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8/9/2019 Toward Theory of Antiliterature
1/16
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Liberation of Difference: Toward a Theory of AntiliteratureAuthor(s): Mark D. SeemSource: New Literary History, Vol. 5, No. 1, What Is Literature? (Autumn, 1973), pp. 119-133Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/468411Accessed: 10-03-2015 06:36 UTC
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8/9/2019 Toward Theory of Antiliterature
2/16
Liberation
f
Difference:
Toward a
Theory
of
Antiliterature
Mark
D.
Seem
I. DiscursiveonstraintsndRepresentation
CCW
HAT
IS
'WRITING'
(that
of
writers')
f
not
a
...
form f
subjection,
perhaps
taking rather different
orms,
ut
whose main
stresses
re nonetheless nalogous,"'
asks
Michel Foucault in
L'Ordre
du discours
"The
Order
of
Discourse,"
translated s
"The
Discourse
on
Language").
The
"order of
discourse"
is
our
starting
oint,
hen.
Is
there
"machine
de
guerre,"
a
literary
discoursewhich
might
have the
status
of
a
counterdiscourse,
n anti-
literature?
f such
be
the
case,
what
exactly
s
different
bout
thisnew
type
of discursive
ctivity;
what
are
the
conditions nd
nature of this
difference? shall first
ttempt
o
explain
these theoretical
roblems,
relying
specially
n the
critical/theoretical
ctivity
f Michel Foucault
and
Gilles
Deleuze.3
Next,
I shall
analyze
briefly
few
passages
from
Proust'sRemembrance
f
Things
Past,
as an
example
of such a counter-
discourse.
In "The
Discourse
on
Language,"
Foucault
defines
discursive
on-
straints nd examinesthe whole interplay f limitation, arefaction,
and
appropriation
f discourse.
First,
he
delineates
those
constraints
imposed
from
without:
excluded and forbidden
peech,
the division
I
The
Discourse
on
Language
(L'Ordre
du
Discours),
tr.
Rupert Swyer,
n
Social
Science
Information
(April
1971),
pp.
7-30,
and included
as an
appendix
to
the
English
translation
of
L'archdologie
du Savoir
(The
Archeology
of Knowledge)
(New
York,
1972).
This
paper
was
originally presented
by
Foucault as
his
in-
augural
lecture
at the
College
de
France.
2
"Machine
de
guerre"
means
literally
war
machine,"
and is an
expression
used
by
Deleuze
and
Guattari
in
Capitalisme
et
schizophrenie: L'Anti-Oedipe (Paris,
1972).
3
Particularly
Foucault's
theoretical
works: Madness
and
Civilization,
The
Order
of Things,
The
Archeology
f
Knowledge,
and The Discourse on
Language.
Deleuze's
major
works are
unfortunately
ot
yet
translated, except
for
the
book on
Proust,
and
are:
Nietzsche
et
la
philosophie,
La
logique
du
sens,
Difdrence
et
rdpitition,
Proust
and
Signs,
culminating
in
his most
recent
work with
F6lix
Guattari,
Capitalisme
et
schizophrdnie.
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8/9/2019 Toward Theory of Antiliterature
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120
NEW LITERARY HISTORY
betweenreason and
madness,4
nd the
volontg
e
ve'rit6
will
to
truth).
Here,
as
Foucault
emphasizes,
t is
mainly
matter
f
collective
ower
and
singular
desire: that
power
which marksdiscoursewith taboos
and
prohibitions
sexual
taboos and
political prohibitions,
or ex-
ample),
which
imposes
silence
on
certain
discourses
in
the case
of
"madness"),
and
which forbids lies." Discourse
would,
therefore,
ay
only
what
is
permitted,
r
what Reason
permits
o tell the
Truth
of
the
world.
This last
constraint,
hat
will to truth
which
s
always
the
result
of an
interplay
f
power
and
authority,
overns
he
other two.
Speaking
of literature
oucault
says:
"All those
who,
at
one
moment
or another
n our
history,
ave
attempted
o mould this
will
to truth
and to turn it
against
truth,
t that
very
point
where truthunder-
takes
to
justify
he
taboo
and to define
madness;
all
those,
from
Nietzsche
to Artaud
and
Bataille,
must now stand as
(probably
haughty)
signposts
or all
our future
work."5
Foucault
then focuses
on the internal
procedures,
where
discourse
itself
xercises
ts own
control. Here it is
no
longer
question
of desire
and
power,
but
rather
of
events
and chance
as
they
establish
the
boundaries
of
discourse.
First,
here
s
critical
ommentary-that
ac-
tivity estined orestatewhat was already aidor writtenntheprimary
text,
which serves
s a
basis for
the
meta-identity
f
the
commentary.
Critical
commentarymerely
engages
in a
repetitive
ct of
mimesis,
forging deceptive
copy
of the
primary
ext.
Furthermore,
hefunc-
tion
of
the author
also
limits the
contingency
f
discourse
and
its
status
s
event.
