London gazette 1948 kos & leros

38426 5371

SUPPLEMENT TO

The London GazetteOF FRIDAY, Sth OCTOBER, 1948

b?Registered as a newspaper

MONDAY, 11 OCTOBER, 1948

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE AEGEAN BETWEEN THE7TH SEPTEMBER, 1943 AND 28x11 NOVEMBER, 1943.

The -following Despatch was submitted to theLords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the2fjth December, 1943, by Vice-Admiral SirALGERNON U. WILLIS, K.C.B., D.S.O.,Commander-in-Chief, Levant.

Levant.Tfjth December, 1943.

Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships theattached report of Naval Operations in theAegean between the 7th September, 1943 and«8th November, 1943.

(Signed) A. U. WILLIS,Vice-Admiral,

Commandenn-Chief.

GENERAL REPORT ON AEGEANOPERATIONS.

EVENTS LEADING UP TO OUR ENTRY INTO THEAEGEAN.

The possibility of capturing the island of"Rhodes and subsequently opening up theAegean (Operation " Accolade") had beenunder active consideration since January, 1943.Outline plans were drawn up but the require-ments of the advance in North Africa and laterthe invasion of Sicily (" Husky "), prohibitedthe allocation of forces necessary to mount suchan operation.

2. In April, Force Commanders and theirstaffs were assembled in Cairo to plan for" Accolade " to take place shortly after thelanding in Sicily, when an Italian surrenderwas considered possible. By the middle ofJune, however, it became apparent that assaultshipping, craft and air forces would not beavailable and the Naval Force Commander andstaff were sent to Algiers to plan " post-Husky"operations in the Central Mediterranean.

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3. Following our successful landings in Sicilywith unexpectedly small losses of assault ship-ping and craft, an attempt was made to planand mount " Accolade " using such forces aswere available in the Middle East or wereearmarked for India. Once again, it becamenecessary to call on General Eisenhower tomake up deficiencies, particularly in long rangefighters, and, as a result, " Accolade " wascancelled by decision of the Combined Chiefs ofStaff, at the Quadrant Conference.* The Com-manders-inOhief, Middle East informed theChiefs of Staff on 3ist August that the onlyoperations which could be mounted from MiddleEast were:—

(a) Small Scale Raids.(b) Sabotage and Guerilla operations by

Resistance Groups.(c) Unopposed " walk-in" to areas

evacuated by the enemy.

PHASE I.Surrender of Italy to the opening of the German

Air Offensive.Sth to z6th September, 1943.

4. When it was known that Italy had sur-rendered, it was decided to take advantage ofthis situation by encouraging the Italian gar-risons to hold such Aegean islands as theycould against the Germans, and to stiffen theirresistance by sending in small parties of Britishtroops. Between Sth and i6th September,Casteloriso, Kos, Leros, Samos, Kalymnos,Symi and Stampalia were all occupied by smalldetachments of Raiding Force troops accom-panied by Civil Affairs Officers. Fairmile motor

Admiralty footnote:* Quadrant Conference—the British-American con-

ference held at Quebec in August, 1943.A

5372 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 11 OCTOBER, 1948

launches and caiques of the Levant SchoonerFlotilla manned by Royal Naval crews providedthe transport.

5. In Rhodes our emissaries were unable toprevent the Italian Governor surrendering theisland to the Germans after a short resistance.(There were 30,000 Italian and 7,000 Germantroops in the island.) The combined servicemission waiting at Casteloraso and the 234Infantry Brigade waiting to proceed to Rhodeswere therefore held available to reinforce theBritish forces in the other islands.

6. During this phase our naval forces, con-sisting of six Fleet destroyers of the 8thDestroyer Flotilla, 2 Hunt class destroyers, istSubmarine Flotilla, 6 motor launches, 4L.C.F.* caiques and 8 R.A.F. high speedlaunches and pinnaces were employed on:—

(a) Building up British forces and suppliesin the islands.

(6) Intercepting enemy shipping proceed-ing from the Piraeus to the Dodecanese.

7. By 28th September, the following hadbeen landed:—

2,700 men, 21 guns, 7 vehicles, 450 tonsof stores and ammunition.

8. Acting on air reconnaissance, on reportsfrom agents in the Piraeus area and fromItalian reporting posts and L.R.D.G.f patrolsin the Cyclades, destroyers carried out sweeps;n the Aegean by night, retiring to the south-ward or lying up in Leros during the day. Oni8th September, H.M.S. FAULKNOR (CaptainA. K. Scott-Moncrdeff, D.S.O., R.N.), H.M.S.ECLIPSE (Commander E. Mack, D.S.O.,D.S.C., R.N.) and H.H.M.S. QUEEN OLGA(Lieutenant-Commander G. Blessas, D.S.O.,R.H.N.) sank a 3,000 ton merchant vessel anda 1,200 ton merchant vessel north of Stampaliaand damaged the escort vessel, which put intoStampalia and was captured by one of ourpatrols assisted by the Italian garrison. Thisconvoy was carrying specialist personnel andsupplies to Rhodes. On 23rd September,H.M.S. ECLIPSE sank a 2,500 ton merchantvessel off the S.W. point of Rhodes which hadlanded reinforcements in Rhodes and was re-turning to the westward. An ex-Italian tor-pedo-boat was driven ashore and laterdestroyed by the R.A.F.

