A Comparative Perspective on the Practical Philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre and Hans-Georg Gadamer (MA Thesis)

Patrick McCusker r0292607

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INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHYKARDINAAL MERCIERPLEIN 2

BE-3000 LEUVEN

“A comparative perspective on the practical philosophy of

Alasdair MacIntyre and Hans-Georg Gadamer”

Supervisor: Dr. Luc Anckaert A thesis presented in partialfulfillment of the requirementsfor the degree of Master ofPhilosophy (MA)

by Patrick McCusker

Leuven, 2013


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Table of Contents

Introduction: (4)

0.1: Why a project about Alasdair MacIntyre and Hans-Georg Gadamer to understand theproblems of contemporary practical philosophy? (4)

0.2: Why the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer are better able to addressthe problems of practical philosophy than the work of Alasdair MacIntyre. (5)

0.3: An outline of the structure of the thesis. (6)

0.4: An outline of the research process. (8)

Chapter One: A Presentation and discussion of MacIntyre’s diagnosis of the ethicalproblems of modernity, and the significance of their limitations: (10)

1.1: What is MacIntyre’s critique of contemporary moral philosophy? (10)

1.2: The significance of Aristotle to MacIntyre’s restoration of virtue. (12)

1.3: Why MacIntyre’s proposed Aristotlean restoration is incapable of resolving the crisis of practicalphilosophy. (21)

Chapter Two: Introducing and discussing Gadamer’s critiques of the Enlightenment bypresenting Gadamer’s hermeneutics: (27)

2.1: The significance of Gadamer’s critique of the methodology of the Enlightenment to philosophicalhermeneutics. (27)

2.2: How Gadamer is influenced by Hegel, and the significance of how Gadamer applies thisinfluence. (32)

2.3: How the reformulated Hegelian dialectic informs Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.

(36)

2.4: The significance of Gadamer’s approach to tradition and language to interpretation and

the achievement of self-knowledge. (42)

2.5: The significance of the self-realisation which takes place in interpretation to practical

philosophy. (46)


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Chapter Three: Understanding the significance of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneuticsto practical philosophy through a closer reading of his work and comparison withAlasdair MacIntyre: (47)

3.1: A discussion of the Aristotlean dimension of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.(47)

3.2.-How practical knowledge differs from technical knowledge. (54)

3.3: A comparison between MacIntyre and Gadamer with regard to their capacity to

rehabilitate Aristotlean virtue. (58)

Conclusion: (72)

Abstract: (75)

Bibliography: (76)


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“A comparative perspective on the practical philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre and Hans-

Georg Gadamer”

Introduction

0.1: Why a project about Alasdair MacIntyre and Hans-Georg Gadamer to understand theproblems of contemporary practical philosophy?

0.1.1: In my study of moral theory as an undergraduate, it quickly became apparent that a crisis had

developed. Much of what I studied drew heavily on objectively determined rights as a source of

justification, giving rise to purely theoretical moral philosophy which appealed to rational

justification. It became apparent when seeking to apply these schemata to real situations and

arguments such as the furore over healthcare reform in the US that they were inadequate for their

purpose. Concepts such as “rights” and “harm” had become so abstract they could be used as

justification for military intervention or not paying taxes. What these competing arguments shared

was a belief in their own universal validity for all rational beings, a common failure which could be

traced to their emergence in or descent from the Enlightenment. The foundations of practical

philosophy in modernity are undermined by their methodological abstractness, making the need to

develop an ethical philosophy capable of accommodating dialogue between differing and

incommensurable positions a priority. This crisis of incommensurability brought about by the

divorce of practical philosophy from tradition was famously diagnosed by Alasdair MacIntyre in

After Virtue1. MacIntyre’s proposed resolution to this crisis was a re-evaluation of the

Aristotlean schema, a suggestion with huge potential which I felt that he failed to realise. Instead,

the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer is better capable of rehabilitating the Aristotlean schema by

placing the emphasis on the realisation of our relationship with the other, as I will demonstrate in

this thesis.

1 MacIntyre, Alasdair : After Virtue (Duckworth, London, 1999 edition)


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0.2: Why the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer are better able to addressthe problems of practical philosophy than the work of Alasdair MacIntyre.

0.2.1: I feel that Alasdair MacIntyre’s reformulation of the Aristotlean schema falls short of being

able to satisfyingly rehabilitate practical philosophy. In attempting to develop an interpretation of

Aristotle which is relevant to our era, MacIntyre continues to apply an analytic methodology when

interpreting Aristotlean philosophy. The significance of this mistake is that it indicates that rather

than our ethical tradition having been lost, it has instead been distorted by analytic method. I feel

that MacIntyre’s interpretation of Aristotle confuses phronesis (practical knowledge developed

from experience) with techne (technical knowledge which can be formally taught). The reason for

this will be shown when we analyse how he tries to present a return to Aristotle as being rationally

justifiable.

0.2.2: The problems created by MacIntyre’s reliance on analytic method limit the potential of

tradition and dialogue between traditions. MacIntyre tries to understand tradition as being

something which can critiqued rationally from an external standpoint, when the true reach of

tradition is much broader and deeper. Instead of reinventing the Aristotlean schema, we must

rediscover it. Such a rediscovery must consider how the proposed rehabilitation will function in

application.

0.2.3: Why does this suggest Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics? Gadamer may not have

explicitly set out his ethical philosophy in “Truth and Method”2, but the foundations for a

hermeneutically based practical philosophy are visible in his emphasis on the role of (i) language,

(ii) dialogue and (iii) tradition in informing our understanding. Gadamer’s philosophical

2 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Truth and Method , translated by Marshall, Donald G. and Weinsheimer, Joel.

(Continuum, London, 2006 edition)


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hermeneutics require an engagement with the other, indicating an ethical dimension founded on the

significance of dialogue and application to practical philosophy. What I want to analyse here is

how Gadamer’s rejection of the methodology of the Enlightenment suggests a means of realising

Aristotlean virtue. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics place the basis of ethical truth within the

logos by linguistically constructing our world, indicating a new direction for practical philosophy.

0.2.4: Gadamer shares MacIntyre’s assertion that the Aristotlean schema can function as the basis

of practical philosophy. However the two thinkers differ drastically in their interpretations of

Aristotle. This difference is reflective and constitutive of their differing approaches to the problems

of practical philosophy, with the methodological implications being of particular importance.

Whereas MacIntyre emphasises techne in his analysis of the Aristotelian schema, Gadamer focuses

on phronesis. This indicates how Gadamer’s hermeneutics can be applied to ethical problems, with

Gadamer viewing the moment of application as informing understanding rather than being subject

to it. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics provide a means of rediscovering Aristotle by directly

engaging with him, thus restoring our link to the tradition. Through studying Gadamer and

MacIntyre’s attempts to address the problems of methodology through the rehabilitation of the

Aristotlean basis of morality, I aim to prove that not only is a new direction for practical

philosophy possible, it is necessary. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics provide an indication

as to how this can be developed, and this thesis will determine the ethical potential of Truth and

Method to realise Aristotlean virtue.

0.3: An outline of the structure of the thesis.

0.3.1: Chapter One: A Presentation and discussion of MacIntyre’s diagnosis of the ethical

problems of modernity, and the significance of their limitations: In this chapter I will present

MacIntyre’s argument that practical philosophy is in crisis, and what the limitations of MacIntyre’s

resolution to the crisis of ethical thought in modernity are. Despite successfully diagnosing the


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crisis brought about by the Enlightenment, MacIntyre continues to display its influence in his

methodology. This undermines his practical philosophy, as his justification for morality remains

analytic.

0.3.2: Chapter Two: Introducing and discussing Gadamer’s critiques of the Enlightenment

by presenting Gadamer’s hermeneutics: I feel that Gadamer is better able than MacIntyre to

understand the significance of the Aristotelian schema. I will here discuss his philosophical

hermeneutics in detail to explain why. I place a particularly strong emphasis on (i) language, (ii)

dialogue and (iii) tradition in this presentation. This is to make clear how the logos is to be

understood as something outside the realm of what can be determined by analytic method.

Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics are able to function as a successful rejection of Cartesian

method in favour of a more Hegelian practical philosophy, as will be demonstrated.

0.3.3: Chapter Three: Understanding the significance of Gadamer’s philosophical

hermeneutics to practical philosophy in a direct comparison with Alasdair MacIntyre. In the

third chapter, the significance of the rejection of the methodology of the Enlightenment in

Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is explained. I will here present “The Hermeneutic

Significance of Aristotle” to explore the Aristotlean basis of philosophical hermeneutics, as well as

the significance of Gadamer’s interpretation of Aristotle. I will then compare his interpretation to

that of MacIntyre, proving that a hermeneutically based practical philosophy is able to reengage the

Aristotlean schema at the basis of practical philosophy.

0.4: An outline of the research process.

0.4.1: When critiquing MacIntyre, I drew primarily on After Virtue when discussing what he

diagnoses as being the crisis of modernity and its resolution. However, to gain a fuller

understanding of the role of tradition and dialogue within his re-evaluation of practical philosophy I


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also consulted the later Whose Justice? Which Rationality?3 .This work contains extended

discussions of these concepts, and the significance of MacIntyre’s analytic method to his

understanding is most evident here. It supplemented After Virtue very well, particularly when

seeking to understand why MacIntyre’s project is limited by analytic method.

0.4.2: When researching the possibility of a hermeneutically based practical philosophy, I began

with the most obvious work by Gadamer. Truth and Method contains the fullest exposition of

Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, and functions as the starting point for any exploration of

his work. By considering the foundational concepts in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics as

articulated here, the ethical implications of his philosophy can be determined.

0.4.3: It would be absurd to write a thesis about differing interpretations of the Aristotelian schema

without directly referencing the Nicomachean Ethics4. It is thus referenced in several places in the

text, but is not explicitly discussed in detail in the same manner as Gadamer and MacIntyre are. It

is instead the object of interpretation, with the differing interpretations being what is of interest

here.

0.4.4: When considering these interpretations, I owed a considerable amount to a number of other

thinkers. The work of James Stout, Jennifer Herdt, John Haldane, Micah Lott and Peter Mehl drew

issues with MacIntyre’s methodology to my attention, and led me to my conclusion that it is

inadequate. When considering Gadamer, I owed a particular debt to the work of P.Christopher

Smith. His Hermeneutics and Human Finitude and commentary on “The Hermeneutic

Significance of Aristotle” suggested the necessity of considering a Hegelian direction implicit in

Gadamer’s practical philosophy which I had overlooked. Whilst this thesis focuses more on the

3 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Duckworth, London, 1988 edition)

4 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford University Press (translated by David Ross), 2009 edition


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methodological distinction between Gadamer and MacIntyre than the Hegelian reading of Gadamer

which dominates Smith’s work, Smith’s commentary nevertheless orientated my enquiry by

suggesting the ethical potential of the logos when considered as part of a dialogical practical

philosophy based on application. In addition to this, the work of Jean Gjesdal, Gunter Figal, David

Weberman and Richard Bernstein were crucial to this thesis by suggesting ways of developing a

practical philosophy from the work of Gadamer.


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Chapter One: A Presentation and discussion of MacIntyre’s diagnosis of the ethical problems

of modernity, and the significance of their limitations

The hypothesis of After Virtue by Alasdair MacIntyre challenges the stasis that has crippled

contemporary practical philosophy. In After Virtue, MacIntyre diagnoses a crisis of

incommensurability as a result of the Enlightenment, proposing a rehabilitation of Aristotlean

virtue as the resolution. Whilst he is correct in his initial diagnoses, his analytic methodology

undermines his claims to be able to rehabilitate Aristotlean virtue due to major issues arising in

application. To understand this, I will present MacIntyre’s critique and proposed restoration before

explaining why it is inadequate.

1.1: What is MacIntyre’s critique of contemporary moral philosophy?

1.1.1: Alasdair MacIntyre’s hypothesis is that in the contemporary philosophical climate, our

understanding of morality has disintegrated into chaos. The severance of morality from social

tradition in the Enlightenment has obscured the broader context and traditions in which our

morality develops. This has left practical philosophy with only the “fragments” of our morality

from which to construct a moral philosophy. By removing the justification which tradition provides

for morality, the concepts and language of moral philosophy have been rendered meaningless by

modernity. The arguments of the Utilitarians and post-Kantians represent expressions of an attitude

in a debate which is intrinsically irresolvable. To address this situation we must become aware of

the broader cultural context in which the “fragments” of a broader philosophy which constitute our

morality operate. We now exist in the wake of the Enlightenment’s separation of ethical thought

from a context in tradition and history. MacIntyre argues that the methodology which the

Enlightenment has provided for dealing with such a crisis is inadequate. To analytically address


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such a crisis is to remain within the structure of the Enlightenment when discussing the problem

created by the legacy of the Enlightenment5.

1.1.2: To approach ethical debates analytically, in which premises are bound to conclusions in the

same manner as calculus or scientific equations gives rise to problems of incommensurability.

MacIntyre argues these can be defined as follows.

1) Even though our diverse moral claims possess logical validity, there is no objective means of

determining their validity against each other. If competing premises have differing normative

concepts or grounds for validity, then debates become incommensurable. How are we to judge

whether arguments on abortion basing their validity on the grounds of seeking to preserve life are

better than those seeking to secure personal liberty? With this problem in mind, the differing

priorities informing arguments can find no common basis upon which a decision can be made.

2) These arguments define themselves as being universally valid ones are those which “purport

to be impersonal rational arguments and as such are presented in a mode appropriate to that

impersonality”6. By doing so, the command made within these arguments is deprived of any force

whatsoever to be obeyed. If I were to follow such an argument, it would be because I was already

compelled to either through the authority of the person making the argument or agreement with the

sentiments expressed.

3) The moral sources and thinkers informing our contemporary moral debate are broad and

heterogeneous. This indicates that a series of fragments of a coherent moral system rather than the

system itself are informing our practical philosophy. The concepts which these fragments discuss

have been divorced from the context in which they attained their meaning and significance. Their

meaning has been changed to represent something other than would have been intended by Hume,

5 MacIntyre, Alasdair : After Virtue (Duckworth, London, 1999 edition), page 2

6 MacIntyre, Alasdair : Ibid, page 8


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Kant, Hegel, Mill or Locke in their work. To understand this distortion, a need to place ethical

discourse within context becomes apparent. The works of Hume and Kant are separated by nearly

half a century, differing languages and culture from each other. The two thinkers are nevertheless

discussed as if they were participants in the same debate engaging one another. This is despite

Hume being a Scottish philosopher who died several years before Kant’s most famous work on

morality was published. To treat them as contemporaries is absurd. To regard history and

philosophy as separate disciplines is to ignore this absurdity, indicating a need to rethink the

relationship between ethical thought and the cultural and historical context it develops within7

1.1.3: The project undertaken by the Enlightenment of “constructing valid arguments which will

move from premises concerning human nature as they understand it to be to conclusions about the

authority of moral rules and precepts” is thus doomed to failure8. By ignoring the relation held by

the conceptions of morality and human nature to their history, the concepts themselves have

become unintelligible and inadequate to concrete ethical situations. They no longer cohere within

the context of their application, instead representing an attempt to impose that which can be

objectively determined to be right upon this situation.

