Selection Kant, Lecture One (1)

LECTUREONE12May1959LetmebeinwitghthefictionthatyoudonotyetknowanytghinabouttheCritiqueofPureReason.Thisfictionissimultaneouslylegitimateandillegitimate.Itisillegitimatesinceitisobviousthateven todaya worklikeKant'sepistemologicalmagnumopusradiatessuchauthoritythateveryonehasheardsomethingorotheraboutit.oever,in. adee,perenseiisless ofafictionthanitse,ms.ebecomespublicknowledgeit tendsgenerallytoobscureits truemean-ingratherthantoelucidateit.Theformulaetowhichphilosophiesupinarigidfashionandthustomakeagenuineinteractionwiththemalltheharder.Tomakethepointmorespecificallyinrelationnicanrevolutionconsistedintheideathattheelementsofcognitionthathadpreviouslybeensoughtintheobjects,inthings-in-them-selves,werenowtobetransferredtothesubject,inotherwordstoreason,thefacultyofcognition.1Tn suchacrudeformulationthisviewofKantisalsofalsebecause,ontheonehand,thesubjectiveturninphilosophyismucholderthanKant-inthemodernhistoryofphilosophyit goesbacktoDescartes,andthereisa sensein whichDavidHume,Kant'simportantEnglishprecursor,wasmoreofasubjectivistthanKant.Andontheotherhand,thiswidelyheldbeliefismistakenbecausethetrueinterestoftheCritiqueofPureReasonisconcernedlesswiththesubject,theturntothesubject,thanwithLIILUUjLLLlVCHdLU1411-IllLlull.2LECTUREONEIfImaymakeastartwithaprogrammaticstatement,asortofmotto,encapsulatingwhatyouareabouttohear,IwouldsaythattheKantianro`pJectcanactuallybecharacterizednotasonethatadoptssubjectivismin ordertodoawaywiththeobjectivityofcogni-tion,butas onethatgroundsobjectivityinthesubjectasan objectivereality.Itstandsincontrasttothepreviouslydominantviewwhichdowngradedobjectivitybyemphasizingthesubject,andrestricteditinaspiritofscepticism.This,wemightsay,isKant'sprojectintheCritiqueofPureReason,andhehimselfhassaidsoinanotverywell-knownpassageinthePrefacetotheCritiqueofPureReason.Ishallreaditouttoyouatoncebecauseitmayhelptodispelasignificantmisunderstandingfromtheveryoutset.Hisenquiry,hesays, hastwosides,oneofwhichis concernedwithobjects,whiletheotherseekstoinvestigatethepureunderstandingitself,itspossibilityandthecognitivefacultiesuponwhichitrests;andsodealswithitinitssubjectiveaspect'.2Hegoesontosaythat,importantthoughthisexpositionis,itisnotessentialtohischiefpurpose',forthechiefquestionisalwaysthis-whatandhowmuchcantheunderstandingandreasonknowapartfromallexperience?Not:-howis thefacultyofthoughtitselfpossible?'3Ibelieve,therefore,thatifyouacceptrightfromthestartthattheinterestoftheCritiqueofPureReasonliesinitsintentiontoestablishtheobjectivenatureofcognition,ortosalvageit,ifI mayanticipatemyfutureargument,thiswillaffordyouaetteraccbesstotheworkthanif yousimplysurrendhertotewidespreadideaofKant'sso-calledsubjectivism.4ThisremainstrueeventhoughthesetwoaspectsofKant'sphilosophyareinconstantfrictionwithoneanother.Howthisprocessoffriction,howthesetwoaspects,relatetooneanotherinaseriesofconfigurationsandhowthisgives rise toawholesetof problems-toexplorethiswill bethetaskI havesetmyselfinthislecturecourse.ButletmereturntothefictionIstartedwith.ItisreasonableformetoassumethatyouhavenopreconceivednotionsabouttheCritiqueofPureReasonbecausethetraditionalbeliefssurroundingthisworknolongersurvive.Once,somefortyyearsago,averyimortanthilosppopherof thedayremarkedwittilythata pphilosoherwassomeonewhoknewwhatwassaidin