9. Prior to the Italian surrender, theGermans had made preparations to take overthe entire military administration of Greeceas from 6th September and had disposed suffi-cient forces on the west coast of Greece, thePeloponnesus, Melos, Crete, Scarpanto andRhodes, to ensure the retention of their controlin these key positions. In the period im-mediately following the surrender, the Germanswere in no position to undertake seaborneoperations, owing ,to the kck of shipping,escort vessels and landing craft, which they hadto obtain from the Italians or transfer fromother areas. By the middle of September, how-ever, they had collected enough craft todespatch raiding forces to the Cyclades toevacuate the Italian garrisons and such food

Admiralty footnotes :* L.C.F.—large landing craft converted to mount

A.A. guns for air defence in combined operations.f L.R.D.G.—Long Range Desert Group.

and war material as they could lay their handson. With the exception of Syra they estab-lished observation posts only and did notgarrison the islands in force.

10. Apart from Rhodes, the Italians' atti-tude was co-operative in the islands visited byus, though their fighting value was low. Itwas considered that even if Leros were rein-forced by such British troops as were avail-able and Kos airfields developed and defendedadequately, we should not be in a secure posi-tion to continue operations in the Aegean untilRhodes was in our possession. Accordingly on22nd September the Chiefs' of Staff approvalwas obtained to mount " Accolade " beforethe end of October with- such forces as wereavailable in the Middle East and could be sparedfrom the Central Mediterranean.

PHASE II.

The Start of the German Offensive.26th September-i2th October.

n. With the arrival of large enemy air re-inforcements from France and the Russian frontand the proved inefficiency of the A.A. defencesof Leros, as shewn by the sinking of H.M.S.INTREPID (Commander C. A. de W. Kitcat,R.N.) and H.H.M.S. QUEEN OLGA in Lerosharbour on 26th September, operations of oursurface forces in the Aegean were restricted tosweeps during the dark hours with forces whoretired to the south-eastward to obtain fightercover from Cyprus during the day. On istOctober :all available Fleet destroyers weresailed to Malta as escort to H.M. Ships HOWEand KING GEORGE V, leaving us with theHunts whose speed and endurance made itdifficult for them to operate far into the Aegeanand still be clear by daylight. As a result,H.M.S. ALDENHAM (Lieutenant-CommanderJ. I. Jones, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N.R.),H.H.M.S. MIAOULIS (Commander C.Nikitiades) and H.H.M.S. THEMISTOCLES(Lieutenant-Commander N. Sams, R.H.N.)who were patrolling off Kaso Strait on the nightof the 2nd/3rd October, were short of fuel andin no position to take action on an aircraftreport of an enemy convoy sighted off Naxosand believed on all available intelligence to bebound for Rhodes. They were ordered to with-draw to Alexandria for fuel. This convoy, infact, carried an invasion force which was landedon Kos at 0500 on October 3rd and capturedthe island in spite of stubborn resistance fromthe British battalion, who received smallassistance from the Italian garrison.

12. No surface force was available to interferewith the landing, but submarines on patrolwere ordered to proceed to the Kos area toattack invasion shipping, and on 4th Octoberthe i2th Cruiser Squadron, consisting of H.M.Ships AURORA, flying the broad pendant ofCommodore W. E. Agnew, C.B., D.S.O.,R.N., PENELOPE (Captain G. D. Belben,D.S.C., A.M., R.N.), SIRIUS (CaptainP. W. B. Brooking, D.S.C., R.N.) and DIDO(Captain J. Terry, M.V.O., R.N.), with fiveFleet destroyers sailed from Malta at highspeed to be available for operations in .theAegean. From the night of 5th/6th onwardsa force of cruisers and destroyers patrolled

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 11 OCTOBER, 1948 5373

close off the Kaso or Scarpanto Straits readyto act on any enemy reports which might bereceived, retiring to the south-eastward by day.

13. H.M. Ships SIRIUS, PENELOPE,FAULKNOR and FURY (Lieutenant-Com-mander T. F. Taylor, R.N.) entered the Aegeanon the night of 6th/7th October when recon-naissance indicated that enemy reinforcementswere arriving from the westward, and assistedby an enemy report from H.M. SubmarineUNRULY (Lieutenant J. P. Fyfe, R.N.)received at 0630 on 7th, they located and sankan enemy convoy consisting of an ammunitionship, an armed trawler and six landing craft.This encounter delayed the retirement of ourforce, which was attacked in daylight in theScarpanto Strait by J.U.88s and 875, H.M.S.PENELOPE being hit by an unexploded bomband her speed reduced to 23 knots. (Thedestruction of this convoy probably preventedthe enemy from making an immediate assaulton Leros.)

14. A force under H.M.S. CARLISLE(Captain H. F. Nalder, R.N.) carried out asweep on the nights of 7th/8th and 8th/gthOctober to intercept any further enemy forcesattempting to reach the Dodecanese from thePiraeus. No sightings were made and at 1215on gth October, when the force was proceedingsouth through Scarpanto Strait, it was heavilyatacked by J.U. 875 and although the escort-ing Lightnings shot down 15 enemy aircraftand ships accounted for three more, H.M.S.PANTHER (Lieutenant-Commander ViscountJocelyn, R.N.) was hit and sunk and H.M.S.CARLISLE, was hit aft and was towed toAlexandria by ROCKWOOD.

15. It now became apparent that our forcescould not enter the Aegean to intercept enemyshipping and be clear again by daylight, andthat further attempts would lead to unaccept-able losses, more especially as the LightningSquadrons were withdrawn to the CentralMediterranean. Accordingly the policy wasadopted of operating destroyers only as an anti-invasion force, and using cruisers to provideA. A. and fighter direction during approach andretirement from the Aegean and for operationsin such areas they could reach during the night.

