Nuclear Accident in Japan: NRC Early Protective Action Recommendations

Nuclear Accident in Japan: NRC Early Protective Action

Recommendations National Radiological Emergency

Preparedness Conference April 18, 2011

Patricia A. Milligan, CHP

Senior Technical Advisor for Preparedness & Response Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

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Status of site prior to earthquake

Reactor #1 Operating

Reactor #4 Shutdown for Maintenance

Reactor #5 & 6 Shutdown for Maintenance

Reactor #2 Operating

Reactor #3 Operating

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NPP site post Tsunami March 11, 2011

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Plant Response Earthquake • Earthquake Caused Automatic Shutdown of 3 Operating

Units • Offsite Power Lost • Initial indications are that Emergency Diesels were operating 14m Tsunami (less than 1 hour later) • All Emergency Back-up Power Lost • 8-10 hours later Station Batteries Depleted

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• Ops Center 24/7 • Team of experts to Tokyo

– First team deployed on March 12 – Additional teams have been deployed

• Support to U.S. Ambassador and Japanese • Coordinating Environmental Monitoring with

DOE & EPA • PARs

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NRC Response

March 12, 2011 early in the day

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March 12, 2011- later in the day

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March 14, 2011

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March 15, 2011

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March 16, 2011

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Emergency Planning Zones and Protective Action Recommendations

Why 50 miles?

– Limited and uncertain data was available – Significant challenges to 3 units and at least 2 spent

fuel pools on site – Potential for large offsite release existed – Elevated dose rates on site presented challenges to

crews attempting to stabilize reactor – Limited offsite data suggested serious damage to

fuel – Winds shifting from out to sea to land

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Emergency Planning Zones and Protective Action Recommendations

Why 50 miles?

• US government cannot affect the outcomes in Japan

• US government can only take actions to protect its citizens

• Evacuation recommendation to 50 miles afforded protection to US citizens in uncertain and challenging conditions

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Emergency Planning Zones and Protective Action Recommendations

• Two emergency planning zones (EPZ) around each nuclear power plant – 10 mile EPZ – plume exposure planning zone – 50 mile EPZ – ingestion exposure planning zone

• EPZ size established: – to protect against most accident sequences – to provide a substantial basis for expansion of response efforts

as needed beyond the EPZ distances

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Basis for Emergency Planning

• What is the basis for the existing Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) the nuclear power plants in US? • Emergency planning in the US is based on a range

of accidents including most severe

• Two EPZs (10/50 miles) around each NPP

• Exact size and shape of EPZ is a result of detailed planning which includes consideration of the specific conditions at each site, unique geographical features of the area, and demographic information.

Domestic Considerations • No U.S. Health Effects from radiation fall out from Fukushima • U.S. Plants Designed for External Events • NRC has initiated additional inspections at all U.S. Plants • NRC conducting Near-Term and Long-Term Reviews.

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NRC Near Term Review • Evaluate Fukushima Daiichi Events • Domestic Operating Reactors and Spent Fuel Pools

• External Events • Station Blackout • Severe Accident Mitigation • Emergency Preparedness • Combustible Gas Control

Staff will brief the Commission in public meetings on

May 12 and June 16 ; final recommendations in public meeting July 19.

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NRC Longer Term Review • Begin as soon as NRC has sufficient technical information from the events in

Japan -no later than the completion of the 90 day near term report • Include specific information on the sequence of events and the status of

equipment during the duration of the event. • Evaluate all technical and policy issues related to the event to identify potential

research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and adjustments to the regulatory framework that should be conducted by NRC.

• Evaluate potential interagency issues such as emergency preparedness. • Applicability of the lessons learned to non-operating reactor and non-reactor

facilities should also be explored. • Provide a report with recommendations, as appropriate, to the Commission

within six months from the start of the evaluation for Commission policy direction.

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