Upload
meara
View
41
Download
0
Tags:
Embed Size (px)
DESCRIPTION
The Rwandan Genocide. JI HYE PARK JINSUH CHOI JONATHAN CURRY. Historical Background. Belgian Colonies in Rwanda. Hutu Rebellion. Hutu Rise to Power. President Habyarimana. In 1994, Rwanda’s population of seven million was composed of three ethnic groups: Hutu (approximately 85% ) - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Citation preview
The Rwandan GenocideJI HYE PARK JINSUH CHOIJONATHAN CURRY
Historical Background
Belgian Colonies in Rwanda
Hutu Rebellion
Hutu Rise to Power
President Habyarimana
In 1994, Rwanda’s population of seven million was composed of three ethnic groups:
Hutu (approximately 85%) Tutsi (14%) and Twa (1%).
-Tutsi considered political and economic elite
-Traditional, no ethnic disputes
Belgian colonists designate Tutsi as superior, Hutu as inferior.
-Altered perceptions of economic and political disparity
-Hutu rebel in 1959, aim to overthrow Tutsi rule
-Belgian forces withdraw in 1961
Following the UN supervised referendum in 1961, the Hutu rise to power.
-Remained under UN trusteeship for until the nation became independent
President Habyarimana-Strong anti-Tutsi upbringing; instinctual support for Hutu superiority
-Planned to share power with Tutsis/moderate Hutus to resolve issues
-Faced with heavy international pressure and violent civil war
President Habyarimana’s plane is shot down.
Almost immediately, violence breaks out.
The genocide goes into full swing.
April 6th, 1994
International Response
UNAMIR
Arusha
UNAMIR II
UN forces in Rwanda were insufficient
-The UNAMIR was present, but ill equipped to handle a genocide
-Security Council called for withdrawal
Arusha Peace Agreement
-Signed August 4th, 1993
-Aimed towards the creation of a broad-based government and establishment of peace-Lacked capacity to address issues like genocide
UNAMIR II-Security Council calls for troop decrease to a force of about 270 -Remaining troops were to be used for negotiations and relief efforts, not military operations
A later revision of UNAMIR II led to the deployment of 5,000+ troops, but by the time they arrived hundreds of thousands of lives had already been lost.
Tipping Points & Key Decisions
Ethnic Elitism
Acts of Extremism
Arusha
Implementation of UNAMIR I
Implementation of UNAMIR II
Ethnic Elitism
Post-WWII Belgian colonists designate Tutsi as “civilized” and Hutu as inferior.
-Ethnic context altered perceptions
-Was not a catalyst of genocide, though nevertheless crucial
Acts of ExtremismThe threat of losing power political and economic power via the Arusha Process led Hutu extremists to begin preparing their ‘final solution.’
-Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique
-Radio Television Libre Mille Collines
-Assassination (?) of the President
UNAMIR I & III
-Hesitancy of those who could provide the most support shows extremists that they can “act with impunity.”
-DPKO refuses Dallaire’s request to disarm militia units that posed a threat to the UNAMIR presence.
-Belgian government withdraws contingent after Prime Minister is killed.
II
-Resolution 912 led to the drastic reduction of UNAMIR forces.
-Resolution 918’s planned course of action is delayed beyond the ideal date of deployment.
Failures of the International Community
Before
• The international communities should have considered ‘final solution’ as serious
matter
• Under Chapter VII, UN was able to use military force in order of peacekeeping and
prevent civilian’s security
Failures of the International Community
Before
• Let Hutus extremists be involved in Arusha peace process
• France should have took an action because it knew that there will be a genocide
happening in Rwanda
Failures of the International Community
After• Situations in Rwanda should have conveyed faster
to non-permanent members of the UN• Resolution 912 was not supposed to be passed
• Should have nominated the situation in Rwanda as ‘genocide’ and expose the condition to media
• Security Council should have interpreted the massacre as a ‘threat to the peace’ under Article
39 of UN Charter, and shift the mandate of UNAMIR
Failures of the International Community
After• Boutros Ghali should have expressed stronger with
his opinion about sending additional military force and broadened understanding of Chapter VII.
• Take control over radio station of Hutus, so that they could not give orders to kill people all over.
• If The US should have supported with weapons immediately. Also, it was the president’s
responsibility to move public's moral opinion to help Rwandans.
Failures of the International Community
After• France could have saved more lives of Rwandan if
they intervened with pure humanitarian motives• Rather than criticizing French intervention at the
last minute, other countries should have helped France
• Every country was only searching for its own benefit, being apathetic to loss of innocent lives. If they were more sympathetic, the genocide would
not have happened.
Wheeler AssessmentSupreme Humanitarian Emergency
5/5
Necessity5/5
Last Resort3/5
Proportionality2/5Positive Humanitarian Outcome
1/5
Humanitarian Justifications1/5
Legality4/5
Selectivity1.5/5
-----------------------------------------
Rwanda, Post-Genocide
International Response
&
Key Players in the Intervention
Justice System
International Responseand Key Players
-President Clinton and members of his Administration go on “pilgrimages of contrition”
-Force Commander Dallaire: “I cannot find any solace in saying ‘I did my best’.”
Justice System-UN establishes the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
-Traditional gacaca courts are repurposed
-Nearly 20 years after the end of the genocide, the courts are still active
Referenced Works
Global Bystander to Genocide: International Society and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. Wheeler, Nicholas.
Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Implications for International Criminal Law and Transitional Justice. Powers, Shannon E.
Ghosts of Rwanda. Frontline documentary.