16. The loss of Kos airfields, besides finallydestroying our hopes of fighter cover for oursurface forces, greatly increased the difficultiesof supply as it prevented the passage and un-loading of merchant ships and heavy lift shipswhich were urgently required to provide heavyA.A. defences and to improve the transportsituation in Leros. The capture of Rhodesbecame increasingly important for the continua-tion of our operations.

17. On gth October, a meeting was held atTunis, attended by General Eisenhower, theFirst Sea Lord (Admiral of the Fleet Sir AndrewB. Cunningham, Bt, G.C.B., D.S.O.) and allCommanders-in-Chief in, the Mediterraneanand Middle East, including the Commander-in-Chief, Levant, Admiral Sir John H. D.Cunningham, K.C.B., M.V.O., to cpnsider thesituation, and it was finally decided that ourresources would not allow us to mount Opera-tion " Accolade ", but that we should try tohold Leros and Samos as long as supplies couldbe maintained.

PHASE III.We build up Leros and Samos whilst the

Germans prepare to invade.1.2th October-$th November.

18. On their return from Tunis, the Com-manders-in-chief, Middle East, at a meetingpresided over by the Foreign Secretary andattended by the First Sea Lord, confirmed thedecision to hold Leros and Samos, using allmeans in their power to do so, and at the sametime decided that it would be impossible torecapture Kos with the forces at their disposal.Approval was given for the use of four Italiansubmarines (ZOEA, ATROPO, CORRIDONI,MENOTTI) and H.M. Submarines SEVERN(Lieutenant-Commander A. N. G. Campbell,R.N.) and RORQUAL (Lieutenant-CommanderL. W. Napier, D.S.O., R.N.) to assist in run-ning supplies. Preparations were made to run.a vessel of the Turkish ferry type through toLeros with heavy vehicles during the Novembernon-moon period. This latter venture was sub-sequently abandoned.

19. On I4th October, Vice-Admiral SirAlgernon U. Willis, K.C.B., D.S.O. relievedAdmiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham, K.C.B.,

" M.V.O. as Commander-in^Chief, Levant.

20. Intelligence now suggested that the enemywould stage an invasion of Leros from Kos andKalymnos with the 4,000 troops believed to bealready there, as soon as he could transferadditional shipping and landing craft from thePiraeus. Our surface forces were thereforeemployed in conjunction with air reconnaissanceand striking forces, to prevent the arrival ofsuch shipping.- A striking force was kept almostcontinuously available in the area, which wasemployed on anti-shipping patrols, bombard-ments of ports and harbours in Kos andKalymnos islands. It was hoped by a displayof activity to induce the enemy to believe wewere capable of exerting greater naval strengthin the area than was actually the case.

21. Reports at noon on I5th October showedan enemy convoy of two merchant ships andtwo landing craft off Naxos proceeding to theeastward and H.M. Ships B E L V O I R(Lieutenant J. F. D. Bush, D.S.C., R.N.) andBEAUFORT (Lieutenant-Commander SirStandish O'G. Roche, Bt., D.S.O.) were orderedto intercept and destroy it. They were reportedand heavily attacked by J.U. 88s and J.U. 875though fortunately without incurring damage,and the convoy was diverted to the northward,thereby evading our force who had to withdrawto the southward due to lack of fuel. H.M.Ships PHEOBE (Captain C. P. Frend, R.N.),FAULKNOR (Captain M. S. Thomas, D.S.O.,R.N.) and FURY who entered the Aegean atdark, continued to search, but made no sightingand had to withdraw from the Aegean beforedaylight. At 13006 on i6th October, H.M.Submarine T O R B A Y (Lieutenant R. J.Clutterbuck, R.N.) sighted the convoy to thenorthward of Levitha and sank one of themerchant ships. During the night of thei6th/i7th, H.M.S. HURSLEY (Lieutenant-Commander W. J. P. Church, D.S.O., D.S.C.,R.N.) and H.H.M.S. MIAOULIS (CommanderE. Boudouris, R.H.N.) searched Kos roadsand the east side of Kalymnos, setting a smallmerchant ship on fire in Port Vathi, sinking anE-boat and a landing craft and setting a sloop


on fire in Port Akti. This was a very spiritedclose range action. On the following night H.M.Ships J E R V I S (Captain J. S. Crawford,D.S.O., R.N.) and PENN (Lieutenant-Com-mander J. H. Swain, D.S.O., R.N.) bombardedPort Kalymnos and set a merchant ship in theharbour on fire. This was evidently the secondship of the enemy convoy.

22. The above enemy losses, with theaddition of the damage of four F-lighters onthe i8th and 2oth by Mitchell aircraft of theU.S.A.A.F. and Beaufighter aircraft of theR.A.F. and torpedoing of a 600 ton merchantship and a lighter by motor torpedo boats onthe night I9th/20th, reduced the chances of theenemy being in a position to invade Leros forthe time being and our naval forces then con-centrated on the reinforcement and supply ofLeros and Samos during the non-moon period.

23. The supply of the garrison at Leros hadby this time (i8th October) become unsatis-factory. An organisation was being set up forsupply by caique through Casteloriso andthrough Samos, but owing to various difficulties,only very small quantities of supplies had sofar reached Leros by either of these methods,though supplies to Samos were going well.Some supplies were being put into Leros byair, but this was falling off owing to shortageof transport aircraft. Supply by submarinecould not start for a week and these would onlyprovide a proportion of the tonnage needed tomaintain the garrison, much less build up areserve. The situation was complicated by thefact that the reinforcement of the garrison ofLeros, which then consisted of one battalion andone company of infantry plus various details"naking about 1,200 hi all, was dependent to aconsiderable extent on the creation of a regularsupply service.