1.2: The significance of Aristotle and the rehabilitation of the virtues for MacIntyre.

1.2.1: To address this crisis, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that we need to move towards an account of

morality which places the tradition of virtue as the basis of practical philosophy. MacIntyre

diagnoses a threefold scheme set out by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics as providing the basis

for virtue. In the Aristotlean schema, there is a contrast between “man-as-he-happens-to-be and

man-as- he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature”9. The function of ethics is to realise this

potential, therefore it “presupposes some account of potentiality and act, some account of the

7 MacIntyre, Alasdair : Ibid, page 118 MacIntyre, Alasdair : Ibid, page 529 MacIntyre, Alasdair : Ibid, page 53


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essence of man as a rational animal and above all some account of the human telos”. This is a

threefold scheme in which “the conception of untutored human nature, the conception of the

precepts of rational ethics and the conception of human-nature-as-it-could-be-if it realised its

telos” are by necessity interrelated in order to function. With this in mind, the rejection of the

teleology which religion had previously provided to the schema in the move towards secularism

deprived man of an end to be realised through correct moral action. The remaining parts of the

schema have an unclear relationship to each other, due to their being fragmentary and incoherent10.

If we remove telos from the morality which serves as its goal, we will find that there is little left.

To replace a morality divested of telos by promoting schema such as Utilitarianism and post-

Kantian analytic philosophy in which abstract notions such as pleasure or rights are deemed a

sufficient justification only leads to the crisis of incommensurability defining our current stasis. To

understand the significance of this, we will consider what it is that MacIntyre identifies as relevant

in the Aristotlean schema, and how our relationship to the tradition which grants our morality its

coherency functions.

1.2.2: MacIntyre’s reformulation of the Aristotelian schema is motivated by what he argues is an

objectively determinable basis for our morality within empirical evidence. The Aristotlean schema

grants priority towards matters of the good in order to live a life in which virtue is essential to

human well-being11. These virtues are given their significance by their purpose or ends in the form

of telos, “which determines what human qualities are virtues”12. To reformulate practical

philosophy in such a manner as to rehabilitate this notion of morality is to determine a resolution to

the following problems afflicting moral philosophy.

10 MacIntyre, Alasdair : Ibid, page 53-511 D’ Andrea, Thomas D. ; Tradition, Rationality and Virtue: The Thought of Alasdair MacIntyre, (Ashgate.Aldershot, England, 2006 edition), Page 26712 MacIntyre, Alasdair : After Virtue (Duckworth, London, 1999 edition), page 184


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1.2.3.1: The existence of rival traditions of the virtues: All of these rival traditions possess

distinct and opposing lists of essential virtues. They also grant differing priority to the different

virtues. To argue for the rehabilitation of Aristotlean practical philosophy as a basis for our

morality requires the formulation of a rational-decision procedure capable of determining which

human qualities are virtues, providing a basis for dialogue between differing ethical traditions. The

development of a list capable of providing virtues which can be agreed on is necessary for the

revitalisation of moral theory13.

1.2.3.2: The differing definitions of the nature of a virtue: When drawing upon the resources

which our past provides us with, we must be able to adjudicate between the rival claims as to the

nature of a virtue and develop a clear definition as to what the nature of a virtue is. Only by doing

so can we develop a new virtue-based morality in practice14.

1.2.3.3: The necessity of justification arising from context: A belief informing action can only

be properly understood within a context descending from tradition. MacIntyre sees the social

sphere as providing the necessary relation of tradition to action for a virtue-centred moral theory.

The reason for this is that it provides a context for morality to operate in the form of narratives and

practices, which provide accepted criteria to judge the morality of an action15.

1.2.3.4:What MacIntyre proposes to resolve this incommensurability is an interpretation of

Aristotle which is able to determine and explain what is of value in the virtues, but which is still

able to provide a telos capable of acting as a justification for our morality. To do so, MacIntyre

speaks of Benjamin Franklin’s argument that virtues are external and relate to the attainment of

prosperity when considering the Aristotlean schema16. MacIntyre justifies this assertion by arguing

that “this distinction between internal and external ends is not drawn by Aristotle himself in the

13 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 181-214 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 18615 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 18216 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 185


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Nicomachean Ethics, but it is an external distinction to be drawn if we are to understand what

Aristotle intended”17. MacIntyre can be said to argue for a reinterpretation of Aristotle which draws

upon the philosophy of the Enlightenment. MacIntyre permits his account of the Aristotlean

schema to rethink the teleology of practical philosophy towards one which grants virtue a social

rather than personal basis. Virtue gains its significance through practice and its relation to a socially

constituted tradition, and must be seen as such. The practices involved in virtue are by necessity

socially constituted, and are defined by MacIntyre as follows: “A practice involves standards of

excellence and obedience to rules as well the achievement of goods. To enter into a practice is to

accept the authority of these standards and inadequacies of my own performance as judged by

them.”18. To participate in a practice such as football or morality is to enter a social process in

which an activity and a life are granted purpose and meaning by their social context. This directs

the moral agent towards the good, whether it is athletic excellence or moral action. For Franklin

and MacIntyre, this necessary social process grants purpose to virtue, providing an authority which

makes the good possible as “the authority of both goods and standards operates in such a way as to

rule out all subjectivist and emotivist analyses of judgement”19, as appeal to the standards of a

practice is capable of resolving moral disputes. However, MacIntyre also identifies an internal

aspect to virtue as necessary. He identifies this aspect as being common and non-divisive to all

who participate in the practices involved20, as a virtue must be seen as self-evidently so.

1.2.3.5: What then, is a virtue itself to be understood as? MacIntyre argues that “A virtue is an

acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those

goods which are internal to practices, and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving

any such goods”21, which here grants virtue the same relation to the realisation of morality as

17 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 18418 MacIntyre, Alasdair : Ibid, page 19019 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 19020 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 19021 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 191


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ability does to the realisation of a craft. Virtue is necessary for morality. MacIntyre specifies that

justice, courage and honesty have to be regarded as part of the structure of any virtue. Without

these three characteristics the practice will enter a decline. The identification of these three

characteristics as the necessary virtues for the realisation of practices means that practice is defined

by MacIntyre as a process in which a healthy relationship between participants and respect for the

standards involved required for the survival of the practice itself. These standards which define the

practice are fixed. They grant it a historical dimension which is crucial to the realisation of the

virtues involved in it, joining them to a narrative through which they attain coherence.

1.2.3.6: The return to the Aristotlean schema of the good which helps to realise this telos for action

grounded in tradition and practice is differentiated from Aristotle’s account by MacIntyre in two

ways: 1)“Although this account of the virtues is teleological, it does not require any allegiance to

Aristotle’s metaphysical hology.”

2)” Secondly, just because of the multiplicity of human processes and the consequent multiplicity of

goods in the pursuit of which the virtues may be exercised.. conflict will not spring solely from

flaws in individual character”22.

The rehabilitation of virtue which takes place in this account remains Aristotelian, as it retains the

following aspects of Aristotle’s moral philosophy.

(i) The distinctions made by Aristotle between voluntariness (the distinction between the

intellectual virtues and the virtues of character), the relationship held by these distinctions with

regard to natural abilities and the passions, and the structure of practical reasoning are defended by

MacIntyre, as they are necessary to make his account intelligible.

(ii) Aristotle’s account of pleasure and enjoyment is retained, despite it being irreconcilable with

any utilitarian view. To succeed in a practice brings with it a degree of enjoyment which develops

22 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 196


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from the pursuit of excellence, as the activity enjoyed and the activity achieved become one and the

same23.

(iii) Action and explanation are linked in what MacIntyre calls an Aristotlean way, which makes

the evaluation of whether or not an act is virtuous possible. As “from an Aristotlean standpoint to

identify certain actions as manifesting or failing to manifest some virtues is never only to evaluate;

it is also to take the first step towards explaining why those actions rather than some others were

performed24”

1.2.4.1: The necessity of tradition and practices to the realisation of the virtues

The virtues are defined by their place within practices, as telos is necessary for their realisation.

MacIntyre argues that without a telos capable of transcending practice by “constituting the good of

a whole human life”25, virtue will be arbitrary and inapplicable. This realisation is possible within

the unity of a life and the tradition informing it, granting it a telos through the manner in which

“Narrative history of a certain kind turns out to be the basic and essential genre for the

characterisation of human action”26. The context in which our actions take place grants them

intelligibility. A dialogical understanding of the world in which dialogue takes place between

varying traditions makes practical philosophy possible, as “conversation is the form of human

transactions in general”27. These dialogues take place primarily within a context which can be

understood as the narrative, meaning that “we all live out narratives in our lives and we understand

our own lives in terms of the narratives we live out”28. The dialogical nature of human existence

means that telos is provided by the prospect of a shared future which our actions are able to

influence. Such a telos requires a capacity for the application of the virtues within the standards of

tradition and practice capable of sustaining the tradition itself through maintaining the relevance of

23 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 19724 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 19925 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 20326 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 20827 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 21128 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 212


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the virtues themselves. This assertion gives rise to what MacIntyre calls “the virtue of having an

adequate sense of the traditions to which one belongs”29. The correct application of the virtues

within the tradition which makes them intelligible is essential to the realisation of our telos. To

possess the necessary virtue is to pursue our own interests in what is good whilst remaining within

the good of the tradition.

1.2.4.2: MacIntyre views tradition and the “narrative” which emerges from it as fundamental to

understanding the world. Whilst the differing intellectual traditions vary in terms of what their

accounts of the virtues and rationality contain, there is nevertheless a rational justification held by

the members of each tradition for participation in it as”Each tradition can at each stage of its

development provide rational justification for its central thesis in its own terms, employing the

standards and concepts by which it judges itself”30. This justification develops from a threefold

process in which the rationality necessary for and implicit in the practice of the enquiry-bearing

traditions involved in practical philosophy is determined adequate. This enquiry begins from the

beliefs and practices which constitute a given for a community and define their identity, such as

language or religion. Authority is conferred within these communities to certain participants within

the tradition such as religious leaders to continue perpetuating the tradition. Traditions develop

from this state of consensus on the authority of persons or texts when this authority is challenged.

This challenge can be made either by external influence on the tradition or the development of new

interpretations indicating potential alterations. As inadequacies within the older form of the

tradition are identified, the third stage occurs in which the tradition’s inadequacies lead to

reformulations designed to overcome these limitations31. The tradition is nevertheless capable of

remaining intact in spite of these reformulations, as “some core of shared belief has to survive

every rupture”32 . Should something fail to correspond to our understanding when considered in

29 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid,,page 22330 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Duckworth, London, 1988 edition), page 35131 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 354-532 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 356


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relation to our tradition-influenced worldview we deem it to be false. When our tradition fails to

address a situation, we change the content of the tradition by recognising a past inadequacy in the

tradition.

As a tradition develops to the point where it is thus able to analytically understand its content as

valid or invalid, it comes to articulate the procedure involved by defining clear characteristics of

truth. By coming to understand itself, a tradition of rational enquiry can come to understand other

traditions and the common characteristics it shares with them33. There is a common basis consisting

of Justice, Courage, Honesty and the understanding of tradition MacIntyre identifies as central to

the Aristotlean schema of morality and its goal of realising man’s telos underpinning all traditions

and making ethical discussion possible.

1.2.4.3: For dialogue between differing traditions to be possible, an element of understanding of the

tradition of the other is necessary. This understanding enables the participants to grasp what the

other tradition has to offer, in the process learning what other traditions offer as a resolution to the

problems facing their own. The differing traditions come to a superior understanding of themselves

through this relationship, as their own practices are thrown into relief by the comparison34. This

represents an act of translation, by which the tradition of the other is made intelligible to our own

through the linguistic relationships between traditions. The tradition becomes aware of itself in this

relationship to rival traditions which are also embedded in specific concepts of language and

culture. Of course, “the invention, elaboration and modification of the concepts through which both

those who found and those who inherit a tradition understand it are inescapably concepts which

have been framed in one language rather than another”35. To engage with a separate tradition is

also to engage with a linguistic community whose utterances must be understood through an act of

translation into our own tradition.

33 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 35934 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 37035 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 371-2


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In doing so, we engage in communication with the particularities of the other language and its

community which have shaped it. The expression of this other language entails an acceptance of

the beliefs, institutions and practices which have formed it, and membership of the tradition

involved36. Practices such as naming confer an identity upon the participants of the tradition,

defining them as participants and frequently conferring authority in cases such as those of nobility.

This aspect of the event of naming becomes a naming “For” a particular community, in which a

particular identity is granted to what defines it. When people from outside the tradition use these

names, they are frequently reduced to terms of pure reference which function purely as labels. To

do so is “creating the illusion of some semantic theorists that there is a single essential relation of

reference”37, and overlooking the significance of a name to its givers. To argue that a single

essential relation of reference exists between different languages is to ignore how tradition informs

language, as seen by the role of authoritative texts within traditions. The debate over these texts

shapes our tradition through new interpretations constantly being brought to bear on them as the

starting point for interpretation changes over time. The development of particular traditions through

interpretation involves the embodiment of the rational justification of previous transformations

being brought to bear on traditions. When we translate from one tradition to another, we risk

distorting a text by divorcing it from its original linguistic and historical context. To avoid this,

MacIntyre proposes that the only rational way in which a rival tradition can be approached is to

allow “for the possibility that in one or more areas the other may be rationally superior to it in

respect precisely of that in the alien tradition which it cannot as yet comprehend”38. To argue that a

tradition gains its validity in the face of the challenges made by other traditions indicates a

problematic understanding of the relationships between various traditions is held by MacIntyre. We

will now discuss the limitations of MacIntyre’s analysis of the relationship between differing

ethical traditions, and how they hinder his attempts to rehabilitate practical philosophy.

36 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 37337 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 37938 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 388


21

1.3: Why MacIntyre’s proposed Aristotlean restoration is incapable of restoring practicalphilosophy.

1.3.1: MacIntyre correctly identifies problems of incommensurability in contemporary morality, as

has been demonstrated by the difficulties involved in reaching consensus on issues such as

euthanasia and abortion. I maintain that his proposed resolution does not represent any significant

advance on the crisis he identifies due to MacIntyre’s relation to the analytic tradition of

philosophy. The hypothesis of MacIntyre’s work remains bound to analytic models of enquiry, as is

made explicit in his assertion that “The mind stands in need of correction when it is empirically

wrong, not our beliefs”39. To assert this indicates that the emphasis in MacIntyre’s enquiries into

virtue, tradition and dialogue is on the same need for empirical validity and methodological

consistency which has undermined the ethical thought of the Enlightenment. His attempts to justify

the application of virtue through an emphasis on their necessary application in practices is

inconsistent, given that to achieve virtue in the Aristotlean sense is to act virtuously as an end unto

itself. The understanding of virtue here is more akin to techne which can be proved correct or

incorrect than phronesis. MacIntyre interprets it as an activity to be borne out in a causal

relationship40 through engagement in practices which bring about the good. MacIntyre’s assertion

that narratives provide the means to realise what is good in the actions of the moral agent is

inadequate to this end. To argue that the good life will have to meet a required standard of virtue is

to confuse the relationship between phronesis and techne when considering the virtues, maintaining

an emphasis on objectivity in the virtues which this thesis holds is impossible. Phronesis must

instead develop from experience, as MacIntyre ignores how the knowledge of how to act morally

develops from experience acquired in application41. Such an understanding remains subject to the

limitations of analytic philosophy, as it retains the argument that a set ideal of what is the good is

39 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 35740 MacIntyre, Alasdair : After Virtue (Duckworth, London, 1999 edition), pages 205-7

41 Smith, P.Christopher: Hermeneutics and Human Finitude (Fordham University Press, 1991 edition), page 57


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possible rather than developing a truly coherent practical philosophy. The problems arising from

MacIntyre’s method can be categorised as follows.

