter should be, therefore, affirmed.3. NO. In view of the absence of express legislation granting employees of private firms or establishments the benefits of vacation and sick leaves with pay, said employees are not assured of such privileges, which are proper subject matters for collective bargaining between employers and employees. Although strictly speaking, therefore, there is no ground for the granting of said privileges, the Court of Industrial Relations in the exercise of its broad powers under Commonwealth Act No. 103 had on several occasions dealt with and granted claims for these benefits. With the enactment of Republic Act No. 875 and the abolition of the Courts general jurisdiction over labor disputes, this power seems to have been curtailed. It is believed, however, that whenever the Court of Industrial Relations may exercise its power of compulsory arbitration, as when a case is certified to it by the President of the Philippines, being again possessed of general powers, said Court may still grant these benefits. (See authorities cited in Franciscos Labor Laws, Vol. II, 3rd ed., p. 508 et seq)

In the case at bar, We cannot ignore the fact that the claim was passed upon by the lower Court when it was still possessed of its broad powers and could have validly granted the same, as it did. But it also appears that the Court a quo was aware of the financial condition of the company as "not very sound due to losses reported during the years 1952 and 1953 although it had a little profit in 1951" (p. 6 Decision), and considering that the ability of the employer to make payment of these privileges must also be reckoned with, it is but just that this demand (sick and vacation leaves with pay) be denied, at least for the time being. Anyway, this could be made the subject of a future agreement between the workers and the management.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in so far as it grants the 36 pinboys represented by respondent Union Employees Welfare Association sick and vacation leaves, a matter which is left to further bargaining agreement between the parties, and with regard to the payment of the hours of overtime allegedly earned by said pinboys which shall be determined in the proper incident in the lower Court after this decision becomes final, subject to the doctrine on the point laid down by this Court in the case of Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Department Union (101 Phil., 257). Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.11. Arica v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 776 [G.R. No. 78210. February 28, 1989.]FACTS: Teofilo Arica et al and 561 others sued Standard Fruits Corporation (STANFILCO) Philippines for allegedly not paying the workers for their assembly time which takes place every work day from 5:30am to 6am. The assembly time consists of the roll call of the workers; their getting of assignments from the foreman; their filling out of the Laborers Daily Accomplishment Report; their getting of tools and equipments from the stockroom; and their going to the field to work. The workers alleged that this is necessarily and primarily for STANFILCOs benefit.ISSUE:Whether or not the 30-minute activity of the petitioners before the scheduled working time is compensable under the Labor CodeHELD: No. Noteworthy is the decision of the Minister of Labor, on May 12, 1978 in the aforecited case (Associated Labor Union v. Standard (Phil.) Fruit Corporation, NLRC Case No. 26-LS-XI-76) where significant findings of facts and conclusions had already been made on the matter.

The Minister of Labor held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The thirty (30)-minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual consent of the parties under Article IV, Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be considered as waiting time within the purview of Section 5, Rule I, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code . . .

"Furthermore, the thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply-rooted, routinary practice of the employees, and the proceedings attendant thereto are not infected with complexities as to deprive the workers the time to attend to other personal pursuits. They are not new employees as to require the company to deliver long briefings regarding their respective work assignments. Their houses are situated right on the area where the farms are located, such that after the roll call, which does not necessarily require the personal presence, they can go back to their houses to attend to some chores. In short, they are not subject to the absolute control of the company during this period, otherwise, their failure to report in the assembly time would justify the company to impose disciplinary measures. The CBA does not contain any provision to this effect; the record is also bare of any proof on this point. This, therefore, demonstrates the indubitable fact that the thirty (30)-minute assembly time was not primarily intended for the interests of the employer, but ultimately for the employees to indicate their availability or non-availability for work during every working day." 12. National Shipyards Steel Corp. v. CIR, 3 SCRA 890 [G.R. No. L-20838. July 30, 1965.]FINDING THAT LABORERS HAD WORKED OVERTIME IS A FINDING OF FACT CONCLUSIVE ON SUPREME COURT. The finding of the Court of Industrial Relations to the effect that laborers had worked overtime is a finding of fact which the Supreme Court cannot disturb if it is supported by sufficient evidence.FACTS: NASSCO is the owner of a number of vessels used in connection with its business of ship building and repair. Respondents are employed as crew members of its tugboats.

On April 15, 1957, respondents filed this case in the Court of Industrial Relations where it was docketed as Case No. 1058-V, claiming overtime compensation from the NASSCO. The case was submitted for decision on a stipulation of facts, of which the following forms part.