thebookshehadnotread.AndthisremarkcouldprobablybesaidtohaveappliedtotheCrt-tiqueofPureReason.In otherwords,theaurasurroundingthisbookwassoextraordinaryatthetimethatevenpeopleunfamiliarwiththetextseemtohavehadafeeling'forwhatitcontained-ifyouwillpardonmyuseofthisword;nootherwordwillreallydo.Theintel-lectualsituationofourageis oneinwhichnoworkbelongingtothepastreallyenjoyssuchauthorityanymore,andcertainlynotKant'sM E T HO"DSA NDI N T E N T ! O3NS~manumo~us,forthesimplereasonthattheschoolthatdominatedtheGermanuniversitiesuntilaroundfortyyearsagohasfadedsome-whatandhasbecomesomethingofadeaddog.sThiswastheNeo-Kantianschoolinitsvariousguises-mathematicalinMarburgandarts-orientatedinsouth-westGermany.InconsequencetheCritiqueofPureReasonisnolongerabletoderiveanysortoftraditionalnourishmentfromthatsourceeither.Iimagine,therefore,thatyoumaywellapproachtheCritiqueofPureReasonwithsomethingofthefeelingthatitislikeanoldstatueoftheGreatElector,6anidolstandingonitsplinthgatheringdust,somethingthattheprofessorskeepondiscussingbecause,regrettably,theyhavebeeninthehabitofdoingsoforthepast150years,butnotanythingthatneedcon-cernusovermuchtoday.Whatindeedarewesupposedtodowithit?YouwillprobablyhaveanideathattheCritiqueofPureReasonisconcernedontheonehandwithparticularquestionsofscientifictheoryandthatitisfilled withdiscoursespertainingtotheindividualsciences,discoursesthatfor themostparthavenowbeensuperseded.Forexample,youwillallhaveheardsomethingtotheeffectthattheKantiantheoryoftheaprion`natureoftimeandspacehasbeenunderminedbyrelativitytheory,orthattheKantiantheoryofcaus-alityasanaprioricategoryhasbeenrefutedbyquantummechanics.Ontheotherhand,however,thenarrower,morespecificallyphilo-sophicalquestionsoftheCritiqueofPureReason-thatistosay,thosenotconnectedwiththegroundingofthesciences-maywellhavelostsomethingoftheirexaltedstatusinyoureyes.Forwhenyouheartheconceptofmetaphysics'-tomentiontheothertermthatforms thesubjectoftheKantiancritique-youwillnotgenerallybe thinkingof thesameconceptsasformedtheessenceof metaphysicsinKant'seyes-thatistosay,theconceptsofGod,freedomandimmortality,orof theindependenceortheexistenceornon"`-existenceof thesoul.Youhaveinsteadbeenbroughtuptofind thetrueessenceofmetaphysicsinsuchconceptsasBeing[Sein].Letmesayrightawaythattheso-calledquestionofBeing'doesnotrepresentaninnovationwhencomparedto theCritiqueofPureReason,orahappyrediscovery.WecouldrathersaythatKanthassomeverydefiniteandunambiguouscommentstomakeaboutthequestionofBeing'inaverycentralchapteroftheCritiqueofPureReason,namelythechapterontheAmphibolyofConceptsofReflection.AndImayPerhapsaddthatif youdonotwishtocapitulatetothecurrenttalkaboutBeing'andtosuccumbhelplesslytothesuggestivepowerofthisso-calledphilosophyofBeing',it wouldbe averygoodthingforyoutofamiliarizeyourselveswiththesematters.It isnotmywishtoeliminatetheproblemsinvolvedherebyproclaimingina professorial4LECTUREONEmannerthattheCritiqueofPureReasonisaGod-givenworkwiththekindof authorityenjoyedby, say,Platoforthelasttwothousandyears,ortoassertthatwefeel paralysedwhenconfrontedwiththeseeternalvaluesandunabletomusterthenecessaryrespectandthenecessaryinterest.