24. In these circumstances—at any ratetemporarily until the caique service and sub-marines got going—-it was decided that theNavy would have to undertake the supply ofLeros with destroyers by night. This provedarduous and trying work for the destroyerswho were constantly shadowed and attacked byenemy aircraft during their approach and with-drawal from the island. That the destroyersavoided damage in harbour was due primarilyto the careful organisation and good judgmentof the Senior British Naval Officer, Aegean(Acting Captain E. H. B. Baker, R.N.)who, by varying the timing of the visits andthe unloading ports and by reducing the time ofdischarge to a minimum, was able on mostoccasions to frustrate the enemy efforts to locateand bomb our ships whilst they were unloading.

25. During the period i6th to 30th October,the following reinforcements were put intoLeros: —By Surface Craft:— By Submarine:—

17 men,255 tons of stores,12 guns,i jeep.

950 men,290 tons of stores,6 guns,ii jeeps,ii trailers;26. As a result of a visit to Leros of senior

Army Staff Officers from General Headquarters,Middle East, policy was reviewed by the threeCommanders-in-Chief on the 3Oth October. Itwas then decided still further to reinforce theisland, which the Army considered neededsome 1,200-1,300 more troops and additional

guns and equipment to make it reasonablytactically secure and capable of beating off anattempt at invasion by the enemy. This wasall the more necessary in view not only of thedifficulty of intercepting an assault across thevery short distances from the harbours andbays of Kos and Kalymnos islands and thequantity of minefields in the area, but alsobecause of the approach of winter and the strainon the destroyers, for owing to losses, thedistance from Alexandria, and other factors, itwas becoming increasingly difficult to maintaina striking force constantly in the area.

27. Every possible means was utilised forpassing in these reinforcements, destroyers,submarines, M.L.s, M.G.B.s, M.M.S.s,B.Y.M.S.,* caiques and schooners, and be-tween 3ist October and 7th November, thefollowing were put into Leros:—By Surface Craft:— By Submarine:—1,280 men, 33 tons of stores.180 tons of stores,14 jeeps,i trailer;28. During this period of build up no contact

was made with enemy forces, though our shipscarried out occasional bombardments of enemyports whilst entering and leaving the Aegean.We were unfortunate in that three destroyerswere mined to the eastward of Kalymnos, H.M.Ships HURWORTH (Commander R. H.Wright, D.S.C., R.N.) and ECLIPSE were sunkand H.H.M.S. ADRIAS had her bows blownoff. On board H.M.S. ECLIPSE were some 200military reinforcements for Leros among whomcasualties were heavy. Although subject to aconsiderable weight of air attack both by dayand night no ships were sunk by this method,though H.M. Ships SIRIUS and AURORAwere both hit and damaged seriously andH.M.S. BELVOIR sustained minor damagefrom an unexploded bomb.

29. During the last week of October therewere clear indications of the mounting of amajor assault force in the Piraeus. To over-come the shortage of landing craft, thirteen60 ft. powered lighters of the I-boat classarrived by rail from the north. Simultaneouslya group of three escort vessels of U-J type weresailed from Piraeus to the Cyclades. The load-ing of several merchant vessels with munitions,guns and supplies suggested preparations for afollow-up convoy.

30. It was not clear if the assault was in-tended for Samos or Leros, but a series of heavyair raids suggested the former. The sinking ofa 1,200 ton eastbound merchant vessel offAnaphi by H.M. Submarine UNSPARING on29th October made it probable that the opera-tion would be postponed, and this impressionwas confirmed by the return of a 2,000 tonmerchant vessel from Syra to Piraeus on istNovember.

PHASE IV.Invasion of Leros—yd November to

i6th November.31. On 3rd November, landing craft and

escorts were in Lavrion and agents reportedthey were carrying out landing exercises.Photographic reconnaissance on 4th NovemberAdmiralty footnote :—

* M.L.—Motor Launch ; M.G.B.—Motor Gun Boat;M.M.S.—Motor Minesweeper; B.Y.M.S.—British YachtMinesweeper,


showed nine landing craft and two escort vesselsin Lavrion with a further four landing craft atZea. They were reported moving eastward on5th November. Between then and the eveningof loth November when they arrived in theKos/Kalymnos area, they moved only by dayunder heavy fighter protection, dispersing andlying up during the night, first in the Paros/Naxos area and later in Amorgos, Levitha andStampalia.

32. Every effort was made to intercept theforce. Beaufighters and Mitchells of 201 (NavalCo-operation) Group attacked it by day, andat night our destroyers often under an attacksearched the areas where the landing craft wereexpected to be lying up, and bombarded har-bours in these areas. Our efforts met withsmall success, due by day to the heavy scaleof fighter protection the enemy maintained overthe convoy and by night to the difficulty ofspotting the craft which were probably beachedand camouflaged in the many small bays avail-able. One F-lighter, one landing craft and twocaiques remained behind in Amorgos on gthNovember, after the rest of the force had sailed,and these were probably damaged by Beau-fighters during their attack p.m. on 8th Novem-ber. H.M. Ships PENN and PATHFINDER(Lieutenant-Commander C. W. Malins, R.N.)sank a caique (probably a Naval Auxiliary)south of Paros on the night 6th/7th November.