It
is,
in
fact,
lways
the
position
f the
author
vis-a-vis
his textwhich
places
his
discourse.
oucault
suggests,
or
example,
hat
the
anonymity
f
scientific
iscourse,
where one
is
concerned
only
with
a
"truth"
ccessible
o
everyone,
s
opposed
to
both the
singularity
(and responsibility) f the author n the literature f the eighteenth
century
nd to
the
disappearing
uthor of the
contemporary
iterary
stage
such
as
Beckett
and
other
anonymous,
or
quasi-anonymous,
figures.
Where
it
was
once
asked
(and
certain
iterary
riticism e-
mands)
that
the author
guarantee
the
unity
of
his
work and
subtly
demonstrate
he
hidden
meaning
runningthrough
t,
it would
now
appear
that these
demands are no
longer
valid
in
relation
o this
anti-
literary
iscourse.
Chance
and discursive vent are
thereby
imited
by
an
identity
n the form of the
individuality
nd the I of the
author
(even though
this
may
hide behind the fradulent oice of a third
4
See Madness and Civilization:
A
History of Insanity
in
the
Age
of
Reason
(New
York,
1965)
for an
in
depth
discussion
of
this division.
5
The Discourse
on
Language.
Reference
to
subsequent
quotes
from this book
will be
given
as
page
numbers in
parentheses
in the
text.
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8/9/2019 Toward Theory of Antiliterature
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8/9/2019 Toward Theory of Antiliterature
5/16
I22
NEW LITERARY
HISTORY
if
not
a
similar
ystem
f
qualification
f
the
writer/author
s
precisely
the one who
"represents"
he
truth;
f not a
representation
estined
o
a closed circle of readers;if not,finally, he
privileged roperty
f a
group
of
people
who have
it
in
their
power
to
say
what
will
fall
into
this
category
f
"literary"
iscourse-that
is
to
say,
this
ominous
circle
of
university
iterary
riticismwhich
fixes,
by
itself,
he role of
the
author
and
the
status
of
this
discourse?
According
o
Foucault,
there
are a certainnumber
of
philosophical
themes
which
respond
o these
imitations
nd constraints
nd,
at
the
same
time,
reinforce hem.
First,
philosophy proposes
an
"ideal
truth" nd an "immanentrationality"s, respectively,he law of dis-
course and the
principle
of
its
ordering.
Next,
philosophy
einforces
the
power
and breadth
of
these limitations
y negating
the
specific
reality
of
discourse.
It
performs
his
in three
ways:
first,
he
con-
cept
of the
"founding
ubject":
Writing/speaking
ubjects
are
seen
as
carriers
f
meaning,
rather han as those who
practice
discourse-
a
prodigious
gnorance
of the
reality
f
discourse Second
there
s
the
notion
of
the
"originating
xperience,"
which
presupposes primary
complicity
ith
the world-a worldthatwould
open
itself o a
reading
in orderto disengage he mmanentmeaning. Such a viewreveals he
world
as made
of
meanings
and
ideas,
and
analysis
need
only
focus
its
glance
on
this
"meaning-full"
urface
to
decipher
the world-Book.
Last of
all,
there
s the
forbidding
heme
of
mediation,
f the
universal
mediation
of discourse. Here
it
is
simply
matter
of
retrieving
he
movement
of a
logos
so as
to
permit
consciousness to
".
.
.
deploy
all
the
rationality
n
the
world"
(p.
228).
This
is
a
subtle denial of
the
reality
f
discourse
ince,
nstead
of
putting
iscourse
tself n the
center
of
analytical ctivity,
ne
finds here
ogos,
as
a discourse
lready,
nd
forever, ronounced: "Discourse is no longermore than the shim-
mering
f
a truth bout to be
born n
its own
eyes
.
."
(p.
228).
As
Foucault
himself tresses
igorously,
n each case
philosophy
oes
nothing
but
suppress
he
reality
f discourse
by
means
of a
game-
specifically,
game
of
signs:
"Discourse thus nullifies
tself,
n
reality,
in
placing
tself
t the
disposal
of the
signifier"
p.
228).
He
adds that
at the
present
ime there
s not
only
a
simple
veneration f discourse
which
pretends
o
liberate
t but
also a
logophilia.
But,
as
he
hastens
o
add,
underneath
his
apparent
ogophilia
a
sort
of
fear
hides
furtively,
a
very
real
logophobia Specifically,
t is a fear of ". ..
everything
that could
possibly
be
violent,
discontinuous,
uerelous,
disordered
even and
perilous
n
it,
of the
ncessant,
isorderly
uzzing
of
discourse"
(p.
229).
In
order
to
analyze,
and
perhaps
mitigate,
his
fear n
all
its condi-
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8/9/2019 Toward Theory of Antiliterature
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LIBERATION OF
DIFFERENCE
123
tions,
one
must
make,
according
to
Foucault,
three
methodological
decisions:
".