{wouldsay that,onthecontrary,suchadmonitionsvtheemselssmackoftheimpotenceandhollownessimplicitinanysuchconceptofunchanging,eternalvalues.I shouldlikeinsteadtodosomethingelse.Icannotdenythat1 stillbelievethatthisworkisonethatdeservestheverygreatestrespect.Itdoessoforquiteobjectivereasons,albeitforreasonsthatareverydifferentfromthosetowhichitoweditspositionwhenitfirstappeared.WhatI shouldlike is tomakethisbookspeaktous. I shouldliketoshowyouwhatinterestthemattersthatarediscussedinit canstillholdforustoday.AndI shouldliketorehearsetheexperiencestatuner letIshdI.worasjectiverealities,asexperiencesfor`mmganessentialpartofthehistoryofphilosophy.I attemptedsomethingofthesortinmymemoriallectureonHegelthatsomeofyoumayhaveheard.7So whatI wouldliketodoistoretranslatethisphilo-sophyfromacodified,ossifiedsystembackintothekindofpicturethatresultsfromasustainedX-rayexamination.Thatistosay,Ishouldliketourgeyoutoconceiveof thisphilosophyas aforcefield,assomethinginwhichtheabstractconceptsthatcomeintoconflictwithoneanotherandconstantlymodifyyoneanotherreal}standinforactuallivingforces.At thesametimeandasamatterofcourse-if I haveanysuccessatall inachievingmyaims-anessentialtaskwillbetoenableyoutoreadthe-veryextensive-textof theCritiqueofPureReasonforyourselves.I hopeyouwilllearnhowtodistinguishbetweenitsessentialandless essentialaspects,acrucialmatterwhenreadingKant.AndI hopealsoto makethingscomealiveby presentingthemintermsofanumberofmodels.ItisnotmyintentiontogiveyoulengthyparaphrasesoftheCritiqueofPureReason,ortosupplyyouwithcommentariesonparticularpassages.All thathasbeendonecountlesstimesandthoseofyouwhowouldlikesuchanapproachcanfindmorethanenoughexamplesofit inthesecondaryliterature.InsteadIshalltrytointroduceyoutothecorephilosophicalprob-lemsthroughthediscussionofparticularquestionsthatIregardasbeingofcentralimportance.ButIshalldothis,asIhavesaid,notthroughtheexpositionofKat]t'sideasasacompletephilosophy,butasakindoftranscriptoftheintellectualexperiencesthathebehindthem.Andtheconceptofexperience(orwhatI wishtoshowyouofit)is notonethatcanbeexplainedabstractlyinadvance.I wouldaskyounottoexpectmetostartwitha definitionofwhatI meanbyit;itsmeaningwillbecomeclearinthecourseoftheselectures.METHO~DSANDINTENTIO5NS~Youwillbecurioustolearnabouttheactualsourceoftheintim-idatingreputationofthisworkasthephilosophicalworkparexcel-lence.A pointintimewhenatraditionhascometoanendandwhentheauthorityofbooksisnolongertakenforgrantedhastheadvant-agethatitispossibletoputsuchquestions.IshouldliketotellyouthatifI havespokenofthelossofauthorityoftheCritiqueofPureReason,thisisnotjustaninventionofmine.ThereareinfactphilosophicaltrendstodaythatreallydoregardthewholeofKant'sphilosophyasnothingmorethanacultobjectthathasnowbeensupersededthankstoadvancesinscientificknowledge,andthatfarfromcallingforphilosophicallabouritcanatbesthopeforacertainantiquarianinterest.AnexampleisHansReichenbach,thelogicalpositivist,whohasdefendedthispointofview,withgreatcourage,ifnotalwayswiththerequisitesensitivity,inhisbookTheRiseofScienticPhilosophyandinanumberofotherwritings.8_____________________________________________________________________actuallyderivesitsgreatauthority-particularlywhenyouseethatit saysnothingaboutthemajortopicswhichmightbethoughttobeofinterest.Tomakethisbrutallycleartoyou:ifyouexpecttofindin theCritiqueofPureReasonproofsfororagainsttheexistenceofGodortheimmortalityofthesouloroffreedom,youwillbesorelydisappointed.Itis truethatthereis