33. With the arrival of this force at Kos andKalymnos on nth November, the enemy hadavailable a total force of 4 serviceable F-boats,13 I-boats, 5 Auxiliary Naval craft and a num-ber of armed caiques, and into these he loadedtroops and equipment already assembled inthese islands.

APPRECIATION ON THE MORNINGENEMY INVASION FLOTILLA REACHEDKOS/KALYMNOS (IOTH NOVEMBER). •

34. Despite the efforts of our destroyers andAir Force, the enemy had, as previouslydescribed, succeeded in getting the bulk of hisinvasion flotilla to its destination. The delaysimposed upon him by our activities had atany rate given time to the reinforced Lerosgarrison to re-organise and prepare for the im-pending invasion. It was now necessary todecide on the policy for the employment ofdestroyers in the event of Leros being assaultedfrom the neighbouring islands.

35. The following factors governed thematter: —

(a) The opinion of the Army Commandthat the reinforced garrison of Leros shouldbe able to beat off, or at any rate destroyafter landing, an initial attack provided thatreinforcements in strength and heavy equip-ment could be prevented from reaching theenemy.

(6) The enemy's complete air superiorityin the area, and the heavy scale of attack hecould inflict on the ships by J.U. 88s andJ.U. 875 with fighter escort. Experience hasshown that the enemy had no intention ofrefraining from attacking ships under wayin Turkish waters.

(c) The limited number of destroyers it waspossible to maintain in the area over theperiod of waiting for the invasion to start.Due to the distance from Alexandria or

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Limassol ships could only remain in the areafor a short period. For example, the Huntshad only enough fuel for one whole night'ssortie at high speed and the return journeyto Alexandria or Limassol.

(d) The short haul for enemy invasion craftfor the actual assault, particularly if, as wasexpected, they assembled first in the variousbays of Kalymnos Island and then moved offto attack at the selected moment.36. Accordingly it was decided that if Leros

was being invaded, destroyers could best con-tribute by endeavouring to intercept at nightand destroy the follow-up convoys, which it wasconsidered would be vital to the enemy.Destroyers were therefore instructed that theyshould not leave their lying up positions byday in order to intercept invading forces unlessspecifically ordered to do so by the Com-mander-in-Chief.

37. Motor launches, motor torpedo boats andmotor gun boats were placed under the ordersof the Senior British Naval Officer, Aegean.At night the motor launches carried out anti-invasion patrols, whilst the motor torpedo boatsand motor gun boats were held at immediatenotice in harbour to act on enemy reports. Fuelstocks for coastal forces were established inSamos and in caiques, with small emergencystocks in Leros.

Situation on evening of loth November.38. The bulk of the enemy invasion flotilla

having arrived at Port Kalymnos and Kos har-bour, it was hoped that they would have tospend at least one night there fuelling and pre-paring to move up to the northern bays ofKalymnos, from which the invasion was ex-pected to be launched.

39. Bombardments of Port Kalymnos andKos harbour and roads were therefore carriedout in bright moonlight on night loth/nthNovember respectively by destroyer forcesunder Commanding Officer, H.M.S. PETARD(Commander R. C. Egan, R.N.) andCaptain (D), 8th Destroyer Flotilla (CaptainM. S. Thomas, D.S.O., R.N.) in FAULKNORH.M.S. PETARD'S force, consisting of H.M.Ships PETARD, ROCKWOOD (LieutenantS. R. le H. Lombard-Hobson, R.N.) andO.R.P. KRAKOWIAK, spent one and a halfhours close off Port Kalymnos and pumped1,500 rounds of 4-inch into this small harbour.A ship which had been damaged previouslywas set on fire and capsized, but it is not knownwhether damage was done to landing craft.

40. Both forces were bombed and H.M.S.ROCKWOOD in PETARD's force, damaged•by an unexploded glider bomb, hit in the gear-ing room. By a fine feat of seamanship,ROCKWOOD was towed by H.M.S. PETARDunder constant bombing attack to Losta Bayin the Gulf of Doris, where they arrived bydaylight.

41. Captain (D), 8th Destroyer Flotilla whohad been instructed to proceed with his forceon completion of his bombardment remained inthe Gulf of Kos so as to be in a position toassist H.M.S. PETARD with H.M.S. ROCK-WOOD if required.

42. During nth, air reconnaissance showedconsiderable movement of landing craft between


Kos and Kalymnos, and it appeared that pre-parations to mount the assault on Leros werein train. The afternoon reconnaissance showeda concentration of landing craft in Kos harbour.

43. The enemy intentions were still not clear.As the next force of destroyers could not reachthe area until late on the night I2th/i3th, itwas essential to conserve fuel in Captain (D),8th Destroyer Flotilla's force. He was there-fore ordered to move to an anchorage nearer toKos Channel and to send his two Hunts toattack any landing craft in Kos roads reportedby air reconnaissance.

44. Motor Torpedo Boat 307 (LieutenantJ. G. G. Muir, R.N.V.R.) on passage fromCasteloriso to Leros was in action with twounknown destroyers off Kalymnos at 0330/I2thNovember, and at 0445/I2th the motor torpedoboat force sailed from Alinda Bay at full speedto search for an enemy merchant ship reported4-5 miles south-east of Leros. No sighting wasmade, but later when sweeping to the north-ward, two destroyers were sighted offPharmaco. These were mistaken for Britishdestroyers.

45. At approximately 0400/I2th NovemberMotor Launch 456 (Lieutenant-CommanderF. P. Monckton, R.N.R.) on patrol to the eastof Alinda sighted and reported enemy forces12 miles east of Leros proceeding north andlater engaged a force of two destroyers and tenlanding craft. After a short and gallant actionMotor Launch 456 was damaged and forced toreturn to Alinda Bay where she landedwounded.