. .
to
question
our will
to
truth;
o
restore o discourse
ts
character s an event; to abolish the sovereigntyf the signifier" p.
229).
This
form
f
analysis
proposed
by
Foucault
is,
clearly,
pposed
point
by
point
to the
traditional
onstraints
perating
n discourse nd
to a structural
pproach:
"...
the
analysis
of
discourse hus
under-
stood,
does not reveal the
universality
f a
meaning,
but
brings
to
light
he
action of
mposedrarity,
ith
fundamental
ower
of affirma-
tion.
Rarity
nd
affirmation;
arity,
n
the ast
resort,
f affirmation-
certainly
ot
any
continuous
utpouring
f
meaning,
nd
certainly
ot
any monarchyof
the
signifier" p. 234, my italics).
It
is therefore
necessary
o detach oneselffrom
every
notionof a
primary
dentity;
liberate oneself
from
any
idea
of an
original logos
as
founder
of
meaning
and from
the constraints f
representation
y
divorcing
oneself,
finally
and most
importantly,
rom the
Hegelian system
and
its
concept
of
totality.
In
short,
one must
change
the
point
of
attack,
the
position
of
analysis,
nd become
situated
at the level
of
the
game,
or better
yet,
n
the entire
theater
of
difference.
One
should
no
longer
peak
of a
repetition
f
identities
nd
resemblances;
one should iberatediscourse, iveback to itthereality f tspractice-
as
a
real
event.
This can
be
accomplished
by becoming
aware
of
differences,
y
seeing
n
discursive
ctivity
ot
ust
a
game
of
representa-
tion,
but
rather
repetition
f
difference.
We
must
study
that
which
makes
any
discourse
ifferent
rom ll
others,
nd
it
is
essential hat we
show what
constitutes
he
difference
f
different
iscursive
practices
in order o
measure heir
power
of affirmation.t
is therefore
ecessary
to
engage
n
an
analytical
practice
which
s
totally
pposed
to
any
and
all
analyses
of
representation,
y taking
part
in a
very
real
struggle
againstsuch analyses. In orderto study he "conditions fpossibility"
of
discourse,
we must have an anticriticaldiscourse.
The discourse
of
Foucault,
as well as that of
Deleuze,
seemsto me to be
exactly
hat:
a
counterdiscourse
which
liberates
difference.
It
is
essential
o
define
briefly
hat
they
mean
by
difference,
epeti-
tion,
multiplicity,
nd
intensive eries.
Then
we
might
be
able
to
analyze
another
orm f counterdiscourse:
literary
iscourse
pposed
at
every
evel
to
the
dentity
f
an
author,
o the
repetition
f the
same,
and to
representation-an
antiliterature
hich
destroys
t
every
mo-
mentall
concepts
f
totality,
literary
iscoursewhich
extends,
t least
in
the
French
novel,
fromProust
(the
originator
f this
"machine"?)
to Beckett
who
is
indeed the
one who
goes
the
farthest,
he one
who
never
tops
going
as far
as
possible
n that
impossible irection).
Fol-
lowing
Nietzsche's
philosophical
discourse,
his
anti-literary
iscourse
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124
NEW
LITERARY
HISTORY
also sets
itself
against
the
original
and
universal
ogos-to
become
ANTI-LOGOS.6
II.
Liberation of
Difference:
A Tool of
Affirmation
As
Deleuze
states
n
L'Anti-Oedipe,
it was Maurice
Blanchot who
posed
the
problem
t the
level of
the
literary
machine."
7
How does
one conceive
fragments
hich
are
joined
by
a relation
f differentiation
without
any
reference o
an
original
totality? Obviously,
an idea of
multiplicity
s
needed,
an
affirmative
hought
rreducible
o a
unity.
In other words
(and
keeping
n mind what Foucault
perceived
as a
fearof the
reality
f
discourse),
what
exactly
re the
forceswhich
move
under the
repetition
f the
same?
According
to
Deleuze,
"the
art of
the
contemporary
ovel revolves
round
difference nd
repetition."8
But
what
exactly
does Deleuze
mean
by
repetition
nd
difference?
He
states his
position
on
repetition
t the
outset of
Difference
t
repe'tition:
Repetition
s
a
behavior,
ut in terms
f
somethingnique
and
singular,whichhas neither ikeness or
equivalence.
And
perhaps
this
repetition
as external
onduct echoes
in turn
a
more
secret
vibration,
n
inner
repetition
ven more
profound
n its
generatingingularity.
estivals
ave
no other
apparent paradox:
to
repeat
an
event
which is
"irricom-
men
able"
(un-beginnable).
t is
not
a matter
f
adding
a second
and
a
third
ime
to
the
first,
ut rather
f
raising
he
first
imeto the
"nth"
power.9
The
point
of
departure
s therefore
ingularity
tself,
n
opposition
o
thenotionof "primarydentity"n representationaliscourse. Strictly
speaking,
representation
s a
type
of
repetition-a
repetition
f
the
same,
of
identity,
f likeness.