"4. That to meet the exigencies of the service in the performance of the above work, petitioners (i.e., Abiday and the 38 other employees) have to work when so required in excess of eight (8) hours a day and/or during Sundays and legal holidays (actual overtime service is subject to determination on the basis of the logbook of the vessels, time sheets and other pertinent records of the respondent (i.e., NASSCO);

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"6. The petitioners are paid by the respondent their regular salaries and subsistence allowance, without additional compensation for overtime work."cralaw virtua1aw librarythe Court of Industrial Relations issued an order requiring NASSCO to pay respondents 25 per cent additional compensation for work done in excess of eight hours and, for this purpose, directed its examiner to make the computation on the basis of the log book, time sheets and other records of the NASSCO.

The examiner submitted two reports, the first, which was filed on February 14, 1958, covering the period January 1 to December 31, 1957, and the second, which was filed on April 30, 1958, covering the period January 1, 1954 to December 31, 1956, in both of which he credited respondents with overtime work at an average of five hours a day.

These reports became the subject of review in this Court in two separate petitions forcertiorarifiled by NASSCO. In G. R. No. L-13732 (NASSCO v. CIR) decided on April 14, 1959, NASSCO challenged the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations and raised the question of whether the order of that court, which directed the computation of overtime pay, could be considered a decision. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. In 107 Phil. 1006 (NASSCO v. CIR), decided on April 29, 1960), NASSCO raised again the question of jurisdiction. Again the petition was dismissed, the resolution on the first petition having become the law of the case.

On November 25, 1960, therefore, respondents filed a "petition" asking the Court of Industrial Relations to direct its examiner to proceed with the computation of overtime pay for the period 1949-53 and 1958-60. This was granted. On June 15, 1962, therefore, the examiner submitted a third report which the Court of Industrial Relations in its order of November 27, 1962 approved. NASSCO asked for a reconsideration but the Court of Industrial Relations en banc denied its motion. Hence this petition for review.ISSUE: WON there is no evidence to support the examiners finding that respondents rendered five hours of overtime service daily during the periods 1949-53 and 1958-60.HELD: NO. The first error assigned by the petitioner that there was no evidence submitted to support the Courts finding that respondents rendered five hours overtime service, is not well taken. Pedro de Joya, the marine land surveyor employed by the petitioner testified that the respondent had really worked overtime as shown by their daily time sheets, payrolls, logbooks and other pertinent records of the petitioner. De Joya stated that the crew of the ship or launch of the petitioner were supposed to work on a three-8 hours shifts but they only had two men assigned on the deck, the captain and the master; in the engine only 2 men engineers and two oilers were assigned; and in other places in the launch or ship only two members of the crew were assigned so that each member of the crew ordinarily worked a minimum of at least 12 hours each. He testified further that sometimes the crew had to work more than 12 hours due to repairs, storms and other calamities.13. Caltex Regular Employees v. Caltex, 247 SCRA 398 [G.R. No. 111359. August 15, 1995.]FACTS: On 12 December 1985, petitioner Union and private respondent Caltex (Philippines), Inc. ("Caltex") entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("1985 CBA") which was to be in effect until midnight of 31 December 1988. The CBA included, among others, the following provision:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ARTICLE III

HOURS OF WORK

In conformity with Presidential Decree 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, the regular work week shall consist of eight (8) hours per day, seven (7) days, Monday through Sunday, during which regular rates of pay shall be paid in accordance with Annex B and work on the employees one Day of Rest, shall be considered a special work day, during which Day of Rest rates of pay shall be paid as provided in Annex B. Daily working schedules shall be established by management in accordance with the requirements of efficient operations on the basis of eight (8) hours per day for any five (5) days. Provided, however, employees required to work in excess of forty (40) hours in any week shall be compensated in accordance with Annex B of this Agreement. 1 (Emphasis supplied)