nolackofsuchproofs,aboveallinthegreatsecondpartoftheTranscendentalLogic,namelytheTranscendentalDialectic.However,theseproofssufferfromthegravedefectthatKanthasalwaysarrangedthemambiguouslybecausehehasalwaysadvancedthemintheformofantinomies.Whatthismeansisthathehasdemonstratedthatboththetruthofthesecon-ceptsandthatoftheiroppositescanbeproved.Whatwehavehereisatheoryofcognition,butatheoryofcognitioninadoublesense.Thefirstmeaningisthatitattemptstolaythefoundationsofthesciencesthatin Kant'seyes areestablishedandfreefromdoubt,thatis tosay,ofmathematicsandthenaturalsciences.Thesecondmean-inglies inhisattempttorestrictthepossibilityofknowledgeofthose_____________________________________________________________________important.Youhavetobeclearaboutthis.TheCritiqueofPureReasondoedoesnotdeHoyttpheoleexise~dst.tAwhcoenncepHelts;.neforremexkedplle',nhetheHistoryofReligionandPhilosophyinGermany,thattheupshotoftheCritiqueofPureReasonisthateventheLordofLordsisdying,wallowing-unproven-inhisownblood',thentheemphasismustbe placedonthewordunproven.9Thatis tosay,whatis limitedis thepossibilityofproof;judgementsaboutthesecategoriesassucharenotmadein thebook.Whatconstitutestheenormoussignificance6LECTUREONEofthebookandwhatreallychangedthewholeintellectualclimateina waythatreverberatesdowntotheeverydaylife ofourmindstodayis probablythefactthatit deniedthatcertainquestionswererationalandhencebanishedthemfromourhorizons.BernhardGroethuysen,the.historianofideas,hasattempted~to show_ inhiswritingshowoaneeviiGddthdI dsappearedfromtheworldinthecourosefthelaterseventeenthandearlyeighteenthcenturies-notaspartofatrendtowardsatheism,butbecausethequestionsaboutthemceasedtoease.owwbkd loNemightsaythattheachievementoftheCritiqueofPureReasonisthatawholeseriesofthesegreatmetaphysical,fundamentalconceptsvanishedfromthehorizonofwhatcouldberationallydecided.Andinthesameway,moderntheology,asithasbeendevelopedbyKarlBarth,followingSofenKierkegaard,hasinsistedwithgreatfeelingonplacingthecategoriesoftheologyinextremeoppositiontoknowledgeandhasarguedthatwhatappliestothemistheparadoxicalconceptoffaith.IfthishasbeenpossibleitisbecauseitisimplicitintheKantiansituation,inthesensethatthesharpdistinctionthatKantmadebetweenknowledgeandthosemetaphysicalcategoriesisafundamentalpremiseforustoday.Thusif wearetospeakofthecritiqueofpurereason,qthiscritiuemustberegardedas neithera negativereply,norindeedas areplyofanysort,tothefundamentalquestionsofphilosophy.Itisratheracritiqueofthosequestions.Itisa critiqueoftheabilityofreasontoposesuchquestions,todothemjustice.WemaysayperhapsthattheenormousimpactoftheCritiqueof PureReasonhasitssourcein thecircumstancethatitwasineffectthefirstworktogiveexpressiontotheelementofbourgeoisresignation,tothatrefusaltomakeanysignificantstatementonthecrucialquestions,andinsteadtosetuphouseinthefiniteworldandexploreitineverydirection,as Goethephrasedit.11Thisisa verydifferentkindofoutlookfromtheradicalatheismofthephi/osophesoftheEnlightenmentsuchas HelvtinsorLaMettrieorHolbach,whoreallydidgivenegativeanswersandinwhosethoughtreasonwassufficientlyconfidenttomakestatementsabouttheAbsolute.Itispreciselythisthatis restrictedinKant.ThecrucialfeatureoftheKantianwork(andthiswillperhapsgiveyouaninsightintoitsinnernature)is thatitisguidedbytheconvictionthatreasonis deniedtherighttostrayintotherealmoftheAbsolute,tostrayintointelligibleworlds',ashetermsit.12Thisexplainswhywecanstandwithbothfeetfirmlyplantedonthegroundanditisthankstothisthatwereallyknowwhatitisthatwecanpositivelyanddefinitelyknow.Wemightalmostsay,then,thatwhathasbeencodifiedintheCri-tt'que