Repetition
can
always
be
represented.
But
"pure"
repetition
s
practiced
against
all
law,
it is
transgression.
It was
the
man
of
duty
and
honor who invented
the
ordeal
of the
repetition
f
the same
(and
of
good),
and
it
is
against
these
concepts
of
good
and
the
same,
and
also
against
generality habit
and
repre-
sentation)
that
repetition
unctions.
In
opposing repetition
o
gen-
6
Gilles
Deleuze,
Proust and
Signs,
tr. Richard Howard
(New
York,
1972);
see
the
chapter
"Anti-Logos."
7 L'Anti-Oedipe, p. 50.
8
Diffdrence
t
rdpetition,
Introduction," my
translation.
9
Diffe'rence
t
rdpitition,
p.
8.
My
translations-further
referenceswill
appear
in the text
as
page
indications.
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LIBERATION OF DIFFERENCE
125
erality,
n
setting
up repetition
gainst
habit and
the
peculiarities
f
memory,
ne
sees that
forgetting
L'OUBLI)
becomes a
positive
orce
-in fact,one forgets ecause one repeats. When we speak of repre-
sentation,
we
are also
speaking
of
mediation:
repetition
perates
n
order to
break
through
his
obstruction:
"it is a matter
of
producing
...
a movement
apable
of
exciting
he
mind
beyond
ll
representation;
of
nventing
ibrations
nd intensities"
p. Io).
Hegel's
dialectics,
ays
Deleuze,
depends
on "bare"
repetition,
repetition
f
surfaces
nd the
same:
hence a
representation
hich
blocks
difference. here
are,
then,
at
least two
types
of
repetition:
bare
repetition,
f
the
same
(where
it
is
a
matter
f
the
identity
f
concepts-a
static and
negativerepeti-
tion),
and "dressed"
repetition
where
it is a
question
of masks and
simulacrums),
a
repetition
f difference
hich
is
affirmative
nd
dy-
namic.
When
Hegel
speaks
of the
resolution
f
contradictions,
f the
nega-
tion of differences
n orderto rise
above
them,
he
is
at the
same
time
referring
o the
religious oncept
of
union:
"Here
is
union,
n
which
the differencesf thesecharacteristicsre
done
away
with
...
."
Who
can
deny
the
fundamentally eligious
(faithful)
nature of
Hegel's
dialectics? For him, resolution f contradictionsdifferences) eems
to
be
achieved
in
a
religious
way,
through worship
(mediation).
Essentially,
hen,
is
it
not
indeed
possible
that
the
whole
notion of
resolving
contradictions
those
annoying
differences )
n order to
reach a
synthesis-above
differences-and to
reach the
totality
f the
ALL
is,
in its most
profound
regions,nothing
ess
than the nihilistic
representation
f the Christian
movement
f the
negation
f differences
(as
in the
Trinity,
nd
especially
he
contradictory
tatus of
the
Son,
Christ,
who
cannot
achieve a
union
with
God
except
by
his own
nega-
tion-through death ), a negation broughtabout by the totalizing
action
of faith?
The ruse of
Christianity,
hich
is also
Hegel's
ruse,
takes the
form
of a mathematical "miracle": make ONE out of
THREE,
rise
bove
DIFFERENCES
to UNITY If
such
be the
case,
is it not
also
possible
that
all
dialectics,
by
their
very
form,
bear the
weight
f this
religious tamp-the
stamp
of FAITH in
a
totality
bove
multiplicity,
ingularities,
nd differences? o
combat
this
nihilistic
faith,
ne needsa
thought
f
ntensity
nd
multiplicity,
thought
which,
instead
of
looking
for
a common denominator nder or
above
differ-
ences,
thinksdifference
differentially."
Referring
o
Deleuze's
own
discourse,
oucault
writes
n
"Theatrum
Philosophicum"
Critique [Nov. 1971])
:
"Let us
pervert ood
sense,
and
make
thought
lay
outside he ordered
category
f
resemblances,"
and
he
adds,
"One mustthink
hought
s
intensive
rregularity-dis-
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I26
NEW LITERARY HISTORY
integration
f
the
subject."'1
It
is
not
a
question
here of the
"true"
thought
r of the "true"
analytical
method: rather t is
a
matter f a
thought, ow
possible
and unavoidable,which s intensive,nd of an
analysis
which liberates
differences.
n
short,
s Deleuze never
stops
repeating
fter
Nietzsche,
we must construct different HEATER
for
this new form
of
thought.
We
need different
asks and
gestures.
We must
develop
a
thought
which
goes beyond
contradictions,
eyond
good
and evil. Foucault
puts
t well:
To
liberate
ifference,
e
need a
thought
ithout
ontradictions,
ithout
dialectics,
without
egation:
a
thought
which
ays
yes
to
divergence;
n
affirmativehoughtwhose instruments disjunction; thought f the
multiple-of
dispersed
nd nomadic
multiplicity
hich
no
constraints
f
the Same
can
limit
r
regroup
.
