The Rwandan Genocide

The Rwandan GenocideJI HYE PARK JINSUH CHOIJONATHAN CURRY

Historical Background

Belgian Colonies in Rwanda

Hutu Rebellion

Hutu Rise to Power

President Habyarimana

In 1994, Rwanda’s population of seven million was composed of three ethnic groups:

Hutu (approximately 85%) Tutsi (14%) and Twa (1%).

-Tutsi considered political and economic elite

-Traditional, no ethnic disputes

Belgian colonists designate Tutsi as superior, Hutu as inferior.

-Altered perceptions of economic and political disparity

-Hutu rebel in 1959, aim to overthrow Tutsi rule

-Belgian forces withdraw in 1961

Following the UN supervised referendum in 1961, the Hutu rise to power.

-Remained under UN trusteeship for until the nation became independent

President Habyarimana-Strong anti-Tutsi upbringing; instinctual support for Hutu superiority

-Planned to share power with Tutsis/moderate Hutus to resolve issues

-Faced with heavy international pressure and violent civil war

President Habyarimana’s plane is shot down.

Almost immediately, violence breaks out.

The genocide goes into full swing.

April 6th, 1994

International Response

UNAMIR

Arusha

UNAMIR II

UN forces in Rwanda were insufficient

-The UNAMIR was present, but ill equipped to handle a genocide

-Security Council called for withdrawal

Arusha Peace Agreement

-Signed August 4th, 1993

-Aimed towards the creation of a broad-based government and establishment of peace-Lacked capacity to address issues like genocide

UNAMIR II-Security Council calls for troop decrease to a force of about 270 -Remaining troops were to be used for negotiations and relief efforts, not military operations

A later revision of UNAMIR II led to the deployment of 5,000+ troops, but by the time they arrived hundreds of thousands of lives had already been lost.

Tipping Points & Key Decisions

Ethnic Elitism

Acts of Extremism

Arusha

Implementation of UNAMIR I

Implementation of UNAMIR II

Ethnic Elitism

Post-WWII Belgian colonists designate Tutsi as “civilized” and Hutu as inferior.

-Ethnic context altered perceptions

-Was not a catalyst of genocide, though nevertheless crucial

Acts of ExtremismThe threat of losing power political and economic power via the Arusha Process led Hutu extremists to begin preparing their ‘final solution.’

-Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique

-Radio Television Libre Mille Collines

-Assassination (?) of the President

UNAMIR I & III

-Hesitancy of those who could provide the most support shows extremists that they can “act with impunity.”

-DPKO refuses Dallaire’s request to disarm militia units that posed a threat to the UNAMIR presence.

-Belgian government withdraws contingent after Prime Minister is killed.

II

-Resolution 912 led to the drastic reduction of UNAMIR forces.

-Resolution 918’s planned course of action is delayed beyond the ideal date of deployment.

Failures of the International Community

Before

• The international communities should have considered ‘final solution’ as serious

matter

• Under Chapter VII, UN was able to use military force in order of peacekeeping and

prevent civilian’s security

Failures of the International Community

Before

• Let Hutus extremists be involved in Arusha peace process

• France should have took an action because it knew that there will be a genocide

happening in Rwanda

Failures of the International Community

After• Situations in Rwanda should have conveyed faster

to non-permanent members of the UN• Resolution 912 was not supposed to be passed

• Should have nominated the situation in Rwanda as ‘genocide’ and expose the condition to media

• Security Council should have interpreted the massacre as a ‘threat to the peace’ under Article

39 of UN Charter, and shift the mandate of UNAMIR

Failures of the International Community

After• Boutros Ghali should have expressed stronger with

his opinion about sending additional military force and broadened understanding of Chapter VII.

• Take control over radio station of Hutus, so that they could not give orders to kill people all over.

• If The US should have supported with weapons immediately. Also, it was the president’s

responsibility to move public's moral opinion to help Rwandans.

Failures of the International Community

After• France could have saved more lives of Rwandan if

they intervened with pure humanitarian motives• Rather than criticizing French intervention at the

last minute, other countries should have helped France

• Every country was only searching for its own benefit, being apathetic to loss of innocent lives. If they were more sympathetic, the genocide would

not have happened.

Wheeler AssessmentSupreme Humanitarian Emergency

5/5

Necessity5/5

Last Resort3/5

Proportionality2/5Positive Humanitarian Outcome

1/5

Humanitarian Justifications1/5

Legality4/5

Selectivity1.5/5

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Rwanda, Post-Genocide

International Response

&

Key Players in the Intervention

Justice System

International Responseand Key Players

-President Clinton and members of his Administration go on “pilgrimages of contrition”

-Force Commander Dallaire: “I cannot find any solace in saying ‘I did my best’.”

Justice System-UN establishes the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

-Traditional gacaca courts are repurposed

-Nearly 20 years after the end of the genocide, the courts are still active

Referenced Works

Global Bystander to Genocide: International Society and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. Wheeler, Nicholas.

Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Implications for International Criminal Law and Transitional Justice. Powers, Shannon E.

Ghosts of Rwanda. Frontline documentary.