1) It depicts rationality as having inconsistent internal elements. This creates major issues for our

relationship with our own tradition, dialogue between traditions, and the role of language.

2) It makes the sort of claims which MacIntyre himself would refuse to grant legitimacy to, making

it self-referentially incoherent.42

1.3.2: The internal inconsistencies of Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of rationality

1.3.2.1: The limitations of how MacIntyre analytically presents the challenges faced by tradition

mean that an “epistemological crisis” rendering a tradition unintelligible to its proponents would

necessarily hold across all traditions- if a challenge made by another tradition renders our own

logically inconsistent, there must be common criteria determining logical validity across differing

traditions capable of disproving the claims of another tradition. The significance of the

epistemological crisis for MacIntyre is the capacity to resolve the problems within a given tradition,

stating that “lack of resolution of epistemological crises defeats the tradition itself”43 . Jennifer

Herdt has identified a self-contradiction in this emphasis on the need to judge standards which will

now be outlined: If MacIntyre is correct when he states that we cannot move outside of our

tradition to judge it, an analytic assessment of it which determines what is epistemologically invalid

about it is implausible. Herdt identifies a failure in MacIntyre’s argument that we can judge

between traditions, as MacIntyre’s claim that our judgement is tradition-dependent means that a

contradiction emerges when traditions are contrasted in the epistemological crisis. The standards of

consistency and correspondence required to judge our own tradition in such a manner must be able

to transcend the distinction between traditions if they are capable of settling disputes between

42 Lott, Micah: “Reasonably Traditional: Self-Contradiction and Self-Reference in MacIntyre’s Account ofTradition-Based Rationality”, Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 30, No. 3, March 2003 page 31543 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Duckworth, London, 1988 edition), page 363


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traditions-thus making them tradition-independent and proving the inconsistency of MacIntyre’s

method when applied to questions of dialogue between traditions44. If we are capable of moving

between traditions in MacIntyre’s account, then we must be capable of moving outside them if it is

the most rational thing to do.

1.3.2.2: This failing is compounded by how MacIntyre misconstrues dialogue between traditions,

as the criteria identified by MacIntyre for the validity of traditions exclude a considerable amount

of traditions and constrain dialogue between them. Herdt argues that these criteria are too general

to function as clear definitions of where one tradition ends and another begins, making the

adversial relationship between traditions identified by MacIntyre difficult to accept45.

Whilst MacIntyre acknowledges the need for tradition to provide context, MacIntyre overextends

the correspondence theory of truth when developing his enquiry into tradition. Our tradition can

hardly function negatively, being erased and rewritten according to the hermeneutic standpoint of

the interpreter. It instead must develop organically from experience and dialogue. MacIntyre’s

adversarial understanding of the relationship between traditions can only lead to the total

undermining of all traditions through negation, not the development of genuine understanding.

Only a more Hegelian understanding which relates that which is said by the other to our own

understanding can manage to develop a genuine relationship with tradition which informs and is

informed by our own understanding. When MacIntyre argues that the goal of dialogue between

traditions is to discern the “best answer to be proposed thus far”, he makes it impossible for

philosophy to move beyond existing problems through dialogue46. The reason for this failure is that

he makes the mistake of arguing that “requirements for successful dialectical questioning” can be

44 Herdt, Jennifer A. : Alasdair MacIntyre’s “Rationality of Traditions” and Tradition-Transcendant Standards ofJustification , The Journal of Religion, Vol. 98, No. 4 (Oct. 1998),pp. page 53645 Herdt, Jennifer A. : Alasdair MacIntyre’s “Rationality of Traditions” and Tradition-Transcendant Standards ofJustification , The Journal of Religion, Vol. 98, No. 4 (Oct. 1998),pp. 543-446 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Duckworth, London, 1988 edition), page 358


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established. To make such a claim is to ignore how dialogue and language truly function, and

makes a mockery of his claim that “tradition-constituted enquiry is anti-Hegelian47”.

1.3.2.3: MacIntyre’s analytic methodology creates further problems for language within dialectic.

These were identified by Jeffrey Stout in “Virtue Amongst the Ruins”. MacIntyre maintains that

the linguistic base is epistemological, and that language can have boundaries48. Stout observes that

this would make genuine dialogue between linguistic traditions impossible, claiming that

“MacIntyre takes insufficient heed of a language’s capacity for hermeneutical enrichment. He is

treating the two languages as static systems” 49 In such a scenario, language cannot evolve

organically from usage to adapt to particular situations, as a particular language would be overtly

bound to “provide standard uses for a necessary range of expression and idioms”50 in a

predetermined and logically validated framework. Such a view of language is too purely functional

to be able to communicate across cultural divides with massively different frames of reference, let

alone dialectically determine itself against them. If language evolves in MacIntyre’s account, it is

through epistemological crises invalidating what had been previously held as the prevailing

orthodoxy rather than through changes in our relationship to the logos51. Stout argues that

MacIntyre’s failure to grant language a power to develop over time, and thus for older moral

concepts to find a new purpose, overlooks why ethical concepts developed in the past may be

rehabilitated in the present52.

1.3.3: The self-referential incoherency of MacIntyre’s method in application

47 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 35948 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 371-349 Stout, Jeffrey: Ethics after Babel (Beacon Press, Massacheusetts, 1988 edition), page 21850 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Duckworth, London, 1988 edition), page 37351 MacIntyre, Alasdair: Ibid, page 38352 Stout, Jeffrey: Ethics after Babel (Beacon Press, Massacheusetts, 1988 edition), page 219


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1.3.3.1: The main problem with what MacIntyre calls the “epistemological crisis” is that his

conception of the relation had between individuals and tradition is problematic, as was observed by

Peter Mehl. For his argument that a tradition is renewed as its members seek to move beyond it to

be correct, the relationship held by individuals to their tradition would have to be one in which we

can entirely abandon our tradition in favour of a new one upon its being proven epistemologically

inadequate. Mehl observes that if MacIntyre is correct, then no remnants of the previous tradition

continue into our current one after an epistemological crisis invalidates our existing tradition53.

This is hermeneutically confused, given our relation to tradition is one in which it informs our

understanding without being subject to the dictates of rationality. Instead of a process we can

abandon, it is instead something that informs our understanding by providing the parameters which

make the world intelligible to us. It is necessarily different for every agent, given that traditions are

constantly changing through experience and dialogue. These criticisms are shared by John Haldane,

who claims that the necessary choice between competing ethical traditions represents a

contradiction in MacIntyre’s thought. If rationality is to be viewed as rooted within tradition, then it

is irrational to move outside it to objectively determine which tradition we should belong to.

However, if we are to choose a tradition from the vantage point of our own tradition, then we are

engaging in a relativist interpretation of that tradition54. Thus we are either irrational or relativist

when we apply MacIntyre’s analytic methodology to questions of tradition and dialogue, in the

process coming to conclusions which MacIntyre would reject.

1.3.3.2: MacIntyre’s method means that we cannot achieve a rehabilitation of practical philosophy

through analytic means. By retaining his emphasis on analytic method, he overemphasis the role of

techne ahead of phronesis in his approach to rehabilitating virtue, as we must find a rational

justification for our practical philosophy. MacIntyre fails to move beyond the Enlightenment

53 Mehl, Peter: “In The Twilight of Modernity: MacIntyre and Mitchell on Moral Traditions and theirAssessment”, The Journal of Religious Ethics, volume 19, No.1 , Spring 1991, page 3554 Haldane, John: “MacIntyre’s Thomist Revival: What Next?”, reprinted in After MacIntyre ; edited by Horton,John and Mendus, Susan (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994 edition)


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thinkers he criticises, as he is too clearly a descendant of the thinkers he criticises in his emphasis

on rationality and epistemological validation55. However, I feel that his proposed restoration of

Aristotlean virtue through language, dialogue and tradition has a considerable degree of merit when

considered from a separate methodological standpoint. To prove this, I will now examine how the

work of Hans-Georg Gadamer functions as a means to rehabiliate the Aristotlean schema through a

more Hegelian method which reconsiders the relationship between phronesis and techne by moving

towards how they were originally defined by Aristotle.

55 Smith, P. Christopher: Hermeneutics and Human Finitude, (Fordham University Press, 1991 edition) page 67


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Chapter Two: Introducing and discussing Gadamer’s critiques of the Enlightenment by

presenting Gadamer’s hermeneutics

In the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, we have a means to potentially rehabilitate practical

philosophy in modernity by reorientating our enquiry towards a more Hegelian understanding.

What will be examined is whether Gadamer’s hermeneutically based definition of these concepts

provides a more satisfying rehabilitation of tradition and challenge to the problems of practical than

those of MacIntyre. This will be achieved by presenting the key objections Gadamer makes to the

Enlightenment to clarify which aspects of his philosophical hermeneutics are relevant to the

problems we identified in MacIntyre’s work. Gadamer’s hermeneutics represent a necessary

Hegelian perspective on the nature of dialectic and tradition, rather than the more analytic work of

MacIntyre. Gadamer’s hermeneutics reconfigure the basis of understanding in a manner which

successfully avoids overemphasising the role of techne. The key concepts of (i) Tradition (ii)

Dialectic and (iii) Language in Gadamer’s hermeneutics will be discussed after considering his

critique of the problems generated within philosophy by the Enlightenment.

2.1: The significance of Gadamer’s critique of the methodology of the Enlightenment tophilosophical hermeneutics.

2.1.1: The impetus is given to Gadamer’s goal of re-evaluating the nature of truth developed from

hermeneutic reflection by the dominance of scientific method which has developed after the

Enlightenment. This orthodoxy has seen the overextension of Cartesian method and analytic

philosophy to the humanities, leading to the crisis which was diagnosed by MacIntyre. Gadamer’s

objective is to address this failing, as is suggested by the name Truth and Method. I will here

outline Gadamer’s criticisms of the Enlightenment, how this leads to his emphasis on tradition and

the significance of this to philosophical hermeneutics.

2.1.2: For Gadamer, the fixation in modernity on empirical validity as determined by Cartesian

method has limited the possibilities of understanding by obscuring alternative ways of approaching


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truth. To apply analytic method in the humanities gives rise to misinterpretations of truth by

attempting to discredit the authority of our tradition in favour of empirical justification56.

Modernity understands rationality as stemming from the capacities of reason. To do so is to place a

strong emphasis on the capacities of analytic methodology even when it is inapplicable.

2.1.3: Gadamer objects to how analytic methodology rejected the teachings of prior philosophy,

with the standards developed in customary practices being rejected in favour of proofs which were

analytically verified. By developing an interpretation primarily informed by the capacities of

reason, we judge the past by the standards of the present and are oblivious to the nuances which lie

in tradition. We have lost a sense of continuity with the prior philosophical tradition by making a

decisive break at Descartes innovations. When we focus our understanding on that which can be

analytically verified, we are overlooking the influence of the classical texts and the traditions which

bestow authority, justification and context to our understanding. The Enlightenment’s rejection of

tradition is considered by Gadamer to develop from an antithetical relationship between tradition

and reason. Gadamer considers this relationship a misunderstanding of the true nature of tradition.

The true activity of tradition is transmitting knowledge through generations, adapting itself to fit

new environments as our hermeneutic situation changes57. The criticisms Gadamer makes of how

philosophy based on post-Cartesian method overlooks or unfairly maligns the role of (i)prejudice,

(ii) tradition, and (iii) language will now be explained.

2.1.2.1: Prejudices: In Truth and Method, Gadamer identified the following distinction between

differing forms of prejudice as defining the position of the Enlightenment:

(1) Prejudice which is brought about by the following of authority other than that of

individual reason

56 Lawn, Chris: Gadamer: A Guide for the Perplexed (Continuum, London, 2006 edition), page 3057 Lawn, Chris: Ibid, page 35


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(2) Prejudice which is brought about by over-hastiness in the use of reason, leading to

insufficient consideration when formulating judgements.

2.1.2.2: This distinction is based on the differing origins identified for prejudice in Cartesian

methodology, with either the deference made towards an external authority or over-hastiness in the

use of reason being to blame for any error. Gadamer views this as emerging mainly from an

objection to dogmatism in religious tradition. By denying the validity of prejudices, the

Enlightenment sought to move against the dogmatic interpretations of religious scripture which had

become dominant by denying scripture any validity conferred upon it by tradition. This was to be

achieved without acknowledging the necessity of prejudices. Gadamer regards this project as

impossible due to the authority conferred on that which is written down, due to how “It is not

altogether easy to realise what is written down can be untrue” and the difficulties of distinguishing

between opinion and truth given that “the human intellect is too weak to manage without

prejudices”. Gadamer argues that the written word has the quality of a proof, and that it requires a

special critical effort to free oneself from a prejudice in its favour58.

2.1.2.3: Gadamer argued that the prejudices which the Enlightenment sought to overwhelm are

necessary to making the world intelligible. The demand made by the Enlightenment to overcome

prejudice is informed by a prejudice in favour of Cartesian method, or a “prejudice against

prejudices”, hindering our understanding of the relationship we hold to our own finitude. The

prejudice against prejudices overemphasis the negative connotation of dogmatism that the word

“prejudices” brings to mind. Gadamer’s revival of the positive potential of prejudice is informed by

how reason must be considered dependent on the circumstances in which it operates. Reason draws

on a pre-modern understanding of prejudice which has been obscured by the dogmatic emphasis on

the capacities of pure reason defining modernity. Judgements cannot be ahistorical, and are made

58 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Truth and Method , translated by Marshall, Donald G. and Weinsheimer, Joel.(Continuum , London, 2006 edition) , page 274-275


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possible by a set of pre-judgements informing our knowledge. We must be considered to exist

within history rather than outside it, as the prejudices of the individual constitute the historical

reality of his being. An analysis of prejudices articulates how the foundations for rationality make it

possible for us to accept the authority of reason’s dictates.59

2.1.2.4: What the Cartesian methodology sought to achieve by dividing prejudices into “true” and

“false” prejudices was to create a view of prejudice which corresponded to its own view of reason

as capable of avoiding error through correct application. This rejection of prejudice on the basis

that it was inhibiting reason was informed by Descartes’ argument that external authority was an

enemy of the capacities of reason. This is repeated in the notion of prejudice arising from over-

hastiness as the cause of failures of reason. In Cartesian method, rationality is considered capable

of developing a true understanding if unimpeded. To argue that prejudice inhibits our

understanding involves a view of the world as a given which confronts us to be analysed, rather

than a continually changing phenomenon which influences our understanding60. The negative view

of prejudice as a force limiting our ability to perceive the world that was advanced by the

Enlightenment is reformulated by Gadamer as possessing a positive value informing our

perspective on the changing nature of the world. What Gadamer argues is that a subject is

necessary for developing a view of the world. This means that a view of the world developed

through perception and consolidated in interpretation is bound to prejudices imposed upon the

understanding by tradition and language. To ignore these is impossible.