.
that s
to
say [applicable]
to a multi-
plicity
f
discernible
oints
whichbecome
displaced
as
one
distinguishes
their
onditions,
nd
which nsists
nd
subsists
n
an
interplay
f
repeti-
tions.
("Theatrum
Philosophicum,"
.
899)
To
speak
of
difference
n
termsof contradictions
s
to undertake
a
violent
negation
of one of the
differences
hich
s
"contradictory,"
n
orderto reach a resolution. n so doing,one negatesthe entirenature
of differentiation
y
staying
within
both a
concept
of
totality
nd
the
limitsof
representation.
ou
do not
resolve
differences;
ou
analyze
their onditions nd
affirm
heir
eality.
When
dealing
with this first
epetition
of
the
Same),
where
dif-
ference
s static
and
subjected
to
identities,
e are in
a
theater
whose
movement
s
horizontal
nd
negative.
But in the
case of this
second
repetition,
hat
of
difference,
t is a
question
of a theaterof
intensity
and
dynamics.
Here,
the
strength
f
repetition
ies n
displacement
nd
disguise (displacementof sites and points of view, disguise of the
characters/actors
ith
masks
and
simulacrums),
nd the
power
of
dif-
ference
ests
n
divergence
nd
displacement,
where the center
for
the
repetitive
ct
shifts
onstantly.
Deleuze
states,
t the
end
of
Difference
t
repetition,
hat there
s,
however,
a
third
repetition,
repetition
hat
is
endless and
beyond
cycles-the
straight
ine
of
the
"empty
form of
time":
beyond
the
cycle
of
memory
nd
forgetting,
he death nstinct.
Beyond
bare
repeti-
tion and dressedrepetition, eyondthat which subjugatesdifference
and that
which
recognizes
t,
there s a
repetition
which makes the
difference,
nd
whose
power
s
destruction nd
selection.
The
highest
form
f
art, then,
ays
Deleuze,
would be that one which
plays
all of
Io
"Theatrum
Philosophicum,"
Critique, p.
898, my
translation.
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LIBERATION
OF DIFFERENCE
127
these
repetitions imultaneously:
repetitions
f
habit,
repetitions
f
memory,
nd the
ultimate
repetitions
f death. Foucault
explains
the
event/death rillantly: "In an exemplaryway, death is the eventof
all
events,
meaning
at its
pure
state:
it
takes
place
in
the
anonymous
billowing
of
discourse;
t
is
that
which is
spoken
about,
has
already
happened
and
remains
indefinitely
uture,
reaching
everywhere
he
extremes
f
singularity.
The
meaning/event
s neutral
as
is
death"
("Theatrum
Philosophicum,"
.
891).
This
third
repetition
s
"pure,"
since
what is
repeated
s
repetition
tself.
Deleuze
brings
about
a
complete
reversal of
representation:
the
concepts
f
likeness nd identityxist,but not as primary
oundations.
To the
contrary,
hese
concepts
are
"secondary powers,"
always
re-
volving
round differences.
n
the
theater f
representation,
verything
rotates
round
the
same,
around
primary
dentity,
ecessity-that
of
the unconditioned
and
of death-and
totality.
But
in the theater
of
eternal
recurrencet is
always
a
question
of
the
famed
Nietzschean
throw-of-the-dice:
he
Dionysian
contemplation
f
all
possibilities
f
Chance
in one
throw,
he affirmation
f
the
return
f the
dice,
which
carries
with
t
necessity
the
necessity
f that
particular
ombination),
the affirmationf the identity f that combinationand, finally, he
affirmation
f the
same
(as
the act
of recurrence
tself),
where
the
return s
contained
n the
contemplation,
here
necessity
s
contained
in
chance,
where
dentity
nd the
one
and all
are contained n the
mul-
tiplicity
f all
possibilities.
Where,
astly, otality
xists
long
with
the
other
parts
and
multiple
fragments
f
this
machine
in the form of a
dice tumbler.
This
thought
of eternal
recurrence
s
clearly
opposed
radically
to
representation:
we
no
longer
have
necessity,
ameness,
likeness,
nd
totality
s
primary
owers,
but
rather
hance,
difference,
dissimilarity,nd multiplicity.Beneath representation,ternal recur-
rence
prepares
its
return:
beneath the
same,
difference
rembles;
beneath
totality,
multiplicity
f
fragments
re
ready
to
explode;
be-
neath
the
ntellect nd
Logos,
desire
and Pathos
rumblenow and
for-
ever-AND
NOT
THE
CONTRARY
Starting
with de
Sade,
and
his
violation,
his
rape
of
representation,
omething
ike
violence,
desire,
or
passion
stretches
tself ut under
all
discursive
ractice,
s the
condi-
tion
of
possibility
nd
necessity
f its
event.11
To
liberate discursive
activity,
e
must
go
even
furtherhan
de
Sade,
no
longer ust
represent-
ing "desire,"but also letting ll of the torrentshat Deleuze and Guat-
tari
term
machines-disirantes"
desiring-machines)
low
freely,
llow-
ing
desire
to
play
and
rejoice
in all of its
interplays
f
repetition
y
i The
Order
of
Things
(New
York,
197i).