ofPureReasonisa theodicyofbourgeoislife whichis consciousMETHODSANDINTENT{ONS7_____________________________________________________________________ofitsownpracticalactivitywhiledespairingofthefulfilmentofitsownutopia.ThepoweroftheCritiqueo(PureReasonresidesnotsomuchinitsresponsestotheso-calledmetaphysicalquestionsasin itshighlyheroicandstoicalrefusaltorespondtothesequestionsin thefirstplace.WhatmakesthispossibleforKantistheself-reflexivenatureofreason.BythisImeanthat,asarationalbeing,Iamcap-ableofreflectingonmyownreason,andthroughthisreflectionI amaetogivemyblselfanaccountofwhatitcanandcannothacieve.Thisdualaspectofself-reflexivityiswhatenablesKanttoclaimthathehasestablishedthefoundationofexperience-inotherwordstheoriginalleadingconceptsofourknowledgeofnature;andontheotherhand,it iswhatpreventsusfromgoingbeyondthisknowledgeandenteringintospeculationsabouttheAbsolute.Nevertheless,Ishouldsayatthispointthattheideaoftheself-reflexivityofreasoncontainsadifficultyandalsoachallengethatonlyemergedfullyinpost-KantianphilosophyandthephilosophyofGermanidealisminthenarrowersense.Thedifficultyis thatwecanenquire,howcanreasoncriticizeitself?Doesnotthefactthatitcriticizesitselfmeanthatitis alwayscaughtupinaprejudice?Thatis tosay,whenreasonjudgesthepossibilityofmakingabsolutestate-ments,doesthisnotnecessarilyimplythatithasalreadymadestate-mentsabouttheAbsolute?Andinfactpost-KantianidealismdidtakeupthisquitesimpleideaandturnitagainstKant.PerhapsthecrucialdistinctionbetweenKantandhissuccessorsisthatinKantthereflexivityofreasonisconceivedinaquitestraightforwardway,muchas withtheEnglishempiricistswhosimilarlydissectthemechan-isms ofreason.ItistruethatatonepointKantdoesmakefunof theconceptofthephysiologyofreasonthathefoundinLockeandwhichventuredsomethingofthesort.13Butwhenwelookmorecloselyatwhathehashimselfdonein theCritiqueofPureReason,wediscoverthatitisrlotallthatfarremovedfromsuchaphysiologyofreason,thatis,fromadissectionofreason,albeitinthecaseofKantonthebasisofprinciples'.Incontrasthissuccessorsthenfaceduptothequestionofwhatitmeansforreasontocriticizeitself-andtheywereledbythatquestionbothtocriticizeKantandtoinferaseriesofanswersthatKanthimselfwasinitiallyunwillingtoprovidewithhiscritique.ButI believethatitwouldbegoodforyoutograsptheideathat,forallKant'snotoriousreputationfordifficulty,hewasarelativelystraightforwardwriterinasmuchashebelieved-withoutwastingtoomuchtimethinkingaboutit-thatreasonisabletotreatof thereoe~kowwile.thdge'tfllsjus,t_anas thffeIsct`,Iaser8LECTUREONEprerequisiteforunderstandingKantthatisabsolutelyindispensableifyouwishtoseewhatisinvolvedinhisphilosophy-connectedwiththisisthefactthatunderlyingKant'sphilosophyliesahugeconfidenceinthemathematicalnaturalsciences;andthathisphilo-sophyisabsolutelyfullofthespiritofthesesciences.IfwewishtograspthechiefinspirationofthewholeCritiqueofPureReason,wemightlocateitin theideathattheattemptsofmetaphysicstoarriveatabsolutecertaintiesbyspinningthemoutof merethoughthaveallfailed-andHumewasrighttocriticizethem.