2.1.2.1: Tradition: The view of the Enlightenment that the authority of reason is to be considered

absolute means that any sources of authority which cannot be proven valid based on analytic

method are to be discredited. The implication of this for the human sciences is that the legitimacy

of traditional authority is overlooked in favour of analytically examining the past, making our

59 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 24260 Lawn, Chris: Gadamer: A Guide for the Perplexed, Continuum, London, 2006 edition, page 39


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examination of the prior tradition of philosophy into an objective enquiry rather than a genuine

dialogue. Such an assertion misunderstands how tradition influences our consciousness of the

world by informing the prejudices which make it intelligible, granting it an authority which the

Enlightenment denies. Gadamer argues that the potential of the authority of tradition to influence

our judgements does not “preclude its being a source of truth”61.

2.1.2.2: The fundamental presupposition of analytic method that Gadamer articulates as

“methodologically disciplined use of reason can safeguard us from all error”62 is an overextension

of the capacities of method to inapplicable areas. What Gadamer identifies as the advantage of his

hermeneutics over Cartesian method when applied to the discussion of tradition is that “neither the

doctrinal authority of the pope nor the appeal to tradition can obviate the work of hermeneutics,

which can safeguard the reasonable meaning of a text against all imposition”63. The text continues

to possess intrinsic properties which are independent of the interpretations made of it, meaning that

when we engage in genuine dialogue with it we can learn from it through relating it to our own

situation. As will be studied, we should develop a better understanding of the necessary and

positive influence of tradition rather than have to analytically justify our relationship to it.

2.1.2.3: Language: Tradition is presented to us linguistically. The articulation of the system of

relations between words and meaning which occurs in the logos places our being in a relationship

with the world. From here, meaning is assigned to language in usage based on the context in which

the term is developed64. Analytic method ignores the logos’ position as the basis of our knowledge

of the world, excluding any critical examination of how the world is given to us linguistically.

Thought is manifest in language and to examine the world on the basis of a pure reason neglects to

understand the relation between word and object which is expressed in language. Gadamer

61 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Truth and Method, translated by Marshall, Donald G. and Weinsheimer, Joel.(Continuum , London, 2006 edition), page 28062 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 27963 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 27964 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 405


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criticises how the Enlightenment seeks to empirically understand language as a series of signs

communicating a meaning which is co-ordinated to the content. Gadamer argues that the

Enlightenment’s quest to reduce language to a series of symbols reducible to a totality is

impossible. For a word to be used as a technical term is “an act of violence against language”,

ignoring its basic nature as something which corresponds to its formation in the logos. Language

and thought are co-existent, and the Enlightenment’s emphasis on true knowledge being a priori

knowledge is incompatible with this65. Gadamer instead rethinks the relation between language

and being so that language becomes the means through which being exists. By understanding being

as linguistically constituted rather than analytically verified, the aspects of prejudice, authority and

tradition which were rejected as negative by the Enlightenment can be positively reformulated.

This reorientation of our relationship with the world from an analytic basis to a more Hegelian

dialectic of correspondence with the logos will now be studied. I will illustrate how Gadamer can

be considered to reformulate Hegelian dialectic in a manner which allows for a more satisfactory

relationship with our own finitude than analytic method is capable of.

2.2. How Gadamer is influenced by Hegel, and the significance of how Gadamer applies this

influence.

2.2.1.1: Hermeneutic reflection is defined by an emphasis on the importance of what Gadamer

terms the “effective historical consciousness”, which indicates a Hegelian influence. Gadamer

explicitly acknowledges this when he claims that he “followed Hegel in order to stress the

hermeneutic dimension of the mediation of past and present”66, as Hegel provided the fundamental

insight as to how language signified a totality in our relations with the world by providing the

means to make it intelligible. Gadamer sees Hegel as developing the relationship between self-

65 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 412-666 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid,, page 575


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understanding and the understanding of the past to potentially rehabilitate tradition and prejudices

from the criticisms of the Enlightenment by making a dialogue with the past possible67.

2.2.1.2: Gadamer makes the relationship between philosophical hermeneutics and Hegel’s

phenomenology of mind explicit in his claim that “This almost defines the aim of philosophical

hermeneutics: its task is to retrace the path of Hegel’s phenomenology of mind until we discover in

all that is subjective the substantiality that determines it”68. This indicates a Hegelian influence on

Gadamer which explains how his hermeneutics are able to adequately come to terms with the role

of language and prejudices in our understanding. Hegel’s influence is further evidenced by

Gadamer’s claim that dissatisfaction with the methodology of the Enlightenment “found its most

significant philosophical justification in Hegel’s explicit appeal to the Greek concept of

methodology” and “The true method was the action of the thing itself”69. This is an appeal to Greek

philosophy which informs Gadamer’s approach extensively, as is seen throughout his hermeneutics

and in the examination of their appropriation of Aristotlean practical philosophy which we will

make in Chapter 3

2.2.1.3: In the Hegelian dialectic which Gadamer refers to, we determine ourselves as rational

through relation to the other. By doing so, the “I think” of Kantian metaphysics and analytic

philosophy is replaced with a “we think” in which intersubjectivity is the basis for knowledge.

Hegel extends the definition of experience from analytic sense-experience to the broader one of

consciousness, in which all that can be lived through informs our understanding. The faculties

which make this possible do not function as an external capacity which judges over our knowledge,

but are instead a part of the experience informing our understanding70. The mind undergoes a

development from its basic animal nature towards an understanding of self which finds its purpose

67 Gjesdal, Kristin: Gadamer and The Legacy of German Idealism (Cambridge University Press, 2009 edition),page 13368 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Truth and Method , translated by Marshall, Donald G. and Weinsheimer, Joel.(Continuum , London, 2006 edition ), page 30169 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 45970 Beiser, Frederick: Hegel (The Routeledge Philosophers), (Routeledge, London, 2005 edition), page 171-3


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in engagement with the other, in the process coming to understand its own rationality through this

relationship in a process culminating in absolute knowledge, which is a priori certain. The initial

authority which the other has over our understanding collapses as our rationality develops, because

we subjugate our irrational desires to the dictates of rationality and thus achieve recognition of our

autonomy from the other. In this process, the world is given to us and we come to understand

ourselves as free rational agents within the world71. We can only satisfy our rationality through

participation in a whole, with this self-awareness through relation to a totality being termed “spirit”

by Hegel. This is clearly an influence on Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, but there are

certain key distinctions.

2.2.3: What is the reformulation of Hegelian dialectic undertaken in Gadamer?

2.2.3.1: How Gadamer redefines finitude in Hegelian dialectic: Gadamer’s hermeneutics

redefine the Hegelian approach by emphasising the finitude involved in dialogical enquiry, rather

than the attempts to achieve Absolute Self-Knowledge in Hegel’s dialectic. Gadamer’s relocation

of the basis of human understanding to language makes this change necessary, as our finite

knowledge becomes the basis of our understanding. Gadamer rejects the possibility of Absolute

Knowledge as being beyond the capacities of language, redefining Hegelian dialectic as oriented

towards finite understanding rather than infinite absolute knowledge72. As mentioned in the

discussion of the hermeneutic circle, Gadamer identifies a dialectic based on the relation between

question and answer at work in hermeneutic experience which gives rise to a correspondence

between the text and interpreter. This relationship is a fundamental and necessary one, granting the

interpretation its motivation and significance within its context. This dialogical shares the goal of

Hegel’s philosophical dialectic, which is “revealing a totality of meaning”73. However, despite their

71 Pages 187-19172 Smith, P. Christopher: Hermeneutics and Human Finitude (Polity Press, 1991 edition), page 88-973 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Truth and Method , translated by Marshall, Donald G. and Weinsheimer, Joel(Continuum, London, 2006 edition) , page 466-7


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shared emphasis on contextualisation and the preconditions which inform our perception and the

overcoming of any limitations created by these preconditions in understanding, there are difference

between philosophical hermeneutics and Hegelian phenomenology of mind. These arise from how

dialectic is considered by Gadamer, who makes a key distinction between his philosophy and that

of Hegel by emphasising the impact of finitude and its limits on understanding. What Gadamer

takes from Hegel is a belief in the universal possibilities of language (and thus philosophical

hermeneutics) and a fascination with the relationship between the components and the whole when

making an interpretation. Gadamer’s dialogical hermeneutics should nevertheless be understood as

differing from Hegel’s dialectic, as the emphasis on finitude differentiates them from Hegelianism.

2.2.3.2: By defining it as such, Gadamer places our hermeneutic situation on a temporal

foundation. The limitations of our interpretations brought about by our situation within time define

our dialogue as possessing a beginning and end, with all dialogue being marked by a relation to the

end of finitude as viewed from the vantage point of our own present horizon74. This emphasis on

the finite nature of human understanding sets philosophical hermeneutics apart from Hegelian

theories of dialectic which seek to understand the infinite, as the differing situations which we

bring to interpretation are what make a hermeneutic interpretation coherent to us. Rather than

disregarding the hermeneutic experience as an example of what Hegel calls a “bad” infinite which

is brought about by infinity being unable to sever its relation to the finite due to the manner in

which finitude is determination which is negatively related to itself as a result of its finite character

eventually altering to a point where it ceases to exist, Gadamer opts to defend its validity75.

Gadamer acknowledges the Hegelian influence on his own philosophy of finitude by granting

74 Pippen, Robert: “Gadamer’s Hegel”, published in Gadamer’s Century, edited by Arnswald, Ulrich, Kertscher,Jens and Malpas, Jeff (MIT Press, Massachusetts, 2002 edition), page 22875 Risser, James: “In The Shadow of Hegel: Infinite Dialogue in Gadamers Hermeneutics”, Research in

Phenomenology, Volume 32, Number 1, 2002 ,, page 90


36

language a speculative power. This speculative power manifests itself in an orientation of the finite

possibilities of interpretation towards the infinite, which involves tradition being passed down to us

through language. Dialogue contains a relation to the “whole of being” within the hermeneutic

circle, rather than a simple statement of the individual’s own situation. This hermeneutic relation

resides within this speculative dynamic of question and answer, in which language provides the

expression of that which is unfolded in dialogue. The “bad infinite” is thus embraced by Gadamer

as providing the inexhaustible dialectic needed for philosophical hermeneutics to achieve self-

knowledge through interpretation76. The hermeneutic interpretation is prompted by a question,

making its existence a dialogical event which is defined by a relation to the horizon of another.

This differs from Hegel, who considers the mind to be self-unfolding through dialectic enquiry77,

whereas Gadamer argues that self-knowledge must descend from the dialogue achieved through

dialectical enquiry informed by history and tradition78. The dialectic of questions and answer which

underpins hermeneutics ensures the necessity of what is uncovered in hermeneutic interpretation.

2.2.4.1: Redefinition of the role of language The tradition to which this dialectic corresponds is

handed to us in language. This grants a crucial role to the logos in understanding of why Gadamer’s

dialectic does not move beyond finitude despite granting a speculative power to language. The

logos from which our understanding of the world derives is dependent on its historical situation.

Our relation to it is thus defined by finitude. The dialectics of dialogue and questioning which

motivate hermeneutic interpretation therefore provide openness to new answers in new situations to

which our knowledge can be applied79.Instead of the absolute knowledge sought by Hegel,

76 Pippen, Robert: “Gadamer’s Hegel”, published in Gadamer’s Century, edited by Arnswald, Ulrich, Kertscher,Jens and Malpas, Jeff (MIT Press, Massachusetts, 2002 edition),, page 22277 Risser, James: “In The Shadow of Hegel: Infinite Dialogue in Gadamers Hermeneutics”, Research in

Phenomenology, Volume 32, Number 1, 2002 , page 93

78 Grondin, Jean: The Philosophy of Gadamer, translated by Kathryn Platt, (Acumen Publishing ltd, Bucks.,2003 edition), page 11179 Grondin, Jean: Ibid, page 94


37

Gadamer placed the linguistic basis of our world as the a priori of hermeneutics80. Gadamer argues

that the granting of meaning to language is reliant on an orientation towards particularity that

renders what is said a part of the particular considerations involved. The word formation involved

reflects the particularity of the act of perception through which the life of a language comes to

develop historically in a socially determined process81. To objectively determine the parameters of

a language ignores the role of what Gadamer terms the “creative” in a language’s capacity for

concept formation. What this multiplicity in potential languages brought about by man’s temporal

situation leads to is a positive significance for the possibilities of articulation. The context in which

concepts are formed is influenced by the differing traditions and environments involved, meaning

Gadamer argues that we can never achieve an absolute knowledge.

2.2.4.2: What makes dialogue across differing cultural traditions possible after this differentiation

is that a positive justification exists for the finitude of understanding. Without the complication of

language by the human mind in the dialectic through which we realise our historical situation,

conceptual differentiation would be impossible. The positive significance of this is that language

provides a very different and more immediately important primary means of formulating concepts

to the scientific system of formulating concepts, as it is determined by what Gadamer calls “the

system of man’s needs and interests”82. The variation in terms which people use is justified by the

fact that universal concepts and pragmatic usage can never be fully reconciled, because a multitude

of possible terms exist across many situations. Language remains bound to a unifying basis in spite

of differentiation, as the mediation between the universal and particular which takes place in

language is such that “all languages are explications of the one unity of the mind”83. We still have

the basis for communication across traditions, as there is a common basis across different traditions

80 Grondin, Jean: Ibid, page 9481 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Truth and Method, translated by Marshall, Donald G. and Weinsheimer, Joel.(Continuum, London, 2006 edition), page 432-382Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 43383 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 435


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through which a dialogue is possible. I will now explain this by discussing the significance of the

reformulated Hegelian dialectic utilised by Gadamer for his philosophical hermeneutics.

2.3: How the reformulated Hegelian dialectic informs Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics

2.3.1.1: To understand how the reconsideration of dialectic in philosophical hermeneutics suggest a

potential resolution to the problems of practical philosophy, I will here present the factors which

inform the application of his reformulated Hegelian dialectic in the act of interpretation in two

steps. I will first present the significance of tradition and language to his philosophical

hermeneutics After doing so, I will explain how effective history, prejudices and temporal distance

inform the practical application of philosophical hermeneutics in the act of interpretation, thus

realising our self-knowledge.