See
chapters
on
representation,
and
the limits
of
representation the
discussions
of Don
Quixote
and
de
Sade).
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I28
NEW
LITERARY
HISTORY
realizing
hat
this
s,
precisely,
esire's
difference. n
order
to
perform
a
radical
analysis,
n
analysis
f "war"
against
he
concept
of a
primary
Logos,we need an analytical nstrumentowerful noughto incorpo-
rate
within tself ll
actionsof
Pathos
(and
see these
actions
as
"path-
ologies");
we need a
"symptomology"-a
"schizo-analyse."12
The
name
for
such
a
method
s
not
important.
But
if one wants to
really
enjoy
modem
literary
ctivity
n
its status
as
a
counterdiscourse,
n
antiliterature,
n
antilogos
from
Proust
to
Beckett n
France),
then
one
needs
a
radical
mode of
thought
ifferent
rom
hosewhich clutter
current ritical
iscourses
wherethe criticnever
tops alking
f
totality,
meaning,
ignifier,
nd
signified-La
(Sainte)
Ecriture
3
In
speaking
f
Deleuze,
Foucault
says
hatthere s a mode of
thought
which is
genital, ggressive,
ffirmative,
nd
selective. Foucault him-
self,
of
course,
plays
a
fundamental
role in the
development
f this
"new"
thought.
As
Foucault
says,
this
ortof
analytical
hought
f the
struggles
f Pathos
against "logophobia"
must
take
into account
the
symptoms
f these
"pathologies,"
and
is
thus
a
sort
of
diagnosis:
"Diagnosis
understood his
way
does
not
establish
he
affadavit
f
our
identity
y
a
game
of
distinctions.
t
establishes he fact that we are
difference,
hat our reason
is
the
difference
f
discourses,
ur
historythe
difference
f
times,
ur self the
difference
f masks. It establishes
that
difference,
ar
from
being
the
forgotten
nd recovered
origin,
s
the
scattering
hat we
are
and that we
produce" (my
italics).14
On the basis
of
the
analytical
rgument resented
n the
preceding
pages,
we
might
now be able
to
leave the
purely
heoretical
erspective
and
apply
this
approach
to
literary
ext. We
shall
attempt
o
analyze
a
few scenes
of
Proust's
Remembrance
of
Things
Past,
in an effort o
grasp
the
fleeting roduction
f
differences,
ather han list
the static
representationfthesame.
III.
Antiliterature:
Kaleidoscopic
Difference
In orderto
examine
these
elements
f
chance,
multiplicity,
ntensive
series,
difference,
nd
repetition,
have chosen a scene
fromProust
which seems
to me
central o the whole Proustiandiscourse: the scene
of
the
group
of
young
girls
t
Balbec-beach.15
I2 L'Anti-Oedipe, p. 325-"Introduction &la schize-analyse."
13
For a
discussion
of this
concept
of
"6criture,"
see
the
works of
Jacques
Derrida,
especially
Ecriture et
la
difference,
d. de
Seuil
(Paris, 1972).
14
Foucault,
L'Archdologie
du
savoir
(Paris,
I969),
pp.
172-73, my
translation.
I5
All
quotations
from
Proust
will be from the
Scott Moncrieff
translation,
Re-
membrance
of
Things
Past
(New
York,
I934),
I. All further
eferenceswill
indi-
cate
page
within
parentheses
n
the text.
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8/9/2019 Toward Theory of Antiliterature
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130
NEW
LITERARY HISTORY
further,
s far as
possible,
and
plunging
to the
depths
of
intensive
series-where
totality
s
laughed
at and
destroyed.
Following
this
scene,
there
s the
very
curious
scene
of
profanation,
repeating
gain
the action of
spitting
n
the
father.
This
new trans-
gressive
ct
is
the
violencewhich
forcesMarcel to
select,
recognize
dif-
ferences,
nd measurethe
distancesbetween
he
girls.
It
is
precisely
question
of their
ndependent
movement:
"They
could
not set
eyes
on an
obstacle
without
musing
themselves
y
crossing
t"
(p.
597)-
Seeing
an
eighty-year-old
an
waiting,
lone,
for his wife to
return,
one
of
the members
f
the
group
umps
over
him,
knocking
him over
"... to thegreat delight fthe othergirls, specially fa pair ofgreen
eyes
n
a
'dashing'
face,
which
expressed,
or
that
bold
act,
an
admira-
tion
and
a
merriment
n
which seemedto
discern
traceof
timidity,
shamefaced nd
blustering imidity
hich did not
exist
n the
others"
(p.
599).