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatweshoulddespairbecause,thankstothepersuasiveforceofthemathematicalsciences-particularlymathematicsitselfandwhattodaywewouldcalltheoreticalphysics-wepossessanentirebodyof knowledgethatactuallydoessatisfythecriterionof absolutetruth.Kant'sachievementonlybecomescomprehensibleontheassumptionthatscienceprovidestheabsoluteknowledgewhichmerelyabstractspeculationhadfailedtodeliver.Ibelievethattosaythisisenoughtoeliminateoneofthediffi-cutiestattentlhdocropupinthemindoftheso-'calleddnaivereaerwhoembarksupontheCritiqueofPureReasonforthefirst time.ForKantbeginswiththequestionHoware synthetica priorijudgementspossible?'(Thiscomesin theIntroductionandit isexploredatlengthinthecourseofthebOOk.14)ThisisoneofthechiefquestionsoftheCritiqueofPureReason.Withoutbotheringwithanylongdrawn-outpreamblesIshouldliketosaysomethingaboutthesignificanceofthisquestion.ButfirstI wanttocommentontheshockcontainedintheexpressionHowaretheypossible?'Forwhenthespeculativephilosopherapproachesthisbookheexpectsacompletelydifferentquestion,namely,Aresyntheticapriorijudgements,inotherwords,bIIvliasouteyadstatements,possible?ThisquestionisnotputintheCritiqueofPureReason.15 Youcansee hereplainlyhowdifficultitistounderstandaworksimplybyreadingthetext,withoutanypriorassumptions.Andif alecturecourselikethisone(andeverylecturecourseoncomparabletopics)hasanyjustificationbeyondthemerefactthatitisadvertisedintheuniversitylectureprogramme,thisjustificationmustsurelybesoughtintherealizationthatsuchworkscannotsimplybeunderstoodontheirown.Thisisnotmeantin theominousschoolmasterlysensethatyouneedtoknowthehistoricalcontextsoas tobeabletoplacethemcorrectly-I amquiteindiffer-enttosuchmatters-butin ordertograspthefactthattheproblemsunderdiscussionareonlycomprehensibleifyouarefamiliarwithcertainforcefieldswithinwhichphilosophiesmaybesaidtomove.Kant'sworkiscalledTheCritiqueofPureReason,andtheem-phasisheredoubtlessfallsonthewordcritique'.InessencethereisMETHODSANDINTENTIONS9_____________________________________________________________________nothingnewinthissincewemightsaythattheentirehistoryofphilosophyisnothingbutonevastnexusofcriticismwhichhasledconsciousnesstoitsideas,itsconceptsandultimatelytoitself.InthissensetheCritiqueofPureReasonisanencounterofphilosophywithIlse.uswaw.lfThhflishtosayisthatthisstrangeformulaHowaresynthetica priorijudgementspossible?'doesbecomemeaningfulandatthesametimeitrevealssomethingoftheentirecomplexion,theInnerworIng"ksofKant'sthought.Itdoessobecausewhatlistruysubstantial,theelementthatseemstoconstituteitsunquestionabletruth,manifestsitselfin theshapeofthesyntheticapriorijudgementsandbecauseitdoesnotspinthetruthabstractlyfromwithinitself,butproceedsfromthetruth,as Kantcallsit,asif fromagiven',andstickstoknowledgethatitholdstobetrueandabsolute.Letmetellyourightawaywhatsyntheticapriorijudgementsare.Forgivemeif Ispeakataratherbasiclevel,butif IamtotakeseriouslymyownfictionthatyouknownothingofKant,thereis nootherwayforward.I muststartbytellingyouwhata judgementis.Youallhaveamoreorlessvagueideaofwhatismeant,butIamsureit is Vaue.lugtheoldtraditionoflogic,judSementsweredefinedastheunionofsubject,predicateandcopula-thatistosay,anobjectwhichcorrespondsingrammaticaltermstoasubjecthassome-thingdifferentpredicatedofit.Thisisexpressedintheformofis',asinAisB'.Thisisasomewhatsuperficialcharacterizationofajudgementbecauseitpresupposesthatthesecomponentsarediscreteentities,whichisnotinfactthecase.Moreover,theimpliedidentityofA = Bisproblematicbecauseingeneraltheconceptbeneathwhichaspecificthingissubsumedisalwaysbroaderthanthatthing,sothatthejudgcmcntisbothidcnticalandnon-identical.Youencounterdifficultiesofallkindsherewiththeconsequencethatajudgementisdefinedasastateofaffairsofwhichitismeaningfultoaskwhetheritistrueorfalse.Ifsuchastateofaffairsisexpressedinwordsitiscustomarytocallitaproposition[Satz],butthisdistinctionplaysnosignificantroleinKant.InKantweheargenerallyofjudgements',eventhoughitispropositionsthataregenerallymeantandnottheInterconnectionsbetweenprimitive,pre-linguisticconcepts.Judgementsmaybesyntheticoranalytic.Thismeansthatthecon-cePtin thepredicateaddssomethingtotheconceptin thesubject,or,moreprecisely,theconceptinthepredicateisnotcontainedinthatofthesubject.Wherethatisnotthecase,thatistosay,if wehaveajudgementthataddssomethingnewandiswhatwemaycallanampliativejudgement',thenwespeakofsyntheticjudgements.Andhrethatisnothecase., wertheprcdateissiplya, repeti~on_____________________________________________________________________JOLECTUREONEwespeakof analyticjudgements.In thatcasethejudgementisa mereanalysis,amereanalysisofitsownsubject;itmerelymakesexplicitwhatisalreadycontainedinthesubject.Inotherwords,analyticjudgementsarereallyalltautologies.Kantcombinestheseconceptswiththeadditionalconceptsofaprioriandaposteriori.Itis self-evidentthattheanalyticjudgementsareall apriori,thatistosay,theyarevalidabsolutelyanduncondi-tionally-preciselybecausetheyaretautologous.Becausetheyare'a,ctuallynotJudgementsatalltheycannotberefuted.Theyaresim-plyrepetitionsof definitionsthatarepresupposed.Syntheticjudge-ments,ontheotherhand,canbeeitherapriorioraposteriori.Thismeansthatif youmakeastatementaboutsomething,formajudge-mentaboutit,thenthisjudgementmayeitherarisefromexperience(Kantwouldsay)oritcanbenecessaryeventhoughit isnotalreadycontainedintheconcept.Thusif yousay,Allmenaremortal',thatisajudgementofexperience,sincemortalityisnotimplicitassuchintheconceptofmen'However,whenyousayAllbodiesareextended',thatis a synthetica priorijudgement.16 It meansthatexten-sionis notcontainedintheconceptof thebody,butnotwithstandingthatallbodiesnecessarilypossessthequalityofextension.Youwinowll askme-andthisbringsmebackhtoteGreatElectorandtothequestionofwhetherhehasa wigorapigtail-youmaywellobject:forgoodness'sake,thisissupposedtobethemostimportantworkinthehistoryofphilosophyandnowwehavetoendureanaccountofhowsyntheticaprtorijudgementsarepossible.Wehavetoputupwithlisteningtotheassertionthatjudgementsarepossiblewhichsaysomethingnew,butwhicharevalidforalltime. . . OnthispointwehavetosaythattheconceptoftruthinKant-andthisisprofoundlyboundupwithbourgeoisthought-isitselfthatofatimelesstruth.Tobeabsolute'forKantmeansasmuchas tobeirrefutablebythepassageoftime;anabsolutelysecuresiposseson;somethingthatcannotbetakenawayfromyou,thatyoucankeepsafeinyourownhandsforever.Theconceptofatimelesstruth,theconceptthatonlythatwhichistimelesscanbegenuinelytrue,whereaswhatevercanberefutedcannotreallyaspiretotheconceptoftruth-thatisoneoftheinnermostdrivingforcesofKantianphilosophy.Andif,finally,theideaofimmortalityappearsasoneofthesupremeideas,thatprovidesyouwiththekeytotheenormousemotionalweightthatthisconceptof ana priort statushasin Kant.Whatheis concernedwithinhisworkisa kindoftenderingofaccountsinwhichheseekstocrystallizethosetruthsthatIenduppossessingwithabsolutecertainty,withoutincurringanydebtsandwithouttheirbeingexposedtoanyclaimsthroughthepassageof