2.3.1.2: Tradition: Tradition defines the basis from which we make our interpretations in

Gadamer’s hermeneutics. We are always situated within our traditions, which inform our

understanding by defining the given circumstances in which reason operates. Gadamer argues that

“The prejudices of an individual, far more than his judgements, constitute the reality of his

being”84, and that their rehabilitation is therefore necessary to understand man’s finite nature. By

arguing against the authority of tradition, the Enlightenment neglected to see how tradition

contributes to our understanding of the world. Its authority is not based on the subjugation of our

reason, but on the acknowledgement of a superior knowledge making our knowledge of a particular

situation possible85. Tradition possesses an influence over our attitudes and behaviour which comes

to provide a justification superior to that of reason or free insight, with Gadamer explicitly claiming

that “The real force of morals is based on tradition”86. Without the influence of tradition,

interpretation becomes impossible.

84 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid,, page 27885Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid,, page 28186 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid,, page 282


39

2.3.2.1: Language: The significance of language to Gadamer’s hermeneutics is clarified by

repeating Gadamer’s assertion that “being that can be understood is language” 87. Language

informed by our relationship to the logos provides the medium by which understanding is possible,

through which the hermeneutic phenomenon gains its power of universality. This power of

universality comes from what Gadamer calls a “universal ontological structure” made visible by

language’s conferring of meaning upon being in our dialectical relationship with the logos. These

meanings then project the ontological constitution of what is understood in a universal sense in

language, whilst determining their own relation to finite beings in interpretation. Language makes

hermeneutic interpretation possible, and defines our relation to the world through its universal,

speculative nature.

2.3.2.2: The conversational realisation of the potential of language extends to the act of

interpretation, in which our viewpoint is engaged in a dialogue with that of the author. The fusion

of horizons which takes place when we move beyond our own historical situation in dialogue with

the other represents the full realisation of the potential of conversation, as a common horizon

between ourselves and the other develops from this process88. The fusion of horizons is evident

whenever we engage in hermeneutic reflection upon a text, and we are brought into contact with

another tradition.

2.3.2.3: This tradition exists primarily in language, meaning that our understanding of the world is

determined by that which is communicated to us in linguistically constituted tradition. That which

is learned from tradition is given to us, and repeats in custom or in direct interaction with it. When

we make an interpretation, we are directly translating what is said in the text into our own

language. The other becomes subordinated to our own conceptual frame of reference, informing it

as it does so. To interpret is to use our prejudices to render that which is said intelligible. The

87 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid,, page 47088 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 367


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interpretation serves the function of bringing the text to dialogical life, and no two interpretations

can be identical. Interpretations must be adapted to the situation in which they belong, as the text

will constantly present itself differently to us. The interpretation makes understanding explicit, and

is part of the context of what is understood. Both the unity of the text and its content are expressed

by being placed in language89.

2.3.3.1: The relationship between language and hermeneutic experience: Language is therefore

to be considered the record of our finitude, in which our traditions are preserved90. Language is

itself constantly formed and reformed as change exists in our world, meaning that “If we start from

the basic ontological view that being is language as revealed to us by the hermeneutical experience

of being, then there follows not only the event-character of the beautiful and the event-structure of

all understanding”91. This flux is what our hermeneutic experiences unfold within, mediating our

finite nature to self and world. Linguistic communication enables this relation to tradition by

enabling the hermeneutic experience, which acts as a mediation between our situation and the

traditions which form and develop language.

2.3.3.2: This role of expression held by language extends to how interpretation functions as the

realisation of hermeneutics. The hermeneutic experience is constituted linguistically, as linguistic

experience is the form of all interpretation. The hermeneutic phenomenon is indicative of the

universal function of language, which makes hermeneutics possible. The universality of language

stems from its dependence on the presupposition of a common world. This world is by definition a

linguistic one, and language and world are co-dependent concepts. World can only be known to us

through language, with the relationship held by man to the world being “absolutely and

fundamentally verbal in nature”92. Gadamer identifies man’s capacity to relate to the world through

89 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 357-990 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 41591 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 48192 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 471


41

language as language’s significance, as language makes it possible for humans to express

themselves freely beyond habitat. Language is variable in a way which the communication of

animals isn’t, with the multitude of possible languages indicating the freedom of man from his

environment and ability to develop a subjective realm of his own93. The world as linguistically

constructed provides the basis for community between people, and the development of society.

Tradition is necessary for this realisation of community, in order for the standards and practices

developed in society to be linguistically intelligible. The starting point of this communication

within society is the effective-historical consciousness, as the experience contained within it is

realised in interpretation and understanding94.

2.3.3.3: Gadamer’s investigation of the logos is motivated by the universal nature of language,

which reveals the verbal nature of the hermeneutic phenomenon. Language is what makes the work

of tradition intelligible to us, with Gadamer arguing that “Verbal form and traditionary content

cannot be separated in the hermeneutic experience”95. Language defines our relation to tradition

through making it possible for us to consummate the hermeneutic experience in which it develops

and is informed. The most important aspect of the function which Gadamer attributes to language

are how its limitations are what grant it relevance, as we cannot arbitrarily change the meaning of

words if language is to properly exist. The functionality of language is dependent on its responding

to a consensus as to the meaning of the terms involved, with language representing the knowledge

of what is referred to, as opposed to the thing itself.

2.3.3.4: The nature of the hermeneutic phenomenon provides a revelation as to the universal

function of language, which grants interpretation a universal significance as “understanding and

interpretation are related to verbal tradition in a specific way”96. This specific form means

93 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 40394 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 41495 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 43896 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 405


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language cannot be understood simply as form. It is something broader and deeper which is called

the logos. Logos is “the stream that flows from this thought and sounds out through the mouth”

representing the articulation of thought and being into language. Gadamer argues that this

articulation “places being in a relationship”, due to the contingency of the situation of the

interpreter. Instead of beginning from the subject and seeking to understand it through an

examination of the words used to discuss it, Gadamer identifies a different function for the word. It

becomes a means to determine “what and how it communicates to the person who uses it”97. The

word only attains significance within its tradition, and the meaning which has developed within the

community of language for it.

2.4.1: The significance of Gadamer’s approach to tradition and language to interpretation

and the achievement of self-knowledge.

2.4.1.1: What this analysis of logos reveals in relation to Gadamer’s broader philosophy is that it is

part of his critique of the Enlightenment. Gadamer identifies as the limitations of the

Enlightenment’s philosophy of language as being a reduction of language through scientific

method to a series of symbols which correspond to the “totality of the knowable”98 , making it

possible for being to be considered something which can be objectively understood. The impact of

this reduction is that language becomes the following of “a path of abstraction that ultimately leads

to the construction of an artificial language”. This is antithetical to the proper function of language

and a failure to understand the relation between language and being. For a technical term to possess

a meaning which is empirically true is “an act of violence against language”. To consider language

in such a manner is to ignore how language and thought co-exist and how language provides the

parameters through which historically influenced thought can be understood. When technical

language is used, the necessity influence of experience and tradition on learning is severed.

97 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 41398 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 414


43

Gadamer dismisses such knowledge as “a substitute for a real piece of knowledge”. Language must

instead be an incarnation, becoming a process of concept formation in which that which is said is

subsumed to the particularity of its situation99. To understand this incarnation of tradition and

language in the act of interpretation, I will now present the impact had by the concepts of Effective

History, Prejudices and Temporal Distance on our interpretations and the self-knowledge achieved.

2.4.2.1 : Effective History: In the context of Gadamer’s critique of method, his argument that

“Understanding is essentially a historically effected event” requires a more detailed explanation.

For hermeneutic reflection to adequately address the matter at hand, the influence of history upon

understanding must be demonstrated. When we make an interpretation, we apply the aspects of our

understanding influenced by tradition to our situation. This influence is such that we cannot take

the immediate appearance of the object of interpretation as being the whole truth. We must instead

understand the phenomenon from the perspective of our historically situated consciousness. The

historical consciousness which we bring to bear on interpretation makes us conscious of our

hermeneutic situation when we make an interpretation, which is to say it makes an objective

knowledge of our situation impossible. That which is brought to influence our understanding

through the effect of history provides the limitations to understanding defining what Gadamer aptly

calls our “horizon”.

2.4.2.2: This horizon can be expanded or contracted as new knowledge of our world and situation

comes to light, but it remains the perspective which informs our knowledge of self and our

interpretations100. Understanding becomes the fusion of these horizons with that which is being

interpreted in a dialogue, which develops our understanding. In this process, the hermeneutic

consciousness projects the historical horizon in which it is located, and undergoes what Gadamer

calls “foregrounding”. This is a reciprocal process in which we approach the tradition under

99 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 427100 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 299-301


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consideration under the influence of the historically effected consciousness. The horizon of the

present is constantly changing as a result of this consideration of our prejudices, meaning that the

hermeneutic task is defined by a tension between the past and the present which is consciously

brought out. The hermeneutic consciousness is constantly seeking to develop knowledge of its own

historical affectedness and “discover in all that is subjective the substantiality which defines it”101.

This is Gadamer’s redefined Hegelian dialectic at work, and its significance is apparent in how our

historically effected consciousness operates.

2.4.3.1: Prejudices: The historically effected consciousness is defined and given urgency by the

relation it holds to the prejudices informing it, as “The recognition that all understanding inevitably

involves some prejudice gives the hermeneutic problem its real thrust”102. If we are to achieve

genuine understanding, we must be able to come to terms with our foreknowledge. Rather than

seeking an objective knowledge of our situation, the prejudices which define it must be understood

and considered rather than rejected. These prejudices are so important to our understanding that

Gadamer argues any attempt by schools of thought such as historicism or the Enlightenment to

purge our understanding of their influence is doomed to failure. Their argument against the

importance of considering tradition is informed by a prejudice against tradition.

2.4.3.2: Gadamer thus reconsiders the influence of prejudice as being to make a positive rather than

negative contribution towards our understanding. When our place within history is considered, the

effective-historical relation means that we are participants within it rather than external observers

of it. By influencing us to such an extent, “the prejudices of an individual rather than his

judgements constitute the historical reality of his being”103. What legitimate prejudices (those

which develop from a rationally justified authority which is based on knowledge, such as that of a

professor) should instead be considered to achieve is to make our limited horizon of world

101 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 301-5102 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 272103 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 278


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intelligible, and grant validity to our actions and judgements when considered in relation to their

content. Hermeneutics is not a judgement being made upon our tradition and its influence, but is

instead an act of participation in a process of history which prejudices make possible.

2.4.4.1: Temporal Distance: As hermeneutics necessarily takes place within a tradition, Gadamer

calls attention to what he calls the hermeneutic rule: “that we must understand the whole in terms of

the detail and the detail in terms of the whole”104. This Platonic understanding of the relation

between components and the whole influences Gadamer’s formulation of the hermeneutic circle, in

which harmony between the components of an interpretation influences the broader understanding

of the interpreter. The hermeneutic circle defines understanding as a process of interplay between

the movement of tradition and that of the interpreter, with a “fore conception of completeness”

guiding the unity of meaning and making that which is uncovered in interpretation intelligible105.

This is however guided by the specific details of the interpretation involved, such as the prejudices

informing the hermeneutic situation of the interpreter and the object of interpretation. Whilst a

bond exists between the interpreter and the object of interpretation, there is still an element of

otherness to that which is encountered in interpretation which necessitates temporal distance to be

understood properly in relation to our historically effected consciousness. For Gadamer, “the true

locus of hermeneutics is this in-between” and the hermeneutic task is thus defined as “to clarify the

conditions in which understanding takes place”106.

2.4.4.2: The role of temporal distance in this process is to separate the prejudices which hinder and

enable our understanding from each other, which must occur in the process of interpretation.

Temporal distance separates prejudices by reconsidering the role of time in our understanding, with

Gadamer explain this in reference to Heidegger’s Dasein . The ontological orientation of time is

given an existential dimension, in which it becomes “the supportive ground of events in which the

104 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 291105 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 294106 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 295


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present is rooted”107. Gadamer gives the impact this has on our understanding of tradition a

positive definition, as temporal distance represents a continuity based on custom and tradition

between ourselves and the past. It makes it possible for us to contextualise an event, and for its

meaning to more fully emerge when knowledge we have developed can be brought to bear upon

the phenomenon. We can foreground the prejudices and historically effected consciousness which

influence our understanding, and critique them.

2.5: The significance of the self-realisation which takes place in interpretation to practical

philosophy.

In the act of interpretation we come to a dialogue with the other in which we achieve a degree of

self-knowledge through the relationship between understanding and tradition. To understand a text

is to relate it to our own by engaging it with our own understanding, which preserves what is of

interest in the text on its own terms in a dialogue with the text. Such an approach preserves what is

important in the object of interpretation, meaning that which is to be learned from the past can live

in the present108. This can be naturally extended to any dialogue, as the linguistic character of our

self-realisation by engagement with the other informs all of our relationships with the other. I will

now extend this to the sphere of practical philosophy and the rehabilitation of the Aristotlean

schema.

107 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 297108 Warnke, Georgia: Gadamer; Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason (Polity Press, 1987 edition), pages 103-5


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Chapter Three: Understanding the significance of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics to

practical philosophy through a closer reading of his work and comparison with Alasdair

MacIntyre.

3.1: The Arisotelian definition of practical knowledge and the forms of knowledge

3.1.1: In his analysis of the virtues of the intellect, Aristotle argues that “there are two parts which

grasp a rational principle-one by which we contemplate the kind of things whose originative causes

are invariable, and one by which we contemplate variable things”109. The virtue of these is

realised in their usage, with the good being achieved when the intellectual parts achieve truth

through “truth in agreement in right desire”110.To realise the virtues, the forms of knowledge

which these parts of the intellect contemplate must be understood and their relationship to the

realisation of virtue in practice. Accordingly, Aristotle distinguishes between three forms of

knowledge

3.1.2: Episteme: The object of scientific knowledge is that which can be demonstrated true or false

by induction, meaning that “the object of scientific knowledge is one of necessity”. This knowledge

is thus a form in which “is thought capable of being taught and its object of being learnt.”111. This

knowledge is defined by its relation to belief in “a certain way”, which grants it its validity112.

3.1.3: Techne: The object of technical knowledge is the knowledge of how to make things. This

knowledge concerns the “coming into being” of things, and is a state of capacity to make

something, the origin of which is in the maker rather than that which is made. Making and acting

109 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford University Press (translated by David Ross), 2009 edition, page102-3110 Aristotle, Ibid, page 103111 Aristotle, Ibid, page 104-5.112 Aristotle, Ibid, page 105


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are two separate capacities, and the ability to make is different from the capacity to act as to make

something is to apply “true reasoning” in the act of making113.

3.1.4:Phronesis: For a man to achieve practical wisdom, he must be capable of deliberating well

about matters of the good in order to discern “what is good and expedient for himself” and “what

sort of things conduce to the good life in general”. Thus, practical wisdom must be separated from

scientific knowledge and technical knowledge, as “that which can be done is capable of being

otherwise, not art because action and making are different kinds of thing”114. It cannot be oriented

towards a specific end, as technical knowledge can due to the manner in which to exercise practical

wisdom is to achieve good action as an end unto itself. For Aristotle, “practical wisdom must be a

reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods” and consequently “there is

no such thing as excellence in practical wisdom” due to the manner in which “it is not only a

reasoned state; this is shown by the fact that a state of that sort may be forgotten but practical

wisdom cannot”. The knowledge informing practical wisdom arises from deliberation and

experience rather than empirical necessity or teaching which inform scientific and technical

knowledge. Practical wisdom is defined as a virtue, and is necessary to realise the virtues in action.