This
is
exactly
he
same sortof
timidity
nd
joy
(the
timidity
and
joy
of the
child/artist
t
play)
which
can be found
in
Vinteuil
and his
daughter-a timidity
owards
rules and
laws,
and the
joy
of
transgression.
hese
younggirls,
hisexotic
tribe
of
"Sapphists,"
mock
authority y
jumping
over it and
knocking
t down.
This
repeated
act of transgressions centralto the entireProustiandiscourse, dis-
course
directed
against
laws,
a
repetitive ractice
of
differentiation
which s
a
pure
act of
transgression.
he violence
of this
transgression,
as
elsewhere,
orces
he narrator o
perform
n act of mental
trans-
gression,
o
go
beyond
llusory
urfaces,
n order to think n terms
of
difference.
Many
critics ave
been
trapped
n the
myriad
f Proustian
surfaces,
never
risking
ransgression
hemselves
nd,
like
Swann
(the
artiste
manqu6),
also
never
arriving
t the
difference
f
this
discourse,
its
nature
of
antilaw,
antitotality,
nticontinuity,
nd anti-the
ame-
or, as Deleuze says,a veritableAnti-Logos: 8 theyhave failed to see
that
far
from
epresenting
continuity
n the
development
f the
novel
(and
literature n
general),
Proust
must be
seen as
a
break
with
a
whole
tradition,
discontinuity
ontemporary
with a new mode of
thought
nd
rendering
ntiliterature
ossible.
Forced
to establish he
real
differences
f these
girls
fter hisviolent
reversal f
totality
nd
authority,
arcel
selects
singular
point
which
will
place
him in
relationship
o the
group, tarting
new
series: the
singularity f those "two greeneyes." "By thistimetheircharming
features
ad ceased
to
be
indistinct nd
impersonal.
I
had dealt them
like
cards
into so
many
heaps
to
compose
.
..
the
big
one
who
had
jumped
over
the
old
banker"
(p.
598).
After
this first
ifferentia-
18
Ibid.,
"Anti-Logos."
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LIBERATION OF
DIFFERENCE
131
tion,
he
focuses
on
those
green eyes,
and
says
of the
girl
whose
eyes
are
so
green:
"I
knew that
I
should
never
possess
this
young
cyclist f I did not possess also what therewas in her eyes" (p.
6oo).
This
selection,
this
choice,
is
the
pure
chance,
but
the dif-
ference of this new
series
is,
at
the same
time,
a
necessity.
Real
thought,
roust
never
ires
f
telling
s,
s
not
the
calm,
voluntary
move-
mentof
rationality,
ut
rather
lways
a
result f
a
violencewhich
forces
us
to
think-a
thought
which
grasps
the true
movement
f
repetition
and
the
displacement
of differences.The
girl
with
the
green
eyes
is
Albertine,
nd
the
series
Albertine/Marcel, herefore,
rows
out
of
this
violence,
his
ransgression,
his
overthrow
f
totalitarian
uthority.
As Deleuze shows,each series s
vertical,
xtratemporal,
nd intensive.
Such
is
obviously
he
case in
this series
which
explodes
n
the worlds
of Sodom and Gomorrah and
the
mystery
f
transexuality.
From
the
singularity
f
Albertine nd the
secret behind
these
green eyes,
which
remains naccessible
hroughout,
e travel
through
ther
eries,
but
not
n
a transcendental
ay
directed
ltimately
owards
unification,
synthesis,
r
totalization,
ut
rather,
s Deleuze
shows in Proust
and
Signs:
we travel
transversally,
rom one series
to
another,
without
ever
totalizing
hem:
"Jealously
s the transversal
f ove's
multiplicity;
travel,
he transversal
f the
multiplicity
f
places; sleep,
thetransversal
of the
multiplicity
f moments."
9
We travel
(if
we
accept
to follow Proust's
own
transgressive
ove-
ment,
rather
han
mposing
n illusion
of
totality
nto
t)
transversally,
from
he series
of Albertine o all
the other ove-series
joined
together
by
the
bond
of
ealousy),
to the series f the
sonata, and,
finally,
o the
series
f
profanation
t
Montjouvain.
Tired of
Albertine
nd
convinced
of the need to
break
up
with
her,
Marcel is terriblyoredwith her duringa trainrideback to Balbec.
To
pass
the
time,
he
speaks
of
music,
deliberately
cornful f
Albertine's
musical tastes.
She
inadvertently
sks
him
the
name
of the
piece
in
question,
and
he
responds
mockingly,
Vinteuil's
sonata."
Suddenly
everything
hanges.
All the Proustian
elements
re
forced back
into
motion
when she
says
that
not
only
does
she
know the
sonata,
but
she
knows
Mlle.
Vinteuil
somewhat,
and knows
Lea
very
well-the one
responsible
or
rediscovering
inteuil's
music.
Immediately,
he visions
ofthatnight t Montjouvain (whereL6a and Mlle. Vinteuilsexually
transgressed
he
"law
of
the
father")
reappear
in
his
mind,
and the
images
of
the
act
of
profanation
haunt
him
again.