46. Between 0600 and 0830/I2th Novemberthe enemy succeeded in landing both north andsouth of Alinda Bay with the object of " pinch-ing out " the bay where he would then beable to land heavy support weapons. A furtherlanding was attempted at Blefuti Bay on thenorth of the island, but was repelled with theloss of two landing craft. It would appear thatthe Italian C.D.* guns did not open fire untiltoo late, and this coupled with the fact thatour close range weapons were sited to cover themore important bays, enabled the enemy toland forces at iPalma, Pasti Di Sotto, Grifo andN. Appetici with the loss of only one morelanding craft. Landings were counter-attackefland held by our forces, but at 13406/12 thesituation was made more difficult by the land-ing of parachute troops to -the west of Alinda,When darkness fell, H.M. Ships FAULKNOR,BEAUFORT and H.H..M.S. PINDOS(Lieutenant-Commander D. Fifas, R.H.N.)together with Motor Torpedo Boats 315(Lieutenant L. E. Newell, D.S.C.,R.N.Z.N.V.R.), 266 (Sub-Lieutenant J. N.Broad, R.N.Z.N.V.R.), and 263 (LieutenantA. G. Fry, R.A.N.V.R.) swept in the Leros/Kalymnos/Levitha area to prevent enemy re-inforcements reaching Leros, and at 2210,Mount Clido battery, Leros was bombardedfrom the eastward at the request of the Armyashore. They made no sightings. H.M. ShipsDULVERTON, ECHO (Lieutenant^om-mander R. H. C. Wyld, R.N.) and BELVOIRwere picked up by enemy aircraft whilst enter-ing the Aegean and shadowed, and H.M.S.DULVERTON was hit by a glider bomb at

Admiralty footnote:* C.D.—coast defence.

0145/i3th and sunk. ECHO and BELVOIR,after picking up survivors, proceeded. Mine-sweepers and motor launches which had 'beensent to Samos from Leros were loaded withreinforcements and ammunition, but since timewould not permit their reaching Leros thatnight, they were held at Samos.

47. During the night I2th/i3th Novembera southerly gale blew up which restricted theoperation of light craft on both sides. On I3thNovember fighting continued ashore, and inspite of very heavy bombing by the enemyand a further parachute landing at ogooB / i3thNovember, which suffered high casualties dueto the strong wind blowing, our forces kept theenemy pinned down to the eastern shore in theAlinda Bay area. During the night of I3th/I4th November, H.M. Ships FAULKNOR,BEAUFORT, and H.H.M.S. PINDOS afterattempting to bombard enemy positions inLeros, left the Aegean owing to shortage of fuel.H.M. Ships ECHO and BELVOIR howeverbombarded enemy positions on Leros at therequest of the Army, and later carried out asweep in the area without making a sighting.Reinforcements from Samos in the motorlaunches and minesweepers were turned backby the weather. H.M. Ships PENN, ALDEN-HAM and BLENCATHRA (Lieutenant E. G.Warren, R.N.) entered the Aegean.

48. At Leros all naval signal publicationswere destroyed at 0700 /I4th November whenan enemy attack threatened to overrun thenaval headquarters and this seriously inter-fered with communications and therefore withoperations. From then on, signalling with theSenior British Naval Officer at Leros had to bedone through army channels using armycyphers.

49. During the day of the I4th November,fighting in Leros continued, our forces counter-attacking with some success in the forenoon,but with the growing weariness of our garrisonwho had been fighting for 48 hours with noreal rest under heavy scale air attack, freshtroops and more ammunition were urgently re-quired. These were collected during the nightfrom Samos by H.M. Ships ECHO andBELVOIR. ECHO, by proceeding at 30 knots,managed to land her 250 troops at Portolagobefore daylight, but BELVOIR with her slowerspeed was forced to lie up.

50. Enemy positions were attacked from theseaward by H.M. Ships PENN, ALDENHAMand BLENCATHRA who arrived at Alinda JBayat dusk on I4th November. Unfortunately onlythree enemy caiques were in the bay, but thesewere engaged and targets ashore, pointed outby our forces, were taken under fire. H.M.S.PENN and her force then patrolled in thisarea being repeatedly attacked by enemy air-craft including glider bombers. She was search-ing for landing craft reported by Leros, butfailed to find. They had evidently turned backas a result of enemy air reports of H.M.S.PENN's force.

51. Motor torpedo boats again patrolled thearea and shortly before daylight they joined'H.M.S. ECHO, who was returning fromPortolago, in attacking an enemy force whichwas approaching Alinda Bay, sinking an F-lighter and two landing barges all laden withtroops.


52. Thus, on the morning of I5th Novem-ber, our forces had been reinforced, whereasthe enemy, though possibly reinforced late onthe I4th,. had been deprived of some of the re-inforcements due to arrive on the morning ofthe i5th. We were, however, owing to theheavy bombing, and the physical condition ofour -troops, unable to score decisively againstthe enemy during the day.

53. H.M. Ships PENN and ECHO'S forceshad been shadowed continuously by aircraftduring the night of I4th/i5th November, andbombed from time to tune, and it was evidentthat the enemy were making use of air recon-naissance to keep their forces clear of ours;on the night I5th/i6th, therefore, H.M.S.PENN and her force were ordered to remainat immediate readiness and to act on enemyreports, hoping thereby that enemy forceswould be committed to a landing and that wewould be able to intercept them. Owing tobreakdown of W/T in Leros, reports of enemylanding craft, relayed through Alexandria,arrived in H.M.S. PENN too late for actionto be taken on them, and the dawn sweepordered by Commander-in-Ghief, Levant pro-duced no enemy sighting. In point of fact, hadthe Commanding Officer of H.M.S. PENNacted as soon as he received the report, it ispossible that he might have interfered with thelanding craft off the beaches in Alinda Bay.