3.1.2: What Aristotle identifies as the necessary relationship between practical knowledge and

virtue.

3.1.2.1: The significance of practical wisdom identified by Aristotle derives from the impact had by

deliberation, as “it must consider the particulars; for it is particular and practice is concerned with

particulars”115. This is why experience is so important to realising practical knowledge, as the

particulars which inform our practical wisdom “become familiar from experience”116. Thus,

excellence in deliberation requires that we are capable of achieving correctness with regard to

113 Aristotle, Ibid, page 105114 Aristotle, Ibid, page 106115 Aristotle, Ibid, page 109116 Aristotle, Ibid, page 110


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“what conduces to the end which practical wisdom apprehends truly”117. The ability to apply this

deliberation is the act of understanding, which is the exercise of the faculty of opinion for the

purpose of judging matters of practical wisdom118.

3.1.2.2: In the capacity for judgement, Aristotle makes a distinction between “sympathetic

judgement” and “correct judgement” which further differentiates practical wisdom from scientific

and technical knowledge- “sympathetic judgement is judgement which discriminates what is

equitable and does so correctly; and correct judgement is that which judges what is true”119.In the

act of sympathetic judgement, we make a perception of the particulars from which we can form a

judgement. Experience improves our ability to make this sympathetic judgement, as “experience

has given them an eye they see aright”120.

3.1.2.3: These qualities are necessary for virtue to be realised, as “the work of man is achieved only

in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes the goal

correct, and practical wisdom makes what leads to it correct”121. Aristotle attributes the

relationship between the two as being one of co-dependence, as virtue informs practical wisdom as

to the good action which is to be pursued whereas practical wisdom makes the realisation of virtue

possible. We must be able to deliberate successfully to realise virtue, thus making practical

wisdom the key to realising Aristotlean virtue. With this in mind, I will now examine how

MacIntyre and Gadamer’s proposed restorations of Aristotlean virtue understand this relationship.

3.1.3: How MacIntyre and Gadamer understand the relationship between the differing formsof knowledge and the virtues.

3.1.3.1: When outlining the Aristotlean schema, MacIntyre’s analytic method remains visible due

to the identification of an analytic procedure from which the conclusions determined objectively

117 Aristotle, Ibid, page 112118 Aristotle, Ibid, page 113119 Aristotle, Ibid, page 113120 Aristotle, Ibid, page 114121 Aristotle, Ibid, page 115


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possess ethical validity. In setting out this procedure, MacIntyre identifies motives and reasoning

which can be objectively justified to determine a basis for empirically justifying assertions made

within the Aristotlean tradition. The practical reasoning which takes place in MacIntyre’s

interpretation of the Aristotlean schema has the following elements. I will here briefly state these

premises, and explain why they are examples of his analytic methodology. MacIntyre is here

maintaining an insistence that virtue can be realised through a relationship with technical

knowledge-as seen by the fact that he has allowed for a direct process in which it is brought out.

1) “The wants and goals of the agent, presupposed by but not expressed in his reasoning. Without

these there would be no context for the reasoning.” By arguing that the motivation for moral action

arises from a desire to bring about certain objectives from our justifying them, MacIntyre

acknowledges the extent to which analytic method still has a place within the revival of the

Aristotlean schema proposed.

2) “The second element is the major premise, an assertion to the effect that doing or having or

seeking such-and-such is the type of thing that is good for or needed by so-and-so” For this to be

possible, the moral agent has be able to analytically justify that the premises involved in his moral

reasoning are objectifiably justifiable and will bring about good. The major premise is formulated

so as to remove specific aspects of the application of the good and to make it possible to argue that

what is good in this particular case can be methodologically justified in any case.

3) This is borne out by what he identifies as the third element, which is articulated as follows: “the

minor premises wherein the agent, relying on a perceptual judgement, asserts that this is an

instance or occasion of the requisite kind”. When considering the correct course of moral action,

application is only a secondary concern to justification for MacIntyre. Rather than application

informing our understanding, it is only an indicator of whether the premises proved valid by

analytic examination are relevant to the case to which they are applied122.

122 MacIntyre, Alasdair : After Virtue (Duckworth, London, 1999 edition), page 162


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For this assertion to be valid, presupposed needs and ends are required for the virtuous act to be

achieved, as the moral agent is expected to be able to act virtuously by acting according to

achieving ends from means123.

3.1.3.2: We gain the practical knowledge required to realise this in our embeddedness in tradition,

from “which one has initially to learn obediently as an apprentice learns”124. This indicates

MacIntyre has confused the practical knowledge which informs our deliberation with knowledge

which can be taught, despite correctly incorporating experience into the development of practical

wisdom. If what is learnt from tradition can be proved invalid in dialectical enquiry, then we must

consider it episteme rather than phronesis, and thus MacIntyre has oriented the relationship

between practical wisdom and virtue in favour of techne rather than phronesis.

3.1.4: The importance of “The Hermeneutic Significance of Aristotle” to understanding the

moral potential of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics

3.1.4.1: “The Hermeneutic Significance of Aristotle” is situated in a discussion of the necessary

consideration of application to questions of hermeneutics. By invoking Aristotle’s analysis of self-

knowledge in this discussion of application, Gadamer indicates that his hermeneutics draw on a

methodology which emphasises practical knowledge ahead of knowledge which can be taught. To

do so, he elaborates the distinctions between practical and theoretical philosophy which define his

work by undergoing an analysis of the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics. The significance of

Aristotle’s distinctions between phronesis, techne and episteme to Gadamer is that they illuminate

the importance of Gadamer’s distinctions between hermeneutic knowledge and scientific method.

What Aristotle’s definition of episteme as “theoretical knowledge” developed from mathematics in

123 Smith, P. Christopher: Hermeneutics and Human Finitude (Fordham University Press, 1991 edition), page51-2124 MacIntyre, Alasdair : After Virtue (Duckworth, London, 1999 edition), page 258


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which “the object of scientific knowledge is of necessity”125, techne as “a state of capacity to

make”126 and phronesis as “a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human

goods”127 in which the object of knowledge of that held by man to himself achieves is to clarify the

relationship between the “human sciences” and “natural sciences”. This grants the hermeneutic

consciousness a justification for rejecting Cartesian method. The assertion that the knowledge

required for application in moral knowledge is not knowledge which can be formally taught

indicates that Gadamer is defining his hermeneutics as necessarily incorporating application and

prejudice when making judgements. This link which is made explicit by Gadamer’s claim that

moral consciousness, like hermeneutics, “calls for prior direction to guide action”128.

3.1.4.2: The knowledge required for a self-knowledge such as hermeneutic reflection or Aristotlean

practical philosophy to be possible is gained through experience, due to the intrinsic relation it

holds to application. Gadamer argues that this relation is made possible through how “Aristotle’s

ability to describe phenomena from every aspect constitutes his real genius”129. Gadamer thus

acknowledges that his interpretation of Aristotle is beholden to Hegelian ideas of a speculative

unity by directly quoting the assertion that “The empirical, comprehended in the synthesis, is the

speculative concept”. Knowledge defined as being episteme is “of necessity”130, techne as “a state

of capacity to make”131 and phronesis as “a form of self-knowledge”. Gadamer seeks to understand

how Aristotle is able to emphasise the significance of phronesis and the limitations of ethical

knowledge when discussing morality.

125Aristotle: Ibid, page 105126 Aristotle: Ibid, page 106127Aristotle: Ibid, page 107128 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Truth and Method , translated by Marshall, Donald G. and Weinsheimer, Joel.(Continuum , London, 2006 edition), page 314129 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 315130 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford University Press (translated by David Ross), 2009 edition, page105131 Aristotle, Ibid, page 106


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3.1.4.3: Gadamer’s dialogical philosophy is particularly relevant to understanding the problem of

application. He identifies a tension which can only be resolved by adopting an approach which

rethinks the relation between means and end by emphasising phronesis ahead of techne. Despite the

fact that laws are formulated with the intention of being universal, they are by necessity applied to

very specific situations. To apply a law is to apply philosophical hermeneutics and our historically

conditioned understanding in much the same manner as what Aristotle is described as calling “the

judge’s form of phronesis”132. This form of practical knowledge is one which is able to adeptly

apply laws and rules which are broadly formulated to specific cases. Despite involving a high

degree of skill it is not a technical ability. An abstract maxim such as that of the law is inadequate

to the problems faced in practical application. The tension between the demands of the law and

those of the situation into which it is applied are such that the law “cannot contain practical reality

in its full concreteness”133. The relation between law and world mirrors that between method and

text in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, with the argument against the application of objective method to

the text in interpretation resembling that which is made here against the application of abstract laws

to complex situations. The necessary tension which exists between the perfectly formulated law

and the circumstances of its application indicates the need for phronesis to be considered a separate

form of knowledge. This distinction will now be outlined and studied so as to grasp its full

significance.

3.2.-How practical knowledge differs from technical knowledge

3.2.1.1: In his analysis of the forms of knowledge, Aristotle emphasises the need to remember that

phronesis and techne are not to be confused. When we display phronesis, we have “calculated well

with a view to some good end which is one of those that are not the subject of any art”134. This

132 Aristotle, Ibid, page 315133 Aristotle, Ibid, page 316134 Aristotle, Ibid, page 106


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means that we must be very careful not to confuse them when we are engaging in deliberation, as

practical and technical knowledge possess different ends. The significance of this to virtue is that it

defines the nature of what it is to be good as one which is not an act that brings about the good as

its end, but instead an action which is good unto itself135. The variable nature of the particulars

which define the good mean that the basis of our moral action cannot be taken as true by necessity,

but instead requires phronesis to be a virtue in which is impossible to be judged as excellent rather

than a techne in which it is possible to judge excellence. Whilst it is possible to be taught a techne

and to excel in it, it is impossible to be taught phronesis as a state which can be taught can also be

forgotten whereas phronesis cannot136. This distinction is crucial to realising the virtues, and we

will now examine how MacIntyre and Gadamer understand it.

3.2.2-How MacIntyre confuses the necessary distinction between practical and technical

knowledge

3.2.2.1: In his account of how virtue is to be realised, MacIntyre confuses the relationship between

phronesis and techne. When he argues in his account of the virtues that it is possible to identify

specific virtues which hold across all traditions in the form of justice, truthfulness and courage137,

he is arguing that these virtues represent a knowledge which holds to be true of necessity, and are

thus episteme. By doing so, he misinterprets Aristotle’s argument that judgement and

understanding are dependent on phronesis as defined separately from techne.

3.2.2.2: This methodologically influenced difference in how application and justification are to be

considered within the Aristotlean schema is intensified by how MacIntyre interprets phronesis.

MacIntyre characterises it as a central virtue within judgement which can be taught by possessing

an intellectual character. Phronesis is necessary for the exercise of the “virtues of character”

developed through experience, but we become “practically wise as a result of systematic

135 Aristotle, Ibid, page 106136 Aristotle, Ibid, page 107137 MacIntyre, Alasdair: After Virtue (Duckworth, London, 1999 edition), page 192


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instruction”138 rather than practical learning through experience. To explain the contradiction

inherent in this argument, MacIntyre defines two separate forms of virtue which exist co-

dependently: “the intellectual virtues are acquired through teaching, the virtues of character from

habitual exercise”. We become just or courageous through practical experience, but can only be

wise as a result of systematic education. This indicates an orientation towards a greater role for

technical knowledge within the revival of the Aristotlean schema in MacIntyre than there is

evidence to support in the Nicomachean ethics, as a clear distinction between the nature of

phronesis and techne as a part of the intellectual virtues is made by Aristotle. The significance of

this is that MacIntyre now casts morality as something which can be taught in the matter of a

techne, making the comparison between him and Gadamer one between the differing roles of

phronesis and techne. Whilst the exercise of practical intelligence which is formally taught requires

the presence of the virtues of character for justice in application, phronesis has been confused and

resembles what Aristotle would define as a techne. By arguing that guidelines which can be taught

must inform our praxis, MacIntyre’s analytic method undermines his proposed rehabilitation of

practical philosophy.

3.2.2.3: We cannot claim to be acting virtuously on the grounds of necessity if we are maintain the

distinction between phronesis and techne, as to do grants our relationship to the other in application

the character of a dictate in which we act independently of the rules of the community in which our

morality is defined. If we take this as our justification to act virtuously, then we are not applying

phronesis in the Aristotlean sense. It instead functions as techne as we are seeking to bring about a

predetermined result from our morality, thus making moral deliberation a skill which can be taught

rather than one developed from experience139. This confusion is further borne out in his concept of

the “epistemological crisis”, as he continues to seek a rationally justifiable basis for our tradition

138 MacIntyre, Alasdair : Ibid, page 154139 Smith, P. Christopher: Hermeneutics And Human Finitude (Fordham University Press, New York, 1991 edition) ,page 59


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and operation of our practical knowledge. This is not what Aristotle has in mind in his analysis of

the intellectual virtues, as he clearly defines acting and making as separate skills, with the capacity

to deliberate requiring experience to be fully realised. MacIntyre has thus failed to respect how the

differing forms of enquiry operate in Aristotle, as he has argued virtue and its realisation can be

realised as techne rather than phronesis.

3.2.3-How Gadamer is able to understand the necessity of the distinction

3.2.3.1: In Gadamer’s analysis, the Aristotlean distinction between moral and technical knowledge

is defined by the manner in which the two spheres correspond to differing modes of enquiry and

forms of knowledge. Gadamer observes a similar tension to that between the “human” and

“natural” sciences discussed in his own work in the distinction made by Aristotle from ethical

knowledge and scientific. “Aristotle sees ethos as differing from physics in being a sphere in which

the laws of nature do not operate. “ Moral knowledge arises from a different basis of knowledge to

scientific knowledge, in which the object of knowledge is “man and what he knows of himself”,

meaning that knowledge developed from this is knowledge which “is concerned with what is not

always the same”140. Consequently, the content of the ethos consists of “human institutions and

human modes of behaviour which are mutable, and like rules only to a limited degree”141. To

impose technical knowledge developed through empirical enquiry and formally taught as an

orthodox solution to problems is inappropriate. It is in fact potentially harmful as “knowledge that

cannot be applied to the concrete situation remains meaningless and even risks obscuring what the

situation calls for”. In making this claim, Gadamer indicates that he is able to understand the

necessity of distinguishing between phronesis and techne , as he is making the necessary distinction

140 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Truth and Method, translated by Marshall, Donald G. and

Weinsheimer, Joel. (Continuum, London, 2006 edition), page 312

141 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 311


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between episteme which holds true of necessity and knowledge which is developed from

experience of particulars.

3.2.3.2: By maintaining the distinction between the forms of knowledge, Gadamer is able to better

preserve the Aristotlean argument that we must view phronesis and techne as separate forms of

knowledge with differing qualifications. Gadamer’s argument that we must remember that “man is

not at his own disposal in the same way as a craftman’s material is at his disposal”142 indicates he

understands the need identified in Aristotle for a form of self-knowledge to guide our morality,

rather than a more objective knowledge of how we are to act virtuously. In being able to make this

distinction between phronesis and techne as understood by Aristotle, Gadamer develops a means of

rehabilitating practical philosophy which we will explore further in our examination of the

relationship between philosophical hermeneutics and Aristotlean praxis.