Thus,
Albertine
stumbles,
otallyby
chance,
into this
other eries
(of
profanation
nd
19
Ibid.,
p.
I37-
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132
NEW
LITERARY
ISTORY
transgression)
f which she is
already
and forever
part,
and
Marcel's
jealously
returns ntensified.He
decides
to
make
her
his
prisoner,
n
order to
deny
the unknownAlbertine
the
lesbian)
and the secretof
her
eyes,
o as
to
annihilateher
difference.But
this
s
impossible,
s
Marcel
will
learn,
and
his
failure,
s
well
as Albertine's
victory,
e-
establishes
difference
orever.
This
is
the last
step
in
Marcel's
"ap-
prenticeship,"
eading
him to
art: but
the
artist,
or
Proust,
s
the one
who
realizes,
s Marcel
must,
hatdifference
an never
be
subjugated,
made
"prisoner,"
r
possessed
by
a
totalizing
ct of
Logos,
and
must,
instead,
be revealed
and
affirmed. he
mystery
f
Albertine's
yes
will
never
be
solved, ust
as
the
mystery
f
Proust
(the
real
man, entering
into
the
realm
of death
through
his
writing)
remains
ntact-a
pure
difference.
Understood
n this
manner,
he Proustianworld
s a theater f
multi-
plicity,
ntensive
eries,
differences,
nd
repetitions.
verything
egins
with
ingularity,
hich eads
to
the
ntensive
evelopment
f
the essence
of
differentiation
orking
underneath
he
surface
of
things.
Proust's
thought perates
xactly
ike
a
kaleidoscope-Remembrance
of
Things
Past
is a
kaleidoscope:
a
multiplicity
f
forms
nd
colors
n constant
movement,ncessantly epeatingdifferentombinationswhich,at that
precise
moment
when
one fixes
the
image
to isolate a
single
series,
seems
to
be
whole.
But
this
totality
s
merely
ne
among many
(each
series
forming
ts
own
totality).
It is
only
one of
the
pieces
n
thisvast
machine
which
uggles
essences
nd substances-it
is
nothing
ut
one
element
mong
others,
ever
unified
n
one
last
movement.The failure
of
so
many
critics
o
see this
deeper
side
of Proust
s
perhaps
due
to a
prejudice,
and
a
fear-the
prejudice
of
Hegelian
totality
nd
the fear
of all that s discontinuous.To denytheprofoundly iscontinuous, if-
ferentiating
ature
of
Proustian discoursewould
be to
annihilate ts
difference,
hereby orcing
t into a
continuum,
nd
onto
a
shelf,
where
it does
not fit.
But
like
Nietzsche's,
roust's
hought
s
radically
ffirma-
tive
and
selective,
igorously
irected
gainst
the
concept
of
a
primary
logos,
and
he sees
Time
(history)
n
terms
of
difference,
isjunction,
discontinuity,
nd death:
"the
meaning
of the
word:
defunctus,"
s
Beckett oncludes
n
his Proust.
Proustian
thought
s
affirmative,
nd
his
discourse
s
in
opposition
o all
laws
of
totality
nd
moral restriction:
it s a counterdiscourse,n antiliterature.
By
restoring
o
this
literary
iscourse ts
status
as an
event and a
practice,
one
instantly
onstructs
powerful
machine
de
guerre"
to
oppose
the notion of
continuity,otality,
nd
representation-to
fight
against
ll that deniesthe
reality
f
discourse.
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8/9/2019 Toward Theory of Antiliterature
16/16
LIBERATION OF DIFFERENCE
133
In
so
doing,
we
allow the
series
to
flow from
the
voice of the
Unnamable20
that
shapeless
verbal
egg)
and,
by
setting
nto
motion
thiskaleidoscopicmachinewith tsperpetualreturn f a multiplicityf
different
orms,
olors,
nd
intensities,
e abandon
ourselves,
ow and
forever,
o the
chances of
the dice: the risk
f
chance
in
all
its
multiple
possibilities;
he risk
of
the
necessity
f difference
f
all that
returns;
the
risk,
inally,
f Death
and
its
silent,
ndless
repetition.
n
analyzing
literary
iscourse
his
way,
we
restore
eality
o what
I
have termed n
antiliterature: he
reality
f life
and of
death,
the
reality
f
a real
dis-
cursive
practice-historically
ifferent-which
s no
longer
ubjected
to
the
ominous
"monarchy
of the
signifier"
ut,
instead,
freed
as a no-
madic
anarchy
ofa
production
which s, n its ast nstance,difference.
STATE
UNIVERSITY
OF
NEW
YORK,
BUFFALO
20
For
a
fascinating
description
of
what
Beckett
might
be
saying
in L'Innom-
mable,
see
L'Anti-Oedipe
where Deleuze
and Guattari refer o
the notion
of
"corps
sans
organes"
as
the
voice-egg,
nd
production.
Recommended