54. Motor torpedo boats, minesweepers andmotor launches landed the troops ex H.M.S.BELVOIR at Portolago during the night. H.M.Ships ECHO and BELVOIR left the Aegeanshort of fuel, and H.M. Ships FURY, EX-MOOR (Commander J. Jefferies, R.N.) andO.R.P. KRAKOWIAK arrived to take theirplace.

55. On the i6th November the situationashore in Leros became critical as reinforce-ments received during the night allowed theenemy to overrun our headquarters and posi-tions in the Merviglia area, and though theywere driven out again by the reinforcementswe had received, the continued bombing andthe incessant fighting over nearly five dayshad so reduced the fighting power of our forcesthat they were unable to continue the battleand the island surrendered at approximately17006.

56. During the night i6th/i7th NovemberH.M.S. EXMOOR and O.R.P. KRA-KOWIAK, who had been ordered to Samosto transfer the Greek " Sacred " Squadron toLeros, rejoined H.M.S. FURY. H.M. ShipsPENN and ALDENHAM's bombardment ofthe Alinda Bay area had to be cancelled andthey bombarded Kos harbour on their waysouth to join H.M.S. BLENCATHRA, whowas towing H.M.S. ROCKWOOD from theGulf of Kos to Alexandria.

PHASE V.WITHDRAWAL FROM AEGEAN.

57. Plans were made in mid-October to col-lect a number of caiques to be available incase it became necessary to withdraw ourtroops from Samos and Leros. The numberof small craft under the orders of the SeniorBritish Naval Officer, Aegean was also in-creased for general operational purposes andto assist in a possible withdrawal.

58. The course taken by the fighting inLeros, however, prevented any action by thesecaiques though in the final stages a numberof army and naval personnel managed to escapein various craft.

59. After its fall on i6th November, evacua-tion of such troops as could foe got out ofLeros was conducted by Lieutenant-Comman-der L. F. Ramseyer, R.N.V.R., from a caique,he himself having escaped from Leros bycaique 12 hours after its surrender. Navalcraft and a number of R.A.F. high speedlaunches were used, S.B.S.* patrols beinglanded to round up British troops still atliberty. An R.A.F. launch and LevantSchooner No. 2 successfully evacuated theL.R.D.G. patrols from Seriphos and Mykonirespectively.

60. Following the fall of Leros it was decidedto withdraw Allied forces still remaining inSamos. These consisted of 220 British troopsand 380 of the Greek Sacred Squadron. Thiswas successfully carried out by caiques on thenight of igth/2Oth November; in addition,8,300 Italian troops, Greek guerillas and civi-lians were evacuated. This movement wascovered by various naval and R.A.F. craft.The majority of these .troops together with anumber of Italians from the Samos garrisonand Greek refugees, were sent 'by train toSyria, having turned over their arms.

61. The remainder of the British naval andmilitary personnel from Samos and theescapees from Leros found their way southin a variety of craft, including two ItalianF-lighters, one towing an L.C.M., twoL.C.T.sf, an Italian tug towing a M.M.S.,various minesweepers and coastal craft, all ofwhom arrived in Levant ports by 2nd Decem-ber. One of these F-lighters which left Leroson i5th November under the command ofLieutenant Stowell, R.N.R., reached Haifa viaSamos with 177 German prisoners from Lerosstill on board on 25th November.

62. The direction of these operations wasseriously 'hampered by the capture of B.Y.M.S.72 at Kalymnos on the night of nth/i2thNovember, which resulted in all the codescarried by these small craft being compromised.

63. Following our withdrawal from theAegean it was decided to reduce the statusof Casteloriso to that of an outpost whichcould be evacuated if a heavy attack developedagainst it; accordingly on the night of27th/28th November surplus men, guns andequipment were withdrawn to the Levant -bydestroyer and L.C.T. without incident.

64. A satisfactory sequel to these disappoint-ing operations was the successful withdrawalof the damaged H.H.M.S. ADRIAS throughKos Channel and north of Rhodes. She lefton ist December, and reached Alexandriaunder her own steam on 6th December. For-tune favoured this hazardous passage in thatunforeseen circumstances prevented her move-ments being known to the enemy until she waseast of Casteloriso. In the first place a Germanhospital ship on opposite course passed her

Admiralty footnotes :* S.B.S.—Special Boat Squadron, an Army unit

(see paragraph 71).f L.C.M.—Landing Craft, Mechanis3d vehicles;

L.C.T.—Landing Craft, Tank.


in the Kos Channel and the enemy searchlightwas extinguished during a critical period; later,when north of Rhodes, the ship escaped detec-tion in continuous rain storms.

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE OPERATIONS AS AWHOLE.

Air Cover.65. Throughout the operations our surface

forces were unable to exercise that commandof the Aegean to which their superiority to theenemy surface forces entitled them due to thecomplete enemy command of the air.

66. With the help of our submarines and air,and by accepting heavy losses from air attacksby day and latterly with increasing accuracyby night, we were able to interfere seriouslywith enemy merchant ship convoys to Rhodesand the Dodecanese, but we were unable tostop craft of all types moving by day onlywith heavy fighter cover and hiding up hi outof the way bays and inlets by night. Onceagain the fact that surface forces cannot exer-cise their proper functions in restricted waterswithout air cover, was clearly demonstrated.