3.3: A comparison between MacIntyre and Gadamer with regard to their capacity to

rehabilitate Aristotlean virtue

3.3.1-How MacIntyre’s work is incapable of rehabilitating the Aristotlean schema

3.3.1.1: As stated, MacIntyre interprets the Aristotlean virtues as matters which hold true of

necessity across differing traditions. This means that his attempts to restore the Aristotlean notion

of virtue is defined by an analytic method in which our justification for acting virtuously must be so

across differing traditions and situations, which is inappropriate to restoring practical philosophy.

MacIntyre fails to rehabilitate the Aristotlean schema due to the manner in which his insistence on

maintaining rational justification for morality fails to appreciate the necessity of considering the

separation between the differing forms of knowledge in Aristotle’s account. The consequences of

his argument that we must retain an analytic methodology when concerning ourselves with

questions of morality confuses phronesis and techne, undermining his understanding of tradition,

language and dialogue. It makes his approach inappropriate to rehabilitating practical philosophy,

142 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 314


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as the relationship between our practical wisdom and our action is subject to the dictates of reason.

This distortion extends to his understanding of tradition, dialogue and language.

3.3.1.1: Tradition

3.3.1.1.1: In MacIntyre’s argument for the validity of tradition he defines it as a suitable basis for

analytically justified moral practice he only contradicts himself. This self-contradiction stems from

how he rejects a possibility of truly transcending our own finite historical situation in relationships

between different traditions in the same way as Gadamer’s “fusion of horizons” is able to.

MacIntyre’s argument that it is possible to find tradition-independent standards by which to judge

our own tradition and that of the other is flawed. It only serves to limit his practical philosophy by

failing to adequately incorporate the influence of tradition and the dialogue between them on our

practical knowledge. This indicates his methodology is incapable of developing a valid tradition

which can serve as justification for our morality, condemning his reformulation of the Aristotelian

schema to failure.

3.3.2.1.2: It is impossible to settle debates between traditions through the use of tradition-

independent resources, as there are no tradition-independent standards adequate to the task. We

simply cannot decide to act without making reference to some teaching which has been informed

by tradition143. To argue that we analytically examine our tradition to determine inconsistencies

within it is therefore unhelpful when seeking to resolve problems within tradition or communicate

with another tradition. MacIntyre’s method does not create a fusion of traditions with that of the

other in communication, but instead continues to regard it as foreign. In maintaining that we are

dependent on tradition to make our world intelligible, MacIntyre demonstrates what can be termed

the “empathetic imagination” in which the differences between the particularities defining

143 Herdt, Jennifer A. : “Alasdair MacIntyre’s “Rationality of Traditions” and Tradition-Transcendent Standardsof Justification” , The Journal of Religion, Vol. 98, No. 4 (Oct. 1998), pp. 530


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traditions are surmountable through developing a conversation144. MacIntyre nevertheless retains a

concept of dialectic as an adversarial process which makes Gadamer’s hermeneutics and the fusion

of horizons a superior means of achieving dialogue across traditions.

3.3.2.1.3: For the emphatic imagination as articulated by MacIntyre to be capable of resolving

disputes between traditions, it must be capable of moving outside tradition towards tradition-

independent factors which do not exist. We cannot remove ourselves from our tradition with the

intention of viewing it objectively. This failure is compounded by MacIntyre’s inability to properly

articulate how we would examine our tradition. MacIntyre only offers an analytic method by which

we can study tradition as an epistemological object of inquiry, rather than any specifics to orient

our examination. To adequately understand our tradition as MacIntyre proposes would involve

learning a second first language, examining our tradition from within this language and compare

how this tradition resolves its epistemological crisis to our own tradition. This is impossible

without specific traditions informing the procedure, making it impossible to step outside tradition.

If we are to subject the claims of tradition to the dictates of reason as suggested by MacIntyre, then

we are treating it as an episteme. This is despite Aristotle’s emphasis that the object of practical

wisdom is different to that of the sciences, meaning that the knowledge informing it must be

considered separately145.

3.3.2.3: Dialogue and language

3.3.2.3.1: An analytic approach to dialogue which understands it as a process of statements

communicating intention such as that of MacIntyre is incapable of realising the full potential of

conversation. To argue that the intention of the author or speaker provides the definitive parameters

144 Herdt, Jennifer A: Ibid, page 531145 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford University Press (translated by David Ross), 2009 edition , page

106


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of both beginning and end from which a conversation develops ignores the full potential of

dialogue to transcend finitude. To explain this, I will now explain why MacIntyre’s argument that

dialogue consists of analytic statements motivated by an intention of being correct is inadequate to

this end. The following key observations about the significance of dialogue to the realisation of

philosophical hermeneutics were made by the scholar David Weberman, and I will now explain

how MacIntyre fails to take these key points pertaining to the necessity of dialogue within practical

philosophy into account.

1) In the phenomenon of conversation, we are directly engaged with what the other says to

us in a dialogue. Rather than attempting to find inconsistencies in the statement of the other when

considered in relation to our own situation, dialogue is a process in which we grasp with what is

directly said. Instead of maintaining a division between “mine” and “his” as MacIntyre does, we

achieve a communication based on what is ours within the dialogue. If we maintain an analytic

method as MacIntyre does, then the anxiety about error and certainty which this engenders

obscures the true meaning and significance of what is said146. To do so is to intentionally limit the

possibilities of dialogue to the resolution of finite concerns rather than the full realisation of our

understanding through a fusion of horizons in which we engage with the other by seeking to reach a

shared understanding.

2) To attempt to reconstruct the intention which is communicated in dialogue with the

intention of relating it to our own understanding requires a turn towards that outside what is

spoken. To do so requires a turn towards the factors informing a statement, such as its context

within tradition and the linguistic and social conventions informing it. An analytic method of

ascertaining or refuting a statement is unable to address these. The content of the statement itself is

inextricably bound to a context which is impossible to understand through an argument that

146 Weberman, David: “Reconciling Gadamer’s non-intentionalism with standard conversational goals”, ThePhilosophical Forum, volume XXX, no. 4, December 1999, page 322


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premises necessarily entail conclusions147. Our dialogue always takes place within a much broader

context of mediation towards that which informs our understanding. For an analytic understanding

of dialogue such as that of MacIntyre to be possible, our relationship to language and tradition

would have to operate as a purely empirical one in which dialogue is capable of epistemologically

disproving the tradition which informs the beliefs of the other. As we have seen in our analysis of

the epistemological crisis, this is not the case.

3) Language gains its meaning and significance from tradition, which grants it an element

of independence. This means that the language involved in a dialogue cannot be simply reduced to

an intended communication between two rational agents. To do so overlooks how gaps in

communication can occur. When MacIntyre argues that our tradition gains validity in the face of

the challenge of other traditions, he fails to take into account that the “challenge” made by other

traditions may be different from what is directly communicated in dialogue.

3.3.2.3.2: MacIntyre’s argument overlooks the power language has to move beyond our finite

situation. Rather than being bound to the direct exchange of ideas which takes place in a

conversation, language has the power to share in an ideality which grants it meaning beyond the

conversational act. Many terms are such that their definition cannot be monopolised as having a

universal meaning across all traditions. To argue such is to ignore how language is not a functional

concept which is put to use in order to validate our arguments, but actively informs them by

defining the parameters of our world. Gadamer’s location of the logos as the basis of ethical truth is

able to address this issue by granting language a fundamental role in how the world is made

intelligible by tradition.

147 Weberman, David: Ibid, page 322


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3.3.2.3.3: MacIntyre’s argument in favour of empirically justified tradition is incapable of this for

the following reasons. To understand dialogue as being a direct engagement between two points of

view overlooks a key facet of any dialogue in which we participate: it must surely have a subject

matter. When we engage in dialogue we engage in a triadic process in which our point of view, the

other’s point of view and the object of discussion are all involved. By doing so, we engage in a

fusion of horizons in which the differing viewpoints inform each other in relation to the object of

conversation. We do not engage in conversation purely to understand or discredit the other, but also

to discuss a specific object with intrinsic characteristics independent of what we bring to bear in

hermeneutic interpretation. It is still possible to be factually wrong in a Gadamerian conversation,

but dialogue is not defined by this problematic of epistemological validity. We inform each other’s

understanding by participating in dialogue, granting it a place within a broader cultural context.

3.3.2.3.4: MacIntyre has confined his revival of the Aristotlean schema to a limited rehabilitation of

praxis which remains bound to the methodology of the Enlightenment due to his retention of the

need to hold the basis of our moral action to rational justification. Without rethinking the

methodology of practical philosophy to emphasise phronesis which develops from experience

instead of techne as justification of our assertions, any rehabilitation of Aristotlean practical

philosophy will fail. MacIntyre remains part of the tradition of the Enlightenment which he

criticises as a result of his failure to redefine the basis of our ethical inquiry. To argue that

everything can be determined rationally justifiable through method and Gadamer’s orientation

towards phronesis makes a genuinely dialogical practical philosophy possible, for reasons which

will now be explained.

3.3.3-How Gadamer’s dialogical philosophy indicates the possibility of rehabilitatingpractical philosophy


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3.3.3.1: In his interpretation of Aristotle, Gadamer links philosophical hermeneutics to the prior

tradition of practical philosophy. By reviving the Aristotlean distinction between phronesis and

techne, Gadamer is able to situating the understanding in the interplay between that which is

accessible or foreign, in which we engage with the particulars by applying our own experience. Our

practical philosophy is thus situated in the event of understanding with the other, from which we

can rehabilitate the Aristotlean schema for practical philosophy148. The parallel between the act of

interpretation which takes place in philosophical hermeneutics and Aristotelian ethical philosophy

is made explicit when Gadamer articulates the need for a context when applying ethical philosophy

by arguing that “the teacher of ethics is too involved in a moral and political context and acquires

his image of the thing from that standpoint.”. The ethical agent here must be able to relate what he

has learned through experience to the situation at hand, rather than apply an abstract method to

discern the correct course of action. In this process, Gadamer’s critique of method and emphasis on

historically conditioned understanding find their moral relevance149. Gadamer’s critique of method

illustrates how the methodology of the Enlightenment is incapable of addressing complex situations

such as those involved in ethics. By removing application from its justification in tradition the

moral agent is unable to engage in a reciprocal engagement with the situation at hand. The

distinction which must be made between the two kinds of knowledge involved here is that between

phronesis and techne as set out by Aristotle. In ethics, knowledge which can be taught can only

inform our deliberation as opposed to conclude it. The ethical principles which can be taught (for

example The Ten Commandments or the Categorical Imperative) are “valid only as schemata”

which find their realisation in action.150 They thus correspond dialogically to their situation in

application, just as the interpreter adjusts his own foreknowledge in accordance with what text he is

148 Figal, Gunter: “Phronesis as Understanding; Situating Philosophical Hermeneutics”, published in TheSpectre of Relativism, page 246-7149 Smith, P. Christopher. “The Ethical Dimension of Gadamer’s Hermeneutical Theory”, Research inPhenomenology 18 (1988), page 76150 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Truth and Method, translated by Marshall, Donald G. and Weinsheimer, Joel(Continuum, London, 2006 edition), page 318


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reading. Just as a reader is likely to have different interpretations of a text, so a moral agent is going

to view different moral situations differently in accordance with the differing particulars involved.

3.3.3.2: This dialogical understanding of morality requires “a fundamental modification of the

nature of the relation between means and ends, one that distinguishes moral from technical

knowledge”. What this means is that Gadamer makes it possible to extend the rehabilitation of

tradition and authority within the human sciences to the sphere of ethics, in which techne cannot

suffice. Gadamer is able to argue that moral knowledge requires self-deliberation involving our

hermeneutic situation. Moral knowledge is not the determining of conclusions from premises as

technical knowledge is. It is instead a continuing and infinite process extending to every aspect of

our experience. The kinds of knowledge developed through moral and technical inquiry are

distinct, and should not be confused with one another151.

3.3.3.3: For the form of moral knowledge to operate, self-deliberation is always required as “moral

knowledge can never be knowable in advance like knowledge that can be taught”152. In this context,

the situations which inform our understanding grant phronesis its relevance as we cannot view the

relations between means and end as forming a whole. Moral knowledge cannot function

dogmatically, as it is eternally changing. For moral knowledge to function, it must incorporate

application. This makes knowledge of the particular essential, and phronesis makes it possible to

incorporate this in relation to our understanding. Phronesis is a universal phenomenon, which is

able to arrange form and matter in ethical deliberation. Moral knowledge becomes fundamental to

experience. Gadamer goes so far as to term it “the ultimate form of experience” due to how the

problems of relating the parts to the whole which define philosophical hermeneutics are an

extension of those in morality. To understand anything, we must be able to relate it to our situation

just as we relate within moral enquiry.

151 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 318152 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 318


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3.3.3.4: Gadamer’s assertion that moral knowledge is the fundamental form of experience provides

a clue as to the universal nature of hermeneutics. The dynamics of self-knowledge and application

which define the relation between moral and technical knowledge indicate that so-called “right

living in general” also informs the hermeneutic experience by indicating how the process of

relating the universal to the particular is a constant one in which “the interpreter seeks no more

than to understand this universal”153. Application is a necessary and universal component of

mediating these points. It grants hermeneutic reflection universal validity by making apparent how

our particular self-knowledge informs our application to the particular situation. The manner in

which understanding is the relating of the particular to the universal means the same distinction

which informs the distinction between phronesis and techne extends to all understanding.

3.3.3.5: The moral and hermeneutic consciousnesses are informed by the same forms of experience

and involve the same processes of deliberation and the development of self-knowledge. If a reader

is to acknowledge the validity of Aristotle’s schema, then he must also acknowledge the validity of

philosophical hermeneutics. By arguing that for morality to be achieved the particular hermeneutic

situation of the moral agent must be considered in deliberation, Gadamer is able to clarify the moral

implications of his hermeneutics. Morality only becomes possible through a relation of the

universal to the particular situation of the moral agent154, rather than adherence to rationally

formulated principles. This point is directly made by Aristotle, when he argues against Socratic

morality’s assertion that the virtues are forms of scientific knowledge155. Gadamer’s practical

philosophy becomes an extension of this distinction between self-knowledge and what can be

learned through scientific method, and indicates new possibilities for its application.

153 Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Ibid, page 321154 Gadamer, Hans-Georg; Ibid, page 321155 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by David Ross (Oxford University Press, 2009 edition) , page

158


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3.3.4: The relationship between philosophical hermeneutics and praxis

3.3.4.1: The equation of philosophical hermeneutics with Aristotelian phronesis which is

undertaken in “The Hermeneutic Significance of Aristotle” proves that a rehabilitation of praxis

which is implicit in Gadamers practical philosophy can be developed. What the knowledge yielded

in the moment of appropriation which takes place either in the application of knowledge to a

situation or an interpretation achieves is to yield the practical knowledge from which our praxis is

developed. Given that one of the goals of philosophical hermeneutics is to address and correct the

problems in understanding which are developed by modernity’s emphasis on the Cartesian method,

the relation between hermeneutics and praxis is a major part of Gadamer’s project. The interplay

which is at work between the emphasis Gadamer places on the knowledge developed in the

moment of appropriation and praxis gives the revival of phronesis as a form of self-knowledge

informing and guiding our actions a relevance which will now be discussed.