Pertinent portions of Annex "B" of the 1985 CBA are also quoted here as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.phSometime in August 1986, the Union called Caltexs attention to alleged violations by Caltex of Annex "B" of the 1985 CBA, e.g. non-payment of night-shift differential, non-payment of overtime pay and non-payment at "first day-off rates" for work performed on a Saturday.Caltex s Industrial Relations manager immediately evaluated petitioners claims and accordingly informed petitioner Union that differential payments would be timely implemented. In the implementation of the re-computed claims, however, no differential payment was made with respect to work performed on the first 2 1/2 hours on a Saturday. On 7 July 1987, the Union instituted a complaint for unfair labor practice against Caltex alleging violation of the provisions of the 1985 CBA. Petitioner Union charged Caltex with shortchanging its employees when Caltex compensated work performed on the first 2 1/2 hours of Saturday, an employees day of rest, at regular rates, when it should be paying at "day of rest" or "day off" rates. Caltex denied the accusations of the Union. It averred that Saturday was never designated as a day of rest, much less a "day-off." It maintained that the 1985 CBA provided only 1 day of rest for employees at the Manila Office, as well as employees similarly situated at the Legazpi and Marinduque Bulk Depots. This day of rest, according to Caltex was Sunday.In due time, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner Union, while finding at the same time that private respondent Caltex was not guilty of any unfair labor practice. Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Guanio, interpreting Article III and Annex "B" of the 1985 CBA, concluded that Caltexs employees had been given two (2) days (instead of one [1] day) of rest, with the result that work performed on the employees first day of rest, viz. Saturday, should be compensated at "First day-off" rates. On appeal by Caltex, public respondent NLRC set aside the decision of Labor Arbiter Guanio. The NLRC found that the conclusions of the Labor Arbiter were not supported by the evidence on record. The NLRC, interpreting the provisions of the 1985 CBA, concluded that CBA granted only one (1) day of rest, e.g., Sunday. The Unions motion for reconsideration was denied on 9 June 1993.

The controversy we must address in this Petition forCertiorarirelates to the appropriate interpretation of Article III in relation to Annex "B" of the parties 1985 CBA.Petitioner Union also contended that private respondent Caltex in the instant petition was violating the statutory prohibition against off-setting undertime for overtime work on another day. Union counsel attempted to establish this charge by asserting that the employees had been required to render "overtime work" on a Saturday but compensated only at regular rates of pay, because they had not completed the eight (8)-hour work period daily from Monday thru Friday.

Petitioners counsel, in his final attempt to lay a basis for compelling private respondent to pay premium rates of pay for all hours worked on a Saturday, regardless of the number of hours actually worked earlier during the week, i.e., on Monday to Friday, insists that private respondent cannot require its employees to complete the 40-hour regular work week on a Saturday, after it has allowed its employees to render only 37-1/2 hours of work.ISSUES: 1. WON respondent Caltex was violating the statutory prohibition against off-setting undertime for overtime work on another day

2. WON private respondent can be compelled to pay premium rates of pay for all hours worked on a Saturday, regardless of the number of hours actually worked earlier during the weekHELD: 1. NO. The Court finds petitioners contention bereft of merit. Overtime work consists of hours worked on a given day in excess of the applicable work period, which here is eight (8) hours. It is not enough that the hours worked fall on disagreeable or inconvenient hours. In order that work may be considered as overtime work, the hours worked must be in excess of and in addition to the eight (8) hours worked during the prescribed daily work period, or the forty (40) hours worked during the regular work week Monday thru Friday. In the present case, under the 1985 CBA, hours worked on a Saturday do not, by that fact alone, necessarily constitute overtime work compensable at premium rates of pay, contrary to petitioners assertion. These are normal or regular work hours, compensable at regular rates of pay, as provided in the 1985 CBA; under that CBA, Saturday is not a rest day or a "day off." It is only when an employee has been required on a Saturday to render work in excess of the forty (40) hours which constitute the regular work week that such employee may be considered as performing overtime work on that Saturday. We consider that the statutory prohibition against offsetting undertime one day with overtime another day has no application in the case at bar.

2. NO. The company practice of allowing employees to leave thirty (30) minutes earlier than the scheduled off-time had been established primarily for the convenience of the employees most of whom have had to commute from work place to home and in order that they may avoid the heavy rush hour vehicular traffic. There is no allegation here by petitioner Union that such practice was resorted to by Caltex in order to escape its contractual obligations. This practice, while it effectively reduced to 37-1/2 the number of hours actually worked by employees who had opted to leave ahead of off-time, is not be construed as modifying the other terms of the 1985 CBA. As correctly pointed out by private respondent, the shortened work period did not result in likewise shortening the work required for purposes of determining overtime pay, as well as for purposes of determining premium pay for work beyond forty (40) hours within the calendar week. It follows that an employee is entitled to be paid premium rates, whether for work in excess of (8) hours on any given day, or for work beyond the forty (40)-hour requirement for the calendar week, only when the employee had, in fact, already rendered the requisite number of hours 8 or 40 prescribed in the 1985 CBA.14. PNB v. PNB Employees Assoc., 115 SCRA 507FACTS: PNB and PNB Employees Association (PEMA) had a dispute regarding the proper computation of overtime pay. PEMA wanted the cost of living allowance (granted in 1958) and longevity pay (granted in 1961) to be included in the computation. PNB disagreed and the 2 parties later went before the CIR to resolve the dispute.