Distance of Area of Operations from our Bases.67. The fact that the centre of the area of

operations was 350 miles from our bases inAlexandria and Cyprus had the following ad-verse effect on- the operations of surfaceforces:—

(a) Operations of the destroyers werelimited to two nights in the Aegean at themost, after which they had to return to refuel.

(fe) Even when fighter cover was available,long gaps were inevitable, as our fightersusually had to return to base after the firstattack owing to shortage of petrol, and it tookanything up to 3 hours for reliefs to arrive.

68. It was impracticable to base small crafton- Casteloriso or any of the Aegean islandsowing to enemy air attack which was veryaccurate by day, and the policy was for allcraft to lie up during daylight.

Command.69. The question of command was not en-

tirely satisfactory. Policy and major decisionswere made by the Commanders-in-Chief Com-mittee in Cairo, but whereas naval operationswere conducted by the Commander-in-Chief,Levant from his headquarters, which was com-bined with that of No. 201 (Naval Co-opera-tion) Group, R.A.F., at Alexandria, the Armyappointed a Corps Commander with a Head-quarters in • Cairo, and the R.A.F. an AirVice Marshal who, though himself in- Cairo,had his operational headquarters in Cyprus.This did. not work out well in practice, andfinallv General Headquarters, Middle East andHeadquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle Easttook over the direct control of operations.

70. On the naval side, experience in theLevant has shown that the best results areobtained by using the normal station opera-tional organisations to the maximum, and thatnew operational staffs should be limited to thoserequired to enable local naval commandersto exercise operational control in the area ofoperations.

Operations of Raiding and ReconnaissanceForces.

71. The activities of the Raiding and Recon-naissance Forces merit special mention. Whenthe Axis had been expelled from North Africathe Long Range Desert Group and Special BoatSquadron- of the Special Air Support Regimentreturned to the Middle East. As it was nownecessary for them to cross the sea to continuetheir activities against the enemy, they weretrained on the Levant coast to operate fromsubmarines, Fairmile motor launches andcoastal force craft of all types, and a forceof caiques and schooners, known as the LevantSchooner Force, was formed under CommanderCoastal Forces, Eastern Mediterranean, mannedby specially selected officers and men to workwith them. These latter craft were fitted withTank engines giving them a speed of 6 knotsand an endurance of 2,000 miles. With themast down they could be camouflaged so effec-tually that they could not be spotted whenlying up close inshore.

72. These forces were acting over theSouthern- Aegean throughout the period ofoperations. They were the first to arrive andthe last to leave, and carried out many daringand successful operations in enemy-occupiedislands. There is no doubt that forces of thistype, well-trained and led, can be of greatvalue both for harassing the .enemy and ob-taining important intelligence.

Submarine Operations.73. In common with all other forces operating

in the Aegean during this period the sub-marines were driven hard. Their patrols, whichwere largely carried out in narrow waters inclose proximity to known or suspected mine-fields, were often considerably prolonged owingto the series of local emergencies which keptdeveloping, and which required the presenceof a submarine in the area.

74. In- the majority of areas the submarineswere subjected to continual surface and airanti-submarine activity, and in addition ourown surface forces were always liable to beencountered at night. These factors, coupledwith the fact that few torpedo targets wereencountered, threw a very heavy strainon allconcerned, and particularly on CommandingOfficers.

75. -It speaks well for the aggressive anddetermined temper of the First SubmarineFlotilla that under these difficult conditionsthree merchant ships, totalling 7,500 tons, anda 400 ft. floating dock were torpedoed andsunk, and twenty-one caiques and schoonersdestroyed, mostly by gunfire.

76. The task of the supply submarines wasnot easy, owing chiefly to dislocation in theworking of the ports at Leros. The heavy airattacks which developed at night during moon-light periods, made unloading submarines im-practicable at these times.

77. H.M. Submarine SEVERN had to bewithdrawn from the supply service after onetrip owing to complete failure of her mainand auxiliary engines. Of the five Italians, onenever left Haifa, and the mechanical conditionof the other four was giving rise to consider-able concern. They carried out their tasksefficiently and with considerable enthusiasm.


CONCLUSION.

78. These operations were carried out to takeadvantage of the Italian surrender to obtain afoothold in the Aegean with such forces as wereavailable in the Middle East. We failed be-cause we were unable to establish airfields inthe area of operations.

79. The enemy's command of the air enablednim so-to limit the operations and impair theefficiency of land, sea and air forces that bypicking his time he could deploy his compara-tively small forces with decisive results.

So. The naval forces engaged on these opera-tions, cruisers, destroyers, submarines andcoastal craft, and the small force of aircraftavailable to 201 (Naval Co-operation-) Groupall fought hard and did valiant work under

particularly trying conditions. They achievedconsiderable success against the enemy and heldoff the attack on Leros for some time, but notwithout heavy casualties to our own forces.

81. Had more aircraft been« available,especially modern long range fighters, and givenmore luck, the operations might have been pro-longed, but after the loss of Kos, if the enemywas prepared to divert the necessary effort, itis doubtful if Leros could have been held in-definitely without our embarking on- a majoroperation for which no forces were available.

82. It may be, however, that the inroad madein the enemy's shipping resources—which pro-cess is still going on—will prove a fatal handi-cap to him when the time comes for us toembark on an " all in " offensive hi the Aegean,with adequate forces.

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London gazette 1948 kos & leros