3.3.4.2: There is a dialectical interplay at work in the relationship between philosophical

hermeneutics and praxis. As an authentic hermeneutic understanding of the object of interpretation

is developed, so is our praxis. By regaining the understanding which Gadamer considers to have

been lost and distorted in praxis by the influence of modernity, phronesis is rehabilitated as an

autonomous phenomenon making the fusion of horizons and effective-historical consciousness

which define hermeneutic reflection possible156. Instead of developing from empirical enquiry, the

truth which is developed in hermeneutic reflection comes from experience and the critical

appropriation of what is learned through it towards informing our praxis.

3.3.4.3: The universality of what is learned through this appropriation of history stems from how

the analysis of Aristotle’s moral philosophy provides a model towards understanding hermeneutics

properly. The mediation of differing abstract influences in relation to concrete situations involving

156 Bernstein, Richard J. : “From Hermeneutics To Praxis”, The Review of Metaphysics, volume 35, no. 4, page832-3


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praxis by phronesis makes acting justly possible. We are able to mediate the abstract law with

regard to the situation at hand in order to resolve it. The influence of tradition on our understanding

of a moral problem will make it possible for us to act justly in the knowledge that our praxis

coheres to tradition157.

Gadamer terms this “Zubehorigkeit”, referring to the extent to which the individual interpreter

belongs within a tradition means that there can be no objective detachment in any situation

involving phronesis. In phronesis, we cannot objectively approach the object under consideration

as we would within the scientific method. Its relevance is instead defined by its dialectical relation

to our finitude. The tradition informing our understanding is a common one shared between the

members of a community and handed down to the interpreter, as our deliberations are always an

expression of the tradition concerned. We cannot apply the law in the expectation that our

prejudices will have no impact on it. A dialogical mediation is at work when phronesis is applied to

a given situation, rather than the application of techne to a given situation158.

3.3.4.4: Our praxis is thus dialogically influenced by the mediation which takes place in phronesis,

and we act accordingly. Our understanding becomes a matter of being “with” the other. We engage

them in the instant in which dialogue occurs. The importance of this dialogical element means that

we are eternally open to the encounter with the other. We understand ourselves through it and

mediate our knowledge to the situation at hand. In the process we become able to address the

problem of application within practical philosophy by considering our relation to the other159. To

deny this dialogical element of our existence is to ignore what grants our actions relevance. A

dialogical practical philosophy must be considered a priority in order to avoid the crisis of

incommensurability diagnosed by MacIntyre. By concretely realising the relation of our historical

157 Bernstein, Richard J.; Ibid, page 840158 Smith, P. Christopher: "Gadamer's Recovery of Consultative Reasoning," , Chicago-Kent Law Review, editedby Francis J. Mootz, fall 2000 issue, Vol. 76, No. 2, page 745-6159Smith, P.Christopher: Ibid, page 844-5


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situation, dialogue and language to our being we can achieve a rehabilitation of the Aristotlean

schema and the development of a true basis for our ethical knowledge in an understanding of

tradition which has been organically developed and defined by dialogue. Rather than negating the

tradition which informs our understanding to an analytic framework which guides our moral action,

we should instead engage with the other in our shared relationship to the logos, thus being good

through the adjustment of our innate capacity for virtue to the particular situation. This process is

dependent on the self-deliberation necessary to apply the teachings of tradition in a given situation,

a capacity which makes the realisation of our innate potential for virtue as identified by Aristotle

possible.

3.3.4.5: The relationship with the logos required for this process is enabled through language and

dialogue, motivating us to act with the Other when acting morally rather than independently and

analytically. Our virtue can thus develop organically through experience and dialogue, reflecting

the environment from which it developed and adapting as we encounter new situations and

influences. To understand the significance of this, I will now examine how the more Hegelian

interpretation of Aristotle which takes place here is able to realise the positive potential of

phronesis by examining how MacIntyre’s interpretation of Aristotle is undermined by his

methodology, and why philosophical hermeneutics are able to restore the positive potential of

phronesis in application.

3.3.5: What Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics are able to address that MacIntyre isn’t

3.3.5.1: MacIntyre’s analytic method has proven itself inadequate to addressing the problems of

practical philosophy through a revival of the Aristotlean schema. Rather than rejuvenating it by

making it applicable to our present situation, MacIntyre’s analytic method diminishes the full

potential of practical philosophy by limiting the significance of dialogue, tradition and language to

fit the parameters of analytic methodology. This confusion limits the power of tradition to inform


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our action, as phronesis cannot be formally taught. If we are to regard it so, then the extent to

which tradition informs our understanding is unnecessarily limited by method. MacIntyre has

avoided discussing the influence of habituation on the realisation of the virtues. The consequence

of this is to deny that tradition can have a positive influence on our practice, rather than simply

being necessary for it to be intelligible. Gadamer understood the positive potential of phronesis as a

separate skill to techne, and emphasised the role of experience and dialogue towards informing

practical philosophy. It is this reorientation in method which sets his practical philosophy apart as a

rehabilitation of the Aristotlean schema, as it places the realisation of practical philosophy firmly

within our dialogue with the other.

3.3.5.2: The significance of Gadamer’s reorientation towards a more Hegelian methodology is that

he makes custom developing from language, practical experience, tradition and dialogue the basis

for ethics. By doing so, he is able to clarify how an action is intelligible in application within a

tradition which has informed our understanding through participation, not through formal teaching.

This tradition cannot be analytically understood, but only experienced and developed in accordance

with our understanding. When we come into contact with another tradition, we are interpreting it

and translating it over to ours in a manner that indicates it is experienced anew. The tradition

becomes alive in our interpretation of it, rather than critiqued analytically to determine what can be

taken from it and used.

3.3.5.3: There is an argument that such an approach may beget problems of relativism through the

lack of analytic criteria to prove or disprove an assertion. These criticisms fail to take into account

a key aspect of the object of interpretation which was observed by David Weberman in his critique

of Gadamer, and which provides a key to understanding how Gadamer’s philosophical

hermeneutics can function as a realisation of practical philosophy which avoids problems of

relativism due to what some critics of Gadamer perceive as a lack of epistemological justification

for moral claims. When we make an interpretation, the object of interpretation must possess


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intrinsic and external characteristics to define what is to be interpreted. By remembering that an

interpretation must possess intrinsic and external characteristics, we can avoid lapsing into a

relativistic position when engaging in dialogue. The object of interpretation or conversation will

always possess characteristics unto itself which define “what” is to be interpreted. These are the

“intrinsic” characteristics, such as its size or shape. These are unchanging and agreed upon160.

When we make an interpretation of this object, we apply knowledge which has been informed by

our situation and provides the context from within which the interpretation is made. These are the

relational properties of the interpretation, and differing interpretations of an object or situation are

informed by them161. A reader of Marx in the 19th century with no knowledge of the impact of his

philosophy which had yet to come would read him primarily as a Left Hegelian, whereas a reader

of Marx with a knowledge of the Russian Revolution and its aftermath would have differing

perspectives on the implication of these theories. The object of understanding is in a state of

perpetually being formed as the relational properties which are brought to bear on it change. To

argue that correct way to act can be analytically determined and would hold independent of context

ignores the constantly changing nature of the object of knowledge. Any dialogue which takes place

with the other takes place within a context, and if we analytically ignore this context then our

dialogue is limited in its potential to epistemological matters.

3.3.5.3: We understand an object of interpretation in terms of its intrinsic properties whilst bringing

our own interpretation to bear on it, indicating Gadamer is able to develop a practical philosophy

which is an endlessly adaptable reformulation of the Aristotlean schema. Our tradition and

foreknowledge influence our understanding without overwhelming it. Dialogue between differing

traditions is therefore made possible by the necessity of engagement with the other to develop

understanding through practical experience. By changing the location of ethical truth to the world

160 Weberman, David: “A New Defence of Gadamer”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 60,No. 1 (Jan. 2000), page 54161Weberman, David: Ibid, page 56


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as given to us in language, all of our understanding takes place within a community through which

it can develop from the tradition that initially informs it. We do not have to step outside tradition to

understand our world properly, but instead we must understand the necessity of experience to

developing our knowledge of world and making our actions intelligible. Gadamer’s reinterpretation

of the Aristotelian schema is able to accommodate experience and tradition as necessary for

practical knowledge informing application. This ensures that the realisation of man’s potential to be

good will always relate to the specific context in which he finds himself. Gadamer’s

methodological shift enables this rehabilitation, as he engages the Aristotlean schema on its own

terms rather than those of modernity. The new direction for practical philosophy is thus one which

emphasises the practical knowledge involved in hermeneutic reflection, not that of analytic

philosophy. To adequately restore our moral tradition by rehabilitating its Aristotlean basis, we

must understand how that basis operates when applied across a variety of situations and traditions

by allowing for the possibility of constant development and re-evaluation through dialogical

engagement with the world. Our knowledge of the particulars of interpretation which are required

to develop phronesis is allowed to developed through experience, rather than being analysed for

rational justification. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics are capable of this rehabilitation, and

are able to move beyond MacIntyre in addressing the methodological root of the crisis in

modernity.


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Conclusion

The primary lesson which I learned when developing this thesis is that the crisis of contemporary

practical philosophy which was diagnosed by Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue will only persist

unless we drastically re-evaluate how we conduct practical philosophy. The reasoning for such an

assertion is borne out by examining how Alasdair MacIntyre’s analytic method continues to

undermine his work. By remaining within an analytic method in his work, MacIntyre ignores the

true source of the crisis of incommensurability. A practical philosophy which maintains an

emphasis on the rational individual and his capacity to act rationally is one which is unaware of just

how morality actually operates in a context. Whilst it is tempting to feel that we can hold our moral

actions as being perpetually justified by rational agency, we are in truth only justifying them to

ourselves with no thought for their application when we do so. This is wholly out of keeping with

the reality of the Aristotlean schema, something which was observed by Gadamer in his reading

thereof. To truly rehabilitate the Aristotlean schema in modernity is to abandon analytic method,

instead moving towards a practical philosophy which constantly adapts to its new surroundings.

The key insight of Gadamer in this respect was to identify how this could be achieved through a

dialogical understanding of our relationship with the other which saw our practical philosophy as

being informed by the same relationships with language and tradition which inform our broader

understanding of the world. If we are to successfully rehabilitate the Aristotlean schema, then we

must rethink our relationship to the world in such a manner as to understand the distinction

between phronesis and techne made by Aristotle. Gadamer achieved this reorientation in his

philosophical hermeneutics, which I have shown are clearly a practical philosophy by their very

nature. The same relationships which inform our interpretations of a text also inform our

interpretations in moral action, and thus make it possible for us to begin realising our potential to

be good in dialogue with the other. We cannot rely on analytic method to achieve this, as was

shown by the failure of MacIntyre to adequately resurrect the Aristotlean schema. Instead, it is


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through reorientating the basis of practical philosophy towards our relationship with the logos and

that which informs it that we can do so.

MacIntyre inhibits the possibility of a successful relationship with the logos through his reliance on

analytic method. We can hardly successfully incorporate the influence of tradition on our

understanding if we are constantly seeking to disprove it when we encounter a differing tradition.

Instead of orientating practical philosophy around the need to analytically prove or disprove our

moral claims, we must instead pursue a more Hegelian direction in our practical philosophy by

emphasising the positive rather than negative potential of dialogue with the other. In Gadamer, this

Hegelian direction is made possible through the manner in which Gadamer’s dialectic is influenced

by Hegel whilst nevertheless making some key changes which rethink the basis of our relationship

to the world by emphasising the finite. This emphasis on the finite possibilities of our

understanding grounds hermeneutic enquiry within our own experience and knowledge, but the

speculative power which Gadamer grants to language provides the means to realise the potential of

philosophical hermeneutics to address the crisis of practical philosophy. A practical philosophy

which draws on philosophical hermeneutics will still be rooted in the actions of the individual

moral agent, but will possess a power to move between differing traditions and viewpoints through

the power of language and dialogue. The dynamic which motivates hermeneutic interpretation is at

work in practical philosophy, a relationship which Gadamer was aware of. This was borne out

when we examined how he uses “The Hermeneutic Significance of Aristotle” as the basis for his

philosophical hermeneutics, and thus the development of a new practical philosophy capable of

overcoming the limitations of contemporary practical philosophy. The key to this was Gadamer’s

opposition to the methodology of the Enlightenment, which addressed the methodological issue at

the heart of the modern ethical crisis.

The crux of this thesis was the methodological distinction between the two thinkers, a distinction

which defined their differing rehabilitations of Aristotlean practical philosophy. By identifying and


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examining this methodological distinction, the means to correcting the ethical crisis which has

developed was discerned in the need to reaffirm Aristotlean practical philosophy through

understanding how it can operate as a basis for our morality. Through a positive understanding of

the importance of language, tradition and dialogue to our understanding, we can rehabilitate

practical philosophy. It is to Gadamer that we must be grateful for this insight into the new

possibilities of practical philosophy, and from whose work we can develop this new practical

philosophy.

Word Count: 21,424


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Abstract: My goal in this project is to address the crisis in practical philosophy diagnosed by

Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue through a comparative examination of the work of Alasdair

MacIntyre and Hans-Georg Gadamer. MacIntyre proposes a rehabilitation of Aristotlean virtue to

address what he identifies as a crisis of incommensurability in practical philosophy. However, I

feel that his resolution is inadequate due to his use of analytic methodology when developing his

thesis as to how virtue is to be rehabilitated. Such a reading is both self-contradictory and an

inadequate restoration of Aristotle, as it misinterprets the fundamental distinction between

phronesis and techne in the Nicomachean Ethics. To show the significance of this, I have presented

MacIntyre’s hypothesis and explained why his proposed resolution is inadequate. After doing so, I

present the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer. I feel that his more Hegelian

method is better capable of restoring the Aristotlean schema by developing a practical philosophy

which maintains the necessary distinction between phronesis and techne. By doing so, Gadamer’s

philosophical hermeneutics indicate the possibility of reviving Aristotlean practical philosophy by

emphasising dialogue with the other and our hermeneutic situation. Such a rehabilitation is closer

to what is set out in the Nicomachean Ethics than the work of MacIntyre, and are thus more capable

of restoring practical philosophy than analytic methodology.


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Bibliography

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MacIntyre, Alasdair : After Virtue (Duckworth, London, 1999 edition)

MacIntyre, Alasdair: Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Duckworth, London, 1988 edition)


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Journal Articles

Bernstein, Richard J.: “From Hermeneutics to Praxis”, The Review of Metaphysics, volume 35, no.

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goals”, The Philosophical Forum, volume XXX, no. 4, December 1999


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Documents

A Comparative Perspective on the Practical Philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre and Hans-Georg Gadamer (MA Thesis)