CIR decided in favor of PEMA and held that PNB should compute the overtime pay of its employees on the basis of the sum total of the employees basic salary or wage plus cost of living allowance and longevity pay. The CIR relied on the ruling in NAWASA v NAWASA Consolidated Unions, which held that for purposes of computing overtime compensation, regular wage includes all payments which the parties have agreed shall be received during the work week, including differentiated payments for working at undesirable times, such as at night and the board and lodging customarily furnished the employee. This prompted PNB to appeal, hence this case.

ISSUE: WON the cost of living allowance and longevity pay should be

included in the computation of overtime pay as held by the CIR

HELD: NO. In the instant case, longevity pay cannot be included in the computation of overtime pay for the very simple reason that the contrary is expressly stipulated in the collective bargaining agreement and, as should be the case, it is settled that the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement constitute the law between the parties.Notwithstanding the portions of NAWASAs opinion relied upon by PEMA, there is nothing in CA 444 that could justify its posture that cost-of-living allowance should be added to the regular wage in computing overtime pay.SYNOPSIS

In connection with an industrial dispute certified by the President of the Philippines, respondent Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ruled, that petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) should include cost-of-living allowances (equity pay) and longevity pay to the sum total of every employees basic salary or wage as basis for computation of the overtime pay of its employees. Respondent CIRs decision was based on its interpretation of the applicable law, the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act No. 444), in the light of its own impression of the Supreme Courts opinion in NAWASA v. NAWASA Consolidated Unions (G. R. No. L-18938, promulgated August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 766) wherein it was held that in computing the daily wage of employees and workers who worked seven days a week their 25% Sunday differential pay should be included; and the computation should not be based exclusively on the basic wage.

On review, the Supreme Court held that: (a) longevity pay cannot be included in the computation of overtime pay since the contrary is expressly stipulated in the collective bargaining agreement which constitutes the law between the parties; (b) notwithstanding the portions of the NAWASA opinion relied upon by respondent PEMA, there is nothing in the Eight- Hour Labor Law that could justify its posture that the cost of living allowance should be added to the regular wage in computing overtime pay; (c) the NAWASA ruling relied upon by respondent PEMA was obiter dictum, the only issue therein being whether or not "in computing the daily wage, the additional compensation for Sunday should be included" ; and (d) in the absence of any specific provision in a collective bargaining agreement, what are decisive in determining the basis for computation of overtime pay are two germane considerations, namely: (1) whether or not the additional pay is for extra work done or service rendered; and (2) whether or not the same is intended to be permanent and regular, not contingent nor temporary and given only to remedy a situation which can change any time.

15. Engineering Equipment Inc., v. Minister of Labor, 138 SCRA 616FACTS: In 1977, Aspera was contracted by Engineering Equipment, Inc. to work as a mechanical engineer in Saudi Arabia. He was contracted to work for 10 hours a day. Later he sued Engineering Equipment claiming that he is entitled to overtime pay because under the law, the working hours should be 8 hours a day only hence the extra 2 hours should be paid as overtime. Engineering Equipment averred that Aspera is a managerial employee.

ISSUE:Whether or not Aspera is entitled to OT pay.

HELD:No. Engineering Equipment was able to prove that Aspera is part of the managerial staff, a fact which Aspera did not deny. Aspera was a managerial employee exercising supervision and control over rank-and-file employees with power to recommend disciplinary action or their dismissal. As a managerial employee within the meaning of the law, he was not entitled to overtime pay.

17. Mercury Drug v. Dayao, 117 SCRA 99 [G.R. No. L-30452. September 30, 1982.]SYNOPSIS

Respondents, employees of petitioner Mercury Drug, Co., filed a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) praying among others for payment of their unpaid wages for work done on Sundays and legal holidays and of additional compensation for nighttime work. Respondents alleged that they were coerced by petitioner into entering into contracts of employment waiving the said benefits. Petitioner filed an answer after its motion to dismiss was denied. The Industrial Court rendered judgment in favor of respondents ruling that an agreement in a contract of employment which would exclude the 25% additional compensation for work done during Sundays and holidays is null and void, and ordere